1. Hebrew Bible, 1 Kings, 12.32 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, and Origen • Origen, and Epicureanism
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 296; Klawans (2019) 69, 70
12.32. וַיַּעַשׂ יָרָבְעָם חָג בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁמִינִי בַּחֲמִשָּׁה־עָשָׂר יוֹם לַחֹדֶשׁ כֶּחָג אֲשֶׁר בִּיהוּדָה וַיַּעַל עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ כֵּן עָשָׂה בְּבֵית־אֵל לְזַבֵּחַ לָעֲגָלִים אֲשֶׁר־עָשָׂה וְהֶעֱמִיד בְּבֵית אֵל אֶת־כֹּהֲנֵי הַבָּמוֹת אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה׃''. None | 12.32. And Jeroboam ordained a feast in the eighth month, on the fifteenth day of the month, like unto the feast that is in Judah, and he went up unto the altar; so did he in Beth-el, to sacrifice unto the calves that he had made; and he placed in Beth-el the priests of the high places that he had made.''. None |
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2. Hesiod, Works And Days, 170 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans • Epicurus , epicureanism
Found in books: Lloyd (1989) 9; Waldner et al (2016) 79
170. καὶ τοὶ μὲν ναίουσιν ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες''. None | 170. For fair-tressed Helen. They were screened as well''. None |
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3. Homer, Iliad, 2.871-2.872, 6.459-6.461 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, epigrams, Homer in • Epicureanism, in Homer • Epicureans, hedonism • pangs in Epicureanism • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 213; Hunter (2018) 18, 19; Long (2019) 140; Wardy and Warren (2018) 213
2.871. Νάστης Ἀμφίμαχός τε Νομίονος ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, 2.872. ὃς καὶ χρυσὸν ἔχων πόλεμον δʼ ἴεν ἠΰτε κούρη
6.459. καί ποτέ τις εἴπῃσιν ἰδὼν κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσαν· 6.460. Ἕκτορος ἥδε γυνὴ ὃς ἀριστεύεσκε μάχεσθαι 6.461. Τρώων ἱπποδάμων ὅτε Ἴλιον ἀμφεμάχοντο.''. None | 2.871. These were led by captains twain, Amphimachus and Nastes—Nastes and Amphimachus, the glorious children of Nomion. And he came to the war all decked with gold, like a girl, fool that he was; but his gold in no wise availed to ward off woeful destruction; nay, he was slain in the river beneath the hands of the son of Aeacus, swift of foot;
6.459. hall lead thee away weeping and rob thee of thy day of freedom. Then haply in Argos shalt thou ply the loom at another s bidding, or bear water from Messeis or Hypereia, sorely against thy will, and strong necessity shall be laid upon thee. And some man shall say as he beholdeth thee weeping: 6.460. Lo, the wife of Hector, that was pre-eminent in war above all the horse-taming Trojans, in the day when men fought about Ilios. So shall one say; and to thee shall come fresh grief in thy lack of a man like me to ward off the day of bondage. But let me be dead, and let the heaped-up earth cover me, 6.461. Lo, the wife of Hector, that was pre-eminent in war above all the horse-taming Trojans, in the day when men fought about Ilios. So shall one say; and to thee shall come fresh grief in thy lack of a man like me to ward off the day of bondage. But let me be dead, and let the heaped-up earth cover me, ''. None |
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4. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, language of • pangs in Epicureanism • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Gordon (2012) 61; Long (2019) 140
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5. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans • Epicureans, • god, gods, Epicurean • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 86; Long (2019) 77; Pinheiro et al (2015) 36; Wilson (2010) 180
62b. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ’ εἶναι ἄλογον: οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ’ ἴσως γ’ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ’ ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν: οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης .'64c. εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις: ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας . ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη. σκέψαι δή, ὠγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί: '. None | 62b. but perhaps there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this? Yes, said Cebes,'64c. Let us then, said he, speak with one another, paying no further attention to them. Do we think there is such a thing as death? Certainly, replied Simmias. We believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists alone by itself? Is death anything other than this? No, it is this, said he. Now, my friend, see if you agree with me; '. None |
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6. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, heresy assimilated to • Epicureans • Epicurus and Epicureans • god, gods, Epicurean
Found in books: Albrecht (2014) 308; Boulluec (2022) 122; Frede and Laks (2001) 159; Long (2019) 69; Osborne (2001) 85
29e. τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δʼ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ΤΙ. ταύτην δὴ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην'90c. φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα, ἄνπερ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, καθʼ ὅσον δʼ αὖ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τούτου μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν, ἅτε δὲ ἀεὶ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν εὖ κεκοσμημένον τὸν δαίμονα σύνοικον ἑαυτῷ, διαφερόντως εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς μία, τὰς οἰκείας ἑκάστῳ τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τῷ δʼ ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις '. None | 29e. constructed Becoming and the All. He was good, and in him that is good no envy ariseth ever concerning anything; and being devoid of envy He desired that all should be, so far as possible, like unto Himself. Tim. This principle, then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos.'90c. must necessarily and inevitably think thoughts that are immortal and divine, if so be that he lays hold on truth, and in so far as it is possible for human nature to partake of immortality, he must fall short thereof in no degree; and inasmuch as he is for ever tending his divine part and duly magnifying that daemon who dwells along with him, he must be supremely blessed. And the way of tendance of every part by every man is one—namely, to supply each with its own congenial food and motion; and for the divine part within us the congenial motion '. None |
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7. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.4.11-1.4.14 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicurus and Epicureanism
Found in books: Gale (2000) 90; Tor (2017) 45
1.4.11. εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἰ νομίζοιμι θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων τι φροντίζειν, οὐκ ἂν ἀμελοίην αὐτῶν. ἔπειτʼ οὐκ οἴει φροντίζειν; οἳ πρῶτον μὲν μόνον τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπον ὀρθὸν ἀνέστησαν· ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης καὶ προορᾶν πλέον ποιεῖ δύνασθαι καὶ τὰ ὕπερθεν μᾶλλον θεᾶσθαι καὶ ἧττον κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ στόμα ἐνεποίησαν· ἔπειτα τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἑρπετοῖς πόδας ἔδωκαν, οἳ τὸ πορεύεσθαι μόνον παρέχουσιν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ χεῖρας προσέθεσαν, αἳ τὰ πλεῖστα οἷς εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἐκείνων ἐσμὲν ἐξεργάζονται. 1.4.12. καὶ μὴν γλῶττάν γε πάντων τῶν ζῴων ἐχόντων, μόνην τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησαν οἵαν ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχῇ ψαύουσαν τοῦ στόματος ἀρθροῦν τε τὴν φωνὴν καὶ σημαίνειν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἃ βουλόμεθα. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἡδονὰς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ζῴοις δοῦναι περιγράψαντας τοῦ ἔτους χρόνον, ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι γήρως ταῦτα παρέχειν. 1.4.13. οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἤρκεσε τῷ θεῷ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε. τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου ζῴου ψυχὴ πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα συνταξάντων ᾔσθηται ὅτι εἰσί; τί δὲ φῦλον ἄλλο ἢ ἄνθρωποι θεοὺς θεραπεύουσι; ποία δὲ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἱκανωτέρα προφυλάττεσθαι ἢ λιμὸν ἢ δίψος ἢ ψύχη ἢ θάλπη, ἢ νόσοις ἐπικουρῆσαι, ἢ ῥώμην ἀσκῆσαι, ἢ πρὸς μάθησιν ἐκπονῆσαι, ἢ ὅσα ἂν ἀκούσῃ ἢ ἴδῃ ἢ μάθῃ ἱκανωτέρα ἐστὶ διαμεμνῆσθαι; 1.4.14. οὐ γὰρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον ὅτι παρὰ τἆλλα ζῷα ὥσπερ θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες; οὔτε γὰρ βοὸς ἂν ἔχων σῶμα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ γνώμην ἐδύνατʼ ἂν πράττειν ἃ ἐβούλετο, οὔθʼ ὅσα χεῖρας ἔχει, ἄφρονα δʼ ἐστί, πλέον οὐδὲν ἔχει. σὺ δʼ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πλείστου ἀξίων τετυχηκὼς οὐκ οἴει σοῦ θεοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; ἀλλʼ ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι, νομιεῖς αὐτοὺς σοῦ φροντίζειν;''. None | 1.4.11. I assure you, that if I believed that the gods pay any heed to man, I would not neglect them. Then do you think them unheeding? In the first place, man is the only living creature that they have caused to stand upright; and the upright position gives him a wider range of vision in front and a better view of things above, and exposes him less to injury. Secondly, to grovelling creatures they have given feet that afford only the power of moving, whereas they have endowed man with hands, which are the instruments to which we chiefly owe our greater happiness. 1.4.12. Again, though all creatures have a tongue, the tongue of man alone has been formed by them to be capable of contact with different parts of the mouth, so as to enable us to articulate the voice and express all our wants to one another. Once more, for all other creatures they have prescribed a fixed season of sexual indulgence; in our case the only time limit they have set is old age. 1.4.13. Nor was the deity content to care for man’s body. What is of yet higher moment, he has implanted in him the noblest type of soul. For in the first place what other creature’s soul has apprehended the existence of gods who set in order the universe, greatest and fairest of things? And what race of living things other than man worships gods? And what soul is more apt than man’s to make provision against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to relieve sickness and promote health, to acquire knowledge by toil, and to remember accurately all that is heard, seen, or learned? 1.4.14. For is it not obvious to you that, in comparison with the other animals, men live like gods, by nature peerless both in body and in soul? For with a man’s reason and the body of an ox we could not carry out our wishes, and the possession of hands without reason is of little worth. Do you, then, having received the two most precious gifts, yet think that the gods take no care of you? What are they to do, to make you believe that they are heedful of you? ''. None |
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8. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 207, 210; Wardy and Warren (2018) 207, 210
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9. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans • Philosophy, Epicurean • gods (Epicurean), human friendship with • gods (Epicurean), involvement in moral formation • knowledge, Epicurean
Found in books: Allison (2020) 71; Frede and Laks (2001) 159; Meister (2019) 7
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10. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus/Epicureans • Lucretius, Epicurean, Emotion and character follows hot and cold in body • Lucretius, Epicurean, Mercy no different from pity in this regard • Lucretius, Epicurean, Teaching (doctrina) can override body only to some extent
Found in books: Linjamaa (2019) 75; Sorabji (2000) 264
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11. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, Prolongation of life of no value • Lucretius, Epicurean, Prolongation of life of no value • death, Epicureanism • god, gods, Epicurean
Found in books: Long (2019) 120; Sorabji (2000) 241
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12. Cicero, On Divination, 1.12, 1.118, 2.33-2.34, 2.40, 2.124, 2.148 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureans • Epicurus and Epicureans • gods, location in Epicureanism
Found in books: Ayres and Ward (2021) 187; Frede and Laks (2001) 245, 258; Gale (2000) 85; Russell and Nesselrath (2014) 79; Stanton (2021) 164; Struck (2016) 10, 184, 188; Wardy and Warren (2018) 230
1.12. Quae est autem gens aut quae civitas, quae non aut extispicum aut monstra aut fulgora interpretantium aut augurum aut astrologorum aut sortium (ea enim fere artis sunt) aut somniorum aut vaticinationum (haec enim duo naturalia putantur) praedictione moveatur? Quarum quidem rerum eventa magis arbitror quam causas quaeri oportere. Est enim vis et natura quaedam, quae tum observatis longo tempore significationibus, tum aliquo instinctu inflatuque divino futura praenuntiat. Quare omittat urguere Carneades, quod faciebat etiam Panaetius requirens, Iuppiterne cornicem a laeva, corvum ab dextera canere iussisset. Observata sunt haec tempore inmenso et in significatione eventis animadversa et notata. Nihil est autem, quod non longinquitas temporum excipiente memoria prodendisque monumentis efficere atque adsequi possit.
1.118. Sed distinguendum videtur, quonam modo. Nam non placet Stoicis singulis iecorum fissis aut avium cantibus interesse deum; neque enim decorum est nec dis dignum nec fieri ullo pacto potest; sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa praecurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, alia in fulgoribus, alia in ostentis, alia in stellis, alia in somniantium visis, alia in furentium vocibus. Ea quibus bene percepta sunt, ii non saepe falluntur; male coniecta maleque interpretata falsa sunt non rerum vitio, sed interpretum inscientia. Hoc autem posito atque concesso, esse quandam vim divinam hominum vitam continentem, non difficile est, quae fieri certe videmus, ea qua ratione fiant, suspicari. Nam et ad hostiam deligendam potest dux esse vis quaedam sentiens, quae est toto confusa mundo, et tum ipsum, cum immolare velis, extorum fieri mutatio potest, ut aut absit aliquid aut supersit; parvis enim momentis multa natura aut adfingit aut mutat aut detrahit.
2.33. Haec observari certe non potuerunt, ut supra docui. Sunt igitur artis inventa, non vetustatis, si est ars ulla rerum incognitarum; cum rerum autem natura quam cognationem habent? quae ut uno consensu iuncta sit et continens, quod video placuisse physicis, eisque maxume, qui omne, quod esset, unum esse dixerunt, quid habere mundus potest cum thesauri inventione coniunctum? Si enim extis pecuniae mihi amplificatio ostenditur idque fit natura, primum exta sunt coniuncta mundo, deinde meum lucrum natura rerum continetur. Nonne pudet physicos haec dicere? Ut enim iam sit aliqua in natura rerum contagio, quam esse concedo (multa enim Stoici colligunt; nam et musculorum iecuscula bruma dicuntur augeri, et puleium aridum florescere brumali ipso die, et inflatas rumpi vesiculas, et semina malorum, quae in iis mediis inclusa sint, in contrarias partis se vertere, iam nervos in fidibus aliis pulsis resonare alios, ostreisque et conchyliis omnibus contingere, ut cum luna pariter crescant pariterque decrescant, arboresque ut hiemali tempore cum luna simul senescente, quia tum exsiccatae sint, tempestive caedi putentur. 2.34. Quid de fretis aut de marinis aestibus plura dicam? quorum accessus et recessus lunae motu gubertur. Sescenta licet eiusdem modi proferri, ut distantium rerum cognatio naturalis appareat)—demus hoc; nihil enim huic disputationi adversatur; num etiam, si fissum cuiusdam modi fuerit in iecore, lucrum ostenditur? qua ex coniunctione naturae et quasi concentu atque consensu, quam sumpa/qeian Graeci appellant, convenire potest aut fissum iecoris cum lucello meo aut meus quaesticulus cum caelo, terra rerumque natura? Concedam hoc ipsum, si vis, etsi magnam iacturam causae fecero, si ullam esse convenientiam naturae cum extis concessero;
2.124. Sed haec quoque in promptu fuerint; nunc interiora videamus. Aut enim divina vis quaedam consulens nobis somniorum significationes facit, aut coniectores ex quadam convenientia et coniunctione naturae, quam vocant sumpa/qeian, quid cuique rei conveniat ex somniis, et quid quamque rem sequatur, intellegunt, aut eorum neutrum est, sed quaedam observatio constans atque diuturna est, cum quid visum secundum quietem sit, quid evenire et quid sequi soleat. Primum igitur intellegendum est nullam vim esse divinam effectricem somniorum. Atque illud quidem perspicuum est, nulla visa somniorum proficisci a numine deorum; nostra enim causa di id facerent, ut providere futura possemus.
2.148. Explodatur igitur haec quoque somniorum divinatio pariter cum ceteris. Nam, ut vere loquamur, superstitio fusa per gentis oppressit omnium fere animos atque hominum inbecillitatem occupavit. Quod et in iis libris dictum est, qui sunt de natura deorum, et hac disputatione id maxume egimus. Multum enim et nobismet ipsis et nostris profuturi videbamur, si eam funditus sustulissemus. Nec vero (id enim diligenter intellegi volo) superstitione tollenda religio tollitur. Nam et maiorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est, et esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri.' '. None | 1.12. Now — to mention those almost entirely dependent on art — what nation or what state disregards the prophecies of soothsayers, or of interpreters of prodigies and lightnings, or of augurs, or of astrologers, or of oracles, or — to mention the two kinds which are classed as natural means of divination — the forewarnings of dreams, or of frenzy? of these methods of divining it behoves us, I think, to examine the results rather than the causes. For there is a certain natural power, which now, through long-continued observation of signs and now, through some divine excitement and inspiration, makes prophetic announcement of the future. 7 Therefore let Carneades cease to press the question, which Panaetius also used to urge, whether Jove had ordered the crow to croak on the left side and the raven on the right. Such signs as these have been observed for an unlimited time, and the results have been checked and recorded. Moreover, there is nothing which length of time cannot accomplish and attain when aided by memory to receive and records to preserve.
1.12. The Divine Will accomplishes like results in the case of birds, and causes those known as alites, which give omens by their flight, to fly hither and thither and disappear now here and now there, and causes those known as oscines, which give omens by their cries, to sing now on the left and now on the right. For if every animal moves its body forward, sideways, or backward at will, it bends, twists, extends, and contracts its members as it pleases, and performs these various motions almost mechanically; how much easier it is for such results to be accomplished by a god, whose divine will all things obey!
1.118. But it seems necessary to settle the principle on which these signs depend. For, according to the Stoic doctrine, the gods are not directly responsible for every fissure in the liver or for every song of a bird; since, manifestly, that would not be seemly or proper in a god and furthermore is impossible. But, in the beginning, the universe was so created that certain results would be preceded by certain signs, which are given sometimes by entrails and by birds, sometimes by lightnings, by portents, and by stars, sometimes by dreams, and sometimes by utterances of persons in a frenzy. And these signs do not often deceive the persons who observe them properly. If prophecies, based on erroneous deductions and interpretations, turn out to be false, the fault is not chargeable to the signs but to the lack of skill in the interpreters.Assuming the proposition to be conceded that there is a divine power which pervades the lives of men, it is not hard to understand the principle directing those premonitory signs which we see come to pass. For it may be that the choice of a sacrificial victim is guided by an intelligent force, which is diffused throughout the universe; or, it may be that at the moment when the sacrifice is offered, a change in the vitals occurs and something is added or taken away; for many things are added to, changed, or diminished in an instant of time.
2.33. Such signs, as I have shown before, certainly could not come within your classification of the kinds of divination dependent on observation. Therefore they are not the result of immemorial usage, but they are the inventions of art — if there can be any art in the occult. But what relationship have they with the laws of nature? Assuming that all the works of nature are firmly bound together in a harmonious whole (which, I observe, is the view of the natural philosophers and especially of those men who maintain that the universe is a unit), what connexion can there be between the universe and the finding of a treasure? For instance, if the entrails foretell an increase in my fortune and they do so in accordance with some law of nature, then, in the first place, there is some relationship between them and the universe, and in the second place, my ficial gain is regulated by the laws of nature. Are not the natural philosophers ashamed to utter such nonsense? And yet a certain contact between the different parts of nature may be admitted and I concede it. The Stoics have collected much evidence to prove it. They claim, for example, that the livers of mice become larger in winter; that the dry pennyroyal blooms the very day of the winter solstice, and that its seed-pods become inflated and burst and the seeds enclosed thither are sent in various directions; that at times when certain strings of the lyre are struck others sound; that it is the habit of oysters and of all shell-fish to grow with the growth of the moon and to become smaller as it wanes; and that trees are considered easiest to cut down in winter and in the dark of the moon, because they are then free from sap. 2.34. There is no need to go on and mention the seas and straits with their tides, whose ebb and flow are governed by the motion of the moon. Innumerable instances of the same kind may be given to prove that some natural connexion does exist between objects apparently unrelated. Concede that it does exist; it does not contravene the point I make, that no sort of a cleft in a liver is prophetic of ficial gain. What natural tie, or what symphony, so to speak, or association, or what sympathy, as the Greeks term it, can there be between a cleft in a liver and a petty addition to my purse? Or what relationship between my miserable money-getting, on the one hand, and heaven, earth, and the laws of nature on the other?15 However, I will concede even this if you wish, though it will greatly weaken my case to admit that there is any connexion between nature and the condition of the entrails;
2.124. But, though the conclusion just stated is obvious, let us now look deeper into the question. Surely you must assume, either that there is a Divine Power which, in planning for our good, gives us information by means of dreams; or that, because of some natural connexion and association — the Greeks call it συμπάθεια — interpreters of dreams know what sort of a dream is required to fit any situation and what sort of a result will follow any dream; or that neither of these suppositions is true, but that the usual result or consequence of every dream is known by a consistent system of rules based on long-continued observation. In the first place, then, it must be understood that there is no divine power which creates dreams. And indeed it is perfectly clear that none of the visions seen in dreams have their origin in the will of the gods; for the gods, for our sakes, would so interpose that we might be able to foresee the future.
2.148. Then let dreams, as a means of divination, be rejected along with the rest. Speaking frankly, superstition, which is widespread among the nations, has taken advantage of human weakness to cast its spell over the mind of almost every man. This same view was stated in my treatise On the Nature of the Gods; and to prove the correctness of that view has been the chief aim of the present discussion. For I thought that I should be rendering a great service both to myself and to my countrymen if I could tear this superstition up by the roots. But I want it distinctly understood that the destruction of superstition does not mean the destruction of religion. For I consider it the part of wisdom to preserve the institutions of our forefathers by retaining their sacred rites and ceremonies. Furthermore, the celestial order and the beauty of the universe compel me to confess that there is some excellent and eternal Being, who deserves the respect and homage of men.' '. None |
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13. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.14, 1.23, 1.29-1.31, 1.71, 2.7, 2.20, 2.23, 2.29-2.30, 2.48, 2.64, 2.77, 2.96, 3.3, 5.17 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Attention, Epicurean therapy distracts attention • Cicero, commentary on Epicureanism • Cicero, on Epicureans • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, • Epicureanism, ethics of • Epicureans • Epicureans, Selective emotion • Epicureans, allegedly effeminate • Epicureans, and wine • Epicureans, as chefs • Epicureans, clothing of • Epicureans, gait of • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicureans, language of • Epicureans, portraits of • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of • friendship, Epicurean • friendship, Epicurean understandings • oikeiōsis = Lat. commendatio or conciliatio, Epicurean version of • pleasure (ἡδονή), in Epicureanism • telos, Epicurean
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 168, 169, 170, 172; Bryan (2018) 206, 208, 217, 218; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 471; Gale (2000) 90; Gordon (2012) 125, 127, 166, 177; Long (2006) 187, 286; Sorabji (2000) 201, 233; Tsouni (2019) 92, 93; Wardy and Warren (2018) 206, 208, 217, 218; Wolfsdorf (2020) 407; Yona (2018) 46, 128, 175
| 2.7. \xa0"What then?" he replied; "does not Epicurus recognize pleasure in your sense?" "Not always," said\xa0I; "now and then, I\xa0admit, he recognizes it only too fully; for he solemnly avows that he cannot even understand what Good there can be or where it can be found, apart from that which is derived from food and drink, the delight of the ears, and the grosser forms of gratification. Do\xa0I misrepresent his words?" "Just as if I\xa0were ashamed of all that," he cried, "or unable to explain the sense in which it is spoken!" "Oh," said\xa0I, "I\xa0haven\'t the least doubt you can explain it with ease. And you have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the opinions of a Wise Man â\x80\x94 who stands alone, so far as I\xa0am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself that title. For I\xa0do not suppose that Metrodorus himself claimed to be a Wise Man, though he did not care to refuse the compliment when the name was bestowed upon him by Epicurus; while the famous Seven of old received their appellation not by their own votes, but by the universal suffrage of mankind. <
2.20. \xa0"For you must not suppose it is merely a verbal distinction: the things themselves are different. To be without pain is one thing, to feel pleasure another; yet you Epicureans try to combine these quite dissimilar feelings â\x80\x94 not merely under a single name (for that I\xa0could more easily tolerate), but as actually being a single thing, instead of really two; which is absolutely impossible. Epicurus, approving both sorts of pleasure, ought to have recognized both sorts; as he really does in fact, though he does not distinguish them in words. In a\xa0number of passages where he is commending that real pleasure which all of us call by the same name, he goes so far as to say that he cannot even imagine any Good that is not connected with pleasure of the kind intended by Aristippus. This is the language that he holds it discourse dealing solely with the topic of the Chief Good. Then there is another treatise containing his most important doctrines in a compendious form, in which we are told he uttered the very oracles of Wisdom. Here he writes the following words, with which you, Torquatus, are of course familiar (for every good Epicurean has got by heart the master\'s Kuriai Doxai or Authoritative Doctrines, since these brief aphorisms or maxims are held to be of sovereign efficacy for happiness). So I\xa0will ask you kindly to notice whether I\xa0translate this maxim correctly: <
2.23. \xa0"What then is the point of saying \'I\xa0should have no fault to find with them if they kept their desires within bounds\'? That is tantamount to saying \'I\xa0should not blame the profligate if they were not profligate.\' He might as well say he would not blame the dishonest either, if they were upright men. Here is our rigid moralist maintaining that sensuality is not in itself blameworthy! And I\xa0profess, Torquatus, on the hypothesis that pleasure is the Chief Good he is perfectly justified in thinking so. I\xa0should be sorry to picture to myself, as you are so fond of doing, debauchees who are sick at table, have to be carried home from dinner-parties, and next day gorge themselves again before they have recovered from the effects of the night before; men who, as the saying goes, have never seen either sunset or sunrise; men who run through their inheritance and sink into penury. None of us supposes that profligates of that description live pleasantly. No, but men of taste and refinement, with first-rate chefs and confectioners, fish, birds, game and the like of the choicest; careful of their digestion; with Wine in flask Decanted from a newâ\x80\x91broach\'d cask,\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. as Lucilius has it, Wine of tang bereft, All harshness in the strainer left; with the accompaniment of dramatic performances and their usual sequel, the pleasures apart from which Epicurus, as he loudly proclaims, does not what Good is; give them also beautiful boys to wait upon them, with drapery, silver, Corinthian bronzes, and the scene of the feast, the banqueting-room, all in keeping; take profligates of this sort; that these live well or enjoy happiness I\xa0will never allow. <
2.29. \xa0"But fancy his failing to see how strong a proof it is that the sort of pleasure, without which he declares he has no idea at all what Good means (and he defines it in detail as the pleasure of the palate, of the ears, and subjoins the other kinds of pleasure, which cannot be specified without an apology), â\x80\x94 he fails, I\xa0say, to see that this, the sole Good which our strict and serious philosopher recognizes, is actually not even desirable, inasmuch as on his own showing we feel no need of this sort of pleasure, so long as we are free from pain! How inconsistent this is! <' "2.30. \xa0If only Epicurus had studied Definition and Division, if he understood the meaning of Predication or even the customary use of terms, he would never have fallen into such a quandary. As it is, you see what he does. He calls a thing pleasure that no one ever called by that name before; he confounds two things that are distinct. The 'kinetic' sort of pleasure (for so he terms the delightful and so to speak sweet-flavoured pleasures we are considering) at one moment he so disparages that you would think you were listening to Manius Curius, while at another moment he so extols it that he tells us he is incapable even of imagining what other good there can be. Now that is language that does not call for a philosopher to answer it, â\x80\x94 it ought to be put down by the police. His morality is at fault, and not only his logic. He does not censure profligacy, provided it be free from unbridled desire, and from fear of consequences. Here he seems to be making a bid for converts: the wouldâ\x80\x91be roué need only turn philosopher. <" '
2.48. \xa0"There, Torquatus, is a full, detailed and complete scheme of Moral Worth, a whole of which these four virtues, which you also mentioned, constitute the parts. Yet your Epicurus tells us that he is utterly at a loss to know what nature or qualities are assigned to this Morality by those who make it the measure of the Chief Good. For if Morality be the standard to which all things are referred, while yet they will not allow that pleasure forms any part of it, he declares that they are uttering sounds devoid of sense (those are his actual words), and that he has no notion or perception whatever of any meaning that this term Morality can have attached to it. In common parlance \'moral\' (honourable) means merely that which ranks high in popular esteem. And popular esteem, says Epicurus, though often in itself more agreeable than certain forms of pleasure, yet is desired simply as a means to pleasure. <' "
2.64. \xa0Epicurus's classification of the desires meant nothing to him; he knew no limit but satiety. At the same time he was careful of his health: took sufficient exercise to come hungry and thirsty to table; ate what was at once most appetizing and most digestible; drank enough wine for pleasure and not too much for health. Nor did he forgo those other indulgences in the absence of which Epicurus declares that he cannot understand what Good is. Pain he never experienced at all; had it come to him, he would have borne it with fortitude, yet would have called in a doctor sooner than a philosopher. He had excellent health and a sound constitution. He was extremely popular. In short, his life was replete with pleasure of every variety. <" "
2.77. \xa0For in that glorious array of high-sounding words, pleasure finds no place, not only what your school calls 'kinetic' pleasure, which is what every one, polished or rustic, every one, I\xa0say, who can speak Latin, means by pleasure, but not even this 'static' pleasure, which no one but you Epicureans would call pleasure at all. \xa0Well then, are you sure you have any right to employ our words with meanings of your own? If you assumed an unnatural expression or demeanour, in order to look more important, that would be insincere. Are you then to affect an artificial language, and say what you do not think? Or are you to change your opinions like your clothes, and have one set for indoor wear and another when you walk abroad? Outside, all show and pretence, but your genuine self concealed within? Reflect, I\xa0beg of you, is this honest? In my view those opinions are true which are honourable, praiseworthy and noble â\x80\x94 which can be openly avowed in the senate and the popular assembly, and in every company and gathering, so that one need not be ashamed to say what one is not ashamed to think. <" '
2.96. \xa0"But I\xa0must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: \'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I\xa0write these words,\' he says, \'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I\xa0am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.\' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. \'Yet all my sufferings,\' he continues, \'are counterbalanced by the joy which I\xa0derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I\xa0charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.\' <
3.3. \xa0In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a\xa0reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I\xa0believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. <
5.17. \xa0Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormÄ\x93. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire â\x80\x94 as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil. <' '. None |
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14. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.14, 1.23, 1.29-1.31, 1.45-1.46, 1.49, 1.58, 1.63, 1.65, 1.67, 1.69, 1.71, 2.7, 2.20, 2.23, 2.29-2.30, 2.48, 2.64, 2.77, 2.96, 3.3, 5.7, 5.13, 5.17 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Attention, Epicurean therapy distracts attention • Cicero, commentary on Epicureanism • Cicero, on Epicureans • Epicurean Garden • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, • Epicureanism, ethics of • Epicureans • Epicureans , criticising Socrates • Epicureans, Selective emotion • Epicureans, allegedly effeminate • Epicureans, and wine • Epicureans, as chefs • Epicureans, clothing of • Epicureans, gait of • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicureans, language of • Epicureans, portraits of • Epicurus and Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicureanism, psychophysical holism • Philosophy, Epicurean • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans • Socrates, Epicurean critique of • death, Epicureanism • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of • friendship, Epicurean • friendship, Epicurean understandings • oikeiōsis = Lat. commendatio or conciliatio, Epicurean version of • pangs in Epicureanism • pleasure (ἡδονή), in Epicureanism • reason, in Epicurean theology • suicide, in Epicureanism • telos, Epicurean • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 168, 169, 170, 172; Brouwer (2013) 169, 170; Bryan (2018) 206, 208, 217, 218; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 471; Erler et al (2021) 100, 101, 106; Fowler (2014) 180; Gale (2000) 90; Gordon (2012) 125, 127, 166, 177; Long (2006) 187, 189, 191, 286, 305; Long (2019) 121, 129, 130, 139, 175; Meister (2019) 8; Osborne (2001) 144; Sorabji (2000) 201, 233; Stanton (2021) 164; Tsouni (2019) 92, 93; Wardy and Warren (2018) 206, 208, 217, 218; Williams and Vol (2022) 271; Wolfsdorf (2020) 407; Wynne (2019) 95; Yona (2018) 46, 84, 128, 161, 164, 165, 175
2.7. istam voluptatem, inquit, Epicurus ignorat? Non semper, inquam; nam interdum nimis nimis minus R etiam novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur. an haec ab eo non dicuntur? Quasi vero me pudeat, inquit, istorum, aut non possim quem ad modum ea dicantur ostendere! Ego vero non dubito, inquam, quin facile possis, nec est quod te pudeat sapienti adsentiri, qui se unus, quod sciam, sapientem profiteri sit ausus. nam Metrodorum non puto ipsum professum, sed, cum appellaretur ab Epicuro, repudiare tantum beneficium noluisse; septem autem illi non suo, sed populorum suffragio omnium nominati sunt.
2.20. duae sunt enim res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes. unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate. vos ex his tam dissimilibus rebus non modo nomen unum —nam id facilius paterer—, sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamini, quod fieri nullo modo nullo modo fieri BE potest. hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti, sicut facit re, neque re neque neque ( om. re) BE remque R tamen dividit verbis. cum enim eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine omnes appellamus, appellant A 1 laudat locis plurimis, audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis, atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est oratio oratio eius est BE de summo bono. in alio vero libro, in quo breviter comprehensis gravissimis sententiis quasi oracula edidisse sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis, quae nota tibi profecto, Torquate, sunt—quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri kuri/as do/cas, id est quasi maxime ratas, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae?—animadverte igitur rectene hanc sententiam interpreter:' "
2.23. quid ergo attinet dicere: 'Nihil haberem, quod reprehenderem, si finitas cupiditates haberent'? hoc est dicere: Non reprehenderem asotos, si non essent asoti. isto modo ne improbos quidem, si essent boni viri. hic homo severus luxuriam ipsam per se reprehendendam non putat, et hercule, Torquate, ut verum loquamur, si summum bonum voluptas est, rectissime non putat. Noli noli Se. nolui N nolim rell. codd. enim mihi fingere asotos, ut soletis, qui in mensam vomant, et qui de conviviis auferantur crudique postridie se rursus ingurgitent, qui solem, ut aiunt, nec occidentem umquam viderint nec orientem, qui consumptis patrimoniis egeant. nemo nostrum istius generis asotos iucunde putat vivere. mundos, elegantis, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis, vitantes cruditatem, quibus vinum quibus vinum et q. s. cf. Lucilii carm. rell. rec. Marx. I p. 78, II p. 366 sq. defusum e pleno sit chrysizon, chrysizon Marx.; hirsizon A hrysizon vel heysizon B hrysizon E hyrsi|hon R hyrsizon N hrysiron V ut ait Lucilius, cui nihildum situlus et nihildum situlus et (situlus = situla, sitella) Se. nihil (nichil BE) dum sit vis et ABE nichil dum sit viset R nichil dempsit (e vid. corr. ex u, psit in ras. ) vis (post s ras.) et (in ras.) N nichil dempsit vis et V sacculus sacculus ABE saculos V sarculos R, N (a ex corr. m. alt., r superscr. ab alt. m. ) abstulerit, adhibentis ludos et quae sequuntur, illa, quibus detractis clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum; adsint etiam formosi pueri, qui ministrent, respondeat his vestis, argentum, Corinthium, locus ipse, aedificium—hos ergo ergo BER ego ANV asotos bene quidem vivere aut aut at BE beate numquam dixerim." '
2.29. Hoc vero non videre, maximo argumento esse voluptatem illam, illam ullam RN 2 qua sublata neget se intellegere omnino quid sit bonum—eam autem ita persequitur: persequer BE persequar R quae palato percipiatur, quae auribus; cetera addit, neget, 29 addit cf. p. 34, 30 sqq quae si appelles, honos praefandus praestandus NV prefraudus E perfraudus B sit—hoc igitur, quod solum bonum severus et gravis philosophus novit, idem non videt vidit BE ne expetendum quidem esse, quod eam voluptatem hoc eodem auctore non desideremus, cum dolore careamus.' "2.30. quam haec sunt contraria! hic si definire, si dividere si dividere BE Non. in dividere R; individere A 1, N 1 (in-|d.), V ( uel ni d.); vel dividere A 2 N 2 didicisset, hic si definire ... incidisset Non. p. 177 didicisset potuisset Non. si loquendi vim, si denique consuetudinem verborum teneret, numquam in tantas salebras incidisset. nunc vides, quid faciat. quam nemo umquam voluptatem appellavit, appellat; quae duo sunt, unum facit. hanc in motu voluptatem —sic enim has suaves suaves has BE et quasi dulces voluptates appellat—interdum ita extenuat, ut M'. M'. edd. marcum Curium putes putes potes A 1 po t R loqui, interdum ita laudat, ut quid praeterea praeter eam NV sit bonum neget se posse ne suspicari quidem. quae iam oratio non a philosopho aliquo, sed a censore opprimenda est. non est enim vitium in oratione solum, solum in oratione R sed etiam in moribus. luxuriam non reprehendit, modo sit vacua infinita cupiditate et timore. hoc loco discipulos quaerere videtur, ut, qui asoti esse velint, philosophi ante fiant." "
2.48. Habes undique expletam et perfectam, Torquate, formam honestatis, quae tota quattuor hys quattuor BE his virtutibus, quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt, continetur. hanc se tuus Epicurus omnino ignorare dicit quam aut qualem esse velint qui hy qui BE ii qui Mdv. honestate honestate edd. honestatem summum bonum metiantur. Si Si Sic BE enim ad honestatem honestatem enim (om. ad) A 1 ad honestatem enim A 2 omnia referant referant Bentl. referantur neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse, ait eos voce ii ii voce R sonare— his enim ipsis verbis utitur—neque intellegere nec videre sub hanc vocem hanc vocem Wes. apud Mdv. hac voce honestatis quae sit subicienda sententia. ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur honestum, quod est populari fama gloriosum. 'Quod', inquit, quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur propter voluptatem. Videsne quam sit magna dissensio?" '
2.64. cupiditates non Epicuri divisione finiebat, sed sua satietate. habebat tamen rationem rationem edd. ratione valitudinis: utebatur iis iis edd. his AR hys BE hijs NV exercitationibus, ut ad cenam et sitiens et esuriens veniret, eo cibo, qui et suavissimus esset et idem facillimus ad concoquendum, conoqquendum N coquendum BEV vino et ad voluptatem et ne noceret. cetera illa adhibebat, quibus demptis negat se Epicurus intellegere quid sit bonum. aberat omnis dolor, qui si adesset, nec molliter ferret et tamen medicis plus quam philosophis uteretur. color egregius, integra valitudo, summa gratia, vita denique conferta voluptatum confecta voluptatum V voluptatum conferta BE omnium varietate.
2.77. nam inter ista tam magnifica verba tamque praeclara non habet ullum voluptas locum, non modo illa, quam in motu esse dicitis, quam omnes urbani rustici, omnes, inquam, qui Latine loquuntur, voluptatem vocant, sed ne haec quidem stabilis, quam praeter vos nemo appellat voluptatem. Vide igitur ne non debeas debeas dubeca s R verbis nostris uti, sententiis tuis. quodsi vultum tibi, si incessum fingeres, fingeres BEN 2 fringeres AN 1 V fringens R quo gravior viderere, non esses tui similis; verba tu fingas et ea dicas, quae non sentias? aut etiam, ut vestitum, sic sententiam habeas aliam domesticam, aliam forensem, ut in fronte ostentatio sit, intus veritas occultetur? vide, quaeso, rectumne sit. mihi quidem eae eae edd. hae A he R ee (= esse) NV et BE verae videntur opiniones, quae honestae, quae laudabiles, quae gloriosae, quae in senatu, quae apud populum, quae in omni coetu concilioque profitendae sint, sunt R ne id non pudeat non pudeat pudeat non (ne E) BE sentire, quod pudeat dicere. Amicitiae vero locus ubi esse potest aut quis amicus esse cuiquam, quem non ipsum amet propter ipsum?' "
2.96. Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas intellegas (intellig.) BEA 2 intellegat A 1 intelligat R intelligantur N intelligatur V facta eius cum dictis discrepare: 'Epicurus Hermarcho salutem. Cum ageremus', inquit, vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus haec. tanti autem autem om. A aderant aderant om. BE vesicae et torminum morbi, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere. Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. sed audiamus ipsum: 'Compensabatur', inquit, tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam me et philosophiam Bai. me (ne R) et philosophia A 1 RN me philosophia BE me et philosophia et A 2 V voluntate ab adolescentulo suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos." '
3.3. ipse etiam dicit dicit cf. p. 13, 24—29 Epicurus ne ne nec RNV argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. nec enim in Torquati sermone quicquam sermone quicquam VN 2 sermone nec quicquam (quitquam ABE) implicatum inpl. R aut tortuosum fuit, nostraque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt inponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur cogitans in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur.' "
5.7. Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V" '
5.13. namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, lyco V lico R lisias et N 2 ( versu ultra marg. continuato; ex priore script. lic cognosci posse videtur ); om. BE spatio vacuo rel. oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ipsi rebus R ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet.
