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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



1568
Augustine, The City Of God, 14.17-14.20


nanJustly is shame very specially connected with this lust; justly, too, these members themselves, being moved and restrained not at our will, but by a certain independent autocracy, so to speak, are called shameful. Their condition was different before sin. For as it is written, They were naked and were not ashamed, Genesis 2:25 - not that their nakedness was unknown to them, but because nakedness was not yet shameful, because not yet did lust move those members without the will's consent; not yet did the flesh by its disobedience testify against the disobedience of man. For they were not created blind, as the unenlightened vulgar fancy; for Adam saw the animals to whom he gave names, and of Eve we read, The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes. Genesis 3:6 Their eyes, therefore were open, but were not open to this, that is to say, were not observant so as to recognize what was conferred upon them by the garment of grace, for they had no consciousness of their members warring against their will. But when they were stripped of this grace, that their disobedience might be punished by fit retribution, there began in the movement of their bodily members a shameless novelty which made nakedness indecent: it at once made them observant and made them ashamed. And therefore, after they violated God's command by open transgression, it is written: And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons. Genesis 3:7 The eyes of them both were opened, not to see, for already they saw, but to discern between the good they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen. And therefore also the tree itself which they were forbidden to touch was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil from this circumstance, that if they ate of it it would impart to them this knowledge. For the discomfort of sickness reveals the pleasure of health. They knew, therefore, that they were naked,- naked of that grace which prevented them from being ashamed of bodily nakedness while the law of sin offered no resistance to their mind. And thus they obtained a knowledge which they would have lived in blissful ignorance of, had they, in trustful obedience to God, declined to commit that offense which involved them in the experience of the hurtful effects of unfaithfulness and disobedience. And therefore, being ashamed of the disobedience of their own flesh, which witnessed to their disobedience while it punished it, they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons, that is, cinctures for their privy parts; for some interpreters have rendered the word by succinctoria. Campestria is, indeed, a Latin word, but it is used of the drawers or aprons used for a similar purpose by the young men who stripped for exercise in the campus; hence those who were so girt were commonly called campestrati. Shame modestly covered that which lust disobediently moved in opposition to the will, which was thus punished for its own disobedience. Consequently all nations, being propagated from that one stock, have so strong an instinct to cover the shameful parts, that some barbarians do not uncover them even in the bath, but wash with their drawers on. In the dark solitudes of India also, though some philosophers go naked, and are therefore called gymnosophists, yet they make an exception in the case of these members and cover them.


nanLust requires for its consummation darkness and secrecy; and this not only when un lawful intercourse is desired, but even such fornication as the earthly city has legalized. Where there is no fear of punishment, these permitted pleasures still shrink from the public eye. Even where provision is made for this lust, secrecy also is provided; and while lust found it easy to remove the prohibitions of law, shamelessness found it impossible to lay aside the veil of retirement. For even shameless men call this shameful; and though they love the pleasure, dare not display it. What! Does not even conjugal intercourse, sanctioned as it is by law for the propagation of children, legitimate and honorable though it be, does it not seek retirement from every eye? Before the bridegroom fondles his bride, does he not exclude the attendants, and even the paranymphs, and such friends as the closest ties have admitted to the bridal chamber? The greatest master of Roman eloquence says, that all right actions wish to be set in the light, i.e., desire to be known. This right action, however, has such a desire to be known, that yet it blushes to be seen. Who does not know what passes between husband and wife that children may be born? Is it not for this purpose that wives are married with such ceremony? And yet, when this well-understood act is gone about for the procreation of children, not even the children themselves, who may already have been born to them, are suffered to be witnesses. This right action seeks the light, in so far as it seeks to be known, but yet dreads being seen. And why so, if not because that which is by nature fitting and decent is so done as to be accompanied with a shame-begetting penalty of sin?


nanHence it is that even the philosophers who have approximated to the truth have avowed that anger and lust are vicious mental emotions, because, even when exercised towards objects which wisdom does not prohibit, they are moved in an ungoverned and inordinate manner, and consequently need the regulation of mind and reason. And they assert that this third part of the mind is posted as it were in a kind of citadel, to give rule to these other parts, so that, while it rules and they serve, man's righteousness is preserved without a breach. These parts, then, which they acknowledge to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind, by its composing and restraining influence, must bridle and recall them from those objects towards which they are unlawfully moved, and give them access to those which the law of wisdom sanctions - that anger, e.g., may be allowed for the enforcement of a just authority, and lust for the duty of propagating offspring - these parts, I say, were not vicious in Paradise before sin, for they were never moved in opposition to a holy will towards any object from which it was necessary that they should be withheld by the restraining bridle of reason. For though now they are moved in this way, and are regulated by a bridling and restraining power, which those who live temperately, justly, and godly exercise, sometimes with ease, and sometimes with greater difficulty, this is not the sound health of nature, but the weakness which results from sin. And how is it that shame does not hide the acts and words dictated by anger or other emotions, as it covers the motions of lust, unless because the members of the body which we employ for accomplishing them are moved, not by the emotions themselves, but by the authority of the consenting will? For he who in his anger rails at or even strikes some one, could not do so were not his tongue and hand moved by the authority of the will, as also they are moved when there is no anger. But the organs of generation are so subjected to the rule of lust, that they have no motion but what it communicates. It is this we are ashamed of; it is this which blushingly hides from the eyes of onlookers. And rather will a man endure a crowd of witnesses when he is unjustly venting his anger on some one, than the eye of one man when he innocently copulates with his wife.


nanIt is this which those canine or cynic philosophers have overlooked, when they have, in violation of the modest instincts of men, boastfully proclaimed their unclean and shameless opinion, worthy indeed of dogs, viz., that as the matrimonial act is legitimate, no one should be ashamed to perform it openly, in the street or in any public place. Instinctive shame has overborne this wild fancy. For though it is related that Diogenes once dared to put his opinion in practice, under the impression that his sect would be all the more famous if his egregious shamelessness were deeply graven in the memory of mankind, yet this example was not afterwards followed. Shame had more influence with them, to make them blush before men, than error to make them affect a resemblance to dogs. And possibly, even in the case of Diogenes, and those who did imitate him, there was but an appearance and pretence of copulation, and not the reality. Even at this day there are still Cynic philosophers to be seen; for these are Cynics who are not content with being clad in the pallium, but also carry a club; yet no one of them dares to do this that we speak of. If they did, they would be spat upon, not to say stoned, by the mob. Human nature, then, is without doubt ashamed of this lust; and justly so, for the insubordination of these members, and their defiance of the will, are the clear testimony of the punishment of man's first sin. And it was fitting that this should appear specially in those parts by which is generated that nature which has been altered for the worse by that first and great sin - that sin from whose evil connection no one can escape, unless God's grace expiate in him individually that which was perpetrated to the destruction of all in common, when all were in one man, and which was avenged by God's justice.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

25 results
1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 2.25, 3.6-3.7 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

2.25. וַיִּהְיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם עֲרוּמִּים הָאָדָם וְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְלֹא יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ׃ 3.6. וַתֵּרֶא הָאִשָּׁה כִּי טוֹב הָעֵץ לְמַאֲכָל וְכִי תַאֲוָה־הוּא לָעֵינַיִם וְנֶחְמָד הָעֵץ לְהַשְׂכִּיל וַתִּקַּח מִפִּרְיוֹ וַתֹּאכַל וַתִּתֵּן גַּם־לְאִישָׁהּ עִמָּהּ וַיֹּאכַל׃ 3.7. וַתִּפָּקַחְנָה עֵינֵי שְׁנֵיהֶם וַיֵּדְעוּ כִּי עֵירֻמִּם הֵם וַיִּתְפְּרוּ עֲלֵה תְאֵנָה וַיַּעֲשׂוּ לָהֶם חֲגֹרֹת׃ 2.25. And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed." 3.6. And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and she gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat." 3.7. And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves girdles."
2. Hebrew Bible, Ecclesiastes, 7.29 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)

7.29. לְבַד רְאֵה־זֶה מָצָאתִי אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה הָאֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם יָשָׁר וְהֵמָּה בִקְשׁוּ חִשְּׁבֹנוֹת רַבִּים׃ 7.29. Behold, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions."
3. Anon., Jubilees, 3.31 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)

3.31. for God doth know that on the day ye shall eat thereof, your eyes will be opened, and ye will be as gods, and ye will know good and evil.
4. Cicero, On Duties, 1.128-1.129, 1.148 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.128. Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui filerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea, quae turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus, illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis. Latrocinari, fraudare, adulterare re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine obscenum; pluraque in ear sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur et ab omni, quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione, fugiamus; status incessus, sessio accubitio, vultus oculi manuum motus teneat illud decorum. 1.129. Quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit. Nec vero histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est, ut iis haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta. Scaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere disciplina verecundiam, ut in scaenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo; verentur enim, ne, si quo casn evenerit, ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, aspiciantur non decore. Nostro quidem more cum parentibus puberes filii, cum soceris generi non lavantur. Retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia, praesertim natura ipsa magistra et duce. 1.148. Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de iis nihil est praecipiendum; illa enim ipsa praecepta sunt, nec quemquam hoc errore duci oportet, ut, si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra rnorem consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sint, idem sibi arbitretur licere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hane licentiam assequebantur. Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum. 1.128.  But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to some Stoics who are practically Cynics) who censure and ridicule us for holding that the mere mention of some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while other things that are immoral we call by their real names. Robbery, fraud, and adultery, for example, are immoral in deed, but it is not indecent to name them. To beget children in wedlock is in deed morally right; to speak of it is indecent. And they assail modesty with a great many other arguments to the same purport. But as for us, let us follow Nature and shun everything that is offensive to our eyes or our ears. So, in standing or walking, in sitting or reclining, in our expression, our eyes, or the movements of our hands, let us preserve what we have called "propriety. 1.129.  In these matters we must avoid especially the two extremes — our conduct and speech should not be effeminate and over-nice, on the one hand, nor coarse and boorish, on the other. And we surely must not admit that, while this rule applies to actors and orators, it is not binding upon us. As for stage-people, their custom, because of its traditional discipline, carries modesty to such a point that an actor would never step out upon the stage without a breech-cloth on, for fear he might make an improper exhibition, if by some accident certain parts of his person should happen to become exposed. And in our own custom grown sons do not bathe with their fathers, nor sons-in‑law with their fathers-in‑law. We must, therefore, keep to the path of this sort of modesty, especially when Nature is our teacher and guide. 1.148.  But no rules need to be given about what is done in accordance with the established customs and conventions of a community; for these are in themselves rules; and no one ought to make the mistake of supposing that, because Socrates or Aristippus did or said something contrary to the manners and established customs of their city, he has a right to do the same; it was only by reason of their great and superhuman virtues that those famous men acquired this special privilege. But the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected, for it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility nothing can be upright, nothing morally good.
5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.10.20, 4.70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4.70. Sed poëtas ludere sinamus, quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari ipsum videmus Iovem: ad at G 1 magistros virtutis philosophos veniamus, qui amorem quimorem quā orem K 1 -i amorem in r. G 2 negant stupri esse St. fr. 3, 653 Epic. 483 et in eo litigant cum Epicuro non multum, ut opinio mea fert, mentiente. quis est enim iste ista K 1 amor amicitiae? cur neque deformem adulescentem quisquam amat neque formosum senem? mihi quidem haec in Graecorum gymnasiis nata consuetudo videtur, in quibus isti liberi et concessi sunt amores. bene ergo Ennius: Ennius sc. 395 Fla/giti flagitii X cives G(?)R rec princi/pium est nudare i/nter civis co/rpora. qui ut sint, quod fieri posse video, pudici, solliciti tamen et anxii sunt, eoque magis, quod se ipsi continent et coërcent.
6. Josephus Flavius, Jewish War, 2.161 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

