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120 results for "epictetus"
1. Plato, Phaedrus, 255E (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, celebrate with sacrifice thirty days free from anger Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 316
2. Plato, Philebus, 47E-50B (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, true love requires detachment Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 183
3. Plato, Republic, 474D-475A, 571D, 589A 7, 611B-612A (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 187
4. Democritus, Fragments, A 20 DK, frags.257-9 DK (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 223
5. Plato, Charmides, 167E (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320
6. Aristotle, Topics, 4.5, 126a12, 126a13, 126a14 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320
7. Aristotle, Movement of Animals, 10, 11, 700b22, 703b10, 703b11, 703b5, 703b6, 703b7, 703b8, 703b9, 6 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320
8. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1.5, 1.8, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 1215b29, 1218a10, 1218a11, 1218a12, 1218a13, 1218a14, 1218a15, 1223b, 1225a37, 1225b10, 1225b8, 1225b9, 1226b30, 1226b31, 1226b32 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241, 327
9. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.6, 1.13, 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, 3.9, 5.8, 9.4, 9.8, 10.3, 10.7, 10.8, 1096b3, 1096b4, 1096b5, 1102b10, 1102b11, 1102b9, 1111b10, 1111b11, 1111b6, 1111b7, 1111b8, 1111b9, 1113b19, 1113b20, 1113b21, 1113b22, 1113b23, 1114a18, 1114a19, 1117b10, 1117b11, 1117b12, 1117b13, 1135a24, 1166a17, 1168b, 1168b34, 1174a17, 1177b26, 1177b27, 1177b28, 1178b10, 1178b11, 1178b12, 1178b13, 1178b14, 1178b15, 1178b16, 1178b17, 1178b18, 1178b19, 1178b20, 1178b21, 1178b22, 1178b23, 1178b8, 1178b9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 187, 241, 250, 320, 327, 376, 413
10. Aristotle, Politics, 7.15, 1334b22 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320
11. Aristotle, Soul, 1.1, 3.9, 403a22, 403a25-b9, 432b, 432b5, 432b6 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 71, 320
12. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2.3, 1380b5, 1380b6 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241
13. Democritus Ephesius, Fragments, A 20 DK, frags.257-9 DK (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 223
14. Cicero, On Laws, 1.12.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, true love requires detachment Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 184
15. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.22(SVF 3.18), 3.31(SVF 3.190), 3.53, 3.52, 3.51, 3.50, 2.27, 3.62, 3.66, 3.65, 3.63, 3.19.63 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170
16. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.22(SVF 3.18), 3.31(SVF 3.190), 3.50, 3.53, 3.52, 3.51, 2.27, 3.63, 3.65, 3.66, 3.19.63, 3.62 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170
17. Cicero, On Fate, 9.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320
18. Cicero, Academica, 2.44, 2.135 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 162
19. Cicero, On Duties, 1.101, 2.18, 3.6.27-3.6.28 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, ensures freedom •epictetus, stoic, proairesis •epictetus, stoic, true love requires detachment Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 184, 331
1.101. Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura; una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est o(rmh/ Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumque sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet. Omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate et neglegentia nec vero agere quicquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere; haec est enim fere discriptio officii. 2.18. Etenim virtus omnis tribus in rebus fere vertitur, quarum una est in perspiciendo, quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique, quid consequens, ex quo quaeque gigtur, quae cuiusque rei causa sit, alterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci pa/qh nomit, appetitionesque, quas illi o(rma/s, oboedientes efficere rationi, tertium iis, quibuscum congregemur, uti moderate et scienter, quorum studiis ea, quae natura desiderat, expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque, si quid importetur nobis incommodi, propulsemus ulciscamurque eos, qui nocere nobis conati sint, tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas humanitasque patitur. 1.101.  Now we find that the essential activity of the spirit is twofold: one force is appetite (that is, ὁρμή, in Greek), which impels a man this way and that; the other is reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and what should be left undone. The result is that reason commands, appetite obeys. Again, every action ought to be free from undue haste or carelessness; neither ought we to do anything for which we cannot assign a reasonable motive; for in these words we have practically a definition of duty. < 2.18.  And, indeed, virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in three properties; the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is [Temperance,] the ability to restrain the passions (which the Greeks call πάθη) and make the impulses (ὁρμαί) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated, in order that we may through their cooperation have our natural wants supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward of any impending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to injure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity will permit. <
20. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.94, 3.22, 3.28, 3.52, 3.54-3.55, 3.58, 3.61, 3.68, 3.70, 3.74, 3.76-3.79, 3.83, 4.43-4.57, 4.61 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic •epictetus, stoic, ensures freedom •epictetus, stoic, only will (proairesis), desire, judgement is upto us, not anything bodily •epictetus, stoic, or falls under our will (proairesis) •epictetus, stoic, proairesis •epictetus, stoic, certain emotions useful in training •epictetus, stoic, true love requires detachment •epictetus, stoic, falsehoods permitted •epictetus, stoic, prothumia Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52, 70, 161, 162, 175, 178, 223, 241, 332
1.94. cur? nam, reor, nullis, si vita longior daretur, posset esse iucundior; nihil enim est profecto homini hominis X prudentia dulcius, cf. Med. fr. 676 quam, ut quam ut quia utem K 1 cetera auferat, adfert certe senectus. Quae vero aetas longa est, aut quid omnino est post omnino add. V vet homini longum? nonne Mo/do pueros, pueri (i in r. V 1 ) V modo a/dulescentes i/n cursu a tergo i/nsequens Com. pall. inc. 43 actergo V 1 Ne/c opitis a/dsecuta est senectus? sed quia ultra nihil habemus, hoc longum dicimus. ducimus K Omnia ista, perinde ut cuique data sunt pro rata parte, ita aut longa aut parte avita longa GKR parte aucta l. in parte aut l. corr. V parte, ita aut Man. brevia dicuntur. apud Hypanim fluvium, qui ab Europae parte in Pontum influit, Aristoteles Arist. hist. an. 552b 18 ait bestiolas quasdam nasci, quae unum diem vivant. ex his igitur hora VIII quae mortua est, provecta aetate mortua est; quae vero occidente sole, decrepita, eo magis, si etiam solstitiali die. confer confert X ( corr. KV 1 ) nostram longissimam aetatem cum aeternitate: in eadem propemodum brevitate qua illae bestiolae reperiemur. reperiemus V 1 3.22. Haec sic sic R c? V c si X dicuntur a Stoicis concludunturque contortius. sed latius aliquando aliquando cf. 323,22 aliquanto s male, cf. de orat. 1, 133 opt. gen. 23 dicenda sunt et diffusius; sententiis tamen utendum eorum potissimum, qui qui ex quā ut v. G 2 maxime forti et, ut ita dicam, virili utuntur ratione atque sententia. nam Peripatetici, familiares nostri, quibus nihil est uberius, nihil eruditius, nihil gravius, mediocritates vel perturbationum vel morborum animi mihi non sane probant. omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, mediocre iocre in r. G 2 malum malum Bouh. magnum alt. id om. H est; nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. nam ut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, sanum non est, sic in animo ista mediocritas caret sanitate. itaque praeclare nostri, ut alia multa, molestiam sollicitudinem angorem propter similitudinem corporum aegrorum aegritudinem aegritudinem cf. Aug. civ. 14,17 ext. nominaverunt. 3.28. Atque hoc quidem perspicuum est, tum tum add. G 2 aegritudinem existere, cum quid ita visum sit, ut magnum quoddam malum adesse et urgere videatur. Epicuro autem placet opinionem mali aegritudinem esse ea ante esse add. V 2 natura, esse, ea natura Usen. Ep. fr. 444 ( sed cf. 334,14 necesse esse eqs.) ex opinione pro opinionem Sey. efficere pro esse Bai. cf. quae dixi Herm. XLI 323 ut, quicumque intueatur in aliquod maius malum, si id sibi accidisse opinetur, sit continuo in aegritudine. aegritudinem X Cyrenaici non omni malo malo modo R 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GK 1 effici censent, sed insperato et necopinato malo. est id quidem non mediocre ad aegritudinem augendam: videntur enim omnia repentina graviora. ex hoc et illa iure laudantur: E/go cum genui, tu/m morituros moriturum et huic rei Sen. ad Pol. 11, 2 sci/vi et ei rei Enn. Telam. sc. 312. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 su/stuli. Prae/terea praeterea ae in r. V c ad Troia/m cum misi ob de/fendendam Grae/ciam, Sci/bam scibam Fronto p. 217 sciebam me in morti/ferum bellum, no/n in epulas mi/ttere. 3.52. qui tum aegritudinem censent existere, si necopinato quid evenerit. est id quidem magnum, ut supra supra p. 332, 6 dixi; etiam Chrysippo Chrys. fr. eth. 417 crysippo X ita videri scio, quod provisum ante non sit, id ferire ferire fieri X corr. V c aut 1 vehementius; sed non sunt in hoc hic in hoc G ( exp. 2 ) omnia. quamquam hostium et ante hostium add. V 2 non male repens adventus advetus G 1 R 1 V 1 magis aliquanto aliquando X corr. V c aut 1 conturbat quam expectatus, et maris subita tempestas quam ante provisa terret provisitaret K 1 navigantes vehementius, et eius modi sunt pleraque. sed cum diligenter necopinatorum naturam consideres, nihil aliud reperias repperias G R 1 V nisi omnia videri subita maiora, et quidem ob duas causas, primum quod, quanta sint quae accidunt, post accidunt V c in mg. add. : et qualia, cum repente accidunt ( non inepte cf. p. 345, 21 ) considerandi spatium non datur, deinde, cum cum tum G videtur praecaveri potuisse, si provisum esset, quasi culpa contractum malum aegritudinem acriorem facit. 3.54. legimus librum Clitomachi, quem ille eversa Karthagine misit consolandi causa ad captivos, cives suos; in eo est disputatio scripta Carneadis, quam se ait in commentarium rettulisse. retulisse G 1 K ( ex retullisse 1 ) V cum ita positum esset, videri vidi G 1 fore in aegritudine sapientem patria capta, quae Carneades contra dixerit, scripta sunt. tanta igitur calamitatis praesentis adhibetur a philosopho medicina, quanta inveteratae inveterata X corr. s (in inveterata al. ) desideraretur V 2 ne desideratur quidem, nec, si aliquot aliquod G annis post idem ille liber captivis missus esset, volneribus mederetur, sed cicatricibus. sensim enim et pedetemptim progrediens extenuatur dolor, non quo ipsa res immutari soleat aut possit, sed id, quod ratio debuerat, usus docet, minora esse ea quae sint visa maiora. Quid ergo opus est, dicet aliquis, omnino ratione aut consolatione illa, ratione aut omnino consolatione ulla X illa s ( idem men- dum p. 353, 29 al. ) omnino ratione aut Po. qua solemus uti, cum levare dolorem maerentium volumus? 3.55. hoc enim fere tum habemus in promptu, promtu GR nihil oportere inopinatum videri. aut aut R, sed u del. R c qui sic VBM s videantur y non quia G 1 R 1, in mg. eodem signo addito quia recentia sunt, maiora videntur G 2 quia recentia sunt R vet (c ?) quia recentia sunt in textu habet K 1 maiora videntur add. K 2 ( item P) tolerabilius feret incommodum, qui cognoverit cognoverint X corr. R 2 V c necesse esse homini tale aliquid accidere? haec enim oratio de ipsa summa mali nihil detrahit, tantum modo adfert, nihil evenisse quod non opidum fuisset. neque tamen genus id orationis in consolando non valet, sed id haud sciam an plurimum. * ergo ista necopinata non habent tantam vim, ut aegritudo ex is omnis oriatur; feriunt enim fortasse gravius, non id efficiunt, ut ea, quae accidant maiora videantur: sic VBM s videantur y non quia G 1 R 1, in mg. eodem signo addito quia recentia sunt, maiora videntur G 2 quia recentia sunt R vet (c ?) quia recentia sunt in textu habet K 1 maiora videntur add. K 2 ( item P) quia recentia sunt, maiora videntur, non quia repentina. Ergo... 18 repentina verba ipsa sana sunt ( cf. Herm. XLI p. 324 ), sed non suo loco posita. a Cicerone ipso, ut argumentationem §§ 52–54 concluderent, in chiro- grapho postea adscripta, ab Attici librariis autem falso loco inserta esse videntur. (nam id efficiunt ... videantur, sed maiora videntur, quia recentia sunt, non quia repentina We. ut ea quae accidant, mala videantur ... non quia repentina, mala Se, Jb. d. ph. V. 24 p. 244 ) 3.58. similiter commemorandis exemplis orbitates quoque liberum liberorum V c praedicantur, eorumque, eorum quoque K 1 qui gravius ferunt, luctus aliorum exemplis leniuntur. sic perpessio ceterorum facit, ut ea quae acciderint multo minora maiora ex minora V c quam quanta sint existimata, videantur. ita fit, sensim cogitantibus ut, quantum sit ementita opinio, appareat. atque hoc idem et Telamo ille declarat: ego cum genui et Theseus: futuras mecum commentabar miserias tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli add. R 2, moriturum scivi V 3 et Anaxagoras: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. cf. p. 332, 9 sqq. hi enim omnes diu cogitantes de rebus humanis intellegebant eas nequaquam pro opinione volgi esse extimescendas. extimescendas KR 1 existimescendas R c G existimiscendas G 1 e corr. V et mihi quidem videtur idem fere accidere is qui ante meditantur, quod is quibus medetur dies, nisi quod ratio ratio V ratione GKR ( unde in hoc quae- dam 2? ) quaedam sanat illos, hos ipsa natura intellecto eo quod rem continet, illud illud continet X trp. B malum, quod opinatum sit esse maxumum, nequaquam esse tantum, ut vitam beatam possit evertere. 