5.17. constitit autem fere inter omnes id, in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem o(rmh\\n o(rmh/n bonū R Graeci vocant. quid autem sit, quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis dissensio. totius enim quaestionis eius, quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur, in his quid sit extremum et ultimum, et quid ultimum BE fons reperiendus est, in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur. Voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris. vacuitatem doloris alii censent primum ascitam ascitam cod. Glogav., Mdv. ; ascitum RV as|scitum N assertum BE et primum declinatum dolorem.' '. None | 2.7. \xa0"What then?" he replied; "does not Epicurus recognize pleasure in your sense?" "Not always," said\xa0I; "now and then, I\xa0admit, he recognizes it only too fully; for he solemnly avows that he cannot even understand what Good there can be or where it can be found, apart from that which is derived from food and drink, the delight of the ears, and the grosser forms of gratification. Do\xa0I misrepresent his words?" "Just as if I\xa0were ashamed of all that," he cried, "or unable to explain the sense in which it is spoken!" "Oh," said\xa0I, "I\xa0haven\'t the least doubt you can explain it with ease. And you have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the opinions of a Wise Man â\x80\x94 who stands alone, so far as I\xa0am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself that title. For I\xa0do not suppose that Metrodorus himself claimed to be a Wise Man, though he did not care to refuse the compliment when the name was bestowed upon him by Epicurus; while the famous Seven of old received their appellation not by their own votes, but by the universal suffrage of mankind. <
2.20. \xa0"For you must not suppose it is merely a verbal distinction: the things themselves are different. To be without pain is one thing, to feel pleasure another; yet you Epicureans try to combine these quite dissimilar feelings â\x80\x94 not merely under a single name (for that I\xa0could more easily tolerate), but as actually being a single thing, instead of really two; which is absolutely impossible. Epicurus, approving both sorts of pleasure, ought to have recognized both sorts; as he really does in fact, though he does not distinguish them in words. In a\xa0number of passages where he is commending that real pleasure which all of us call by the same name, he goes so far as to say that he cannot even imagine any Good that is not connected with pleasure of the kind intended by Aristippus. This is the language that he holds it discourse dealing solely with the topic of the Chief Good. Then there is another treatise containing his most important doctrines in a compendious form, in which we are told he uttered the very oracles of Wisdom. Here he writes the following words, with which you, Torquatus, are of course familiar (for every good Epicurean has got by heart the master\'s Kuriai Doxai or Authoritative Doctrines, since these brief aphorisms or maxims are held to be of sovereign efficacy for happiness). So I\xa0will ask you kindly to notice whether I\xa0translate this maxim correctly: <
2.23. \xa0"What then is the point of saying \'I\xa0should have no fault to find with them if they kept their desires within bounds\'? That is tantamount to saying \'I\xa0should not blame the profligate if they were not profligate.\' He might as well say he would not blame the dishonest either, if they were upright men. Here is our rigid moralist maintaining that sensuality is not in itself blameworthy! And I\xa0profess, Torquatus, on the hypothesis that pleasure is the Chief Good he is perfectly justified in thinking so. I\xa0should be sorry to picture to myself, as you are so fond of doing, debauchees who are sick at table, have to be carried home from dinner-parties, and next day gorge themselves again before they have recovered from the effects of the night before; men who, as the saying goes, have never seen either sunset or sunrise; men who run through their inheritance and sink into penury. None of us supposes that profligates of that description live pleasantly. No, but men of taste and refinement, with first-rate chefs and confectioners, fish, birds, game and the like of the choicest; careful of their digestion; with Wine in flask Decanted from a newâ\x80\x91broach\'d cask,\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. as Lucilius has it, Wine of tang bereft, All harshness in the strainer left; with the accompaniment of dramatic performances and their usual sequel, the pleasures apart from which Epicurus, as he loudly proclaims, does not what Good is; give them also beautiful boys to wait upon them, with drapery, silver, Corinthian bronzes, and the scene of the feast, the banqueting-room, all in keeping; take profligates of this sort; that these live well or enjoy happiness I\xa0will never allow. <
2.29. \xa0"But fancy his failing to see how strong a proof it is that the sort of pleasure, without which he declares he has no idea at all what Good means (and he defines it in detail as the pleasure of the palate, of the ears, and subjoins the other kinds of pleasure, which cannot be specified without an apology), â\x80\x94 he fails, I\xa0say, to see that this, the sole Good which our strict and serious philosopher recognizes, is actually not even desirable, inasmuch as on his own showing we feel no need of this sort of pleasure, so long as we are free from pain! How inconsistent this is! <' "2.30. \xa0If only Epicurus had studied Definition and Division, if he understood the meaning of Predication or even the customary use of terms, he would never have fallen into such a quandary. As it is, you see what he does. He calls a thing pleasure that no one ever called by that name before; he confounds two things that are distinct. The 'kinetic' sort of pleasure (for so he terms the delightful and so to speak sweet-flavoured pleasures we are considering) at one moment he so disparages that you would think you were listening to Manius Curius, while at another moment he so extols it that he tells us he is incapable even of imagining what other good there can be. Now that is language that does not call for a philosopher to answer it, â\x80\x94 it ought to be put down by the police. His morality is at fault, and not only his logic. He does not censure profligacy, provided it be free from unbridled desire, and from fear of consequences. Here he seems to be making a bid for converts: the wouldâ\x80\x91be roué need only turn philosopher. <" '
2.48. \xa0"There, Torquatus, is a full, detailed and complete scheme of Moral Worth, a whole of which these four virtues, which you also mentioned, constitute the parts. Yet your Epicurus tells us that he is utterly at a loss to know what nature or qualities are assigned to this Morality by those who make it the measure of the Chief Good. For if Morality be the standard to which all things are referred, while yet they will not allow that pleasure forms any part of it, he declares that they are uttering sounds devoid of sense (those are his actual words), and that he has no notion or perception whatever of any meaning that this term Morality can have attached to it. In common parlance \'moral\' (honourable) means merely that which ranks high in popular esteem. And popular esteem, says Epicurus, though often in itself more agreeable than certain forms of pleasure, yet is desired simply as a means to pleasure. <' "
2.64. \xa0Epicurus's classification of the desires meant nothing to him; he knew no limit but satiety. At the same time he was careful of his health: took sufficient exercise to come hungry and thirsty to table; ate what was at once most appetizing and most digestible; drank enough wine for pleasure and not too much for health. Nor did he forgo those other indulgences in the absence of which Epicurus declares that he cannot understand what Good is. Pain he never experienced at all; had it come to him, he would have borne it with fortitude, yet would have called in a doctor sooner than a philosopher. He had excellent health and a sound constitution. He was extremely popular. In short, his life was replete with pleasure of every variety. <" "
2.77. \xa0For in that glorious array of high-sounding words, pleasure finds no place, not only what your school calls 'kinetic' pleasure, which is what every one, polished or rustic, every one, I\xa0say, who can speak Latin, means by pleasure, but not even this 'static' pleasure, which no one but you Epicureans would call pleasure at all. \xa0Well then, are you sure you have any right to employ our words with meanings of your own? If you assumed an unnatural expression or demeanour, in order to look more important, that would be insincere. Are you then to affect an artificial language, and say what you do not think? Or are you to change your opinions like your clothes, and have one set for indoor wear and another when you walk abroad? Outside, all show and pretence, but your genuine self concealed within? Reflect, I\xa0beg of you, is this honest? In my view those opinions are true which are honourable, praiseworthy and noble â\x80\x94 which can be openly avowed in the senate and the popular assembly, and in every company and gathering, so that one need not be ashamed to say what one is not ashamed to think. <" '
2.96. \xa0"But I\xa0must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: \'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I\xa0write these words,\' he says, \'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I\xa0am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.\' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. \'Yet all my sufferings,\' he continues, \'are counterbalanced by the joy which I\xa0derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I\xa0charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.\' <
3.3. \xa0In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a\xa0reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I\xa0believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. <
5.7. \xa0"Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I\xa0will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I\xa0almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I\xa0beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." <' "
5.13. \xa0Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. <" '
5.17. \xa0Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormÄ\x93. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire â\x80\x94 as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil. <' '. None |
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15. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.1-1.4, 1.10-1.12, 1.18-1.41, 1.18.46, 1.43-1.49, 1.53, 1.57-1.61, 1.69, 1.82, 1.85, 1.93, 1.96, 1.111, 1.116-1.117, 1.123, 2.13, 2.19, 2.46-2.49, 2.88, 2.142, 2.146-2.148, 2.153, 2.160, 3.3, 3.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean philosophers, on Plato's Timaeus • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, • Epicureanism, Theories of sight • Epicureanism, debate concerning Arnobius • Epicureans • Epicureans, as letter writers • Epicureans, cosmology of • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicureans, language of • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, and the swerve (παρέγκλισις, declinatio) • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on fate (εἱμαρμένη) • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on free movement (ἐλευθέρα κείνησις) • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on providence (πρόνοια) • Mind, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Phaedrus the Epicurean • Philosophy, Epicurean • Senses, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Superstitio, In Lucretius’ Epicureanism • Velleius (Epicurean) • Velleius, Epicurean philosopher • animal sacrifice, conceptual parallels with Epicureanism • belief, Epicurean theory of • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of • friendship, Epicurean understandings • god, gods, Epicurean • gods (Epicurean), involvement in moral formation • gods (Epicurean), realist and idealist conceptions of • gods, location in Epicureanism • limit, Epicurean concept of • preconceptions, Epicurean • reason, in Epicurean theology • reproduction, Epicurean theory of
Found in books: Allison (2020) 61, 77, 82; Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 124, 131; Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 608, 609, 614; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 5, 66; Bryan (2018) 218; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 480; Frede and Laks (2001) 86, 96, 97, 159, 187, 245; Gale (2000) 85, 90, 112, 271; Gordon (2012) 88; Hoenig (2018) 88, 89, 90; Liatsi (2021) 193; Lloyd (1989) 31; Long (2006) 117, 119, 158; Long (2019) 71; Mackey (2022) 217; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 37; Meister (2019) 7, 8; Nuno et al (2021) 14, 47; Rosa and Santangelo (2020) 97; Simmons(1995) 135; Stanton (2021) 164; Struck (2016) 184; Wardy and Warren (2018) 218, 229, 230; Wynne (2019) 86, 95, 98; Yona (2018) 46
| 1.1. There are a number of branches of philosophy that have not as yet been by any means adequately explored; but the inquiry into the nature of the gods, which is both highly interesting in relation to the theory of the soul, and fundamentally important for the regulation of religion, is one of special difficulty and obscurity, as you, Brutus, are well aware. The multiplicity and variety of the opinions held upon this subject by eminent scholars are bound to constitute a strong argument for the view that philosophy has its origin and starting-point in ignorance, and that the Academic School were well-advised in "withholding assent" from beliefs that are uncertain: for what is more unbecoming than ill‑considered haste? and what is so ill‑considered or so unworthy of the dignity and seriousness proper to a philosopher as to hold an opinion that is not true, or to maintain with unhesitating certainty a proposition not based on adequate examination, comprehension and knowledge? ' "1.2. As regards the present subject, for example, most thinkers have affirmed that the gods exist, and this is the most probable view and the one to which we are all led by nature's guidance; but Protagoras declared himself uncertain, and Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene held that there are no gods at all. Moreover, the upholders of the divine existence differ and disagree so widely, that it would be a troublesome task to recount their opinions. Many views are put forward about the outward form of the gods, their dwelling-places and abodes, and mode of life, and these topics are debated with the widest variety of opinion among philosophers; but as to the question upon which the whole issue of the dispute principally turns, whether the gods are entirely idle and inactive, taking no part at all in the direction and government of the world, or whether on the contrary all things both were created and ordered by them in the beginning and are controlled and kept in motion by them throughout eternity, here there is the greatest disagreement of all. And until this issue is decided, mankind must continue to labour under the profoundest uncertainty, and to be in ignorance about matters of the highest moment. " '1.3. For there are and have been philosophers who hold that the gods exercise no control over human affairs whatever. But if their opinion is the true one, how can piety, reverence or religion exist? For all these are tributes which it is our duty to render in purity and holiness to the divine powers solely on the assumption that they take notice of them, and that some service has been rendered by the immortal gods to the race of men. But if on the contrary the gods have neither the power nor the will to aid us, if they pay no heed to us at all and take no notice of our actions, if they can exercise no possible influence upon the life of men, what ground have we for rendering any sort of worship, honour or prayer to the immortal gods? Piety however, like the rest of the virtues, cannot exist in mere outward show and pretence; and, with piety, reverence and religion must likewise disappear. And when these are gone, life soon becomes a welter of disorder and confusion; ' "1.4. and in all probability the disappearance of piety towards the gods will entail the disappearance of loyalty and social union among men as well, and of justice itself, the queen of all the virtues. There are however other philosophers, and those of eminence and note, who believe that the whole world is ruled and governed by divine intelligence and reason; and not this only, but also that the gods' providence watches over the life of men; for they think that the cornº and other fruits of the earth, and also the weather and the seasons and the changes of the atmosphere by which all the products of the soil are ripened and matured, are the gift of the immortal gods to the human race; and they adduce a number of things, which will be recounted in the books that compose the present treatise, that are of such a nature as almost to appear to have been expressly constructed by the immortal gods for the use of man. This view was controverted at great length by Carneades, in such a manner as to arouse in persons of active mind a keen desire to discover the truth. " "
1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so, he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. " '
1.11. To those again who are surprised at my choice of a system to which to give my allegiance, I think that a sufficient answer has been given in the four books of my Academica. Nor is it the case that I have come forward as the champion of a lost cause and of a position now abandoned. When men die, their doctrines do not perish with them, though perhaps they suffer from the loss of their authoritative exponent. Take for example the philosophical method referred to, that of a purely negative dialectic which refrains from pronouncing any positive judgement. This, after being originated by Socrates, revived by Arcesilas, and reinforced by Carneades, has flourished right down to our own period; though I understand that in Greece itself it is now almost bereft of adherents. But this I ascribe not to the fault of the Academy but to the dullness of mankind. If it is a considerable matter to understand any one of the systems of philosophy singly, how much harder is it to master them all! Yet this is the task that confronts those whose principle is to discover the truth by the method of arguing both for and against all the schools.
1.12. In an undertaking so extensive and so arduous, I do not profess to have attained success, though I do claim to have attempted it. At the same time it would be impossible for the adherents of this method to dispense altogether with any standard of guidance. This matter it is true I have discussed elsewhere more thoroughly; but some people are so dull and slow of apprehension that they appear to require repeated explanations. Our position is not that we hold that nothing is true, but that we assert that all true sensations are associated with false ones so closely resembling them that they contain no infallible mark to guide our judgement and assent. From this followed the corollary, that many sensations are probable, that is, though not amounting to a full perception they are yet possessed of a certain distinctness and clearness, and so can serve to direct the conduct of the wise man.
1.18. Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato\'s Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render \'Providence\') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream.
1.19. What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; ' "1.20. but the prize example is that the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution? What thing is there that has a beginning but not an end? While as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato's creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried though? If on the contrary it is something different, I ask why it made the world mortal, and not everlasting as did Plato's divine creator? " '1.21. Moreover I would put to both of you the question, why did these deities suddenly awake into activity as world-builders after countless ages of slumber? for though the world did not exist, it does not follow that ages did not exist — meaning by ages, not periods made up of a number of days and nights in annual courses, for ages in this sense I admit could not have been produced without the circular motion of the firmament; but from the infinite past there has existed an eternity not measured by limited divisions of time, but of a nature intelligible in terms of extension; since it is inconceivable that there was ever a time when time did not exist. 1.22. Well then, Balbus, what I ask is, why did your Providence remain idle all through that extent of time of which you speak? Was it in order to avoid fatigue? But god cannot know fatigue; and also there was no fatigue in question, since all the elements, sky, fire, earth and sea, were obedient to the divine will. Also, why should god take a fancy to decorate the firmament with figures and illuminations, like an aedile? If it was to embellish his own abode, then it seems that he had previously between dwelling for an infinite time in a dark and gloomy hovel! And are we to suppose that thenceforward the varied beauties which we see adorning earth and sky have afforded him pleasure? How can a god take pleasure in things of this sort? And if he did, he could not have dispensed with it so long. ' "1.23. Or were these beauties designed for the sake of men, as your school usually maintains? For the sake of wise men? If so, all this vast effort of construction took place on account of a handful of people. For the sake of fools then? But in the first place there was no reason for god to do a service to the wicked and secondly, what good did he do? inasmuch as all fools are beyond question extremely miserable, precisely because they are fools (for what can be mentioned more miserable than folly?), and in the second place because there are so many troubles in life that, though wise men can assuage them by balancing against them life's advantages, fools can neither avoid their approach nor endure their presence. Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess. I will touch on this a little later; " "1.24. for the present I will confine myself to expressing my surprise at their stupidity in holding that a being who is immortal and also blessed is of a spherical shape, merely on the ground that Plato pronounces a sphere to be the most beautiful of all figures. For my own part, on the score of appearance I prefer either a cylinder or a cube or a cone or a pyramid. Then, what mode of existence is assigned to their spherical deity? Why, he is in a state of rotation, spinning round with a velocity that surpasses all powers of conception. But what room there can be in such an existence for steadfastness of mind and for happiness, I cannot see. Also, why should a condition that is painful in the human body, if even the smallest part of it is affected, be supposed to be painless in the deity? Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively. " '1.25. "So much, Lucilius, for the doctrines of your school. To show what the older systems are like, I will trace their history from the remotest of your predecessors. Thales of Miletus, who was the first person to investigate these matters, said that water was the first principle of things, but that god was the mind that moulded all things out of water — supposing that gods can exist without sensation; and why did he make mind an adjunct of water, if mind can exist by itself, devoid of body? The view of Anaximander is that the gods are not everlasting but are born and perish at long intervals of time, and that they are worlds, countless in number. But how we conceive of god save as living for ever? 1.26. Next, Anaximenes held that air is god, and that it has a beginning in time, and is immeasurable and infinite in extent, and is always in motion; just as if formless air could be god, especially seeing that it is proper to god to possess not merely some shape but the most beautiful shape; or as if anything that has had a beginning must not necessarily be mortal. Then there is Anaxagoras, the successor of Anaximenes; he was the first thinker to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by the rational power of an infinite mind. But in saying this he failed to see that there can be no such thing as sentient and continuous activity in that which is infinite, and that sensation in general can only occur when the subject itself becomes sentient by the impact of a sensation. Further, if he intended his infinite mind to be a definite living creature, it must have some inner principle of life to justify the name. But mind is itself the innermost principle. Mind therefore will have an outer integument of body. 1.27. But this Anaxagoras will not allow; yet mind naked and simple, without any material adjunct to serve as an organ of sensation, seems to elude the capacity of our understanding. Alcmaeon of Croton, who attributed divinity to the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, and also to the soul, did not perceive that he was bestowing immortality on things that are mortal. As for Pythagoras, who believed that the entire substance of the universe is penetrated and pervaded by a soul of which our souls are fragments, he failed to notice that this severance of the souls of men from the world-soul means the dismemberment and rending asunder of god; and that when their souls are unhappy, as happens to most men, then a portion of god is unhappy; which is impossible. 1.28. Again, if the soul of man is divine, why is it not omniscient? Moreover, if the Pythagorean god is pure soul, how is he implanted in, or diffused throughout, the world? Next, Xenophanes endowed the universe with mind, and held that, as being infinite, it was god. His view of mind is as open to objection as that of the rest; but on the subject of infinity he incurs still severer criticism, for the infinite can have no sensation and no contact with anything outside. As for Parmenides, he invents a purely fanciful something resembling a crown — stephanè is his name for it —, an unbroken ring of glowing lights, encircling the sky, which he entitles god; but no one can imagine this to possess divine form, or sensation. He also has many other portentous notions; he deifies war, strife, lust and the like, things which can be destroyed by disease or sleep or forgetfulness or lapse of time; and he also deifies the stars, but this has been criticized in another philosopher and need not be dealt with now in the case of Parmenides. ' "1.29. Empedocles again among many other blunders comes to grief most disgracefully in his theology. He assigns divinity to the four substances which in his system are the constituent elements of the universe, although manifestly these substances both come into and pass out of existence, and are entirely devoid of sensation. Protagoras also, who declares he has no clear views whatever about the gods, whether they exist or do not exist, or what they are like, seems to have no notion at all of the divine nature. Then in what a maze of error is Democritus involved, who at one moment ranks as gods his roving 'images,' at another the substance that emits and radiates these images, and at another again the scientific intelligence of man! At the same time his denial of immutability and therefore of eternity, to everything whatsoever surely involves a repudiation of deity so absolute as to leave no conception of a divine be remaining! Diogenes of Apollonia makes air a god; but how can air have sensation, or divinity in any shape? " '1.30. The inconsistencies of Plato are a long story. In the Timaeus he says that it is impossible to name the father of this universe; and in the Laws he deprecates all inquiry into the nature of the deity. Again, he holds that god is entirely incorporeal (in Greek, asomatos); but divine incorporeity is inconceivable, for an incorporeal deity would necessarily be incapable of sensation, and also of practical wisdom, and of pleasure, all of which are attributes essential to our conception of deity. Yet both in the Timaeus and the Laws he says that the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls are gods, in addition to those in whom we have been taught to believe; but it is obvious that these propositions are both inherently false and mutually destructive. 1.31. Xenophon also commits almost the same errors, though in fewer words; for in his memoir of the sayings of Socrates he represents Socrates as arguing that it is wrong to inquire about the form of god, but also as saying that both the sun and the soul are god, and as speaking at one moment of a single god and at another of several: utterances that involve almost the same mistakes as do those which we quoted from Plato. 1.32. Antisthenes also, in his book entitled The Natural Philosopher, says that while there are many gods of popular belief, there is one god in nature, so depriving divinity of all meaning or substance. Very similarly Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, and speaking of a certain force that governs all things and is endowed with life, does his best to root out the notion of deity from our minds altogether. 1.33. And Aristotle in the Third Book of his Philosophy has a great many confused notions, not disagreeing with the doctrines of his master Plato; at one moment he assigns divinity exclusively to the intellect, at another he says that the world is itself a god, then again he puts some other being over the world, and assigns to this being the rôle of regulating and sustaining the world-motion by means of a sort of inverse rotation; then he says that the celestial heat is god — not realizing that the heavens are a part of that world which elsewhere he himself has entitled god. But how could the divine consciousness which he assigns to the heavens persist in a state of such rapid motion? Where moreover are all the gods of accepted belief, if we count the heavens also as a god? Again, in maintaining that god is incorporeal, he robs him entirely of sensation, and also of wisdom. Moreover, how is motion possible for an incorporeal being, and how, if he is always in motion, can he enjoy tranquillity and bliss? 1.34. Nor was his fellow-pupil Xenocrates any wiser on this subject. His volumes On the Nature of the Gods give no intelligible account of the divine form; for he states that there are eight gods: five inhabiting the planets, and in a state of motion; one consisting of all the fixed stars, which are to be regarded as separate members constituting a single deity; seventh he adds the sun, and eighth the moon. But what sensation of bliss these things can enjoy it is impossible to conceive. Another member of the school of Plato, Heracleides of Pontus, filled volume after volume with childish fictions; at one moment he deems the world divine, at another the intellect; he also assigns divinity to the planets, and holds that the deity is devoid of sensation and mutable of form; and again in the same volume he reckons earth and sky as gods. 1.35. Theophrastus also is intolerably inconsistent; at one moment he assigns divine pre‑eminence to mind, at another to the heavens, and then again to the constellations and stars in the heavens. Nor is his pupil, Strato, surnamed the Natural Philosopher, worthy of attention; in his view the sole repository of divine power is nature, which contains in itself the causes of birth, growth and decay, but is entirely devoid of sensation and of form. 1.36. "Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno\'s view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a \'reason\' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod\'s Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. ' "1.37. Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views. He thinks that the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all. Cleanthes, who attended Zeno's lectures at the same time as the last-named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and at another decides that the most unquestionable deity is that remote all‑surrounding fiery atmosphere called the aether, which encircles and embraces the universe on its outer side at an exceedingly lofty altitude; while in the books that he wrote to combat hedonism he babbles like one demented, now imagining gods of some definite shape and form, now assigning full divinity to the stars, now pronouncing that nothing is more divine than reason. The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. " '1.38. Persaeus, another pupil of Zeno, says that men have deified those persons who have made some discovery of special utility for civilization, and that useful and health-giving things have themselves been called by divine names; he did not even say that they were discoveries of the gods, but speaks of them as actually divine. But what could be more ridiculous than to award divine honours to things mean and ugly, or to give the rank of gods to men now dead and gone, whose worship could only take the form of lamentation? 1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. 1.40. He also argues that the god whom men call Jupiter is the aether, and that Neptune is the air which permeates the sea, and the goddess called Ceres the earth; and he deals in the same way with the whole series of the names of the other gods. He also identifies Jupiter with the mighty Law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guide of life and instructress in duty, and which he entitles Necessity or Fate, and the Everlasting Truth of future events; none of which conceptions is of such a nature as to be deemed to possess divinity. 1.41. This is what is contained in his Nature of the Gods, Book I. In Book II he aims at reconciling the myths of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer with his own theology as enunciated in Book I, and so makes out that even the earliest poets of antiquity, who had no notion of these doctrines, were really Stoics. In this he is followed by Diogenes of Babylon, who in his book entitled Minerva rationalizes the myth of the birth of the virgin goddess from Jove by explaining it as an allegory of the processes of nature.
1.43. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some \'preconception\' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus\'s Rule or Standard of Judgement. ' "1.44. You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the uimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) " '1.45. We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that \'that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favour, since all such things belong only to the weak.\' "If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshipping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man\'s pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favour alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence. 1.46. "For the divine form we have the hints of nature supplemented by the teachings of reason. From nature all men of all races derive the notion of gods as having human shape and none other; for in what other shape do they ever appear to anyone, awake or asleep? But not to make primary concepts the sole test of all things, reason itself delivers the same pronouncement. 1.47. For it seems appropriate that the being who is the most exalted, whether by reason of his happiness or his eternity, should also be the most beautiful; but what disposition of the limbs, what cast of features, what shape or outline can be more beautiful than the human form? You Stoics at least, Lucilius, (for my friend Cotta says one thing at one time and another at another) are wont to portray the skill of the divine creator by enlarging on the beauty as well as the utility of design displayed in all parts of the human figure. 1.48. But if the human figure surpasses the form of all other living beings, and god is a living being, god must possess the shape which is the most beautiful of all; and since it is agreed that the gods are supremely happy, and no one can be happy without virtue, and virtue cannot exist without reason, and reason is only found in the human shape, it follows that the gods possess the form of man. 1.49. Yet their form is not corporeal, but only resembles bodily substance; it does not contain blood, but the semblance of blood. "These discoveries of Epicurus are so acute in themselves and so subtly expressed that not everyone would be capable of appreciating them. Still I may rely on your intelligence, and make my exposition briefer than the subject demands. Epicurus then, as he not merely discerns abstruse and recondite things with his mind\'s eye, but handles them as tangible realities, teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind, and not materially or individually, like the solid objects which Epicurus in virtue of their substantiality entitles steremnia; but by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods, our minds with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of the nature of a being both blessed and eternal.
1.53. We for our part deem happiness to consist in tranquillity of mind and entire exemption from all duties. For he who taught us all the rest has also taught us that the world was made by nature, without needing an artificer to construct it, and that the act of creation, which according to you cannot be performed without divine skill, is so easy, that nature will create, is creating and has created worlds without number. You on the contrary cannot see how nature can achieve all this without the aid of some intelligence, and so, like the tragic poets, being unable to bring the plot of your drama to a dénouement, you have recourse to a god;
1.57. Then Cotta took up the discussion. "Well, Velleius," he rejoined, with his usual suavity, "unless you had stated a case, you certainly would have had no chance of hearing anything from me. I always find it much easier to think of arguments to prove a thing false than to prove it true. This often happens to me, and did so just now while I was listening to you. Ask me what I think that the divine nature is like, and very probably I shall make no reply; but inquire whether I believe that it resembles the description of it which you have just given, and I shall say that nothing seems to me less likely. But before proceeding to examine your arguments, I will give my opinion of yourself. 1.58. I fancy I have often heard that friend of yours Lucius Crassus declare that of all the Roman adherents of Epicureanism he placed you unquestionably first, and that few of those from Greece could be ranked beside you; but knowing his extraordinary esteem for you, I imagined that he was speaking with the partiality of a friend. I myself however, though reluctant to praise you to your face, must nevertheless pronounce that your exposition of an obscure and difficult theme has been most illuminating, and not only exhaustive in its treatment of the subject, but also graced with a charm of style not uncommon in your school. 1.59. When at Athens, I frequently attended the discourses of Zeno, whom our friend Philo used to call the leader of the Epicurean choir; in fact it was Philo who suggested that I should go to him — no doubt in order that I might be better able to judge how completely the Epicurean doctrine may be refuted when I had heard an exposition of it from the head of the school. Now Zeno, unlike most Epicureans, had a style as clear, cogent and elegant as your own. But what often occurred to me in his case happened just now while I was listening to you: I felt annoyed that talents so considerable should have chanced to select (if you will forgive my saying it) so trivial, not to say so stupid, a set of doctrines. ' "1.60. Not that I propose at the moment to contribute something better of my own. As I said just now, in almost all subjects, but especially in natural philosophy, I am more ready to say what is not true than what is. Inquire of me as to the being and nature of god, and I shall follow the example of Simonides, who having the same question put to him by the great Hiero, requested a day's grace for consideration; next day, when Hiero repeated the question, he asked for two days, and so went on several times multiplying the number of days by two; and when Hiero in surprise asked why he did so, he replied, 'Because the longer I deliberate the more obscure the matter seems to me.' But Simonides is recorded to have been not only a charming poet but also a man of learning and wisdom in other fields, and I suppose that so many acute and subtle ideas came into his mind that he could not decide which of them was truest, and therefore despaired of truth altogether. " '1.61. But as for your master Epicurus (for I prefer to join issue with him rather than with yourself), which of his utterances is, I do not say worthy of philosophy, but compatible with ordinary common sense? "In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the gods exist or do they not? \'It is difficult to deny their existence.\' No doubt it would be if the question were to be asked in a public assembly, but in private conversation and in a company like the present it is perfectly easy. This being so, I, who am a high priest, and who hold it to be a duty most solemnly to maintain the rights and doctrines of the established religion, should be glad to be convinced of this fundamental tenet of the divine existence, not as an article of faith merely but as an ascertained fact. For many disturbing reflections occur to my mind, which sometimes make me think that there are no gods at all.
1.69. "This is a very common practice with your school. You advance a paradox, and then, when you want to escape censure, you adduce in support of it some absolute impossibility; so that you would have done better to abandon the point in dispute rather than to offer so shameless a defence. For instance, Epicurus saw that if the atoms travelled downwards by their own weight, we should have no freedom of the will, since the motion of the atoms would be determined by necessity. He therefore invented a device to escape from determinism (the point had apparently escaped the notice of Democritus): he said that the atom while travelling vertically downward by the force of gravity makes a very slight swerve to the side. ' "
1.82. For we have often seen temples robbed and images of gods carried off from the holiest shrines by our fellow-countrymen, but no one ever even heard of an Egyptian laying profane hands on a crocodile or ibis or cat. What therefore do you infer? that the Egyptians do not believe their sacred bull Apis to be a god? Precisely as much as you believe the Saviour Juno of your native place to be a goddess. You never see her even in your dreams unless equipped with goat-skin, spear, buckler and slippers turned up at the toe. Yet that is not the aspect of the Argive Juno, nor of the Roman. It follows that Juno has one form for the Argives, another for the people of Lanuvium, and another for us. And indeed our Jupiter of the Capitol is not the same as the Africans' Juppiter Ammon. " "
1.85. Well then, if the gods do not possess the appearance of men, as I have proved, nor some such form as that of the heavenly bodies, as you are convinced, why do you hesitate to deny their existence? You do not dare to. Well, that is no doubt wise — although in this matter it is not the public that you fear, but the gods themselves: I personally am acquainted with Epicureans who worship every paltry image, albeit I am aware that according to some people's view Epicurus really abolished the gods, but nominally retained them in order not to offend the people of Athens. Thus the first of his selected aphorisms or maxims, which you call the Kyriai Doxai, runs, I believe, thus: That which is blessed and immortal neither experiences trouble nor causes it to anyone. Now there are people who think that the wording of this maxim was intentional, though really it was due to the author's inability to express himself clearly; their suspicion does an injustice to the most guileless of mankind. " '
1.93. "Was it dreams like these that not only encouraged Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus to contradict Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but actually emboldened a loose woman like Leontium to write a book refuting Theophrastus? Her style no doubt is the neatest of Attic, but all the same! — such was the licence that prevailed in the Garden of Epicurus. And yet you are touchy yourselves, indeed Zeno actually used to invoke the law. I need not mention Albucius. As for Phaedrus, though he was the most refined and courteous of old gentlemen, he used to lose his temper if I spoke too harshly; although Epicurus attacked Aristotle in the most insulting manner, abused Socrates\' pupil Phaedo quite outrageously, devoted whole volumes to an onslaught on Timocrates, the brother of his own associate Metrodorus, for differing from him on some point or other of philosophy, showed no gratitude toward Democritus himself, whose system he adopted, and treated so badly his own master Nausiphanes, from whom he had learnt a considerable amount. As for Zeno, he aimed the shafts of his abuse not only at his contemporaries, Apollodorus, Silus and the rest, but Socrates himself, the father of philosophy, he declared to have been the Attic equivalent of our Roman buffoons; and he always alluded to Chrysippus in the feminine gender. ' "
1.96. Your only answer is: 'I have never seen a happy sun or world.' Well, but have you ever seen any other world but this one? No, you will reply. Then why did you venture to assert the existence of, not thousands and thousands, but a countless number of worlds? 'That is what reason teaches.' Then will not reason teach you that when we seek to find a being who shall be supremely excellent, and happy and eternal as well — and nothing else constitutes divinity —, even as that being will surpass us in immortality, so also will it surpass us in mental excellence, and even as in mental excellence, so also in bodily. Why then, if we are inferior to god in all else, are we his equals in form? for man came nearer to the divine image in virtue than in outward aspect. " "
1.111. In what then does his life consist? 'In a constant succession of things good,' you reply, 'without any admixture of evils.' Things good — what things? Pleasures, I suppose — that is, of course, pleasures of the body, for your school recognizes no pleasures of the mind that do not arise from and come back to the body. I don't suppose that you, Velleius, are like the rest of the Epicureans, who are ashamed of certain utterances of Epicurus, in which he protests that he cannot conceive any good that is unconnected with the pleasures of the voluptuary and the sensualist, pleasures which in fact he proceeds without a blush to enumerate by name. " "
1.116. 'But deity possesses an excellence and pre‑eminence which must of its own nature attract the worship of the wise.' Now how can there be any excellence in a being so engrossed in the delights of his own pleasure that he always has been, is, and will continue to be entirely idle and inactive? Furthermore how can you owe piety to a person who has bestowed nothing upon you? or how can you owe anything at all to one who has done you no service? Piety is justice towards the gods; but how can any claims of justice exist between us and them, if god and man have nothing in common? Holiness is the science of divine worship; but I fail to see why the gods should be worshipped if we neither have received nor hope to receive benefit from them. " '
1.117. On the other hand what reason is there for adoring the gods on the ground of our admiration for the divine nature, if we cannot see that that nature possesses any special excellence? "As for freedom from superstition, which is the favourite boast of your school, that is easy to attain when you have deprived the gods of all power; unless perchance you think that it was possible for Diagoras or Theodorus to be superstitious, who denied the existence of the gods altogether. For my part, I don\'t see how it was possible even for Protagoras, who was not certain either that the gods exist or that they do not. For the doctrines of all these thinkers abolish not only superstition, which implies a groundless fear of the gods, but also religion, which consists in piously worshipping them.
1.123. Epicurus is making fun of us, though he is not so much a humorist as a loose and careless writer. For how can holiness exist if the gods pay no heed to man\'s affairs? Yet what is the meaning of an animate being that pays no heed to anything? "It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as the good friend of us all, Posidonius, argued in the fifth book of his On the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular odium. Indeed he could not have been so senseless as really to imagine god to be like a feeble human being, but resembling him only in outline and surface, not in solid substance, and possessing all man\'s limbs but entirely incapable of using them, an emaciated and transparent being, showing no kindness or beneficence to anybody, caring for nothing and doing nothing at all. In the first place, a being of this nature is an absolute impossibility, and Epicurus was aware of this, and so actually abolishes the gods, although professedly retaining them. ' "
2.13. As to their nature there are various opinions, but their existence nobody denies. Indeed our master Cleanthes gave four reasons to account for the formation in men's minds of their ideas of the gods. He put first the argument of which I spoke just now, the one arising from our foreknowledge of future events; second, the one drawn from the magnitude of the benefits which we derive from our temperate climate, from the earth's fertility, and from a vast abundance of other blessings; " '
2.19. Again, consider the sympathetic agreement, interconnexion and affinity of things: whom will this not compel to approve the truth of what I say? Would it be possible for the earth at one definite time to be gay with flowers and then in turn all bare and stark, or for the spontaneous transformation of so many things about us to signal the approach and the retirement of the sun at the summer and the winter solstices, or for the tides to flow and ebb in the seas and straits with the rising and setting of the moon, or for the different courses of the stars to be maintained by the one revolution of the entire sky? These processes and this musical harmony of all the parts of the world assuredly would not go on were they not maintained in unison by a single divine and all‑pervading spirit.
2.46. Let Epicurus jest at this notion as he will — and he is a person who jokes with difficulty, and has but the slightest smack of his native Attic wit, — let him protest his inability to conceive of god as a round and rotating body. Nevertheless he will never dislodge me from one belief which even he himself accepts: he holds that gods exist, on the ground that there must necessarily be some mode of being of outstanding and supreme excellence; now clearly nothing can be more excellent than the world. Nor can it be doubted that a living being endowed with sensation, reason and intelligence must excel a being devoid of those attributes; 2.47. hence it follows that the world is a living being and possesses sensation, intelligence and reason; and this argument leads to the conclusion that the world is god. "But these points will appear more readily a little later merely from a consideration of the creatures that the world produces. In the meantime, pray, Velleius, do not parade your school\'s utter ignorance of science. You say that you think a cone, a cylinder and a pyramid more beautiful than a sphere. Why, even in matters of taste you Epicureans have a criterion of your own! However, assuming that the figures which you mention are more beautiful to the eye — though for my part I don\'t think them so, for what can be more beautiful than the figure that encircles and encloses in itself all other figures, and that can possess no roughness or point of collision on its defence, no indentation of the concavity, no protuberance or depression? There are two forms that excel all others, among solid bodies the globe (for so we may translate the Greek sphaera), and among plane figures the round or circle, the Greek kyklos; well then, these two forms alone possess the property of absolute uniformity in all their parts and of having every point on the circumference equidistant from the centre; and nothing can be more compact than that. 2.48. Still, if you Epicureans cannot see this, as you have never meddled with that learned dust, could you not have grasped even so much of natural philosophy as to understand that the uniform motion and regular disposition of the heavenly bodies could not have been maintained with any other shape? Hence nothing could be more unscientific than your favourite assertion, that it is not certain that our world itself is round, since it may possibly have some other form, and there are countless numbers of worlds, all of different shapes. 2.49. Had but Epicurus learnt that twice two are four he certainly would not talk like that; but while making his palate the test of the chief good, he forgets to lift up his eyes to what Ennius calls \'the palate of the sky.\' "For there are two kinds of heavenly bodies, some that travel from east to west in unchanging paths, without ever making the slightest deviation in their course, while the others perform two unbroken revolutions in the same paths and courses. Now both of these facts indicate at once the rotatory motion of the firmament, which is only possible with a spherical shape, and the circular revolutions of the heavenly bodies. "Take first of all the sun, which is the chief of the celestial bodies. Its motion is such that it first fills the countries of the earth with a flood of light, and then leaves them in darkness now on one side and now on the other; for night is caused merely by the shadow of the earth, which intercepts the light of the sun. Its daily and nightly paths have the same regularity. Also the sun by at one time slightly approaching and at another time slightly receding causes a moderate variation of temperature. For the passage of about ¼ diurnal revolutions of the sun completes the circuit of a year; and by bending its course now towards the north and now towards the south the sun causes summers and winters and the two seasons of which one follows the waning of winter and the other that of summer. Thus from the changes of the four seasons are derived the origins and causes of all those creatures which come into existence on land and in the sea.
2.88. Suppose a traveller to carry into Scythia or Britain the orrery recently constructed by our friend Posidonius, which at each revolution reproduces the same motions of the sun, the moon and the five planets that take place in the heavens every twenty-four hundred, would any single native doubt that this orrery was the work of a rational being? This thinkers however raise doubts about the world itself from which all things arise and have their being, and debate whether it is the produce of chance or necessity of some sort, or of divine reason and intelligence; they think more highly of the achievement of Archimedes in making a model of the revolutions of the firmament than of that of nature in creating them, although the perfection of the original shows a craftsmanship many times as great as does the counterfeit.
2.142. "Again what artificer but nature, who is unsurpassed in her cunning, could have attained such skilfulness in the construction of the senses? First, she has clothed and walled the eyes with membranes of the finest texture, which she has made on the one hand transparent so that we may be able to see through them, and on the other hand firm of substance, to serve as the outer cover of the eye. The eyes she has made mobile and smoothly turning, so as both to avoid any threatened injury and to direct their gaze easily in any direction they desire. The actually organ of vision, called the pupil or \'little doll,\' is so small as easily to avoid objects that might injure it; and the lids, which are the covers of the eyes, are very soft to the touch so as not to hurt the pupil, and very neatly constructed as to be able both to shut the eyes in order that nothing may impinge upon them and to open them; and nature has provided that this process can be repeated again and again with extreme rapidity.
2.146. The ears are likewise marvellously skilful organs of discrimination; they judge differences of tone, of pitch and of key in the music of the voice and of wind and stringed instruments, and many different qualities of voice, sonorous and dull, smooth and rough, bass and treble, flexible and hard, distinctions discriminated by the human ear alone. Likewise the nostrils, the taste and in some measure the touch have highly sensitive faculties of discrimination. And the arts invented to appeal to and indulge these senses are even more numerous than I could wish. The developments of perfumery and of the meretricious adornment of the person are obvious examples. 2.147. "Coming now to the actual mind and intellect of man, his reason, wisdom and foresight, one who cannot see that these owe their perfection to divine providence must in my view himself be devoid of these very faculties. While discussing this topic I could wish, Cotta, that I had the gift of your eloquence. How could not you describe first our powers of understanding, and then our faculty of conjoining premisses and consequences in a single act of apprehension, the faculty I mean that enables us to judge what conclusion follows from any given propositions and to put the inference in syllogistic form, and also to delimit particular terms in a succinct definition; whence we arrive at an understanding of the potency and the nature of knowledge, which is the most excellent part even of the divine nature. Again, how remarkable are the faculties which you Academics invalidate and abolish, our sensory and intellectual perception and comprehension of external objects; 2.148. it is by collating and comparing our precepts that we also create the arts that serve either practical necessities or the purpose of amusement. Then take the gift of speech, the queen of arts as you are fond of calling it — what a glorious, what a divine faculty it is! In the first place it enables us both to learn things we do not know and to teach things we do know to others; secondly it is our instrument for exhortation and persuasion, for consoling the afflicted and assuaging the fears of the terrified, for curbing passion and quenching appetite and anger; it is this that has united us in the bonds of justice, law and civil order, this that has sped us from savagery and barbarism.