2.161. However, they try their spouses for three years; and if they find that they have their natural purgations thrice, as trials that they are likely to be fruitful, they then actually marry them. But they do not use to accompany with their wives when they are with child, as a demonstration that they do not marry out of regard to pleasure, but for the sake of posterity. Now the women go into the baths with some of their garments on, as the men do with somewhat girded about them. And these are the customs of this order of Essenes.
7. Martial, Epigrams, 3.87 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Martial, Epigrams, 3.87 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. New Testament, 1 John, 1.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

1.8. If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.
10. New Testament, 1 Thessalonians, 4.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

4.4. that each one of you know how to possess himself of his own vessel in sanctification and honor
11. New Testament, 2 Timothy, 3.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

3.1. But know this, that in the last days, grievous times will come.
12. New Testament, Romans, 5.12, 7.23 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

5.12. Therefore, as sin entered into the world through one man, and death through sin; and so death passed to all men, because all sinned. 7.23. but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members.
13. New Testament, John, 8.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

8.36. If therefore the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed.
14. New Testament, Luke, 1.35 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

1.35. The angel answered her, "The Holy Spirit will come on you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you. Therefore also the holy one who is born from you will be called the Son of God.
15. New Testament, Matthew, 19.4-19.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

19.4. He answered, "Haven't you read that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female 19.5. and said, 'For this cause a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall join to his wife; and the two shall become one flesh?' 19.6. So that they are no more two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, don't let man tear apart.
16. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 3.5.31-3.5.32 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

17. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.15 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

3.15. Under the influence of the same error (for who could keep the right course when Cicero is in error?), Seneca said: Philosophy is nothing else than the right method of living, or the science of living honourably, or the art of passing a good life. We shall not err in saying that philosophy is the law of living well and honourably. And he who spoke of it as a rule of life, gave to it that which was its due. He evidently did not refer to the common name of philosophy; for, since this is diffused into many sects and systems, and has nothing certain - nothing, in short, respecting which all agree with one mind and one voice - what can be so false as that philosophy should be called the rule of life, since the diversity of its precepts hinders the right way and causes confusion? Or the law of living well, when its subjects are widely discordant? Or the science of passing life, in which nothing else is effected by its repeated contradictions than general uncertainty? For I ask whether he thinks that the Academy is philosophy or not? I do not think that he will deny it. And if this is so, none of these things, therefore, is in agreement with philosophy; which renders all things uncertain, abrogates law, esteems art as nothing, subverts method, distorts rule, entirely takes away knowledge. Therefore all those things are false, because they are inconsistent with a system which is always uncertain, and up to this time explaining nothing. Therefore no system, or science, or law of living well, has been established, except in this the only true and heavenly wisdom, which had been unknown to philosophers. For that earthly wisdom, since it is false, becomes varied and manifold, and altogether opposed to itself. And as there is but one founder and ruler of the world, God, and as truth is one; so wisdom must be one and simple, because, if anything is true and good, it cannot be perfect unless it is the only one of its kind. But if philosophy were able to form the life, no others but philosophers would be good, and all those who had not learned it would be always bad. But since there are, and always have been, innumerable persons who are or have been good without any learning, but of philosophers there has seldom been one who has done anything praiseworthy in his life; who is there, I pray, who does not see that those men are not teachers of virtue, of which they themselves are destitute? For if any one should diligently inquire into their character, he will find that they are passionate, covetous, lustful, arrogant, wanton, and, concealing their vices under a show of wisdom, doing those things at home which they had censured in the schools. Perhaps I speak falsely for the sake of bringing an accusation. Does not Tullius both acknowledge and complain of the same thing? How few, he says, of philosophers are found of such a character, so constituted in soul and life, as reason demands! How few who think true instruction not a display of knowledge, but a law of life! How few who are obedient to themselves, and submit to their own decrees! We may see some of such levity and ostentation, that it would be better for them not to have learned at all; others eagerly desirous of money, others of glory; many the slaves of lusts, so that their speech wonderfully disagrees with their life. Cornelius Nepos also writes to the same Cicero: So far am I from thinking that philosophy is the teacher of life and the completer of happiness, that I consider that none have greater need of teachers of living than many who are engaged in the discussion of this subject. For I see that a great part of those who give most elaborate precepts in their school respect-modesty and self-restraint, live at the same time in the unrestrained desires of all lusts. Seneca also, in his Exhortations, says: Many of the philosophers are of this description, eloquent to their own condemnation: for if you should hear them arguing against avarice, against lust and ambition, you would think that they were making a public disclosure of their own character, so entirely do the censures which they utter in public flow back upon themselves; so that it is right to regard them in no other light than as physicians, whose advertisements contain medicines, but their medicine chests poison. Some are not ashamed of their vices; but they invent defences for their baseness, so that they may appear even to sin with honour. Seneca also says: The wise man will even do things which he will not approve of, that he may find means of passing to the accomplishment of greater things; nor will he abandon good morals, but will adapt them to the occasion; and those things which others employ for glory or pleasure, he will employ for the sake of action. Then he says shortly afterwards: All things which the luxurious and the ignorant do, the wise man also will do, but not in the same manner, and with the same purpose. But it makes no difference with what intention you act, when the action itself is vicious; because acts are seen, the intention is not seen. Aristippus, the master of the Cyrenaics, had a criminal intimacy with Lais, the celebrated courtesan; and that grave teacher of philosophy defended this fault by saying, that there was a great difference between him and the other lovers of Lais, because he himself possessed Lais, whereas others were possessed by Lais. O illustrious wisdom, to be imitated by good men! Would you, in truth, entrust your children to this man for education, that they might learn to possess a harlot? He said that there was some difference between himself and the dissolute, that they wasted their property, whereas he lived in indulgence without any cost. And in this the harlot was plainly the wiser, who had the philosopher as her creature, that all the youth, corrupted by the example and authority of the teacher, might flock together to her without any shame. What difference therefore did it make, with what intention the philosopher betook himself to that most notorious harlot, when the people and his rivals saw him more depraved than all the abandoned? Nor was it enough to live in this manner, but he began also to teach lusts; and he transferred his habits from the brothel to the school, contending that bodily pleasure was the chief good. Which pernicious and shameful doctrine has its origin not in the heart of the philosopher, but in the bosom of the harlot. For why should I speak of the Cynics, who practised licentiousness in public? What wonder if they derived their name and title from dogs, since they also imitated their life? Therefore there is no instruction of virtue in this sect, since even those who enjoin more honourable things either themselves do not practice what they advise; or if they do (which rarely happens), it is not the system which leads them to that which is right, but nature which often impels even the unlearned to praise.
18. Augustine, Confessions, 3.7, 6.25 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

3.7. 12. For I was ignorant as to that which really is, and was, as it were, violently moved to give my support to foolish deceivers, when they asked me, Whence is evil? - and, Is God limited by a bodily shape, and has He hairs and nails?- and, Are they to be esteemed righteous who had many wives at once and did kill men, and sacrificed living creatures? 1 Kings 18:40 At which things I, in my ignorance, was much disturbed, and, retreating from the truth, I appeared to myself to be going towards it; because as yet I knew not that evil was naught but a privation of good, until in the end it ceases altogether to be; which how should I see, the sight of whose eyes saw no further than bodies, and of my mind no further than a phantasm? And I knew not God to be a Spirit, John 4:24 not one who has parts extended in length and breadth, nor whose being was bulk; for every bulk is less in a part than in the whole, and, if it be infinite, it must be less in such part as is limited by a certain space than in its infinity; and cannot be wholly everywhere, as Spirit, as God is. And what that should be in us, by which we were like God, and might rightly in Scripture be said to be after the image of God, I was entirely ignorant. 13. Nor had I knowledge of that true inner righteousness, which does not judge according to custom, but out of the most perfect law of God Almighty, by which the manners of places and times were adapted to those places and times - being itself the while the same always and everywhere, not one thing in one place, and another in another; according to which Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and Moses, and David, and all those commended by the mouth of God were righteous, Hebrews 11:8-40 but were judged unrighteous by foolish men, judging out of man's judgment, 1 Corinthians 4:3 and gauging by the petty standard of their own manners the manners of the whole human race. Like as if in an armoury, one knowing not what were adapted to the several members should put greaves on his head, or boot himself with a helmet, and then complain because they would not fit. Or as if, on some day when in the afternoon business was forbidden, one were to fume at not being allowed to sell as it was lawful to him in the forenoon. Or when in some house he sees a servant take something in his hand which the butler is not permitted to touch, or something done behind a stable which would be prohibited in the dining-room, and should be indigt that in one house, and one family, the same thing is not distributed everywhere to all. Such are they who cannot endure to hear something to have been lawful for righteous men in former times which is not so now; or that God, for certain temporal reasons, commanded them one thing, and these another, but both obeying the same righteousness; though they see, in one man, one day, and one house, different things to be fit for different members, and a thing which was formerly lawful after a time unlawful - that permitted or commanded in one corner, which done in another is justly prohibited and punished. Is justice, then, various and changeable? Nay, but the times over which she presides are not all alike, because they are times. But men, whose days upon the earth are few, Job 14:1 because by their own perception they cannot harmonize the causes of former ages and other nations, of which they had no experience, with these of which they have experience, though in one and the same body, day, or family, they can readily see what is suitable for each member, season, part, and person - to the one they take exception, to the other they submit. 14. These things I then knew not, nor observed. They met my eyes on every side, and I saw them not. I composed poems, in which it was not permitted me to place every foot everywhere, but in one metre one way, and in another, nor even in any one verse the same foot in all places. Yet the art itself by which I composed had not different principles for these different cases, but comprised all in one. Still I saw not how that righteousness, which good and holy men submitted to, far more excellently and sublimely comprehended in one all those things which God commanded, and in no part varied, though in varying times it did not prescribe all things at once, but distributed and enjoined what was proper for each. And I, being blind, blamed those pious fathers, not only for making use of present things as God commanded and inspired them to do, but also for foreshowing things to come as God was revealing them.
19. Augustine, Reply To Faustus, 30.6 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

20. Augustine, Against Julian, 4.41, 4.43-4.44, 4.75 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

21. Augustine, On The Good of Marriage, 2.2 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

22. Augustine, On Genesis Against The Manichaeans, 2.21.32, 11.1.3, 11.31.40-11.31.41 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