3.61. Omnibus enim modis fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt propter magnitudinem aegritudinis. ex quo ipsam aegritudinem lu/phn a\gP HN fere X ( L ex A V) Chrysippus quasi Chrys. fr. eth. 485 solutionem totius hominis appellatam omnibus modis... 12 appellat putat. appellat amputat KR 1 V ( cf. H et praef. ) Quae tota poterit evelli explicata, ut ut aut V 1 principio dixi, dixi cf. p. 329, 2sqq. causa aegritudinis; est enim nulla alia nisi opinio et iudicium magni praesentis atque urgentis mali. est... 15 mali itaque et dolor corporis, cuius est morsus acerrumus, perferetur perferetur X ( cf. Po. comm. ad 1, 29 ) perfertur V c spe proposita boni, et acta aetas honeste ac splendide tantam adfert consolationem, ut eos qui ita vixerint aut non attingat aegritudo aegritudo del. Dav. aut perleviter pungat animi dolor. Sed ad hanc opinionem magni mali cum illa etiam opinio accessit oportere, rectum esse, rectū esse esse scr. V c ad officium pertinere ferre perferre V ( sed per in r. rec ) illud aegre quod acciderit, tum denique efficitur illa gravis aegritudinis perturbatio. tum ... 23 perturbatio om. H 3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 3.70. neque tamen, cum se in media stultitia, qua nihil quia n. G 1 est peius, haerere intellegant, aegritudine premuntur; nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putant lugendum lungendum GV 1 ( prius n eras. ) iungen- dum KR viris? sqq. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 qualis fuit Q. Maxumus fuitque maxumus G 2 (quae G 1 ) KV ( ss. m. 3 ) ac fortasse R 1 (Q post fuit in r. m. al. ) efferens efferrens GR 1 V filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus paullus RG 1 e corr. V 1 (l eras. ) cf.p. 263, 17; 274, 19; 457, 7 duobus paucis lucius et marcus X diebus amissis amisis G 1 R 1 V 1 filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione consolationem G -ne V conlegimus. 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 3.77. Erit igitur in consolationibus prima medicina docere aut nullum malum esse aut admodum parvum, altera et prius et om. G 1 de communi condicione vitae et proprie, propriae G 1 KVH ( sim. 358, 6 ) si quid sit de ipsius qui maereat disputandum, tertia tertiam H summam esse stultitiam frustra confici maerore, cum intellegas nihil nil G posse profici. nam Cleanthes cleantes X (24 GK 1 ) Cl. fr. 577 quidem sapientem consolatur, qui consolatione non eget. nihil enim enim om. G 1 esse malum, quod turpe non sit, si lugenti persuaseris, non tu illi luctum, sed stultitiam detraxeris; erit... 21 detraxeris ( sine 18 nam... 19 eget) H alienum autem tempus docendi. et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes suscipi... 24 Cleanthes om. K Cleanthes del. Ba. sed cf. Va. Op. 2, 130. 409 ipse fateatur. quid enim dicemus, cum Socrates Aisch. Socr. fr. 10 D. Aug. civ. 14, 8 Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse nec quicquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis baiolum interesse, cum se Alcibiades adflictaret lacrimansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret, illam ante dep. add. V 2 —quid dicemus, Cleanthe? acleanthe V (356, 23 cl. in r. V 2 ) o cleanthe Str. p. 58 tum tum ( cf. 356, 23 aliquando)] num edd. aegritudinem X corr. K 1 R c V 1 in illa re, quae aegritudine Alcibiadem adficiebat, mali nihil fuisse? 3.78. quid? illa Lyconis qualia quia GRV 1 (a eras. ) sunt? qui aegritudinem extenuans parvis ait eam rebus moveri, fortunae et corporis incommodis, non animi malis. mali X corr. V 2 quid ergo? illud, quod Alcibiades dolebat, non ex animi malis vitiisque constabat? ad Epicuri consolationem satis est ante dictum. 3.79. ne ne n onne K ( ss. 2 ) illa quidem firmissima consolatio est, quamquam quamquam quidquam K 1 et usitata est et saepe prodest: non tibi hoc soli. prodest haec quidem, ut dixi, dixi p. 345, 13 sed nec semper nec omnibus; sunt enim qui respuant; sed refert, quo modo adhibeatur. ut enim enim om. G 1 tulerit quisque eorum qui sapienter tulerunt, non quo quisque incommodo adfectus sit, praedicandum est. Chrysippi crys. KR chris. G ad veritatem firmissima est, ad tempus aegritudinis difficilis. magnum opus opus s onus X est probare maerenti illum suo iudicio et, quod se se exp. V 2 ita putet oportere facere, maerere. Nimirum igitur, ut in causis non semper utimur eodem statu—sic enim appellamus controversiarum genera—, sed ad tempus, ad controversiae naturam, ad personam accommodamus, sic in aegritudine lenienda, quam lenienda. nam quam X nam del. s quisque curationem recipere possit, videndum est. nimirum ... 26 est H 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.43. quorum est talis oratio: primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant, cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt, multoque et imit. Lact. inst. 6, 14 in hostem et in inprobum et in probum V (im ss. 2 ) et inprobum GK (imp.) R (imp.) civem vehementioris vehementiores V (e ex i 2 ) iratorum impetus esse, levis autem ratiunculas eorum, qui ita cogitarent: proelium rectum est hoc fieri, convenit dimicare demicare K 1 pro legibus, pro libertate, pro patria; haec nullam habent habent Peripateticorum argumentatio- nem recta oratione C. referre pergit ut mox v. 13 vim, nisi ira excanduit fortitudo. noctu eqs. ( cf. p. 447, 26 fin. 3, 62. 64 al. ) nec vero de bellatoribus solum disputant: imperia severiora nulla esse putant sine aliqua acerbitate iracundiae; oratorem denique non modo accusantem, sed ne defendentem quidem probant sine aculeis iracundiae, quae etiamsi non adsit, tamen verbis atque motu simulandam arbitrantur, ut auditoris iram oratoris incendat actio. virum denique videri negant qui irasci nesciet, nesciet W (nesciat edd. plur. ) o(/stis ou)de/pote o0rgisqh/setai, tou=ton ou)d ' a)/ndra dokei=n ei/(nai/ fasin Cf. o( sofo\s o)rgisqh/setai, amaturum esse p. 398, 5 vincetur 427, 28 al. Hor. ars 35 eamque, quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lentitudinis vitiosolitudinis K nomine nomine in mg. G 1 appellant. eamque ... 13 appellant Non. 134, 4 4.44. Nec vero nevero G 1 solum hanc libidinem laudant—est enim ira, ut modo modo cf. p. 371, 7 321, 18 Lact. ira 17, 20 definivi, ulciscendi libido—, sed ipsum illud genus vel alt. vel om. KR libidinis vel cupiditatis ad summam utilitatem esse dicunt a natura datum; nihil enim quemquam nisi quod lubeat praeclare facere posse. noctu sqq. Val. Max. 8, 14 ext. 1 ambulabat in publico Themistocles, quod somnum capere non posset, posset: indicatur non externa ambulandi causa, sed ratio qua adductus adulescens inquietus consilium ambulandi ceperit (cum pro quod Sey. ) quaerentibusque respondebat Miltiadis militiadis ( alt. i del. V 3 ) trophaeis GR( corr. R 1 )V militia adstropheis K (tropea miliciadis Val. Max. ) tropaeis se e somno suscitari. suscitare X corr. V rec s cui non sunt auditae Demosthenis demostenis X dolore GR 1 V 1 vigiliae? qui dolere se aiebat, agebat K si quando opificum antelucana victus esset industria. philosophiae denique ipsius principes numquam in suis studiis tantos progressus sine flagranti cupiditate facere potuissent. ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoran Democritum Platonem accepimus. ubi enim quicquid quiquid G 1 esset esse G 1 K quod disci dici GR 1 V 1 ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) posset, eo veniendum iudicaverunt. num num nam R 1 putamus haec fieri sine summo cupiditatis ardore potuisse? 4.45. Ipsam aegritudinem, quam nos ut taetram et inmanem beluam fugiendam fugienda X (-ā V c ) diximus, diximus p. 330, 10 non sine magna utilitate a natura dicunt constitutam, ut homines homines s omnes X castigationes V 1 castigationibus reprehensionibus ignominiis adfici se adfici se adficisse X ( corr. V 3 ) in delicto dolerent. impunitas enim peccatorum data videtur eis qui ignominiam et infamiam ferunt sine dolore; morderi est melius conscientia. ex quo est illud e vita ductum evicta d. V Afr. fr.409 ab Afranio: nam cum dissolutus filius: heu me miserum! eume K tum severus pater: dum modo doleat aliquid, doleat quidlubet. 4.46. Reliquas quoque partis aegritudinis utilis esse dicunt, misericordiam ad opem ferendam et calamitates calamitates post indignorum rep. X del. V 3 hominum indignorum sublevandas; ipsum illud aemulari obtrectare non esse inutile, cum aut se non idem videat consecutum, quod alium, aut alium idem, quod se; metum vero si qui quis GV rec sustulisset, omnem vitae diligentiam sublatam fore, quae summa esset in eis esse K qui leges, qui magistratus, qui leges qui magistratus in r. V c qui paupertatem, qui ignominiam, qui mortem, qui dolorem timerent. tenerent K Haec tamen ita disputant, ut resecanda esse fateantur, evelli penitus dicant nec posse nec opus esse et in omnibus fere rebus mediocritatem esse optumam existiment. existimant s quae cum exponunt, nihilne tibi videntur an aliquid dicere? Mihi vero dicere aliquid, itaque expecto, quid ad ista. ista ( eras. m) K Reperiam fortasse, sed illud ante: 4.47. videsne, quanta fuerit apud Academicos verecundia? plane enim dicunt, quod ad rem pertineat: Peripateticis Peripateticis haec igitur continent quae Academici ( qui verecunde nihil ipsi adfirmant ) dicunt Ciceroque ipse ut Aca- demicus amplectitur ( cf. p. 364, 4 ) respondetur a Stoicis; digladientur illi per me licet, cui nihil est necesse nisi, ubi sit illud, quod veri simillimum videatur, anquirere. quid est igitur quod occurrat in hac quaestione, e quo e quo B 2 s aequa X (e qua V rec ) possit attingi aliquid veri simile, quo longius mens humana progredi non potest? definitio perturbationis, qua quae KV 1 Zeno fr. 205 recte Zenonem usum puto. ita enim definit, ut perturbatio sit aversa a a GrB s om. X ratione contra naturam animi commotio, vel brevius, ut perturbatio sit adpetitus vehementior, vehementior vehementior semel in X autem intellegatur is qui procul absit a naturae constantia. 4.48. quid ad has definitiones possim possint ' Bern. 1 ' Bentl. sed ( ut p. 387, 20 sqq. ) C. ipse definitiones excutit; cf. v. 2–4 et p. 389, 25; 410, 3 dicere? atque atque Tregder atqui haec pleraque sunt prudenter acuteque disserentium, illa quidem ex rhetorum pompa: ardores animorum cotesque virtutum. an vero vir fortis, nisi stomachari coepit, non potest fortis esse? gladiatorium id quidem. id quidem ex idem K 1 quamquam in eis ipsis videmus saepe constantiam: conlocuntur, versus ign. conloquuntur G(?) congrediuntur, quaerunt quaerunt Schlen- ger, Phil. 12, 288 quaeruntur GVR 1 (a del. 1 ) queruntur K aliquid, postulant, ut magis placati quam irati esse videantur, sed in illo genere sit sane Pacideianus pacidianus X (plac. V) aliquis hoc animo, ut narrat Lucil. 153 Lucilius: Occidam illum equidem et vincam, si id quaeritis inquit, Verum illud credo fore: in os prius accipiam ipse Quam gladium in stomacho furi furi Ti. suria GRV sura K ( def. Ro b b. p. 100 ) furia Marx spurci Sey. ac pulmonibus sisto. pulmonibus isto VG 1 Odi hominem, iratus pugno, nec longius quicquam Nobis, nobis s vobis X ( ubis R 1? ) quam dextrae gladium dum accommodet accomodet V ( prius o in r. c ) alter; Usque adeo studio atque odio illius ecferor hęc feror K c ira; at at s V rec ac sine hac hac ac G gladiatoria iracundia videmus progredientem apud Homerum Aiacem multa cum hilaritate, H 211 7. cum depugnaturus esset cum Hectore; 4.49. cuius, ut arma sumpsit, ingressio laetitiam attulit attollit K sociis, terrorem autem autem add. G 2 hostibus, ut ipsum Hectorem, haect. KV (6 G) quem ad modum est apud Homerum, toto pectore trementem provocasse ad pugnam paeniteret. atque atque V hi conlocuti inter se, prius quam manum consererent, leniter et quiete nihil ne in ipsa quidem pugna iracunde rabioseve fecerunt. ego ne Torquatum quidem illum, qui hoc cognomen cognomen e corr. V rec B s cognovit nomen X invenit, iratum existimo Gallo torquem detraxisse, nec Marcellum apud Clastidium ideo fortem fuisse, quia fuerit iratus. 