2.153. "Then moreover hasn\'t man\'s reason penetrated even to the sky? We alone of living creatures know the risings and settings and the courses of the stars, the human race has set limits to the day, the month and the year, and has learnt the eclipses of the sun and moon and foretold for all future time their occurrence, their extent and their dates. And contemplating the heavenly bodies the mind arrives at a knowledge of the gods, from which arises piety, with its comrades justice and the rest of the virtues, the sources of a life of happiness that vies with and resembles the divine existence and leaves us inferior to the celestial beings in nothing else save immortality, which is immaterial for happiness. I think that my exposition of these matters has been sufficient to prove how widely man\'s nature surpasses all other living creatures; and this should make it clear that neither such a conformation and arrangement of the members nor such power of mind and intellect can possibly have been created by chance. ' "
2.160. As for the pig, it can only furnish food; indeed Chrysippus actually says that its soul was given it to serve as salt and keep it from putrefaction; and because this animal was fitted for the food of man, nature made it the most prolific of all her offspring. Why should I speak of the teeming swarms of delicious fish? or of birds, which afford us so much pleasure that our Stoic Providence appears to have been at times a disciple of Epicurus? and they could not even be caught save by man's intelligence and cunning; — although some birds, birds of flight and birds of utterance as our augurs call them, we believe to have been created for the purpose of giving omens. " '
3.3. "Yes, to be sure, Velleius," replied Cotta; for "I have a very different business before me with Lucilius from what I had with you." "How so, pray?" said Velleius. "Because I think that your master Epicurus does not put up a very strong fight on the question of the immortal gods; he only does not venture to deny their existence so that he may not encounter any ill‑feeling or reproach. But when he asserts that the gods do nothing and care for nothing, and that though they possess limbs like those of men they make no use of those limbs, he seems not to be speaking seriously, and to think it enough if he affirms the existence of blessed and everlasting beings of some sort.
3.5. "Very well," rejoined Cotta, "let us then proceed as the argument itself may lead us. But before we come to the subject, let me say a few words about myself. I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that you put forward at the conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontife. This no doubt meant that I ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion. For my part I always shall uphold them and always have done so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall ever dislodge me from the belief as to the worship of the immortal gods which I have inherited from our forefathers. But on any question of el I am guided by the high pontifes, Titus Coruncanius, Publius Scipio and Publius Scaevola, not by Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, who was both an augur and a philosopher, to whose discourse upon religion, in his famous oration, I would rather listen than to any leader of the Stoics. The religion of the Roman people comprises ritual, auspices, and the third additional division consisting of all such prophetic warnings as the interpreters of the Sybil or the soothsayers have derived from portents and prodigies. While, I have always thought that none of these departments of religion was to be despised, and I have held the conviction that Romulus by his auspices and Numa by his establishment of our ritual laid the foundations of our state, which assuredly could never have been as great as it is had not the fullest measure of divine favour been obtained for it. ''. None |
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16. Cicero, On Duties, 1.114 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, Against fear of death • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus
Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 249; Williams and Vol (2022) 78
1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus.''. None | 1.114. \xa0Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I\xa0remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. <''. None |
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17. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, authority of Epicurus
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 244; Wardy and Warren (2018) 244
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18. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, Thessalonians • Epicureanism, attacks against • Epicureanism,education • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of
Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 182; Yona (2018) 48
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19. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, on Epicureans • Epicureanism • Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, and the swerve (παρέγκλισις, declinatio) • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on fate (εἱμαρμένη) • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on free movement (ἐλευθέρα κείνησις)
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 5, 7; Frede and Laks (2001) 254; Long (2006) 286; Santangelo (2013) 17; Taylor (2012) 89
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20. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • economics, Epicurean • economics, Epicurean, and pleasure/pain • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 40, 97; Williams and Vol (2022) 65; Yona (2018) 29, 39
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21. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureanism,
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 49; Santangelo (2013) 61
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22. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, satire on uncomprehending followers • cult, Epicurean
Found in books: Mackey (2022) 212; Yona (2018) 22, 257
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23. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, • Epicureanism, associated with flattery • Epicureans, and wine • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicureans, portraits of • epicureanism/Epicurean philosophy • eros (sexual desire), and Epicureanism
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 63; Bryan (2018) 218; Gordon (2012) 149, 163, 164, 171; Hubbard (2014) 425; Thorsen et al. (2021) 146; Wardy and Warren (2018) 218; Yona (2018) 54; Čulík-Baird (2022) 126
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24. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anticipation of misfortune, Rejected by Epicureans • Attention, Epicurean therapy distracts attention • Cicero, on Epicureans • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, • Epicureanism, Epicureans • Epicureanism, ethics of • Epicureans • Epicureans, Freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) • Epicureans, Hope, value of • Epicureans, Prolongation of life of no value • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Epicurus/Epicureanism, love and sex • Lucretius, Epicurean, Prolongation of life of no value • Philodemus, Epicurean • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans • cult, Epicurean • goods, in Epicureanism • pangs in Epicureanism
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 33, 160, 166; Bryan (2018) 208, 217, 218; Graver (2007) 200; Long (2006) 178, 190, 286; Long (2019) 137; Mackey (2022) 212; Pinheiro et al (2015) 93; Rohmann (2016) 152; Sorabji (2000) 46, 182, 233, 235, 237, 241; Wardy and Warren (2018) 208, 217, 218; Williams and Vol (2022) 65, 68
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25. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • god, gods, Epicurean • gods (Epicurean), realist and idealist conceptions of
Found in books: Allison (2020) 82; Long (2019) 72
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26. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean love • Epicureans, and wine • Epicurus/Epicureanism, love and sex • epicureanism/Epicurean philosophy
Found in books: Gordon (2012) 173; Thorsen et al. (2021) 148, 149, 156; Williams and Vol (2022) 137
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27. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, comparison to Pauline Christianity • Epicurus/Epicureanism, parrhesia
Found in books: Allison (2020) 14; Williams and Vol (2022) 85
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28. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans • breath and heat (Epicurean) • death, Epicureanism
Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 93; Liatsi (2021) 196; Long (2019) 135
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29. Horace, Sermones, 1.2.30, 1.2.116-1.2.118, 1.2.121, 1.2.127, 1.4.115, 1.5.101 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean Doctrine • Epicureanism • Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, gods detached in intermundia • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Epicurus/Epicureanism, love and sex • economics, Epicurean, divergences from Epicurean mainstream • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of • epicureanism/Epicurean philosophy • persona of Horace, Epicurean basis • pig, significance in Epicurean imagery
Found in books: Liatsi (2021) 193; Radicke (2022) 307; Thorsen et al. (2021) 146, 149; Williams and Vol (2022) 71, 137, 205; Yona (2018) 3, 17, 43
| 1.2.30. However, since I observe a considerable number of people giving ear to the reproaches that are laid against us by those who bear ill will to us, and will not believe what I have written concerning the antiquity of our nation, while they take it for a plain sign that our nation is of a late date, because they are not so much as vouchsafed a bare mention by the most famous historiographers among the Grecians,
1.2.30. Moreover, he attests that we Jews, went as auxiliaries along with king Alexander, and after him with his successors. I will add farther what he says he learned when he was himself with the same army, concerning the actions of a man that was a Jew. His words are these:—
1.2.30. for if we remember, that in the beginning the Greeks had taken no care to have public records of their several transactions preserved, this must for certain have afforded those that would afterward write about those ancient transactions, the opportunity of making mistakes, and the power of making lies also;
1.4.115. As for the witnesses whom I shall produce for the proof of what I say, they shall be such as are esteemed to be of the greatest reputation for truth, and the most skilful in the knowledge of all antiquity, by the Greeks themselves. I will also show, that those who have written so reproachfully and falsely about us, are to be convicted by what they have written themselves to the contrary.
1.4.115. but as to the time from the death of Moses till the reign of Artaxerxes, king of Persia, who reigned after Xerxes, the prophets, who were after Moses, wrote down what was done in their times in thirteen books. The remaining four books contain hymns to God, and precepts for the conduct of human life.
1.5.101. Afterward I got leisure at Rome; and when all my materials were prepared for that work, I made use of some persons to assist me in learning the Greek tongue, and by these means I composed the history of those transactions; and I was so well assured of the truth of what I related, that I first of all appealed to those that had the supreme command in that war, Vespasian and Titus, as witnesses for me, '
1.5.101. I shall also endeavor to give an account of the reasons why it hath so happened, that there hath not been a great number of Greeks who have made mention of our nation in their histories. I will, however, bring those Grecians to light who have not omitted such our history, for the sake of those that either do not know them, or pretend not to know them already. |
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30. Ovid, Ars Amatoria, 2.657-2.662 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Epicurus/Epicureanism, parrhesia • Lucretius, Epicurean • Philodemus, Epicurean, Pride
Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 222; Williams and Vol (2022) 80, 101
2.657. Nominibus mollire licet mala: fusca vocetur, 2.658. rend= 2.659. Si straba, sit Veneri similis: si rava, Minervae: 2.661. Dic habilem, quaecumque brevis, quae turgida, plenam, 2.662. rend=''. None | 2.657. Tho' in your pow'r, a rival ne'er expose," "2.658. Never his intercepted joys disclose: He means intercepting a rival's letter, and discovering the contents. To intercept letters, and divulge a secret, was a crime punishable by the laws, by banishment, or interdiction of fire and water, by which was understood exile." '2.659. This I command, Venus commands the same,' "2.660. Who hates the snares she once sustain'd with shame." "2.661. What impious wretch will Ceres ' rites expose, This is a simile, and shows us it was not lawful to reveal the mysteries of Ceres . Macrobius in the 11th chapter of his first book upon Scipio's dream, writes that the philosopher Numenius, being too curious to know the secrets of hidden things, incurred the wrath of the gods by divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, which were the same with those of Ceres ." "2.662. Or Juno's solemn mysteries disclose!"". None |
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31. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 1.382 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean Doctrine • Epicurus/Epicureanism
Found in books: Radicke (2022) 496; Williams and Vol (2022) 189, 190
1.382. et velate caput cinctasque resolvite vestes''. None | 1.382. The mansions that remained, resisting vast''. None |
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32. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 8-9 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on providence (πρόνοια) • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on the indestructibility of the world
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 65, 66, 70; Gunderson (2022) 32
| 8. But Moses, who had early reached the very summits of philosophy, and who had learnt from the oracles of God the most numerous and important of the principles of nature, was well aware that it is indispensable that in all existing things there must be an active cause, and a passive subject; and that the active cause is the intellect of the universe, thoroughly unadulterated and thoroughly unmixed, superior to virtue and superior to science, superior even to abstract good or abstract beauty; '9. while the passive subject is something iimate and incapable of motion by any intrinsic power of its own, but having been set in motion, and fashioned, and endowed with life by the intellect, became transformed into that most perfect work, this world. And those who describe it as being uncreated, do, without being aware of it, cut off the most useful and necessary of all the qualities which tend to produce piety, namely, providence: '. None |
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33. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, commentary on Epicureanism • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, and conversion • Epicureanism, ataraxia • Epicureanism, personal relationships within • Epicureanism, the wise man” of • Epicureanism, writings of Epicurus • Horace, as Epicurean godlike sage • friendship, Epicurean understandings
Found in books: Bowditch (2001) 249, 250; Jenkyns (2013) 76; Xinyue (2022) 80, 81; Yona (2018) 158, 159, 161
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34. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, commentary on Epicureanism • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, and medical imagery • Epicureanism, and the epistolary genre • Epicureanism, democratic aspect of • Epicureanism, retreat from social life of • Epicureans • Epicureans, and food • Epicureans, language of • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Philosophy, Epicurean • Sabine farm, the, and Epicureanism • Virgil, Epicurean studies under Siro • economics, Epicurean • economics, Epicurean, acceptable sources of income • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of • persona of Horace, Epicurean basis • pig, significance in Epicurean imagery
Found in books: Bowditch (2001) 175, 177, 181, 236; Gale (2000) 194; Gordon (2012) 62; Liatsi (2021) 194; Meister (2019) 8; Williams and Vol (2022) 5; Yona (2018) 7, 17, 31, 40, 128; Zanker (1996) 125
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35. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Animus, In Lucretius’s Epicurean theory of sight • Anticipation of misfortune, Rejected by Epicureans • Attention, Epicurean therapy distracts attention • Body-Environment approach (BEA), In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Damis, Epicurean • Darkness, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Epicurean • Epicurean Doctrine • Epicurean astronomy • Epicurean garden • Epicurean proems in Lucretius DRN • Epicurean therapeutic program • Epicurean, Epicureanism • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, Epicureans • Epicureanism, Lucretian imagery • Epicureanism, Theories of sight • Epicureanism, Thessalonians • Epicureanism, afterlife, view of • Epicureanism, and pleasure • Epicureanism, ataraxia • Epicureanism, debate concerning Arnobius • Epicureanism, ethics of • Epicureanism, gods mercy • Epicureanism, on erotic desire • Epicureanism, on friendship • Epicureanism, satire on uncomprehending followers • Epicureanism, simplicity of life • Epicureanism, the wise man” of • Epicureanism, theology of • Epicureans • Epicureans, Against fear of death • Epicureans, Epicureanism • Epicureans, Hope, value of • Epicureans, Marriage only in special circumstances • Epicureans, alleged atheism of • Epicureans, allegedly effeminate • Epicureans, and food • Epicureans, and wine • Epicureans, as chefs • Epicureans, as eunuchs • Epicureans, chance • Epicureans, clothing of • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicureans, language of • Epicureans, pleasure • Epicurus , epicureanism • Epicurus and Epicureanism • Epicurus and Epicureanism, • Epicurus and Epicureans • Epicurus, Epicurean • Epicurus, Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicurean/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, ambivalence about marriage • Epicurus/Epicureanism, gods detached in intermundia • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Epicurus/Epicureanism, love and sex • Epicurus/Epicureanism, parrhesia • Epicurus/Epicureanism, pleasure • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, and Celsus • God, Epicurean • Hearing, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of the senses • Knowledge, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Light, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Lucretius, Epicurean • Lucretius, Epicurean theory of sight • Lucretius, Epicurean, Against fear of death • Lucretius, Epicurean, Asymmetrical attitude to past and future • Lucretius, Epicurean, Body reassembly of us after breaking off of memory of no concern to us • Lucretius, Epicurean, Erotic love discouraged • Lucretius, Epicurean, Free will • Lucretius, Epicurean, Pleasure in safe viewing of storm-tossed non-Epicureans • Lucretius, Epicurean, marriage is only for procreation • Mind, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Musonius some level of equality required, Epicureans, wise man will marry only in special circumstances • Partition of soul, Epicurean bipartition of soul • Perception, Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of perception/the senses • Philodemus, Epicurean, Pride • Philosophy, Epicurean • Polystratus the Epicurean, • Sabine farm, the, and Epicureanism • Senses, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Senses, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of the senses • Senses, Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Senses, Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of the senses • Superstitio, In Lucretius’ Epicureanism • Touch, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Unconscious, Epicureans • Velleius, Epicurean philosopher • action, Epicurean theory of • animal sacrifice, conceptual parallels with Epicureanism • belief, Epicurean theory of • breath and heat (Epicurean) • cosmology, Epicurean • death, Epicureanism • economics, Epicurean, divergences from Epicurean mainstream • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of • epicureanism/Epicurean philosophy • eras, Epicureanism on • eros (sexual desire), and Epicureanism • friendship, Epicurean • friendship, Epicurean understandings • god, gods, Epicurean • gods (Epicurean), involvement in moral formation • gods, location in Epicureanism • heaven, Epicurean • identity, in Epicureanism • knowledge, Epicurean • limit, Epicurean concept of • marriage, Epicurean • pangs in Epicureanism • pastoral, Epicurean ethos of • persona of Horace, Epicurean basis • reproduction, Epicurean theory of • seeds, in Epicurean physics • suicide, in Epicureanism • taste, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of the senses • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Allison (2020) 73; Athanassaki and Titchener (2022) 301; Ayres and Ward (2021) 188, 189; Bett (2019) 24, 63; Bowditch (2001) 213, 214, 231; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 279; Bryan (2018) 205; Clay and Vergados (2022) 143, 150, 155, 156, 157, 159, 193, 198, 199, 201, 209, 211, 212, 218, 328; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 481, 482; Del Lucchese (2019) 157; Dillon and Timotin (2015) 91; Edelmann-Singer et al (2020) 82; Esler (2000) 63; Fabre-Serris et al (2021) 190; Gale (2000) 85, 90, 113, 153, 179, 182, 186, 188, 198, 199, 223, 244, 245, 246, 258; Gee (2013) 68, 72, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 106, 108; Gordon (2012) 4, 5, 6, 7, 26, 43, 51, 52, 58, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 117, 161; Gunderson (2022) 32; Horkey (2019) 251, 263; Hubbard (2014) 424; Inwood and Warren (2020) 93, 96, 97, 108; Jenkyns (2013) 73, 181, 219, 221, 222, 223; Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018) 20, 21, 22; Liatsi (2021) 196, 197, 199; Lloyd (1989) 9, 31; Long (2006) 158, 159, 163, 167, 169, 171, 173, 174, 175, 179, 185, 194, 196, 197, 209; Long (2019) 76, 119, 120, 121, 123, 128, 146, 147, 148, 175; Luck (2006) 292; Mackey (2022) 213, 217, 236, 237, 241; Malherbe et al (2014) 370; McDonough (2009) 103, 106; Meister (2019) 8; Nuno et al (2021) 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 45, 47, 48, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 66, 67; Osborne (2001) 144; Radicke (2022) 209, 210, 211, 212, 390, 468; Rohmann (2016) 155, 180, 182, 189; Rosa and Santangelo (2020) 91, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100; Sattler (2021) 52, 67; Simmons(1995) 135, 139, 142, 252; Sorabji (2000) 27, 222, 224, 228, 229, 235, 236, 237, 243, 248, 275, 283, 320, 333; Thorsen et al. (2021) 109; Tor (2017) 46; Volk and Williams (2006) 2; Waldner et al (2016) 74; Wardy and Warren (2018) 205, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230; Williams and Vol (2022) 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 76, 77, 80, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 137, 167, 168, 169, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 197, 198, 200, 205, 293; Xinyue (2022) 80, 81; Yona (2018) 3, 22, 35, 43, 49, 51, 81, 84, 256, 257
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36. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean Doctrine • Epicurus/Epicureanism, parrhesia • epicureanism/Epicurean philosophy
Found in books: Radicke (2022) 496; Thorsen et al. (2021) 150, 161, 164; Williams and Vol (2022) 101
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37. Epictetus, Discourses, 2.20.20, 3.3.14-3.3.15 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Attention, Epicurean therapy distracts attention • Epicureans • Epicureans, and food • Epicureans, as eunuchs • Epicurus and Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicureans
Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 196; Gordon (2012) 180, 181; Osborne (2001) 144; Sorabji (2000) 216; Wilson (2022) 33
| 2.20.20. THE propositions which are true and evident are of necessity used even by those who contradict them: and a man might perhaps consider it to be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is plain that he must make the contradictory negation, that nothing is universally true. What, wretch, do you not admit even this? For what else is this than to affirm that whatever is universally affirmed is false? Again if a man should come forward and say: Know that there is nothing that can be known, but all things are incapable of sure evidence; or if another say, Believe me and you will be the better for it, that a man ought not to believe any thing; or again, if another should say, Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn any thing; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now in what respect do these differ from those? Whom shall I name? Those who call themselves Academics? Men, agree with us that no man agrees with another: believe us that no man believes anybody. Thus Epicurus also, when he designs to destroy the natural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of that which he destroys. For what does he say? Be not deceived, men, nor be led astray, nor be mistaken: there is no natural fellowship among rational animals; believe me. But those who say otherwise, deceive you and seduce you by false reasons. —What is this to you? Permit us to be deceived. Will you fare worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by all means to be preserved? Nay, it will be much better and safer for you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us? Why do you keep awake for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you write so many books, that no one of us may be deceived about the gods and believe that they take care of men; or that no one may suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure? For if this is so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of a worm, of which you judged yourself worthy: eat and drink, and enjoy women, and ease yourself, and snore. And what is it to you, how the rest shall think about these things, whether right or wrong? For what have we to do with you? You take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk, and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable thing if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like you to be shorn and milked? For this you ought to say to your brother Epicureans: but ought you not to conceal it from others, and particularly before every thing to persuade them, that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that temperance is a good thing; in order that all things may be secured for you? Or ought we to maintain this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom then ought we to maintain it? With such as on their part also maintain it, or with such as violate this fellowship? And who violate it more than you who establish such doctrines? What then was it that waked Epicurus from his sleepiness, and compelled him to write what he did write? What else was it than that which is the strongest thing in men, nature, which draws a man to her own will though he be unwilling and complaining? For since, she says, you think that there is no community among mankind, write this opinion and leave it for others, and break your sleep to do this, and by your own practice condemn your own opinions. Shall we then say that Orestes was agitated by the Erinyes (Furies) and roused from his deep sleep, and did not more savage Erinyes and Pains rouse Epicurus from his sleep and not allow him to rest, but compelled him to make known his own evils, as madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of Cybele)? So strong and invincible is man’s nature, For how can a vine be moved not in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of an olive tree? or on the other hand how can an olive tree be moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner of a vine? It is impossible: it cannot be conceived. Neither then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements (affects) of a man; and even those who are deprived of their genital members are not able to deprive themselves of man’s desires. Thus Epicurus also mutilated all the offices of a man, and of a father of a family, and of a citizen and of a friend, but he did not mutilate human desires, for he could not; not more than the lazy Academics can cast away or blind their own senses, though they have tried with all their might to do it. What a shame is this? when a man has received from nature measures and rules for the knowing of truth, and does not strive to add to these measures and rules and to improve them, but just the contrary, endeavours to take away and destroy whatever enables us to discern the truth? What say you philosopher? piety and sanctity, what do you think that they are? If you like, I will demonstrate that they are good things. Well, demonstrate it that our citizens may be turned and honour the deity and may no longer be negligent about things of the highest value. Have you then the demonstrations?—I have, and I am thankful.—Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the contrary: That there are no Gods, and, if there are, they take no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and them; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and checking wrong doers.—Well done, philosopher, you have done something for our citizens, you have brought back all the young men to contempt of things divine.—What then, does not this satisfy you? Learn now, that justice is nothing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing.—Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the young men, that we may have more with the same opinions as you and who say the same as you. From such principles as these have grown our well constituted states; by these was Sparta founded: Lycurgus fixed these opinions in the Spartans by his laws and education, that neither is the servile condition more base than honourable, nor the condition of free men more honourable than base, and that those who died at Thermopylae died from these opinions; and through what other opinions did the Athenians leave their city? Then those who talk thus, marry and beget children, and employ themselves in public affairs and make themselves priests and interpreters. of whom? of gods who do not exist: and they consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and they report the oracles to others. Monstrous impudence and imposture. Man what are you doing? are you refuting yourself every day; and will you not give up these frigid attempts? When you eat, where do you carry your hand to? to your mouth or to your eye? when you wash yourself, what do you go into? do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit? If I were a slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him daily, I would rack him. If he said, Boy, throw some olive oil into the bath, I would take pickle sauce and pour it down on his head. What is this? he would say—An appearance was presented to me, I swear by your genius, which could not be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it—Here give me the barley-drink (tisane), he says—I would fill and carry him a dish of sharp sauce—Did I not ask for the barley drink? Yes, mister: this is the barley drink? Take it and smell; take it and taste. How do you know then if our senses deceive us?—If I had three or four fellow—slaves of the same opinion, I should force him to hang himself through passion or to change his mind. But now they mock us by using all the things which nature gives, and in words destroying them. Grateful indeed are men and modest, who, if they do nothing else, are daily eating bread and yet are shameless enough to say, we do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter Persephone or a Pluto; not to mention that they are enjoying the night and the day, the seasons of the year, and the stars, and the sea and the land and the co—operation of mankind, and yet they are not moved in any degree by these things to turn their attention to them; but they only seek to belch out their little problem (matter for discussion), and when they have exercised their stomach to go off to the bath. But what they shall say, and about what things or to what persons, and what their hearers shall learn from this talk, they care not even in the least degree, nor do they care if any generous youth after hearing such talk should suffer any harm from it, nor after he has suffered harm should lose all the seeds of his generous nature; nor if we should give an adulterer help towards being shameless in his acts; nor if a public peculator should lay hold of some cunning excuse from these doctrines; nor if another who neglects his parents should be confirmed in his audacity by this teaching.—What then in your opinion is good or bad? This or that?— Why then should a man say any more in reply to such persons as these, or give them any reason or listen to any reason from them, or try to convince them? By Zeus one might much sooner expect to make catamites change their mind than those who are become so deaf and blind to their own evils. This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you. Matthew, xxi. 31. Mrs. Carter. To an Academic who said he comprehended nothing, the Stoic Ariston replied, Do you not see even the person who is sitting near you? When the Academic denied it, Ariston said, Who made you blind? who stole your power of sight. (Diog. Laert. vii. 163. Upton.)
3.3.14. THE material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty: and the body is the material for the physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons); the land is the matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature to be moved towards the desire of the good, and to aversion from the evil; and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. For as the money-changer (banker) is not allowed to reject Caesar’s coin, nor the seller of herbs, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not, he must give up what is sold for the coin; so it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately attracts to itself; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any more than persons will reject Caesar’s coin. On this principle depends every movement both of man and God. For this reason the good is preferred to every intimate relationship (obligation). There is no intimate relationship between me and my father, but there is between me and the good. Are you so hard-hearted? Yes, for such is my nature; and this is the coin which God has given me. For this reason if the good is something different from the beautiful and the just, both father is gone (neglected), and brother and country, and every thing. But shall I overlook my own good, in order that you may have it, and shall I give it up to you? Why? I am your father. But you are not my good. I am your brother. But you are not my good. But if we place the good in a right determination of the will, the very observance of the relations of life is good, and accordingly he who gives up any external things, obtains that which is good. Your father takes away your property. But he does not injure you. Your brother will have the greater part of the estate in land. Let him have as much as he chooses. Will he then have a greater share of modesty, of fidelity, of brotherly affection? For who will eject you from this possession? Not even Zeus, for neither has he chosen to do so; but he has made this in my own power, and he has given it to me just as he possessed it himself, free from hindrance, compulsion, and impediment. When then the coin which another uses is a different coin, if a man presents this coin, be receives that which is sold for it. Suppose that there comes into the province a thievish proconsul, what coin does he use? Silver coin. Show it to him, and carry off what you please. Suppose one comes who is an adulterer: what coin does he use? Little girls. Take, a man says, the coin, and sell me the small thing. Give, says the seller, and buy what you want. Another is eager to possess boys. Give him the coin, and receive what you wish. Another is fond of hunting: give him a fine nag or a dog. Though he groans and laments, be will sell for it that which you want. For another compels him from within, he who has fixed determined) this coin. Mrs. Carter compares the Epistle to the Romans, vii. 21–23. Schweighaeuser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing willingly; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be carried away by the passion which rules him. The another who compels is God, Schweig. says, who has made the nature of man such, that he must postpone every thing else to that thing in which he places his Good: and he adds, that it is man’s fault if he places his good in that thing, in which God has not placed it. Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is compelled and allows himself to be carried away, etc. The notion of compulsion is inconsistent with the exercise of the will. The man is unlucky. He is like him who sees, as the Latin poet says, the better things and approves of them, but follows the worse. Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man should exercise himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine every man whom you see, every man whom you hear; answer as to a question, What have you seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is this independent of the will, or dependent? Independent. Take it away. What have you seen? A man lamenting over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is a thing independent of the will. Take it away. Has the proconsul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is a proconsul’s office? Independent of the will, or dependent on it? Independent. Take this away also: it does not stand examination: cast it away: it is nothing to you. If we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning to night, something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith caught half asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that in the school we are roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a man lamenting, we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say, He is happy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is miserable. If we see a poor man, we say, He is wretched: he has nothing to eat. We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we should direct all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting? Opinion. What is bad fortune? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is divided opinion, what is blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what is trifling?. All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and opinions about things independent of the will, as if they were good and bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will, and I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be the state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the soul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are the appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with giddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues which are confounded, but the spirit (the nervous power) on which they are impressed; but if the spirit be restored to its settled state, those things also are restored. 3.3.15. THE material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty: and the body is the material for the physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons); the land is the matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature to be moved towards the desire of the good, and to aversion from the evil; and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. For as the money-changer (banker) is not allowed to reject Caesar’s coin, nor the seller of herbs, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not, he must give up what is sold for the coin; so it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately attracts to itself; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any more than persons will reject Caesar’s coin. On this principle depends every movement both of man and God. For this reason the good is preferred to every intimate relationship (obligation). There is no intimate relationship between me and my father, but there is between me and the good. Are you so hard-hearted? Yes, for such is my nature; and this is the coin which God has given me. For this reason if the good is something different from the beautiful and the just, both father is gone (neglected), and brother and country, and every thing. But shall I overlook my own good, in order that you may have it, and shall I give it up to you? Why? I am your father. But you are not my good. I am your brother. But you are not my good. But if we place the good in a right determination of the will, the very observance of the relations of life is good, and accordingly he who gives up any external things, obtains that which is good. Your father takes away your property. But he does not injure you. Your brother will have the greater part of the estate in land. Let him have as much as he chooses. Will he then have a greater share of modesty, of fidelity, of brotherly affection? For who will eject you from this possession? Not even Zeus, for neither has he chosen to do so; but he has made this in my own power, and he has given it to me just as he possessed it himself, free from hindrance, compulsion, and impediment. When then the coin which another uses is a different coin, if a man presents this coin, be receives that which is sold for it. Suppose that there comes into the province a thievish proconsul, what coin does he use? Silver coin. Show it to him, and carry off what you please. Suppose one comes who is an adulterer: what coin does he use? Little girls. Take, a man says, the coin, and sell me the small thing. Give, says the seller, and buy what you want. Another is eager to possess boys. Give him the coin, and receive what you wish. Another is fond of hunting: give him a fine nag or a dog. Though he groans and laments, be will sell for it that which you want. For another compels him from within, he who has fixed determined) this coin. Mrs. Carter compares the Epistle to the Romans, vii. 21–23. Schweighaeuser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing willingly; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be carried away by the passion which rules him. The another who compels is God, Schweig. says, who has made the nature of man such, that he must postpone every thing else to that thing in which he places his Good: and he adds, that it is man’s fault if he places his good in that thing, in which God has not placed it. Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is compelled and allows himself to be carried away, etc. The notion of compulsion is inconsistent with the exercise of the will. The man is unlucky. He is like him who sees, as the Latin poet says, the better things and approves of them, but follows the worse. Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man should exercise himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine every man whom you see, every man whom you hear; answer as to a question, What have you seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is this independent of the will, or dependent? Independent. Take it away. What have you seen? A man lamenting over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is a thing independent of the will. Take it away. Has the proconsul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is a proconsul’s office? Independent of the will, or dependent on it? Independent. Take this away also: it does not stand examination: cast it away: it is nothing to you. If we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning to night, something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith caught half asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that in the school we are roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a man lamenting, we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say, He is happy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is miserable. If we see a poor man, we say, He is wretched: he has nothing to eat. We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we should direct all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting? Opinion. What is bad fortune? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is divided opinion, what is blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what is trifling?. All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and opinions about things independent of the will, as if they were good and bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will, and I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be the state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the soul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are the appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with giddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues which are confounded, but the spirit (the nervous power) on which they are impressed; but if the spirit be restored to its settled state, those things also are restored.''. None |
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38. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 8.419, 10.277-10.280, 13.171-13.173, 18.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans
Found in books: Klawans (2019) 14, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 61, 68, 69; Taylor (2012) 89, 91
8.419. λογίζεσθαί τε πάλιν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν βασιλέα γεγενημένων στοχαζομένους προσῆκε τὴν τοῦ χρεὼν ἰσχύν, ὅτι μηδὲ προγινωσκόμενον αὐτὸ διαφυγεῖν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὑπέρχεται τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχὰς ἐλπίσι κολακεῦον χρησταῖς, αἷς εἰς τὸ πόθεν αὐτῶν κρατήσει περιάγει." '
10.277. ταῦτα πάντα ἐκεῖνος θεοῦ δείξαντος αὐτῷ συγγράψας κατέλειψεν: ὥστε τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα σκοποῦντας θαυμάζειν ἐπὶ τῇ παρὰ θεοῦ τιμῇ τὸν Δανίηλον καὶ τοὺς ̓Επικουρείους ἐκ τούτων εὑρίσκειν πεπλανημένους,' "10.278. οἳ τήν τε πρόνοιαν ἐκβάλλουσι τοῦ βίου καὶ θεὸν οὐκ ἀξιοῦσιν ἐπιτροπεύειν τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς μακαρίας καὶ ἀφθάρτου πρὸς διαμονὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας κυβερνᾶσθαι τὰ σύμπαντα, ἄμοιρον δὲ ἡνιόχου καὶ ἀφρόντιστον τὸν κόσμον αὐτομάτως φέρεσθαι λέγουσιν." '10.279. ὃς εἰ τοῦτον ἀπροστάτητος ἦν τὸν τρόπον, καθάπερ καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐρήμους κυβερνητῶν καταδυομένας ὁρῶμεν ὑπὸ πνευμάτων ἢ καὶ τὰ ἅρματα περιτρεπόμενα μὴ ἔχοντα τοὺς ἡνιοχοῦντας, συντριβεὶς ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπρονοήτου συμφορᾶς ἀπωλώλει καὶ διεφθείρετο.
13.171. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον τρεῖς αἱρέσεις τῶν ̓Ιουδαίων ἦσαν, αἳ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων διαφόρως ὑπελάμβανον, ὧν ἡ μὲν Φαρισαίων ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ Σαδδουκαίων, ἡ τρίτη δὲ ̓Εσσηνῶν.' "13.172. οἱ μὲν οὖν Φαρισαῖοι τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἔργον εἶναι λέγουσιν, τινὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνειν τε καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ τῶν ̓Εσσηνῶν γένος πάντων τὴν εἱμαρμένην κυρίαν ἀποφαίνεται καὶ μηδὲν ὃ μὴ κατ' ἐκείνης ψῆφον ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντᾶν." "13.173. Σαδδουκαῖοι δὲ τὴν μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἀναιροῦσιν οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιοῦντες οὐδὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κεῖσθαι, ὡς καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἡμᾶς γινομένους καὶ τὰ χείρω παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀβουλίαν λαμβάνοντας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀκριβεστέραν πεποίημαι δήλωσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ βίβλῳ τῆς ̓Ιουδαϊκῆς πραγματείας." "
18.13. ̔Ηρώδῃ τῷ μεγάλῳ θυγατέρες ἐκ Μαριάμμης τῆς ̔Υρκανοῦ θυγατρὸς γίνονται δύο, Σαλαμψιὼ μὲν ἡ ἑτέρα, ἣ γαμεῖται Φασαήλῳ τῷ αὐτῆς ἀνεψιῷ Φασαήλου παιδὶ ὄντι τοῦ ̔Ηρώδου ἀδελφοῦ δεδωκότος τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτήν, Κύπρος δὲ ̓Αντιπάτρῳ καὶ αὐτὴ ἀνεψιῷ ̔Ηρώδου παιδὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς Σαλώμης.'
18.13. πράσσεσθαί τε εἱμαρμένῃ τὰ πάντα ἀξιοῦντες οὐδὲ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τὸ βουλόμενον τῆς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὁρμῆς ἀφαιροῦνται δοκῆσαν τῷ θεῷ κρίσιν γενέσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐκείνης βουλευτηρίῳ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἐθελήσαντι προσχωρεῖν μετ' ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας." '". None | 8.419. We may also guess, from what happened to this king, and have reason to consider the power of fate; that there is no way of avoiding it, even when we know it. It creeps upon human souls, and flatters them with pleasing hopes, till it leads them about to the place where it will be too hard for them.
10.277. All these things did this man leave in writing, as God had showed them to him, insomuch that such as read his prophecies, and see how they have been fulfilled, would wonder at the honor wherewith God honored Daniel; and may thence discover how the Epicureans are in an error, 10.278. who cast Providence out of human life, and do not believe that God takes care of the affairs of the world, nor that the universe is governed and continued in being by that blessed and immortal nature, but say that the world is carried along of its own accord, without a ruler and a curator; 10.279. which, were it destitute of a guide to conduct it, as they imagine, it would be like ships without pilots, which we see drowned by the winds, or like chariots without drivers, which are overturned; so would the world be dashed to pieces by its being carried without a Providence, and so perish, and come to nought.
13.171. 9. At this time there were three sects among the Jews, who had different opinions concerning human actions; the one was called the sect of the Pharisees, another the sect of the Sadducees, and the other the sect of the Essenes. 13.172. Now for the Pharisees, they say that some actions, but not all, are the work of fate, and some of them are in our own power, and that they are liable to fate, but are not caused by fate. But the sect of the Essenes affirm, that fate governs all things, and that nothing befalls men but what is according to its determination. 13.173. And for the Sadducees, they take away fate, and say there is no such thing, and that the events of human affairs are not at its disposal; but they suppose that all our actions are in our own power, so that we are ourselves the causes of what is good, and receive what is evil from our own folly. However, I have given a more exact account of these opinions in the second book of the Jewish War.
18.13. 4. Herod the Great had two daughters by Mariamne, the grand daughter of Hyrcanus; the one was Salampsio, who was married to Phasaelus, her first cousin, who was himself the son of Phasaelus, Herod’s brother, her father making the match; the other was Cypros, who was herself married also to her first cousin Antipater, the son of Salome, Herod’s sister.'