23. Augustine, De Nuptiis Et Concupiscentia, 1.6, 1.24, 2.26 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

24. Augustine, The City of God, 14.1-14.16, 14.18-14.24, 14.26-14.28, 19.1-19.3 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

14.1. We have already stated in the preceding books that God, desiring not only that the human race might be able by their similarity of nature to associate with one another, but also that they might be bound together in harmony and peace by the ties of relationship, was pleased to derive all men from one individual, and created man with such a nature that the members of the race should not have died, had not the two first (of whom the one was created out of nothing, and the other out of him) merited this by their disobedience; for by them so great a sin was committed, that by it the human nature was altered for the worse, and was transmitted also to their posterity, liable to sin and subject to death. And the kingdom of death so reigned over men, that the deserved penalty of sin would have hurled all headlong even into the second death, of which there is no end, had not the undeserved grace of God saved some therefrom. And thus it has come to pass, that though there are very many and great nations all over the earth, whose rites and customs, speech, arms, and dress, are distinguished by marked differences, yet there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities, according to the language of our Scriptures. The one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit; and when they severally achieve what they wish, they live in peace, each after their kind. 14.3. But if any one says that the flesh is the cause of all vices and ill conduct, inasmuch as the soul lives wickedly only because it is moved by the flesh, it is certain he has not carefully considered the whole nature of man. For the corruptible body, indeed, weighs down the soul. Wisdom 9:15 Whence, too, the apostle, speaking of this corruptible body, of which he had shortly before said, though our outward man perish, 2 Corinthians 4:16 says, We know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened: not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up in life. 2 Corinthians 5:1-4 We are then burdened with this corruptible body; but knowing that the cause of this burdensomeness is not the nature and substance of the body, but its corruption, we do not desire to be deprived of the body, but to be clothed with its immortality. For then, also, there will be a body, but it shall no longer be a burden, being no longer corruptible. At present, then, the corruptible body presses down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weighs down the mind that muses upon many things, nevertheless they are in error who suppose that all the evils of the soul proceed from the body. Virgil, indeed, seems to express the sentiments of Plato in the beautiful lines, where he says - A fiery strength inspires their lives, An essence that from heaven derives, Though clogged in part by limbs of clay And the dull 'vesture of decay;' but though he goes on to mention the four most common mental emotions - desire, fear, joy, sorrow - with the intention of showing that the body is the origin of all sins and vices, saying - Hence wild desires and grovelling fears, And human laughter, human tears, Immured in dungeon-seeming nights They look abroad, yet see no light, yet we believe quite otherwise. For the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul, is not the cause but the punishment of the first sin; and it was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible. And though from this corruption of the flesh there arise certain incitements to vice, and indeed vicious desires, yet we must not attribute to the flesh all the vices of a wicked life, in case we thereby clear the devil of all these, for he has no flesh. For though we cannot call the devil a fornicator or drunkard, or ascribe to him any sensual indulgence (though he is the secret instigator and prompter of those who sin in these ways), yet he is exceedingly proud and envious. And this viciousness has so possessed him, that on account of it he is reserved in chains of darkness to everlasting punishment. Now these vices, which have dominion over the devil, the apostle attributes to the flesh, which certainly the devil has not. For he says hatred, variance, emulations, strife, envying are the works of the flesh; and of all these evils pride is the origin and head, and it rules in the devil though he has no flesh. For who shows more hatred to the saints? Who is more at variance with them? Who more envious, bitter, and jealous? And since he exhibits all these works, though he has no flesh, how are they works of the flesh, unless because they are the works of man, who is, as I said, spoken of under the name of flesh? For it is not by having flesh, which the devil has not, but by living according to himself - that is, according to man - that man became like the devil. For the devil too, wished to live according to himself when he did not abide in the truth; so that when he lied, this was not of God, but of himself, who is not only a liar, but the father of lies, he being the first who lied, and the originator of lying as of sin. 14.6. But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man's will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing that ought to be hated, will remain. 14.8. Those emotions which the Greeks call εὐπαθείαι, and which Cicero calls constantiœ, the Stoics would restrict to three; and, instead of three perturbations in the soul of the wise man, they substituted severally, in place of desire, will; in place of joy, contentment; and for fear, caution; and as to sickness or pain, which we, to avoid ambiguity, preferred to call sorrow, they denied that it could exist in the mind of a wise man. Will, they say, seeks the good, for this the wise man does. Contentment has its object in good that is possessed, and this the wise man continually possesses. Caution avoids evil, and this the wise man ought to avoid. But sorrow arises from evil that has already happened; and as they suppose that no evil can happen to the wise man, there can be no representative of sorrow in his mind. According to them, therefore, none but the wise man wills, is contented, uses caution; and that the fool can do no more than desire, rejoice, fear, be sad. The former three affections Cicero calls constantiœ, the last four perturbationes. Many, however, calls these last passions; and, as I have said, the Greeks call the former εὐπαθείαι, and the latter πάθη . And when I made a careful examination of Scripture to find whether this terminology was sanctioned by it, I came upon this saying of the prophet: There is no contentment to the wicked, says the Lord; Isaiah 57:21 as if the wicked might more properly rejoice than be contented regarding evils, for contentment is the property of the good and godly. I found also that verse in the Gospel: Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them? Matthew 7:12 which seems to imply that evil or shameful things may be the object of desire, but not of will. Indeed, some interpreters have added good things, to make the expression more in conformity with customary usage, and have given this meaning, Whatsoever good deeds that you would that men should do unto you. For they thought that this would prevent any one from wishing other men to provide him with unseemly, not to say shameful gratifications - luxurious banquets, for example - on the supposition that if he returned the like to them he would be fulfilling this precept. In the Greek Gospel, however, from which the Latin is translated, good does not occur, but only, All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them, and, as I believe, because good is already included in the word would; for He does not say desire. Yet though we may sometimes avail ourselves of these precise proprieties of language, we are not to be always bridled by them; and when we read those writers against whose authority it is unlawful to reclaim, we must accept the meanings above mentioned in passages where a right sense can be educed by no other interpretation, as in those instances we adduced partly from the prophet, partly from the Gospel. For who does not know that the wicked exult with joy? Yet there is no contentment for the wicked, says the Lord. And how so, unless because contentment, when the word is used in its proper and distinctive significance, means something different from joy? In like manner, who would deny that it were wrong to enjoin upon men that whatever they desire others to do to them they should themselves do to others, lest they should mutually please one another by shameful and illicit pleasure? And yet the precept, Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them, is very wholesome and just. And how is this, unless because the will is in this place used strictly, and signifies that will which cannot have evil for its object? But ordinary phraseology would not have allowed the saying, Be unwilling to make any manner of lie, Sirach 7:13 had there not been also an evil will, whose wickedness separates if from that which the angels celebrated, Peace on earth, of good will to men. Luke 2:14 For good is superfluous if there is no other kind of will but good will. And why should the apostle have mentioned it among the praises of charity as a great thing, that it rejoices not in iniquity, unless because wickedness does so rejoice? For even with secular writers these words are used indifferently. For Cicero, that most fertile of orators, says, I desire, conscript fathers, to be merciful. And who would be so pedantic as to say that he should have said I will rather than I desire, because the word is used in a good connection? Again, in Terence, the profligate youth, burning with wild lust, says, I will nothing else than Philumena. That this will was lust is sufficiently indicated by the answer of his old servant which is there introduced: How much better were it to try and banish that love from your heart, than to speak so as uselessly to inflame your passion still more! And that contentment was used by secular writers in a bad sense that verse of Virgil testifies, in which he most succinctly comprehends these four perturbations - Hence they fear and desire, grieve and are content The same author had also used the expression, the evil contentments of the mind. So that good and bad men alike will, are cautious, and contented; or, to say the same thing in other words, good and bad men alike desire, fear, rejoice, but the former in a good, the latter in a bad fashion, according as the will is right or wrong. Sorrow itself, too, which the Stoics would not allow to be represented in the mind of the wise man, is used in a good sense, and especially in our writings. For the apostle praises the Corinthians because they had a godly sorrow. But possibly some one may say that the apostle congratulated them because they were penitently sorry, and that such sorrow can exist only in those who have sinned. For these are his words: For I perceive that the same epistle has made you sorry, though it were but for a season. Now I rejoice, not that you were made sorry, but that you sorrowed to repentance; for you were made sorry after a godly manner, that you might receive damage by us in nothing. For godly sorrow works repentance to salvation not to be repented of, but the sorrow of the world works death. For, behold, this selfsame thing that you sorrowed after a godly sort, what carefulness it wrought in you! 2 Corinthians 7:8-11 Consequently the Stoics may defend themselves by replying, that sorrow is indeed useful for repentance of sin, but that this can have no place in the mind of the wise man, inasmuch as no sin attaches to him of which he could sorrowfully repent, nor any other evil the endurance or experience of which could make him sorrowful. For they say that Alcibiades (if my memory does not deceive me), who believed himself happy, shed tears when Socrates argued with him, and demonstrated that he was miserable because he was foolish. In his case, therefore, folly was the cause of this useful and desirable sorrow, wherewith a man mourns that he is what he ought not to be. But the Stoics maintain not that the fool, but that the wise man, cannot be sorrowful. 14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible. 14.10. But it is a fair question, whether our first parent or first parents (for there was a marriage of two), before they sinned, experienced in their animal body such emotions as we shall not experience in the spiritual body when sin has been purged and finally abolished. For if they did, then how were they blessed in that boasted place of bliss, Paradise? For who that is affected by fear or grief can be called absolutely blessed? And what could those persons fear or suffer in such affluence of blessings, where neither death nor ill-health was feared, and where nothing was wanting which a good will could desire, and nothing present which could interrupt man's mental or bodily enjoyment? Their love to God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved. Their avoidance of sin was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintained, no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorrow. Or did they perhaps desire to touch and eat the forbidden fruit, yet feared to die; and thus both fear and desire already, even in that blissful place, preyed upon those first of mankind? Away with the thought that such could be the case where there was no sin! And, indeed, this is already sin, to desire those things which the law of God forbids, and to abstain from them through fear of punishment, not through love of righteousness. Away, I say, with the thought, that before there was any sin, there should already have been committed regarding that fruit the very sin which our Lord warns us against regarding a woman: Whosoever looks on a woman to lust after her, has committed adultery with her already in his heart. Matthew 5:28 As happy, then, as were these our first parents, who were agitated by no mental perturbations, and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the whole human race have been, had they not introduced that evil which they have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of their descendants committed iniquity worthy of damnation; but this original blessedness continuing until, in virtue of that benediction which said, Increase and multiply, Genesis 1:28 the number of the predestined saints should have been completed, there would then have been bestowed that higher felicity which is enjoyed by the most blessed angels - a blessedness in which there should have been a secure assurance that no one would sin, and no one die; and so should the saints have lived, after no taste of labor, pain, or death, as now they shall live in the resurrection, after they have endured all these things. 