4.50. de Africano quidem, quia notior est nobis propter recentem memoriam, vel iurare possum non illum iracundia tum inflammatum fuisse, cum in acie M. Alliennium aciem alliennium KRG ( ex ali- 1 ) acie malliennium V Paelignum pelignum KV e corr. scuto protexerit gladiumque hosti in pectus infixerit. de L. Bruto fortasse dubitarim, an propter infinitum odium tyranni ecfrenatius effren. K 1 (hecfren. c ) e fren. V 1 in Arruntem arrunte X invaserit; video enim utrumque comminus comminus eqs. Ennii verba latere susp. Mue. adhuc G 1 ictu cecidisse contrario. quid igitur huc adhibetis iram? an fortitudo, nisi insanire coepit, impetus suos non habet? quid? Herculem, quem in caelum ista ipsa, quam vos iracundiam esse vultis, sustulit fortitudo, iratumne ratumne X corr. V 3 s censes conflixisse cum Erymanthio erymathio X (erim. V) corr. R 2 apro aut aut ut R 1 ( corr. c? ) K leone Nemeaeo? nemaeo X an etiam Theseus Marathonii tauri marathonii auri GV 1 ( corr. c ) marathonii auri R 1 marathoniit auri K cornua conprehendit comp. KR iratus? vide ne fortitudo minime sit rabiosa sitque iracundia tota levitatis. 4.51. Neque enim est ulla fortitudo, quae rationis est expers. contemnendae res humanae sunt, sunt B sint X neglegenda mors est, patibiles et dolores et labores putandi — haec 'contemnendae... 7 putandi' — haec dist. Po. ( cf. p. 307, 23 ) cum constituta sunt iudicio atque sententia, tum est robusta illa et stabilis fortitudo, nisi forte, quae vehementer acriter animose fiunt, iracunde fieri suspicamur. mihi ne mihi ne B mi nime X (minime V) Scipio quidem ille pontufex maxumus, qui hoc Stoicorum stoicicorum GV verum esse declaravit, numquam privatum esse sapientem, iratus videtur fuisse Ti. Ti ex tam K c Graccho gracho X tum, cum consulem languentem reliquit atque ipse privatus, ut si consul consul ĕet K (ĕ c ) esset, qui rem publicam salvam salvam s salva X esse vellent, vellent We. vellet hęc quid VK c se sequi iussit. 4.52. nescio, ecquid ipsi nos fortiter in re p. fecerimus: si quid fecimus, certe irati non fecimus. an est quicquam similius insaniae insaniae s insania X quam ira? quam bene Ennius initium dixit Enn. fr. inc. 18 insaniae. color, vox, oculi, spiritus, inpotentia dictorum ac factorum quam partem habent sanitatis? quid Achille Homerico foedius, quid Agamemnone in iurgio? nam Aiacem quidem ira ad furorem mortemque perduxit. non igitur desiderat fortitudo advocatam iracundiam; satis est instructa parata armata per sese. nam isto quidem modo isto modo quidem s corr. We. licet dicere utilem vinulentiam ad fortitudinem, utilem vinul.... 27 utilem om. V etiam dementiam, quod et insani et ebrii multa faciunt saepe vehementius. semper Aiax fortis, fortissimus tamen in furore; nam Trag. inc. 64 nam poetae tribuunt alii Fa/cinus fecit ma/ximum, cum Da/nais inclina/ntibus Summa/m rem perfeci/t perfecit s perficit X manu. manu Bentl. manus s manu sua restituit proelium Insaniens G. Hermann op. 7, 382 sed cf. Plasberg, Festschr. f. Vahlen 224, qui recte proel. r. ins. Ciceroni, non poetae tribuisse vid. proelium restituit insaniens: 4.53. dicamus igitur utilem insaniam? insaniem KR Tracta definitiones fortitudinis: intelleges eam stomacho non egere. fortitudo est igitur adfectio Sphaerus St. fr. 1, 628 cf. Chrys. 3, 285 animi legi summae legissumme K (summe V) optemp. G in perpetiendis rebus obtemperans vel conservatio stabilis iudicii in eis in eis ex meis V c rebus quae formidolosae videntur subeundis et repellendis vel scientia rerum formidolosarum contrariarumque contrariarumque alt. a ex u eff. rumque in r. scr. V c aut aut et Hei. perferendarum aut s ( sed omnino neglegenda est ou)de/tera vel a)dia/fora cf. fin. 4, 71 ) omnino neglegendarum conservans conservens V 1 earum rerum stabile iudicium vel brevius, ut Chrysippus chris. V (nam superiores definitiones erant Sphaeri, spheri X hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoici; sunt enim omnino omnes fere similes, sed declarant communis notiones alia magis alia)—quo modo igitur Chrysippus? chris. V fortitudo est inquit scientia rerum perferendarum vel adfectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo summae legi parens sine timore. quamvis licet insectemur istos, ut Carneades solebat, metuo ne soli soli add. K c philosophi sint. quae quae ex qui K 1 enim istarum definitionum non aperit notionem nostram, quam habemus omnes de fortitudine tectam atque involutam? qua aperta quis est qui aut bellatori aut imperatori aut oratori quaerat aliquid neque eos existumet sine rabie quicquam fortiter facere posse? 4.54. Quid? Stoici, qui omnes insipientes insanos esse dicunt, nonne ista conligunt? colligunt G 1 ( corr. 1 ) KcV rec ( ex colig.) remove perturbationes maxumeque maxumequae G 1 RV 1 videbantur K iracundiam: iam videbuntur monstra mostra R 1 nostra G dicere. nunc autem ita ita add. K c disserunt, sic se dicere omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne caenum. St. fr. 3, 665 cf. Aug. soliloq. 1, 11, 19 at non semper. commove: senties. sic iracundus non semper iratus est; lacesse: iam videbis furentem. Quid? ista bellatrix iracundia, cum domum rediit, qualis est cum uxore, cum liberis, cum familia? an tum quoque est utilis? est igitur aliquid quod quod add. V 1 perturbata mens melius possit facere quam constans? an quisquam potest sine perturbatione mentis irasci? bene igitur nostri, cum omnia essent in moribus moribus V c s morbus GR 1 V 1 morbis KR e corr. vitia, quod nullum erat iracundia foedius, iracundos solos solus V 1 morosos nominaverunt. 4.55. Oratorem vero irasci minime decet, simulare non dedecet. simulare n. dedecet om. V decet X an tibi irasci tum videmur, cum quid in causis acrius et vehementius dicimus? quid? cum iam rebus transactis et praeteritis orationes scribimus, num irati scribimus? ecquis ecquis s etquis X hoc animadvertit? Accius Atr. 233 animadvortet de orat. 3, 217 M (animum advertit L), quod hic quoque fort. restituendum vincite! —num aut egisse umquam iratum Aesopum aut scripsisse existimas existimamus KR iratum Accium? aguntur ista praeclare, et ab oratore quidem melius, si modo est orator, est orator melius G 1 quam ab ullo histrione, istrione X ( str. G 1 ) sed aguntur leniter et mente tranquilla. Libidinem vero laudare cuius est libidinis? lubid. GRK c Themistoclem mihi et Demosthenen demostenen X proferri G 1 profertis, additis Pythagoran Democritum Platonem. quid? vos studia libidinem libidine GK vocatis? quae vel optimarum rerum, ut ea sunt quae profertis, sedata tamen et et add. G 2 tranquilla esse debent. Iam aegritudinem laudare, unam rem maxime detestabilem, quorum est tandem philosophorum? at ad KR commode dixit Afranius: dum modo doleat aliquid, fr. 409 cf. p. 383, 13 doleat doleat lateat G 1 quidlibet. quidlibet hic X dixit enim de adulescente perdito ac dissoluto, nos autem de constanti viro ac sapienti sapienti ex -e V 1 quaerimus. et quidem ipsam illam iram centurio habeat aut signifer vel ceteri, de quibus dici non necesse est, ne rhetorum aperiamus mysteria. utile est enim uti motu utinmotu K 1 animi, qui uti ratione non potest. nos autem, ut testificor saepe, de sapiente quaerimus. quoque ( item post Afranii versum ) 4.56. At etiam etiam enim Sey. sed cf. p. 383, 14 aemulari utile est, obtrectare, obtrectari X misereri. cur misereare potius quam feras opem, si id facere possis? an sine misericordia liberales esse non possumus? non enim suscipere ipsi aegritudines propter alios debemus, sed alios, si possumus, levare aegritudine. obtrectare vero alteri aut illa vitiosa aemulatione, quae rivalitati similis est, aemulari quid habet utilitatis, cum sit aemulantis angi alieno bono quod ipse non habeat, obtrectantis opt. G autem angi alieno bono, quod id etiam alius habeat? qui qui s quis GKCRV quid K 1 (quis id M) app. V c id adprobari possit, aegritudinem suscipere pro experientia, si quid habere velis? nam nam B s non X solum habere velle summa dementia est. Mediocritates autem malorum quis laudare recte possit? 4.57. quis enim potest, in quo libido cupiditasve sit, non libidinosus et cupidus esse? in quo ira, non iracundus? in quo angor, non anxius? in quo timor, non timidus? libidinosum igitur et iracundum et anxium et timidum censemus esse sapientem? de cuius excellentia excelentia R 1 V 1 multa quidem dici quamvis fuse fuse om. V possunt B 1 e corr. s possit X lateque possunt, sed brevissime illo modo, sapientiam sapientia GV 1 sapientem K 1 esse dici ... 390, 1 esse in ras. eius- dem spatii K 1 ( ante ras. ult. verbum fuit cognitionemque cf. p. 390, 2 ) rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit; ex quo efficitur, ut divina imitetur, humana omnia inferiora virtute ducat. in hanc tu igitur tamquam in mare, quod est ventis subiectum, perturbationem cadere cadere om. R 1 ( add. 2? ) tibi dixisti videri? quid est quod tantam gravitatem constantiamque perturbet? an inprovisum aliquid aut repentinum? quid potest accidere tale ei, ei ut v. K et GRV cui nihil, quod homini evenire possit, non praemeditatum sit ? nam quod aiunt nimia add. Bouhier ( cf. 3, 34 Phil. 11, 7 ) resecari oportere, naturalia relinqui, quid tandem potest esse naturale, quod idem nimium esse possit? sunt enim omnia ista ex errorum orta radicibus, quae evellenda et extrahenda et extrahenda om. V penitus, non circumcidenda nec amputanda sunt. 4.61. quaedam autem sunt aegritudines, quas levare illa ulla V rec medicina nullo modo possit, ut, si quis aegre ferat nihil in se esse virtutis, nihil animi, nihil officii, nihil honestatis, propter mala is is ex si G 2 agatur G 1 quidem angatur, sed alia quaedam sit ad eum admovenda curatio, et talis quidem, quae possit esse omnium etiam de ceteris rebus discrepantium philosophorum. inter omnis enim convenire oportet commotiones animorum a recta ratione aversas esse vitiosas, vitiosas om. V 3 ut, etiamsi vel mala sint illa, quae quae ex quem V 3 metum aegritudinemve, vel vel ...17 vel Bentl. nec ... nec bona, quae cupiditatem laetitiamve moveant, tamen sit vitiosa ipsa commotio. constantem enim quendam volumus, sedatum, gravem, humana omnia spernentem spernentem Anon. ap. Lb. illum esse, quem prementem (praem. GKH)X ( vix Cice- ronianum, licet Sen. de ira 3, 6, 1 dicat : animus quietus semper, omnia infra se premens cf. Tusc. p. 405, 20 omnia subter se habet) praemeditantem Se. magimum et fortem virum virum add. G 3 dicimus. talis autem nec maerens nec timens nec cupiens nec gestiens esse quisquam potest. eorum enim haec sunt, qui eventus quae ventus G 1 ( corr. 1 ) V 1 ( corr. 3 ) humanos superiores quam suos animos esse ducunt. ducunt s di- cunt X
21. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , cols.31-2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 162
22. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 17.109 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic •epictetus, stoic, lower self and daimonic self Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 163, 246
23. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, 6(SVF 3.432) (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, true love requires detachment Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 174
24. Philo of Alexandria, Who Is The Heir, 21 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, certain emotions useful in training Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 51
25. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 2.57 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, certain emotions useful in training Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 51
26. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, 14-15(SVF 3.513) (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, falsehoods permitted Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 223
27. Ovid, Ars Amatoria, 2.657-2.662 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, other exercises, relabelling Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 222
2.657. Nominibus mollire licet mala: fusca vocetur, 2.658. rend= 2.659. Si straba, sit Veneri similis: si rava, Minervae: 2.660. rend= 2.661. Dic habilem, quaecumque brevis, quae turgida, plenam, 2.662. rend= 2.657. Tho' in your pow'r, a rival ne'er expose, 2.658. Never his intercepted joys disclose: He means intercepting a rival's letter, and discovering the contents. To intercept letters, and divulge a secret, was a crime punishable by the laws, by banishment, or interdiction of fire and water, by which was understood exile. 2.659. This I command, Venus commands the same, 2.660. Who hates the snares she once sustain'd with shame. 2.660. call her ‘trim’, who’s tiny, ‘full-bodied’ if she’s gross, and hide the fault behind the nearest virtue. Don’t ask how old she is, or who was Consul when she was born, that’s strictly the Censor’s duty: Especially if she’s past bloom, and the good times gone, and now she plucks the odd grey hair. There’s value, O youth, in this or a greater age: this will bear seed, this is a field to sow. Besides, they’ve more knowledge of the thing, and have that practice that alone makes the artist: 2.661. What impious wretch will Ceres ' rites expose, This is a simile, and shows us it was not lawful to reveal the mysteries of Ceres . Macrobius in the 11th chapter of his first book upon Scipio's dream, writes that the philosopher Numenius, being too curious to know the secrets of hidden things, incurred the wrath of the gods by divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, which were the same with those of Ceres . 2.662. Or Juno's solemn mysteries disclose!
28. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 2.251-2.293, 3.1087-3.1094, 4.1160-4.1170, 4.1175-4.1184 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic •epictetus, stoic, other exercises, relabelling Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 222, 241, 320
2.251. Denique si semper motu conectitur omnis 2.252. et vetere exoritur motus novus ordine certo 2.253. nec declido faciunt primordia motus 2.254. principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, 2.255. ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur, 2.256. libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat, 2.257. unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas, 2.258. per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque voluptas, 2.259. declinamus item motus nec tempore certo 2.260. nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens? 2.261. nam dubio procul his rebus sua cuique voluntas 2.262. principium dat et hinc motus per membra rigantur. 2.263. nonne vides etiam patefactis tempore puncto 2.264. carceribus non posse tamen prorumpere equorum 2.265. vim cupidam tam de subito quam mens avet ipsa? 2.266. omnis enim totum per corpus materiai 2.267. copia conciri debet, concita per artus 2.268. omnis ut studium mentis conixa sequatur; 2.269. ut videas initum motus a corde creari 2.270. ex animique voluntate id procedere primum, 2.271. inde dari porro per totum corpus et artus. 2.272. nec similest ut cum inpulsi procedimus ictu 2.273. viribus alterius magnis magnoque coactu; 2.274. nam tum materiem totius corporis omnem 2.275. perspicuumst nobis invitis ire rapique, 2.276. donec eam refrenavit per membra voluntas. 2.277. iamne vides igitur, quamquam vis extera multos 2.278. pellat et invitos cogat procedere saepe 2.279. praecipitesque rapi, tamen esse in pectore nostro 2.280. quiddam quod contra pugnare obstareque possit? 2.281. cuius ad arbitrium quoque copia materiai 2.282. cogitur inter dum flecti per membra per artus 2.283. et proiecta refrenatur retroque residit. 2.284. quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necessest, 2.285. esse aliam praeter plagas et pondera causam 2.286. motibus, unde haec est nobis innata potestas, 2.287. de nihilo quoniam fieri nihil posse videmus. 2.288. pondus enim prohibet ne plagis omnia fiant 2.289. externa quasi vi; sed ne res ipsa necessum 2.290. intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis 2.291. et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique, 2.292. id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum 2.293. nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo. 3.1087. nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum 3.1088. tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus, 3.1089. quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti. 3.1090. proinde licet quod vis vivendo condere saecla, 3.1091. mors aeterna tamen nihilo minus illa manebit, 3.1092. nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno 3.1093. lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille, 3.1094. mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante. 4.1160. nigra melichrus est, inmunda et fetida acosmos, 4.1161. caesia Palladium, nervosa et lignea dorcas, 4.1162. parvula, pumilio, chariton mia, tota merum sal, 4.1163. magna atque inmanis cataplexis plenaque honoris. 4.1164. balba loqui non quit, traulizi, muta pudens est; 4.1165. at flagrans, odiosa, loquacula Lampadium fit. 4.1166. ischnon eromenion tum fit, cum vivere non quit 4.1167. prae macie; rhadine verost iam mortua tussi. 4.1168. at nimia et mammosa Ceres est ipsa ab Iaccho, 4.1169. simula Silena ac Saturast, labeosa philema. 4.1170. cetera de genere hoc longum est si dicere coner. 4.1175. et miseram taetris se suffit odoribus ipsa, 4.1176. quam famulae longe fugitant furtimque cachint. 4.1177. at lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe 4.1178. floribus et sertis operit postisque superbos 4.1179. unguit amaracino et foribus miser oscula figit; 4.1180. quem si iam ammissum venientem offenderit aura 4.1181. una modo, causas abeundi quaerat honestas 4.1182. et meditata diu cadat alte sumpta querella 4.1183. stultitiaque ibi se damnet, tribuisse quod illi 4.1184. plus videat quam mortali concedere par est.
29. Epictetus, Discourses, 4.1.101, 4.1.102, 4.1.100, 4.1.104, 4.1.103, 4.1.99, '3.22, 1.1.23, 2.6.9, 2.6.10, 4.1.89, 4.1.90, 3.26, 3.3, 2.6.9(SVF 3.191), 4.4.25, 4.4.26, 4.4.24, 1.11.30, 4.9.10, 4.10.3, 2.21.12, 2.21.13, 2.21.14, 3.19.1, 3.23, 3.30, 1.11.33, 1.11.32, 1.11.31, 3.37, 3.3.14, 3.3.19, 3.3.18, 3.3.17, 3.3.16, 3.3.15, 4.6.10, 2.18.12, 2.12.12, 2.11.22, 2.5.23, 4.4.45, 3.23.30, 3.16.3, 3.7.5, 2.18.14, 2.18.13, 3.23.37, 3.7.7, 3.7.27, 4.4.46, 4.4.47, 4.4.48, 3.22.96, 3.22.82, 3.22.93, 2.21, 3.22.97, 3.22.81, 1.18.23, 3.2.5, 3.24.84, 3.8.5, 3.8.4, 3.8.3, 3.8.2, 3.8.1, 3.24.85, 3.24.86, 4.1.111, 3.24.87, 3.24.88, 4.1.76, 4.1.77, 1.17.22, 4.1.78, 4.1.79, 4.1.80, 1.17.23, 2.19.39, 1.17.26, 1.17.27, 4.1.75, 1.17.28, 4.1.74, 4.1.73, 1.17.21, 4.1.72, 3.24.69, 1.22.10, 2.19.32, 1.17.25, 1.17.24, 1.12.34, 1.1.7, 1.4.27, 3.24.108, 3.24.117, 3.28, 4.8.23, 4.10.23, 1.14.12, 2.18.19, 2.2, 40-4), 19.2, 31.2, 1.4.18, 2.2.19, 2.2.20, 2.2.28, 3.1.40, 3.5.7, 1.2.36, 1.2.33, 1.2.35, 1.2.34, 1.2.37, 1.2.30, 1.2.27, 1.2.28, 3.23.5, 1.2.29, 1.2.25, 1.2.32, 1.2.26, 1.2.31, 2.22.32, 2.22.30, 2.22.29, 2.22.28, 2.22.27, 2.22.12, 2.22.11, 2.22.10, 2.22.8, 2.22.31, 2.22, 2.22.26, 2.22.15, 2.22.4, 2.22.3, 1.23.5, 3.10.2-3 (PythagorasGolden Verses, 2.9.19, 2.9.21, 4.7.6, 2.9.20, 310 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (2010) 109
30. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 2, 4, 20, 34, 33.16, 6.49, 3, 15, 9, 46.2, 16, 31.2, 2.2, 5, 19.2, 18, 1, fr.52, fr.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 219
31. New Testament, Matthew, 26.39 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 219, 320
26.39. καὶ προελθὼν μικρὸν ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ προσευχόμενος καὶ λέγων Πάτερ μου, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν, παρελθάτω ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο· πλὴν οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλʼ ὡς σύ. 26.39. He went forward a little, fell on his face, and prayed, saying, "My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass away from me; nevertheless, not what I desire, but what you desire."
32. Josephus Flavius, Against Apion, '36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •stoicism, epictetus Found in books: Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 637
33. New Testament, Mark, 14.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320
14.36. καὶ ἔλεγεν Ἀββά ὁ πατήρ, πάντα δυνατά σοι· παρένεγκε τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ· ἀλλʼ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί σύ. 14.36. He said, "Abba, Father, all things are possible to you. Please remove this cup from me. However, not what I desire, but what you desire."
34. New Testament, Luke, 22.42 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320
22.42. εἰ βούλει παρένεγκε τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ· πλὴν μὴ τὸ θέλημά μου ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γινέσθω. 22.42. saying, "Father, if you are willing, remove this cup from me. Nevertheless, not my will, but yours, be done."
35. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 4.39 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 219
36. Plutarch, Letter of Condolence To Apollonius, 110D (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, falsehoods permitted Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 223
37. Seneca The Younger, De Clementia, 2.5-2.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic •epictetus, stoic, handbook used in christian monasteries, with only rejection of pity suppressed Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 162, 390
38. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 1.7, 2.1, 2.4, 3.3, 5.6, 5.16, 19.1, 20.2-20.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic •epictetus, stoic, true love requires detachment •epictetus, stoic, falsehoods permitted •epictetus, stoic, importance of clarity about what is upto us •epictetus, stoic, morning and evening reviews of the day •epictetus, stoic, only what is upto us matters Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 162, 175, 178, 214, 223
39. Seneca The Younger, De Constantia Sapientis, 15.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, certain emotions useful in training •epictetus, stoic, but distinguished from first movements assent and emotion Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52, 379
40. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.3.8, 1.9.2, 1.16.7, 2.2.1-2.2.2, 2.2.6, 2.3.2-2.3.5, 2.4.1-2.4.2, 2.10.7, 2.28-2.29, 2.36.1, 3.11, 3.12.4-3.12.7, 3.14, 3.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241
41. Seneca The Younger, De Providentia (Dialogorum Liber I), 6.6-6.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, importance of clarity about what is upto us •epictetus, stoic, morning and evening reviews of the day •epictetus, stoic, only what is upto us matters Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 214
42. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 1.2, 1.5, 13.2-13.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, confession •epictetus, stoic, employ a critic •epictetus, stoic, remember wife and children are mortal •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 218, 219
43. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 11.1, 12.10, 13.4, 24.20-24.21, 41.2, 51.6, 51.9, 58.23, 59.14, 70.14-70.15, 70.19-70.25, 78.16, 83.1, 91.21, 93.7, 95.52-95.54, 101.8-101.9, 108.13-108.22 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 52, 69, 161, 162, 184, 214, 223, 241, 252, 379
95. educam et imo Ditis e regno extraham 12.10. But now I ought to close my letter. "What?" you say; "shall it come to me without any little offering?" Be not afraid; it brings something, – nay, more than something, a great deal. For what is more noble than the following saying[10] of which I make this letter the bearer: "It is wrong to live under constraint; but no man is constrained to live under constraint." of course not. On all sides lie many short and simple paths to freedom; and let us thank God that no man can be kept in life. We may spurn the very constraints that hold us. 13.4. There are more things, Lucilius, likely to frighten us than there are to crush us; we suffer more often in imagination than in reality. I am not speaking with you in the Stoic strain but in my milder style. For it is our Stoic fashion to speak of all those things, which provoke cries and groans, as unimportant and beneath notice; but you and I must drop such great-sounding words, although, Heaven knows, they are true enough. What I advise you to do is, not to be unhappy before the crisis comes; since it may be that the dangers before which you paled as if they were threatening you, will never come upon you; they certainly have not yet come. 41.2. This is what I mean, Lucilius: a holy spirit indwells within us, one who marks our good and bad deeds, and is our guardian. As we treat this spirit, so are we treated by it. Indeed, no man can be good without the help of God. Can one rise superior to fortune unless God helps him to rise? He it is that gives noble and upright counsel. In each good man A god doth dwell, but what god know we not.[1] 51.6. We too have a war to wage, a type of warfare in which there is allowed no rest or furlough. To be conquered, in the first place, are pleasures, which, as you see, have carried off even the sternest characters. If a man has once understood how great is the task which he has entered upon, he will see that there must be no dainty or effeminate conduct. What have I to do with those hot baths or with the sweating-room where they shut in the dry steam which is to drain your strength? Perspiration should flow only after toil. 51.6. We too have a war to wage, a type of warfare in which there is allowed no rest or furlough. To be conquered, in the first place, are pleasures, which, as you see, have carried off even the sternest characters. If a man has once understood how great is the task which he has entered upon, he will see that there must be no dainty or effeminate conduct. What have I to do with those hot baths or with the sweating-room where they shut in the dry steam which is to drain your strength? Perspiration should flow only after toil. 51.9. I have set freedom before my eyes; and I am striving for that reward. And what is freedom, you ask? It means not being a slave to any circumstance, to any constraint, to any chance; it means compelling Fortune to enter the lists on equal terms. And on the day when I know that I have the upper hand, her power will be naught. When I have death in my own control, shall I take orders from her? 51.9. I have set freedom before my eyes; and I am striving for that reward. And what is freedom, you ask? It means not being a slave to any circumstance, to any constraint, to any chance; it means compelling Fortune to enter the lists on equal terms. And on the day when I know that I have the upper hand, her power will be naught. When I have death in my own control, shall I take orders from her? 59.14. I shall now show you how you may know that you are not wise. The wise man is joyful, happy and calm, unshaken, he lives on a plane with the gods. Now go, question yourself; if you are never downcast, if your mind is not harassed by my apprehension, through anticipation of what is to come, if day and night your soul keeps on its even and unswerving course, upright and content with itself, then you have attained to the greatest good that mortals can possess. If, however, you seek pleasures of all kinds in all directions, you must know that you are as far short of wisdom as you are short of joy. Joy is the goal which you desire to reach, but you are wandering from the path, if you expect to reach your goal while you are in the midst of riches and official titles, – in other words, if you seek joy in the midst of cares, these objects for which you strive so eagerly, as if they would give you happiness and pleasure, are merely causes of grief. 59.14. I shall now show you how you may know that you are not wise. The wise man is joyful, happy and calm, unshaken; he lives on a plane with the gods. Now go, question yourself; if you are never downcast, if your mind is not harassed by any apprehension, through anticipation of what is to come, if day and night your soul keeps on its even and unswerving course, upright and content with itself, then you have attained to the greatest good that mortals can possess. If, however, you seek pleasures of all kinds in all directions, you must know that you are as far short of wisdom as you are short of joy. Joy is the goal which you desire to reach, but you are wandering from the path, if you expect to reach your goal while you are in the midst of riches and official titles, – in other words, if you seek joy in the midst of cares. These objects for which you strive so eagerly, as if they would give you happiness and pleasure, are merely causes of grief. 70.14. You can find men who have gone so far as to profess wisdom and yet maintain that one should not offer violence to one's own life, and hold it accursed for a man to be the means of his own destruction; we should wait, say they, for the end decreed by nature. But one who says this does not see that he is shutting off the path to freedom. The best thing which eternal law ever ordained was that it allowed to us one entrance into life, but many exits. 70.14. You can find men who have gone so far as to profess wisdom and yet maintain that one should not offer violence to one's own life, and hold it accursed for a man to be the means of his own destruction; we should wait, say they, for the end decreed by nature. But one who says this does not see that he is shutting off the path to freedom. The best thing which eternal law ever ordained was that it allowed to us one entrance into life, but many exits. 70.15. Must I await the cruelty either of disease or of man, when I can depart through the midst of torture, and shake off my troubles? This is the one reason why we cannot complain of life; it keeps no one against his will. Humanity is well situated, because no man is unhappy except by his own fault. Live, if you so desire; if not, you may return to the place whence you came. 70.15. Must I await the cruelty either of disease or of man, when I can depart through the midst of torture, and shake off my troubles? This is the one reason why we cannot complain of life: it keeps no one against his will. Humanity is well situated, because no man is unhappy except by his own fault. Live, if you so desire; if not, you may return to the place whence you came. 70.19. It is in this one matter only that the day will come which will require us to test our training. You need not think that none but great men have had the strength to burst the bonds of human servitude; you need not believe that this cannot be done except by a Cato, – Cato, who with his hand dragged forth the spirit which he had not succeeded in freeing by the sword. Nay, men of the meanest lot in life have by a mighty impulse escaped to safety, and when they were not allowed to die at their own convenience, or to suit themselves in their choice of the instruments of death, they have snatched up whatever was lying ready to hand, and by sheer strength have turned objects which were by nature harmless into weapons of their own. 70.19. It is in this one matter only that the day will come which will require us to test our training. You need not think that none but great men have had the strength to burst the bonds of human servitude; you need not believe that this cannot be done except by a Cato, – Cato, who with his hand dragged forth the spirit which he had not succeeded in freeing by the sword. Nay, men of the meanest lot in life have by a mighty impulse escaped to safety, and when they were not allowed to die at their own convenience, or to suit themselves in their choice of the instruments of death, they have snatched up whatever was lying ready to hand, and by sheer strength have turned objects which were by nature harmless into weapons of their own. 70.20. For example, there was lately in a training-school for wild-beast gladiators a German, who was making ready for the morning exhibition; he withdrew in order to relieve himself, – the only thing which he was allowed to do in secret and without the presence of a guard. While so engaged, he seized the stick of wood, tipped with a sponge, which was devoted to the vilest uses, and stuffed it, just as it was, down his throat; thus he blocked up his windpipe, and choked the breath from his body. That was truly to insult death! 70.20. For example, there was lately in a training-school for wild-beast gladiators a German, who was making ready for the morning exhibition; he withdrew in order to relieve himself, – the only thing which he was allowed to do in secret and without the presence of a guard. While so engaged, he seized the stick of wood, tipped with a sponge, which was devoted to the vilest uses, and stuffed it, just as it was, down his throat; thus he blocked up his windpipe, and choked the breath from his body. That was truly to insult death! 70.21. Yes, indeed; it was not a very elegant or becoming way to die; but what is more foolish than to be over-nice about dying? What a brave fellow! He surely deserved to be allowed to choose his fate! How bravely he would have wielded a sword! With what courage he would have hurled himself into the depths of the sea, or down a precipice! Cut off from resources on every hand, he yet found a way to furnish himself with death, and with a weapon for death. Hence you can understand that nothing but the will need postpone death. Let each man judge the deed of this most zealous fellow as he likes, provided we agree on this point, – that the foulest death is preferable to the fairest slavery. 70.21. Yes, indeed; it was not a very elegant or becoming way to die; but what is more foolish than to be over-nice about dying? What a brave fellow! He surely deserved to be allowed to choose his fate! How bravely he would have wielded a sword! With what courage he would have hurled himself into the depths of the sea, or down a precipice! Cut off from resources on every hand, he yet found a way to furnish himself with death, and with a weapon for death. Hence you can understand that nothing but the will need postpone death. Let each man judge the deed of this most zealous fellow as he likes, provided we agree on this point, – that the foulest death is preferable to the fairest slavery. 70.22. Inasmuch as I began with an illustration taken from humble life I shall keep on with that sort. For men will make greater demands upon themselves, if they see that death can be despised even by the most despised class of men. The Catos, the Scipios, and the others whose names we are wont to hear with admiration, we regard as beyond the sphere of imitation; but I shall now prove to you that the virtue of which I speak is found as frequently in the gladiators' training-school as among the leaders in a civil war. 70.22. Inasmuch as I began with an illustration taken from humble life, I shall keep on with that sort. For men will make greater demands upon themselves, if they see that death can be despised even by the most despised class of men. The Catos, the Scipios, and the others whose names we are wont to hear with admiration, we regard as beyond the sphere of imitation; but I shall now prove to you that the virtue of which I speak is found as frequently in the gladiators' training-school as among the leaders in a civil war. 70.23. Lately a gladiator, who had been sent forth to the morning exhibition, was being conveyed in a cart along with the other prisoners; nodding as if he were heavy with sleep, he let his head fall over so far that it was caught in the spokes; then he kept his body in position long enough to break his neck by the revolution of the wheel. So he made his escape by means of the very wagon which was carrying him to his punishment. 70.23. Lately a gladiator, who had been sent forth to the morning exhibition, was being conveyed in a cart along with the other prisoners;[11] nodding as if he were heavy with sleep, he let his head fall over so far that it was caught in the spokes; then he kept his body in position long enough to break his neck by the revolution of the wheel. So he made his escape by means of the very wagon which was carrying him to his punishment. 78.16. What blows do athletes receive on their faces and all over their bodies! Nevertheless, through their desire for fame they endure every torture, and they undergo these things not only because they are fighting but in order to be able to fight. Their very training means torture. So let us also win the way to victory in all our struggles, – for the reward is not a garland or a palm or a trumpeter who calls for silence at the proclamation of our names, but rather virtue, steadfastness of soul, and a peace that is won for all time, if fortune has once been utterly vanquished in any combat. You say, "I feel severe pain." 83.1. LXXXIII. On DrunkennessYou bid me give you an account of each separate day, and of the whole day too; so you must have a good opinion of me if you think that in these days of mine there is nothing to hide. At any rate, it is thus that we should live, – as if we lived in plain sight of all men; and it is thus that we should think, – as if there were someone who could look into our inmost souls; and there is one who can so look. For what avails it that something is hidden from man? Nothing is shut off from the sight of God. He is witness of our souls, and he comes into the very midst of our thoughts – comes into them, I say, as one who may at any time depart. 