18.13. and when they determine that all things are done by fate, they do not take away the freedom from men of acting as they think fit; since their notion is, that it hath pleased God to make a temperament, whereby what he wills is done, but so that the will of man can act virtuously or viciously. '. None |
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39. Josephus Flavius, Against Apion, 2.148, 2.154-2.169, 2.171-2.189, 2.191-2.199, 2.201-2.209, 2.211-2.219, 2.221-2.229, 2.231-2.239, 2.241-2.249, 2.251-2.259, 2.261-2.269, 2.271-2.279, 2.281-2.289, 2.291-2.296 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism,exclusiveness • Epicureans
Found in books: Klawans (2019) 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 61; Malherbe et al (2014) 722
2.148. ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων, καθ' οὓς ζῶντες διατελοῦμεν. ἄλλως τε καὶ τὴν κατηγορίαν ὁ ̓Απολλώνιος οὐκ ἀθρόαν ὥσπερ ὁ ̓Απίων ἔταξεν, ἀλλὰ σποράδην, καὶ δὴ εἴπας ποτὲ μὲν ὡς ἀθέους καὶ μισανθρώπους λοιδορεῖ, ποτὲ δ' αὖ δειλίαν ἡμῖν ὀνειδίζει καὶ τοὔμπαλιν ἔστιν ὅπου τόλμαν κατηγορεῖ καὶ ἀπόνοιαν. λέγει δὲ καὶ ἀφυεστάτους εἶναι τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲν εἰς τὸν βίον εὕρημα συμβεβλῆσθαι μόνους." "
2.154. φημὶ τοίνυν τὸν ἡμέτερον νομοθέτην τῶν ὁπουδηποτοῦν μνημονευομένων νομοθετῶν προάγειν ἀρχαιότητι: Λυκοῦργοι γὰρ καὶ Σόλωνες καὶ Ζάλευκος ὁ τῶν Λοκρῶν καὶ πάντες οἱ θαυμαζόμενοι παρὰ τοῖς ̔́Ελλησιν ἐχθὲς δὴ καὶ πρῴην ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον παραβαλλόμενοι φαίνονται γεγονότες, ὅπου γε μηδ' αὐτὸ τοὔνομα" "2.155. πάλαι ἐγιγνώσκετο τοῦ νόμου παρὰ τοῖς ̔́Ελλησι. καὶ μάρτυς ̔́Ομηρος οὐδαμοῦ τῆς ποιήσεως αὐτῷ χρησάμενος: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν κατὰ τοῦτον, ἀλλὰ γνώμαις ἀορίστοις τὰ πλήθη διῳκεῖτο καὶ προστάγμασι τῶν βασιλέων, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ μέχρι πολλοῦ διέμειναν ἔθεσιν ἀγράφοις χρώμενοι καὶ πολλὰ τούτων ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ συντυγχάνον μετατιθέντες." "2.156. ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης ἀρχαιότατος γεγονώς, τοῦτο γὰρ δήπουθεν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πάντα καθ' ἡμῶν λέγουσιν, ἑαυτόν τε παρέσχεν ἄριστον τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἡγεμόνα καὶ σύμβουλον τήν τε κατασκευὴν αὐτοῖς ὅλην τοῦ βίου τῷ νόμῳ περιλαβὼν ἔπεισεν παραδέξασθαι καὶ βεβαιοτάτην εἰς ἀεὶ φυλαχθῆναι παρεσκεύασεν." '2.157. ̓́Ιδωμεν δὲ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ τὸ πρῶτον μεγαλεῖον: ἐκεῖνος γὰρ τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν, ἐπείπερ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐκλιποῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν πάτριον γῆν ἐπανιέναι, πολλὰς τὰς μυριάδας παραλαβὼν ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ ἀμηχάνων διέσωσεν εἰς ἀσφάλειαν: καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἄνυδρον αὐτοὺς καὶ πολλὴν ψάμμον ἔδει διοδοιπορῆσαι καὶ νικῆσαι πολεμίους καὶ τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ λείαν ὁμοῦ σώζειν μαχομένους.' "2.158. ἐν οἷς ἅπασι καὶ στρατηγὸς ἄριστος ἐγένετο καὶ σύμβουλος συνετώτατος καὶ πάντων κηδεμὼν ἀληθέστατος. ἅπαν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνηρτῆσθαι παρεσκεύασεν, καὶ περὶ παντὸς ἔχων πεισθέντας ἀντὶ τοῦ κελευσθέντος εἰς οὐδεμίαν οἰκείαν ἔλαβεν ταῦτα πλεονεξίαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα τοῦ καιροῦ δυνάμεις μὲν αὐτοῖς περιβάλλονται καὶ τυραννίδας οἱ προεστηκότες, ἐθίζουσι" '2.159. δὲ τὰ πλήθη μετὰ πολλῆς ζῆν ἀνομίας, ἐν τούτῳ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐκεῖνος καθεστηκὼς τοὐναντίον ᾠήθη δεῖν εὐσεβεῖν καὶ πολλὴν εὔνοιαν τοῖς λαοῖς ἐμπαρασχεῖν, οὕτως αὐτός τε τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείξειν τὴν αὐτοῦ νομίζων καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῖς αὐτὸν ἡγεμόνα πεποιημένοις βεβαιοτάτην παρέξειν.' "2.161. οὐθὲν ἀνέχονται ἐξαμαρτεῖν. τοιοῦτος μὲν δή τις αὐτὸς ἡμῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, οὐ γόης οὐδ' ἀπατεών, ἅπερ λοιδοροῦντες λέγουσιν ἀδίκως, ἀλλ' οἵους παρὰ τοῖς ̔́Ελλησιν αὐχοῦσιν τὸν Μίνω γεγονέναι" '2.162. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς ἄλλους νομοθέτας: οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν τοὺς νόμους ὑποτίθενται, ὁ δέ γε Μίνως ἔλεγεν ὅτι εἰς τὸν ̓Απόλλω καὶ τὸ Δελφικὸν αὐτοῦ μαντεῖον τὰς τῶν νόμων μαντείας ἀνέφερεν, ἤτοι τἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχειν νομίζοντες ἢ πείσειν ῥᾷον ὑπολαμβάνοντες.' "2.163. τίς δ' ἦν ὁ μάλιστα κατορθώσας τοὺς νόμους καὶ τῆς δικαιοτάτης περὶ θεοῦ πίστεως ἐπιτυχών, πάρεστιν ἐξ αὐτῶν κατανοεῖν τῶν νόμων ἀντιπαραβάλλοντας: ἤδη γὰρ περὶ τούτων λεκτέον." '2.164. οὐκοῦν ἄπειροι μὲν αἱ κατὰ μέρος τῶν ἐθῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων παρὰ τοῖς ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις διαφοραί, * κεφαλαιωδῶς ἂν ἐπίοι τις: οἱ μὲν γὰρ μοναρχίαις, οἱ δὲ ταῖς ὀλίγων δυναστείαις, ἄλλοι δὲ' "2.165. τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐπέτρεψαν τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῶν πολιτευμάτων. ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης εἰς μὲν τούτων οὐδοτιοῦν ἀπεῖδεν, ὡς δ' ἄν τις εἴποι βιασάμενος τὸν λόγον θεοκρατίαν ἀπέδειξε τὸ πολίτευμα" '2.166. θεῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ κράτος ἀναθείς. καὶ πείσας εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἅπαντας ἀφορᾶν ὡς αἴτιον μὲν ἁπάντων ὄντα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἃ κοινῇ τε πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅσων ἔτυχον αὐτοὶ δεηθέντες ἐν ἀμηχάνοις, λαθεῖν δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου γνώμην οὐκ ἐνὸν οὔτε τῶν' "2.167. πραττομένων οὐδὲν οὔθ' ὧν ἄν τις παρ' αὐτῷ διανοηθῇ, ἕνα αὐτὸν ἀπέφηνε καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀίδιον χρόνον ἀναλλοίωτον πάσης ἰδέας θνητῆς κάλλει διαφέροντα καὶ δυνάμει μὲν ἡμῖν γνώριμον," "2.168. ὁποῖος δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ἄγνωστον. ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι παρ' ̔́Ελλησιν ὅτι μὲν ἐδιδάχθησαν ἐκείνου τὰς ἀρχὰς παρασχόντος, ἐῶ νῦν λέγειν, ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ πρέποντα τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ φύσει καὶ μεγαλειότητι, σφόδρα μεμαρτυρήκασι: καὶ γὰρ Πυθαγόρας καὶ ̓Αναξαγόρας καὶ Πλάτων οἵ τε μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν ἅπαντες οὕτως" "2.169. φαίνονται περὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ φύσεως πεφρονηκότες. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πρὸς ὀλίγους φιλοσοφοῦντες εἰς πλήθη δόξαις προκατειλημμένα τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν, ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης ἅτε δὴ τὰ ἔργα παρέχων σύμφωνα τοῖς λόγοις οὐ μόνον τοὺς καθ' αὑτὸν ἔπεισεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀεὶ γενησομένοις" '
2.171. ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ πράξεις καὶ διατριβαὶ καὶ λόγοι πάντες ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς θεὸν ἡμῖν εὐσέβειαν ἀναφέρουσιν: οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων ἀνεξέταστον οὐδὲ ἀόριστον παρέλιπεν. δύο μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἁπάσης παιδείας τρόποι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη κατασκευῆς, ὧν ὁ μὲν λόγῳ 2.172. διδασκαλικός, ὁ δὲ διὰ τῆς ἀσκήσεως τῶν ἠθῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι νομοθέται ταῖς γνώμαις διέστησαν καὶ τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν ὃν ἔδοξεν ἑκάστοις ἑλόμενοι τὸν ἕτερον παρέλιπον, οἷον Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν καὶ Κρῆτες ἔθεσιν ἐπαίδευον, οὐ λόγοις, ̓Αθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ̔́Ελληνες ἃ μὲν χρὴ πράττειν ἢ μὴ προσέτασσον διὰ τῶν νόμων, τοῦ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἐθίζειν ὠλιγώρουν.' "2.173. ̔Ο δ' ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης ἄμφω ταῦτα συνήρμοσεν κατὰ πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν: οὔτε γὰρ κωφὴν ἀπέλιπε τὴν τῶν ἠθῶν ἄσκησιν οὔτε τὸν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ἄπρακτον εἴασεν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἀρξάμενος τροφῆς καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν οἶκον ἑκάστων διαίτης οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν βραχυτάτων αὐτεξούσιον ἐπὶ ταῖς βουλήσεσι" "2.174. τῶν χρησομένων κατέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ σιτίων, ὅσων ἀπέχεσθαι χρὴ καὶ τίνα προσφέρεσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινωνησόντων τῆς διαίτης ἔργων τε συντονίας καὶ τοὔμπαλιν ἀναπαύσεως ὅρον ἔθηκεν αὐτὸς καὶ κανόνα τὸν νόμον, ἵν' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πατρὶ τούτῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ ζῶντες μήτε βουλόμενοι μηθὲν μήθ' ὑπ' ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτάνωμεν." "2.175. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγνοίας ὑποτίμησιν κατέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον ἀπέδειξε παίδευμα τὸν νόμον, οὐκ εἰσάπαξ ἀκροασομένοις οὐδὲ δὶς ἢ πολλάκις, ἀλλ' ἑκάστης ἑβδομάδος τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἀφεμένους ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρόασιν ἐκέλευσε τοῦ νόμου συλλέγεσθαι καὶ τοῦτον ἀκριβῶς ἐκμανθάνειν: ὃ δὴ πάντες ἐοίκασιν οἱ νομοθέται παραλιπεῖν." "2.176. Καὶ τοσοῦτον οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπέχουσι τοῦ κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους νόμους ζῆν, ὥστε σχεδὸν αὐτοὺς οὐδ' ἴσασιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξαμάρτωσιν, τότε παρ' ἄλλων μανθάνουσιν, ὅτι τὸν" "2.177. νόμον παραβεβήκασιν, οἵ τε τὰς μεγίστας καὶ κυριωτάτας παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς διοικοῦντες ὁμολογοῦσι τὴν ἄγνοιαν: ἐπιστάτας γὰρ παρακαθίστανται τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων οἰκονομίας τοὺς ἐμπειρίαν ἔχειν τῶν νόμων ὑπισχνουμένους." "2.178. ἡμῶν δὲ ὁντινοῦν τις ἔροιτο τοὺς νόμους ῥᾷον ἂν εἴποι πάντας ἢ τοὔνομα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. τοιγαροῦν ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης εὐθὺς αἰσθήσεως αὐτοὺς ἐκμανθάνοντες ἔχομεν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὥσπερ ἐγκεχαραγμένους, καὶ σπάνιος μὲν ὁ παραβαίνων, ἀδύνατος δ' ἡ τῆς κολάσεως παραίτησις." '2.179. Τοῦτο πρῶτον ἁπάντων τὴν θαυμαστὴν ὁμόνοιαν ἡμῖν ἐμπεποίηκεν: τὸ γὰρ μίαν μὲν ἔχειν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν περὶ θεοῦ, τῷ βίῳ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι μηδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν, καλλίστην ἐν ἤθεσιν ἀνθρώπων συμφωνίαν ἀποτελεῖ.' "2.181. πρόνοιαν ἀφαιρουμένων: οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι τῶν βίων ὄψεται διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ μὲν ἔργα πάντων παρ' ἡμῖν, εἷς δὲ λόγος ὁ τῷ νόμῳ συμφωνῶν περὶ θεοῦ πάντα λέγων ἐκεῖνον ἐφορᾶν. καὶ μὴν περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ὅτι δεῖ πάντα τἆλλα τέλος ἔχειν τὴν εὐσέβειαν, καὶ γυναικῶν ἀκούσειεν ἄν τις καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν." '2.182. ̔́Οθεν δὴ καὶ τὸ προφερόμενον ἡμῖν ὑπό τινων ἔγκλημα, τὸ δὴ μὴ καινῶν εὑρετὰς ἔργων ἢ λόγων ἄνδρας παρασχεῖν, ἐντεῦθεν συμβέβηκεν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι τὸ μηδενὶ τῶν πατρίων ἐμμένειν καλὸν εἶναι νομίζουσι καὶ τοῖς τολμῶσι ταῦτα παραβαίνειν 2.183. μάλιστα σοφίας δεινότητα μαρτυροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον μίαν εἶναι καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετὴν ὑπειλήφαμεν τὸ μηδὲν ὅλως ὑπεναντίον μήτε πρᾶξαι μήτε διανοηθῆναι τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς νομοθετηθεῖσιν. ὅπερ εἰκότως ἂν εἴη τεκμήριον τοῦ κάλλιστα τὸν νόμον τεθῆναι: τὰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον αἱ πεῖραι δεόμενα διορθώσεως ἐλέγχουσιν.' "2.184. ̔Ημῖν δὲ τοῖς πεισθεῖσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τεθῆναι τὸν νόμον κατὰ θεοῦ βούλησιν οὐδ' εὐσεβὲς ἦν τοῦτον μὴ φυλάττειν: τί γὰρ αὐτοῦ τις ἂν μετακινήσειεν ἢ τί κάλλιον ἐξεῦρεν ἢ τί παρ' ἑτέρων ὡς ἄμεινον μετήνεγκεν; ἆρά γε τὴν ὅλην κατάστασιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος;" '2.185. καὶ τίς ἂν καλλίων ἢ δικαιοτέρα γένοιτο τῆς θεὸν μὲν ἡγεμόνα τῶν ὅλων πεποιημένης, τοῖς ἱερεῦσι δὲ κοινῇ μὲν τὰ μέγιστα διοικεῖν ἐπιτρεπούσης, τῷ δὲ πάντων ἀρχιερεῖ πάλιν αὖ πεπιστευκυίας' "2.186. τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἱερέων ἡγεμονίαν; οὓς οὐ κατὰ πλοῦτον οὐδέ τισιν ἄλλαις προύχοντας αὐτομάτοις πλεονεξίαις τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπὶ τὴν τιμὴν ἔταξεν, ἀλλ' ὅσοι τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ πειθοῖ τε καὶ σωφροσύνῃ τῶν ἄλλων διέφερον, τούτοις τὴν περὶ τὸν" "2.187. θεὸν μάλιστα θεραπείαν ἐνεχείρισεν. τοῦτο δ' ἦν καὶ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀκριβὴς ἐπιμέλεια: καὶ γὰρ ἐπόπται πάντων καὶ δικασταὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων καὶ κολασταὶ τῶν κατεγνωσμένων οἱ ἱερεῖς ἐτάχθησαν." '2.188. Τίς ἂν οὖν ἀρχὴ γένοιτο ταύτης ὁσιωτέρα; τίς δὲ τιμὴ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἁρμόζουσα, παντὸς μὲν τοῦ πλήθους κατεσκευασμένου πρὸς τὴν εὐσέβειαν, ἐξαίρετον δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἱερέων πεπιστευμένων, ὥσπερ δὲ τελετῆς τινος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας οἰκονομουμένης;' "2.189. ἃ γὰρ ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄλλοι φυλάττειν οὐ δύνανται μυστήρια καὶ τελετὰς ἐπονομάζοντες, ταῦτα μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ γνώμης ἀμεταθέτου φυλάττομεν ἡμεῖς δι' αἰῶνος." "
2.191. ἡμῖν ἄφατος: πᾶσα μὲν ὕλη πρὸς εἰκόνα τὴν τούτου κἂν ᾖ πολυτελὴς ἄτιμος, πᾶσα δὲ τέχνη πρὸς μιμήσεως ἐπίνοιαν ἄτεχνος. οὐδὲν ὅμοιον οὔτ' εἴδομεν οὔτ' ἐπινοοῦμεν οὔτ' εἰκάζειν ἐστὶν ὅσιον." "2.192. ἔργα βλέπομεν αὐτοῦ φῶς οὐρανὸν γῆν ἥλιον ὕδατα ζῴων γενέσεις καρπῶν ἀναδόσεις. ταῦτα θεὸς ἐποίησεν οὐ χερσὶν οὐ πόνοις οὔ τινων συνεργασομένων ἐπιδεηθείς, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ θελήσαντος καλῶς ἦν εὐθὺς γεγονότα. τοῦτον θεραπευτέον ἀσκοῦντας ἀρετήν: τρόπος γὰρ θεοῦ θεραπείας οὗτος ὁσιώτατος." '2.193. Εἷς ναὸς ἑνὸς θεοῦ, φίλον γὰρ ἀεὶ παντὶ τὸ ὅμοιον, κοινὸς ἁπάντων κοινοῦ θεοῦ ἁπάντων. τοῦτον θεραπεύσουσιν μὲν διὰ παντὸς οἱ ἱερεῖς, ἡγήσεται δὲ τούτων ὁ πρῶτος ἀεὶ κατὰ γένος. 2.194. οὗτος μετὰ τῶν συνιερέων θύσει τῷ θεῷ, φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους, δικάσει περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων, κολάσει τοὺς ἐλεγχθέντας. ὁ τούτῳ μὴ πειθόμενος ὑφέξει δίκην ὡς εἰς θεὸν αὐτὸν ἀσεβῶν.' "2.195. θύομεν τὰς θυσίας οὐκ εἰς μέθην ἑαυτοῖς, ἀβούλητον γὰρ θεῷ τόδε, ἀλλ' εἰς σωφροσύνην." "2.196. καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς θυσίαις χρὴ πρῶτον ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς εὔχεσθαι σωτηρίας, εἶθ' ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν: ἐπὶ γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ γεγόναμεν καὶ ταύτην ὁ προτιμῶν τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸν ἰδίου μάλιστα θεῷ κεχαρισμένος." "2.197. δέησις δ' ἔστω πρὸς τὸν θεόν, οὐχ ὅπως δῷ τἀγαθά, δέδωκεν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑκὼν καὶ πᾶσιν εἰς μέσον κατατέθεικεν, ἀλλ' ὅπως δέχεσθαι δυνώμεθα καὶ λαβόντες φυλάττωμεν." "2.198. ἁγνείας ἐπὶ ταῖς θυσίαις διείρηκεν ὁ νόμος ἀπὸ κήδους ἀπὸ λέχους ἀπὸ κοινωνίας τῆς πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων. ἃ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη γράφειν. τοιοῦτος μὲν ὁ περὶ θεοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου θεραπείας λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἅμα καὶ νόμος." "2.199. Τίνες δ' οἱ περὶ γάμων νόμοι; μῖξιν μόνην οἶδεν ὁ νόμος τὴν κατὰ φύσιν τὴν πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ταύτην, εἰ μέλλοι τέκνων ἕνεκα γίνεσθαι. τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἀρρένων ἐστύγηκεν καὶ θάνατος τοὐπιτίμιον, εἴ τις ἐπιχειρήσειεν." "
2.201. γυνὴ χείρων, φησίν, ἀνδρὸς εἰς ἅπαντα. τοιγαροῦν ὑπακουέτω, μὴ πρὸς ὕβριν, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἄρχηται: θεὸς γὰρ ἀνδρὶ τὸ κράτος ἔδωκεν. ταύτῃ συνεῖναι δεῖ τὸν γήμαντα μόνῃ, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἄλλου πειρᾶν ἀνόσιον. εἰ δέ τις τοῦτο πράξειεν, οὐδεμία θανάτου παραίτησις, οὔτ' εἰ βιάσαιτο παρθένον ἑτέρῳ προωμολογημένην, οὔτ' εἰ πείσειεν γεγαμημένην." "2.202. τέκνα τρέφειν ἅπαντα προσέταξεν, καὶ γυναιξὶν ἀπεῖπεν μήτ' ἀμβλοῦν τὸ σπαρὲν μήτε διαφθείρειν ἀλλὰ ἢν φανείη τεκνοκτόνος ἂν εἴη ψυχὴν ἀφανίζουσα καὶ τὸ γένος ἐλαττοῦσα. τοιγαροῦν οὐδ' εἴ τις ἐπὶ λέχους" '2.203. φθορὰν παρέλθοι, καθαρὸς εἶναι τότε προσήκει. καὶ μετὰ τὴν νόμιμον συνουσίαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἀπολούσασθαι: ψυχῆς γὰρ ἔχειν τοῦτο μερισμὸν πρὸς ἄλλην χώραν ὑπέλαβεν: καὶ γὰρ ἐμφυομένη σώμασιν κακοπαθεῖ καὶ τούτων αὖ θανάτῳ διακριθεῖσα. διόπερ ἁγνείας ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔταξεν.' "2.204. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν παίδων γενέσεσιν ἐπέτρεψεν εὐωχίας συντελεῖν καὶ προφάσεις ποιεῖσθαι μέθης, ἀλλὰ σώφρονα τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς τῆς τροφῆς ἔταξε. καὶ γράμματα παιδεύειν ἐκέλευσεν τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τῶν προγόνων τὰς πράξεις ἐπίστασθαι, τὰς μὲν ἵνα μιμῶνται, τοῖς δ' ἵνα συντρεφόμενοι μήτε παραβαίνωσι μήτε σκῆψιν ἀγνοίας ἔχωσι." '2.205. Τῆς εἰς τοὺς τετελευτηκότας προυνόησεν ὁσίας οὐ πολυτελείαις ἐνταφίων οὐ κατασκευαῖς μνημείων ἐπιφανῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν περὶ τὴν κηδείαν τοῖς οἰκειοτάτοις ἐπιτελεῖν, πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς παριοῦσι καὶ προσελθεῖν καὶ συναποδύρασθαι. καθαίρειν δὲ καὶ τὸν οἶκον καὶ τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας ἀπὸ κήδους, ἵνα πλεῖστον ἀπέχῃ τοῦ δοκεῖν καθαρὸς εἶναί τις φόνον ἐργασάμενος.' "2.206. Γονέων τιμὴν μετὰ τὴν πρὸς θεὸν δευτέραν ἔταξεν καὶ τὸν οὐκ ἀμειβόμενον τὰς παρ' αὐτῶν χάριτας ἀλλ' εἰς ὁτιοῦν ἐλλείποντα λευσθησόμενον παραδίδωσι. καὶ παντὸς τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τιμὴν ἔχειν τοὺς νέους φησίν, ἐπεὶ πρεσβύτατον ὁ θεός." '2.207. κρύπτειν οὐδὲν ἐᾷ πρὸς φίλους: οὐ γὰρ εἶναι φιλίαν τὴν μὴ πάντα πιστεύουσαν. κἂν συμβῇ τις ἔχθρα, τἀπόρρητα λέγειν κεκώλυκε. δικάζων εἰ δῶρα τις λάβοι, θάνατος ἡ ζημία. περιορῶν ἱκέτην 2.208. βοηθεῖν ἐνὸν ὑπεύθυνος. ὃ μὴ κατέθηκέν τις οὐκ ἀναιρήσεται, τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐδενὸς ἅψεται, τόκον οὐ λήψεται. ταῦτα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὅμοια τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἡμῶν συνέχει κοινωνίαν 2.209. Πῶς δὲ καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλοφύλους ἐπιεικείας ἐφρόντισεν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἄξιον ἰδεῖν, φανεῖται γὰρ ἄριστα πάντων προνοησάμενος ὅπως μήτε τὰ οἰκεῖα διαφθείρωμεν μήτε φθονήσωμεν τοῖς μετέχειν τῶν ἡμετέρων προαιρουμένοις.
2.211. Τἆλλα δὲ προείρηκεν, ὧν ἡ μετάδοσίς ἐστιν ἀναγκαία: πᾶσι παρέχειν τοῖς δεομένοις πῦρ ὕδωρ τροφήν, ὁδοὺς φράζειν, ἄταφον μὴ περιορᾶν, ἐπιεικεῖς δὲ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους 2.212. κριθέντας εἶναι οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν πυρπολεῖν οὐδὲ τέμνειν ἥμερα δένδρα, ἀλλὰ καὶ σκυλεύειν ἀπείρηκεν τοὺς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ πεσόντας, καὶ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων προυνόησεν, ὅπως αὐτῶν ὕβρις ἀπῇ,' "2.213. μάλιστα δὲ γυναικῶν. οὕτως δ' ἡμερότητα καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν ἡμᾶς ἐξεπαίδευσεν, ὡς μηδὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ὀλιγωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ μόνην ἐφῆκε τούτων χρῆσιν τὴν νόμιμον, πᾶσαν δ' ἑτέραν ἐκώλυσεν: ἃ δ' ὥσπερ ἱκετεύοντα προσφεύγει ταῖς οἰκίαις ἀπεῖπεν ἀνελεῖν. οὐδὲ νεοττοῖς τοὺς γονέας αὐτῶν ἐπέτρεψε συνεξαιρεῖν, φείδεσθαι δὲ κἀν τῇ πολεμίᾳ τῶν ἐργαζομένων ζῴων" "2.214. καὶ μὴ φονεύειν. οὕτως πανταχόθεν τὰ πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν περιεσκέψατο, διδασκαλικοῖς μὲν τοῖς προειρημένοις χρησάμενος νόμοις, τοὺς δ' αὖ κατὰ τῶν παραβαινόντων τιμωρητικοὺς τάξας ἄνευ προφάσεως." '2.215. Ζημία γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν παραβαινόντων ὁ θάνατος, ἂν μοιχεύσῃ τις, ἂν βιάσηται κόρην, ἂν ἄρρενι τολμήσῃ πεῖραν προσφέρειν, ἂν ὑπομείνῃ παθεῖν ὁ πειρασθείς. ἔστι δὲ' "2.216. καὶ ἐπὶ δούλοις ὁμοίως ὁ νόμος ἀπαραίτητος. ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ μέτρων ἤν τις κακουργήσῃ ἢ σταθμῶν ἢ περὶ πράσεως ἀδίκου καὶ δόλῳ γενομένης, κἂν ὑφέληταί τις ἀλλότριον, κἂν ὃ μὴ κατέθηκεν ἀνέληται, πάντων εἰσὶ κολάσεις οὐχ οἷαι παρ' ἑτέροις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ" '2.217. τὸ μεῖζον. περὶ μὲν γὰρ γονέων ἀδικίας ἢ τῆς εἰς θεὸν ἀσεβείας κἂν μελλήσῃ τις, εὐθὺς ἀπόλλυται. τοῖς μέντοι γε νομίμως βιοῦσι γέρας ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄργυρος οὐδὲ χρυσὸς οὐ κοτίνου στέφανος ἢ σελίνου' "2.218. καὶ τοιαύτη τις ἀνακήρυξις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἕκαστος αὑτῷ τὸ συνειδὸς ἔχων μαρτυροῦν πεπίστευκεν, τοῦ μὲν νομοθέτου προφητεύσαντος, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τὴν πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν παρεσχηκότος, ὅτι τοῖς τοὺς νόμους διαφυλάξασι κἂν εἰ δέοι θνήσκειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν προθύμως ἀποθανεῖν ἔδωκεν ὁ θεὸς γενέσθαι τε πάλιν καὶ βίον ἀμείνω λαβεῖν ἐκ περιτροπῆς." "2.219. ὤκνουν δ' ἂν ἐγὼ ταῦτα γράφειν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἅπασιν ἦν φανερόν, ὅτι πολλοὶ καὶ πολλάκις ἤδη τῶν ἡμετέρων περὶ τοῦ μηδὲ ῥῆμα φθέγξασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον πάντα παθεῖν γενναίως προείλοντο." "
2.221. ἡμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ἀκολουθίαν, ἀλλά τις ἢ συγγράψαι λόγος αὐτοῖς ἀνεγίνωσκε τοῖς ̔́Ελλησιν ἤ που περιτυχεῖν ἔξω τῆς γινωσκομένης γῆς ἔφασκεν ἀνθρώποις τοιαύτην μὲν ἔχουσι δόξαν οὕτω σεμνὴν περὶ θεοῦ, τοιούτοις δὲ νόμοις πολὺν αἰῶνα βεβαίως ἐμμεμενηκόσι, πάντας ἂν οἶμαι θαυμάσαι διὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς παρ' αὐτοῖς μεταβολάς." '2.222. ἀμέλει τῶν γράψαι τι παραπλήσιον εἰς πολιτείαν καὶ νόμους ἐπιχειρησάντων ὡς θαυμαστὰ συνθέντων κατηγοροῦσι, φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς λαβεῖν ἀδυνάτους ὑποθέσεις. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους παραλείπω φιλοσόφους, ὅσοι τι τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ἐπραγματεύσαντο, 2.223. Πλάτων δὲ θαυμαζόμενος παρὰ τοῖς ̔́Ελλησιν ὡς καὶ σεμνότητι βίου διενεγκὼν καὶ δυνάμει λόγων καὶ πειθοῖ πάντας ὑπεράρας τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γεγονότας, ὑπὸ τῶν φασκόντων δεινῶν εἶναι τὰ πολιτικὰ μικροῦ δεῖν χλευαζόμενος καὶ κωμῳδούμενος διατελεῖ. 2.224. καίτοι τἀκείνου σκοπῶν συχνῶς τις ἂν εὕροι ῥᾷον καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ἔγγιον συνηθείαις, αὐτὸς δὲ Πλάτων ὡμολόγηκεν, ὅτι τὴν ἀληθῆ περὶ θεοῦ δόξαν εἰς τὴν τῶν ὄχλων ἄνοιαν οὐκ ἦν 2.225. ἀσφαλὲς ἐξενεγκεῖν. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν Πλάτωνος λόγους τινὲς εἶναι κενοὺς νομίζουσι κατὰ πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν κεκαλλιγραφημένους, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν νομοθετῶν Λυκοῦργον τεθαυμάκασι καὶ τὴν Σπάρτην ἅπαντες ὑμνοῦσιν, ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου νόμοις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐνεκαρτέρησαν. 2.226. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν ὡμολογήσθω τεκμήριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους θαυμάζοντες τὸν ἐκείνων χρόνον ἀντιπαραβαλλέτωσαν τοῖς πλείοσιν ἢ δισχιλίοις' "2.227. ἔτεσι τῆς ἡμετέρας πολιτείας, καὶ προσέτι λογιζέσθωσαν, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν χρόνον εἶχον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀκριβῶς ἔδοξαν τοὺς νόμους διαφυλάττειν, ἐπεὶ μέντοι περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐγένοντο μεταβολαὶ τῆς τύχης, μικροῦ δεῖν ἁπάντων ἐπελάθοντο τῶν νόμων." "2.228. ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν τύχαις γεγονότες μυρίαις διὰ τὰς τῶν βασιλευσάντων τῆς ̓Ασίας μεταβολὰς οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις τῶν δεινῶν τοὺς νόμους προύδομεν οὐκ ἀργίας οὐδὲ τρυφῆς αὐτοὺς χάριν περιέποντες, ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἐθέλοι σκοπεῖν, πολλῷ τινι τῆς δοκούσης ἐπιτετάχθαι Λακεδαιμονίοις καρτερίας μείζονας ἄθλους καὶ πόνους ἡμῖν ἐπιτεθέντας" '2.229. * οἱ μέν γε μήτε γῆν ἐργαζόμενοι μήτε περὶ τέχνας πονοῦντες ἀλλὰ πάσης ἐργασίας ἄφετοι λιπαροὶ καὶ τὰ σώματα' "
2.231. τὸ κρατεῖν πάντων, ἐφ' οὓς ἂν στρατεύωσιν. ὅτι δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο κατώρθωσαν, ἐῶ λέγειν: οὐ γὰρ καθ' ἕνα μόνον, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ πολλάκις ἀθρόως τῶν τοῦ νόμου προσταγμάτων ἀμελήσαντες αὑτοὺς μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων παρέδοσαν τοῖς πολεμίοις." "2.232. ̓͂Αρ' οὖν καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν, οὐ λέγω τοσούτους, ἀλλὰ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἔγνω τις προδότας γενομένους τῶν νόμων ἢ θάνατον φοβηθέντας, οὐχὶ τὸν ῥᾷστον ἐκεῖνον λέγω τὸν συμβαίνοντα τοῖς μαχομένοις, ἀλλὰ τὸν μετὰ λύμης τῶν σωμάτων, ὁποῖος εἶναι δοκεῖ πάντων χαλεπώτατος;" "2.233. ὃν ἔγωγε νομίζω τινὰς κρατήσαντας ἡμῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ μίσους προσφέρειν τοῖς ὑποχειρίοις, ἀλλὰ ὡς θαυμαστόν τι θέαμα βουλομένους ἰδεῖν, εἴ τινές εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι μόνον εἶναι κακὸν αὐτοῖς πεπιστευκότες, εἰ πρᾶξαί τι παρὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νόμους εἰ λόγον εἰπεῖν παρ' ἐκείνοις παραβιασθεῖεν." "2.234. οὐ χρὴ δὲ θαυμάζειν, εἰ πρὸς θάνατον ἀνδρείως ἔχομεν ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ῥᾷστα δοκοῦντα τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἄλλοι ῥᾳδίως ὑπομένουσιν, αὐτουργίαν λέγω καὶ τροφῆς λιτότητα καὶ τὸ μηδὲν εἰκῆ μηδ' ὡς ἔτυχεν ἕκαστος ἐπιτεθυμηκὼς φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν ἢ συνουσίᾳ προσελθεῖν ἢ πολυτελείᾳ" "2.235. καὶ πάλιν ἀργίας ὑπομεῖναι τάξιν ἀμετακίνητον. ἀλλ' οἱ τοῖς ξίφεσιν ὁμόσε χωροῦντες καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξ ἐφόδου τρεπόμενοι τοῖς προστάγμασιν τοῖς περὶ διαίτης οὐκ ἀντέβλεψαν. ἡμῖν δὲ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ ταῦτα τῷ νόμῳ πειθαρχεῖν ἡδέως κἀκεῖ περίεστιν ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὸ γενναῖον." '2.236. Εἶτα Λυσίμαχοι καὶ Μόλωνες καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες ἄλλοι συγγραφεῖς, ἀδόκιμοι σοφισταί, μειρακίων ἀπατεῶνες, ὡς πάνυ ἡμᾶς φαυλοτάτους ἀνθρώπων λοιδοροῦσιν.' "2.237. ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλόμην περὶ τῶν παρ' ἑτέροις νομίμων ἐξετάζειν: τὰ γὰρ αὑτῶν ἡμῖν φυλάττειν πάτριόν ἐστιν, οὐ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων κατηγορεῖν. καὶ περί γε τοῦ μήτε χλευάζειν μήτε βλασφημεῖν τοὺς νομιζομένους θεοὺς παρ' ἑτέροις ἄντικρυς ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης ἀπείρηκεν αὐτῆς ἕνεκα προσηγορίας τοῦ θεοῦ." "2.238. τῶν δὲ κατηγόρων διὰ τῆς ἀντιπαραθέσεως ἡμᾶς ἐλέγχειν οἰομένων οὐχ οἷόν τε κατασιωπᾶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ λόγου μέλλοντος οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐλεγχθήσεσθαι νῦν αὐτῶν συντιθέντων, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ πολλῶν εἰρημένου καὶ λίαν εὐδοκιμούντων." '2.239. τίς γὰρ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ̔́Ελλησιν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ τεθαυμασμένων οὐκ ἐπιτετίμηκεν καὶ ποιητῶν τοῖς ἐπεφανεστάτοις καὶ νομοθετῶν τοῖς μάλιστα πεπιστευμένοις, ὅτι τοιαύτας δόξας περὶ θεῶν' "
2.241. * ὅσοις δὲ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀπένειμαν τούτοις πατέρα μὲν τῷ λόγῳ, τύραννον δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ δεσπότην ἐφιστάντες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συνισταμένην ἐπιβουλὴν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ θυγατρός, ἣν ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ κεφαλῆς ἐγέννησεν, ἵνα δὴ συλλαβόντες αὐτὸν καθείρξωσιν, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ." '2.242. Ταῦτα δικαίως μέμψεως πολλῆς ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ φρονήσει διαφέροντες καὶ πρὸς τούτοις καταγελῶσιν, εἰ τῶν θεῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀγενείους καὶ μειράκια, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ γενειῶντας εἶναι χρὴ δοκεῖν, ἄλλους δὲ τετάχθαι πρὸς ταῖς τέχναις, χαλκεύοντά τινα, τὴν δὲ ὑφαίνουσαν, τὸν δὲ πολεμοῦντα καὶ μετὰ ἀνθρώπων μαχόμενον,' "2.243. τοὺς δὲ κιθαρίζοντας ἢ τοξικῇ χαίροντας, εἶτ' αὐτοῖς ἐγγιγνομένας πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεις καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων φιλονεικίας μέχρι τοῦ μὴ μόνον ἀλλήλοις τὰς χεῖρας προσφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων" '2.244. τραυματιζομένους ὀδύρεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν. τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντων ἀσελγέστερον, τὴν περὶ τὰς μίξεις ἀκρασίαν καὶ τοὺς ἔρωτας πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον μικροῦ δεῖν ἅπασι προσάψαι καὶ τοῖς ἄρρεσι' "2.245. τῶν θεῶν καὶ ταῖς θηλείαις; εἶθ' οἱ γενναιότατοι καὶ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ τὰς ἀπατηθείσας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ γενομένας ἐγκύους καθειργνυμένας ἢ καταποντιζομένας περιορᾷ καὶ τοὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονότας οὔτε σώζειν δύναται κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης" "2.246. οὔτ' ἀδακρυτὶ τοὺς θανάτους αὐτῶν ὑπομένειν. καλά γε ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑπόμενα, μοιχείας μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ βλεπομένης οὕτως ἀναισχύντως ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ὥστε τινὰς καὶ ζηλοῦν ὁμολογεῖν τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῇ δεδεμένους: τί γὰρ οὐκ ἔμελλον, ὁπότε μηδ' ὁ πρεσβύτατος καὶ βασιλεὺς ἠδυνήθη τῆς πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα μίξεως ἐπισχεῖν" '2.247. τὴν ὁρμὴν ὅσον γοῦν εἰς τὸ δωμάτιον ἀπελθεῖν; οἱ δὲ δὴ δουλεύοντες τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεοὶ καὶ νῦν μὲν οἰκοδομοῦντες ἐπὶ μισθῷ νῦν δὲ ποιμαίνοντες, ἄλλοι δὲ τρόπον κακούργων ἐν χαλκῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ δεδεμένοι, τίνα τῶν εὖ φρονούντων οὐκ ἂν παροξύνειαν, ὡς τοῖς ταῦτα συνθεῖσιν ἐπιπλῆξαι καὶ πολλὴν εὐήθειαν καταγνῶναι τῶν προσεμένων; 2.248. οἱ δὲ καὶ δεῖμόν τινα καὶ φόβον ἤδη δὲ καὶ λύσσαν καὶ ἀπάτην καὶ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν κακίστων παθῶν εἰς θεοῦ φύσιν καὶ μορφὴν ἀνέπλασαν: τοῖς δὲ εὐφημοτέροις τούτων καὶ' "2.249. θύειν τὰς πόλεις ἔπεισαν. τοιγαροῦν εἰς πολλὴν ἀνάγκην καθίστανται τοὺς μέν τινας τῶν θεῶν νομίζειν δοτῆρας ἀγαθῶν, τοὺς δὲ καλεῖν ἀποτροπαίους, εἶτα δὲ τούτους ὥσπερ τοὺς πονηροτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάρισι καὶ δώροις ἀποσείονται, μέγα τι λήψεσθαι κακὸν ὑπ' αὐτῶν προσδοκῶντες, εἰ μὴ μισθὸν αὐτοῖς παράσχοιεν." "
2.251. ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἄλλην τάξιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν φαυλοτάτων ἐφῆκαν τοῖς μὲν ποιηταῖς οὕστινας ἂν βούλωνται θεοὺς εἰσάγειν πάντα πάσχοντας, τοῖς δὲ ῥήτορσι πολιτογραφεῖν" '2.252. κατὰ ψήφισμα τῶν ξένων θεῶν τὸν ἐπιτήδειον: πολλῆς δὲ καὶ ζωγράφοι καὶ πλάσται τῆς εἰς τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ̔Ελλήνων ἀπέλαυσαν ἐξουσίας, αὐτὸς ἕκαστός τινα μορφὴν ἐπινοῶν, ὁ μὲν ἐκ πηλοῦ πλάττων, ὁ δὲ γράφων, οἱ δὲ μάλιστα δὴ θαυμαζόμενοι τῶν δημιουργῶν τὸν ἐλέφαντα καὶ τὸν χρυσὸν ἔχουσι τῆς ἀεὶ καινουργίας' "2.253. τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν ἱερῶν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ παντελῶς εἰσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐμπερισπούδαστα καθάρσεσι παντοδαπαῖς περικοσμούμενα. εἶθ' οἱ μὲν πρότερον ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἀκμάσαντες θεοὶ γεγηράκασιν: οἱ δὲ ὑπακμάζοντες τούτων ἐν δευτέρᾳ τάξει" '2.254. ὑποβέβληνται οὕτω γὰρ εὐφημότερον λέγειν: ἄλλοι δὲ καινοί τινες εἰσαγόμενοι θρησκείας τυγχάνουσιν, ὡς ἐν παρεκβάσει ὧν προείπομεν τοὺς τόπους ἐρημωθέντας καταλιπεῖν καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰ μὲν ἐρημοῦται, τὰ δὲ νεωστὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν βούλησιν ἕκαστος ἱδρύεται, δέον τοίνυν τοὐναντίον τὴν περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξαν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν τιμὴν ἀμετακίνητον διαφυλάττειν.' "2.255. ̓Απολλώνιος μὲν οὖν ὁ Μόλων τῶν ἀνοήτων εἷς ἦν καὶ τετυφωμένων, τοὺς μέντοι κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐν τοῖς ̔Ελληνικοῖς φιλοσοφήσαντας οὔτε τῶν προειρημένων οὐδὲν διέλαθεν οὔτε τὰς ψυχρὰς προφάσεις τῶν ἀλληγοριῶν ἠγνόησαν, διόπερ τῶν μὲν εἰκότως κατεφρόνησαν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ πρέπουσαν περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξαν ἡμῖν συνεφώνησαν." "2.256. ἀφ' ἧς ὁρμηθεὶς ὁ Πλάτων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδένα ποιητῶν φησι δεῖν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν παραδέχεσθαι καὶ τὸν ̔́Ομηρον εὐφήμως ἀποπέμπεται στεφανώσας καὶ μύρον αὐτοῦ καταχέας, ἵνα δὴ μὴ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ θεοῦ τοῖς μύθοις ἀφανίσειε." "2.257. μάλιστα δὲ Πλάτων μεμίμηται τὸν ἡμέτερον νομοθέτην κἀν τῷ μηδὲν οὕτω παίδευμα προστάττειν τοῖς πολίταις ὡς τὸ πάντας ἀκριβῶς τοὺς νόμους ἐκμανθάνειν, καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐπιμίγνυσθαί τινας ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ' εἶναι καθαρὸν" "2.258. τὸ πολίτευμα τῶν ἐμμενόντων τοῖς νόμοις προυνόησεν. ὧν οὐδὲν λογισάμενος ὁ Μόλων ̓Απολλώνιος ἡμῶν κατηγόρησεν, ὅτι μὴ παραδεχόμεθα τοὺς ἄλλαις προκατειλημμένους δόξαις περὶ θεοῦ μηδὲ κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλομεν τοῖς καθ' ἑτέραν συνήθειαν βίου ζῆν προαιρουμένοις." "2.259. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἴδιον ἡμῶν, κοινὸν δὲ πάντων, οὐχ ̔Ελλήνων δὲ μόνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ̔́Ελλησιν εὐδοκιμωτάτων: Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καὶ ξενηλασίας ποιούμενοι διετέλουν καὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδημεῖν πολίταις οὐκ ἐπέτρεπον διαφθορὰν ἐξ" "
2.261. τῆς πολιτείας οὔτε τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς μετεδίδοσαν διατριβῆς: ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζηλοῦν οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν, τοὺς μέντοι μετέχειν τῶν ἡμετέρων βουλομένους ἡδέως δεχόμεθα. καὶ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τεκμήριον, οἶμαι, φιλανθρωπίας ἅμα καὶ μεγαλοψυχίας." '2.262. ̓Εῶ περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ πλείω λέγειν. οἱ δὲ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτῶν δόξαντες πόλιν ̓Αθηναῖοι πῶς περὶ τούτων εἶχον, ̓Απολλώνιος ἠγνόησεν, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ῥῆμα μόνον παρὰ τοὺς ἐκείνων' "2.263. νόμους φθεγξαμένους περὶ θεῶν ἀπαραιτήτως ἐκόλασαν. τίνος γὰρ ἑτέρου χάριν Σωκράτης ἀπέθανεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ προεδίδου τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πολεμίοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐσύλησεν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καινοὺς ὅρκους ὤμνυεν καί τι δαιμόνιον αὐτῷ σημαίνειν ἔφασκεν ἢ διαπαίζων, ὡς ἔνιοι λέγουσι, διὰ ταῦτα κατεγνώσθη κώνειον πιὼν ἀποθανεῖν." '2.264. καὶ διαφθείρειν δὲ τοὺς νέους ὁ κατήγορος αὐτὸν ᾐτιᾶτο, τῆς πατρίου πολιτείας καὶ τῶν νόμων ὅτι προῆγεν αὐτοὺς καταφρονεῖν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν πολίτης ̓Αθηναίων τοιαύτην ὑπέμεινε τιμωρίαν.' "2.265. ̓Αναξαγόρας δὲ Κλαζομένιος ἦν, ἀλλ' ὅτι νομιζόντων ̓Αθηναίων τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι θεὸν ὅδ' αὐτὸν ἔφη μύδρον εἶναι διάπυρον, θάνατον αὐτοῦ παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους κατέγνωσαν." "2.266. καὶ Διαγόρᾳ τῷ Μηλίῳ τάλαντον ἐπεκήρυξαν, εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἀνέλοι, ἐπεὶ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς μυστήρια χλευάζειν ἐλέγετο. καὶ Πρωταγόρας εἰ μὴ θᾶττον ἔφυγε, συλληφθεὶς ἂν ἐτεθνήκει γράψαι τι δόξας" "2.267. οὐχ ὁμολογούμενον τοῖς ̓Αθηναίοις περὶ θεῶν. τί δὲ δεῖ θαυμάζειν, εἰ πρὸς ἄνδρας οὕτως ἀξιοπίστους διετέθησαν, οἵ γε μηδὲ γυναικῶν ἐφείσαντο; νῦν γὰρ τὴν ἱέρειαν ἀπέκτειναν, ἐπεί τις αὐτῆς κατηγόρησεν, ὅτι ξένους ἐμύει θεούς: νόμῳ δ' ἦν τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῖς κεκωλυμένον καὶ τιμωρία κατὰ τῶν ξένον εἰσαγόντων" '2.268. θεὸν ὥριστο θάνατος. οἱ δὲ τοιούτῳ νόμῳ χρώμενοι δῆλον ὅτι τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι θεούς: οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς πλειόνων ἀπολαύειν ἐφθόνουν.' "2.269. τὰ μὲν οὖν ̓Αθηναίων ἐχέτω καλῶς. Σκύθαι δὲ φόνοις χαίροντες ἀνθρώπων καὶ βραχὺ τῶν θηρίων διαφέροντες, ὅμως τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς οἴονται δεῖν περιστέλλειν, καὶ τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ̔Ελλήνων ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ θαυμασθέντα τὸν ̓Ανάχαρσιν ἐπανελθόντα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀνεῖλον, ἐπεὶ τῶν ̔Ελληνικῶν ἐθῶν ἔδοξεν ἥκειν ἀνάπλεως, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ παρὰ Πέρσαις ἄν τις εὕροι" "