14.11. But because God foresaw all things, and was therefore not ignorant that man also would fall, we ought to consider this holy city in connection with what God foresaw and ordained, and not according to our own ideas, which do not embrace God's ordination. For man, by his sin, could not disturb the divine counsel, nor compel God to change what He had decreed; for God's foreknowledge had anticipated both - that is to say, both how evil the man whom He had created good should become, and what good He Himself should even thus derive from him. For though God is said to change His determinations (so that in a tropical sense the Holy Scripture says even that God repented ), this is said with reference to man's expectation, or the order of natural causes, and not with reference to that which the Almighty had foreknown that He would do. Accordingly God, as it is written, made man upright, Ecclesiastes 7:29 and consequently with a good will. For if he had not had a good will, he could not have been upright. The good will, then, is the work of God; for God created him with it. But the first evil will, which preceded all man's evil acts, was rather a kind of falling away from the work of God to its own works than any positive work. And therefore the acts resulting were evil, not having God, but the will itself for their end; so that the will or the man himself, so far as his will is bad, was as it were the evil tree bringing forth evil fruit. Moreover, the bad will, though it be not in harmony with, but opposed to nature, inasmuch as it is a vice or blemish, yet it is true of it as of all vice, that it cannot exist except in a nature, and only in a nature created out of nothing, and not in that which the Creator has begotten of Himself, as He begot the Word, by whom all things were made. For though God formed man of the dust of the earth, yet the earth itself, and every earthly material, is absolutely created out of nothing; and man's soul, too, God created out of nothing, and joined to the body, when He made man. But evils are so thoroughly overcome by good, that though they are permitted to exist, for the sake of demonstrating how the most righteous foresight of God can make a good use even of them, yet good can exist without evil, as in the true and supreme God Himself, and as in every invisible and visible celestial creature that exists above this murky atmosphere; but evil cannot exist without good, because the natures in which evil exists, in so far as they are natures, are good. And evil is removed, not by removing any nature, or part of a nature, which had been introduced by the evil, but by healing and correcting that which had been vitiated and depraved. The will, therefore, is then truly free, when it is not the slave of vices and sins. Such was it given us by God; and this being lost by its own fault, can only be restored by Him who was able at first to give it. And therefore the truth says, If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed; 1 John 8:36 which is equivalent to saying, If the Son shall save you, you shall be saved indeed. For He is our Liberator, inasmuch as He is our Saviour. Man then lived with God for his rule in a paradise at once physical and spiritual. For neither was it a paradise only physical for the advantage of the body, and not also spiritual for the advantage of the mind; nor was it only spiritual to afford enjoyment to man by his internal sensations, and not also physical to afford him enjoyment through his external senses. But obviously it was both for both ends. But after that proud and therefore envious angel (of whose fall I have said as much as I was able in the eleventh and twelfth books of this work, as well as that of his fellows, who, from being God's angels, became his angels), preferring to rule with a kind of pomp of empire rather than to be another's subject, fell from the spiritual Paradise, and essaying to insinuate his persuasive guile into the mind of man, whose unfallen condition provoked him to envy now that himself was fallen, he chose the serpent as his mouthpiece in that bodily Paradise in which it and all the other earthly animals were living with those two human beings, the man and his wife, subject to them, and harmless; and he chose the serpent because, being slippery, and moving in tortuous windings, it was suitable for his purpose. And this animal being subdued to his wicked ends by the presence and superior force of his angelic nature, he abused as his instrument, and first tried his deceit upon the woman, making his assault upon the weaker part of that human alliance, that he might gradually gain the whole, and not supposing that the man would readily give ear to him, or be deceived, but that he might yield to the error of the woman. For as Aaron was not induced to agree with the people when they blindly wished him to make an idol, and yet yielded to constraint; and as it is not credible that Solomon was so blind as to suppose that idols should be worshipped, but was drawn over to such sacrilege by the blandishments of women; so we cannot believe that Adam was deceived, and supposed the devil's word to be truth, and therefore transgressed God's law, but that he by the drawings of kindred yielded to the woman, the husband to the wife, the one human being to the only other human being. For not without significance did the apostle say, And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression; 1 Timothy 2:14 but he speaks thus, because the woman accepted as true what the serpent told her, but the man could not bear to be severed from his only companion, even though this involved a partnership in sin. He was not on this account less culpable, but sinned with his eyes open. And so the apostle does not say, He did not sin, but He was not deceived. For he shows that he sinned when he says, By one man sin entered into the world, Romans 5:12 and immediately after more distinctly, In the likeness of Adam's transgression. But he meant that those are deceived who do not judge that which they do to be sin; but he knew. Otherwise how were it true Adam was not deceived? But having as yet no experience of the divine severity, he was possibly deceived in so far as he thought his sin venial. And consequently he was not deceived as the woman was deceived, but he was deceived as to the judgment which would be passed on his apology: The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me, and I did eat. Genesis 3:12 What need of saying more? Although they were not both deceived by credulity, yet both were entangled in the snares of the devil, and taken by sin. 14.13. Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For pride is the beginning of sin. Sirach 10:13 And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself. This happens when it becomes its own satisfaction. And it does so when it falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to satisfy it more than itself. This falling away is spontaneous; for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of that higher and changeless good by which it was illumined to intelligence and kindled into love, it would not have turned away to find satisfaction in itself, and so become frigid and benighted; the woman would not have believed the serpent spoke the truth, nor would the man have preferred the request of his wife to the command of God, nor have supposed that it was a venial trangression to cleave to the partner of his life even in a partnership of sin. The wicked deed, then - that is to say, the trangression of eating the forbidden fruit - was committed by persons who were already wicked. That evil fruit Matthew 7:18 could be brought forth only by a corrupt tree. But that the tree was evil was not the result of nature; for certainly it could become so only by the vice of the will, and vice is contrary to nature. Now, nature could not have been depraved by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Consequently, that it is a nature, this is because it is made by God; but that it falls away from Him, this is because it is made out of nothing. But man did not so fall away as to become absolutely nothing; but being turned towards himself, his being became more contracted than it was when he clave to Him who supremely is. Accordingly, to exist in himself, that is, to be his own satisfaction after abandoning God, is not quite to become a nonentity, but to approximate to that. And therefore the holy Scriptures designate the proud by another name, self-pleasers. For it is good to have the heart lifted up, yet not to one's self, for this is proud, but to the Lord, for this is obedient, and can be the act only of the humble. There is, therefore, something in humility which, strangely enough, exalts the heart, and something in pride which debases it. This seems, indeed, to be contradictory, that loftiness should debase and lowliness exalt. But pious humility enables us to submit to what is above us; and nothing is more exalted above us than God; and therefore humility, by making us subject to God, exalts us. But pride, being a defect of nature, by the very act of refusing subjection and revolting from Him who is supreme, falls to a low condition; and then comes to pass what is written: You cast them down when they lifted up themselves. For he does not say, when they had been lifted up, as if first they were exalted, and then afterwards cast down; but when they lifted up themselves even then they were cast down - that is to say, the very lifting up was already a fall. And therefore it is that humility is specially recommended to the city of God as it sojourns in this world, and is specially exhibited in the city of God, and in the person of Christ its King; while the contrary vice of pride, according to the testimony of the sacred writings, specially rules his adversary the devil. And certainly this is the great difference which distinguishes the two cities of which we speak, the one being the society of the godly men, the other of the ungodly, each associated with the angels that adhere to their party, and the one guided and fashioned by love of self, the other by love of God. The devil, then, would not have ensnared man in the open and manifest sin of doing what God had forbidden, had man not already begun to live for himself. It was this that made him listen with pleasure to the words, You shall be as gods, Genesis 3:5 which they would much more readily have accomplished by obediently adhering to their supreme and true end than by proudly living to themselves. For created gods are gods not by virtue of what is in themselves, but by a participation of the true God. By craving to be more, man becomes less; and by aspiring to be self-sufficing, he fell away from Him who truly suffices him. Accordingly, this wicked desire which prompts man to please himself as if he were himself light, and which thus turns him away from that light by which, had he followed it, he would himself have become light - this wicked desire, I say, already secretly existed in him, and the open sin was but its consequence. For that is true which is written, Pride goes before destruction, and before honor is humility; Proverbs 18:12 that is to say, secret ruin precedes open ruin, while the former is not counted ruin. For who counts exaltation ruin, though no sooner is the Highest forsaken than a fall is begun? But who does not recognize it as ruin, when there occurs an evident and indubitable transgression of the commandment? And consequently, God's prohibition had reference to such an act as, when committed, could not be defended on any pretense of doing what was righteous. And I make bold to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into an open and indisputable transgression, and so displease themselves, as already, by pleasing themselves, they had fallen. For Peter was in a healthier condition when he wept and was dissatisfied with himself, than when he boldly presumed and satisfied himself. And this is averred by the sacred Psalmist when he says, Fill their faces with shame, that they may seek Your name, O Lord; that is, that they who have pleased themselves in seeking their own glory may be pleased and satisfied with You in seeking Your glory. 14.15. Therefore, because the sin was a despising of the authority of God - who had created man; who had made him in His own image; who had set him above the other animals; who had placed him in Paradise; who had enriched him with abundance of every kind and of safety; who had laid upon him neither many, nor great, nor difficult commandments, but, in order to make a wholesome obedience easy to him, had given him a single very brief and very light precept by which He reminded that creature whose service was to be free that He was Lord, - it was just that condemnation followed, and condemnation such that man, who by keeping the commandments should have been spiritual even in his flesh, became fleshly even in his spirit; and as in his pride he had sought to be his own satisfaction, God in His justice abandoned him to himself, not to live in the absolute independence he affected, but instead of the liberty he desired, to live dissatisfied with himself in a hard and miserable bondage to him to whom by sinning he had yielded himself, doomed in spite of himself to die in body as he had willingly become dead in spirit, condemned even to eternal death (had not the grace of God delivered him) because he had forsaken eternal life. Whoever thinks such punishment either excessive or unjust shows his inability to measure the great iniquity of sinning where sin might so easily have been avoided. For as Abraham's obedience is with justice pronounced to be great, because the thing commanded, to kill his son, was very difficult, so in Paradise the disobedience was the greater, because the difficulty of that which was commanded was imperceptible. And as the obedience of the second Man was the more laudable because He became obedient even unto death, Philippians 2:8 so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable because he became disobedient even unto death. For where the penalty annexed to disobedience is great, and the thing commanded by the Creator is easy, who can sufficiently estimate how great a wickedness it is, in a matter so easy, not to obey the authority of so great a power, even when that power deters with so terrible a penalty? In short, to say all in a word, what but disobedience was the punishment of disobedience in that sin? For what else is man's misery but his own disobedience to himself, so that in consequence of his not being willing to do what he could do, he now wills to do what he cannot? For though he could not do all things in Paradise before he sinned, yet he wished to do only what he could do, and therefore he could do all things he wished. But now, as we recognize in his offspring, and as divine Scripture testifies, Man is like to vanity. For who can count how many things he wishes which he cannot do, so long as he is disobedient to himself, that is, so long as his mind and his flesh do not obey his will? For in spite of himself his mind is both frequently disturbed, and his flesh suffers, and grows old, and dies; and in spite of ourselves we suffer whatever else we suffer, and which we would not suffer if our nature absolutely and in all its parts obeyed our will. But is it not the infirmities of the flesh which hamper it in its service? Yet what does it matter how its service is hampered, so long as the fact remains, that by the just retribution of the sovereign God whom we refused to be subject to and serve, our flesh, which was subjected to us, now torments us by insubordination, although our disobedience brought trouble on ourselves, not upon God? For He is not in need of our service as we of our body's; and therefore what we did was no punishment to Him, but what we receive is so to us. And the pains which are called bodily are pains of the soul in and from the body. For what pain or desire can the flesh feel by itself and without the soul? But when the flesh is said to desire or to suffer, it is meant, as we have explained, that the man does so, or some part of the soul which is affected by the sensation of the flesh, whether a harsh sensation causing pain, or gentle, causing pleasure. But pain in the flesh is only a discomfort of the soul arising from the flesh, and a kind of shrinking from its suffering, as the pain of the soul which is called sadness is a shrinking from those things which have happened to us in spite of ourselves. But sadness is frequently preceded by fear, which is itself in the soul, not in the flesh; while bodily pain is not preceded by any kind of fear of the flesh, which can be felt in the flesh before the pain. But pleasure is preceded by a certain appetite which is felt in the flesh like a craving, as hunger and thirst and that generative appetite which is most commonly identified with the name lust, though this is the generic word for all desires. For anger itself was defined by the ancients as nothing else than the lust of revenge; although sometimes a man is angry even at iimate objects which cannot feel his vengeance, as when one breaks a pen, or crushes a quill that writes badly. Yet even this, though less reasonable, is in its way a lust of revenge, and is, so to speak, a mysterious kind of shadow of [the great law of] retribution, that they who do evil should suffer evil. There is therefore a lust for revenge, which is called anger; there is a lust of money, which goes by the name of avarice; there is a lust of conquering, no matter by what means, which is called opinionativeness; there is a lust of applause, which is named boasting. There are many and various lusts, of which some have names of their own, while others have not. For who could readily give a name to the lust of ruling, which yet has a powerful influence in the soul of tyrants, as civil wars bear witness? 