91.21. Then let not this sort of thing damage death, either, in our estimation; death also is in bad odour. But no one of those who malign death has made trial of it. Meanwhile it is foolhardy to condemn that of which you are ignorant. This one thing, however, you do know – that death is helpful to many, that it sets many free from tortures, want, ailments, sufferings, and weariness. We are in the power of nothing when once we have death in our own power! Farewell. 95.52. all that you behold, that which comprises both god and man, is one – we are the parts of one great body. Nature produced us related to one another, since she created us from the same source and to the same end. She engendered in us mutual affection, and made us prone to friendships. She established fairness and justice; according to her ruling, it is more wretched to commit than to suffer injury. Through her orders, let our hands be ready for all that needs to be helped. 95.53. Let this verse be in your heart and on your lips: I am a man; and nothing in man's lot Do I deem foreign to me. Let us possess things in common; for birth is ours in common. Our relations with one another are like a stone arch, which would collapse if the stones did not mutually support each other, and which is upheld in this very way. 95.53. There is no word which reaches our ears without doing us harm; we are injured both by good wishes and by curses. The angry prayers of our enemies instil false fears in us; and the affection of our friends spoils us through their kindly wishes. For this affection sets us a-groping after goods that are far away, unsure, and wavering, when we really might open the store of happiness at home. 101.8. The greatest flaw in life is that it is always imperfect, and that a certain part of it is postponed. One who daily puts the finishing touches to his life is never in want of time. And yet, from this want arise fear and a craving for the future which eats away the mind. There is nothing more wretched than worry over the outcome of future events; as to the amount or the nature of that which remains, our troubled minds are set aflutter with unaccountable fear. 101.9. How, then, shall we avoid this vacillation? In one way only, – if there be no reaching forward in our life, if it is withdrawn into itself. For he only is anxious about the future, to whom the present is unprofitable. But when I have paid my soul its due, when a soundly-balanced mind knows that a day differs not a whit from eternity – whatever days or problems the future may bring – then the soul looks forth from lofty heights and laughs heartily to itself when it thinks upon the ceaseless succession of the ages. For what disturbance can result from the changes and the instability of Chance, if you are sure in the face of that which is unsure? 108.13. At any rate, when I used to hear Attalus denouncing sin, error, and the evils of life, I often felt sorry for mankind and regarded Attalus as a noble and majestic being, – above our mortal heights. He called himself a king,[10] but I thought him more than a king, because he was entitled to pass judgment on kings. 108.14. And in truth, when he began to uphold poverty, and to show what a useless and dangerous burden was everything that passed the measure of our need, I often desired to leave his lecture-room a poor man. Whenever he castigated our pleasure-seeking lives, and extolled personal purity, moderation in diet, and a mind free from unnecessary, not to speak of unlawful, pleasures, the desire came upon me to limit my food and drink. 108.15. And that is why some of these habits have stayed with me, Lucilius. For I had planned my whole life with great resolves. And later, when I returned to the duties of a citizen, I did indeed keep a few of these good resolutions. That is why I have forsaken oysters and mushrooms for ever: since they are not really food, but are relishes to bully the sated stomach into further eating, as is the fancy of gourmands and those who stuff themselves beyond their powers of digestion: down with it quickly, and up with it quickly! 108.16. That is why I have also throughout my life avoided perfumes; because the best scent for the person is no scent at all.[11] That is why my stomach is unacquainted with wine. That is why throughout my life I have shunned the bath, and have believed that to emaciate the body and sweat it into thinness is at once unprofitable and effeminate. Other resolutions have been broken, but after all in such a way that, in cases where I ceased to practice abstinence, I have observed a limit which is indeed next door to abstinence; perhaps it is even a little more difficult, because it is easier for the will to cut off certain things utterly than to use them with restraint. 108.17. Inasmuch as I have begun to explain to you how much greater was my impulse to approach philosophy in my youth than to continue it in my old age, I shall not be ashamed to tell you what ardent zeal Pythagoras inspired in me. Sotion[12] used to tell me why Pythagoras abstained from animal food, and why, in later times, Sextius did also. In each case, the reason was different, but it was in each case a noble reason. 108.18. Sextius believed that man had enough sustece without resorting to blood, and that a habit of cruelty is formed whenever butchery is practised for pleasure. Moreover, he thought we should curtail the sources of our luxury; he argued that a varied diet was contrary to the laws of health, and was unsuited to our constitutions. 108.19. Pythagoras, on the other hand, held that all beings were inter-related, and that there was a system of exchange between souls which transmigrated from one bodily shape into another. If one may believe him, no soul perishes or ceases from its functions at all, except for a tiny interval – when it is being poured from one body into another. We may question at what time and after what seasons of change the soul returns to man, when it has wandered through many a dwelling-place; but meantime, he made men fearful of guilt and parricide, since they might be, without knowing it, attacking the soul of a parent and injuring it with knife or with teeth – if, as is possible, the related spirit be dwelling temporarily in this bit of flesh! 108.20. When Sotion had set forth this doctrine, supplementing it with his own proofs, he would say: "You do not believe that souls are assigned, first to one body and then to another, and that our so-called death is merely a change of abode? You do not believe that in cattle, or in wild beasts, or in creatures of the deep, the soul of him who was once a man may linger? You do not believe that nothing on this earth is annihilated, but only changes its haunts? And that animals also have cycles of progress and, so to speak, an orbit for their souls, no less than the heavenly bodies, which revolve in fixed circuits? Great men have put faith in this idea; 108.21. therefore, while holding to your own view, keep the whole question in abeyance in your mind. If the theory is true, it is a mark of purity to refrain from eating flesh; if it be false, it is economy. And what harm does it do to you to give such credence? I am merely depriving you of food which sustains lions and vultures." 108.22. I was imbued with this teaching, and began to abstain from animal food; at the end of a year the habit was as pleasant as it was easy. I was beginning to feel that my mind was more active; though I would not to-day positively state whether it really was or not. Do you ask how I came to abandon the practice? It was this way: The days of my youth coincided with the early part of the reign of Tiberius Caesar. Some foreign rites were at that time[13] being inaugurated, and abstinence from certain kinds of animal food was set down as a proof of interest in the strange cult. So at the request of my father, who did not fear prosecution, but who detested philosophy, I returned to my previous habits; and it was no very hard matter to induce me to dine more comfortably.
44. Seneca The Younger, Natural Questions, 2.59.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, but distinguished from first movements assent and emotion •epictetus, stoic, first movements not escaped by sage Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69, 379
45. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, 82F, 82A-F (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 218
46. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 22.4, 24.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic •epictetus, stoic, true love requires detachment Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170, 184
47. Plutarch, On The Control of Anger, 454E-455A, 456A-B, 463D, 459E-460C (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241
48. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, 1071B, 1071A (SVF 3.195), 1069A (SVF 3.626-7), 1068F, 1071B-C (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170
49. Plutarch, On The E At Delphi, 392C-E, 392B-C (Heraclitus fr.91DK) (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 162, 245
50. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, 474E-475A, 473B-474B (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 162, 244
51. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, 449A-B, 449E (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 162
52. Plutarch, How To Tell A Flatterer From A Friend, 74C (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, confession •epictetus, stoic, employ a critic •epictetus, stoic, remember wife and children are mortal Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 218
53. Apuleius, Apology, 15 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, importance of clarity about what is upto us •epictetus, stoic, morning and evening reviews of the day •epictetus, stoic, only what is upto us matters •epictetus, stoic, true love requires detachment Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 175, 214
54. Lucian, Demonax, 1.130 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan
55. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 2.1, 4.50 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, importance of clarity about what is upto us •epictetus, stoic, morning and evening reviews of the day •epictetus, stoic, only what is upto us matters •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 214, 241
56. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 32.186.21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 162
57. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1, 19.1.3, 19.1.15-19.1.21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, first movements not escaped by sage •epictetus, stoic, prothumia •epictetus, stoic, bites •epictetus, stoic, but distinguished from first movements assent and emotion Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68, 69, 70, 71, 376, 377
19.1. The reply of a certain philosopher, when he was asked why he turned pale in a storm at sea. We were sailing from Cassiopa to Brundisium over the Ionian Sea, violent, vast and storm-tossed. During almost the whole of the night which followed our first day a fierce side-wind blew, which had filled our ship with water. Then afterwards, while we were all still lamenting, and working hard at the pumps, day at last dawned. But there was no less danger and no slackening of the violence of the wind; on the contrary, more frequent whirlwinds, a black sky, masses of fog, and a kind of fearful cloud-forms, which they called typhones, or "typhoons," seemed to hang over and threaten us, ready to overwhelm the ship. In our company was an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, whom I had known at Athens as a man of no slight importance, holding the young men who were his pupils under very good control. In the midst of the great dangers of that time and that tumult of sea and sky I looked for him, desiring to know in what state of mind he was and whether he was unterrified and courageous. And then I beheld the man frightened and ghastly pale, not indeed uttering any lamentations, as all the rest were doing, nor any outcries of that kind, but in his loss of colour and distracted expression not differing much from the others. But when the sky cleared, the sea grew calm, and the heat of danger cooled, then the Stoic was approached by a rich Greek from Asia, a man of elegant apparel, as we saw, and with an abundance of baggage and many attendants, while he himself showed signs of a luxurious person and disposition. This man, in a bantering tone, said: "What does this mean, Sir philosopher, that when we were in danger you were afraid and turned pale, while I neither feared nor changed colour?" And the philosopher, after hesitating for a moment about the propriety of answering him, said: "If in such a terrible storm I did show a little fear, you are not worthy to be told the reason for it. But, if you please, the famous Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, shall answer for me, who on being asked on a similar occasion by a man much like you why he feared, though a philosopher, while his questioner on the contrary had no fear, replied that they had not the same motives, for his questioner need not be very anxious about the life of a worthless coxcomb, but he himself feared for the life of an Aristippus." With these words then the Stoic rid himself of the rich Asiatic. But later, when we were approaching Brundisium and sea and sky were calm, I asked him what the reason for his fear was, which he had refused to reveal to the man who had improperly addressed him. And he quietly and courteously replied: "Since you are desirous of knowing, hear what our forefathers, the founders of the Stoic sect, thought about that brief but inevitable and natural fear, or rather," said he, "read it, for if you read it, you will be the more ready to believe it and you will remember it better." Thereupon before my eyes he drew from his little bag the fifth book of the Discourses of the philosopher Epictetus, which, as arranged by Arrian, undoubtedly agree with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus. In that book I read this statement, which of course was written in Greek: "The mental visions, which the philosophers call φαντασίαι or 'phantasies,' by which the mind of man on the very first appearance of an object is impelled to the perception of the object, are neither voluntary nor controlled by the will, but through a certain power of their own they force their recognition upon men; but the expressions of assent, which they call συγκαταθέσεις, by which these visions are recognized, are voluntary and subject to man's will. Therefore when some terrifying sound, either from heaven or from a falling building or as a sudden announcement of some danger, or anything else of that kind occurs, even the mind of a wise man must necessarily be disturbed, must shrink and feel alarm, not from a preconceived idea of any danger, but from certain swift and unexpected attacks which forestall the power of the mind and of reason. Presently, however, the wise man does not approve 'such phantasies,' that is to say, such terrifying mental visions (to quote the Greek, 'he does not consent to them nor confirm them'), but he rejects and scorns them, nor does he see in them anything that ought to excite fear. And they say that there is this difference between the mind of a foolish man and that of a wise man, that the foolish man thinks that such 'visions' are in fact as dreadful and terrifying as they appear at the original impact of them on his mind, and by his assent he approves of such ideas as if they were rightly to be feared, and 'confirms' them; for προσεπιδοξάζει is the word which the Stoics use in their discourses on the subject. But the wise man, after being affected for a short time and slightly in his colour and expression, 'does not assent,' but retains the steadfastness and strength of the opinion which he has always had about visions of this kind, namely that they are in no wise to be feared but excite terror by a false appearance and vain alarms." That these were the opinions and utterances of Epictetus the philosopher in accordance with the beliefs of the Stoics I read in that book which I have mentioned, and I thought that they ought to be recorded for this reason, that when things of the kind which I have named chance to occur, we may not think that to fear for a time and, as it were, turn white is the mark of a foolish and weak man, but in that brief but natural impulse we yield rather to human weakness than because we believe that those things are what they seem.
58. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.7.35, 4.7.41, 4.7.43, 4.7.44, 5.6.31, 5.6.32, 4.7.33, 4.7.28, 4.7.30, 4.7.14, 4.7.26, 4.7.32, 5.5.22, 5.5.23, 5.5.24, 5.5.29, 5.5.31, 5.5.34, 5.5.35, 5.6.19, 5.6.20, 5.5.32, 5.5.33, 4.7.7, 5.5.30, 4.6.41, 4.6.40, 4.7.37 (Posidonius), 4.7.16 (Chrysippus) (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241
59. Aelian, Varia Historia, 9.20 (Aristippus) (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, but distinguished from first movements assent and emotion •epictetus, stoic, first movements not escaped by sage Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 376
60. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 2.1.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, do not project your desire to approaching food •epictetus, stoic, questioning appearances, assessing for indifference and training for this •epictetus, stoic, remember wife and children are mortal •epictetus, stoic, true love requires detachment Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 216
61. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), 164.32(SVF 3.194), 164.7(SVF 3.193), 163-4(SVF 3.192), 163.32, 163.4(SVF 3.192) (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170
62. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 11.64-7(SVF 1.361), 11.62, 11.63, 11.62(SVF 3.122), 11.61, 11.22(SVF 3.75), 11.161 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170
63. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 33, 205.15-22 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 332
64. Galen, That The Qualities of The Mind Depend On The Temperament of The Body, 67.2-67.16 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 163
65. Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.8, 3.1.18, 3.1.20, 4.4.4 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320, 398
3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with those words which were spoken to Pharaoh, who is said to have been hardened by God, in order that he might not let the people go; and, along with his case, the language of the apostle also will be considered, where he says, Therefore He has mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardens. For it is on these passages chiefly that the heretics rely, asserting that salvation is not in our own power, but that souls are of such a nature as must by all means be either lost or saved; and that in no way can a soul which is of an evil nature become good, or one which is of a virtuous nature be made bad. And hence they maintain that Pharaoh, too, being of a ruined nature, was on that account hardened by God, who hardens those that are of an earthly nature, but has compassion on those who are of a spiritual nature. Let us see, then, what is the meaning of their assertion; and let us, in the first place, request them to tell us whether they maintain that the soul of Pharaoh was of an earthly nature, such as they term lost. They will undoubtedly answer that it was of an earthly nature. If so, then to believe God, or to obey Him, when his nature opposed his so doing, was an impossibility. And if this were his condition by nature, what further need was there for his heart to be hardened, and this not once, but several times, unless indeed because it was possible for him to yield to persuasion? Nor could any one be said to be hardened by another, save him who of himself was not obdurate. And if he were not obdurate of himself, it follows that neither was he of an earthly nature, but such an one as might give way when overpowered by signs and wonders. But he was necessary for God's purpose, in order that, for the saving of the multitude, He might manifest in him His power by his offering resistance to numerous miracles, and struggling against the will of God, and his heart being by this means said to be hardened. Such are our answers, in the first place, to these persons; and by these their assertion may be overturned, according to which they think that Pharaoh was destroyed in consequence of his evil nature. And with regard to the language of the Apostle Paul, we must answer them in a similar way. For who are they whom God hardens, according to your view? Those, namely, whom you term of a ruined nature, and who, I am to suppose, would have done something else had they not been hardened. If, indeed, they come to destruction in consequence of being hardened, they no longer perish naturally, but in virtue of what befalls them. Then, in the next place, upon whom does God show mercy? On those, namely, who are to be saved. And in what respect do those persons stand in need of a second compassion, who are to be saved once by their nature, and so come naturally to blessedness, except that it is shown even from their case, that, because it was possible for them to perish, they therefore obtain mercy, that so they may not perish, but come to salvation, and possess the kingdom of the good. And let this be our answer to those who devise and invent the fable of good or bad natures, i.e., of earthly or spiritual souls, in consequence of which, as they say, each one is either saved or lost. 3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with what is said about Pharaoh— that he was hardened by God, that he might not send away the people; along with which will be examined also the statement of the apostle, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. And certain of those who hold different opinions misuse these passages, themselves also almost destroying free-will by introducing ruined natures incapable of salvation, and others saved which it is impossible can be lost; and Pharaoh, they say, as being of a ruined nature, is therefore hardened by God, who has mercy upon the spiritual, but hardens the earthly. Let us see now what they mean. For we shall ask them if Pharaoh was of an earthy nature; and when they answer, we shall say that he who is of an earthy nature is altogether disobedient to God: but if disobedient, what need is there of his heart being hardened, and that not once, but frequently? Unless perhaps, since it was possible for him to obey (in which case he would certainly have obeyed, as not being earthy, when hard pressed by the signs and wonders), God needs him to be disobedient to a greater degree, in order that He may manifest His mighty deeds for the salvation of the multitude, and therefore hardens his heart. This will be our answer to them in the first place, in order to overturn their supposition that Pharaoh was of a ruined nature. And the same reply must be given to them with respect to the statement of the apostle. For whom does God harden? Those who perish, as if they would obey unless they were hardened, or manifestly those who would be saved because they are not of a ruined nature. And on whom has He mercy? Is it on those who are to be saved? And how is there need of a second mercy for those who have been prepared once for salvation, and who will by all means become blessed on account of their nature? Unless perhaps, since they are capable of incurring destruction, if they did not receive mercy, they will obtain mercy, in order that they may not incur that destruction of which they are capable, but may be in the condition of those who are saved. And this is our answer to such persons. 3.1.18. Let us now look to the expression, It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For our opponents assert, that if it does not depend upon him that wills, nor on him that runs, but on God that shows mercy, that a man be saved, our salvation is not in our own power. For our nature is such as to admit of our either being saved or not, or else our salvation rests solely on the will of Him who, if He wills it, shows mercy, and confers salvation. Now let us inquire, in the first place, of such persons, whether to desire blessings be a good or evil act; and whether to hasten after good as a final aim be worthy of praise. If they were to answer that such a procedure was deserving of censure, they would evidently be mad; for all holy men both desire blessings and run after them, and certainly are not blameworthy. How, then, is it that he who is not saved, if he be of an evil nature, desires blessing, and runs after them, but does not find them? For they say that a bad tree does not bring forth good fruits, whereas it is a good fruit to desire blessings. And how is the fruit of a bad tree good? And if they assert that to desire blessings, and to run after them, is an act of indifference, i.e., neither good nor bad, we shall reply, that if it be an indifferent act to desire blessings, and to run after them, then the opposite of that will also be an indifferent act, viz., to desire evils, and to run after them; whereas it is certain that it is not an indifferent act to desire evils, and to run after them, but one that is manifestly wicked. It is established, then, that to desire and follow after blessings is not an indifferent, but a virtuous proceeding. 3.1.18. Let us look next at the passage: So, then, it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For they who find fault say: If it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, salvation does not depend upon ourselves, but upon the arrangement made by Him who has formed us such as we are, or on the purpose of Him who shows mercy when he pleases. Now we must ask these persons the following questions: Whether to desire what is good is virtuous or vicious; and whether the desire to run in order to reach the goal in the pursuit of what is good be worthy of praise or censure? And if they shall say that it is worthy of censure, they will return an absurd answer; since the saints desire and run, and manifestly in so acting do nothing that is blameworthy. But if they shall say that it is virtuous to desire what is good, and to run after what is good, we shall ask them how a perishing nature desires better things; for it is like an evil tree producing good fruit, since it is a virtuous act to desire better things. They will give (perhaps) a third answer, that to desire and run after what is good is one of those things that are indifferent, and neither beautiful nor wicked. Now to this we must say, that if to desire and to run after what is good be a thing of indifference, then the opposite also is a thing of indifference, viz., to desire what is evil, and to run after it. But it is not a thing of indifference to desire what is evil, and to run after it. And therefore also, to desire what is good, and to run after it, is not a thing of indifference. Such, then, is the defense which I think we can offer to the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. Solomon says in the book of Psalms (for the Song of Degrees is his, from which we shall quote the words): Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman wakes in vain: not dissuading us from building, nor teaching us not to keep watch in order to guard the city in our soul, but showing that what is built without God, and does not receive a guard from Him, is built in vain and watched to no purpose, because God might reasonably be entitled the Lord of the building; and the Governor of all things, the Ruler of the guard of the city. As, then, if we were to say that such a building is not the work of the builder, but of God, and that it was not owing to the successful effort of the watcher, but of the God who is over all, that such a city suffered no injury from its enemies, we should not be wrong, it being understood that something also had been done by human means, but the benefit being gratefully referred to God who brought it to pass; so, seeing that the (mere) human desire is not sufficient to attain the end, and that the running of those who are, as it were, athletes, does not enable them to gain the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus — for these things are accomplished with the assistance of God — it is well said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. As if also it were said with regard to husbandry what also is actually recorded: I planted, Apollos watered; and God gave the increase. So then neither is he that plants anything, neither he that waters; but God that gives the increase. Now we could not piously assert that the production of full crops was the work of the husbandman, or of him that watered, but the work of God. So also our own perfection is brought about, not as if we ourselves did nothing; for it is not completed by us, but God produces the greater part of it. And that this assertion may be more clearly believed, we shall take an illustration from the art of navigation. For in comparison with the effect of the winds, and the mildness of the air, and the light of the stars, all co-operating in the preservation of the crew, what proportion could the art of navigation be said to bear in the bringing of the ship into harbour? — since even the sailors themselves, from piety, do not venture to assert often that they had saved the ship, but refer all to God; not as if they had done nothing, but because what had been done by Providence was infinitely greater than what had been effected by their art. And in the matter of our salvation, what is done by God is infinitely greater than what is done by ourselves; and therefore, I think, is it said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For if in the manner which they imagine we must explain the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, the commandments are superfluous; and it is in vain that Paul himself blames some for having fallen away, and approves of others as having remained upright, and enacts laws for the Churches: it is in vain also that we give ourselves up to desire better things, and in vain also (to attempt) to run. But it is not in vain that Paul gives such advice, censuring some and approving of others; nor in vain that we give ourselves up to the desire of better things, and to the chase after things that are pre-eminent. They have accordingly not well explained the meaning of the passage. 3.1.20. Still the declaration of the apostle will appear to drag us to the conclusion that we are not possessed of freedom of will, in which, objecting against himself, he says, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. You will say then unto me, Why does He yet find fault? For who has resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why have you made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? For it will be said: If the potter of the same lump make some vessels to honour and others to dishonour, and God thus form some men for salvation and others for ruin, then salvation or ruin does not depend upon ourselves, nor are we possessed of free-will. Now we must ask him who deals so with these passages, whether it is possible to conceive of the apostle as contradicting himself. I presume, however, that no one will venture to say so. If, then, the apostle does not utter contradictions, how can he, according to him who so understands him, reasonably find fault, censuring the individual at Corinth who had committed fornication, or those who had fallen away, and had not repented of the licentiousness and impurity of which they had been guilty? And how can he bless those whom he praises as having done well, as he does the house of Onesiphorus in these words: The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant to him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day. It is not consistent for the same apostle to blame the sinner as worthy of censure, and to praise him who had done well as deserving of approval; and again, on the other hand, to say, as if nothing depended on ourselves, that the cause was in the Creator why the one vessel was formed to honour, and the other to dishonour. And how is this statement correct: For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he has done, whether it be good or bad, since they who have done evil have advanced to this pitch of wickedness because they were created vessels unto dishonour, while they that have lived virtuously have done good because they were created from the beginning for this purpose, and became vessels unto honour? And again, how does not the statement made elsewhere conflict with the view which these persons draw from the words which we have quoted (that it is the fault of the Creator that one vessel is in honour and another in dishonour), viz., that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master's use, and prepared unto every good work; for if he who purges himself becomes a vessel unto honour, and he who allows himself to remain unpurged becomes a vessel unto dishonour, then, so far as these words are concerned, the Creator is not at all to blame. For the Creator makes vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour, not from the beginning according to His foreknowledge, since He does not condemn or justify beforehand according to it; but (He makes) those into vessels of honour who purged themselves, and those into vessels of dishonour who allowed themselves to remain unpurged: so that it results from older causes (which operated) in the formation of the vessels unto honour and dishonour, that one was created for the former condition, and another for the latter. But if we once admit that there were certain older causes (at work) in the forming of a vessel unto honour, and of one unto dishonour, what absurdity is there in going back to the subject of the soul, and (in supposing) that a more ancient cause for Jacob being loved and for Esau being hated existed with respect to Jacob before his assumption of a body, and with regard to Esau before he was conceived in the womb of Rebecca?
