| 1. Parmenides, Fragments, b1.30, b8.51, b7.3-4 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 77 |
| 2. Septuagint, Prayer of Azariah, 2.43-2.45 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 64 |
| 3. Antisthenes, Fragments, 50c, 50a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 77 |
4. Plato, Theaetetus, 176b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism/stoics/stoic epistemology Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206| 176b. ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δʼ οὔ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς οὐδαμῇ | |
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| 5. Plato, Republic, 7.532a, 6.510b, 6.511c (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
6. Plato, Philebus, 39a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoic, epistemology Found in books: MacDougall, Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition (2022) 133| 39a. ΣΩ. ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμπίπτουσα εἰς ταὐτὸν κἀκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνονταί μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράφῃ τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα, δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ λόγοι ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι· ψευδῆ δʼ ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρʼ ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς γράψῃ, τἀναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη. | 39a. Soc. Memory unites with the senses, and they and the feelings which are connected with them seem to me almost to write words in our souls; and when the feeling in question writes the truth, true opinions and true statements are produced in us; but when the writer within us writes falsehoods, the resulting opinions and statements are the opposite of true. |
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| 7. Melissus, Fragments, b8 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 77 |
| 8. Antisthenes, Fragments, 50c, 50a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 77 |
| 9. Aristotle, Memory And Reminiscence, 449b31, 449b1 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 10. Aristotle, Soul, 404a27, 404a28, 404a29, 427a18-429a9 (=3.3) (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 60 |
| 11. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.1, 1094b19 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 12. Timon of Phlius, Fragments, 11-12, 19-20, 44-45, 48, 54, 60, 66, 57 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 77 |
| 13. Aristotle, Physics, 1.5, 188a27 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 14. Aristotle, Topics, 2.7, 113a32 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 15. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1235b14, 1235b15, 1235b16, 1235b17, 1235b18, 1235b13 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 65 |
| 16. Theophrastus, Metaphysics, 9a11, 9b21-24, 8b10 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 61 |
| 17. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 7.1, 1009b12, 1009b13, 1009b14, 1009b15, 1009b28, 1010a32, 1010b1, 1012a29, 1062a31, 980a1, 996b26 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 66 |
| 18. Aristotle, Sense And Sensibilia, 437a3 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 61 |
| 19. Antisthenes of Rhodes, Fragments, 50c, 50a (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 77 |
20. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.43, 3.16, 4.3, 5.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of •epistemology, stoic Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 107, 289; Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 142| 2.43. Quae quod quod Mdv. cum Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt sunt visa BE pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est desitum est contra eos BE disputari. dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selectione se lectione R electione BE delectione V expoliarent expoliarent N ( sed hamulus ad litt. r pertinens et ent in ras. ), V; expoliaverunt AR spoliaverunt BE nec ei quicquam, aut unde oriretur, darent, oriretur darent ARN 2 ore retunderet BE orientur darent N 1 orirentur darent V aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt. Erillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit, sed nec optimum nec quo vita gubernari possit. itaque hic ipse iam pridem est reiectus; post enim Chrysippum contra eum add. Se. (est contra eum disp. H. A. Koch p. 37 ) non sane est disputatum. Restatis igitur vos; nam cum Academicis incerta incerta V ĩcerta (˜ et cer ab alt. man., cer in ras. ) N uncta AR iuncta BE luctatio est, qui nihil affirmant et quasi desperata cognitione certi id sequi volunt, quodcumque veri simile videatur. 3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. 4.3. Existimo igitur, inquam, Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, auditores Platonis BE Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum, Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitutam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni, cum Polemonem audisset, cur et ab eo ipso et a superioribus dissideret. quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim quid mutandum putes nec expectes, dum ad omnia dicam, quae a te a te ed. princ. Rom. ante dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra confligendum puto. 5.23. de illis, cum volemus. Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tamquam tamquam (tanquā R) tranquillitas RN tranquillitas tamquam BE tranquillitas ( om. tamquam) V tranquillitas, quam appellant eu)qumi/an, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea ipsa secl. Se. est est ipsa BE beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sit ( utroque loco ) dett. sint sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus diximus p. 163, 16 sqq. naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil quod non aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse del. Lamb. ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quicquam quicquam quitquid BE omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. ergo ergo igitur BE instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium. | 2.43. Aristo and Pyrrho thought all these things utterly worthless, and said, for example, that there was absolutely nothing to choose between the most perfect health and the most grievous sickness; and consequently men have long ago quite rightly given up arguing against them. For in insisting upon the unique importance of virtue in such a sense as to rob it of any power of choice among external things and to deny it any starting-point or basis, they destroyed the very virtue they desired to cherish. Again, Erillus, in basing everything on knowledge, fixed his eyes on one definite Good, but this not the greatest Good, nor one that could serve as the guide of life. Accordingly Erillus himself has long ago been set aside; since Chrysippus no one has even troubled to refute him."Accordingly your school remains; for there is no coming to grips with the Academics, who affirm nothing positively, and despairing of a knowledge of certain truth, make up their minds to take apparent probability as their guide. < 3.16. "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 4.3. "My view, then, Cato," I proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master's predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows â but I should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting while I deal with the whole of your discourse; for I think I shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. < 5.23. "The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. < |
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21. Cicero, On Duties, 1.15, 3.69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 293| 1.15. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae. Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima discripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium. 3.69. Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis. | 3.69. Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship â although I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and again â which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. < |
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22. Cicero, Topica, 97 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, epistemology Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70| 97. nec solum perpetuae actiones sed etiam partes orationis isdem locis adiuvantur, partim propriis partim communibus; ut in principiis, quibus quibus secl. Friedrich ut benevoli, ut dociles, ut attenti sint qui audiant, efficiendum est propriis locis; itemque narrationes ut ad suos fines spectent, id est ut planae sint, ut breves, ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae moderatae codd. : moratae edd. vett. , ut cum dignitate. Quae quamquam in tota oratione esse debent, magis tamen sunt propria narrandi. | |
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23. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.57-1.58, 2.4, 2.9, 5.85 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of •stoicism, epistemology Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 59; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 65, 107, 293| 1.57. Habet primum memoriam, et eam infinitam rerum innumerabilium. quam Men. 81 e sqq. quidem Plato Quam quidem Plato cf. 247, 4 Ego autem recordationem esse volt vitae superioris. nam in illo libro, qui inscribitur Menon, meñ K 1 (ñ erasum, non in mg. add. 2 ) me non V 1 pusionem quendam Socrates interrogat quaedam geometrica de dimensione quadrati. ad ea sic ille respondet respondet s respondit X Boeth. ut puer, et tamen ita faciles interrogationes sunt, ut gradatim gradatum RV 1 respondens eodem perveniat, quo si quo si quasi Boeth. K 1 V 1 ( corr. K c V c geometrica didicisset. ex quo effici volt Socrates, ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi recordari. quem locum multo etiam accuratius explicat in eo sermone, quem habuit eo ipso die, quo excessit e Phaed. 72e sqq. vita; docet enim quemvis, qui omnium rerum rudis esse videatur, bene interroganti interrogati V 1 respondentem respondem X ( corr. K 2 V c ) declarare se non tum cf. Lact. inst. 7, 22,19 illa discere, sed reminiscendo recognoscere, nec vero fieri ullo modo posse, ut a pueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi consignatas consignata V 1 (s add. c ) cognitgnatas primo R in animis notiones, quas quas add. K c e)nnoi/as ennoias X (i in e corr. V 1 ) ENNOUAC Boeth. vocant, haberemus, nisi animus, ante quam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset. 1.58. cumque nihil esset , lac. ind. Po. (suppl. fere : eorum quae sensibus perciperentur cl. div.2,9 Tim.28A) ut omnibus locis a Platone disseritur—nihil enim ille post enim hab. VBP s putat esse, quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum esse, esse s esset quod semper tale sit quale quale EIDEAN corr. Sey. est ( i)de/an appellat ille, nos speciem)—, non potuit animus haec in corpore inclusus c lusus V (ss ) adgnoscere, ad gn. G 1 a gn. V cognita attulit; ex quo tam multarum rerum rerum om. V cognitionis admiratio tollitur. neque ea plane videt animus, cum repente in in om. Boeth. tam insolitum tamque perturbatum domicilium inmigravit, sed cum se collegit collegit s recollegit Boeth. colligit X (col V) atque recreavit, tum adgnoscit ad gn. R 1 agn. V Boeth. illa reminiscendo. in illo libro... 11 vita et 14 aiunt enim nullo modo fieri pos- se ut ... 247, 3 reminiscendo ( om. 18 cumque... 24 tollitur) libere reddit Boethius in Cic. top. 76 V p. 391, 7 Bai. (Stangl, Jahrb. 