14.16. Although, therefore, lust may have many objects, yet when no object is specified, the word lust usually suggests to the mind the lustful excitement of the organs of generation. And this lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward members, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man with a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. What friend of wisdom and holy joys, who, being married, but knowing, as the apostle says, how to possess his vessel in santification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as the Gentiles who know not God, 1 Thessalonians 4:4 would not prefer, if this were possible, to beget children without this lust, so that in this function of begetting offspring the members created for this purpose should not be stimulated by the heat of lust, but should be actuated by his volition, in the same way as his other members serve him for their respective ends? But even those who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious lust; and though it often opposes its whole combined energy to the soul that resists it, sometimes also it is divided against itself, and while it moves the soul, leaves the body unmoved. 14.18. Lust requires for its consummation darkness and secrecy; and this not only when un lawful intercourse is desired, but even such fornication as the earthly city has legalized. Where there is no fear of punishment, these permitted pleasures still shrink from the public eye. Even where provision is made for this lust, secrecy also is provided; and while lust found it easy to remove the prohibitions of law, shamelessness found it impossible to lay aside the veil of retirement. For even shameless men call this shameful; and though they love the pleasure, dare not display it. What! Does not even conjugal intercourse, sanctioned as it is by law for the propagation of children, legitimate and honorable though it be, does it not seek retirement from every eye? Before the bridegroom fondles his bride, does he not exclude the attendants, and even the paranymphs, and such friends as the closest ties have admitted to the bridal chamber? The greatest master of Roman eloquence says, that all right actions wish to be set in the light, i.e., desire to be known. This right action, however, has such a desire to be known, that yet it blushes to be seen. Who does not know what passes between husband and wife that children may be born? Is it not for this purpose that wives are married with such ceremony? And yet, when this well-understood act is gone about for the procreation of children, not even the children themselves, who may already have been born to them, are suffered to be witnesses. This right action seeks the light, in so far as it seeks to be known, but yet dreads being seen. And why so, if not because that which is by nature fitting and decent is so done as to be accompanied with a shame-begetting penalty of sin? 14.19. Hence it is that even the philosophers who have approximated to the truth have avowed that anger and lust are vicious mental emotions, because, even when exercised towards objects which wisdom does not prohibit, they are moved in an ungoverned and inordinate manner, and consequently need the regulation of mind and reason. And they assert that this third part of the mind is posted as it were in a kind of citadel, to give rule to these other parts, so that, while it rules and they serve, man's righteousness is preserved without a breach. These parts, then, which they acknowledge to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind, by its composing and restraining influence, must bridle and recall them from those objects towards which they are unlawfully moved, and give them access to those which the law of wisdom sanctions - that anger, e.g., may be allowed for the enforcement of a just authority, and lust for the duty of propagating offspring - these parts, I say, were not vicious in Paradise before sin, for they were never moved in opposition to a holy will towards any object from which it was necessary that they should be withheld by the restraining bridle of reason. For though now they are moved in this way, and are regulated by a bridling and restraining power, which those who live temperately, justly, and godly exercise, sometimes with ease, and sometimes with greater difficulty, this is not the sound health of nature, but the weakness which results from sin. And how is it that shame does not hide the acts and words dictated by anger or other emotions, as it covers the motions of lust, unless because the members of the body which we employ for accomplishing them are moved, not by the emotions themselves, but by the authority of the consenting will? For he who in his anger rails at or even strikes some one, could not do so were not his tongue and hand moved by the authority of the will, as also they are moved when there is no anger. But the organs of generation are so subjected to the rule of lust, that they have no motion but what it communicates. It is this we are ashamed of; it is this which blushingly hides from the eyes of onlookers. And rather will a man endure a crowd of witnesses when he is unjustly venting his anger on some one, than the eye of one man when he innocently copulates with his wife. 14.20. It is this which those canine or cynic philosophers have overlooked, when they have, in violation of the modest instincts of men, boastfully proclaimed their unclean and shameless opinion, worthy indeed of dogs, viz., that as the matrimonial act is legitimate, no one should be ashamed to perform it openly, in the street or in any public place. Instinctive shame has overborne this wild fancy. For though it is related that Diogenes once dared to put his opinion in practice, under the impression that his sect would be all the more famous if his egregious shamelessness were deeply graven in the memory of mankind, yet this example was not afterwards followed. Shame had more influence with them, to make them blush before men, than error to make them affect a resemblance to dogs. And possibly, even in the case of Diogenes, and those who did imitate him, there was but an appearance and pretence of copulation, and not the reality. Even at this day there are still Cynic philosophers to be seen; for these are Cynics who are not content with being clad in the pallium, but also carry a club; yet no one of them dares to do this that we speak of. If they did, they would be spat upon, not to say stoned, by the mob. Human nature, then, is without doubt ashamed of this lust; and justly so, for the insubordination of these members, and their defiance of the will, are the clear testimony of the punishment of man's first sin. And it was fitting that this should appear specially in those parts by which is generated that nature which has been altered for the worse by that first and great sin - that sin from whose evil connection no one can escape, unless God's grace expiate in him individually that which was perpetrated to the destruction of all in common, when all were in one man, and which was avenged by God's justice. 14.21. Far be it, then, from us to suppose that our first parents in Paradise felt that lust which caused them afterwards to blush and hide their nakedness, or that by its means they should have fulfilled the benediction of God, Increase and multiply and replenish the earth; Genesis 1:28 for it was after sin that lust began. It was after sin that our nature, having lost the power it had over the whole body, but not having lost all shame, perceived, noticed, blushed at, and covered it. But that blessing upon marriage, which encouraged them to increase and multiply and replenish the earth, though it continued even after they had sinned, was yet given before they sinned, in order that the procreation of children might be recognized as part of the glory of marriage, and not of the punishment of sin. But now, men being ignorant of the blessedness of Paradise, suppose that children could not have been begotten there in any other way than they know them to be begotten now, i.e., by lust, at which even honorable marriage blushes; some not simply rejecting, but sceptically deriding the divine Scriptures, in which we read that our first parents, after they sinned, were ashamed of their nakedness, and covered it; while others, though they accept and honor Scripture, yet conceive that this expression, Increase and multiply, refers not to carnal fecundity, because a similar expression is used of the soul in the words, You will multiply me with strength in my soul; and so, too, in the words which follow in Genesis, And replenish the earth, and subdue it, they understand by the earth the body which the soul fills with its presence, and which it rules over when it is multiplied in strength. And they hold that children could no more then than now be begotten without lust, which, after sin, was kindled, observed, blushed for, and covered; and even that children would not have been born in Paradise, but only outside of it, as in fact it turned out. For it was after they were expelled from it that they came together to beget children, and begot them. 14.22. But we, for our part, have no manner of doubt that to increase and multiply and replenish the earth in virtue of the blessing of God, is a gift of marriage as God instituted it from the beginning before man sinned, when He created them male and female - in other words, two sexes manifestly distinct. And it was this work of God on which His blessing was pronounced. For no sooner had Scripture said, Male and female created He them, Genesis 1:27-28 than it immediately continues, And God blessed them, and God said to them, Increase, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, etc. And though all these things may not unsuitably be interpreted in a spiritual sense, yet male and female cannot be understood of two things in one man, as if there were in him one thing which rules, another which is ruled; but it is quite clear that they were created male and female, with bodies of different sexes, for the very purpose of begetting offspring, and so increasing, multiplying, and replenishing the earth; and it is great folly to oppose so plain a fact. It was not of the spirit which commands and the body which obeys, nor of the rational soul which rules and the irrational desire which is ruled, nor of the contemplative virtue which is supreme and the active which is subject, nor of the understanding of the mind and the sense of the body, but plainly of the matrimonial union by which the sexes are mutually bound together, that our Lord, when asked whether it were lawful for any cause to put away one's wife (for on account of the hardness of the hearts of the Israelites Moses permitted a bill of divorcement to be given), answered and said, Have you not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more two, but one flesh. What, therefore, God has joined together, let not man put asunder. Matthew 19:4-5 It is certain, then, that from the first men were created, as we see and know them to be now, of two sexes, male and female, and that they are called one, either on account of the matrimonial union, or on account of the origin of the woman, who was created from the side of the man. And it is by this original example, which God Himself instituted, that the apostle admonishes all husbands to love their own wives in particular. Ephesians 5:25 14.23. But he who says that there should have been neither copulation nor generation but for sin, virtually says that man's sin was necessary to complete the number of the saints. For if these two by not sinning should have continued to live alone, because, as is supposed, they could not have begotten children had they not sinned, then certainly sin was necessary in order that there might be not only two but many righteous men. And if this cannot be maintained without absurdity, we must rather believe that the number of the saints fit to complete this most blessed city would have been as great though no one had sinned, as it is now that the grace of God gathers its citizens out of the multitude of sinners, so long as the children of this world generate and are generated. Luke 20:34 And therefore that marriage, worthy of the happiness of Paradise, should have had desirable fruit without the shame of lust, had there been no sin. But how that could be, there is now no example to teach us. Nevertheless, it ought not to seem incredible that one member might serve the will without lust then, since so many serve it now. Do we now move our feet and hands when we will to do the things we would by means of these members? Do we meet with no resistance in them, but perceive that they are ready servants of the will, both in our own case and in that of others, and especially of artisans employed in mechanical operations, by which the weakness and clumsiness of nature become, through industrious exercise, wonderfully dexterous? And shall we not believe that, like as all those members obediently serve the will, so also should the members have discharged the function of generation, though lust, the award of disobedience, had been awanting? Did not Cicero, in discussing the difference of governments in his De Republica, adopt a simile from human nature, and say that we command our bodily members as children, they are so obedient; but that the vicious parts of the soul must be treated as slaves, and be coerced with a more stringent authority? And no doubt, in the order of nature, the soul is more excellent than the body; and yet the soul commands the body more easily than itself. Nevertheless this lust, of which we at present speak, is the more shameful on this account, because the soul is therein neither master of itself, so as not to lust at all, nor of the body, so as to keep the members under the control of the will; for if they were thus ruled, there should be no shame. But now the soul is ashamed that the body, which by nature is inferior and subject to it, should resist its authority. For in the resistance experienced by the soul in the other emotions there is less shame, because the resistance is from itself, and thus, when it is conquered by itself, itself is the conqueror, although the conquest is inordinate and vicious, because accomplished by those parts of the soul which ought to be subject to reason, yet, being accomplished by its own parts and energies, the conquest is, as I say, its own. For when the soul conquers itself to a due subordination, so that its unreasonable motions are controlled by reason, while it again is subject to God, this is a conquest virtuous and praiseworthy. Yet there is less shame when the soul is resisted by its own vicious parts than when its will and order are resisted by the body, which is distinct from and inferior to it, and dependent on it for life itself. But so long as the will retains under its authority the other members, without which the members excited by lust to resist the will cannot accomplish what they seek, chastity is preserved, and the delight of sin foregone. And certainly, had not culpable disobedience been visited with penal disobedience, the marriage of Paradise should have been ignorant of this struggle and rebellion, this quarrel between will and lust, that the will may be satisfied and lust restrained, but those members, like all the rest, should have obeyed the will. The field of generation should have been sown by the organ created for this purpose, as the earth is sown by the hand. And whereas now, as we essay to investigate this subject more exactly, modesty hinders us, and compels us to ask pardon of chaste ears, there would have been no cause to do so, but we could have discoursed freely, and without fear of seeming obscene, upon all those points which occur to one who meditates on the subject. There would not have been even words which could be called obscene, but all that might be said of these members would have been as pure as what is said of the other parts of the body. Whoever, then, comes to the perusal of these pages with unchaste mind, let him blame his disposition, not his nature; let him brand the actings of his own impurity, not the words which necessity forces us to use, and for which every pure and pious reader or hearer will very readily pardon me, while I expose the folly of that scepticism which argues solely on the ground of its own experience, and has no faith in anything beyond. He who is not scandalized at the apostle's censure of the horrible wickedness of the women who changed the natural use into that which is against nature, Romans 1:26 will read all this without being shocked, especially as we are not, like Paul, citing and censuring a damnable uncleanness, but are explaining, so far as we can, human generation, while with Paul we avoid all obscenity of language. 