66. Origen, Against Celsus, 1.64, 8.51(SVF 3.474) (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 178
1.64. But if we were to reproach those who have been converted with their former lives, then we would have occasion to accuse Ph do also, even after he became a philosopher; since, as the history relates, he was drawn away by Socrates from a house of bad fame to the pursuits of philosophy. Nay, even the licentious life of Polemo, the successor of Xenocrates, will be a subject of reproach to philosophy; whereas even in these instances we ought to regard it as a ground of praise, that reasoning was enabled, by the persuasive power of these men, to convert from the practice of such vices those who had been formerly entangled by them. Now among the Greeks there was only one Ph do, I know not if there were a second, and one Polemo, who betook themselves to philosophy, after a licentious and most wicked life; while with Jesus there were not only at the time we speak of, the twelve disciples, but many more at all times, who, becoming a band of temperate men, speak in the following terms of their former lives: For we ourselves also were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving various lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful, and hating one another. But after that the kindness and love of God our Saviour towards man appeared, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which He shed upon us richly, we became such as we are. For God sent forth His Word and healed them, and delivered them from their destructions, as the prophet taught in the book of Psalms. And in addition to what has been already said, I would add the following: that Chrysippus, in his treatise on the Cure of the Passions, in his endeavours to restrain the passions of the human soul, not pretending to determine what opinions are the true ones, says that according to the principles of the different sects are those to be cured who have been brought under the dominion of the passions, and continues: And if pleasure be an end, then by it must the passions be healed; and if there be three kinds of chief blessings, still, according to this doctrine, it is in the same way that those are to be freed from their passions who are under their dominion; whereas the assailants of Christianity do not see in how many persons the passions have been brought under restraint, and the flood of wickedness checked, and savage manners softened, by means of the Gospel. So that it well became those who are ever boasting of their zeal for the public good, to make a public acknowledgement of their thanks to that doctrine which by a new method led men to abandon many vices, and to bear their testimony at least to it, that even though not the truth, it has at all events been productive of benefit to the human race.
67. Plotinus, Enneads, 4.8.1(1-11), 5.8.10(31-43), 6.8, 6.9.7 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320
68. Porphyry, Letter To Marcella, 35 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241
35. Try not to wrong thy slaves nor to correct them when thou art angry. And before correcting them, prove to them that thou dost this for their good, and give them an opportunity for excuse. When purchasing slaves, avoid the stubborn ones. Practise doing many things thyself, for our own labour is simple and easy. And men should use each limb for the purpose for which nature intended it to be used, for nature needs no more. They who do not use their own bodies, but make excessive use of others, commit a twofold wrong, and are ungrateful to nature that has given them these parts. Never use thy bodily parts merely for the sake of pleasure, for it is far better to die than to obscure thy soul by intemperance . . . . correct the vice of thy nature. . . . If thou give aught to thy slaves, distinguish the better ones by a share of honour . . . . for it is impossible that he who does wrong to man should honour God. But look on the love of mankind as the foundation of thy piety. And . . . .
69. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 6.19 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 162
70. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 31.197 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241
71. Porphyry, Aids To The Study of The Intelligibles, 32 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, contest appearances even in dreams Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 414
72. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.102, 7.101, 7.103, 7.104, 7.101-3(SVF 3.195), 7.160(SVF 1.351), 7.105, 2.71, 7.106(SVF 3.127), 7.94, 7.96, 8.7, 7.28, 7.33, 7.32, Letter to Menoeceus), 10.145 (Epicurus, Kyriai Doxai), 10.126 (Epicurus (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170
7.102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics, and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision things preferred.
73. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.14 (Heracleides of Pontus) (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, or falls under our will (proairesis) Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 327
74. Gregory of Nazianzus, Letters, 32 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic •epictetus, stoic, lower self and daimonic self Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 163, 246
75. Evagrius Ponticus, Praktikos, 15-17, 20, 22, 24, 27, 71, 91, 28 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 366
76. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 21 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, prothumia Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 71
77. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 269, 6, 261 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 398
78. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 269, 6, 261 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 398
79. Augustine, Retractiones, 1.7.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 398
80. Augustine, Questions On The Heptateuch, 1.30 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, but distinguished from first movements assent and emotion Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 379
81. Augustine, The City of God, 9.4-9.5, 14.6, 14.9-14.10, 14.16 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic •epictetus, stoic, but distinguished from first movements assent and emotion •epictetus, stoic, celebrate with sacrifice thirty days free from anger •epictetus, stoic, contest appearances even in dreams Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 316, 379, 398, 413
9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus. The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was immediately to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears. 9.5. We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness; not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. But how much more honorable had it been in that Stoic we have been telling of, had he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a fellow-creature, than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far better and more humane, and more consot with pious sentiments, are the words of Cicero in praise of C sar, when he says, Among your virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your compassion. And what is compassion but a fellow-feeling for another's misery, which prompts us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient to reason, when compassion is shown without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue, which the Stoics are not ashamed to reckon among the vices, although, as the book of the eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind invade the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be free from all vice. Whence it follows that these very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without forcing him to act against reason and virtue; and that, therefore, the opinion of the Peripatetics or Platonists and of the Stoics is one and the same. But, as Cicero says, mere logomachy is the bane of these pitiful Greeks, who thirst for contention rather than for truth. However, it may justly be asked, whether our subjection to these affections, even while we follow virtue, is a part of the infirmity of this life? For the holy angels feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger; and yet ordinary language ascribes to them also these mental emotions, because, though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us; and thus even God Himself is said in Scripture to be angry, and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the effect of His vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection. 14.6. But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man's will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing that ought to be hated, will remain. 14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible. 14.10. But it is a fair question, whether our first parent or first parents (for there was a marriage of two), before they sinned, experienced in their animal body such emotions as we shall not experience in the spiritual body when sin has been purged and finally abolished. For if they did, then how were they blessed in that boasted place of bliss, Paradise? For who that is affected by fear or grief can be called absolutely blessed? And what could those persons fear or suffer in such affluence of blessings, where neither death nor ill-health was feared, and where nothing was wanting which a good will could desire, and nothing present which could interrupt man's mental or bodily enjoyment? Their love to God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved. Their avoidance of sin was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintained, no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorrow. Or did they perhaps desire to touch and eat the forbidden fruit, yet feared to die; and thus both fear and desire already, even in that blissful place, preyed upon those first of mankind? Away with the thought that such could be the case where there was no sin! And, indeed, this is already sin, to desire those things which the law of God forbids, and to abstain from them through fear of punishment, not through love of righteousness. Away, I say, with the thought, that before there was any sin, there should already have been committed regarding that fruit the very sin which our Lord warns us against regarding a woman: Whosoever looks on a woman to lust after her, has committed adultery with her already in his heart. Matthew 5:28 As happy, then, as were these our first parents, who were agitated by no mental perturbations, and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the whole human race have been, had they not introduced that evil which they have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of their descendants committed iniquity worthy of damnation; but this original blessedness continuing until, in virtue of that benediction which said, Increase and multiply, Genesis 1:28 the number of the predestined saints should have been completed, there would then have been bestowed that higher felicity which is enjoyed by the most blessed angels - a blessedness in which there should have been a secure assurance that no one would sin, and no one die; and so should the saints have lived, after no taste of labor, pain, or death, as now they shall live in the resurrection, after they have endured all these things. 14.16. Although, therefore, lust may have many objects, yet when no object is specified, the word lust usually suggests to the mind the lustful excitement of the organs of generation. And this lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward members, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man with a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. What friend of wisdom and holy joys, who, being married, but knowing, as the apostle says, how to possess his vessel in santification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as the Gentiles who know not God, 1 Thessalonians 4:4 would not prefer, if this were possible, to beget children without this lust, so that in this function of begetting offspring the members created for this purpose should not be stimulated by the heat of lust, but should be actuated by his volition, in the same way as his other members serve him for their respective ends? But even those who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious lust; and though it often opposes its whole combined energy to the soul that resists it, sometimes also it is divided against itself, and while it moves the soul, leaves the body unmoved.
82. Augustine, On The Holy Trinity, 12.12 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, contest appearances even in dreams Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 414
83. Augustine, De Sermone Domini In Monte Secundum Matthaeum, 1.12.33-1.12.34 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, contest appearances even in dreams Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 414
84. Julian (Emperor), Letters, 201 B-C (Democritus A 20 DK) (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, falsehoods permitted Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 223
85. Julian (Emperor), Letters, 201 B-C (Democritus A 20 DK) (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, falsehoods permitted Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 223
86. Augustine, Commentary On Genesis, 12.15.31 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, contest appearances even in dreams Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 414
87. Augustine, Against Julian, 2.7.20, 4.14.72, 5.10.42 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, contest appearances even in dreams Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 413
88. Augustine, Confessions, 4.8.13, 7.3, 8.5, 8.9-8.10, 8.9.21, 10.30, 10.33, 10.35.55 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 398
89. Evagrius, On Discrimination In Respect of Passions And Thoughts, 10 (= On Various Bad Thoughts, 11-12), 2), 20 (= On Various Bad Thoughts, 3 (= On Various Bad Thoughts, 19-20) (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 366
90. Julian (Emperor), Letters, 201 B-C (Democritus A 20 DK) (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, falsehoods permitted Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 223
91. Gregory of Nazianzus, Letters, 32 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic •epictetus, stoic, lower self and daimonic self Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 163, 246
92. John Philoponus, In Aristotelis De Anima Libros Commentaria, Philoponus (?) 583.16 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, prothumia Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 71
93. Jerome, Commentaria In Matthaeum (Commentaria In Evangelium S. Matthaei), 26, 5, verse 37, verses 36-9, verses 28-9 (PL 26, cols.39-40) (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 398
94. Stobaeus, Anthology, 4.671.7(Hierocles the Stoic), 3.532.1-13 (Theophrastus fr.526 FHS&G), 4.2.13 (Democritus frags.257-9 DK) (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 252
95. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.80, 2.79, 2.75, 2.85.2, 2.85.1, 2.83.10-84.2(SVF 3.124), 2.83.2, 2.83-4(SVF 3.124), 2.82.11(SVF 1.192; 3.128), 2.83, 2.82, 2.80.22-81.1, 2.80(SVF 3.136), 2.79.16, 2.79.15, 2.85.3, 2.85.4, 2.87.22(SVF 3.173), 2.72.6, 2.72.5, 2.72.4, 2.72.3, 2.72.2, 2.58.9, 2.58.8, 2.58.7, 2.58.6, 2.58.5, 2.72.1, 2.101.24-102.2, 2.76.15, 2.76.13, 2.76.14, 2.111, 2.8.30 (Musonius), 2.57-116 (Arius Didymus)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170
96. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, 1, q.95, a.2, respondeo  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 398
97. Epicurus, On Nature, 34.25, lines 22-34 (Arighetti2)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 327
98. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 126  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241
99. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Epictetum Commentaria, 38, line 87, p.361, p.384, lines 568-575, line 24-p.364 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 214
100. Evagrius, 'Frag.From Sayings of The Fathers (Apophthegmata Patrum), PG 65.176A Evagrius  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, handbook used in christian monasteries, with only rejection of pity suppressed Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 390
101. Aristotle, Protrepticus, fr.12 Ross  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, personae Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 250
102. Pseudo‐Nilus, Handbook (Edition of Epictetus), 22 (PG 79.1286-1315)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, handbook used in christian monasteries, with only rejection of pity suppressed Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 390
104. Porphyry, On What Is Up To Us, ap.Stobaeum 2.163.16-167.7; fr.268Smith  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 320
105. Galen, On The Diagnosis And Therapy of The Distinctive Passions of The Individual'S Soul, 5, 4  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241
107. Augustine, New Sermon, Mainz, Ed.Dolbeau, 41 (3)  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, contest appearances even in dreams Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 413
109. Philodemus, On Conversation (Cronache Ercolanesi 5), pp.63-76  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, confession •epictetus, stoic, employ a critic •epictetus, stoic, remember wife and children are mortal Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 218
110. Pseudo‐Nilus =Evagrius, Sentences To The Monks, PG 40.1279 A  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 366
113. Epigraphy, Ms, 4.112, 4.121  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus of hierapolis, stoic Found in books: Marek, In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World (2019) 489
114. Epigraphy, Puhl And Möbius, 847  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus of hierapolis, stoic Found in books: Marek, In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World (2019) 489
115. Galen, Svg, 2.24, 2.894  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus of hierapolis, stoic Found in books: Marek, In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World (2019) 489
116. Antiphon, On Emotions, fr.58 DK  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 241
117. Basil of Caesarea, Ascetic Sermons, 1, col.882 (PG 31)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 214
119. Pseudo‐Plutarch, Is The Emotional Element In Humans A Part Or A Capacity of The Soul?, fragment, p.48 (Loeb vol.15)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
120. Gregory of Nyssa, On The Creation of Man, 12.4  Tagged with subjects: •epictetus, stoic, prothumia Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 71