2.271. ὑβρίζων καὶ παῖδας ἐκτέμνων. παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ θάνατος ὥρισται, κἂν ἄλογόν τις οὕτω ζῷον ἀδικῇ: καὶ τούτων ἡμᾶς τῶν νόμων ἀπαγαγεῖν οὔτε φόβος ἴσχυσεν τῶν κρατησάντων οὔτε ζῆλος τῶν" "2.272. παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις τετιμημένων. οὐδὲ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἠσκήσαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ πολέμους ἄρασθαι χάριν πλεονεξίας, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς νόμους διαφυλάττειν. τὰς γοῦν ἄλλας ἐλαττώσεις πρᾴως ὑπομένοντες, ἐπειδάν τινες ἡμᾶς τὰ νόμιμα κινεῖν ἀναγκάζωσι, τότε καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν αἱρούμεθα πολέμους καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων ταῖς συμφοραῖς ἐγκαρτεροῦμεν." '2.273. διὰ τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ζηλώσαιμεν τοὺς ἑτέρων νόμους ὁρῶντες μηδὲ παρὰ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτοὺς τετηρημένους; πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔμελλον Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τῆς ἀνεπιμίκτου καταγνώσεσθαι πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς γάμους ὀλιγωρίας, ̓Ηλεῖοι δὲ καὶ Θηβαῖοι τῆς παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄγαν ἀνέδην πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας μίξεως;' "2.274. ἃ γοῦν πάλαι κάλλιστα καὶ συμφορώτατα πράττειν ὑπελάμβανον, ταῦτ' εἰ καὶ μὴ παντάπασι τοῖς ἔργοις πεφεύγασιν, οὐχ" '2.275. ὁμολογοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτῶν νόμους ἀπόμνυνται τοσοῦτόν ποτε παρὰ τοῖς ̔́Ελλησιν ἰσχύσαντας, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τὰς τῶν ἀρρένων μίξεις ἐπεφήμισαν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον καὶ τοὺς τῶν γνησίων ἀδελφῶν γάμους, ταύτην ἀπολογίαν αὑτοῖς τῶν ἀτόπων καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονῶν συντιθέντες. 2.276. ̓Εῶ νῦν περὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν λέγειν, ὅσας μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔδοσαν οἱ πλεῖστοι νομοθέται τοῖς πονηροῖς διαλύσεις, ἐπὶ μοιχείας μὲν ζημίας χρημάτων, ἐπὶ φθορᾶς δὲ καὶ γάμους νομοθετήσαντες, ὅσας δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀσεβείας προφάσεις περιέχουσιν ἀρνήσεως, εἰ καί τις ἐπιχειρήσειεν ἐξετάζειν: ἤδη γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πλείοσι μελέτη' "2.277. γέγονε τοῦ παραβαίνειν τοὺς νόμους. οὐ μὴν καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ κἂν πλούτου καὶ πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν στερηθῶμεν, ὁ γοῦν νόμος ἡμῖν ἀθάνατος διαμένει, καὶ οὐδεὶς ̓Ιουδαίων οὔτε μακρὰν οὕτως ἂν ἀπέλθοι τῆς πατρίδος οὔτε πικρὸν φοβηθήσεται" '2.278. δεσπότην, ὡς μὴ πρὸ ἐκείνου δεδιέναι τὸν νόμον. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν νόμων οὕτως πρὸς αὐτοὺς διακείμεθα, συγχωρησάτωσαν ὅτι κρατίστους ἔχομεν νόμους. εἰ δὲ φαύλοις οὕτως ἡμᾶς ἐμμένειν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, τί οὐκ ἂν αὐτοὶ δικαίως πάθοιεν τοὺς κρείττονας οὐ φυλάττοντες;' "2.279. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁ πολὺς χρόνος πιστεύεται πάντων εἶναι δοκιμαστὴς ἀληθέστατος, τοῦτον ἂν ποιησαίμην ἐγὼ μάρτυρα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνου φήμης περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ παραδοθείσης: ἀπείρου γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου γεγονότος, εἴ τις αὐτὸν παραβάλλοι ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἡλικίαις νομοθετῶν, παρὰ πάντας εὕροι τοῦτον *" '
2.281. ἀνθρώποις ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον αὑτῶν ζῆλον ἐμπεποιήκασι. πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς ̔́Ελλησι φιλοσοφήσαντες τῷ μὲν δοκεῖν τὰ πάτρια διεφύλαττον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐκείνῳ κατηκολούθησαν, ὅμοια μὲν περὶ θεοῦ φρονοῦντες, εὐτέλειαν δὲ' "2.282. βίου καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν διδάσκοντες. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλήθεσιν ἤδη πολὺς ζῆλος γέγονεν ἐκ μακροῦ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐσεβείας, οὐδ' ἔστιν οὐ πόλις ̔Ελλήνων οὐδητισοῦν οὐδὲ βάρβαρον οὐδὲ ἓν ἔθνος, ἔνθα μὴ τὸ τῆς ἑβδομάδος, ἣν ἀργοῦμεν ἡμεῖς, τὸ ἔθος δὲ διαπεφοίτηκεν καὶ αἱ νηστεῖαι καὶ λύχνων ἀνακαύσεις καὶ πολλὰ τῶν εἰς βρῶσιν ἡμῖν οὐ νενομισμένων παρατετήρηται." '2.283. μιμεῖσθαι δὲ πειρῶνται καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἡμῶν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀνάδοσιν καὶ τὸ φιλεργὸν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ' "2.284. τὸ καρτερικὸν ἐν ταῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων ἀνάγκαις: τὸ γὰρ θαυμασιώτατον, ὅτι χωρὶς τοῦ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπαγωγοῦ δελέατος αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἴσχυσεν ὁ νόμος, καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου πεφοίτηκεν, οὕτως ὁ νόμος διὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων βεβάδικεν. αὐτὸς δέ τις ἕκαστος τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὸν οἶκον ἐπισκοπῶν τὸν αὐτοῦ τοῖς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγομένοις οὐκ ἀπιστήσει." '2.285. χρὴ τοίνυν πάντων ἀνθρώπων καταγνῶναι πονηρίαν ἐθελούσιον, εἰ τἀλλότρια καὶ φαῦλα πρὸ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ καλῶν ζηλοῦν ἐπιτεθυμήκασιν, ἢ παύσασθαι' "2.286. βασκαίνοντας ἡμῖν τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιφθόνου τινὸς ἀντιποιούμεθα πράγματος τὸν αὑτῶν τιμῶντες νομοθέτην καὶ τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνου προφητευθεῖσι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ πεπιστευκότες: καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ συνίεμεν αὐτοὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τῶν νόμων, ἁπάντων ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ζηλούντων μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς προήχθημεν." "2.287. ̓Αλλὰ γὰρ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὴν ἀκριβῆ πεποίημαι παράδοσιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀρχαιολογίας μοι γραφεῖσι. νυνὶ δ' αὐτῶν ἐπεμνήσθην ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν ἀναγκαῖον, οὔτε τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ψέγειν οὔτε τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐγκωμιάζειν προθέμενος, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοὺς περὶ ἡμῶν ἀδίκως γεγραφότας ἐλέγξω πρὸς αὐτὴν" '2.288. ἀναιδῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πεφιλονεικηκότας. καὶ δή μοι δοκῶ πεπληρῶσθαι διὰ τῆς γραφῆς ἱκανῶς ἃ προϋπεσχόμην: καὶ γὰρ ἀρχαιότητι προϋπάρχον ἐπέδειξα τὸ γένος, τῶν κατηγόρων ὅτι νεώτατόν ἐστιν εἰρηκότων, καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολλοὺς ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν ἐμνημονευκότας ἡμῶν ἀρχαίους παρέσχομεν μάρτυρας, ἐκείνων ὅτι μηδείς ἐστιν διαβεβαιουμένων.' "2.289. ἀλλὰ μὴν Αἰγυπτίους ἔφασαν ἡμῶν τοὺς προγόνους: ἐδείχθησαν δ' εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐλθόντες ἑτέρωθεν. διὰ δὲ λύμην σωμάτων αὐτοὺς ἐκβληθῆναι κατεψεύσαντο: προαιρέσει καὶ περιουσίᾳ ῥώμης ἐφάνησαν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ὑποστρέψαντες γῆν." "
2.291. Περὶ τῶν νόμων οὐκ ἐδέησε λόγου πλείονος: αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἑωράθησαν δι' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀσέβειαν μὲν εὐσέβειαν δ' ἀληθεστάτην διδάσκοντες, οὐδ' ἐπὶ μισανθρωπίαν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων κοινωνίαν παρακαλοῦντες, ἀδικίας ἐχθροί, δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμελεῖς, ἀργίαν καὶ πολυτέλειαν ἐξορίζοντες, αὐτάρκεις καὶ φιλοπόνους εἶναι" '2.292. διδάσκοντες, πολέμων μὲν ἀπείργοντες εἰς πλεονεξίαν, ἀνδρείους δὲ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν εἶναι παρασκευάζοντες, ἀπαραίτητοι πρὸς τὰς τιμωρίας, ἀσόφιστοι λόγων παρασκευαῖς, τοῖς ἔργοις ἀεὶ βεβαιούμενοι: ταῦτα γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡμεῖς παρέχομεν τῶν γραμμάτων ἐναργέστερα. 2.293. διόπερ ἐγὼ θαρσήσας ἂν εἴποιμι πλείστων ἅμα καὶ καλλίστων ἡμᾶς εἰσηγητὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις γεγονέναι: τί γὰρ εὐσεβείας ἀπαραβάτου κάλλιον; τί δὲ τοῦ πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς νόμοις δικαιότερον;' "2.294. ἢ τί συμφορώτερον τοῦ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοεῖν καὶ μήτ' ἐν συμφοραῖς διίστασθαι μήτ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις στασιάζειν ἐξυβρίζοντας, ἀλλ' ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν θανάτου καταφρονεῖν, ἐν εἰρήνῃ δὲ τέχναις ἢ γεωργίαις προσανέχειν, πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχοῦ πεπεῖσθαι τὸν θεὸν ἐποπτεύοντα διέπειν;" "2.295. ταῦτ' εἰ μὲν παρ' ἑτέροις ἢ ἐγράφη πρότερον ἢ ἐφυλάχθη βεβαιότερον, ἡμεῖς ἂν ἐκείνοις χάριν ὠφείλομεν ὡς μαθηταὶ γεγονότες: εἰ δὲ καὶ χρώμενοι μάλιστα πάντων βλεπόμεθα καὶ τὴν πρώτην εὕρεσιν αὐτῶν ἡμετέραν οὖσαν ἐπεδείξαμεν, ̓Απίωνες μὲν καὶ Μόλωνες καὶ πάντες ὅσοι τῷ ψεύδεσθαι" '2.296. καὶ λοιδορεῖν χαίρουσιν ἐξεληλέγχθωσαν. σοὶ δέ, ̓Επαφρόδιτε, μάλιστα τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀγαπῶντι καὶ διὰ σὲ τοῖς ὁμοίως βουλησομένοις περὶ τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν εἰδέναι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γεγράφθω βιβλίον.' ". None | 2.148. Moreover, since this Apollonius does not do like Apion, and lay a continued accusation against us, but does it only by starts, and up and down his discourse, while he sometimes reproaches us as atheists, and man-haters, and sometimes hits us in the teeth with our want of courage, and yet sometimes, on the contrary, accuses us of too great boldness, and madness in our conduct; nay, he says that we are the weakest of all the barbarians, and that this is the reason why we are the only people who have made no improvements in human life;
2.154. Now I venture to say, that our legislator is the most ancient of all the legislators whom we have any where heard of; for as for the Lycurguses, and Solons, and Zaleucus Locrensis, and all those legislators who are so admired by the Greeks, they seem to be of yesterday, if compared with our legislator, insomuch as the very name of a law was not so much as known in old times among the Grecians. 2.155. Homer is a witness to the truth of this observation, who never uses that term in all his poems; for indeed there was then no such thing among them, but the multitude was governed by wise maxims, and by the injunctions of their king. It was also a long time that they continued in the use of these unwritten customs, although they were always changing them upon several occasions; 2.156. but for our legislator, who was of so much greater antiquity than the rest (as even those that speak against us upon all occasions do always confess), he exhibited himself to the people as their best governor and counsellor, and included in his legislation the entire conduct of their lives, and prevailed with them to receive it, and brought it so to pass, that those that were made acquainted with his laws did most carefully observe them. 2.171. for all our actions and studies, and all our words in Moses’s settlement have a reference to piety towards God; for he hath left none of these in suspense, or undetermined; for there are two ways of coming at any sort of learning and a moral conduct of life; the one is by instruction in words, the other by practical exercises. 2.172. Now, other lawgivers have separated these two ways in their opinions, and choosing one of those ways of instruction, or that which best pleased every one of them, neglected the other. Thus did the Lacedemonians and the Cretans teach by practical exercises, but not by words: while the Athenians, and almost all the other Grecians, made laws about what was to be done, or left undone, but had no regard to the exercising them thereto in practice. 2.191. All materials, let them be ever so costly, are unworthy to compose an image for him; and all arts are unartful to express the notion we ought to have of him. We can neither see nor think of any thing like him, nor is it agreeable to piety to form a resemblance of him. 2.192. We see his works, the light, the heaven, the earth, the sun and the moon, the waters, the generations of animals, the productions of fruits. These things hath God made, not with hands, nor with labor, nor as wanting the assistance of any to cooperate with him; but as his will resolved they should be made and be good also, they were made, and became good immediately. All men ought to follow this Being, and to worship him in the exercise of virtue; for this way of worship of God is the most holy of all others. 2.201. for (says the scripture) “A woman is inferior to her husband in all things.” Let her, therefore, be obedient to him; not so, that he should abuse her, but that she may acknowledge her duty to her husband; for God hath given the authority to the husband. A husband, therefore, is to lie only with his wife whom he hath married; but to have to do with another man’s wife is a wicked thing; which, if any one ventures upon, death is inevitably his punishment: no more can he avoid the same who forces a virgin betrothed to another man, or entices another man’s wife. 2.202. The law, moreover enjoins us to bring up all our offspring, and forbids women to cause abortion of what is begotten, or to destroy it afterward; and if any woman appears to have so done, she will be a murderer of her child, by destroying a living creature, and diminishing human kind: if any one, therefore, proceeds to such fornication or murder, he cannot be clean. 2.203. Moreover, the law enjoins, that after the man and wife have lain together in a regular way, they shall bathe themselves; for there is a defilement contracted thereby, both in soul and body, as if they had gone into another country; for indeed the soul, by being united to the body, is subject to miseries, and is not freed therefrom again but by death; on which account the law requires this purification to be entirely performed. 26. 2.204. Nay, indeed, the law does not permit us to make festivals at the births of our children, and thereby afford occasion of drinking to excess; but it ordains that the very beginning of our education should be immediately directed to sobriety. It also commands us to bring those children up in learning and to exercise them in the laws, and make them acquainted with the acts of their predecessors, in order to their imitation of them, and that they might be nourished up in the laws from their infancy, and might neither transgress them, nor have any pretense for their ignorance of them. 2.211. 30. However, there are other things which our legislator ordained for us beforehand, which of necessity we ought to do in common to all men; as to afford fire, and water, and food to such as want it; to show them the roads; nor to let any one lie unburied. He also would have us treat those that are esteemed our enemies with moderation: 2.212. for he doth not allow us to set their country on fire, nor permit us to cut down those trees that bear fruit: nay, farther, he forbids us to spoil those that have been slain in war. He hath also provided for such as are taken captive, that they may not be injured, and especially that the women may not be abused. 2.213. Indeed he hath taught us gentleness and humanity so effectually, that he hath not despised the care of brute beasts, by permitting no other than a regular use of them, and forbidding any other; and if any of them come to our houses, like supplicants, we are forbidden to slay them: nor may we kill the dams, together with their young ones; but we are obliged, even in an enemy’s country, to spare and not kill those creatures that labor for mankind. 2.214. Thus hath our lawgiver contrived to teach us an equitable conduct every way, by using us to such laws as instruct us therein; while at the same time he hath ordained, that such as break these laws should be punished, without the allowance of any excuse whatsoever. 2.221. but that somebody had pretended to have written these laws himself, and had read them to the Greeks, or had pretended that he had met with men out of the limits of the known world, that had such reverent notions of God, and had continued a long time in the firm observance of such laws as ours, I cannot but suppose that all men would admire them on a reflection upon the frequent changes they had therein been themselves subject to; 2.222. and this while those that have attempted to write somewhat of the same kind for politic government, and for laws, are accused as composing monstrous things, and are said to have undertaken an impossible task upon them. And here I will say nothing of those other philosophers who have undertaken any thing of this nature in their writings. 2.223. But even Plato himself, who is so admired by the Greeks on account of that gravity in his manners, and force in his words, and that ability he had to persuade men beyond all other philosophers, is little better than laughed at and exposed to ridicule on that account, by those that pretend to sagacity in political affairs; 2.224. although he that shall diligently peruse his writings, will find his precepts to be somewhat gentle, and pretty near to the customs of the generality of mankind. Nay, Plato himself confesseth that it is not safe to publish the true notion concerning God among the ignorant multitude. 2.225. Yet do some men look upon Plato’s discourses as no better than certain idle words set off with great artifice. However, they admire Lycurgus as the principal lawgiver; and all men celebrate Sparta for having continued in the firm observance of his laws for a very long time. 2.226. So far then we have gained, that it is to be confessed a mark of virtue to submit to laws. But then let such as admire this in the Lacedemonians compare that duration of theirs with more than two thousand years which our political government hath continued; 2.227. and let them farther consider, that though the Lacedemonians did seem to observe their laws exactly while they enjoyed their liberty, yet that when they underwent a change of their fortune, they forgot almost all those laws; 2.228. while we, having been under ten thousand changes in our fortune by the changes that happened among the kings of Asia, have never betrayed our laws under the most pressing distresses we have been in; nor have we neglected them either out of sloth or for a livelihood. Nay, if any one will consider it, the difficulties and labors laid upon us have been greater than what appears to have been borne by the Lacedemonian fortitude, 2.229. while they neither ploughed their land nor exercised any trades, but lived in their own city, free from all such painstaking, in the enjoyment of plenty, and using such exercises as might improve their bodies,
2.231. I need not add this, that they have not been fully able to observe their laws; for not only a few single persons, but multitudes of them, have in heaps neglected those laws, and have delivered themselves, together with their arms, into the hands of their enemies. 2.241. and for those to whom they have allotted heaven, they have set over them one, who in title is their father, but in his actions a tyrant and a lord; whence it came to pass that his wife, and brother, and daughter (which daughter he brought forth from his own head), made a conspiracy against him to seize upon him and confine him, as he had himself seized upon and confined his own father before. 2.251. but omitted it as a thing of very little consequence, and gave leave both to the poets to introduce what gods they pleased, and those subject to all sorts of passions, and to the orators to procure political decrees from the people for the admission of such foreign gods as they thought proper. 2.252. The painters also, and statuaries of Greece, had herein great power, as each of them could contrive a shape proper for a god; the one to be formed out of clay, and the other by making a bare picture of such a one; but those workmen that were principally admired, had the use of ivory and of gold as the constant materials for their new statues; 2.253. whereby it comes to pass that some temples are quite deserted, while others are in great esteem, and adorned with all the rites of all kinds of purification. Besides this, the first gods, who have long flourished in the honors done them, are now grown old while those that flourished after them are come in their room as a second rank, that I may speak the most honorably of them that I can: 2.254. nay, certain other gods there are who are newly introduced, and newly worshipped as we, by way of digression have said already, and yet have left their places of worship desolate; and for their temples, some of them are already left desolate, and others are built anew, according to the pleasure of men; whereas they ought to have preserved their opinion about God, and that worship which is due to him, always and immutably the same. 2.261. whereas we, though we do not think fit to imitate other institutions, yet do we willingly admit of those that desire to partake of ours, which I think I may reckon to be a plain indication of our humanity, and at the same time of our magimity also. 2.271. Now, with us, it is a capital crime, if any one does thus abuse even a brute beast; and as for us, neither hath the fear of our governors, nor a desire of following what other nations have in so great esteem, been able to withdraw us from our own laws; 2.272. nor have we exerted our courage in raising up wars to increase our wealth, but only for the observation of our laws; and when we with patience bear other losses, yet when any persons would compel us to break our laws, then it is that we choose to go to war, though it be beyond our ability to pursue it, and bear the greatest calamities to the last with much fortitude. 2.273. And, indeed, what reason can there be why we should desire to imitate the laws of other nations, while we see they are not observed by their own legislators? And why do not the Lacedemonians think of abolishing that form of their government which suffers them not to associate with any others, as well as their contempt of matrimony? And why do not the Eleans and Thebans abolish that unnatural and impudent lust, which makes them lie with males? 2.274. For they will not show a sufficient sign of their repentance of what they of old thought to be very excellent, and very advantageous in their practices, unless they entirely avoid all such actions for the time to come: 2.275. nay, such things are inserted into the body of their laws, and had once such a power among the Greeks, that they ascribed these sodomitical practices to the gods themselves, as a part of their good character; and indeed it was according to the same manner that the gods married their own sisters. This the Greeks contrived as an apology for their own absurd and unnatural pleasures. 2.281. nay, the earliest Grecian philosophers, though in appearance they observed the laws of their own countries, yet did they, in their actions and their philosophic doctrines, follow our legislator, and instructed men to live sparingly, and to have friendly communication one with another. 2.282. Nay, farther, the multitude of mankind itself have had a great inclination of a long time to follow our religious observances; for there is not any city of the Grecians, nor any of the barbarians, nor any nation whatsoever, whither our custom of resting on the seventh day hath not come, and by which our fasts and lighting up lamps, and many of our prohibitions as to our food, are not observed; 2.283. they also endeavor to imitate our mutual concord with one another, and the charitable distribution of our goods, and our diligence in our trades, and our fortitude in undergoing the distresses we are in, on account of our laws; 2.284. and, what is here matter of the greatest admiration, our law hath no bait of pleasure to allure men to it, but it prevails by its own force; and as God himself pervades all the world, so hath our law passed through all the world also. So that if any one will but reflect on his own country, and his own family, he will have reason to give credit to what I say. 2.285. It is therefore but just, either to condemn all mankind of indulging a wicked disposition, when they have been so desirous of imitating laws that are to them foreign and evil in themselves, rather than following laws of their own that are of a better character, or else our accusers must leave off their spite against us; 2.286. nor are we guilty of any envious behavior towards them, when we honor our own legislator, and believe what he, by his prophetic authority, hath taught us concerning God; for though we should not be able ourselves to understand the excellency of our own laws, yet would the great multitude of those that desire to imitate them, justify us, in greatly valuing ourselves upon them. 2.291. 42. As to the laws themselves, more words are unnecessary, for they are visible in their own nature, and appear to teach not impiety, but the truest piety in the world. They do not make men hate one another, but encourage people to communicate what they have to one another freely; they are enemies to injustice, they take care of righteousness, they banish idleness and expensive living, and instruct men to be content with what they have and to be laborious in their callings; 2.292. they forbid men to make war from a desire of getting more, but make men courageous in defending the laws; they are inexorable in punishing malefactors; they admit no sophistry of words, but are always established by actions themselves, which actions we ever propose as surer demonstrations than what is contained in writing only; 2.293. on which account I am so bold as to say that we are become the teachers of other men, in the greatest number of things, and those of the most excellent nature only; for what is more excellent than inviolable piety? what is more just than submission to laws? 2.294. and what is more advantageous than mutual love and concord? and this so far that we are to be neither divided by calamities, nor to become injurious and seditious in prosperity; but to condemn death when we are in war, and in peace to apply ourselves to our mechanical occupations, or to our tillage of the ground; while we in all things and all ways are satisfied that God is the inspector and governor of our actions. 2.295. If these precepts had either been written at first, or more exactly kept by any others before us, we should have owed them thanks as disciples owe to their masters; but if it be visible that we have made use of them more than any other men, and if we have demonstrated that the original invention of them is our own, let the Apions, and the Molones, with all the rest of those that delight in lies and reproaches, stand confuted; 2.296. but let this and the foregoing book be dedicated to thee, Epaphroditus, who art so great a lover of truth, and by thy means to those that have been in like manner desirous to be acquainted with the affairs of our nation. |
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40. Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 10.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean • Epicureans
Found in books: Klawans (2019) 14, 67, 68, 69, 70; Schremer (2010) 38, 60
10.1. כָּל יִשְׂרָאֵל יֵשׁ לָהֶם חֵלֶק לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה ס) וְעַמֵּךְ כֻּלָּם צַדִּיקִים לְעוֹלָם יִירְשׁוּ אָרֶץ נֵצֶר מַטָּעַי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַי לְהִתְפָּאֵר. וְאֵלּוּ שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חֵלֶק לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא, הָאוֹמֵר אֵין תְּחִיַּת הַמֵּתִים מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וְאֵין תּוֹרָה מִן הַשָּׁמָיִם, וְאֶפִּיקוֹרֶס. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, אַף הַקּוֹרֵא בַסְּפָרִים הַחִיצוֹנִים, וְהַלּוֹחֵשׁ עַל הַמַּכָּה וְאוֹמֵר (שמות טו) כָּל הַמַּחֲלָה אֲשֶׁר שַׂמְתִּי בְמִצְרַיִם לֹא אָשִׂים עָלֶיךָ כִּי אֲנִי ה' רֹפְאֶךָ. אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר, אַף הַהוֹגֶה אֶת הַשֵּׁם בְּאוֹתִיּוֹתָיו:"". None | 10.1. All Israel have a portion in the world to come, for it says, “Your people, all of them righteous, shall possess the land for ever; They are the shoot that I planted, my handiwork in which I glory” (Isaiah 60:2. And these are the ones who have no portion in the world to come: He who maintains that resurrection is not a biblical doctrine, that the torah was not divinely revealed, and an epikoros. Rabbi Akiva says: “Even one who reads non-canonical books and one who whispers a charm over a wound and says, “I will not bring upon you any of the diseases which i brought upon the Egyptians: for I the lord am you healer” (Exodus 15:26). Abba Shaul says: “Also one who pronounces the divine name as it is spelled.”''. None |
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41. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, Thessalonians • Epicureanism, afterlife, view of • Epicureanism, as school or sect • Epicureanism, attacks against • Epicureanism, comparison to Pauline Christianity • Epicureanism, fame, rejection of • Epicureanism, heresy assimilated to • Epicureanism, on friendship • Epicureanism, psychagogy • Epicureanism, simplicity of life • Epicureans, Epicureanism • atheism, accusations against, Epicureans • commonplace, Epicurean • friendship, Epicurean • philosophy/philosophers, Epicurean • weakness, of Epicurean students
Found in books: Allison (2020) 11, 132, 133, 134, 135; Boulluec (2022) 328, 329, 396, 485; Gunderson (2022) 52, 53; Malherbe et al (2014) 291, 370, 371, 756; Černušková (2016) 334
2.6. Σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, σοφίαν δὲ οὐ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργουμένων· 6.13. τὰ βρώματα τῇ κοιλίᾳ, καὶ ἡ κοιλία τοῖς βρώμασιν· ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ταύτην καὶ ταῦτα καταργήσει. τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐ τῇ πορνείᾳ ἀλλὰ τῷ κυρίῳ, καὶ ὁ κύριος τῷ σώματι· 8.1. Περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων, οἴδαμεν ὅτι πάντες γνῶσιν ἔχομεν. 8.2. ἡ γνῶσις φυσιοῖ, ἡ δὲ ἀγάπη οἰκοδομεῖ. 8.3. εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἐγνωκέναι τι, οὔπω ἔγνω καθὼς δεῖ γνῶναι· εἰ δέ τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, οὗτος ἔγνωσται ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ. 8.8. βρῶμα δὲ ἡμᾶς οὐ παραστήσει τῷ θεῷ· οὔτε ἐὰν μὴ φάγωμεν, ὑστερούμεθα, οὔτε ἐὰν φάγωμεν, περισσεύομεν. 8.11. ἀπόλλυται γὰρ ὁ ἀσθενῶν ἐν τῇ σῇ γνώσει, ὁ ἀδελφὸς διʼ ὃν Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν. 8.12. οὕτως δὲ ἁμαρτάνοντες εἰς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τύπτοντες αὐτῶν τὴν συνείδησιν ἀσθενοῦσαν εἰς Χριστὸν ἁμαρτάνετε. 11.19. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ αἱρέσεις ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι· ἵνα καὶ οἱ δόκιμοι φανεροὶ γένωνται ἐν ὑμῖν. 13.1. Καὶ ἔτι καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν ὑμῖν δείκνυμι. Ἐὰν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῶ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, γέγονα χαλκὸς ἠχῶν ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον. 13.12. βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι διʼ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.' '. None | 2.6. We speak wisdom, however, among those who are fullgrown; yet a wisdom not of this world, nor of the rulers of this world,who are coming to nothing. 6.13. "Foods for the belly, andthe belly for foods," but God will bring to nothing both it and them.But the body is not for sexual immorality, but for the Lord; and theLord for the body. 8.1. Now concerning things sacrificed to idols: We know that we allhave knowledge. Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up.' "8.2. But ifanyone thinks that he knows anything, he doesn't yet know as he oughtto know." '8.3. But if anyone loves God, the same is known by him.' "8.8. But food will not commend us to God. Forneither, if we don't eat, are we the worse; nor, if we eat, are we thebetter." '8.11. And through your knowledge, he who is weak perishes, thebrother for whose sake Christ died. 8.12. Thus, sinning against thebrothers, and wounding their conscience when it is weak, you sinagainst Christ. 11.19. For there also mustbe factions among you, that those who are approved may be revealedamong you.' "13.1. If I speak with the languages of men and of angels, but don'thave love, I have become sounding brass, or a clanging cymbal." '13.12. For now we see in a mirror, dimly, butthen face to face. Now I know in part, but then I will know fully, evenas I was also fully known.' '. None |
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42. New Testament, 1 Thessalonians, 5.1-5.15, 5.21 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, Christians • Epicureanism, Thessalonians • Epicureanism, afterlife, view of • Epicureanism, as school or sect • Epicureanism, asphaleia • Epicureanism, attacks against • Epicureanism, community • Epicureanism, comparison to Pauline Christianity • Epicureanism, letters, use of • Epicureanism, manual labor • Epicureanism, mutual edification • Epicureanism, on friendship • Epicureanism, pastoral care • Epicureanism, peace and security • Epicureanism, pleasure • Epicureanism, psychagogy • Epicureanism, simplicity of life • Epicureanism,education • God (Pauline), compared with Epicurean gods • friendship, Epicurean • gods (Epicurean), compared with Pauline God • gods (Epicurean), human friendship with • gods (Epicurean), involvement in moral formation • knowledge, Epicurean
Found in books: Allison (2020) 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 183; Boulluec (2022) 485; Malherbe et al (2014) 73, 174, 182, 206, 207, 272, 338, 369, 370, 373, 374, 717
5.1. Περὶ δὲ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν, ἀδελφοί, οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε ὑμῖν γράφεσθαι, 5.2. αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀκριβῶς οἴδατε ὅτι ἡμέρα Κυρίου ὡς κλέπτης ἐν νυκτὶ οὕτως ἔρχεται. 5.3. ὅταν λέγωσιν Εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια, τότε αἰφνίδιος αὐτοῖς ἐπίσταται ὄλεθρος ὥσπερ ἡ ὠδὶν τῇ ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσῃ, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐκφύγωσιν. 5.4. ὑμεῖς δέ, ἀδελ φοί, οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σκότει, ἵνα ἡ ἡμέρα ὑμᾶς ὡς κλέπτας καταλάβῃ, 5.5. πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς υἱοὶ φωτός ἐστε καὶ υἱοὶ ἡμέρας. Οὐκ ἐσμὲν νυκτὸς οὐδὲ σκότους· 5.6. ἄρα οὖν μὴ καθεύδωμεν ὡς οἱ λοιποί, ἀλλὰ γρηγορῶμεν καὶ νήφωμεν. 5.7. οἱ γὰρ καθεύδοντες νυκτὸς καθεύδουσιν, καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι νυκτὸς μεθύουσιν· 5.8. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἡμέρας ὄντες νήφωμεν,ἐνδυσάμενοι θώρακαπίστεως καὶ ἀγάπης καὶπερικε φαλαίανἐλπίδασωτηρίας· 5.9. ὅτι οὐκ ἔθετο ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ὀργὴν ἀλλὰ εἰς περιποίησιν σωτηρίας διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ,
5.10. τοῦ ἀποθανόντος περὶ ἡμῶν ἵνα εἴτε γρηγορῶμεν εἴτε καθεύδωμεν ἅμα σὺν αὐτῷ ζήσωμεν.
5.11. Διὸ παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους καὶ οἰκοδομεῖτε εἷς τὸν ἕνα, καθὼς καὶ ποιεῖτε.
5.12. Ἐρωτῶμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, εἰδέναι τοὺς κοπιῶντας ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ προϊσταμένους ὑμῶν ἐν κυρίῳ καὶ νουθετοῦντας ὑμᾶς,
5.13. καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς ὑπερεκπερισσοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ διὰ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν.
5.14. εἰρηνεύετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. Παρακαλοῦμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, νουθετεῖτε τοὺς ἀτάκτους, παραμυθεῖσθε τοὺς ὀλιγοψύχους, ἀντέχεσθε τῶν ἀσθενῶν, μακροθυμεῖτε πρὸς πάντας.
5.15. ὁρᾶτε μή τις κακὸν ἀντὶ κακοῦ τινὶ ἀποδῷ,
5.21. πάντα δὲ δοκιμάζετε, τὸ καλὸν κατέχετε,''. None | 5.1. But concerning the times and the seasons, brothers, you have no need that anything be written to you. 5.2. For you yourselves know well that the day of the Lord comes like a thief in the night. 5.3. For when they are saying, "Peace and safety," then sudden destruction will come on them, like birth pains on a pregt woman; and they will in no way escape. ' "5.4. But you, brothers, aren't in darkness, that the day should overtake you like a thief. " "5.5. You are all sons of light, and sons of the day. We don't belong to the night, nor to darkness, " "5.6. so then let's not sleep, as the rest do, but let's watch and be sober. " '5.7. For those who sleep, sleep in the night, and those who are drunken are drunken in the night. 5.8. But let us, since we belong to the day, be sober, putting on the breastplate of faith and love, and, for a helmet, the hope of salvation. ' "5.9. For God didn't appoint us to wrath, but to the obtaining of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, " '
5.10. who died for us, that, whether we wake or sleep, we should live together with him.
5.11. Therefore exhort one another, and build each other up, even as you also do.
5.12. But we beg you, brothers, to know those who labor among you, and are over you in the Lord, and admonish you, ' "
5.13. and to respect and honor them in love for their work's sake. Be at peace among yourselves. " '
5.14. We exhort you, brothers, admonish the disorderly, encourage the fainthearted, support the weak, be patient toward all.
5.15. See that no one returns evil for evil to anyone, but always follow after that which is good, for one another, and for all.
