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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



1250
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.6
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

22 results
1. Plato, Lysis, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

246a. that that which moves itself is nothing else than the soul,—then the soul would necessarily be ungenerated and immortal. Concerning the immortality of the soul this is enough; but about its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure; let us therefore speak in that way. We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all good and
4. Plato, Philebus, 46 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

5. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

6. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

8. Aristotle, History of Animals, 8.1, 9.1 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

9. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

10. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1.9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

11. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.10.35 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

12. Cicero, On Duties, 1.107-1.115 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.107. Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus. 1.115. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores, divitiae, opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubertur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius mavult excellere. 1.107.  We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. 1.108.  Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴρων in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. 1.109.  Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus — both father and son — and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand — the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings — had no such gracious manner in social intercourse [. . .], and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. 1.110.  Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is — that is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural genius. 1.111.  If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. 1.112.  Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another [under the same circumstances] a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. 1.113.  How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. 1.114.  Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. 1.115.  To the two above-mentioned characters is added a third, which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a fourth also, which we assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers and military commands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and influence, and their opposites depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled by circumstances. But what rôle we ourselves may choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. And so some turn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to oratory, while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to excel in one, another in another.
13. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.7, 4.10, 4.39, 4.41-4.42, 4.57 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.7. ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, aliquid quid adherant G 1 causam disserendi. tum res acta sic est: Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo. Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines libidines add. G 2 iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, eiusmodi V ( ss. c ) quae Graeci pa/qh pathe X appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, relique ... 