127 S. 290. 299) 2.4. quid futurum putamus, cum adiutore populo, quo utebamur utebamur ex -ntur G 1 antea, nunc minime nos uti posse videamus? est enim philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens est philosophia ... 21 fugiens Lact. inst. 3, 25,2 eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa, ut, vel si quis universam velit vituperare, secundo id populo facere possit, vel si in in V 3 in r. eam quam nos maxime sequimur conetur invadere, magna habere possit auxilia e e add. V 2 s om. X a s reliquorum philosophorum disciplinis. est itaque philosophia... 26 disciplinis H Nos autem universae philosophiae vituperatoribus respondimus in Hortensio, pro Academia autem quae dicenda essent, satis accurate in Academicis quattuor libris explicata arbitramur; sed tamen tantum abest ut scribi contra nos nolimus, nolimus ex nolumus R 1 ex uolumus G 1 ut id etiam maxime optemus. in ipsa enim Graecia philosophia tanto ipsa enim Graeciae philosophia tantum Boeth. in honore numquam fuisset, nisi doctissimorum contentionibus dissensionibusque viguisset. viguisset V ( ss. 2 ) cf. praef. crevisset Boeth. 2.9. Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partis partes K 1 R 1?ecorr. disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset, quid in quaque re re add. in mg. K 2 veri simile esset, inveniri, invenire GK 1 (~i 2 aut c ) RV 1 (i V rec ) sed etiam quod esset ea maxuma dicendi exercitatio. qua qua G princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. nostra autem memoria Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum: ad quam nos consuetudinem a familiaribus nostris adducti in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumpsimus. itaque cum ante meridiem dictioni operam dedissemus, sicut pridie feceramus, post meridiem meridie X (-di V me- ridi ach. G) meridiẽ K 2 R c? cf. de orat.2, 367 et Usener, Jahrb f. Phil. 117 p. 79 in Academiam descendimus. in qua disputationem habitam non quasi narrantes exponimus, exponemus V 2 sed eisdem ex eisdem K (exp. 2 aut 1) fere verbis, ut actum disputatumque est. Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum mundum V 1 sermo ille nobis institutus et a tali et ali V 1 et tali V c quodam ductus ductus Crat. inductus cf. Brut. 21 exordio: | |
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24. Cicero, On Laws, 1.39 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 289 | 1.39. For the rest, who indulged their appetites and pampered their passions, pursuing some objects and avoiding others, for no other reason than their amount of gratification or annoyance, though they sometimes speak truth, as we candidly allow, -- let them talk in their own gardens, and let them retire from all the political debates respecting the interests of the state, of which they know nothing, nor, indeed, care to know. As to that new academy of which Arcesilas and Carneades are the leaders, and who attack all sects and parties, we implore them not to interrupt us in our present discussion; for if they invade us on these subjects in which our minds are thoroughly familiar and resolved, they will seek their own ruin. But I, who wish rather to please, dare not excite their resentment; for in questions of this nature, we would fain proceed without any mixture of sophistry or anger; and any defects in our arguments, may surely be expiated without such fumigations as the invectives of criticism. ATTICUS: As you use the word 'expiation,' permit me to enquire what views you entertain respecting the justice of punishment, where laws have been broken and violated. Do you think such offences against laws can be expiated without enforcing the penalty, either directly or indirectly? MARCUS: I think not. I conceive there is no other expiation for the crimes and impieties of men. The guilty therefore must pay the penalty, and bear the punishment. The retributions they undergo are not so much those inflicted by courts of justice, which were not always in being, do not exist at present in many places, and even where established, are frequently biased and partial; but the retributions I principally intend are those of conscience. The Furies pursue and torment them, not with their burning torches, as the poets feign, but by remorse and the tortures arising from guilt. Was it the fear of punishment, and not the nature of the thing itself that ought to restrain mankind from wickedness, what, I would ask, could give villains the least uneasiness, abstracting from all fears of this kind? And yet none of them was ever so audaciously impudent, but he endeavoured to justify what he had done by some law of nature, denied the fact, or else pretended a just sorrow for it. Now if the wicked have the confidence to appeal to these laws, with what profound respect ought good men to treat them? There is the greater need, therefore, of insisting on the natural and unavoidable penalties of conscience. For if either direct punishment, or the fear of it, was what deterred from a vicious course of life, and not the turpitude of the thing itself, then none could he guilty of injustice, in a moral sense, and the greatest offenders ought rather to be called imprudent than wicked. |
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| 25. Cicero, De Finibus, 2.43, 4.3, 5.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 107, 289 |
26. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.11-1.12, 1.17-1.20, 3.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, epistemology •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 289, 293; Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 35 | 1.11. To those again who are surprised at my choice of a system to which to give my allegiance, I think that a sufficient answer has been given in the four books of my Academica. Nor is it the case that I have come forward as the champion of a lost cause and of a position now abandoned. When men die, their doctrines do not perish with them, though perhaps they suffer from the loss of their authoritative exponent. Take for example the philosophical method referred to, that of a purely negative dialectic which refrains from pronouncing any positive judgement. This, after being originated by Socrates, revived by Arcesilas, and reinforced by Carneades, has flourished right down to our own period; though I understand that in Greece itself it is now almost bereft of adherents. But this I ascribe not to the fault of the Academy but to the dullness of mankind. If it is a considerable matter to understand any one of the systems of philosophy singly, how much harder is it to master them all! Yet this is the task that confronts those whose principle is to discover the truth by the method of arguing both for and against all the schools. 1.12. In an undertaking so extensive and so arduous, I do not profess to have attained success, though I do claim to have attempted it. At the same time it would be impossible for the adherents of this method to dispense altogether with any standard of guidance. This matter it is true I have discussed elsewhere more thoroughly; but some people are so dull and slow of apprehension that they appear to require repeated explanations. Our position is not that we hold that nothing is true, but that we assert that all true sensations are associated with false ones so closely resembling them that they contain no infallible mark to guide our judgement and assent. From this followed the corollary, that many sensations are probable, that is, though not amounting to a full perception they are yet possessed of a certain distinctness and clearness, and so can serve to direct the conduct of the wise man. 1.17. However we can discuss this some other time. For the moment we will, if you please, continue the topic which we had begun." "Agreed," cried Cotta; "but to let the newcomer know what is the subject of discussion" — here he glanced at me — "I will explain that we were debating the nature of the gods: a question which seemed to me, as it always does, an extremely obscure one, and upon which I was therefore inquiring of Velleius as to the opinion of Epicurus. So if you do not mind, Velleius," he continued, "please resume the exposition that you had begun." "I will do so," replied Velleius, "although it is not I but you who have been reinforced by an ally — since both of you," he said, with a smile in our direction, "are disciples of Philo, and have learned from him to know nothing." "What we have learned," I rejoined, "shall be Cotta's affair; but pray don't think I have come to act as his ally, but as a listener, and an impartial and unprejudiced listener too, under no sort of bond or obligation willy nilly to uphold some fixed opinion." 1.18. After this, Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect, dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if he had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus's intervals of worlds. Do not attend, says he, to these idle and imaginary tales; nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God of Plato's Timaeus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the Πρόνοια of the Stoics, which the Latins call Providence; nor to that round, that burning, revolving deity, the World, endowed with sense and understanding; the prodigies and wonders, not of inquisitive philosophers, but of dreamers! For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be modelled and built by God? What materials, what tools, what bars, what machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the air, fire, water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the architect? From whence arose those five forms, of which the rest were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the senses? It is tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort that they look more like things to be desired than to be discovered. But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius, is the same as Plato's God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato's God? 1.18. Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render 'Providence') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. 1.19. What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; 1.20. but the prize example is that the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution? What thing is there that has a beginning but not an end? While as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato's creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried though? If on the contrary it is something different, I ask why it made the world mortal, and not everlasting as did Plato's divine creator? 3.95. "I on my side," replied Cotta, "only desire to be refuted. My purpose was rather to discuss the doctrines I have expounded than to pronounce judgement upon them, and I am confident that you can easily defeat me." "Oh, no doubt," interposed Velleius; "why, he thinks that even our dreams are sent to us by Jupiter — though dreams themselves are not so unsubstantial as a Stoic disquisition on the nature of the gods." Here the conversation ended, and we parted, Velleius thinking Cotta's discourse to be the truer, while I felt that that of Balbus approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth. |
