6. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.2.12-1.2.30, 1.2.35, 1.2.40-1.2.48, 4.6 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
| 1.2.12. Among the associates of Socrates were Critias and Alcibiades; and none wrought so many evils to the state. For Critias in the days of the oligarchy bore the palm for greed and violence: Alcibiades, for his part, exceeded all in licentiousness and insolence under the democracy. 1.2.13. Now I have no intention of excusing the wrong these two men wrought the state; but I will explain how they came to be with Socrates . 1.2.14. Ambition was the very life-blood of both: no Athenian was ever like them. They were eager to get control of everything and to outstrip every rival in notoriety. They knew that Socrates was living on very little, and yet was wholly independent; that he was strictly moderate in all his pleasures; and that in argument he could do what he liked with any disputant. 1.2.15. Sharing this knowledge and the principles I have indicated, is it to be supposed that these two men wanted to adopt the simple life of Socrates, and with this object in view sought his society? Did they not rather think that by associating with him they would attain the utmost proficiency in speech and action? 1.2.16. For my part I believe that, had heaven granted them the choice between the life they saw Socrates leading and death, they would have chosen rather to die. Their conduct betrayed their purpose; for as soon as they thought themselves superior to their fellow-disciples they sprang away from Socrates and took to politics; it was for political ends that they had wanted Socrates . 1.2.17. But it may be answered: Socrates should have taught his companions prudence before politics. I do not deny it; but I find that all teachers show their disciples how they themselves practise what they teach, and lead them on by argument. And I know that it was so with Socrates : he showed his companions that he was a gentleman himself, and talked most excellently of goodness and of all things that concern man. 1.2.18. I know further that even those two were prudent so long as they were with Socrates, not from fear of fine or blow, but because at that time they really believed in prudent conduct. 1.2.19. But many self-styled lovers of wisdom may reply: A just man can never become unjust; a prudent man can never become wanton; in fact no one having learned any kind of knowledge can become ignorant of it. I do not hold with this view. Cyropaedia VII. v. 75. Against Antisthenes. I notice that as those who do not train the body cannot perform the functions proper to the body, so those who do not train the soul cannot perform the functions of the soul: for they cannot do what they ought to do nor avoid what they ought not to do. 1.2.20. For this cause fathers try to keep their sons, even if they are prudent lads, out of bad company: for the society of honest men is a training in virtue, but the society of the bad is virtue’s undoing. As one of the poets says: From the good shalt thou learn good things; but if thou minglest with the bad thou shalt lose even what thou hast of wisdom. Theognis And another says: Ah, but a good man is at one time noble, at another base. unknown 1.2.21. My testimony agrees with theirs; for I see that, just as poetry is forgotten unless it is often repeated, so instruction, when no longer heeded, fades from the mind. To forget good counsel is to forget the experiences that prompted the soul to desire prudence: and when those are forgotten, it is not surprising that prudence itself is forgotten. 1.2.22. I see also that men who take to drink or get involved in love intrigues lose the power of caring about right conduct and avoiding evil. For many who are careful with their money no sooner fall in love than they begin to waste it: and when they have spent it all, they no longer shrink from making more by methods which they formerly avoided because they thought them disgraceful. 1.2.23. How then can it be impossible for one who was prudent to lose his prudence, for one who was capable of just action to become incapable? To me indeed it seems that whatever is honourable, whatever is good in conduct is the result of training, and that this is especially true of prudence. For in the same body along with the soul are planted the pleasures which call to her: Abandon prudence, and make haste to gratify us and the body. 1.2.24. And indeed it was thus with Critias and Alcibiades. So long as they were with Socrates, they found in him an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions. But when they parted from him, Critias fled to Thessaly, and got among men who put lawlessness before justice; while Alcibiades, on account of his beauty, was hunted by many great ladies, and because of his influence at Athens and among her allies he was spoilt by many powerful men: and as athletes who gain an easy victory in the games are apt to neglect their training, so the honour in which he was held, the cheap triumph he won with the people, led him to neglect himself. 1.2.25. Such was their fortune: and when to pride of birth, confidence in wealth, vainglory and much yielding to temptation were added corruption and long separation from Socrates, what wonder if they grew overbearing? 