29 usitate ( libere ) H uisit. G 1 ( sic etiam 322, 10; 325,16 ) nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. Mihi vero isto modo. 4.10. sed post requires, si quid fuerit obscurius. Faciam equidem; tu tamen, ut soles, dices ista ipsa obscura planius quam dicuntur a Graecis. Enitar equidem, sed intento opus est animo, ne ne nemo K 1 omnia dilabantur, si unum aliquid effugerit. Quoniam, quae Graeci pa/qh vocant, nobis perturbationes pathe X perturbationes cf. Aug. civ. 14, 5 appellari magis placet quam morbos, in his explicandis veterem illam equidem Pythagorae primum, dein Platonis discriptionem sequar, qui animum in duas partes dividunt: alteram rationis participem faciunt, fiunt K 1 alteram expertem; in participe rationis ponunt ponunt V rec s pot X tranquillitatem, id est placidam quietamque constantiam, in illa altera motus turbidos cum cum We. tum irae tum cupiditatis, contrarios inimicosque rationi. 4.39. modum tu adhibes vitio? an vitium nullum est non parere rationi? an ratio parum praecipit nec bonum illud esse, quod aut cupias ardenter aut aut B s V 3 ut X adeptus ecferas te insolenter, nec porro malum, quo aut oppressus iaceas aut, iaceas aut aut in r. V 1 ne opprimare, mente vix constes? eaque omnia aut nimis tristia tristitia V 1 aut nimis laeta errore fieri, qui si si del. Mue. ad Seyfferti Lael. p. 253. an si = sc. error secl.? error stultis extenuetur die, ut, cum res eadem maneat, aliter ferant maneat ... ferant s maneant... ferat X (eaedem maneant M s ) cf. p. 345, 2 inveterata aliter recentia, sapientis ne attingat quidem omnino? 4.41. Qui modum igitur vitio quaerit, similiter facit, ut si posse putet eum qui se e Leucata praecipitaverit sustinere se, cum velit. ut enim id non potest, sic animus perturbatus et incitatus nec cohibere neccoloco K se potest nec, quo loco n eqoloco G 1 necquiloco R 1 ( corr. 2 ) vult, insistere. omninoque, quae crescentia omnino quaeque cr. X (quaequae K) pernitiosa GRV perniciosa sunt, eadem sunt vitiosa nascentia; 4.42. aegritudo autem ceteraeque perturbationes amplificatae certe pestiferae sunt: igitur pestiferunt ig. K 1 etiam susceptae continuo in magna pestis parte versantur. etenim ipsae ipse GV se impellunt, ubi semel a ratione discessum est, ipsaque sibi imbecillitas inb. G indulget in altumque provehitur imprudens nec reperit repperit X locum consistendi. quam ob rem nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes adprobent an moderatam iniustitiam, moderatam ignaviam, moderatam intemperantiam; qui enim vitiis modum apponit, is partem suscipit vitiorum; quod cum ipsum per se odiosum est, tum eo molestius, quia sunt in lubrico incitataque semel proclivi labuntur sustinerique sustineri quae X (qu e V) nullo modo possunt. Quid, quod idem Peripatetici perturbationes istas, quas nos nos V c s non X extirpandas putamus, non modo naturalis esse dicunt, sed etiam utiliter a natura datas? 4.57. quis enim potest, in quo libido cupiditasve sit, non libidinosus et cupidus esse? in quo ira, non iracundus? in quo angor, non anxius? in quo timor, non timidus? libidinosum igitur et iracundum et anxium et timidum censemus esse sapientem? de cuius excellentia excelentia R 1 V 1 multa quidem dici quamvis fuse fuse om. V possunt B 1 e corr. s possit X lateque possunt, sed brevissime illo modo, sapientiam sapientia GV 1 sapientem K 1 esse dici ... 390, 1 esse in ras. eius- dem spatii K 1 ( ante ras. ult. verbum fuit cognitionemque cf. p. 390, 2 ) rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit; ex quo efficitur, ut divina imitetur, humana omnia inferiora virtute ducat. in hanc tu igitur tamquam in mare, quod est ventis subiectum, perturbationem cadere cadere om. R 1 ( add. 2? ) tibi dixisti videri? quid est quod tantam gravitatem constantiamque perturbet? an inprovisum aliquid aut repentinum? quid potest accidere tale ei, ei ut v. K et GRV cui nihil, quod homini evenire possit, non praemeditatum sit ? nam quod aiunt nimia add. Bouhier ( cf. 3, 34 Phil. 11, 7 ) resecari oportere, naturalia relinqui, quid tandem potest esse naturale, quod idem nimium esse possit? sunt enim omnia ista ex errorum orta radicibus, quae evellenda et extrahenda et extrahenda om. V penitus, non circumcidenda nec amputanda sunt.
14. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

15. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.4.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

16. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 118.1-118.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

17. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.20 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

18. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 6.3, 7.87-7.88 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

6.3. He was the first to define statement (or assertion) by saying that a statement is that which sets forth what a thing was or is. He used repeatedly to say, I'd rather be mad than feel pleasure, and We ought to make love to such women as will feel a proper gratitude. When a lad from Pontus was about to attend his lectures, and asked him what he required, the answer was, Come with a new book, a new pen, and new tablets, if you have a mind to (implying the need of brains as well). When someone inquired what sort of wife he ought to marry, he said, If she's beautiful, you'll not have her to yourself; if she's ugly, you'll pay for it dearly. Being told that Plato was abusing him, he remarked, It is a royal privilege to do good and be ill spoken of. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions.
19. Augustine, Confessions, 8.5, 8.9-8.10 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

8.5. 10. But when that man of Yours, Simplicianus, related this to me about Victorinus, I burned to imitate him; and it was for this end he had related it. But when he had added this also, that in the time of the Emperor Julian, there was a law made by which Christians were forbidden to teach grammar and oratory, and he, in obedience to this law, chose rather to abandon the wordy school than Your word, by which You make eloquent the tongues of the dumb, Wisdom 10:21 - he appeared to me not more brave than happy, in having thus discovered an opportunity of waiting on You only, which thing I was sighing for, thus bound, not with the irons of another, but my own iron will. My will was the enemy master of, and thence had made a chain for me and bound me. Because of a perverse will was lust made; and lust indulged in became custom; and custom not resisted became necessity. By which links, as it were, joined together (whence I term it a chain), did a hard bondage hold me enthralled. givest away thy strength to resist him in the rest; when the hem is worn, the whole garment will ravel out, if it be not mended by timely repentance. See Müller, Lehre von der Sünde, book v., where the beginnings and alarming progress of evil in the soul are graphically described. See 9JKLJKLsec. 18, note, below}-- But that new will which had begun to develope in me, freely to worship You, and to wish to enjoy You, O God, the only sure enjoyment, was not able as yet to overcome my former wilfulness, made strong by long indulgence. Thus did my two wills, one old and the other new, one carnal, the other spiritual, contend within me; and by their discord they unstrung my soul. 11. Thus came I to understand, from my own experience, what I had read, how that the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh. Galatians 5:17 I verily lusted both ways; yet more in that which I approved in myself, than in that which I disapproved in myself. For in this last it was now rather not I, Romans 7:20 because in much I rather suffered against my will than did it willingly. And yet it was through me that custom became more combative against me, because I had come willingly whither I willed not. And who, then, can with any justice speak against it, when just punishment follows the sinner? Nor had I now any longer my wonted excuse, that as yet I hesitated to be above the world and serve You, because my perception of the truth was uncertain; for now it was certain. But I, still bound to the earth, refused to be Your soldier; and was as much afraid of being freed from all embarrassments, as we ought to fear to be embarrassed. 12. Thus with the baggage of the world was I sweetly burdened, as when in slumber; and the thoughts wherein I meditated upon You were like the efforts of those desiring to awake, who, still overpowered with a heavy drowsiness, are again steeped therein. And as no one desires to sleep always, and in the sober judgment of all waking is better, yet does a man generally defer to shake off drowsiness, when there is a heavy lethargy in all his limbs, and, though displeased, yet even after it is time to rise with pleasure yields to it, so was I assured that it were much better for me to give up myself to Your charity, than to yield myself to my own cupidity; but the former course satisfied and vanquished me, the latter pleased me and fettered me. Nor had I anything to answer You calling to me, Awake, you that sleep, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give you light. Ephesians 5:14 And to You showing me on every side, that what Thou said was true, I, convicted by the truth, had nothing at all to reply, but the drawling and drowsy words: Presently, lo, presently; Leave me a little while. But presently, presently, had no present; and my leave me a little while went on for a long while. In vain did I delight in Your law after the inner man, when another law in my members warred against the law of my mind, and brought me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. For the law of sin is the violence of custom, whereby the mind is drawn and held, even against its will; deserving to be so held in that it so willingly falls into it. O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death but Your grace only, through Jesus Christ our Lord? 8.9. 