5.21. Test all things, and hold firmly that which is good. ''. None |
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43. New Testament, Acts, 17.16-17.34, 18.12-18.15 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Athens, Epicurus, Epicureans • Death, Epicurean view • Epicureanism, Christians • Epicureanism, Epicureans • Epicureanism, Paul • Epicureanism, pastoral care • Epicureanism,exclusiveness • Epicureans • Epicureans, • Epicureans/ Epicureanism • atheism, accusations against, Epicureans • philosophers, Epicurean • philosophy/philosophers, Epicurean
Found in books: Bowersock (1997) 103; Breytenbach and Tzavella (2022) 2, 4, 11, 76, 79, 83; Malherbe et al (2014) 213, 756, 757, 763; McDonough (2009) 117; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 612, 613, 635; Rohmann (2016) 157, 170, 187, 188; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 174, 203, 208, 218; Černušková (2016) 334
17.16. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις ἐκδεχομένου αὐτοὺς τοῦ Παύλου, παρωξύνετο τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ θεωροῦντος κατείδωλον οὖσαν τὴν πόλιν. 17.17. διελέγετο μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις καὶ τοῖς σεβομένοις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν πρὸς τοὺς παρατυγχάνοντας. 17.18. τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρίων καὶ Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων συνέβαλλον αὐτῷ, καί τινες ἔλεγον Τί ἂν θέλοι ὁ σπερμολόγος οὗτος λέγειν; οἱ δέ Ξένων δαιμονίων δοκεῖ καταγγελεὺς εἶναι· 17.19. ὅτι τὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν εὐηγγελίζετο. ἐπιλαβόμενοι δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄρειον Πάγον ἤγαγον, λέγοντες Δυνάμεθα γνῶναι τίς ἡ καινὴ αὕτη ἡ ὑπὸ σοῦ λαλουμένη διδαχή; 17.20. ξενίζοντα γάρ τινα εἰσφέρεις εἰς τὰς ἀκοὰς ἡμῶν·βουλόμεθα οὖν γνῶναι τίνα θέλει ταῦτα εἶναι. 17.21. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ πάντες καὶ οἱ ἐπιδημοῦντες ξένοι εἰς οὐδὲν ἕτερον ηὐκαίρουν ἢ λέγειν τι ἢ ἀκούειν τι καινότερον. 17.22. σταθεὶς δὲ Παῦλος ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ Ἀρείου Πάγου ἔφη Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατὰ πάντα ὡς δεισιδαιμονεστέρους ὑμᾶς θεωρῶ· 17.23. διερχόμενος γὰρ καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν εὗρον καὶ βωμὸν ἐν ᾧ ἐπεγέγραπτο ΑΓΝΩΣΤΩ ΘΕΩ. ὃ οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτο ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν. 17.24. ὁ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντατὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὗτος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς ὑπάρχων κύριος οὐκ ἐν χειροποιήτοις ναοῖς κατοικεῖ 17.25. οὐδὲ ὑπὸ χειρῶν ἀνθρωπίνων θεραπεύεται προσδεόμενός τινος, αὐτὸςδιδοὺς πᾶσι ζωὴν καὶ πνοὴν καὶ τὰ πάντα· 17.26. ἐποίησέν τε ἐξ ἑνὸς πᾶν ἔθνος ανθρώπων κατοικεῖν ἐπὶ παντὸς προσώπου τῆς γῆς, ὁρίσας προστεταγμένους καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁροθεσίας τῆς κατοικίας αὐτῶν, 17.27. ζητεῖν τὸν θεὸν εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὕροιεν, καί γε οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἡμῶν ὑπάρχοντα. 17.28. ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, ὡς καί τινες τῶν καθʼ ὑμᾶς ποιητῶν εἰρήκασιν 18.12. Γαλλίωνος δὲ ἀνθυπάτου ὄντος τῆς Ἀχαίας κατεπέστησαν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι ὁμοθυμαδὸν τῷ Παύλῳ καὶ ἤγαγον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, 18.13. λέγοντες ὅτι Παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἀναπείθει οὗτος τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σέβεσθαι τὸν θεόν. 18.14. μέλλοντος δὲ τοῦ Παύλου ἀνοίγειν τὸ στόμα εἶπεν ὁ Γαλλίων πρὸς τοὺς Ἰουδαίους Εἰ μὲν ἦν ἀδίκημά τι ἢ ῥᾳδιούργημα πονηρόν, ὦ Ἰουδαῖοι, κατὰ λόγον ἂν ἀνεσχόμην ὑμῶν· 18.15. εἰ δὲ ζητήματά ἐστιν περὶ λόγου καὶ ὀνομάτων καὶ νόμου τοῦ καθʼ ὑμᾶς, ὄψεσθε αὐτοί· κριτὴς ἐγὼ τούτων οὐ βούλομαι εἶναι.' '. None | 17.16. Now while Paul waited for them at Athens, his spirit was provoked within him as he saw the city full of idols. 17.17. So he reasoned in the synagogue with Jews and the devout persons, and in the marketplace every day with those who met him. 17.18. Some of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers also encountered him. Some said, "What does this babbler want to say?"Others said, "He seems to be advocating foreign demons," because he preached Jesus and the resurrection. 17.19. They took hold of him, and brought him to the Areopagus, saying, "May we know what this new teaching is, which is spoken by you? 17.20. For you bring certain strange things to our ears. We want to know therefore what these things mean." 17.21. Now all the Athenians and the strangers living there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear some new thing. 17.22. Paul stood in the midst of the Areopagus, and said, "You men of Athens, I perceive that you are very religious in all things. ' "17.23. For as I passed along, and observed the objects of your worship, I found also an altar with this inscription: 'TO AN UNKNOWN GOD.' What therefore you worship in ignorance, this I announce to you. " '17.24. The God who made the world and all things in it, he, being Lord of heaven and earth, dwells not in temples made with hands, ' "17.25. neither is he served by men's hands, as though he needed anything, seeing he himself gives to all life and breath, and all things. " '17.26. He made from one blood every nation of men to dwell on all the surface of the earth, having determined appointed seasons, and the bounds of their habitation, 17.27. that they should seek the Lord, if perhaps they might reach out for him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us. ' "17.28. 'For in him we live, and move, and have our being.' As some of your own poets have said, 'For we are also his offspring.' " '17.29. Being then the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Divine Nature is like gold, or silver, or stone, engraved by art and device of man. 17.30. The times of ignorance therefore God overlooked. But now he commands that all men everywhere should repent, 17.31. because he has appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he has ordained; whereof he has given assurance to all men, in that he has raised him from the dead." 17.32. Now when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked; but others said, "We want to hear you yet again concerning this." 17.33. Thus Paul went out from among them. 17.34. But certain men joined with him, and believed, among whom also was Dionysius the Areopagite, and a woman named Damaris, and others with them.
18.12. But when Gallio was proconsul of Achaia, the Jews with one accord rose up against Paul and brought him before the judgment seat, 18.13. saying, "This man persuades men to worship God contrary to the law." 18.14. But when Paul was about to open his mouth, Gallio said to the Jews, "If indeed it were a matter of wrong or of wicked crime, Jews, it would be reasonable that I should bear with you; 18.15. but if they are questions about words and names and your own law, look to it yourselves. For I don\'t want to be a judge of these matters."' '. None |
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44. New Testament, Colossians, 2.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, Epicureans • Epicureans, • Epicureans/ Epicureanism • philosophy/philosophers, Epicurean
Found in books: Huttner (2013) 124; Rohmann (2016) 157; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 208; Černušková (2016) 334
2.8. Βλέπετε μή τις ὑμᾶς ἔσται ὁ συλαγωγῶν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οὐ κατὰ Χριστόν·''. None | 2.8. Be careful that you don't let anyone rob you through his philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the elements of the world, and not after Christ. "". None |
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45. New Testament, Ephesians, 4.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicurus and Epicureans
Found in books: Albrecht (2014) 316; Osborne (2001) 34
4.6. ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν.''. None | 4.6. one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in us all. ''. None |
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46. New Testament, Matthew, 7.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus/Epicurean/Epicureanism • philosophy/philosophers, Epicurean
Found in books: Edelmann-Singer et al (2020) 237; Černušková (2016) 334
7.7. Αἰτεῖτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· ζητεῖτε, καὶ εὑρήσετε· κρούετε, καὶ ἀνοιγήσεται ὑμῖν.''. None | 7.7. "Ask, and it will be given you. Seek, and you will find. Knock, and it will be opened for you. ''. None |
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47. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 6.6, 52.3-52.4, 66.47, 90.28, 94.51, 121.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, adaptability • Epicureanism, classification • Epicureanism, community • Epicureanism, pastoral care • Epicureanism, students, classes of • Epicureanism,education • Epicureans • Epicureans, Against fear of death • Epicureans, Epicureanism • Epicureans, hedonism • economics, Epicurean • economics, Epicurean, acceptable sources of income • oikeiōsis = Lat. commendatio or conciliatio, Epicurean version of
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 217; Jenkyns (2013) 230; Liatsi (2021) 195; Malherbe et al (2014) 232, 568, 714; Sattler (2021) 67; Sorabji (2000) 153, 248; Tsouni (2019) 92; Wardy and Warren (2018) 217; Yona (2018) 31
| 6.6. Cleanthes could not have been the express image of Zeno, if he had merely heard his lectures; he shared in his life, saw into his hidden purposes, and watched him to see whether he lived according to his own rules. Plato, Aristotle, and the whole throng of sages who were destined to go each his different way, derived more benefit from the character than from the words of Socrates. It was not the class-room of Epicurus, but living together under the same roof, that made great men of Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus. Therefore I summon you, not merely that you may derive benefit, but that you may confer benefit; for we can assist each other greatly. ' "
52.3. Epicurus1 remarks that certain men have worked their way to the truth without any one's assistance, carving out their own passage. And he gives special praise to these, for their impulse has come from within, and they have forged to the front by themselves. Again, he says, there are others who need outside help, who will not proceed unless someone leads the way, but who will follow faithfully. of these, he says, Metrodorus was one; this type of man is also excellent, but belongs to the second grade. We ourselves are not of that first class, either; we shall be well treated if we are admitted into the second. Nor need you despise a man who can gain salvation only with the assistance of another; the will to be saved means a great deal, too. " '52.4. You will find still another class of man, – and a class not to be despised, – who can be forced and driven into righteousness, who do not need a guide as much as they require someone to encourage and, as it were, to force them along. This is the third variety. If you ask me for a man of this pattern also, Epicurus tells us that Hermarchus was such. And of the two last-named classes, he is more ready to congratulate the one,2 but he feels more respect for the other; for although both reached the same goal, it is a greater credit to have brought about the same result with the more difficult material upon which to work.
66.47. I can show you at this moment in the writings of Epicurus18 a graded list of goods just like that of our own school. For there are some things, he declares, which he prefers should fall to his lot, such as bodily rest free from all inconvenience, and relaxation of the soul as it takes delight in the contemplation of its own goods. And there are other things which, though he would prefer that they did not happen, he nevertheless praises and approves, – for example, the kind of resignation, in times of ill-health and serious suffering, to which I alluded a moment ago, and which Epicurus displayed on that last and most blessed day of his life. For he tells us19 that he had to endure excruciating agony from a diseased bladder and from an ulcerated stomach, – so acute that it permitted no increase of pain; "and yet," he says, "that day was none the less happy." And no man can spend such a day in happiness unless he possesses the Supreme Good. ' "
90.28. But it is our vices that bring us to despair; for the second class of rational being, man, is of an inferior order, – a guardian, as it were, who is too unstable to hold fast to what is best, his judgment still wavering and uncertain. He may require the faculties of sight and hearing, good health, a bodily exterior that is not loathsome, and, besides, greater length of days conjoined with an unimpaired constitution.
90.28. She shows us what things are evil and what things are seemingly evil; she strips our minds of vain illusion. She bestows upon us a greatness which is substantial, but she represses the greatness which is inflated, and showy but filled with emptiness; and she does not permit us to be ignorant of the difference between what is great and what is but swollen; nay, she delivers to us the knowledge of the whole of nature and of her own nature. She discloses to us what the gods are and of what sort they are; what are the nether gods, the household deities, and the protecting spirits; what are the souls which have been endowed with lasting life and have been admitted to the second class of divinities,18 where is their abode and what their activities, powers, and will. Such are wisdom's rites of initiation, by means of which is unlocked, not a village shrine, but the vast temple of all the gods – the universe itself, whose true apparitions and true aspects she offers to the gaze of our minds. For the vision of our eyes is too dull for sights so great. " '
94.51. Moreover, if one awaits the time when one can know of oneself what the best line of action is, one will sometimes go astray and by going astray will be hindered from arriving at the point where it is possible to be content with oneself. The soul should accordingly be guided at the very moment when it is becoming able to guide itself.25 Boys study according to direction. Their fingers are held and guided by others so that they may follow the outlines of the letters; next, they are ordered to imitate a copy and base thereon a style of penmanship. Similarly, the mind is helped if it is taught according to direction.
94.51. Then comes the second problem, – how to deal with men. What is our purpose? What precepts do we offer? Should we bid them refrain from bloodshed? What a little thing it is not to harm one whom you ought to help! It is indeed worthy of great praise, when man treats man with kindness! Shall we advise stretching forth the hand to the shipwrecked sailor, or pointing out the way to the wanderer, or sharing a crust with the starving? Yes, if I can only tell you first everything which ought to be afforded or withheld; meantime, I can lay down for mankind a rule, in short compass, for our duties in human relationships:
121.16. The periods of infancy, boyhood, youth, and old age, are different; but I, who have been infant, boy, and youth, am still the same. Thus, although each has at different times a different constitution, the adaptation of each to its constitution is the same. For nature does not consign boyhood or youth, or old age, to me; it consigns me to them. Therefore, the child is adapted to that constitution which is his at the present moment of childhood, not to that which will be his in youth. For even if there is in store for him any higher phase into which he must be changed, the state in which he is born is also according to nature. ''. None |
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48. Tacitus, Annals, 6.22 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans
Found in books: Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 618; Frede and Laks (2001) 245
6.22. Sed mihi haec ac talia audienti in incerto iudicium est fatone res mortalium et necessitate immutabili an forte volvantur. quippe sapientissimos veterum quique sectam eorum aemulantur diversos reperies, ac multis insitam opinionem non initia nostri, non finem, non denique homines dis curae; ideo creberrime tristia in bonos, laeta apud deteriores esse. contra alii fatum quidem congruere rebus putant, sed non e vagis stellis, verum apud principia et nexus naturalium causarum; ac tamen electionem vitae nobis relinquunt, quam ubi elegeris, certum imminentium ordinem. neque mala vel bona quae vulgus putet: multos qui conflictari adversis videantur beatos, at plerosque quamquam magnas per opes miserrimos, si illi gravem fortunam constanter tolerent, hi prospera inconsulte utantur. ceterum plurimis mortalium non eximitur quin primo cuiusque ortu ventura destinentur, sed quaedam secus quam dicta sint cadere fallaciis ignara dicentium: ita corrumpi fidem artis cuius clara documenta et antiqua aetas et nostra tulerit. quippe a filio eiusdem Thrasulli praedictum Neronis imperium in tempore memorabitur, ne nunc incepto longius abierim.''. None | 6.22. \xa0For myself, when I\xa0listen to this and similar narratives, my judgement wavers. Is the revolution of human things governed by fate and changeless necessity, or by accident? You will find the wisest of the ancients, and the disciplines attached to their tenets, at complete variance; in many of them a fixed belief that Heaven concerns itself neither with our origins, nor with our ending, nor, in fine, with mankind, and that so adversity continually assails the good, while prosperity dwells among the evil. Others hold, on the contrary, that, though there is certainly a fate in harmony with events, it does not emanate from wandering stars, but must be sought in the principles and processes of natural causation. Still, they leave us free to choose our life: that choice made, however, the order of the future is certain. Nor, they maintain, are evil and good what the crowd imagines: many who appear to be the sport of adverse circumstances are happy; numbers are wholly wretched though in the midst of great possessions â\x80\x94 provided only that the former endure the strokes of fortune with firmness, while the latter employ her favours with unwisdom. With most men, however, the faith is ineradicable that the future of an individual is ordained at the moment of his entry into life; but at times a prophecy is falsified by the event, through the dishonesty of the prophet who speaks he knows not what; and thus is debased the credit of an art, of which the most striking evidences have been furnished both in the ancient world and in our own. For the forecast of Nero's reign, made by the son of this very Thrasyllus, shall be related at its fitting place: at present I\xa0do not care to stray too far from my theme. <"". None |
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49. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans • Epicureans, Freedom from disturbance (ataraxia)
Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 182; Wolfsdorf (2020) 684
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50. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, Epicureanism • Epicureans, and food • Epicureans, as letter writers • Partition of soul, Epicurean bipartition of soul
Found in books: Gordon (2012) 7, 86; Gunderson (2022) 114; Inwood and Warren (2020) 108
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51. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureans, hedonism • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans • god, gods, Epicurean • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 208, 210; Erler et al (2021) 214; Long (2019) 76; Wardy and Warren (2018) 208, 210
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52. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, Garden • Epicureans, hedonism • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 202, 203, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 220; Wardy and Warren (2018) 202, 203, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 220
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53. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, ethics of • Epicureans , criticising Socrates • Epicureans, and food • Epicureans, as chefs • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicureans, language of • Socrates, Epicurean critique of • death, Epicureanism • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 171; Bryan (2018) 206, 218; Gordon (2012) 27; Long (2006) 187; Long (2019) 130; Wardy and Warren (2018) 206, 218
| 187e. The reason why he has traduced the young men may be seen in Plato himself. In the case of Alcibiades, he says in the dialogue named from him that he did not begin to have converse with Socrates until he had passed out of his early bloom, when all who lusted for his body had deserted him. He tells us this at the beginning of the dialogue. The contradictory things which he says in the case of Charmides may be learned from the dialogue itself by anyone who wishes. For he represents him inconsistently' '. None |
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54. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.27, 2.14.2-2.14.4, 2.14.6, 3.24.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean • Epicureanism, Epicureans • Epicureanism, as school or sect • Epicureanism, heresy assimilated to • Epicurus and Epicureans
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 83, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122; Lampe (2003) 256; Osborne (2001) 34, 85; Rohmann (2016) 160
| 2.14.2. And not only are they convicted of bringing forward, as if their own original ideas, those things which are to be found among the comic poets, but they also bring together the things which have been said by all those who were ignorant of God, and who are termed philosophers; and sewing together, as it were, a motley garment out of a heap of miserable rags, they have, by their subtle manner of expression, furnished themselves with a cloak which is really not their own. They do, it is true, introduce a new kind of doctrine, inasmuch as by a new sort of art it has been substituted for the old. Yet it is in reality both old and useless, since these very opinions have been sewed together out of ancient dogmas redolent of ignorance and irreligion. For instance, Thales of Miletus affirmed that water was the generative and initial principle of all things. Now it is just the same thing whether we say water or Bythus. The poet Homer, again, held the opinion that Oceanus, along with mother Tethys, was the origin of the gods: this idea these men have transferred to Bythus and Sige. Anaximander laid it down that infinitude is the first principle of all things, having seminally in itself the generation of them all, and from this he declares the immense worlds which exist were formed: this, too, they have dressed up anew, and referred to Bythus and their AEons. Anaxagoras, again, who has also been surnamed "Atheist," gave it as his opinion that animals were formed from seeds falling down from heaven upon earth. This thought, too, these men have transferred to "the seed" of their Mother, which they maintain to be themselves; thus acknowledging at once, in the judgment of such as are possessed of sense, that they themselves are the offspring of the irreligious Anaxagoras. 2.14.3. Again, adopting the ideas of shade and vacuity from Democritus and Epicurus, they have fitted these to their own views, following upon those teachers who had already talked a great deal about a vacuum and atoms, the one of which they called that which is, and the other that which is not. In like manner, these men call those things which are within the Pleroma real existences, just as those philosophers did the atoms; while they maintain that those which are without the Pleroma have no true existence, even as those did respecting the vacuum. They have thus banished themselves in this world (since they are here outside of the Pleroma) into a place which has no existence. Again, when they maintain that these things below are images of those which have a true existence above, they again most manifestly rehearse the doctrine of Democritus and Plato. For Democritus was the first who maintained that numerous and diverse figures were stamped, as it were, with the forms of things above, and descended from universal space into this world. But Plato, for his part, speaks of matter, and exemplar, and God. These men, following those distinctions, have styled what he calls ideas, and exemplar, the images of those things which are above; while, through a mere change of name, they boast themselves as being discoverers and contrivers of this kind of imaginary fiction. 2.14.4. This opinion, too, that they hold the Creator formed the world out of previously existing matter, both Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato expressed before them; as, forsooth, we learn they also do under the inspiration of their Mother. Then again, as to the opinion that everything of necessity passes away to those things out of which they maintain it was also formed, and that God is the slave of this necessity, so that He cannot impart immortality to what is mortal, or bestow incorruption on what is corruptible, but every one passes into a substance similar in nature to itself, both those who are named Stoics from the portico (stoa), and indeed all that are ignorant of God, poets and historians alike, make the same affirmation. Those heretics who hold the same system of infidelity have ascribed, no doubt, their own proper region to spiritual beings,--that, namely, which is within the Pleroma, but to animal beings the intermediate space, while to corporeal they assign that which is material. And they assert that God Himself can do no otherwise, but that every one of the different kinds of substance mentioned passes away to those things which are of the same nature.
3.24.2. Alienated thus from the truth, they do deservedly wallow in all error, tossed to and fro by it, thinking differently in regard to the same things at different times, and never attaining to a well- grounded knowledge, being more anxious to be sophists of words than disciples of the truth. For they have not been founded upon the one rock, but upon the sand, which has in itself a multitude of stones. Wherefore they also imagine many gods, and they always have the excuse of searching after truth (for they are blind), but never succeed in finding it. For they blaspheme the Creator, Him who is truly God, who also furnishes power to find the truth; imagining that they have discovered another god beyond God, or another Pleroma, or another dispensation. Wherefore also the light which is from God does not illumine them, because they have dishonoured and despised God, holding Him of small account, because, through His love and infinite benignity, He has come within reach of human knowledge (knowledge, however, not with regard to His greatness, or with regard to His essence--for that has no man measured or handled--but after this sort: that we should know that He who made, and formed, and breathed in them the breath of life, and nourishes us by means of the creation, establishing all things by His Word, and binding them together by His Wisdom--this is He who is the only true God); but they dream of a non-existent being above Him, that they may be regarded as having found out the great God, whom nobody, they hold, can recognise holding communication with the human race, or as directing mundane matters: that is to say, they find out the god of Epicurus, who does nothing either for himself or others; that is, he exercises no providence at all.' '. None |
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55. Justin, First Apology, 44, 57 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean • Epicureanism, Epicureans
Found in books: Lampe (2003) 262, 423; Rohmann (2016) 160
| 44. And the holy Spirit of prophecy taught us this, telling us by Moses that God spoke thus to the man first created: Behold, before your face are good and evil: choose the good. And again, by the other prophet Isaiah, that the following utterance was made as if from God the Father and Lord of all: Wash you, make you clean; put away evils from your souls; learn to do well; judge the orphan, and plead for the widow: and come and let us reason together, says the Lord: And if your sins be as scarlet, I will make them white as wool; and if they be red like as crimson, I will make them white as snow. And if you be willing and obey Me, you shall eat the good of the land; but if you do not obey Me, the sword shall devour you: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it. Isaiah 1:16, etc. And that expression, The sword shall devour you, does not mean that the disobedient shall be slain by the sword, but the sword of God is fire, of which they who choose to do wickedly become the fuel. Wherefore He says, The sword shall devour you: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it. And if He had spoken concerning a sword that cuts and at once dispatches, He would not have said, shall devour. And so, too, Plato, when he says, The blame is his who chooses, and God is blameless, took this from the prophet Moses and uttered it. For Moses is more ancient than all the Greek writers. And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they are charged with not accurately understanding the truth when they assert contradictories. So that what we say about future events being foretold, we do not say it as if they came about by a fatal necessity; but God foreknowing all that shall be done by all men, and it being His decree that the future actions of men shall all be recompensed according to their several value, He foretells by the Spirit of prophecy that He will bestow meet rewards according to the merit of the actions done, always urging the human race to effort and recollection, showing that He cares and provides for men. But by the agency of the devils death has been decreed against those who read the books of Hystaspes, or of the Sibyl, or of the prophets, that through fear they may prevent men who read them from receiving the knowledge of the good, and may retain them in slavery to themselves; which, however, they could not always effect. For not only do we fearlessly read them, but, as you see, bring them for your inspection, knowing that their contents will be pleasing to all. And if we persuade even a few, our gain will be very great; for, as good husbandmen, we shall receive the reward from the Master. '
57. Nor can the devils persuade men that there will be no conflagration for the punishment of the wicked; as they were unable to effect that Christ should be hidden after He came. But this only can they effect, that they who live irrationally, and were brought up licentiously in wicked customs, and are prejudiced in their own opinions, should kill and hate us; whom we not only do not hate, but, as is proved, pity and endeavour to lead to repentance. For we do not fear death, since it is acknowledged we must surely die; and there is nothing new, but all things continue the same in this administration of things; and if satiety overtakes those who enjoy even one year of these things, they ought to give heed to our doctrines, that they may live eternally free both from suffering and from want. But if they believe that there is nothing after death, but declare that those who die pass into insensibility, then they become our benefactors when they set us free from sufferings and necessities of this life, and prove themselves to be wicked, and inhuman, and bigoted. For they kill us with no intention of delivering us, but cut us off that we may be deprived of life and pleasure. '. None |
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56. Justin, Dialogue With Trypho, 2.1-2.2, 2.4, 2.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean • Epicureanism, as school or sect
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 42, 43; Lampe (2003) 262, 423
| 2.1. Justin: I will tell you what seems to me; for philosophy is, in fact, the greatest possession, and most honourable before God, to whom it leads us and alone commends us; and these are truly holy men who have bestowed attention on philosophy. What philosophy is, however, and the reason why it has been sent down to men, have escaped the observation of most; for there would be neither Platonists, nor Stoics, nor Peripatetics, nor Theoretics, nor Pythagoreans, this knowledge being one. I wish to tell you why it has become many-headed. It has happened that those who first handled it i.e., philosophy, and who were therefore esteemed illustrious men, were succeeded by those who made no investigations concerning truth, but only admired the perseverance and self-discipline of the former, as well as the novelty of the doctrines; and each thought that to be true which he learned from his teacher: then, moreover, those latter persons handed down to their successors such things, and others similar to them; and this system was called by the name of him who was styled the father of the doctrine. Being at first desirous of personally conversing with one of these men, I surrendered myself to a certain Stoic; and having spent a considerable time with him, when I had not acquired any further knowledge of God (for he did not know himself, and said such instruction was unnecessary), I left him and betook myself to another, who was called a Peripatetic, and as he fancied, shrewd. And this man, after having entertained me for the first few days, requested me to settle the fee, in order that our intercourse might not be unprofitable. Him, too, for this reason I abandoned, believing him to be no philosopher at all. But when my soul was eagerly desirous to hear the peculiar and choice philosophy, I came to a Pythagorean, very celebrated - a man who thought much of his own wisdom. And then, when I had an interview with him, willing to become his hearer and disciple, he said, 'What then? Are you acquainted with music, astronomy, and geometry? Do you expect to perceive any of those things which conduce to a happy life, if you have not been first informed on those points which wean the soul from sensible objects, and render it fitted for objects which appertain to the mind, so that it can contemplate that which is honourable in its essence and that which is good in its essence?' Having commended many of these branches of learning, and telling me that they were necessary, he dismissed me when I confessed to him my ignorance. Accordingly I took it rather impatiently, as was to be expected when I failed in my hope, the more so because I deemed the man had some knowledge; but reflecting again on the space of time during which I would have to linger over those branches of learning, I was not able to endure longer procrastination. In my helpless condition it occurred to me to have a meeting with the Platonists, for their fame was great. I thereupon spent as much of my time as possible with one who had lately settled in our city, - a sagacious man, holding a high position among the Platonists - and I progressed, and made the greatest improvements daily. And the perception of immaterial things quite overpowered me, and the contemplation of ideas furnished my mind with wings, so that in a little while I supposed that I had become wise; and such was my stupidity, I expected immediately to look upon God, for this is the end of Plato's philosophy. " "
2.6. Justin: I will tell you what seems to me; for philosophy is, in fact, the greatest possession, and most honourable before God, to whom it leads us and alone commends us; and these are truly holy men who have bestowed attention on philosophy. What philosophy is, however, and the reason why it has been sent down to men, have escaped the observation of most; for there would be neither Platonists, nor Stoics, nor Peripatetics, nor Theoretics, nor Pythagoreans, this knowledge being one. I wish to tell you why it has become many-headed. It has happened that those who first handled it i.e., philosophy, and who were therefore esteemed illustrious men, were succeeded by those who made no investigations concerning truth, but only admired the perseverance and self-discipline of the former, as well as the novelty of the doctrines; and each thought that to be true which he learned from his teacher: then, moreover, those latter persons handed down to their successors such things, and others similar to them; and this system was called by the name of him who was styled the father of the doctrine. Being at first desirous of personally conversing with one of these men, I surrendered myself to a certain Stoic; and having spent a considerable time with him, when I had not acquired any further knowledge of God (for he did not know himself, and said such instruction was unnecessary), I left him and betook myself to another, who was called a Peripatetic, and as he fancied, shrewd. And this man, after having entertained me for the first few days, requested me to settle the fee, in order that our intercourse might not be unprofitable. Him, too, for this reason I abandoned, believing him to be no philosopher at all. But when my soul was eagerly desirous to hear the peculiar and choice philosophy, I came to a Pythagorean, very celebrated - a man who thought much of his own wisdom. And then, when I had an interview with him, willing to become his hearer and disciple, he said, 'What then? Are you acquainted with music, astronomy, and geometry? Do you expect to perceive any of those things which conduce to a happy life, if you have not been first informed on those points which wean the soul from sensible objects, and render it fitted for objects which appertain to the mind, so that it can contemplate that which is honourable in its essence and that which is good in its essence?' Having commended many of these branches of learning, and telling me that they were necessary, he dismissed me when I confessed to him my ignorance. Accordingly I took it rather impatiently, as was to be expected when I failed in my hope, the more so because I deemed the man had some knowledge; but reflecting again on the space of time during which I would have to linger over those branches of learning, I was not able to endure longer procrastination. In my helpless condition it occurred to me to have a meeting with the Platonists, for their fame was great. I thereupon spent as much of my time as possible with one who had lately settled in our city, - a sagacious man, holding a high position among the Platonists - and I progressed, and made the greatest improvements daily. And the perception of immaterial things quite overpowered me, and the contemplation of ideas furnished my mind with wings, so that in a little while I supposed that I had become wise; and such was my stupidity, I expected immediately to look upon God, for this is the end of Plato's philosophy. "". None |
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57. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicurus and Epicureanism
Found in books: Long (2006) 117, 121; Tor (2017) 46
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58. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, accusations against • Epicureanism, atheism • Epicureanism, attacks against • Epicureans • Epicureans, Freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) • Philodemus, Epicurean • atheism, accusations against, Epicureans
Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 762; Sorabji (2000) 46, 182
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59. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean • Epicurus , epicureanism
Found in books: Lampe (2003) 426; Waldner et al (2016) 69, 74
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60. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Partition of soul, Epicurean bipartition of soul • Senses, Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of the senses
Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 104; Nuno et al (2021) 9
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61. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean • Epicureanism, Epicureans • Epicureans/ Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicurean/Epicureanism
Found in books: Edelmann-Singer et al (2020) 237; Lampe (2003) 255, 256; Rohmann (2016) 161, 283; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 208
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62. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureans
Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 229; Lloyd (1989) 31
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63. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, as school or sect • Epicureanism, heresy assimilated to • Epicureans • Epicureans, • Epicureans, Garden • Epicureans, hedonism • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 277, 278, 297; Bryan (2018) 208, 209; Huttner (2013) 124; Osborne (2010) 202; Wardy and Warren (2018) 208, 209
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64. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, hedonism • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 204, 206; Wardy and Warren (2018) 204, 206
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65. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Athens, Epicurus, Epicureans • philosophers, Epicurean
Found in books: Breytenbach and Tzavella (2022) 83; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 612
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66. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 1.21, 2.88, 5.58, 6.22, 7.4, 7.38, 7.40-7.41, 7.127, 7.134, 7.136, 7.139-7.140, 7.142, 7.148-7.150, 7.160-7.167, 10.3, 10.5-10.7, 10.9, 10.11, 10.13, 10.16-10.22, 10.24, 10.27, 10.32, 10.117, 10.119-10.120, 10.122-10.136, 10.139 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Attention, Epicurean therapy distracts attention • Damis, Epicurean • Death, Epicurean view • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, Corinth • Epicureanism, Menander • Epicureanism, Sardanapalus • Epicureanism, as school or sect • Epicureanism, associated with flattery • Epicureanism, attacks against • Epicureanism, ethics of • Epicureanism, gods mercy • Epicureanism, heresy assimilated to • Epicureanism, pleasure • Epicureanism, self-definition • Epicureanism, theology of • Epicureans • Epicureans , criticising Socrates • Epicureans, Garden • Epicureans, Marriage only in special circumstances • Epicureans, Selective emotion • Epicureans, allegedly effeminate • Epicureans, and food • Epicureans, as letter writers • Epicureans, authority of Epicurus • Epicureans, chance • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicureans, illnesses of • Epicureans, language of • Epicureans, pleasure • Epicureans/ Epicureanism • Epicurus and Epicureans • Epicurus, Epicurean • Epicurus, Epicurean philosophy • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Epicurus/Epicureanism, love and sex • Epicurus/Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on free movement (ἐλευθέρα κείνησις) • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on up to us (παρ’ ἡμῖν) • Lucretius, Epicurean, Erotic love discouraged • Lucretius, Epicurean, marriage is only for procreation • Musonius some level of equality required, Epicureans, wise man will marry only in special circumstances • Philodemus, Epicurean, On frank criticism • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans • Socrates, Epicurean critique of • Velleius, Epicurean philosopher • Vesuvius, eruption of ( ad, virtue(s), Epicurean concept of • cult, Epicurean • death, Epicureanism • economics, Epicurean • economics, Epicurean, acceptable sources of income • economics, Epicurean, and pleasure/pain • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of • friendship, Epicurean understandings • god, gods, Epicurean • gods, location in Epicureanism • oikeiōsis = Lat. commendatio or conciliatio, Epicurean version of • pangs in Epicureanism • pleasure (ἡδονή), in Epicureanism • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Athanassaki and Titchener (2022) 299; Ayres and Ward (2021) 156, 188, 189; Bett (2019) 62, 192; Boulluec (2022) 38, 329; Brouwer (2013) 170; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 6, 35; Bryan (2018) 202, 206, 209, 210, 216, 217, 218, 221, 242, 243; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 474, 476; Esler (2000) 63; Gale (2000) 90, 153; Geljon and Runia (2019) 256; Gordon (2012) 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 82, 83, 84, 88, 151, 179; Inwood and Warren (2020) 11; König (2012) 238; Lloyd (1989) 31; Long (2006) 191; Long (2019) 74, 118, 119, 138, 139; Mackey (2022) 212; Malherbe et al (2014) 48, 150; Osborne (2001) 144; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021) 635; Simmons(1995) 139, 140, 142, 252; Sorabji (2000) 196, 201, 233, 283; Stanton (2021) 164, 256; Struck (2016) 184; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 231; Tsouni (2019) 92; Wardy and Warren (2018) 202, 206, 209, 210, 216, 217, 218, 221, 230, 242, 243; Williams and Vol (2022) 68, 191; Wilson (2022) 33; Wolfsdorf (2020) 404; Xinyue (2022) 47; Yona (2018) 27, 30, 33, 38, 45, 54, 165
| 2.88. Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceed from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good.
5.58. 3. STRATOHis successor in the school was Strato, the son of Arcesilaus, a native of Lampsacus, whom he mentioned in his will; a distinguished man who is generally known as the physicist, because more than anyone else he devoted himself to the most careful study of nature. Moreover, he taught Ptolemy Philadelphus and received, it is said, 80 talents from him. According to Apollodorus in his Chronology he became head of the school in the 123rd Olympiad, and continued to preside over it for eighteen years.
6.22. Through watching a mouse running about, says Theophrastus in the Megarian dialogue, not looking for a place to lie down in, not afraid of the dark, not seeking any of the things which are considered to be dainties, he discovered the means of adapting himself to circumstances. He was the first, say some, to fold his cloak because he was obliged to sleep in it as well, and he carried a wallet to hold his victuals, and he used any place for any purpose, for breakfasting, sleeping, or conversing. And then he would say, pointing to the Stoa of Zeus and the Pompeion, that the Athenians had provided him with places to live in.' "
7.4. For a certain space, then, he was instructed by Crates, and when at this time he had written his Republic, some said in jest that he had written it on Cynosura, i.e. on the dog's tail. Besides the Republic he wrote the following works:of Life according to Nature.of Impulse, or Human Nature.of Emotions.of Duty.of Law.of Greek Education.of Vision.of the Whole World.of Signs.Pythagorean Questions.Universals.of Varieties of Style.Homeric Problems, in five books.of the Reading of Poetry.There are also by him:A Handbook of Rhetoric.Solutions.Two books of Refutations.Recollections of Crates.Ethics.This is a list of his writings. But at last he left Crates, and the men above mentioned were his masters for twenty years. Hence he is reported to have said, I made a prosperous voyage when I suffered shipwreck. But others attribute this saying of his to the time when he was under Crates." '
7.38. And furthermore the following according to Hippobotus were pupils of Zeno: Philonides of Thebes; Callippus of Corinth; Posidonius of Alexandria; Athenodorus of Soli; and Zeno of Sidon.I have decided to give a general account of all the Stoic doctrines in the life of Zeno because he was the founder of the School. I have already given a list of his numerous writings, in which he has spoken as has no other of the Stoics. And his tenets in general are as follows. In accordance with my usual practice a summary statement must suffice.
7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus.
7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions.
7.127. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues, and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods:
7.134. They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter. This doctrine is laid down by Zeno of Citium in his treatise On Existence, Cleanthes in his work On Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics towards the end, Archedemus in his treatise On Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Exposition. There is a difference, according to them, between principles and elements; the former being without generation or destruction, whereas the elements are destroyed when all things are resolved into fire. Moreover, the principles are incorporeal and destitute of form, while the elements have been endowed with form.
7.136. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and by Archedemus in a work On Elements. An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved.
7.139. For through some parts it passes as a hold or containing force, as is the case with our bones and sinews; while through others it passes as intelligence, as in the ruling part of the soul. Thus, then, the whole world is a living being, endowed with soul and reason, and having aether for its ruling principle: so says Antipater of Tyre in the eighth book of his treatise On the Cosmos. Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Providence and Posidonius in his book On the Gods say that the heaven, but Cleanthes that the sun, is the ruling power of the world. Chrysippus, however, in the course of the same work gives a somewhat different account, namely, that it is the purer part of the aether; the same which they declare to be preeminently God and always to have, as it were in sensible fashion, pervaded all that is in the air, all animals and plants, and also the earth itself, as a principle of cohesion. 7.140. The world, they say, is one and finite, having a spherical shape, such a shape being the most suitable for motion, as Posidonius says in the fifth book of his Physical Discourse and the disciples of Antipater in their works on the Cosmos. Outside of the world is diffused the infinite void, which is incorporeal. By incorporeal is meant that which, though capable of being occupied by body, is not so occupied. The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united whole. This is a necessary result of the sympathy and tension which binds together things in heaven and earth. Chrysippus discusses the void in his work On Void and in the first book of his Physical Sciences; so too Apollophanes in his Physics, Apollodorus, and Posidonius in his Physical Discourse, book ii. But these, it is added i.e. sympathy and tension, are likewise bodies.
7.142. The world, they hold, comes into being when its substance has first been converted from fire through air into moisture and then the coarser part of the moisture has condensed as earth, while that whose particles are fine has been turned into air, and this process of rarefaction goes on increasing till it generates fire. Thereupon out of these elements animals and plants and all other natural kinds are formed by their mixture. The generation and the destruction of the world are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, by Posidonius in the first book of his work On the Cosmos, by Cleanthes, and by Antipater in his tenth book On the Cosmos. Panaetius, however, maintained that the world is indestructible.The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius.
7.148. The substance of God is declared by Zeno to be the whole world and the heaven, as well as by Chrysippus in his first book of the Gods, and by Posidonius in his first book with the same title. Again, Antipater in the seventh book of his work On the Cosmos says that the substance of God is akin to air, while Boethus in his work On Nature speaks of the sphere of the fixed stars as the substance of God. Now the term Nature is used by them to mean sometimes that which holds the world together, sometimes that which causes terrestrial things to spring up. Nature is defined as a force moving of itself, producing and preserving in being its offspring in accordance with seminal principles within definite periods, and effecting results homogeneous with their sources. 7.149. Nature, they hold, aims both at utility and at pleasure, as is clear from the analogy of human craftsmanship. That all things happen by fate or destiny is maintained by Chrysippus in his treatise De fato, by Posidonius in his De fato, book ii., by Zeno and by Boethus in his De fato, book i. Fate is defined as an endless chain of causation, whereby things are, or as the reason or formula by which the world goes on. What is more, they say that divination in all its forms is a real and substantial fact, if there is really Providence. And they prove it to be actually a science on the evidence of certain results: so Zeno, Chrysippus in the second book of his De divinatione, Athenodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Discourse and the fifth book of his De divinatione. But Panaetius denies that divination has any real existence. 7.150. The primary matter they make the substratum of all things: so Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and Zeno. By matter is meant that out of which anything whatsoever is produced. Both substance and matter are terms used in a twofold sense according as they signify (1) universal or (2) particular substance or matter. The former neither increases nor diminishes, while the matter of particular things both increases and diminishes. Body according to them is substance which is finite: so Antipater in his second book On Substance, and Apollodorus in his Physics. Matter can also be acted upon, as the same author says, for if it were immutable, the things which are produced would never have been produced out of it. Hence the further doctrine that matter is divisible ad infinitum. Chrysippus says that the division is not ad infinitum, but itself infinite; for there is nothing infinitely small to which the division can extend. But nevertheless the division goes on without ceasing.