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27. Cicero, Academica, 1.30-1.33, 1.41-1.42, 1.44, 2.7-2.8, 2.16, 2.33, 2.60, 2.62, 2.83, 2.94, 2.145 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of •epistemology, stoic •stoicism, epistemology Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 59, 70; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 102, 107, 289, 293; Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138, 139| 1.30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus tamen non non om. *g ; tamen non in ras. p esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. mentem volebant rerum esse esse ereum ngf iudicem, solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset (hanc illi i)de/an appellabant, appellabant *gw -labantur m 1 -lant pg iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere). 1.31. sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur nec percipere ullo modo res eas quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quod quod *g quae *d essent aut ita parvae ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae ut nihil umquam unum esset et add. Ha. aut Reid constans, ne idem ne idem Man. eidem *g*d quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. itaque hanc omnem partem artem Non. rerum opinabilem opinabilium Goer. appellabant; itaque ... appellabant Non. p. 148 (opinabile) appellabat Non. ? 1.32. scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus notionibus s ? Lb. mot- *g*d atque rationibus. qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant et has ad omnia de quibus disceptabatur adhibebant; verborum etiam explicatio explicari *g probabatur, probatur *g id est qua de causa quaeque essent esset m p px ita nominata, quam e)tumologi/an appellabant; post argumentis quibusdam quibusdam om. *d et quasi rerum notis ducibus et rer. not. quasi duc. Dav. utebantur ad probandum ad prob. rursus accedit s et ad concludendum id quod explanari volebant. in qua in quo Man. denique Mue. tradebatur omnis dialecticae dialectica w disciplina id est orationis ratione conclusae; conclusa rw huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. 1.33. Haec forma forma om. *d erat illis prima, a Platone tradita; cuius quas acceperim dissupationes dissupationes Bai. disputat- *g*d si vultis exponam.' Nos vero volumus inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam. ATT. Et recte quidem quidem om. *d inquit respondes; praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. VA. “Aristoteles igitur igitur om. *d primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, quas ... erat amplexatus pars codicum Non. p. 470 ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, ferret Ern. vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 1.41. visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec? hoc Dav. ' ATT. nos vero inquit; inquam Ald. quonam quoniam ng 1 quam p 1 ; (quo)nam ... sed in ras. p enim alio alio om. *dn modo katalhmpto\n diceres? — VA. “sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum probatum *g esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat at, del. Man. ac gf cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re in re iure mw usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existebat existebat Pl. -erat p -eret rw extiterat *g etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla imb. adsensio Pl. et cum falso incognitoque communis. 1.42. sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam quam dixi collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis paruis *g numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod ut supra dixi comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod quod om. *g, in ras. p omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam eam nat. Man. n. eam Fab. posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur; e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. aperituntur Man. -rirentur Dav. reperirentur Gr. errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam ignorationem s et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constantis assensionis a virtute sapientiaque removebat. Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus.” 1.44. Tum ego Cum Zenone inquam “ut accepimus Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi quidem mihi *gp videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et vel ut iam ante et iam ante Dav. ad Lact. epit. 32 et ueluti amantes *g*d Socratem Democritum Anaxagoram Empedoclem omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus imbecillos inbecilles p 1 sgf animos brevia curricula vitae et et om. sgf ut Democritus cf. p. 43, 13 in profundo veritatem esse demersam, demersam gfx dim- smnp m diuersam *d opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati ueritate *g relinqui, deinceps deinceps denique Bentl. densis IACvHeusde ' Cic. filopla/twn ' ( 1836 ) 236 n. 1 omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. cf. Lact. inst. 3, 4, 11. 28, 12 s. 30, 6 Democr. fr. 117 Deiels Emped. fr. 2 D. ( Kranz Herm. 47, 29 n. 2 ) | |
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28. Cicero, On Divination, 2.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 289| 2.15. Potestne igitur earum rerum, quae nihil habent rationis, quare futurae sint, esse ulla praesensio? Quid est enim aliud fors, quid fortuna, quid casus, quid eventus, nisi cum sic aliquid cecidit, sic evenit, ut vel aliter cadere atque evenire potuerit? Quo modo ergo id, quod temere fit caeco casu et volubilitate fortunae, praesentiri et praedici potest? | 2.15. Can there, then, be any foreknowledge of things for whose happening no reason exists? For we do not apply the words chance, luck, accident, or casualty except to an event which has so occurred or happened that it either might not have occurred at all, or might have occurred in any other way. How, then, is it possible to foresee and to predict an event that happens at random, as the result of blind accident, or of unstable chance? 