14.24. The man, then, would have sown the seed, and the woman received it, as need required, the generative organs being moved by the will, not excited by lust. For we move at will not only those members which are furnished with joints of solid bone, as the hands, feet, and fingers, but we move also at will those which are composed of slack and soft nerves: we can put them in motion, or stretch them out, or bend and twist them, or contract and stiffen them, as we do with the muscles of the mouth and face. The lungs, which are the very tenderest of the viscera except the brain, and are therefore carefully sheltered in the cavity of the chest, yet for all purposes of inhaling and exhaling the breath, and of uttering and modulating the voice, are obedient to the will when we breathe, exhale, speak, shout, or sing, just as the bellows obey the smith or the organist. I will not press the fact that some animals have a natural power to move a single spot of the skin with which their whole body is covered, if they have felt on it anything they wish to drive off - a power so great, that by this shivering tremor of the skin they can not only shake off flies that have settled on them, but even spears that have fixed in their flesh. Man, it is true, has not this power; but is this any reason for supposing that God could not give it to such creatures as He wished to possess it? And therefore man himself also might very well have enjoyed absolute power over his members had he not forfeited it by his disobedience; for it was not difficult for God to form him so that what is now moved in his body only by lust should have been moved only at will. We know, too, that some men are differently constituted from others, and have some rare and remarkable faculty of doing with their body what other men can by no effort do, and, indeed, scarcely believe when they hear of others doing. There are persons who can move their ears, either one at a time, or both together. There are some who, without moving the head, can bring the hair down upon the forehead, and move the whole scalp backwards and forwards at pleasure. Some, by lightly pressing their stomach, bring up an incredible quantity and variety of things they have swallowed, and produce whatever they please, quite whole, as if out of a bag. Some so accurately mimic the voices of birds and beasts and other men, that, unless they are seen, the difference cannot be told. Some have such command of their bowels, that they can break wind continuously at pleasure, so as to produce the effect of singing. I myself have known a man who was accustomed to sweat whenever he wished. It is well known that some weep when they please, and shed a flood of tears. But far more incredible is that which some of our brethren saw quite recently. There was a presbyter called Restitutus, in the parish of the Calamensian Church, who, as often as he pleased (and he was asked to do this by those who desired to witness so remarkable a phenomenon), on some one imitating the wailings of mourners, became so insensible, and lay in a state so like death, that not only had he no feeling when they pinched and pricked him, but even when fire was applied to him, and he was burned by it, he had no sense of pain except afterwards from the wound. And that his body remained motionless, not by reason of his self-command, but because he was insensible, was proved by the fact that he breathed no more than a dead man; and yet he said that, when any one spoke with more than ordinary distinctness, he heard the voice, but as if it were a long way off. Seeing, then, that even in this mortal and miserable life the body serves some men by many remarkable movements and moods beyond the ordinary course of nature, what reason is there for doubting that, before man was involved by his sin in this weak and corruptible condition, his members might have served his will for the propagation of offspring without lust? Man has been given over to himself because he abandoned God, while he sought to be self-satisfying; and disobeying God, he could not obey even himself. Hence it is that he is involved in the obvious misery of being unable to live as he wishes. For if he lived as he wished, he would think himself blessed; but he could not be so if he lived wickedly. 14.26. In Paradise, then, man lived as he desired so long as he desired what God had commanded. He lived in the enjoyment of God, and was good by God's goodness; he lived without any want, and had it in his power so to live eternally. He had food that he might not hunger, drink that he might not thirst, the tree of life that old age might not waste him. There was in his body no corruption, nor seed of corruption, which could produce in him any unpleasant sensation. He feared no inward disease, no outward accident. Soundest health blessed his body, absolute tranquillity his soul. As in Paradise there was no excessive heat or cold, so its inhabitants were exempt from the vicissitudes of fear and desire. No sadness of any kind was there, nor any foolish joy; true gladness ceaselessly flowed from the presence of God, who was loved out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned. 1 Timothy 1:5 The honest love of husband and wife made a sure harmony between them. Body and spirit worked harmoniously together, and the commandment was kept without labor. No languor made their leisure wearisome; no sleepiness interrupted their desire to labor. In tanta facilitate rerum et felicitate hominum, absit ut suspicemur, non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo: sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra qua c tera, et sine ardoris illecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Neque enim quia experientia probari non potest, ideo credendum non est; quando illas corporis partes non ageret turbidus calor, sed spontanea potestas, sicut opus esset, adhiberet; ita tunc potuisse utero conjugis salva integritate feminei genitalis virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest eadem integritate salva ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Eadem quippe via posset illud injici, qua hoc potest ejici. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret: sic ad fœtandum et concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque conjungeret. We speak of things which are now shameful, and although we try, as well as we are able, to conceive them as they were before they became shameful, yet necessity compels us rather to limit our discussion to the bounds set by modesty than to extend it as our moderate faculty of discourse might suggest. For since that which I have been speaking of was not experienced even by those who might have experienced it - I mean our first parents (for sin and its merited banishment from Paradise anticipated this passionless generation on their part) - when sexual intercourse is spoken of now, it suggests to men's thoughts not such a placid obedience to the will as is conceivable in our first parents, but such violent acting of lust as they themselves have experienced. And therefore modesty shuts my mouth, although my mind conceives the matter clearly. But Almighty God, the supreme and supremely good Creator of all natures, who aids and rewards good wills, while He abandons and condemns the bad, and rules both, was not destitute of a plan by which He might people His city with the fixed number of citizens which His wisdom had foreordained even out of the condemned human race, discriminating them not now by merits, since the whole mass was condemned as if in a vitiated root, but by grace, and showing, not only in the case of the redeemed, but also in those who were not delivered, how much grace He has bestowed upon them. For every one acknowledges that he has been rescued from evil, not by deserved, but by gratuitous goodness, when he is singled out from the company of those with whom he might justly have borne a common punishment, and is allowed to go scathless. Why, then, should God not have created those whom He foresaw would sin, since He was able to show in and by them both what their guilt merited, and what His grace bestowed, and since, under His creating and disposing hand, even the perverse disorder of the wicked could not pervert the right order of things? 14.28. Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God, You are my glory, and the lifter up of mine head. In the one, the princes and the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other, the princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying, while the former take thought for all. The one delights in its own strength, represented in the persons of its rulers; the other says to its God, I will love You, O Lord, my strength. And therefore the wise men of the one city, living according to man, have sought for profit to their own bodies or souls, or both, and those who have known God glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened; professing themselves to be wise,- that is, glorying in their own wisdom, and being possessed by pride -they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. For they were either leaders or followers of the people in adoring images, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Romans 1:21-25 But in the other city there is no human wisdom, but only godliness, which offers due worship to the true God, and looks for its reward in the society of the saints, of holy angels as well as holy men, that God may be all in all. 1 Corinthians 15:28 19.1. As I see that I have still to discuss the fit destinies of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, I must first explain, so far as the limits of this work allow me, the reasonings by which men have attempted to make for themselves a happiness in this unhappy life, in order that it may be evident, not only from divine authority, but also from such reasons as can be adduced to unbelievers, how the empty dreams of the philosophers differ from the hope which God gives to us, and from the substantial fulfillment of it which He will give us as our blessedness. Philosophers have expressed a great variety of diverse opinions regarding the ends of goods and of evils, and this question they have eagerly canvassed, that they might, if possible, discover what makes a man happy. For the end of our good is that for the sake of which other things are to be desired, while it is to be desired for its own sake; and the end of evil is that on account of which other things are to be shunned, while it is avoided on its own account. Thus, by the end of good, we at present mean, not that by which good is destroyed, so that it no longer exists, but that by which it is finished, so that it becomes complete; and by the end of evil we mean, not that which abolishes it, but that which completes its development. These two ends, therefore, are the supreme good and the supreme evil; and, as I have said, those who have in this vain life professed the study of wisdom have been at great pains to discover these ends, and to obtain the supreme good and avoid the supreme evil in this life. And although they erred in a variety of ways, yet natural insight has prevented them from wandering from the truth so far that they have not placed the supreme good and evil, some in the soul, some in the body, and some in both. From this tripartite distribution of the sects of philosophy, Marcus Varro, in his book De Philosophia, has drawn so large a variety of opinions, that, by a subtle and minute analysis of distinctions, he numbers without difficulty as many as 288 sects - not that these have actually existed, but sects which are possible. To illustrate briefly what he means, I must begin with his own introductory statement in the above-mentioned book, that there are four things which men desire, as it were by nature without a master, without the help of any instruction, without industry or the art of living which is called virtue, and which is certainly learned: either pleasure, which is an agreeable stirring of the bodily sense; or repose, which excludes every bodily inconvenience; or both these, which Epicurus calls by the one name, pleasure; or the primary objects of nature, which comprehend the things already named and other things, either bodily, such as health, and safety, and integrity of the members, or spiritual, such as the greater and less mental gifts that are found in men. Now these four things - pleasure, repose, the two combined, and the primary objects of nature - exist in us in such sort that we must either desire virtue on their account, or them for the sake of virtue, or both for their own sake; and consequently there arise from this distinction twelve sects, for each is by this consideration tripled. I will illustrate this in one instance, and, having done so, it will not be difficult to understand the others. According, then, as bodily pleasure is subjected, preferred, or united to virtue, there are three sects. It is subjected to virtue when it is chosen as subservient to virtue. Thus it is a duty of virtue to live for one's country, and for its sake to beget children, neither of which can be done without bodily pleasure. For there is pleasure in eating and drinking, pleasure also in sexual intercourse. But when it is preferred to virtue, it is desired for its own sake, and virtue is chosen only for its sake, and to effect nothing else than the attainment or preservation of bodily pleasure. And this, indeed, is to make life hideous; for where virtue is the slave of pleasure it no longer deserves the name of virtue. Yet even this disgraceful distortion has found some philosophers to patronize and defend it. Then virtue is united to pleasure when neither is desired for the other's sake, but both for their own. And therefore, as pleasure, according as it is subjected, preferred, or united to virtue, makes three sects, so also do repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the prime natural blessings, make their three sects each. For as men's opinions vary, and these four things are sometimes subjected, sometimes preferred, and sometimes united to virtue, there are produced twelve sects. But this number again is doubled by the addition of one difference, viz., the social life; for whoever attaches himself to any of these sects does so either for his own sake alone, or for the sake of a companion, for whom he ought to wish what he desires for himself. And thus there will be twelve of those who think some one of these opinions should be held for their own sakes, and other twelve who decide that they ought to follow this or that philosophy not for their own sakes only, but also for the sake of others whose good they desire as their own. These twenty-four sects again are doubled, and become forty-eight by adding a difference taken from the New Academy. For each of these four and twenty sects can hold and defend their opinion as certain, as the Stoics defended the position that the supreme good of man consisted solely in virtue; or they can be held as probable, but not certain, as the New Academics did. There are, therefore, twenty-four who hold their philosophy as certainly true, other twenty-four who hold their opinions as probable, but not certain. Again, as each person who attaches himself to any of these sects may adopt the mode of life either of the Cynics or of the other philosophers, this distinction will double the number, and so make ninety-six sects. Then, lastly, as each of these sects may be adhered to either by men who love a life of ease, as those who have through choice or necessity addicted themselves to study, or by men who love a busy life, as those who, while philosophizing, have been much occupied with state affairs and public business, or by men who choose a mixed life, in imitation of those who have apportioned their time partly to erudite leisure, partly to necessary business: by these differences the number of the sects is tripled, and becomes 288. I have thus, as briefly and lucidly as I could, given in my own words the