1.2.26. For their wrongdoing, then, is Socrates to be called to account by his accuser? And does he deserve no word of praise for having controlled them in the days of their youth, when they would naturally be most reckless and licentious? Other cases, at least, are not so judged. 1.2.27. For what teacher of flute, lyre, or anything else, after making his pupils proficient, is held to blame if they leave him for another master, and then turn out incompetent? What father, whose son bears a good character so long as he is with one master, but goes wrong after he has attached himself to another, throws the blame on the earlier teacher? Is it not true that the worse the boy turns out with the second, the higher is his father’s praise of the first? Nay, fathers themselves, living with their sons, are not held responsible for their boys’ wrongdoing if they are themselves prudent men. 1.2.28. This is the test which should have been applied to Socrates too. If there was anything base in his own life, he might fairly have been thought vicious. But, if his own conduct was always prudent, how can he be fairly held to blame for the evil that was not in him? 1.2.29. Nevertheless, although he was himself free from vice, if he saw and approved of base conduct in them, he would be open to censure. Well, when he found that Critias loved Euthydemus IV. ii. 1. and wanted to lead him astray, he tried to restrain him by saying that it was mean and unbecoming in a gentleman to sue like a beggar to the object of his affection, whose good opinion he coveted, stooping to ask a favour that it was wrong to grant. 1.2.30. As Critias paid no heed whatever to this protest, Socrates, it is said, exclaimed in the presence of Euthydemus and many others, Critias seems to have the feelings of a pig: he can no more keep away from Euthydemus than pigs can help rubbing themselves against stones. 1.2.35. Since you are ignorant, Socrates, said Charicles in an angry tone, we put our order into language easier to understand. You may not hold any converse whatever with the young. Well then, said Socrates, that there may be no question raised about my obedience, please fix the age limit below which a man is to be accounted young. So long, replied Charicles, as he is not permitted to sit in the Council, because as yet he lacks wisdom. You shall not converse with anyone who is under thirty. 1.2.40. Indeed, there is a story told of Alcibiades, that, when he was less than twenty years old, he had a talk about laws with Pericles, his guardian, the first citizen in the State. 1.2.41. Tell me, Pericles, he said, can you teach me what a law is? Certainly, he replied. Then pray teach me. For whenever I hear men praised for keeping the laws, it occurs to me that no one can really deserve that praise who does not know what a law is. 1.2.42. Well, Alcibiades, there is no great difficulty about what you desire. You wish to know what a law is. Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not to be done. Do they suppose it is right to do good or evil? Good, of course, young man, — not evil. 1.2.43. But if, as happens under an oligarchy, not the majority, but a minority meet and enact rules of conduct, what are these? Whatsoever the sovereign power in the State, after deliberation, enacts and directs to be done is known as a law. If, then, a despot, being the sovereign power, enacts what the citizens are to do, are his orders also a law? Yes, whatever a despot as ruler enacts is also known as a law. 1.2.44. But force, the negation of law, what is that, Pericles? Is it not the action of the stronger when he constrains the weaker to do whatever he chooses, not by persuasion, but by force? That is my opinion. Then whatever a despot by enactment constrains the citizens to do without persuasion, is the negation of law? I think so: and I withdraw my answer that whatever a despot enacts without persuasion is a law. 1.2.45. And when the minority passes enactments, not by persuading the majority, but through using its power, are we to call that force or not? Everything, I think, that men constrain others to do without persuasion, whether by enactment or not, is not law, but force. It follows then, that whatever the assembled majority, through using its power over the owners of property, enacts without persuasion is not law, but force? 1.2.46. Alcibiades, said Pericles, at your age, I may tell you, we, too, were very clever at this sort of thing. For the puzzles we thought about and exercised our wits on were just such as you seem to think about now. Ah, Pericles, cried Alcibiades, if only I had known you intimately when you were at your cleverest in these things! 1.2.47. So soon, then, as they presumed themselves to be the superiors of the politicians, they no longer came near Socrates . For apart from their general want of sympathy with him, they resented being cross-examined about their errors when they came. Politics had brought them to Socrates, and for politics they left him. 1.2.48. But Criton was a true associate of Socrates, as were Chaerophon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas, and others who consorted with him not that they might shine in the courts or the assembly, but that they might become gentlemen, and be able to do their duty by house and household, and relatives and friends, and city and citizens. of these not one, in his youth or old age, did evil or incurred censure. |
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