21. Whence is this monstrous thing? And why is it? Let Your mercy shine on me, that I may inquire, if so be the hiding-places of man's punishment, and the darkest contritions of the sons of Adam, may perhaps answer me. Whence is this monstrous thing? And why is it? The mind commands the body, and it obeys immediately; the mind commands itself, and is resisted. The mind commands the hand to be moved, and such readiness is there that the command is scarce to be distinguished from the obedience. Yet the mind is mind, and the hand is body. The mind commands the mind to will, and yet, though it be itself, it obeys not. Whence this monstrous thing? And why is it? I repeat, it commands itself to will, and would not give the command unless it willed; yet is not that done which it commands. But it wills not entirely; therefore it commands not entirely. For so far forth it commands, as it wills; and so far forth is the thing commanded not done, as it wills not. For the will commands that there be a will;- not another, but itself. But it does not command entirely, therefore that is not which it commands. For were it entire, it would not even command it to be, because it would already be. It is, therefore, no monstrous thing partly to will, partly to be unwilling, but an infirmity of the mind, that it does not wholly rise, sustained by truth, pressed down by custom. And so there are two wills, because one of them is not entire; and the one is supplied with what the other needs. 8.10. 22. Let them perish from Your presence, O God, as vain talkers and deceivers Titus 1:10 of the soul do perish, who, observing that there were two wills in deliberating, affirm that there are two kinds of minds in us - one good, the other evil. They themselves verily are evil when they hold these evil opinions; and they shall become good when they hold the truth, and shall consent unto the truth, that Your apostle may say unto them, You were sometimes darkness, but now are you light in the Lord. Ephesians 5:8 But, they, desiring to be light, not in the Lord, but in themselves, conceiving the nature of the soul to be the same as that which God is, are made more gross darkness; for that through a shocking arrogancy they went farther from You, the true Light, which lights every man that comes into the world. John 1:9 Take heed what you say, and blush for shame; draw near unto Him and be lightened, and your faces shall not be ashamed. I, when I was deliberating upon serving the Lord my God now, as I had long purposed - I it was who willed, I who was unwilling. It was I, even I myself. I neither willed entirely, nor was entirely unwilling. Therefore was I at war with myself, and destroyed by myself. And this destruction overtook me against my will, and yet showed not the presence of another mind, but the punishment of my own. Now, then, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me, Romans 7:17 - the punishment of a more unconfined sin, in that I was a son of Adam. 23. For if there be as many contrary natures as there are conflicting wills, there will not now be two natures only, but many. If any one deliberate whether he should go to their conventicle, or to the theatre, those men at once cry out, Behold, here are two natures - one good, drawing this way, another bad, drawing back that way; for whence else is this indecision between conflicting wills? But I reply that both are bad - that which draws to them, and that which draws back to the theatre. But they believe not that will to be other than good which draws to them. Supposing, then, one of us should deliberate, and through the conflict of his two wills should waver whether he should go to the theatre or to our church, would not these also waver what to answer? For either they must confess, which they are not willing to do, that the will which leads to our church is good, as well as that of those who have received and are held by the mysteries of theirs, or they must imagine that there are two evil natures and two evil minds in one man, at war one with the other; and that will not be true which they say, that there is one good and another bad; or they must be converted to the truth, and no longer deny that where any one deliberates, there is one soul fluctuating between conflicting wills. 24. Let them no more say, then, when they perceive two wills to be antagonistic to each other in the same man, that the contest is between two opposing minds, of two opposing substances, from two opposing principles, the one good and the other bad. For Thou, O true God, disprove, check, and convince them; like as when both wills are bad, one deliberates whether he should kill a man by poison, or by the sword; whether he should take possession of this or that estate of another's, when he cannot both; whether he should purchase pleasure by prodigality, or retain his money by covetousness; whether he should go to the circus or the theatre, if both are open on the same day; or, thirdly, whether he should rob another man's house, if he have the opportunity; or, fourthly, whether he should commit adultery, if at the same time he have the means of doing so - all these things concurring in the same point of time, and all being equally longed for, although impossible to be enacted at one time. For they rend the mind amid four, or even (among the vast variety of things men desire) more antagonistic wills, nor do they yet affirm that there are so many different substances. Thus also is it in wills which are good. For I ask them, is it a good thing to have delight in reading the apostle, or good to have delight in a sober psalm, or good to discourse on the gospel? To each of these they will answer, It is good. What, then, if all equally delight us, and all at the same time? Do not different wills distract the mind, when a man is deliberating which he should rather choose? Yet are they all good, and are at variance until one be fixed upon, whither the whole united will may be borne, which before was divided into many. Thus, also, when above eternity delights us, and the pleasure of temporal good holds us down below, it is the same soul which wills not that or this with an entire will, and is therefore torn asunder with grievous perplexities, while out of truth it prefers that, but out of custom forbears not this.
20. Augustine, Against Julian, 3.1.2, 4.8.52, 4.41 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