opinions which Varro expresses in his book. But how he refutes all the rest of these sects, and chooses one, the Old Academy, instituted by Plato, and continuing to Polemo, the fourth teacher of that school of philosophy which held that their system was certain; and how on this ground he distinguishes it from the New Academy, which began with Polemo's successor Arcesilaus, and held that all things are uncertain; and how he seeks to establish that the Old Academy was as free from error as from doubt - all this, I say, were too long to enter upon in detail, and yet I must not altogether pass it by in silence. Varro then rejects, as a first step, all those differences which have multiplied the number of sects; and the ground on which he does so is that they are not differences about the supreme good. He maintains that in philosophy a sect is created only by its having an opinion of its own different from other schools on the point of the ends-in-chief. For man has no other reason for philosophizing than that he may be happy; but that which makes him happy is itself the supreme good. In other words, the supreme good is the reason of philosophizing; and therefore that cannot be called a sect of philosophy which pursues no way of its own towards the supreme good. Thus, when it is asked whether a wise man will adopt the social life, and desire and be interested in the supreme good of his friend as in his own, or will, on the contrary, do all that he does merely for his own sake, there is no question here about the supreme good, but only about the propriety of associating or not associating a friend in its participation: whether the wise man will do this not for his own sake, but for the sake of his friend in whose good he delights as in his own. So, too, when it is asked whether all things about which philosophy is concerned are to be considered uncertain, as by the New Academy, or certain, as the other philosophers maintain, the question here is not what end should be pursued, but whether or not we are to believe in the substantial existence of that end; or, to put it more plainly, whether he who pursues the supreme good must maintain that it is a true good, or only that it appears to him to be true, though possibly it may be delusive - both pursuing one and the same good. The distinction, too, which is founded on the dress and manners of the Cynics, does not touch the question of the chief good, but only the question whether he who pursues that good which seems to himself true should live as do the Cynics. There were, in fact, men who, though they pursued different things as the supreme good, some choosing pleasure, others virtue, yet adopted that mode of life which gave the Cynics their name. Thus, whatever it is which distinguishes the Cynics from other philosophers, this has no bearing on the choice and pursuit of that good which constitutes happiness. For if it had any such bearing, then the same habits of life would necessitate the pursuit of the same chief good, and diverse habits would necessitate the pursuit of different ends. 19.2. The same may be said of those three kinds of life, the life of studious leisure and search after truth, the life of easy engagement in affairs, and the life in which both these are mingled. When it is asked, which of these should be adopted, this involves no controversy about the end of good, but inquires which of these three puts a man in the best position for finding and retaining the supreme good. For this good, as soon as a man finds it, makes him happy; but lettered leisure, or public business, or the alternation of these, do not necessarily constitute happiness. Many, in fact, find it possible to adopt one or other of these modes of life, and yet to miss what makes a man happy. The question, therefore, regarding the supreme good and the supreme evil, and which distinguishes sects of philosophy, is one; and these questions concerning the social life, the doubt of the Academy, the dress and food of the Cynics, the three modes of life - the active, the contemplative, and the mixed - these are different questions, into none of which the question of the chief good enters. And therefore, as Marcus Varro multiplied the sects to the number of 288 (or whatever larger number he chose) by introducing these four differences derived from the social life, the New Academy, the Cynics, and the threefold form of life, so, by removing these differences as having no bearing on the supreme good, and as therefore not constituting what can properly be called sects, he returns to those twelve schools which concern themselves with inquiring what that good is which makes man happy, and he shows that one of these is true, the rest false. In other words, he dismisses the distinction founded on the threefold mode of life, and so decreases the whole number by two-thirds, reducing the sects to ninety-six. Then, putting aside the Cynic peculiarities, the number decreases by a half, to forty-eight. Taking away next the distinction occasioned by the hesitancy of the New Academy, the number is again halved, and reduced to twenty-four. Treating in a similar way the diversity introduced by the consideration of the social life, there are left but twelve, which this difference had doubled to twenty-four. Regarding these twelve, no reason can be assigned why they should not be called sects. For in them the sole inquiry is regarding the supreme good and the ultimate evil - that is to say, regarding the supreme good, for this being found, the opposite evil is thereby found. Now, to make these twelve sects, he multiplies by three these four things - pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the primary objects of nature which Varro calls primigenia. For as these four things are sometimes subordinated to virtue, so that they seem to be desired not for their own sake, but for virtue's sake; sometimes preferred to it, so that virtue seems to be necessary not on its own account, but in order to attain these things; sometimes joined with it, so that both they and virtue are desired for their own sakes - we must multiply the four by three, and thus we get twelve sects. But from those four things Varro eliminates three - pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined - not because he thinks these are not worthy of the place assigned them, but because they are included in the primary objects of nature. And what need is there, at any rate, to make a threefold division out of these two ends, pleasure and repose, taking them first severally and then conjunctly, since both they, and many other things besides, are comprehended in the primary objects of nature? Which of the three remaining sects must be chosen? This is the question that Varro dwells upon. For whether one of these three or some other be chosen, reason forbids that more than one be true. This we shall afterwards see; but meanwhile let us explain as briefly and distinctly as we can how Varro makes his selection from these three, that is, from the sects which severally hold that the primary objects of nature are to be desired for virtue's sake, that virtue is to be desired for their sake, and that virtue and these objects are to be desired each for their own sake. 19.3. Which of these three is true and to be adopted he attempts to show in the following manner. As it is the supreme good, not of a tree, or of a beast, or of a god, but of man that philosophy is in quest of, he thinks that, first of all, we must define man. He is of opinion that there are two parts in human nature, body and soul, and makes no doubt that of these two the soul is the better and by far the more worthy part. But whether the soul alone is the man, so that the body holds the same relation to it as a horse to the horseman, this he thinks has to be ascertained. The horseman is not a horse and a man, but only a man, yet he is called a horseman, because he is in some relation to the horse. Again, is the body alone the man, having a relation to the soul such as the cup has to the drink? For it is not the cup and the drink it contains which are called the cup, but the cup alone; yet it is so called because it is made to hold the drink. Or, lastly, is it neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but both together, which are man, the body and the soul being each a part, but the whole man being both together, as we call two horses yoked together a pair, of which pair the near and the off horse is each a part, but we do not call either of them, no matter how connected with the other, a pair, but only both together? of these three alternatives, then, Varro chooses the third, that man is neither the body alone, nor the soul alone, but both together. And therefore the highest good, in which lies the happiness of man, is composed of goods of both kinds, both bodily and spiritual. And consequently he thinks that the primary objects of nature are to be sought for their own sake, and that virtue, which is the art of living, and can be communicated by instruction, is the most excellent of spiritual goods. This virtue, then, or art of regulating life, when it has received these primary objects of nature which existed independently of it, and prior to any instruction, seeks them all, and itself also, for its own sake; and it uses them, as it also uses itself, that from them all it may derive profit and enjoyment, greater or less, according as they are themselves greater or less; and while it takes pleasure in all of them, it despises the less that it may obtain or retain the greater when occasion demands. Now, of all goods, spiritual or bodily, there is none at all to compare with virtue. For virtue makes a good use both of itself and of all other goods in which lies man's happiness; and where it is absent, no matter how many good things a man has, they are not for his good, and consequently should not be called good things while they belong to one who makes them useless by using them badly. The life of man, then, is called happy when it enjoys virtue and these other spiritual and bodily good things without which virtue is impossible. It is called happier if it enjoys some or many other good things which are not essential to virtue; and happiest of all, if it lacks not one of the good things which pertain to the body and the soul. For life is not the same thing as virtue, since not every life, but a wisely regulated life, is virtue; and yet, while there can be life of some kind without virtue, there cannot be virtue without life. This I might apply to memory and reason, and such mental faculties; for these exist prior to instruction, and without them there cannot be any instruction, and consequently no virtue, since virtue is learned. But bodily advantages, such as swiftness of foot, beauty, or strength, are not essential to virtue, neither is virtue essential to them, and yet they are good things; and, according to our philosophers, even these advantages are desired by virtue for its own sake, and are used and enjoyed by it in a becoming manner. They say that this happy life is also social, and loves the advantages of its friends as its own, and for their sake wishes for them what it desires for itself, whether these friends live in the same family, as a wife, children, domestics; or in the locality where one's home is, as the citizens of the same town; or in the world at large, as the nations bound in common human brotherhood; or in the universe itself, comprehended in the heavens and the earth, as those whom they call gods, and provide as friends for the wise man, and whom we more familiarly call angels. Moreover, they say that, regarding the supreme good and evil, there is no room for doubt, and that they therefore differ from the New Academy in this respect, and they are not concerned whether a philosopher pursues those ends which they think true in the Cynic dress and manner of life or in some other. And, lastly, in regard to the three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, they declare in favor of the third. That these were the opinions and doctrines of the Old Academy, Varro asserts on the authority of Antiochus, Cicero's master and his own, though Cicero makes him out to have been more frequently in accordance with the Stoics than with the Old Academy. But of what importance is this to us, who ought to judge the matter on its own merits, rather than to understand accurately what different men have thought about it?
25. Augustine, Retractiones, 1.1.2 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
adam Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 10, 96, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153, 154, 158, 161, 165, 175, 187, 191, 208, 209, 210
adam and eve Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
admission fees, concerns and reservations about Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
aeneas Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 208
affectio Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82
affectus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 96, 140
alexandria Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
allegory/allegorical reading Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 148
ambrose Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11, 145, 149
amictorium (top) Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
anger, augustine, less shameful than lust, because body supposedly subject to will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
anger Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 154, 155, 156, 157
animal body Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11
animus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 96, 140, 141, 153, 154, 155, 156
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; does sex require pleasure? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
apatheia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 96, 157, 208
apuleius Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 164, 165
aquinas (thomas), animals and, after the fall, humans are inferior because neither can moderate lust by reason Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
arbitrium Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 144, 150
aristotle Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 148
asceticism Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 143, 210
asyndeton Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 145
athletes Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146, 149
auctoritas Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 208
augustine, anger contrasted with lust as supposedly free of bodily insubordination Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
augustine, anti-pelagianism Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
augustine, attack on stoic apatheia, misrepresents stoic acceptance of first movements as acceptance of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
augustine, before the fall, no conflict of lust with will, first view, adam and eve had only spiritual bodies Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
augustine, but augustine accepts that since we have only the gift of moderation, god blames only excess Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
augustine, effect of music on lust shows lust is not under control of the will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
augustine, esp. insubordination of male member Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
augustine, insubordinate to will as central objection to lust Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
augustine, lust Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380, 406
augustine, lust disobedient to will was not cause of fall, but a fit punishment for man Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
augustine, lust in animals all right because they have no reason for lust to rebel against Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
augustine, metriopatheia favoured for many emotions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
augustine, second view, bodies usable for sex without lust or pleasure but unused Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
augustine, third view, if there was lust and pleasure, it did not oppose will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
augustine, this in turn explains shame at sex and need for privacy Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380, 406
