Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

2048

Calcidius (Chalcidius), Platonis Timaeus Commentaria, 144-146
NaN
NaN
NaN

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

21 results
1. Empedocles, Fragments, 4 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
2. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) 248c. on which the soul is raised up is nourished by this. And this is a law of Destiny, that the soul which follows after God and obtains a view of any of the truths is free from harm until the next period, and if it can always attain this, is always unharmed; but when, through inability to follow, it fails to see, and through some mischance is filled with forgetfulness and evil and grows heavy, and when it has grown heavy, loses its wings and falls to the earth, then it is the law that this soul
3. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) 41d. For the rest, do ye weave together the mortal with the immortal, and thereby fashion and generate living creatures, and give them food that they may grow, and when they waste away receive them to yourselves again.
4. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12.7-12.9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
5. Cicero, On Divination, 1.125 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 1.125. Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis dividi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci ei(marme/nhn, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. 1.125. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening.
6. Cicero, On Fate, 30 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
7. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.6, 2.56 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 2.6. Nor is this unaccountable or accidental; it is the result, firstly, of the fact that the gods often manifest their power in bodily presence. For instance in the Latin War, at the critical battle of Lake Regillus between the dictator Aulus Postumius and Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting on horseback in our ranks. And in more modern history likewise these sons of Tyndareus brought the news of the defeat of Perses. What happened was that Publius Vatinius, the grandfather of our young contemporary, was returning to Rome by night from Reate, of which he was governor, when he was informed by two young warriors on white horses that King Perses had that very day been taken prisoner. When Vatinius carried the news to the Senate, at first he was flung into gaol on the charge of spreading an unfounded report on a matter of national concern; but afterwards a dispatch arrived from Paulus, and the date was found to tally, so the Senate bestowed upon Vatinius both a grant of land and exemption from military service. It is also recorded in history that when the Locrians won their great victory over the people of Crotona at the important battle of the River Sagra, news of the engagement was reported at the Olympic Games on the very same day. often has the sound of the voices of the Fauns, often has the apparition of a divine form compelled anyone that is not either feeble-minded or impious to admit the real presence of the gods. 2.56. In the heavens therefore there is nothing of chance or hazard, no error, no frustration, but absolute order, accuracy, calculation and regularity. whatever lacks these qualities, whatever is false and spurious and full of error, belongs to the region between the earth and the moon (the last of the heavenly bodies), and to the surface of the earth. Anyone therefore who thinks that the marvellous order and incredible regularity of the heavenly bodies, which is the sole source of preservation and safety for all things, is not rational, himself cannot be deemed a rational thing.
8. Plutarch, On Fate, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
9. Seneca The Younger, De Providentia (Dialogorum Liber I), 5.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
10. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 10.3, 26.2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
11. Apuleius, On Plato, 1.8, 1.12 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
12. Atticus, Fragments, 3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
13. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, 15, 17, 52, 11 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
14. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, 15, 17, 52, 11 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
15. Calcidius (Chalcidius), Platonis Timaeus Commentaria, 145-146, 149-151, 165-166, 176-177, 187, 295-297, 143 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
16. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 15.5.1-15.5.14, 15.6.3, 15.6.6, 15.18.2 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
17. Origen, Against Celsus, 2.20 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) 2.20. Let us see how he continues after this: These events, he says, he predicted as being a God, and the prediction must by all means come to pass. God, therefore, who above all others ought to do good to men, and especially to those of his own household, led on his own disciples and prophets, with whom he was in the habit of eating and drinking, to such a degree of wickedness, that they became impious and unholy men. Now, of a truth, he who shared a man's table would not be guilty of conspiring against him; but after banqueting with God, he became a conspirator. And, what is still more absurd, God himself plotted against the members of his own table, by converting them into traitors and villains! Now, since you wish me to answer even those charges of Celsus which seem to me frivolous, the following is our reply to such statements. Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, comes to pass because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he who foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it would happen; but the future event itself, which would have taken place though not predicted, afforded the occasion to him, who was endowed with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence. Now, certainly this result is present to the foreknowledge of him who predicts an event, when it is possible that it may or may not happen, viz., that one or other of these things will take place. For we do not assert that he who foreknows an event, by secretly taking away the possibility of its happening or not, makes any such declaration as this: This shall infallibly happen, and it is impossible that it can be otherwise. And this remark applies to all the foreknowledge of events dependent upon ourselves, whether contained in the sacred Scriptures or in the histories of the Greeks. Now, what is called by logicians an idle argument, which is a sophism, will be no sophism as far as Celsus can help, but according to sound reasoning it is a sophism. And that this may be seen, I shall take from the Scriptures the predictions regarding Judas, or the foreknowledge of our Saviour regarding him as the traitor; and from the Greek histories the oracle that was given to Laius, conceding for the present its truth, since it does not affect the argument. Now, in Ps. cviii., Judas is spoken of by the mouth of the Saviour, in words beginning thus: Hold not Your peace, O God of my praise; for the mouth of the wicked and the mouth of the deceitful are opened against me. Now, if you carefully observe the contents of the psalm, you will find that, as it was foreknown that he would betray the Saviour, so also was he considered to be himself the cause of the betrayal, and deserving, on account of his wickedness, of the imprecations contained in the prophecy. For let him suffer these things, because, says the psalmist, he remembered not to show mercy, but persecuted the poor and needy man. Wherefore it was possible for him to show mercy, and not to persecute him whom he did persecute. But although he might have done these things, he did not do them, but carried out the act of treason, so as to merit the curses pronounced against him in the prophecy. And in answer to the Greeks we shall quote the following oracular response to Laius, as recorded by the tragic poet, either in the exact words of the oracle or in equivalent terms. Future events are thus made known to him by the oracle: Do not try to beget children against the will of the gods. For if you beget a son, your son shall murder you; and all your household shall wade in blood. Now from this it is clear that it was within the power of Laius not to try to beget children, for the oracle would not have commanded an impossibility; and it was also in his power to do the opposite, so that neither of these courses was compulsory. And the consequence of his not guarding against the begetting of children was, that he suffered from so doing the calamities described in the tragedies relating to Œdipus and Jocasta and their sons. Now that which is called the idle argument, being a quibble, is such as might be applied, say in the case of a sick man, with the view of sophistically preventing him from employing a physician to promote his recovery; and it is something like this: If it is decreed that you should recover from your disease, you will recover whether you call in a physician or not; but if it is decreed that you should not recover, you will not recover whether you call in a physician or no. But it is certainly decreed either that you should recover, or that you should not recover; and therefore it is in vain that you call in a physician. Now with this argument the following may be wittily compared: If it is decreed that you should beget children, you will beget them, whether you have intercourse with a woman or not. But if it is decreed that you should not beget children, you will not do so, whether you have intercourse with a woman or no. Now, certainly, it is decreed either that you should beget children or not; therefore it is in vain that you have intercourse with a woman. For, as in the latter instance, intercourse with a woman is not employed in vain, seeing it is an utter impossibility for him who does not use it to beget children; so, in the former, if recovery from disease is to be accomplished by means of the healing art, of necessity the physician is summoned, and it is therefore false to say that in vain do you call in a physician. We have brought forward all these illustrations on account of the assertion of this learned Celsus, that being a God He predicted these things, and the predictions must by all means come to pass. Now, if by by all means he means necessarily, we cannot admit this. For it was quite possible, also, that they might not come to pass. But if he uses by all means in the sense of simple futurity, which nothing hinders from being true (although it was possible that they might not happen), he does not at all touch my argument; nor did it follow, from Jesus having predicted the acts of the traitor or the perjurer, that it was the same thing with His being the cause of such impious and unholy proceedings. For He who was among us, and knew what was in man, seeing his evil disposition, and foreseeing what he would attempt from his spirit of covetousness, and from his want of stable ideas of duty towards his Master, along with many other declarations, gave utterance to this also: He that dips his hand with Me in the dish, the same shall betray Me.
18. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 36-43, 35 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
19. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 2.302 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
20. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 2.302 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
21. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.176, 2.930-2.933, 2.956-2.957, 2.962