7.160. 2. ARISTONAriston the Bald, of Chios, who was also called the Siren, declared the end of action to be a life of perfect indifference to everything which is neither virtue nor vice; recognizing no distinction whatever in things indifferent, but treating them all alike. The wise man he compared to a good actor, who, if called upon to take the part of a Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate them both becomingly. He wished to discard both Logic and Physics, saying that Physics was beyond our reach and Logic did not concern us: all that did concern us was Ethics.' "7.161. Dialectical reasonings, he said, are like spiders' webs, which, though they seem to display some artistic workmanship, are yet of no use. He would not admit a plurality of virtues with Zeno, nor again with the Megarians one single virtue called by many names; but he treated virtue in accordance with the category of relative modes. Teaching this sort of philosophy, and lecturing in the Cynosarges, he acquired such influence as to be called the founder of a sect. At any rate Miltiades and Diphilus were denominated Aristoneans. He was a plausible speaker and suited the taste of the general public. Hence Timon's verse about him:One who from wily Ariston's line boasts his descent." "7.162. After meeting Polemo, says Diocles of Magnesia, while Zeno was suffering from a protracted illness, he recanted his views. The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses." "7.163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you? and when the other answered No, he rejoined,Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?The books attributed to him are as follows:Exhortations, two books.of Zeno's Doctrines.Dialogues.Lectures, six books.Dissertations on Philosophy, seven books.Dissertations on Love.Commonplaces on Vainglory.Notebooks, twenty-five volumes.Memorabilia, three books.Anecdotes, eleven books.Against the Rhetoricians.An Answer to the Counter-pleas of Alexinus.Against the Dialecticians, three books.Letters to Cleanthes, four books.Panaetius and Sosicrates consider the Letters to be alone genuine; all the other works named they attribute to Ariston the Peripatetic." '7.164. The story goes that being bald he had a sunstroke and so came to his end. I have composed a trifling poem upon him in limping iambics as follows:Wherefore, Ariston, when old and bald did you let the sun roast your forehead? Thus seeking warmth more than was reasonable, you lit unwillingly upon the chill reality of Death.There was also another Ariston, a native of Iulis; a third, a musician of Athens; a fourth, a tragic poet; a fifth, of Halae, author of treatises on rhetoric; a sixth, a Peripatetic philosopher of Alexandria. 7.165. 3. HERILLUSHerillus of Carthage declared the end of action to be Knowledge, that is, so to live always as to make the scientific life the standard in all things and not to be misled by ignorance. Knowledge he defined as a habit of mind, not to be upset by argument, in the acceptance of presentations. Sometimes he used to say there was no single end of action, but it shifted according to varying circumstances and objects, as the same bronze might become a statue either of Alexander or of Socrates. He made a distinction between end-in-chief and subordinate end: even the unwise may aim at the latter, but only the wise seek the true end of life. Everything that lies between virtue and vice he pronounced indifferent. His writings, though they do not occupy much space, are full of vigour and contain some controversial passages in reply to Zeno. 7.166. He is said to have had many admirers when a boy; and as Zeno wished to drive them away, he compelled Herillus to have his head shaved, which disgusted them.His books are the following:of Training.of the Passions.Concerning Opinion or Belief.The Legislator.The Obstetrician.The Challenger.The Teacher.The Reviser.The Controller.Hermes.Medea.Dialogues.Ethical Themes. 7.167. 4. DIONYSIUSDionysiusDionysius, the Renegade, declared that pleasure was the end of action; this under the trying circumstance of an attack of ophthalmia. For so violent was his suffering that he could not bring himself to call pain a thing indifferent.He was the son of Theophantus and a native of Heraclea. At first, as Diocles relates, he was a pupil of his fellow-townsman, Heraclides, next of Alexinus and Menedemus, and lastly of Zeno. At the outset of his career he was fond of literature and tried his hand at all kinds of poetry; afterwards he took Aratus for his model, whom he strove to imitate. When he fell away from Zeno, he went over to the Cyrenaics, and used to frequent houses of ill fame and indulge in all other excesses without disguise. After living till he was nearly eighty years of age, he committed suicide by starving himself.The following works are attributed to him:of Apathy, two booksOn Training, two books.of Pleasure, four books.of Wealth, Popularity and RevengeHow to live amongst Men.of Prosperity.of Ancient Kings.of those who are Praised.of the Customs of Barbarians.These three, then, are the heterodox Stoics. The legitimate successor to Zeno, however, was Cleanthes: of whom we have now to speak.' "
10.3. Hence the point of Timon's allusion in the lines:Again there is the latest and most shameless of the physicists, the schoolmaster's son from Samos, himself the most uneducated of mortals.At his instigation his three brothers, Neocles, Chaeredemus, and Aristobulus, joined in his studies, according to Philodemus the Epicurean in the tenth book of his comprehensive work On Philosophers; furthermore his slave named Mys, as stated by Myronianus in his Historical Parallels. Diotimus the Stoic, who is hostile to him, has assailed him with bitter slanders, adducing fifty scandalous letters as written by Epicurus; and so too did the author who ascribed to Epicurus the epistles commonly attributed to Chrysippus." "
10.5. Furthermore that he extolled Idomeneus, Herodotus, and Timocrates, who had published his esoteric doctrines, and flattered them for that very reason. Also that in his letters he wrote to Leontion, O Lord Apollo, my dear little Leontion, with what tumultuous applause we were inspired as we read your letter. Then again to Themista, the wife of Leonteus: I am quite ready, if you do not come to see me, to spin thrice on my own axis and be propelled to any place that you, including Themista, agree upon; and to the beautiful Pythocles he writes: I will sit down and await thy divine advent, my heart's desire. And, as Theodorus says in the fourth book of his work, Against Epicurus, in another letter to Themista he thinks he preaches to her." '10.6. It is added that he corresponded with many courtesans, and especially with Leontion, of whom Metrodorus also was enamoured. It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these terms: I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form. And in his letter to Pythocles: Hoist all sail, my dear boy, and steer clear of all culture. Epictetus calls him preacher of effeminacy and showers abuse on him.Again there was Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who was his disciple and then left the school. He in the book entitled Merriment asserts that Epicurus vomited twice a day from over-indulgence, and goes on to say that he himself had much ado to escape from those notorious midnight philosophizings and the confraternity with all its secrets;' "10.7. further, that Epicurus's acquaintance with philosophy was small and his acquaintance with life even smaller; that his bodily health was pitiful, so much so that for many years he was unable to rise from his chair; and that he spent a whole mina daily on his table, as he himself says in his letter to Leontion and in that to the philosophers at Mitylene. Also that among other courtesans who consorted with him and Metrodorus were Mammarion and Hedia and Erotion and Nikidion. He alleges too that in his thirty-seven books On Nature Epicurus uses much repetition and writes largely in sheer opposition to others, especially to Nausiphanes, and here are his own words: Nay, let them go hang: for, when labouring with an idea, he too had the sophist's off-hand boastfulness like many another servile soul;" "
10.9. But these people are stark mad. For our philosopher has abundance of witnesses to attest his unsurpassed goodwill to all men – his native land, which honoured him with statues in bronze; his friends, so many in number that they could hardly be counted by whole cities, and indeed all who knew him, held fast as they were by the siren-charms of his doctrine, save Metrodorus of Stratonicea, who went over to Carneades, being perhaps burdened by his master's excessive goodness; the School itself which, while nearly all the others have died out, continues for ever without interruption through numberless reigns of one scholarch after another;" '
10.11. This is stated by Apollodorus, who also says that he purchased the garden for eighty minae; and to the same effect Diocles in the third book of his Epitome speaks of them as living a very simple and frugal life; at all events they were content with half a pint of thin wine and were, for the rest, thorough-going water-drinkers. He further says that Epicurus did not think it right that their property should be held in common, as required by the maxim of Pythagoras about the goods of friends; such a practice in his opinion implied mistrust, and without confidence there is no friendship. In his correspondence he himself mentions that he was content with plain bread and water. And again: Send me a little pot of cheese, that, when I like, I may fare sumptuously. Such was the man who laid down that pleasure was the end of life. And here is the epigram in which Athenaeus eulogizes him:
10.13. Apollodorus in his Chronology tells us that our philosopher was a pupil of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to Eurylochus, Epicurus himself denies it and says that he was self-taught. Both Epicurus and Hermarchus deny the very existence of Leucippus the philosopher, though by some and by Apollodorus the Epicurean he is said to have been the teacher of Democritus. Demetrius the Magnesian affirms that Epicurus also attended the lectures of Xenocrates.The terms he used for things were the ordinary terms, and Aristophanes the grammarian credits him with a very characteristic style. He was so lucid a writer that in the work On Rhetoric he makes clearness the sole requisite.' "
10.16. and then, having bidden his friends remember his doctrines, breathed his last.Here is something of my own about him:Farewell, my friends; the truths I taught hold fast:Thus Epicurus spake, and breathed his last.He sat in a warm bath and neat wine quaff'd,And straightway found chill death in that same draught.Such was the life of the sage and such his end.His last will was as follows: On this wise I give and bequeath all my property to Amynomachus, son of Philocrates of Bate and Timocrates, son of Demetrius of Potamus, to each severally according to the items of the deed of gift laid up in the Metroon," '10.17. on condition that they shall place the garden and all that pertains to it at the disposal of Hermarchus, son of Agemortus, of Mitylene, and the members of his society, and those whom Hermarchus may leave as his successors, to live and study in. And I entrust to my School in perpetuity the task of aiding Amynomachus and Timocrates and their heirs to preserve to the best of their power the common life in the garden in whatever way is best, and that these also (the heirs of the trustees) may help to maintain the garden in the same way as those to whom our successors in the School may bequeath it. And let Amynomachus and Timocrates permit Hermarchus and his fellow-members to live in the house in Melite for the lifetime of Hermarchus. 10.18. And from the revenues made over by me to Amynomachus and Timocrates let them to the best of their power in consultation with Hermarchus make separate provision (1) for the funeral offerings to my father, mother, and brothers, and (2) for the customary celebration of my birthday on the tenth day of Gamelion in each year, and for the meeting of all my School held every month on the twentieth day to commemorate Metrodorus and myself according to the rules now in force. Let them also join in celebrating the day in Poseideon which commemorates my brothers, and likewise the day in Metageitnion which commemorates Polyaenus, as I have done hitherto.' "10.19. And let Amynomachus and Timocrates take care of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, and of the son of Polyaenus, so long as they study and live with Hermarchus. Letthem likewise provide for the maintece of Metrodorus's daughter, so long as she is well-ordered and obedient to Hermarchus; and, when she comes of age, give her in marriage to a husband selected by Hermarchus from among the members of the School; and out of the revenues accruing to me let Amynomachus and Timocrates in consultation with Hermarchus give to them as much as they think proper for their maintece year by year." '10.20. Let them make Hermarchus trustee of the funds along with themselves, in order that everything may be done in concert with him, who has grown old with me in philosophy and is left at the head of the School. And when the girl comes of age, let Amynomachus and Timocrates pay her dowry, taking from the property as much as circumstances allow, subject to the approval of Hermarchus. Let them provide for Nicanor as I have hitherto done, so that none of those members of the school who have rendered service to me in private life and have shown me kindness in every way and have chosen to grow old with me in the School should, so far as my means go, lack the necessaries of life. 10.21. All my books to be given to Hermarchus.And if anything should happen to Hermarchus before the children of Metrodorus grow up, Amynomachus and Timocrates shall give from the funds bequeathed by me, so far as possible, enough for their several needs, as long as they are well ordered. And let them provide for the rest according to my arrangements; that everything may be carried out, so far as it lies in their power. of my slaves I manumit Mys, Nicias, Lycon, and I also give Phaedrium her liberty. 10.22. And when near his end he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.Such were the terms of his will.Among his disciples, of whom there were many, the following were eminent: Metrodorus, the son of Athenaeus (or of Timocrates) and of Sande, a citizen of Lampsacus, who from his first acquaintance with Epicurus never left him except once for six months spent on a visit to his native place, from which he returned to him again.' "
10.24. Metrodorus wrote the following works:Against the Physicians, in three books.of Sensations.Against Timocrates.of Magimity.of Epicurus's Weak Health.Against the Dialecticians.Against the Sophists, in nine books.The Way to Wisdom.of Change.of Wealth.In Criticism of Democritus.of Noble Birth.Next came Polyaenus, son of Athenodorus, a citizen of Lampsacus, a just and kindly man, as Philodemus and his pupils affirm. Next came Epicurus's successor Hermarchus, son of Agemortus, a citizen of Mytilene, the son of a poor man and at the outset a student of rhetoric.There are in circulation the following excellent works by him:" '
10.27. hence he has frequently repeated himself and set down the first thought that occurred to him, and in his haste has left things unrevised, and he has so many citations that they alone fill his books: nor is this unexampled in Zeno and Aristotle. Such, then, in number and character are the writings of Epicurus, the best of which are the following:of Nature, thirty-seven books.of Atoms and Void.of Love.Epitome of Objections to the Physicists.Against the Megarians.Problems.Sovran Maxims.of Choice and Avoidance.of the End.of the Standard, a work entitled Canon.Chaeredemus.of the Gods.of Piety.
10.32. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same; nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown. For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning. And the objects presented to mad-men and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects – i.e. movements in the mind – which that which is unreal never does.
10.117. Such are his views on celestial phenomena.But as to the conduct of life, what we ought to avoid and what to choose, he writes as follows. Before quoting his words, however, let me go into the views of Epicurus himself and his school concerning the wise man.There are three motives to injurious acts among men – hatred, envy, and contempt; and these the wise man overcomes by reason. Moreover, he who has once become wise never more assumes the opposite habit, not even in semblance, if he can help it. He will be more susceptible of emotion than other men: that will be no hindrance to his wisdom. However, not every bodily constitution nor every nationality would permit a man to become wise.Even on the rack the wise man is happy. He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed.
10.119. Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose. Nor will he drivel, when drunken: so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant; nor will he turn Cynic (so the second book On Life tells us); nor will he be a mendicant. But even when he has lost his sight, he will not withdraw himself from life: this is stated in the same book. The wise man will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta.
10.122. Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it. 10.123. Those things which without ceasing I have declared unto thee, those do, and exercise thyself therein, holding them to be the elements of right life. First believe that God is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, thou shalt not affirm of him aught that is foreign to his immortality or that agrees not with blessedness, but shalt believe about him whatever may uphold both his blessedness and his immortality. For verily there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious. 10.124. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods, seeing that they are always favourable to their own good qualities and take pleasure in men like unto themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind.Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. 10.125. For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer. But in the world, at one time men shun death as the greatest of all evils, and at another time choose it as a respite from the evils in life. 10.126. The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offence to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades. 10.127. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. 10.128. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. 10.129. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And ofttimes we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is choiceworthy, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned.
10.130. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good. Again, we regard independence of outward things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been removed,' "
10.131. while bread and water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate one's self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul." '
10.132. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the other virtues, for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them.
10.133. Who, then, is superior in thy judgement to such a man? He holds a holy belief concerning the gods, and is altogether free from the fear of death. He has diligently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight. Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach.
10.134. It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath that yoke of destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honour the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. Nor does he hold chance to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder; nor to be a cause, though an uncertain one, for he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to men so as to make life blessed, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil. He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool.
10.135. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance.Exercise thyself in these and kindred precepts day and night, both by thyself and with him who is like unto thee; then never, either in waking or in dream, wilt thou be disturbed, but wilt live as a god among men. For man loses all semblance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings.Elsewhere he rejects the whole of divination, as in the short epitome, and says, No means of predicting the future really exists, and if it did, we must regard what happens according to it as nothing to us.Such are his views on life and conduct; and he has discoursed upon them at greater length elsewhere.
10.136. He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are: Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest. The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are: Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.
10.139. A blessed and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement implies weakness Elsewhere he says that the gods are discernible by reason alone, some being numerically distinct, while others result uniformly from the continuous influx of similar images directed to the same spot and in human form.Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.' '. None |
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67. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.42 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean garden • Epicureanism, Epicureans • Epicureanism, ethics of
Found in books: Long (2006) 182; Rohmann (2016) 163
| 3.17.42. I have spoken on the subject of philosophy itself as briefly as I could; now let us come to the philosophers, not that we may contend with these, who cannot maintain their ground, but that we may pursue those who are in flight and driven from our battlefield. The system of Epicurus was much more generally followed than those of the others; not because it brings forward any truth, but because the attractive name of pleasure invites many. For every one is naturally inclined to vices. Moreover, for the purpose of drawing the multitude to himself, he speaks that which is specially adapted to each character separately. He forbids the idle to apply himself to learning; he releases the covetous man from giving largesses to the people; he prohibits the inactive man from undertaking the business of the state, the sluggish from bodily exercise, the timid from military service. The irreligious is told that the gods pay no attention to the conduct of men; the man who is unfeeling and selfish is ordered to give nothing to any one, for that the wise man does everything on his own account. To a man who avoids the crowd, solitude is praised. One who is too sparing, learns that life can be sustained on water and meal. If a man hates his wife, the blessings of celibacy are enumerated to him; to one who has bad children, the happiness of those who are without children is proclaimed; against unnatural parents it is said that there is no bond of nature. To the man who is delicate and incapable of endurance, it is said that pain is the greatest of all evils; to the man of fortitude, it is said that the wise man is happy even under tortures. The man who devotes himself to the pursuit of influence and distinction is enjoined to pay court to kings; he who cannot endure annoyance is enjoined to shun the abode of kings. Thus the crafty man collects an assembly from various and differing characters; and while he lays himself out to please all, he is more at variance with himself than they all are with one another. But we must explain from what source the whole of this system is derived, and what origin it has. Epicurus saw that the good are always subject to adversities, poverty, labours, exile, loss of dear friends. On the contrary, he saw that the wicked were happy; that they were exalted with influence, and loaded with honours; he saw that innocence was unprotected, that crimes were committed with impunity: he saw that death raged without any regard to character, without any arrangement or discrimination of age; but that some arrived at old age, while others were carried off in their infancy; that some died when they were now robust and vigorous, that others were cut off by an untimely death in the first flower of youth; that in wars the better men were especially overcome and slain. But that which especially moved him, was the fact that religious men were especially visited with weightier evils, whereas he saw that less evils or none at all fell upon those who altogether neglected the gods, or worshipped them in an impious manner; and that even the very temples themselves were often set on fire by lightning. And of this Lucretius complains, when he says respecting the god:- Then he may hurl lightnings, and often throw down his temples, and withdrawing into the deserts, there spend his rage in practising his bolt, which often passes the guilty by, and strikes dead the innocent and unoffending.But if he had been able to collect even a small particle of truth, he would never say that the god throws down his own temples, when he throws them down on this account, because they are not his. The Capitol, which is the chief seat of the Roman city and religion, was struck with lightning and set on fire not once only, but frequently. But what was the opinion of clever men respecting this is evident from the saying of Cicero, who says that the flame came from heaven, not to destroy that earthly dwelling-place of Jupiter, but to demand a loftier and more magnificent abode. Concerning which transaction, in the books respecting his consulship, he speaks to the same purport as Lucretius:- For the father thundering on high, throned in the lofty Olympus, himself assailed his own citadels and famed temples, and cast fires upon his abode in the Capitol.In the obstinacy of their folly, therefore, they not only did not understand the power and majesty of the true God, but they even increased the impiety of their error, in endeavouring against all divine law to restore a temple so often condemned by the judgment of Heaven. Therefore, when Epicurus reflected on these things, induced as it were by the injustice of these matters (for thus it appeared to him in his ignorance of the cause and subject), he thought that there was no providence. And having persuaded himself of this, he undertook also to defend it, and thus he entangled himself in inextricable errors. For if there is no providence, how is it that the world was made with such order and arrangement? He says: There is no arrangement, for many things are made in a different manner from that in which they ought to have been made. And the divine man found subjects of censure. Now, if I had leisure to refute these things separately, I could easily show that this man was neither wise nor of sound mind. Also, if there is no providence, how is it that the bodies of animals are arranged with such foresight, that the various members, being disposed in a wonderful manner, discharge their own offices individually? The system of providence, he says, contrived nothing in the production of animals; for neither were the eyes made for seeing, nor the ears for hearing, nor the tongue for speaking, nor the feet for walking; inasmuch as these were produced before it was possible to speak, to hear, to see, and to walk. Therefore these were not produced for use; but use was produced from them. If there is no providence, why do rains fall, fruits spring up, and trees put forth leaves? These things, he says, are not always done for the sake of living creatures, inasmuch as they are of no benefit to providence; but all things must be produced of their own accord. From what source, therefore, do they arise, or how are all things which are carried on brought about? There is no need, he says, of supposing a providence; for there are seeds floating through the empty void, and from these, collected together without order, all things are produced and take their form. Why, then, do we not perceive or distinguish them? Because, he says, they have neither any color, nor warmth, nor smell; they are also without flavour and moisture; and they are so minute, that they cannot be cut and divided. Thus, because he had taken up a false principle at the commencement, the necessity of the subjects which followed led him to absurdities. For where or from whence are these atoms? Why did no one dream of them besides Leucippus only? From whom Democritus, having received instructions, left to Epicurus the inheritance of his folly. And if these are minute bodies, and indeed solid, as they say, they certainly are able to fall under the notice of the eyes. If the nature of all things is the same, how is it that they compose various objects? They meet together, he says, in varied order and position as the letters which, though few in number, by variety of arrangement make up innumerable words. But it is urged the letters have a variety of forms. And so, he says, have these first principles; for they are rough, they are furnished with hooks, they are smooth. Therefore they can be cut and divided, if there is in them any part which projects. But if they are smooth and without hooks, they cannot cohere. They ought therefore to be hooked, that they may be linked together one with another. But since they are said to be so minute that they cannot be cut asunder by the edge of any weapon, how is it that they have hooks or angles? For it must be possible for these to be torn asunder, since they project. In the next place, by what mutual compact, by what discernment, do they meet together, so that anything may be constructed out of them? If they are without intelligence, they cannot come together in such order and arrangement; for nothing but reason can bring to accomplishment anything in accordance with reason. With how many arguments can this trifling be refuted! But I must proceed with my subject. This is he Who surpassed in intellect the race of man, and quenched the light of all, as the ethereal sun arisen quenches the stars. Which verses I am never able to read without laughter. For this was not said respecting Socrates or Plato, who are esteemed as kings of philosophers, but concerning a man who, though of sound mind and vigorous health, raved more senselessly than any one diseased. And thus the most vain poet, I do not say adorned, but overwhelmed and crushed, the mouse with the praises of the lion. But the same man also releases us from the fear of death, respecting which these are his own exact words:- When we are in existence, death does not exist; when death exists, we have no existence: therefore death is nothing to us.How cleverly he has deceived us! As though it were death now completed which is an object of fear, by which sensation has been already taken away, and not the very act of dying, by which sensation is being taken from us. For there is a time in which we ourselves even yet exist, and death does not yet exist; and that very time appears to be miserable, because death is beginning to exist, and we are ceasing to exist. Nor is it said without reason that death is not miserable. The approach of death is miserable; that is, to waste away by disease, to endure the thrust, to receive the weapon in the body, to be burnt with fire, to be torn by the teeth of beasts. These are the things which are feared, not because they bring death, but because they bring great pain. But rather make out that pain is not an evil. He says it is the greatest of all evils. How therefore can I fail to fear, if that which precedes or brings about death is an evil? Why should I say that the argument is false, inasmuch as souls do not perish? But, he says, souls do perish; for that which is born with the body must perish with the body. I have already stated that I prefer to put off the discussion of this subject, and to reserve it for the last part of my work, that I may refute this persuasion of Epicurus, whether it was that of Democritus or Dic archus, both by arguments and divine testimonies. But perhaps he promised himself impunity in the indulgence of his vices; for he was an advocate of most disgraceful pleasure, and said that man was born for its enjoyment. Who, when he hears this affirmed, would abstain from the practice of vice and wickedness? For; if the soul is doomed to perish, let us eagerly pursue riches, that we may be able to enjoy all kinds of indulgence; and if these are wanting to us, let us take them away from those who have them by stealth, by stratagem, or by force, especially if there is no God who regards the actions of men: as long as the hope of impunity shall favour us, let us plunder and put to death. For it is the part of the wise man to do evil, if it is advantageous to him, and safe; since, if there is a God in heaven, He is not angry with any one. It is also equally the part of the foolish man to do good; because, as he is not excited with anger, so he is not influenced by favour. Therefore let us live in the indulgence of pleasures in every possible way; for in a short time we shall not exist at all. Therefore let us suffer no day, in short, no moment of time, to pass away from us without pleasure; lest, since we ourselves are doomed to perish, the life which we have already spent should itself also perish. Although he does not say this in word, yet he teaches it in fact. For when he maintains that the wise man does everything for his own sake, he refers all things which he does to his own advantage. And thus he who hears these disgraceful things, will neither think that any good thing ought to be done, since the conferring of benefits has reference to the advantage of another; nor that he ought to abstain from guilt, because the doing of evil is attended with gain. If any chieftain of pirates or leader of robbers were exhorting his men to acts of violence, what other language could he employ than to say the same things which Epicurus says: that the gods take no notice; that they are not affected with anger nor kind feeling; that the punishment of a future state is not to be dreaded, because souls die after death, and that there is no future state of punishment at all; that pleasure is the greatest good; that there is no society among men; that every one consults for his own interest; that there is no one who loves another, unless it be for his own sake; that death is not to be feared by a brave man, nor any pain; for that he, even if he should be tortured or burnt, should say that he does not regard it. There is evidently sufficient cause why any one should regard this as the expression of a wise man, since it can most fittingly be applied to robbers! ''. None |
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68. Origen, Against Celsus, 1.8-1.10, 1.13-1.14, 1.16, 1.21, 1.68, 3.75, 3.80, 3.80.1, 3.80.26-3.80.27, 4.4, 4.54, 4.83, 5.3, 8.69 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, and Epicureanism • Epicurean • Epicureanism • Epicureans • Epicureans, Epicureanism • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, and Celsus
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 275, 276, 277, 280, 289; Bryan (2018) 207; Fowler (2014) 172; Gunderson (2022) 187, 188; James (2021) 158; Janowitz (2002b) 35; Lampe (2003) 262; Wardy and Warren (2018) 207
| 1.8. It is with a certain eloquence, indeed, that he appears to advocate the cause of those who bear witness to the truth of Christianity by their death, in the following words: And I do not maintain that if a man, who has adopted a system of good doctrine, is to incur danger from men on that account, he should either apostatize, or feign apostasy, or openly deny his opinions. And he condemns those who, while holding the Christian views, either pretend that they do not, or deny them, saying that he who holds a certain opinion ought not to feign recantation, or publicly disown it. And here Celsus must be convicted of self-contradiction. For from other treatises of his it is ascertained that he was an Epicurean; but here, because he thought that he could assail Christianity with better effect by not professing the opinions of Epicurus, he pretends that there is a something better in man than the earthly part of his nature, which is akin to God, and says that they in whom this element, viz., the soul, is in a healthy condition, are ever seeking after their kindred nature, meaning God, and are ever desiring to hear something about Him, and to call it to remembrance. Observe now the insincerity of his character! Having said a little before, that the man who had embraced a system of good doctrine ought not, even if exposed to danger on that account from men, to disavow it, or pretend that he had done so, nor yet openly disown it, he now involves himself in all manner of contradictions. For he knew that if he acknowledged himself an Epicurean, he would not obtain any credit when accusing those who, in any degree, introduce the doctrine of Providence, and who place a God over the world. And we have heard that there were two individuals of the name of Celsus, both of whom were Epicureans; the earlier of the two having lived in the time of Nero, but this one in that of Adrian, and later. 1.9. He next proceeds to recommend, that in adopting opinions we should follow reason and a rational guide, since he who assents to opinions without following this course is very liable to be deceived. And he compares inconsiderate believers to Metragyrt, and soothsayers, and Mithr, and Sabbadians, and to anything else that one may fall in with, and to the phantoms of Hecate, or any other demon or demons. For as among such persons are frequently to be found wicked men, who, taking advantage of the ignorance of those who are easily deceived, lead them away whither they will, so also, he says, is the case among Christians. And he asserts that certain persons who do not wish either to give or receive a reason for their belief, keep repeating, Do not examine, but believe! and, Your faith will save you! And he alleges that such also say, The wisdom of this life is bad, but that foolishness is a good thing! To which we have to answer, that if it were possible for all to leave the business of life, and devote themselves to philosophy, no other method ought to be adopted by any one, but this alone. For in the Christian system also it will be found that there is, not to speak at all arrogantly, at least as much of investigation into articles of belief, and of explanation of dark sayings, occurring in the prophetical writings, and of the parables in the Gospels, and of countless other things, which either were narrated or enacted with a symbolic signification, (as is the case with other systems). But since the course alluded to is impossible, partly on account of the necessities of life, partly on account of the weakness of men, as only a very few individuals devote themselves earnestly to study, what better method could be devised with a view of assisting the multitude, than that which was delivered by Jesus to the heathen? And let us inquire, with respect to the great multitude of believers, who have washed away the mire of wickedness in which they formerly wallowed, whether it were better for them to believe without a reason, and (so) to have become reformed and improved in their habits, through the belief that men are chastised for sins, and honoured for good works or not to have allowed themselves to be converted on the strength of mere faith, but (to have waited) until they could give themselves to a thorough examination of the (necessary) reasons. For it is manifest that, (on such a plan), all men, with very few exceptions, would not obtain this (amelioration of conduct) which they have obtained through a simple faith, but would continue to remain in the practice of a wicked life. Now, whatever other evidence can be furnished of the fact, that it was not without divine intervention that the philanthropic scheme of Christianity was introduced among men, this also must be added. For a pious man will not believe that even a physician of the body, who restores the sick to better health, could take up his abode in any city or country without divine permission, since no good happens to men without the help of God. And if he who has cured the bodies of many, or restored them to better health, does not effect his cures without the help of God, how much more He who has healed the souls of many, and has turned them (to virtue), and improved their nature, and attached them to God who is over all things, and taught them to refer every action to His good pleasure, and to shun all that is displeasing to Him, even to the least of their words or deeds, or even of the thoughts of their hearts? 1.10. In the next place, since our opponents keep repeating those statements about faith, we must say that, considering it as a useful thing for the multitude, we admit that we teach those men to believe without reasons, who are unable to abandon all other employments, and give themselves to an examination of arguments; and our opponents, although they do not acknowledge it, yet practically do the same. For who is there that, on betaking himself to the study of philosophy, and throwing himself into the ranks of some sect, either by chance, or because he is provided with a teacher of that school, adopts such a course for any other reason, except that he believes his particular sect to be superior to any other? For, not waiting to hear the arguments of all the other philosophers, and of all the different sects, and the reasons for condemning one system and for supporting another, he in this way elects to become a Stoic, e.g., or a Platonist, or a Peripatetic, or an Epicurean, or a follower of some other school, and is thus borne, although they will not admit it, by a kind of irrational impulse to the practice, say of Stoicism, to the disregard of the others; despising either Platonism, as being marked by greater humility than the others; or Peripateticism, as more human, and as admitting with more fairness than other systems the blessings of human life. And some also, alarmed at first sight about the doctrine of providence, from seeing what happens in the world to the vicious and to the virtuous, have rashly concluded that there is no divine providence at all, and have adopted the views of Epicurus and Celsus.
1.13. But since Celsus has declared it to be a saying of many Christians, that the wisdom of this life is a bad thing, but that foolishness is good, we have to answer that he slanders the Gospel, not giving the words as they actually occur in the writings of Paul, where they run as follow: If any one among you seems to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may become wise. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. The apostle, therefore, does not say simply that wisdom is foolishness with God, but the wisdom of this world. And again, not, If any one among you seems to be wise, let him become a fool universally; but, let him become a fool in this world, that he may become wise. We term, then, the wisdom of this world, every false system of philosophy, which, according to the Scriptures, is brought to nought; and we call foolishness good, not without restriction, but when a man becomes foolish as to this world. As if we were to say that the Platonist, who believes in the immortality of the soul, and in the doctrine of its metempsychosis, incurs the charge of folly with the Stoics, who discard this opinion; and with the Peripatetics, who babble about the subtleties of Plato; and with the Epicureans, who call it superstition to introduce a providence, and to place a God over all things. Moreover, that it is in agreement with the spirit of Christianity, of much more importance to give our assent to doctrines upon grounds of reason and wisdom than on that of faith merely, and that it was only in certain circumstances that the latter course was desired by Christianity, in order not to leave men altogether without help, is shown by that genuine disciple of Jesus, Paul, when he says: For after that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. Now by these words it is clearly shown that it is by the wisdom of God that God ought to be known. But as this result did not follow, it pleased God a second time to save them that believe, not by folly universally, but by such foolishness as depended on preaching. For the preaching of Jesus Christ as crucified is the foolishness of preaching, as Paul also perceived, when he said, But we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness; but to them who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and wisdom of God. 1.14. Celsus, being of opinion that there is to be found among many nations a general relationship of doctrine, enumerates all the nations which gave rise to such and such opinions; but for some reason, unknown to me, he casts a slight upon the Jews, not including them among the others, as having either laboured along with them, and arrived at the same conclusions, or as having entertained similar opinions on many subjects. It is proper, therefore, to ask him why he gives credence to the histories of Barbarians and Greeks respecting the antiquity of those nations of whom he speaks, but stamps the histories of this nation alone as false. For if the respective writers related the events which are found in these works in the spirit of truth, why should we distrust the prophets of the Jews alone? And if Moses and the prophets have recorded many things in their history from a desire to favour their own system, why should we not say the same of the historians of other countries? Or, when the Egyptians or their histories speak evil of the Jews, are they to be believed on that point; but the Jews, when saying the same things of the Egyptians, and declaring that they had suffered great injustice at their hands, and that on this account they had been punished by God, are to be charged with falsehood? And this applies not to the Egyptians alone, but to others; for we shall find that there was a connection between the Assyrians and the Jews, and that this is recorded in the ancient histories of the Assyrians. And so also the Jewish historians (I avoid using the word prophets, that I may not appear to prejudge the case) have related that the Assyrians were enemies of the Jews. Observe at once, then, the arbitrary procedure of this individual, who believes the histories of these nations on the ground of their being learned, and condemns others as being wholly ignorant. For listen to the statement of Celsus: There is, he says, an authoritative account from the very beginning, respecting which there is a constant agreement among all the most learned nations, and cities, and men. And yet he will not call the Jews a learned nation in the same way in which he does the Egyptians, and Assyrians, and Indians, and Persians, and Odrysians, and Samothracians, and Eleusinians.
1.16. I must express my surprise that Celsus should class the Odrysians, and Samothracians, and Eleusinians, and Hyperboreans among the most ancient and learned nations, and should not deem the Jews worthy of a place among such, either for their learning or their antiquity, although there are many treatises in circulation among the Egyptians, and Phœnicians, and Greeks, which testify to their existence as an ancient people, but which I have considered it unnecessary to quote. For any one who chooses may read what Flavius Josephus has recorded in his two books, On the Antiquity of the Jews, where he brings together a great collection of writers, who bear witness to the antiquity of the Jewish people; and there exists the Discourse to the Greeks of Tatian the younger, in which with very great learning he enumerates those historians who have treated of the antiquity of the Jewish nation and of Moses. It seems, then, to be not from a love of truth, but from a spirit of hatred, that Celsus makes these statements, his object being to asperse the origin of Christianity, which is connected with Judaism. Nay, he styles the Galactophagi of Homer, and the Druids of the Gauls, and the Get, most learned and ancient tribes, on account of the resemblance between their traditions and those of the Jews, although I know not whether any of their histories survive; but the Hebrews alone, as far as in him lies, he deprives of the honour both of antiquity and learning. And again, when making a list of ancient and learned men who have conferred benefits upon their contemporaries (by their deeds), and upon posterity by their writings, he excluded Moses from the number; while of Linus, to whom Celsus assigns a foremost place in his list, there exists neither laws nor discourses which produced a change for the better among any tribes; whereas a whole nation, dispersed throughout the entire world, obey the laws of Moses. Consider, then, whether it is not from open malevolence that he has expelled Moses from his catalogue of learned men, while asserting that Linus, and Mus us, and Orpheus, and Pherecydes, and the Persian Zoroaster, and Pythagoras, discussed these topics, and that their opinions were deposited in books, and have thus been preserved down to the present time. And it is intentionally also that he has omitted to take notice of the myth, embellished chiefly by Orpheus, in which the gods are described as affected by human weaknesses and passions.
1.21. The following is the view of Celsus and the Epicureans: Moses having, he says, learned the doctrine which is to be found existing among wise nations and eloquent men, obtained the reputation of divinity. Now, in answer to this we have to say, that it may be allowed him that Moses did indeed hear a somewhat ancient doctrine, and transmitted the same to the Hebrews; that if the doctrine which he heard was false, and neither pious nor venerable, and if notwithstanding, he received it and handed it down to those under his authority, he is liable to censure; but if, as you assert, he gave his adherence to opinions that were wise and true, and educated his people by means of them, what, pray, has he done deserving of condemnation? Would, indeed, that not only Epicurus, but Aristotle, whose sentiments regarding providence are not so impious (as those of the former), and the Stoics, who assert that God is a body, had heard such a doctrine! Then the world would not have been filled with opinions which either disallow or enfeeble the action of providence, or introduce a corrupt corporeal principle, according to which the god of the Stoics is a body, with respect to whom they are not afraid to say that he is capable of change, and may be altered and transformed in all his parts, and, generally, that he is capable of corruption, if there be any one to corrupt him, but that he has the good fortune to escape corruption, because there is none to corrupt. Whereas the doctrine of the Jews and Christians, which preserves the immutability and unalterableness of the divine nature, is stigmatized as impious, because it does not partake of the profanity of those whose notions of God are marked by impiety, but because it says in the supplication addressed to the Divinity, You are the same, it being, moreover, an article of faith that God has said, I change not. ' "
1.68. But after this, Celsus, having a suspicion that the great works performed by Jesus, of which we have named a few out of a great number, would be brought forward to view, affects to grant that those statements may be true which are made regarding His cures, or His resurrection, or the feeding of a multitude with a few loaves, from which many fragments remained over, or those other stories which Celsus thinks the disciples have recorded as of a marvellous nature; and he adds: Well, let us believe that these were actually wrought by you. But then he immediately compares them to the tricks of jugglers, who profess to do more wonderful things, and to the feats performed by those who have been taught by Egyptians, who in the middle of the market-place, in return for a few obols, will impart the knowledge of their most venerated arts, and will expel demons from men, and dispel diseases, and invoke the souls of heroes, and exhibit expensive banquets, and tables, and dishes, and dainties having no real existence, and who will put in motion, as if alive, what are not really living animals, but which have only the appearance of life. And he asks, Since, then, these persons can perform such feats, shall we of necessity conclude that they are 'sons of God,' or must we admit that they are the proceedings of wicked men under the influence of an evil spirit? You see that by these expressions he allows, as it were, the existence of magic. I do not know, however, if he is the same who wrote several books against it. But, as it helped his purpose, he compares the (miracles) related of Jesus to the results produced by magic. There would indeed be a resemblance between them, if Jesus, like the dealers in magical arts, had performed His works only for show; but now there is not a single juggler who, by means of his proceedings, invites his spectators to reform their manners, or trains those to the fear of God who are amazed at what they see, nor who tries to persuade them so to live as men who are to be justified by God. And jugglers do none of these things, because they have neither the power nor the will, nor any desire to busy themselves about the reformation of men, inasmuch as their own lives are full of the grossest and most notorious sins. But how should not He who, by the miracles which He did, induced those who beheld the excellent results to undertake the reformation of their characters, manifest Himself not only to His genuine disciples, but also to others, as a pattern of most virtuous life, in order that His disciples might devote themselves to the work of instructing men in the will of God, and that the others, after being more fully instructed by His word and character than by His miracles, as to how they were to direct their lives, might in all their conduct have a constant reference to the good pleasure of the universal God? And if such were the life of Jesus, how could any one with reason compare Him with the sect of impostors, and not, on the contrary, believe, according to the promise, that He was God, who appeared in human form to do good to our race? " '
3.75. But as he afterwards says that the teacher of Christianity acts like a person who promises to restore patients to bodily health, but who prevents them from consulting skilled physicians, by whom his ignorance would be exposed, we shall inquire in reply, What are the physicians to whom you refer, from whom we turn away ignorant individuals? For you do not suppose that we exhort those to embrace the Gospel who are devoted to philosophy, so that you would regard the latter as the physicians from whom we keep away such as we invite to come to the word of God. He indeed will make no answer, because he cannot name the physicians; or else he will be obliged to betake himself to those of them who are ignorant, and who of their own accord servilely yield themselves to the worship of many gods, and to whatever other opinions are entertained by ignorant individuals. In either case, then, he will be shown to have employed to no purpose in his argument the illustration of one who keeps others away from skilled physicians. But if, in order to preserve from the philosophy of Epicurus, and from such as are considered physicians after his system, those who are deceived by them, why should we not be acting most reasonably in keeping such away from a dangerous disease caused by the physicians of Celsus, - that, viz., which leads to the annihilation of providence, and the introduction of pleasure as a good? But let it be conceded that we do keep away those whom we encourage to become our disciples from other philosopher-physicians - from the Peripatetics, for example, who deny the existence of providence and the relation of Deity to man - why shall we not piously train and heal those who have been thus encouraged, persuading them to devote themselves to the God of all things, and free those who yield obedience to us from the great wounds inflicted by the words of such as are deemed to be philosophers? Nay, let it also be admitted that we turn away from physicians of the sect of the Stoics, who introduce a corruptible god, and assert that his essence consists of a body, which is capable of being changed and altered in all its parts, and who also maintain that all things will one day perish, and that God alone will be left; why shall we not even thus emancipate our subjects from evils, and bring them by pious arguments to devote themselves to the Creator, and to admire the Father of the Christian system, who has so arranged that instruction of the most benevolent kind, and fitted for the conversion of souls, should be distributed throughout the whole human race? Nay, if we should cure those who have fallen into the folly of believing in the transmigration of souls through the teaching of physicians, who will have it that the rational nature descends sometimes into all kinds of irrational animals, and sometimes into that state of being which is incapable of using the imagination, why should we not improve the souls of our subjects by means of a doctrine which does not teach that a state of insensibility or irrationalism is produced in the wicked instead of punishment, but which shows that the labours and chastisements inflicted upon the wicked by God are a kind of medicines leading to conversion? For those who are intelligent Christians, keeping this in view, deal with the simple-minded, as parents do with very young children. We do not betake ourselves then to young persons and silly rustics, saying to them, Flee from physicians. Nor do we say, See that none of you lay hold of knowledge; nor do we assert that knowledge is an evil; nor are we mad enough to say that knowledge causes men to lose their soundness of mind. We would not even say that any one ever perished through wisdom; and although we give instruction, we never say, Give heed to me, but Give heed to the God of all things, and to Jesus, the giver of instruction concerning Him. And none of us is so great a braggart as to say what Celsus put in the mouth of one of our teachers to his acquaintances, I alone will save you. Observe here the lies which he utters against us! Moreover, we do not assert that true physicians destroy those whom they promise to cure.