2.15. Sleep is regarded as a refuge from every toil and care; but it is actually made the fruitful source of worry and fear. In fact dreams would be less regarded on their own account and would be viewed with greater indifference had they not been taken under the guardianship of philosophers — not philosophers of the meaner sort, but those of the keenest wit, competent to see what follows logically and what does not — men who are considered well-nigh perfect and infallible. Indeed, if their arrogance had not been resisted by Carneades, it is probable that by this time they would have adjudged the only philosophers. While most of my war of words has been with these men, it is not because I hold them in especial contempt, but on the contrary, it is because they seem to me to defend their own views with the greatest acuteness and skill. Moreover, it is characteristic of the Academy to put forward no conclusions of its own, but to approve those which seem to approach nearest to the truth; to compare arguments; to draw forth all that may be said in behalf of any opinion; and, without asserting any authority of its own, to leave the judgement of the inquirer wholly free. That same method, which by the way we inherited from Socrates, I shall, if agreeable to you, my dear Quintus, follow as often as possible in our future discussions.Nothing could please me better, Quintus replied.When this was said, we arose. |
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29. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 43-44, 42 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: MacDougall, Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition (2022) 133 | 42. Now the outward sense, as indeed its name shows, in some degree is a kind of insertion, placing the things that are made apparent to it in the mind; for in the mind, since that is the greatest storehouse and receptacle for all things, is everything placed and treasured up which comes under the operation of the sense of seeing or hearing, or the other organs of the outward senses. |
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| 30. Strabo, Geography, 1.15 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 107 |
31. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 97.12, 121.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •epistemology, stoic Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 142 | 121.9. So all these animals have a consciousness of their physical constitution, and for that reason can manage their limbs as readily as they do; nor have we any better proof that they come into being equipped with this knowledge than the fact that no animal is unskilled in the use of its body. |
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| 32. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1056e-1057b (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •epistemology, stoic Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 139 |
| 33. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 7.111, 28.22, 33.40, 37.50 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •epistemology, stoic Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 142 |
34. New Testament, Romans, 3.1-3.4, 3.29-3.30, 9.1-9.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •epistemology, stoic Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 92, 138| 3.1. Τί οὖν τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου, ἢ τίς ἡ ὠφελία τῆς περιτομῆς; 3.2. πολὺ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον. πρῶτον μὲν [γὰρ] ὅτι ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ. 3.3. τί γάρ; εἰ ἠπίστησάν τινες, μὴ ἡ ἀπιστία αὐτῶν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ καταργήσει; 3.4. μὴ γένοιτο· γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής,πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης,καθάπερ γέγραπται 3.29. ἢ Ἰουδαίων ὁ θεὸς μόνον; οὐχὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν; 3.30. ναὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν, εἴπερ εἷς ὁ θεός, ὃς δικαιώσει περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως καὶ ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως. 9.1. Ἀλήθειαν λέγω ἐν Χριστῷ, οὐ ψεύδομαι, συνμαρτυρούσης μοι τῆς συνειδήσεώς μου ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, 9.2. ὅτι λύπη μοί ἐστιν μεγάλη καὶ ἀδιάλειπτος ὀδύνη τῇ καρδίᾳ μου· 9.3. ηὐχόμην γὰρ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀπὸ τοῦ χριστοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου τῶν συγγενῶν μου κατὰ σάρκα, οἵτινές εἰσιν Ἰσραηλεῖται, 9.4. ὧν ἡ υἱοθεσία καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ αἱ διαθῆκαι καὶ ἡ νομοθεσία καὶ ἡ λατρεία καὶ αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι, 9.5. ὧν οἱ πατέρες, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων, θεὸς εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας· ἀμήν. | 3.1. Then what advantage does the Jew have? Or what is the profit of circumcision? 3.2. Much in every way! Because first of all, they were entrusted with the oracles of God. 3.3. For what if some were without faith? Will their lack of faith nullify the faithfulness of God? 3.4. May it never be! Yes, let God be found true, but every man a liar. As it is written, "That you might be justified in your words, And might prevail when you come into judgment." 3.29. Or is God the God of Jews only? Isn't he the God of Gentiles also? Yes, of Gentiles also, 3.30. since indeed there is one God who will justify the circumcised by faith, and the uncircumcised through faith. 9.1. I tell the truth in Christ. I am not lying, my conscience testifying with me in the Holy Spirit, 9.2. that I have great sorrow and unceasing pain in my heart. 9.3. For I could wish that I myself were accursed from Christ for my brothers' sake, my relatives according to the flesh, 9.4. who are Israelites; whose is the adoption, the glory, the covets, the giving of the law, the service, and the promises; 9.5. of whom are the fathers, and from whom is Christ as concerning the flesh, who is over all, God, blessed forever. Amen. |