21. Augustine, The City of God, 14.6, 14.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

14.6. But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man's will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing that ought to be hated, will remain. 14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible.
22. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 132



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
action, vs. virtue of character Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 206, 217
action Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 200
actions, relation to virtues of character Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 129, 139
affect/affection Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81, 82
anger Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 120, 129
animals, characters (dispositions) of Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 120
animals, emotions (affections, passions) of Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 120
antipater of tarsus, stoic, end of aiming well distinguished from target Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
antisthenes, socratic, against pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
aokhlēsia, freedom from disturbance Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; accepted (but note different senses) by speusippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; apatheia already rejected by aristotle in opposition to speusippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194, 195
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; did christ exhibit apatheia? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; not even then Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; some emotions for stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; stoics Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194, 195
apatheia Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81
aretê Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17
aristotle, ethics and politics of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
aristotle, metriopatheia in opposition to speusippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194, 195
aristotle, schadenfreude Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
aristotle Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17; Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
ataraxia, freedom from disturbance Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
augustine, anti-pelagianism Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, emotion an act of will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, it is pride and vanity to deny this Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, lust Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, relation to stoics Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, two wills in humans Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
behaviour Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81
body Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
bravery Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17
brown, l. Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 209
burnet, john Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
cato Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
character, moral Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 206, 216, 217
choice Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 206, 209, 217
christ, did christ have emotions? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
christology, natures of christ, augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
christology, natures of christ, basil of caesarea Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
christology, natures of christ, jerome Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
christology, natures of christ, origen and rufinus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, aristotelian metriopatheia ridiculed as belief in moderate perturbation, vice or evil Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
cicero, platonizing roman statesman, orator, translation of pathos as perturbatio Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
cicero Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 93
cognitive theory Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
consequentialism Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 200
constitution Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 94
decision (choice, proairesis) Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 129
deliberation Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 217; Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 120
deontology Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 200
desire Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 206, 217
distress Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 82
dynamis Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 108
edwards, c. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
emotion, ancient philosophical theory of Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81, 82
emotion Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 94
emotions (passions, affections, pathē), human and animal Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 120
emotions (passions, affections, pathē), relation to virtues of character Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 129, 139
emotions passions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
epictetus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
epicureans, freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
equity (epieikeia) Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 94
ergon Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 209, 217
ethics, of stoicism Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
ethics, stoic Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81
eudaimonia Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17, 93, 109
fear Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 120
fine, the Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 217
friendship Kelsey, Mind and World in Aristotle's De Anima (2021) 72; Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 93
functional role Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 120
gauthier, r.-a Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
goodness, appearance of Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 216, 217
goodness, of action Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 200, 217
goodness, of persons Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 200
goods, benefit Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81, 82
grant, a. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
harm Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81, 82
hexis Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17, 108, 109
homosexual love Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
honor Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
honourableness Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
hursthouse, r. Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 200
jealousy (phthonos), bad Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
julian of eclanum, bishop, pelagian opponent of augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
justice, natural justice Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 93
justice Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17, 93, 94
kantianism Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 200
law, natural law Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 93, 94
logos Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17, 109
lord's prayer and forgiveness, need for daily forgiveness" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
love, homosexual love Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
love, the right kind of homosexual love is not an emotion (pathos) in stoics Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
mesotês Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 94
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; but not for lust or pride Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; but not for schadenfreude Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; implies not medium quantity, but appropriate emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; lactantius Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; not all emotions acceptable Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195, 208, 399
metriopatheia\u2003 Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
middle (meson) Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 206, 209, 216, 217
middle platonism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
middle state (mesotes) Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 206, 209, 217
natorp, p. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
nature, contrary to Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81
nature, living in accordance with Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81
nature, of humans Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 209, 217
nature Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 82
neoplatonism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
normative self or identity Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
opinion Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 82
pain (the painful) Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 120, 139
panaetius Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
para physin Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 94
passion, irrationality of Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81
passion Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81, 82; Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 108, 109
passions emotions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
pelagius and pelagianism, hence alleged to believe apatheia and sinlessness attainable Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
person, concepts of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
persona Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
phronêsis Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17
plato, discusses opponents of pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
plato Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 93; Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
pleasure, opponents of pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
pleasure, schadenfreude Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
pleasure Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 82; Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 109; Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 139
pohlenz, max Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
praxis Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 94
pride, augustine, denial of need for forgiveness is pride or vanity Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
pride, per contra root of all other sins in ecclesiasticus, augustine, and gregory the great Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
proairesis Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 108
rabbow, paul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
reason, and virtuous action Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 206, 209
reason Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81, 82; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
self-knowledge Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
seneca, the younger, stoic, aristotelian metriopatheia ridiculed as belief in moderate disease Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 208
seneca, the younger, stoic Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
seneca Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
shame Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17
skill Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 209
socrates Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 93; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
speusippus, platonist, against pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
speusippus, platonist, aokhlēsia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195
speusippus, platonist, virtue as apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194, 195
spirit pneuma Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
stoic Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81, 82
stoicism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 74
stoics Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 93
sôphrosynê Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 17
vanity, augustine, denial of need for forgiveness is vanity or pride Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
virtue, aristotle, virtue aims at the mean, a substantive doctrine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194, 195
virtue, speusippus, virtue is apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194, 195
virtue Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 206, 209, 216, 217; Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81
virtue ethics Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 200, 206, 217
virtues, of character Sattler, Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (2021) 129, 139
will, two wills in humans Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
williams, bernard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194
wisdom, virtue of Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 216
wise man Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 368
wish, object of Harte, Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows (2017) 216, 217
with Liatsi, Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature: Aspects of Ethical Reasoning from Homer to Aristotle and Beyond (2021) 93, 94, 108, 109
woods, michael Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194
worldview Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 81
zeller, e. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194, 195
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 194
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 195, 208, 399