3.80.27. Seeing, however, that Celsus alleges that Christians are won over by us through vain hopes, we thus reply to him when he finds fault with our doctrine of the blessed life, and of communion with God: As for you, good sir, they also are won over by vain hopes who have accepted the doctrine of Pythagoras and Plato regarding the soul, that it is its nature to ascend to the vault of heaven, and in the super-celestial space to behold the sights which are seen by the blessed spectators above. According to you, O Celsus, they also who have accepted the doctrine of the duration of the soul (after death), and who lead a life through which they become heroes, and make their abodes with the gods, are won over by vain hopes. Probably also they who are persuaded that the soul comes (into the body) from without, and that it will be withdrawn from the power of death, would be said by Celsus to be won over by empty hopes. Let him then come forth to the contest, no longer concealing the sect to which he belongs, but confessing himself to be an Epicurean, and let him meet the arguments, which are not lightly advanced among Greeks and Barbarians, regarding the immortality of the soul, or its duration (after death), or the immortality of the thinking principle; and let him prove that these are words which deceive with empty hopes those who give their assent to them; but that the adherents of his philosophical system are pure from empty hopes, and that they indeed lead to hopes of good, or - what is more in keeping with his opinions - give birth to no hope at all, on account of the immediate and complete destruction of the soul (after death). Unless, perhaps, Celsus and the Epicureans will deny that it is a vain hope which they entertain regarding their end - pleasure - which, according to them, is the supreme good, and which consists in the permanent health of the body, and the hope regarding it which is entertained by Epicurus. ' "
3.80. Seeing, however, that Celsus alleges that Christians are won over by us through vain hopes, we thus reply to him when he finds fault with our doctrine of the blessed life, and of communion with God: As for you, good sir, they also are won over by vain hopes who have accepted the doctrine of Pythagoras and Plato regarding the soul, that it is its nature to ascend to the vault of heaven, and in the super-celestial space to behold the sights which are seen by the blessed spectators above. According to you, O Celsus, they also who have accepted the doctrine of the duration of the soul (after death), and who lead a life through which they become heroes, and make their abodes with the gods, are won over by vain hopes. Probably also they who are persuaded that the soul comes (into the body) from without, and that it will be withdrawn from the power of death, would be said by Celsus to be won over by empty hopes. Let him then come forth to the contest, no longer concealing the sect to which he belongs, but confessing himself to be an Epicurean, and let him meet the arguments, which are not lightly advanced among Greeks and Barbarians, regarding the immortality of the soul, or its duration (after death), or the immortality of the thinking principle; and let him prove that these are words which deceive with empty hopes those who give their assent to them; but that the adherents of his philosophical system are pure from empty hopes, and that they indeed lead to hopes of good, or - what is more in keeping with his opinions - give birth to no hope at all, on account of the immediate and complete destruction of the soul (after death). Unless, perhaps, Celsus and the Epicureans will deny that it is a vain hope which they entertain regarding their end - pleasure - which, according to them, is the supreme good, and which consists in the permanent health of the body, and the hope regarding it which is entertained by Epicurus.
4.4. The argument which Celsus employs against us and the Jews will be turned against himself thus: My good sir, does the God who is over all things know what takes place among men, or does He not know? Now if you admit the existence of a God and of providence, as your treatise indicates, He must of necessity know. And if He does know, why does He not make (men) better? Is it obligatory, then, on us to defend God's procedure in not making men better, although He knows their state, but not equally binding on you, who do not distinctly show by your treatise that you are an Epicurean, but pretend to recognise a providence, to explain why God, although knowing all that takes place among men, does not make them better, nor by divine power liberate all men from evil? We are not ashamed, however, to say that God is constantly sending (instructors) in order to make men better; for there are to be found among men reasons given by God which exhort them to enter on a better life. But there are many diversities among those who serve God, and they are few in number who are perfect and pure ambassadors of the truth, and who produce a complete reformation, as did Moses and the prophets. But above all these, great was the reformation effected by Jesus, who desired to heal not only those who lived in one corner of the world, but as far as in Him lay, men in every country, for He came as the Saviour of all men. " '
4.54. But as in the words which I quoted from Celsus, which are a paraphrase from the Tim us, certain expressions occur, such as, God made nothing mortal, but immortal things alone, while mortal things are the works of others, and the soul is a work of God, but the nature of the body is different, and there is no difference between the body of a man and that of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog; for the matter is the same, and their corruptible part alike,- let us discuss these points for a little; and let us show that Celsus either does not disclose his Epicurean opinions, or, as might be said by one person, has exchanged them for better, or, as another might say, has nothing in common save the name, with Celsus, the Epicurean. For he ought, in giving expression to such opinions, and in proposing to contradict not only us, but the by no means obscure sect of philosophers who are the adherents of Zeno of Citium, to have proved that the bodies of animals are not the work of God, and that the great skill displayed in their construction did not proceed from the highest intelligence. And he ought also, with regard to the countless diversities of plants, which are regulated by an inherent, incomprehensible nature, and which have been created for the by no means despicable use of man in general, and of the animals which minister to man, whatever other reasons may be adduced for their existence, not only to have stated his opinion, but also to have shown us that it was no perfect intelligence which impressed these qualities upon the matter of plants. And when he had once represented (various) divinities as the creators of all the bodies, the soul alone being the work of God, why did not he, who separated these great acts of creation, and apportioned them among a plurality of creators, next demonstrate by some convincing reason the existence of these diversities among divinities, some of which construct the bodies of men, and others - those, say, of beasts of burden, and others - those of wild animals? And he who saw that some divinities were the creators of dragons, and of asps, and of basilisks, and others of each plant and herb according to its species, ought to have explained the causes of these diversities. For probably, had he given himself carefully to the investigation of each particular point, he would either have observed that it was one God who was the creator of all, and who made each thing with a certain object and for a certain reason; or if he had failed to observe this, he would have discovered the answer which he ought to return to those who assert that corruptibility is a thing indifferent in its nature; and that there was no absurdity in a world which consists of diverse materials, being formed by one architect, who constructed the different kinds of things so as to secure the good of the whole. Or, finally, he ought to have expressed no opinion at all on so important a doctrine, since he did not intend to prove what he professed to demonstrate; unless, indeed, he who censures others for professing a simple faith, would have us to believe his mere assertions, although he gave out that he would not merely assert, but would prove his assertions.
4.83. After Celsus has finished speaking of the bees, in order to depreciate (as far as he can) the cities, and constitutions, and governments, and sovereignties not only of us Christians, but of all mankind, as well as the wars which men undertake on behalf of their native countries, he proceeds, by way of digression, to pass a eulogy upon the ants, in order that, while praising them, he may compare the measures which men take to secure their subsistence with those adopted by these insects, and so evince his contempt for the forethought which makes provision for winter, as being nothing higher than the irrational providence of the ants, as he regards it. Now might not some of the more simple-minded, and such as know not how to look into the nature of all things, be turned away (so far, at least, as Celsus could accomplish it) from helping those who are weighed down with the burdens (of life), and from sharing their toils, when he says of the ants, that they help one another with their loads, when they see one of their number toiling under them? For he who needs to be disciplined by the word, but who does not at all understand its voice, will say: Since, then, there is no difference between us and the ants, even when we help those who are weary with bearing their heavy burdens, why should we continue to do so to no purpose? And would not the ants, as being irrational creature, be greatly puffed up, and think highly of themselves, because their works were compared to those of men? While men, on the other hand, who by means of their reason are enabled to hear how their philanthropy towards others is contemned, would be injured, so far as could be effected by Celsus and his arguments: for he does not perceive that, while he wishes to turn away from Christianity those who read his treatise, he turns away also the sympathy of those who are not Christians from those who bear the heaviest burdens (of life). Whereas, had he been a philosopher, who was capable of perceiving the good which men may do each other, he ought, in addition to not removing along with Christianity the blessings which are found among men, to have lent his aid to co-operate (if he had it in his power) with those principles of excellence which are common to Christianity and the rest of mankind. Moreover, even if the ants set apart in a place by themselves those grains which sprout forth, that they may not swell into bud, but may continue throughout the year as their food, this is not to be deemed as evidence of the existence of reason among ants, but as the work of the universal mother, Nature, which adorned even irrational animals, so that even the most insignificant is not omitted, but bears traces of the reason implanted in it by nature. Unless, indeed, by these assertions Celsus means obscurely to intimate (for in many instances he would like to adopt Platonic ideas) that all souls are of the same species, and that there is no difference between that of a man and those of ants and bees, which is the act of one who would bring down the soul from the vault of heaven, and cause it to enter not only a human body, but that of an animal. Christians, however, will not yield their assent to such opinions: for they have been instructed before now that the human soul was created in the image of God; and they see that it is impossible for a nature fashioned in the divine image to have its (original) features altogether obliterated, and to assume others, formed after I know not what likeness of irrational animals.
5.3. But observe how, in his desire to subvert our opinions, he who never acknowledged himself throughout his whole treatise to be an Epicurean, is convicted of being a deserter to that sect. And now is the time for you, (reader), who peruse the works of Celsus, and give your assent to what has been advanced, either to overturn the belief in a God who visits the human race, and exercises a providence over each individual man, or to grant this, and prove the falsity of the assertions of Celsus. If you, then, wholly annihilate providence, you will falsify those assertions of his in which he grants the existence of God and a providence, in order that you may maintain the truth of your own position; but if, on the other hand, you still admit the existence of providence, because you do not assent to the dictum of Celsus, that neither has a God nor the son of a God come down nor is to come down to mankind, why not rather carefully ascertain from the statements made regarding Jesus, and the prophecies uttered concerning Him, who it is that we are to consider as having come down to the human race as God, and the Son of God?- whether that Jesus who said and ministered so much, or those who under pretence of oracles and divinations, do not reform the morals of their worshippers, but who have besides apostatized from the pure and holy worship and honour due to the Maker of all things, and who tear away the souls of those who give heed to them from the one only visible and true God, under a pretence of paying honour to a multitude of deities?
8.69. Celsus, then, as if not observing that he was saying anything inconsistent with the words he had just used, if all were to do the same as you, adds: You surely do not say that if the Romans were, in compliance with your wish, to neglect their customary duties to gods and men, and were to worship the Most High, or whatever you please to call him, that he will come down and fight for them, so that they shall need no other help than his. For this same God, as yourselves say, promised of old this and much more to those who served him, and see in what way he has helped them and you! They, in place of being masters of the whole world, are left with not so much as a patch of ground or a home; and as for you, if any of you transgresses even in secret, he is sought out and punished with death. As the question started is, What would happen if the Romans were persuaded to adopt the principles of the Christians, to despise the duties paid to the recognised gods and to men, and to worship the Most High? this is my answer to the question. We say that if two of us shall agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of the Father of the just, which is in heaven; for God rejoices in the agreement of rational beings, and turns away from discord. And what are we to expect, if not only a very few agree, as at present, but the whole of the empire of Rome? For they will pray to the Word, who of old said to the Hebrews, when they were pursued by the Egyptians, The Lord shall fight for you, and you shall hold your peace; and if they all unite in prayer with one accord, they will be able to put to flight far more enemies than those who were discomfited by the prayer of Moses when he cried to the Lord, and of those who prayed with him. Now, if what God promised to those who keep His law has not come to pass, the reason of its nonfulfilment is not to be ascribed to the unfaithfulness of God. But He had made the fulfilment of His promises to depend on certain conditions - namely, that they should observe and live according to His law; and if the Jews have not a plot of ground nor a habitation left to them, although they had received these conditional promises, the entire blame is to be laid upon their crimes, and especially upon their guilt in the treatment of Jesus. ''. None |
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69. Porphyry, Letter To Marcella, 24 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, theology of • Epicureans, Hope, value of • Velleius, Epicurean philosopher
Found in books: Simmons(1995) 139; Sorabji (2000) 238
| 24. No god is responsible for a man's evils, for he has chosen his lot himself. The prayer which is accompanied by base actions is impure, and |45 therefore not acceptable to God; but that which is accompanied by noble actions is pure, and at the same time acceptable. There are four first principles that must be upheld concerning God—faith, truth, love, hope. We must have faith that our only salvation is in turning to God. And having faith, we must strive with all our might to know the truth about God. And when we know this, we must love Him we do know. And when we love Him we must nourish our souls on good hopes for our life, for it is by their good hopes good men are superior to bad ones. Let then these four principles be firmly held."". None |
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70. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Celsus, and Epicureanism • Epicureanism, Epicureans • Epicureanism, epistemology of • Epicureanism, heresy assimilated to • Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, and Celsus
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 122; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 122, 276; Fowler (2014) 182; Long (2006) 51; Rohmann (2016) 154
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71. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, theory of names • Epicureans
Found in books: James (2021) 54; Janowitz (2002b) 35
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72. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureans • Epicurus and Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicurean/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureans • God, Epicurean • breath and heat (Epicurean)
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 466, 468, 469, 474, 475, 479, 481, 517, 520; Edelmann-Singer et al (2020) 237; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 268, 269, 395; Inwood and Warren (2020) 91; Linjamaa (2019) 233; Osborne (2001) 62
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73. Augustine, The City of God, 10.23, 18.27, 18.41 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, Epicureans • Epicureanism, gods mercy • Epicureanism, theology of • Epicureans/ Epicureanism • Lucretius, Epicurean, Free will
Found in books: Rohmann (2016) 176, 177; Simmons(1995) 142; Sorabji (2000) 334; Tanaseanu-Döbler and von Alvensleben (2020) 218
| 10.23. Even Porphyry asserts that it was revealed by divine oracles that we are not purified by any sacrifices to sun or moon, meaning it to be inferred that we are not purified by sacrificing to any gods. For what mysteries can purify, if those of the sun and moon, which are esteemed the chief of the celestial gods, do not purify? He says, too, in the same place, that principles can purify, lest it should be supposed, from his saying that sacrificing to the sun and moon cannot purify, that sacrificing to some other of the host of gods might do so. And what he as a Platonist means by principles, we know. For he speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the middle place between these two. For if, like Plotinus in his discussion regarding the three principal substances, he wished us to understand by this third the soul of nature, he would certainly not have given it the middle place between these two, that is, between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the soul of nature after the intellect of the Father, while Porphyry, making it the mean, does not place it after, but between the others. No doubt he spoke according to his light, or as he thought expedient; but we assert that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father only, nor of the Son only, but of both. For philosophers speak as they have a mind to, and in the most difficult matters do not scruple to offend religious ears; but we are bound to speak according to a certain rule, lest freedom of speech beget impiety of opinion about the matters themselves of which we speak.
18.27. In order that we may be able to consider these times, let us go back a little to earlier times. At the beginning of the book of the prophet Hosea, who is placed first of twelve, it is written, The word of the Lord which came to Hosea in the days of Uzziah, Jothan, Ahaz, and Hezekiah, kings of Judah. Hosea 1:1 Amos also writes that he prophesied in the days of Uzziah, and adds the name of Jeroboam king of Israel, who lived at the same time. Amos 1:1 Isaiah the son of Amos - either the above-named prophet, or, as is rather affirmed, another who was not a prophet, but was called by the same name - also puts at the head of his book these four kings named by Hosea, saying by way of preface that he prophesied in their days. Micah also names the same times as those of his prophecy, after the days of Uzziah; Micah 1:1 for he names the same three kings as Hosea named - Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah. We find from their own writings that these men prophesied contemporaneously. To these are added Jonah in the reign of Uzziah, and Joel in that of Jotham, who succeeded Uzziah. But we can find the date of these two prophets in the chronicles, not in their own writings, for they say nothing about it themselves. Now these days extend from Procas king of the Latins, or his predecessor Aventinus, down to Romulus king of the Romans, or even to the beginning of the reign of his successor Numa Pompilius. Hezekiah king of Judah certainly reigned till then. So that thus these fountains of prophecy, as I may call them, burst forth at once during those times when the Assyrian kingdom failed and the Roman began; so that, just as in the first period of the Assyrian kingdom Abraham arose, to whom the most distinct promises were made that all nations should be blessed in his seed, so at the beginning of the western Babylon, in the time of whose government Christ was to come in whom these promises were to be fulfilled, the oracles of the prophets were given not only in spoken but in written words, for a testimony that so great a thing should come to pass. For although the people of Israel hardly ever lacked prophets from the time when they began to have kings, these were only for their own use, not for that of the nations. But when the more manifestly prophetic Scripture began to be formed, which was to benefit the nations too, it was fitting that it should begin when this city was founded which was to rule the nations.
18.41. But let us omit further examination of history, and return to the philosophers from whom we digressed to these things. They seem to have labored in their studies for no other end than to find out how to live in a way proper for laying hold of blessedness. Why, then, have the disciples dissented from their masters, and the fellow disciples from one another, except because as men they have sought after these things by human sense and human reasonings? Now, although there might be among them a desire of glory, so that each wished to be thought wiser and more acute than another, and in no way addicted to the judgment of others, but the inventor of his own dogma and opinion, yet I may grant that there were some, or even very many of them, whose love of truth severed them from their teachers or fellow disciples, that they might strive for what they thought was the truth, whether it was so or not. But what can human misery do, or how or where can it reach forth, so as to attain blessedness, if divine authority does not lead it? Finally, let our authors, among whom the canon of the sacred books is fixed and bounded, be far from disagreeing in any respect. It is not without good reason, then, that not merely a few people prating in the schools and gymnasia in captious disputations, but so many and great people, both learned and unlearned, in countries and cities, have believed that God spoke to them or by them, i.e. the canonical writers, when they wrote these books. There ought, indeed, to be but few of them, lest on account of their multitude what ought to be religiously esteemed should grow cheap; and yet not so few that their agreement should not be wonderful. For among the multitude of philosophers, who in their works have left behind them the monuments of their dogmas, no one will easily find any who agree in all their opinions. But to show this is too long a task for this work. But what author of any sect is so approved in this demon-worshipping city, that the rest who have differed from or opposed him in opinion have been disapproved? The Epicureans asserted that human affairs were not under the providence of the gods; and the Stoics, holding the opposite opinion, agreed that they were ruled and defended by favorable and tutelary gods. Yet were not both sects famous among the Athenians? I wonder, then, why Anaxagoras was accused of a crime for saying that the sun was a burning stone, and denying that it was a god at all; while in the same city Epicurus flourished gloriously and lived securely, although he not only did not believe that the sun or any star was a god, but contended that neither Jupiter nor any of the gods dwelt in the world at all, so that the prayers and supplications of men might reach them! Were not both Aristippus and Antisthenes there, two noble philosophers and both Socratic? Yet they placed the chief end of life within bounds so diverse and contradictory, that the first made the delight of the body the chief good, while the other asserted that man was made happy mainly by the virtue of the mind. The one also said that the wise man should flee from the republic; the other, that he should administer its affairs. Yet did not each gather disciples to follow his own sect? Indeed, in the conspicuous and well-known porch, in gymnasia, in gardens, in places public and private, they openly strove in bands each for his own opinion, some asserting there was one world, others innumerable worlds; some that this world had a beginning, others that it had not; some that it would perish, others that it would exist always; some that it was governed by the divine mind, others by chance and accident; some that souls are immortal, others that they are mortal - and of those who asserted their immortality, some said they transmigrated through beasts, others that it was by no means so; while of those who asserted their mortality, some said they perished immediately after the body, others that they survived either a little while or a longer time, but not always; some fixing supreme good in the body, some in the mind, some in both; others adding to the mind and body external good things; some thinking that the bodily senses ought to be trusted always, some not always, others never. Now what people, senate, power, or public dignity of the impious city has ever taken care to judge between all these and other nearly innumerable dissensions of the philosophers, approving and accepting some, and disapproving and rejecting others? Has it not held in its bosom at random, without any judgment, and confusedly, so many controversies of men at variance, not about fields, houses, or anything of a pecuniary nature, but about those things which make life either miserable or happy? Even if some true things were said in it, yet falsehoods were uttered with the same licence; so that such a city has not amiss received the title of the mystic Babylon. For Babylon means confusion, as we remember we have already explained. Nor does it matter to the devil, its king, how they wrangle among themselves in contradictory errors, since all alike deservedly belong to him on account of their great and varied impiety. But that nation, that people, that city, that republic, these Israelites, to whom the oracles of God were entrusted, by no means confounded with similar licence false prophets with the true prophets; but, agreeing together, and differing in nothing, acknowledged and upheld the authentic authors of their sacred books. These were their philosophers, these were their sages, divines, prophets, and teachers of probity and piety. Whoever was wise and lived according to them was wise and lived not according to men, but according to God who has spoken by them. If sacrilege is forbidden there, God has forbidden it. If it is said, Honor your father and your mother, Exodus 20:12 God has commanded it. If it is said, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not kill, You shall not steal, and other similar commandments, not human lips but the divine oracles have enounced them. Whatever truth certain philosophers, amid their false opinions, were able to see, and strove by laborious discussions to persuade men of - such as that God had made this world, and Himself most providently governs it, or of the nobility of the virtues, of the love of country, of fidelity in friendship, of good works and everything pertaining to virtuous manners, although they knew not to what end and what rule all these things were to be referred - all these, by words prophetic, that is, divine, although spoken by men, were commended to the people in that city, and not inculcated by contention in arguments, so that he who should know them might be afraid of contemning, not the wit of men, but the oracle of God. ''. None |
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74. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicurus, Epicurean philosophy • Hearing, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of the senses • Lucretius, Epicurean theory of sight • Senses, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Senses, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of the senses • Senses, Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • Senses, Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of the senses • Touch, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of sight • taste, In Lucretius’ Epicurean theory of the senses
Found in books: König (2012) 223; Nuno et al (2021) 45
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75. Vergil, Aeneis, 2.6, 9.616
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean Doctrine • Epicurean philosophy • Epicureanism • Epicureans, clothing of • anger, Epicurean view
Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 218; Gordon (2012) 162; Hunter (2018) 100; Radicke (2022) 259
2.6. et quorum pars magna fui. Quis talia fando
9.616. et tunicae manicas et habent redimicula mitrae.''. None | 2.6. how Asia 's glory and afflicted throne " '
9.616. have lasting music, no remotest age '". None |
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76. Vergil, Eclogues, 1.1-1.6, 6.64, 9.47
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, Lucretian imagery • Epicureanism, ataraxia • Epicureanism, theory of motivation • Virgil, Epicurean studies under Siro • epicureanism/Epicurean philosophy • pastoral, Epicurean ethos of
Found in books: Bowditch (2001) 219; Gale (2000) 194; Thorsen et al. (2021) 114; Xinyue (2022) 46, 48, 80, 81
| 1.1. You, Tityrus, 'neath a broad beech-canopy" '1.2. reclining, on the slender oat rehearse 1.3. your silvan ditties: I from my sweet fields,' "1.4. and home's familiar bounds, even now depart." '1.5. Exiled from home am I; while, Tityrus, you 1.6. it careless in the shade, and, at your call,
6.64. as with a beast to mate, though many a time
9.47. or Cinna deem I, but account myself'". None |
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77. Vergil, Georgics, 1.133, 1.145-1.146, 1.168, 2.40, 2.174-2.175, 2.490-2.494, 2.498-2.499, 2.505-2.506, 3.244, 3.478-3.566, 4.561-4.566
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean • Epicurean Doctrine • Epicurean philosophy,, as Iron Age phenomenon • Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, ambivalence about marriage • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • friendship, Epicurean understandings
Found in books: Clay and Vergados (2022) 218, 328; Fabre-Serris et al (2021) 189; Gale (2000) 112, 145, 179, 185, 186, 188, 244, 245, 246, 252; Jenkyns (2013) 217, 221, 224; Perkell (1989) 43; Radicke (2022) 212; Williams and Vol (2022) 77, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 281; Xinyue (2022) 60, 80; Yona (2018) 164
1.133. ut varias usus meditando extunderet artis
1.145. tum variae venere artes. Labor omnia vicit 1.146. inprobus et duris urgens in rebus egestas.
1.168. si te digna manet divini gloria ruris.
2.40. O decus, o famae merito pars maxima nostrae,
2.174. magna virum; tibi res antiquae laudis et artem 2.175. ingredior, sanctos ausus recludere fontis,
2.490. Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, 2.491. atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum 2.492. subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari. 2.493. Fortunatus et ille, deos qui novit agrestis, 2.494. panaque Silvanumque senem Nymphasque sorores:
2.498. non res Romanae perituraque regna; neque ille 2.499. aut doluit miserans inopem aut invidit habenti
2.505. hic petit excidiis urbem miserosque Penatis, 2.506. ut gemma bibat et Sarrano dormiat ostro;
3.244. in furias. ignemque ruunt. Amor omnibus idem.
3.478. Hic quondam morbo caeli miseranda coorta est 3.479. tempestas totoque autumni incanduit aestu 3.480. et genus omne neci pecudum dedit, omne ferarum, 3.481. corrupitque lacus, infecit pabula tabo. 3.482. Nec via mortis erat simplex, sed ubi ignea venis 3.483. omnibus acta sitis miseros adduxerat artus, 3.484. rursus abundabat fluidus liquor omniaque in se 3.485. ossa minutatim morbo collapsa trahebat. 3.486. Saepe in honore deum medio stans hostia ad aram 3.487. lanea dum nivea circumdatur infula vitta, 3.488. inter cunctantis cecidit moribunda ministros. 3.489. Aut si quam ferro mactaverat ante sacerdos 3.490. inde neque impositis ardent altaria fibris 3.491. nec responsa potest consultus reddere vates, 3.492. ac vix suppositi tinguntur sanguine cultri 3.493. summaque ieiuna sanie infuscatur harena. 3.494. Hinc laetis vituli volgo moriuntur in herbis 3.495. et dulcis animas plena ad praesepia reddunt; 3.496. hinc canibus blandis rabies venit et quatit aegros 3.497. tussis anhela sues ac faucibus angit obesis. 3.498. Labitur infelix studiorum atque immemor herbae 3.499. victor equus fontisque avertitur et pede terram 3.500. crebra ferit; demissae aures, incertus ibidem 3.501. sudor et ille quidem morituris frigidus, aret 3.502. pellis et ad tactum tractanti dura resistit. 3.503. Haec ante exitium primis dant signa diebus; 3.504. sin in processu coepit crudescere morbus, 3.505. tum vero ardentes oculi atque attractus ab alto 3.506. spiritus, interdum gemitu gravis, imaque longo 3.507. ilia singultu tendunt, it naribus ater 3.508. sanguis et obsessas fauces premit aspera lingua. 3.509. Profuit inserto latices infundere cornu 3.510. Lenaeos; ea visa salus morientibus una; 3.511. mox erat hoc ipsum exitio, furiisque refecti 3.512. ardebant ipsique suos iam morte sub aegra, 3.513. di meliora piis erroremque hostibus illum, 3.514. discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus. 3.515. Ecce autem duro fumans sub vomere taurus 3.516. concidit et mixtum spumis vomit ore cruorem 3.517. extremosque ciet gemitus. It tristis arator 3.518. maerentem abiungens fraterna morte iuvencum, 3.519. atque opere in medio defixa relinquit aratra. 3.520. Non umbrae altorum nemorum, non mollia possunt 3.521. prata movere animum, non qui per saxa volutus 3.522. purior electro campum petit amnis; at ima 3.523. solvuntur latera atque oculos stupor urguet inertis 3.524. ad terramque fluit devexo pondere cervix. 3.525. Quid labor aut benefacta iuvant? Quid vomere terras 3.526. invertisse gravis? Atqui non Massica Bacchi 3.527. munera, non illis epulae nocuere repostae: 3.528. frondibus et victu pascuntur simplicis herbae, 3.529. pocula sunt fontes liquidi atque exercita cursu 3.530. flumina, nec somnos abrumpit cura salubris. 3.531. Tempore non alio dicunt regionibus illis 3.532. quaesitas ad sacra boves Iunonis et uris 3.533. imparibus ductos alta ad donaria currus. 3.534. Ergo aegre rastris terram rimantur et ipsis 3.535. unguibus infodiunt fruges montisque per altos 3.536. contenta cervice trahunt stridentia plaustra. 3.537. Non lupus insidias explorat ovilia circum 3.538. nec gregibus nocturnus obambulat; acrior illum 3.539. cura domat; timidi dammae cervique fugaces 3.540. nunc interque canes et circum tecta vagantur. 3.541. Iam maris immensi prolem et genus omne natantum 3.542. litore in extremo, ceu naufraga corpora, fluctus 3.543. proluit; insolitae fugiunt in flumina phocae. 3.544. Interit et curvis frustra defensa latebris 3.545. vipera et attoniti squamis adstantibus hydri. 3.546. Ipsis est aer avibus non aequus et illae 3.547. praecipites alta vitam sub nube relinquunt. 3.548. Praeterea iam nec mutari pabula refert 3.549. artes nocent quaesitaeque; cessere magistri 3.550. Phillyrides Chiron Amythaoniusque Melampus. 3.551. Saevit et in lucem Stygiis emissa tenebris 3.552. pallida Tisiphone Morbos agit ante Metumque, 3.553. inque dies avidum surgens caput altius effert: 3.554. Balatu pecorum et crebris mugitibus amnes 3.555. arentesque sot ripae collesque supini: 3.556. Iamque catervatim dat stragem atque aggerat ipsis 3.557. in stabulis turpi dilapsa cadavera tabo 3.558. donec humo tegere ac foveis abscondere discunt. 3.559. Nam neque erat coriis usus nec viscera quisquam 3.560. aut undis abolere potest aut vincere flamma; 3.561. ne tondere quidem morbo inluvieque peresa 3.562. vellera nec telas possunt attingere putris; 3.563. verum etiam invisos si quis temptarat amictus, 3.564. ardentes papulae atque immundus olentia sudor 3.565. membra sequebatur nec longo deinde moranti 3.566. tempore contactos artus sacer ignis edebat.
4.561. fulminat Euphraten bello victorque volentes 4.562. per populos dat iura viamque adfectat Olympo. 4.563. Illo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat 4.564. Parthenope studiis florentem ignobilis oti, 4.565. carmina qui lusi pastorum audaxque iuventa, 4.566. Tityre, te patulae cecini sub tegmine fagi.''. None | 1.133. And when the parched field quivers, and all the blade
1.145. Holds all the country, whence the hollow dyke 1.146. Sweat steaming vapour?' "
1.168. Might forge the various arts, with furrow's help" '
2.40. That gave it being. Nay, marvellous to tell,
2.174. And ease the panting breathlessness of age. 2.175. But no, not Mede-land with its wealth of woods,' "
2.490. Till hollow vale o'erflows, and gorge profound," "2.491. Where'er the god hath turned his comely head." '2.492. Therefore to Bacchus duly will we sing 2.493. Meet honour with ancestral hymns, and cate 2.494. And dishes bear him; and the doomed goat
2.498. Hath needs beyond exhausting; the whole soil 2.499. Thrice, four times, yearly must be cleft, the sod
2.505. And the chill north wind from the forests shook 2.506. Their coronal, even then the careful swain' "
3.244. And rippling plains 'gin shiver with light gusts;" '
3.478. Many there be who from their mothers keep 3.479. The new-born kids, and straightway bind their mouth 3.480. With iron-tipped muzzles. What they milk at dawn, 3.481. Or in the daylight hours, at night they press; 3.482. What darkling or at sunset, this ere morn 3.483. They bear away in baskets—for to town 3.484. The shepherd hies him—or with dash of salt 3.485. Just sprinkle, and lay by for winter use. 3.486. Nor be thy dogs last cared for; but alike 3.487. Swift Spartan hounds and fierce Molossian feed 3.488. On fattening whey. Never, with these to watch, 3.489. Dread nightly thief afold and ravening wolves, 3.490. Or Spanish desperadoes in the rear. 3.491. And oft the shy wild asses thou wilt chase, 3.492. With hounds, too, hunt the hare, with hounds the doe; 3.493. oft from his woodland wallowing-den uprouse 3.494. The boar, and scare him with their baying, and drive,' "3.495. And o'er the mountains urge into the toil" '3.496. Some antlered monster to their chiming cry. 3.497. Learn also scented cedar-wood to burn 3.498. Within the stalls, and snakes of noxious smell 3.499. With fumes of galbanum to drive away. 3.500. oft under long-neglected cribs, or lurk 3.501. A viper ill to handle, that hath fled 3.502. The light in terror, or some snake, that wont' "3.503. 'Neath shade and sheltering roof to creep, and shower" '3.504. Its bane among the cattle, hugs the ground, 3.505. Fell scourge of kine. Shepherd, seize stakes, seize stones! 3.506. And as he rears defiance, and puffs out 3.507. A hissing throat, down with him! see how low 3.508. That cowering crest is vailed in flight, the while, 3.509. His midmost coils and final sweep of tail 3.510. Relaxing, the last fold drags lingering spires. 3.511. Then that vile worm that in Calabrian glade 3.512. Uprears his breast, and wreathes a scaly back, 3.513. His length of belly pied with mighty spots— 3.514. While from their founts gush any streams, while yet 3.515. With showers of Spring and rainy south-winds earth 3.516. Is moistened, lo! he haunts the pools, and here 3.517. Housed in the banks, with fish and chattering frog 3.518. Crams the black void of his insatiate maw. 3.519. Soon as the fens are parched, and earth with heat 3.520. Is gaping, forth he darts into the dry, 3.521. Rolls eyes of fire and rages through the fields, 3.522. Furious from thirst and by the drought dismayed. 3.523. Me list not then beneath the open heaven 3.524. To snatch soft slumber, nor on forest-ridge 3.525. Lie stretched along the grass, when, slipped his slough, 3.526. To glittering youth transformed he winds his spires, 3.527. And eggs or younglings leaving in his lair, 3.528. Towers sunward, lightening with three-forked tongue. 3.529. of sickness, too, the causes and the sign' "3.530. I'll teach thee. Loathly scab assails the sheep," '3.531. When chilly showers have probed them to the quick, 3.532. And winter stark with hoar-frost, or when sweat 3.533. Unpurged cleaves to them after shearing done, 3.534. And rough thorns rend their bodies. Hence it i 3.535. Shepherds their whole flock steep in running streams, 3.536. While, plunged beneath the flood, with drenched fell, 3.537. The ram, launched free, goes drifting down the tide.' "3.538. Else, having shorn, they smear their bodies o'er" '3.539. With acrid oil-lees, and mix silver-scum 3.540. And native sulphur and Idaean pitch, 3.541. Wax mollified with ointment, and therewith 3.542. Sea-leek, strong hellebores, bitumen black.' "3.543. Yet ne'er doth kindlier fortune crown his toil," '3.544. Than if with blade of iron a man dare lance' "3.545. The ulcer's mouth ope: for the taint is fed" '3.546. And quickened by confinement; while the swain 3.547. His hand of healing from the wound withholds, 3.548. Or sits for happier signs imploring heaven.' "3.549. Aye, and when inward to the bleater's bone" '3.550. The pain hath sunk and rages, and their limb' "3.551. By thirsty fever are consumed, 'tis good" '3.552. To draw the enkindled heat therefrom, and pierce 3.553. Within the hoof-clefts a blood-bounding vein. 3.554. of tribes Bisaltic such the wonted use, 3.555. And keen Gelonian, when to 3.556. He flies, or Getic desert, and quaffs milk 3.557. With horse-blood curdled. Seest one far afield' "3.558. oft to the shade's mild covert win, or pull" '3.559. The grass tops listlessly, or hindmost lag, 3.560. Or, browsing, cast her down amid the plain, 3.561. At night retire belated and alone; 3.562. With quick knife check the mischief, ere it creep 3.563. With dire contagion through the unwary herd. 3.564. Less thick and fast the whirlwind scours the main 3.565. With tempest in its wake, than swarm the plague 3.566. of cattle; nor seize they single lives alone,
4.561. All unforgetful of his ancient craft, 4.562. Transforms himself to every wondrous thing, 4.563. Fire and a fearful beast, and flowing stream. 4.564. But when no trickery found a path for flight, 4.565. Baffled at length, to his own shape returned, 4.566. With human lips he spake, “Who bade thee, then,''. None |
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78. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, authority of Epicurus • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 35; Bryan (2018) 242, 243; Wardy and Warren (2018) 242, 243
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79. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Anticipation of misfortune, Rejected by Epicureans • Epicureanism • Epicureans • Epicureans, Against fear of death • Epicureans, Hope, value of • Epicureans, Selective emotion • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicurus and Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Lucretius, Epicurean, Against fear of death • pleasure (ἡδονή), in Epicureanism
Found in books: Ayres and Ward (2021) 188, 189; Bryan (2018) 220; Long (2006) 118; Sorabji (2000) 201, 236, 237, 248; Wardy and Warren (2018) 220; Williams and Vol (2022) 191; Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
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80. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurean garden • Epicurean therapeutic program • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, ethics of • Epicureans • Epicureans, • Epicureans, Prolongation of life of no value • Epicureans, Selective emotion • Epicureans, alleged atheism of • Epicureans, and food • Epicureans, and wine • Epicureans, as chefs • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicureans, language of • Epicurus/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureanism, hedonic calculus • Epicurus/Epicureanism, pleasure • Epicurus/Epicureans • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism • Epicurus/Epicureans/Epicureanism, on up to us (παρ’ ἡμῖν) • Horace, Epicureanism as main thread of life • Lucretius, Epicurean, Free will • Lucretius, Epicurean, Prolongation of life of no value • Philodemus, Epicurean, Confession • Philodemus, Epicurean, On frank criticism • Sage, Epicurean • Vesuvius, eruption of ( ad, virtue(s), Epicurean concept of • Zeno of Sidon, Epicurean • death, Epicureanism • economics, Epicurean • economics, Epicurean, and pleasure/pain • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of • ethics, of Epicureanism • friendship, Epicurean • god, gods, Epicurean • gods (Epicurean), character (blessedness and incorruptibility) • gods (Epicurean), human friendship with • gods (Epicurean), involvement in moral formation • gods (Epicurean), realist and idealist conceptions of • knowledge, Epicurean • oikeiōsis = Lat. commendatio or conciliatio, Epicurean version of • pangs in Epicureanism • pleasure (ἡδονή), in Epicureanism • suicide, in Epicureanism • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Allison (2020) 58, 59, 60, 63, 71, 72, 81, 82; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 174; Bryan (2018) 220; Frede and Laks (2001) 254; Gordon (2012) 5, 6, 8, 27, 31, 32, 42, 43, 47, 57, 59, 60, 90, 127, 134; Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018) 23; Linjamaa (2019) 75; Long (2006) 79, 114, 161, 179, 187, 188, 189, 200; Long (2019) 70, 73, 74, 77, 118, 121, 126, 127, 131, 132, 134, 136; Mackey (2022) 241; McDonough (2009) 106; Rosa and Santangelo (2020) 94, 95; Sorabji (2000) 201, 217, 241, 333; Tsouni (2019) 92; Wardy and Warren (2018) 220; Williams and Vol (2022) 64, 80, 184, 185; Wilson (2010) 180; Wolfsdorf (2020) 404; Yona (2018) 27, 28, 29, 30, 36, 37, 40
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81. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureanism, communal life of • Epicureans • Epicureans, as chefs • Epicureans, hedonism • Epicureans, language of • Partition of soul, Epicurean bipartition of soul • Philodemus, Epicurean, Confession • Philodemus, Epicurean, On frank criticism • Sage, Epicurean • Zeno of Sidon, Epicurean • breath and heat (Epicurean) • death, Epicureanism • economics, Epicurean, economics, Philodemus’ account of • god, gods, Epicurean • gods (Epicurean), character (blessedness and incorruptibility) • gods (Epicurean), involvement in moral formation • gods (Epicurean), realist and idealist conceptions of • knowledge, Epicurean • limit, Epicurean concept of • pangs in Epicureanism • seeds, in Epicurean physics
Found in books: Allison (2020) 60, 63, 64, 65, 81, 90; Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 609; Bryan (2018) 215; Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 479, 480; Gordon (2012) 28; Inwood and Warren (2020) 90, 94, 95, 110; Lloyd (1989) 9; Long (2006) 167, 169; Long (2019) 71, 121, 122, 123, 136; McDonough (2009) 103; Sorabji (2000) 217; Struck (2016) 184; Wardy and Warren (2018) 215; Yona (2018) 49
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82. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism • Epicureans • Epicureans, alleged atheism of • Epicureans, and food • Epicureans, as chefs • Epicureans, language of • Partition of soul, Epicurean bipartition of soul • breath and heat (Epicurean) • ethics, of Epicureanism • gods, location in Epicureanism • limit, Epicurean concept of • seeds, in Epicurean physics
Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 476, 480; Gale (2000) 90; Gordon (2012) 29; Inwood and Warren (2020) 110; Long (2006) 162, 168; McDonough (2009) 103; Wardy and Warren (2018) 229
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83. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans, alleged atheism of • Epicureans, hedonism • Plutarch, criticism of Epicureans • Vesuvius, eruption of ( ad, virtue(s), Epicurean concept of • cult, Epicurean • economics, Epicurean • economics, Epicurean, acceptable sources of income • economics, Epicurean, and pleasure/pain • friendship, Epicurean • god, gods, Epicurean • gods (Epicurean), human friendship with • gods (Epicurean), involvement in moral formation • knowledge, Epicurean • value, in Epicureanism
Found in books: Allison (2020) 71, 74; Bryan (2018) 203, 215, 216, 218, 219; Gordon (2012) 5, 59; Long (2019) 73, 75; Mackey (2022) 212; Wardy and Warren (2018) 203, 215, 216, 218, 219; Yona (2018) 30, 31
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84. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureans • Epicureans, and food • Epicureans, language of
Found in books: Gordon (2012) 62; Lloyd (1989) 49
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85. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, • Epicurus and Epicureanism,
Found in books: Edmonds (2019) 245; Luck (2006) 398
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