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35. New Testament, Philippians, 3.3, 3.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 92| 3.3. ἡμεῖς γάρ ἐσμεν ἡ περιτομή, οἱ πνεύματι θεοῦ λατρεύοντες καὶ καυχώμενοι ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐν σαρκὶ πεποιθότες, 3.7. Ἀλλὰ ἅτινα ἦν μοι κέρδη, ταῦτα ἥγημαι διὰ τὸν χριστὸν ζημίαν. | 3.3. For we are the circumcision, who worship God in the Spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh; 3.7. However, what things were gain to me, these have I counted loss for Christ. |
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| 36. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 4.4, 6.12, 7.18, 8.1-11.1, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.10, 8.12, 10.23, 10.25, 10.26, 10.28, 10.29 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145 |
37. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 6.2.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, epistemology Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell, Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy (2023) 70 | 6.2.32. From such impressions arises that á¼Î½Î¬Ïγεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence. Is it not from visions such as these that Vergil was inspired to write â "Sudden her fingers let the shuttle fall And all the thread was spilled," |
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| 38. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.18.1-1.18.3, 1.22.9-1.22.15, 2.10.14-2.10.29, 2.26.1-2.26.3, 3.22.37, 3.22.94, 3.24.22-3.24.23, 3.24.35-3.24.36, 3.24.47-3.24.56, 3.26.25, 4.3.1, 4.4.1-4.4.4, 4.9.10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •epistemology, stoic Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 92, 142, 143 |
| 39. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.150-7.153, 7.157, 7.217-7.226, 7.228-7.232, 7.247, 7.327-7.334, 8.56 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •epistemology, stoic •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 51, 64, 65; Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138, 139 |
| 40. Hierocles Stoicus, , 1.37-7.50 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •epistemology, stoic Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 142 |
| 41. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 6.30 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •epistemology, stoic Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 141 |
42. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 4.32, 6.53, 7.12, 7.46-7.47, 7.50-7.51, 7.85, 7.162-7.163, 7.171, 7.183, 9.111 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of •epistemology, stoic Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 77, 102, 106; Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138, 141 | 4.32. He also attended the lectures of the geometer Hipponicus, at whom he pointed a jest as one who was in all besides a listless, yawning sluggard but yet proficient in his subject. Geometry, he said, must have flown into his mouth while it was agape. When this man's mind gave way, Arcesilaus took him to his house and nursed him until he was completely restored. He took over the school on the death of Crates, a certain Socratides having retired in his favour. According to some, one result of his suspending judgement on all matters was that he never so much as wrote a book. Others relate that he was caught revising some works of Crantor, which according to some he published, according to others he burnt. He would seem to have held Plato in admiration, and he possessed a copy of his works. 6.53. Noticing a good-looking youth lying in an exposed position, he nudged him and cried, Up, man, up, lest some foe thrust a dart into thy back! To one who was feasting lavishly he said:Short-liv'd thou'lt be, my son, by what thou – buy'st.As Plato was conversing about Ideas and using the nouns tablehood and cuphood, he said, Table and cup I see; but your tablehood and cuphood, Plato, I can nowise see. That's readily accounted for, said Plato, for you have the eyes to see the visible table and cup; but not the understanding by which ideal tablehood and cuphood are discerned. 7.12. Thraso of the deme Anacaea, Philocles of Peiraeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystus, Medon of Acharnae, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Paeania have been elected commissioners for the making of the crown and the building.These are the terms of the decree.Antigonus of Carystus tells us that he never denied that he was a citizen of Citium. For when he was one of those who contributed to the restoration of the baths and his name was inscribed upon the pillar as Zeno the philosopher, he requested that the words of Citium should be added. He made a hollow lid for a flask and used to carry about money in it, in order that there might be provision at hand for the necessities of his master Crates. 7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.47. By wariness they mean a strong presumption against what at the moment seems probable, so as not to be taken in by it. Irrefutability is strength in argument so as not to be brought over by it to the opposite side. Earnestness (or absence of frivolity) is a habit of referring presentations to right reason. Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot methodically put questions and give answers. 7.50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take impression in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object. 