augustine Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
babies Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 191
barbarians Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148; Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 147, 148
bathing Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 147, 148
beatus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 157, 158, 187
bikini Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
birth Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 143, 191
blindness Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 144, 148
body Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11, 82, 140, 141, 145, 148, 149, 152, 156, 161, 208
bonum Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 145, 163, 164
buttocks Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
campestria Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146, 147, 149
caro Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96, 146
carthage Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 10, 161
catholic Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11, 148
children Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 141, 142, 148, 152, 153, 154, 156, 158, 165
christianity Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
christians Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
cicero Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 148, 152, 153, 156, 161, 162, 163, 164, 208, 210
ciuitas Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 142, 151
clement of alexandria Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
cloak Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 159, 164
concubitus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 141, 147, 151, 152, 163, 164
constantia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 208
corpus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 140, 141, 149, 150, 160
crates Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 164
cupiditas, concupiscentia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 141, 150, 153, 156, 157
cynics, cynicism Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165
dead sea scrolls Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
determinism Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146
devil Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 208
diogenes laertius Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 164
diogenes of sinope Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 159, 161, 163, 164, 165
dominus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 165
emotions Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 10, 82, 96, 140, 142, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 208, 209, 210
ennius Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 149
erubesco Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 152, 156, 159, 164
eschaton, eschatological Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 96, 208
eve Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 10, 96, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153, 158, 161, 165, 175, 187, 191, 208, 209, 210
evil Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 145, 150, 163
exemplum Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 141, 208
eyes Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 144, 145, 150, 153, 156
fear, pavor ambiguous between fear and trembling Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
fear Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 96, 210
female, women Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 143, 147, 148, 153, 154, 175
fig leaves Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 209
flagitium Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 141, 149, 175
flesh Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 10, 144
free will Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 10, 11, 191, 210
gaudeo, gaudium Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 142
gellius, aulus, compiler of philosophical doctrines, report on stoic first movements misunderstood by augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
genitals Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 175, 191, 209, 210
good, goodness Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 145, 150, 163, 164, 175, 210
grace Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 10, 145, 150, 161, 165, 187, 209
gratia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 145, 150, 161, 165
greek Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96, 149
guilt Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146, 155, 175, 209
gymnosophists Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 147, 149, 150
happiness/the happy life Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96, 157, 158
hipparchia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 164
homosexuality Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
hope Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96
husband Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 152
hygiene Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
increase and multiply command Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 153
india Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 147, 149
injury Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146
interior and structure, licentious atmosphere Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
iustus, iustitia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 155, 157, 158, 161, 163
jerome Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 210
jesus christ Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 210
jewish society, law Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
josephus Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
joy Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 96, 142, 145, 210
jubilees, book of Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
judaism Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
julian of eclanum Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 10, 11, 143, 163, 164, 209, 210
justice/righteousness Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 155, 156, 161, 209
laodicea Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
law Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 144, 145, 150, 152, 154, 155, 158
leather Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
legs Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
lex scatinia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 153
libero/libertas Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 162, 165
libido Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11, 96, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 154, 155, 156, 159, 160, 163, 175, 191, 209
life, eternal life Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 158
light, illumination Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 152, 153
love, charity Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 96, 142, 152, 208, 209, 210
lust, anger supposedly different Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
lust, augustine's main objection that lust and male member not subject to will" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380, 406
lust, lust and pleasure not necessary for sex in clement of alexandria and augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
lust, relation to will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380, 406
lust Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 165, 175, 191, 209
male, men Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 143, 147, 148
malus, malum Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 145, 163
manichees/manichaeism Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 10, 11, 146, 148, 209
marriage Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 141, 142, 143, 152, 153, 154, 156, 164, 175
martial Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
mary, mother of jesus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11, 143
medicine and medical services, in baths Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
melchisedek Bickerman and Tropper, Studies in Jewish and Christian History (2007) 659
members (bodily) Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 142, 143, 150, 155, 161, 175
membrum Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 142, 147, 150, 153, 160, 175
metempsychosis Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 208
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; accepted by augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; does sex require pleasure? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; not all emotions acceptable Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
metriopatheia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82
metus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96
mind Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 141, 142, 145, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 187, 210
mixed (and separate) bathing for men and women Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
modesty Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 151, 155, 159, 164, 191
motus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 150, 159
natura Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146, 151, 153, 155, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 175
necessity Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 175
noceo Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146
nudity Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148; Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 159
obedience/disobedience Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 209
oboedientia/inoboedientia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96, 142, 146, 160
obscenity/lewdness Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 175
obscenus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 175
oculus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 144, 147, 148, 150, 153, 156
opening (clothing) Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
orgasm Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 147
pain Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96, 146, 191, 209
peccatum Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 96, 144, 145, 146, 150, 155
pelagian/pelagianism Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 10, 11, 142, 143, 149, 209, 210
pelagius Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 10, 11
penis Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 175
peripatetics Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 162
perturbatio Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96, 208
pharisees Bickerman and Tropper, Studies in Jewish and Christian History (2007) 659
piazza armerina Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
piety, pious Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 155, 157
plato Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 156
platonicus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 10, 11, 162
platonists/platonism Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 10, 142, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 208, 209
pleasure Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 141, 159, 163
pliny the elder Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 149
poena Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 145, 153
polemic Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11, 210
praeuaricatio Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 165
pride, haughtiness Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 157
primal sin Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 153, 155, 209
principium Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 149
procreation Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 141, 142, 143, 148, 153, 154, 155
proles Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 142
prostitution Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 151, 152, 154
providence Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 187
public sex Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 159, 160
pudicitia/pudicus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 144, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153, 158, 159, 160, 163, 164, 175, 191
punishment Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96, 146, 152, 153, 155, 161, 191, 209
rabbinic halakhah Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
ratio Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 164
reason/rationality Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 82, 96, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158
retribution Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 160, 161
sadness Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146
sapiens, sapientia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 142, 155, 158
schmitt, émile Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
semen, seed Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 175, 191
sermons Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11
sex, not depend on lust and pleasure? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
sex, sex in public and shame Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380, 406
sex, sexuality Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 175, 187
sexual differentiation Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 210
shame Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 158, 159, 160, 163, 164, 175, 191, 209
shame at sex, evolutionary, versus lapsarian explanations Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380, 406
sickness Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 141, 145, 155
soul Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96, 154, 155, 156, 157
speusippus, platonist, lust excludes thought Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
st. paul Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11, 82, 141, 175
stoics, stoicism Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 10, 82, 96, 142, 149, 157, 163, 208
stuprum Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 151, 153, 154
subligar, subligaculum (loincloth) Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
temptation Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406
terence Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 210
tertullian Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 165
tosefta Eliav, A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean (2023) 148
tranquillity Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 142, 187
tree of the knowledge of good and evil Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 145, 150
tripartite soul model Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 154, 155, 156, 157, 158
tripartite time structure Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 208
trygetius Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 157
turpis/turpitudo Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 144, 151, 152, 163, 175
uerecundia Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146, 151, 155, 158, 159, 163, 175, 191
ueritas Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 165
uitium, uitiosus Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 146, 155
underwear Radicke, Roman Women’s Dress: Literary Sources, Terminology, and Historical Development (2022) 516
uoluntas Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 96, 141, 142, 148, 155, 160, 175, 191, 208
uoluptas Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 140, 141, 147, 159, 163
vagina/womb Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 11, 143, 175, 191, 210
varro Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 162, 163, 165
vergil Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 9, 208
vice, viciousness Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 154, 155, 208
virgin, virginity Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 143, 191
wife Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 143, 147, 152, 156, 158
wisdom, wise man Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 142, 154, 155, 158, 187
zeno Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine's City of God 14 (2019) 164
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 380
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 406