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
anthropomorphism	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
aristotle, on god/prime mover	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 122
aristotle, platonists and	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 122
calcidius, and apuleius	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
cause, series of causes/ series causarum	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
cicero	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
cleanthes	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121
compatibilism	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 119
contingency, contingent (ἐνδεχόμενον), (middle) platonists on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121, 122
cosmos, craft, art, techne	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
cosmos, cycle	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
cosmos, demiurge, divine craftmanship	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
cosmos, order	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
epicurus/epicureans/epicureanism	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 122
fate, and providence	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
fate, apuleius on	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
fate, as divine law	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
fate, calcidius on	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
fate/ heimarmene	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
fate (εἱμαρμένη), platonists on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117, 118, 119, 121
fate (εἱμαρμένη), stoics on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121
gods, and providence	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
gods, aristotle on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 122
gods, platonists on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117
gods, stoics on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121
heavens, spheres	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
individuals	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
law (νομός, θεσμός), paul on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117, 118, 119
luck/chance (τύχη), platonists on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 119
matter (ὕλη), platonists on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117
myth	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
necessity ἀνάγκη, platonists on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 119, 121
p. nigidius figulus, providential	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
paul, on law	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117, 118, 119
plato, phaedrus	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
plato	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
platonists/platonism/plato, and aristotle	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 122
platonists/platonism/plato, and stoicism	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121, 122
platonists/platonism/plato, on causality	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117, 118
platonists/platonism/plato, on contingency (τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121, 122
platonists/platonism/plato, on fate (εἱμαρμένη)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117, 118, 119, 121
platonists/platonism/plato, on first principles (ἀρχαί)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117
platonists/platonism/plato, on gods	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117
platonists/platonism/plato, on laws (νόμος)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117, 118, 119
platonists/platonism/plato, on matter (ὕλη)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117
platonists/platonism/plato, on necessity (ἀνάγκη)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 119, 121
platonists/platonism/plato, on providence (πρόνοια)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117, 119, 121
platonists/platonism/plato	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117, 118, 119, 121, 122
predestination (προόρισις), in stoicism	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121
predestination (προόρισις), platonists on	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117, 119, 121
predestination (προόρισις), principles in platonism, first (ἀρχαί)'	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 117
providence, and gods will	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
providence, apuleius on	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
providence, calcidius on	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
providence	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
reason/ logos	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
religion traditional	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
scepticism	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
stoics/stoicism, on fate (εἱμαρμένη)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121
stoics/stoicism, on god/zeus	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121
stoics/stoicism, on providence (πρόνοια, providentia)	Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 121
theodicy	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98
theology, and highest god	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
theology, calcidius on	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
timaeus methodology passage, and commentary on plato, timaeus	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
truth, leads to	Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 198
zeno of citium	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 98