7.51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man. 7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it. 7.162. After meeting Polemo, says Diocles of Magnesia, while Zeno was suffering from a protracted illness, he recanted his views. The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses. 7.163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you? and when the other answered No, he rejoined,Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?The books attributed to him are as follows:Exhortations, two books.of Zeno's Doctrines.Dialogues.Lectures, six books.Dissertations on Philosophy, seven books.Dissertations on Love.Commonplaces on Vainglory.Notebooks, twenty-five volumes.Memorabilia, three books.Anecdotes, eleven books.Against the Rhetoricians.An Answer to the Counter-pleas of Alexinus.Against the Dialecticians, three books.Letters to Cleanthes, four books.Panaetius and Sosicrates consider the Letters to be alone genuine; all the other works named they attribute to Ariston the Peripatetic. 7.171. Once when he was reproached with cowardice, he replied, That is why I so seldom go wrong. Again, when extolling his own manner of life above that of the wealthy, he used to say that, while they were playing at ball, he was at work digging hard and barren ground. He would often find fault with himself too, and one day when Ariston heard him doing this and asked, Who is it you are scolding so? he, laughing, said, An old man with grey hairs and no wits. To some one who declared that Arcesilaus did not do what he ought, his reply was, No more of this; do not censure him. For if by his words he does away with duty, he maintains it at all events by his deeds. And Arcesilaus rejoined, I am not to be won by flattery. Whereupon Cleanthes said, True, but my flattery consists in alleging that your theory is incompatible with your practice. 7.183. At wine-parties he used to behave quietly, though he was unsteady on his legs; which caused the woman-slave to say, As for Chrysippus, only his legs get tipsy. His opinion of himself was so high that when some one inquired, To whom shall I entrust my son? he replied, To me: for, if I had dreamt of there being anyone better than myself, I should myself be studying with him. Hence, it is said, the application to him of the line:He alone has understanding; the others flit shadow-like around;andBut for Chrysippus, there had been no Stoa. 9.111. There are also reputed works of his extending to twenty thousand verses which are mentioned by Antigonus of Carystus, who also wrote his life. There are three silli in which, from his point of view as a Sceptic, he abuses every one and lampoons the dogmatic philosophers, using the form of parody. In the first he speaks in the first person throughout, the second and third are in the form of dialogues; for he represents himself as questioning Xenophanes of Colophon about each philosopher in turn, while Xenophanes answers him; in the second he speaks of the more ancient philosophers, in the third of the later, which is why some have entitled it the Epilogue. |
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| 43. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 14.6.4-14.6.6, 14.6.12-14.6.13, 14.18.2, 14.18.8-14.18.9 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 51, 102 |
| 44. Iamblichus, Concerning The Mysteries, 2.11 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism/stoics/stoic epistemology Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 45. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations, 28.19, 41.11 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoic, epistemology Found in books: MacDougall, Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition (2022) 137 |
| 46. Augustine, Contra Academicos, 3.38 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 102 |
| 47. Syrianus, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, 96.6-96.10 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism/stoics/stoic epistemology Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 48. Damaskios, In Phaedonem (Versio 1), 1.112-1.113 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism/stoics/stoic epistemology Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 49. Proclus, Commentary On Plato'S Republic, 31.7-31.8 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism/stoics/stoic epistemology Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 50. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 1.247.10-1.247.12, 3.345.17-3.345.20 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism/stoics/stoic epistemology Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 51. Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem, 104.23, 104.24, 104.25, 245.17-246.3 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 52. Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem Commentarii, 4.885.12-4.885.13, 4.893.15, 4.893.30, 4.898.18-4.898.22 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 53. Proclus, In Primum Euclidis Librum Commentarius, 45.8 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism/stoics/stoic epistemology Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 54. Olympiodorus The Younger of Alexandria, In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria, 6.2.15-6.2.17 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism/stoics/stoic epistemology Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 55. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.338 Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 107 |
| 56. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria, 795.11-795.16 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism/stoics/stoic epistemology Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 206 |
| 57. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, 199 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, stoics, epistemology of Found in books: Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 66 |
| 58. Aristotle, 1, 3.7, 430b22, 430b23, 431a16, 431b2, 431b20, 431b21, 431b22, 431b23, 432a10, 432a11, 432a12, 432a13, 432a14, 432a3, 432a4, 432a5, 432a6, 432a7, 432a8, 432a9 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan |
| 59. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.7.5c, 2.7.5b, 2.7.8, 2.7.9, 2.7.10 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 142 |
