| 1. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201 |
| 2. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201 |
| 3. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201 |
| 4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201 |
5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.29-3.30, 3.33, 3.58, 5.96 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235| 3.29. haec igitur praemeditatio futurorum malorum lenit eorum adventum, quae venientia longe ante videris. itaque apud Euripiden a Theseo dicta laudantur; licet Eurip. fr. 964 euripidĕ K thesseo GKR 1 enim, ut saepe facimus, in Latinum illa convertere: Nam qui hae/c audita a do/cto meminisse/m viro, Futu/ras mecum co/mmentabar mi/serias: Aut mo/rtem acerbam aut alt. aut add. G 2 exilii X e/xili maesta/m fugam Aut se/mper aliquam mo/lem meditaba/r mali, Ut, si/ qua invecta di/ritas casu/ foret, Ne me i/nparatum cu/ra lacerare/t repens. lacerare trepens G 1 R 1 3.30. quod autem Theseus a docto se audisse dicit, id de se ipso de ipso K 1 ( ex dese ipse) V 1 (se add. 1 ) Anax. A 33 loquitur Euripides. fuerat enim auditor Anaxagorae, quem ferunt nuntiata morte filii dixisse: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. quae vox declarat is esse haec acerba, quibus non fuerint cogitata. ergo id quidem non dubium, quin omnia, quae mala putentur, sint inprovisa graviora. itaque quamquam non haec una res efficit maximam aegritudinem, tamen, quoniam multum potest provisio animi et praeparatio ad minuendum dolorem, sint semper omnia homini humana meditata. et et ex e V c nimirum haec est illa praestans et divina sapientia, et perceptas penitus et pertractatas res humanas habere, nihil admirari, ammirari GR 1 V cum acciderit, nihil, ante quam evenerit, non evenire posse arbitrari. Quam ob rem o/mnis, cum secu/ndae res sunt ma/xume, tum ma/xume tum maxume add. K c maxime alt. loco GRV bis H Medita/ri secum opo/rtet, quo pacto a/dversam adversum KRH aerumna/m ferant. fuerant H ferat K 1 Peri/cla, pericula X damna pe/regre rediens se/mper secum co/gitet, pericla damna exilia peregre rediens semper cogitet Ter. codd. Aut fi/li filii p. X peccatum au/t uxoris mo/rtem aut morbum fi/liae, Commu/nia esse haec, ne/ quid horum umquam a/ccidat animo/ novum; c. e. haec, fieri posse, ut ne quid animo sit novom Ter. Quicqui/d praeter praeter propter K spem eve/niat, omne id de/putare esse i/n lucro. ergo .. 22 lucro H ... 22 Ter. Phormio 241–6 ergo hoc hoc ex haec G 2 Terentius a philosophia sumptum cum tam commode dixerit, nos, e quorum fontibus id haustum est, non et dicemus hoc melius et constantius sentiemus? 3.33. Levationem autem aegritudinis in duabus rebus ponit, avocatione a cogitanda molestia et revocatione revocationem GKV 1 ad contemplandas voluptates. parere pareri GR 1 ( corr. 1 ) V 1 ( corr. 2 ) enim censet animum rationi posse et, quo illa ducat, sequi. vetat igitur ratio intueri molestias, abstrahit ab acerbis cogitationibus, hebetem habetem V 1 aciem ad miserias contemplandas facit; facit add. V c ( ante aciem We. ft. rectius cf. docere 220,13 sed cf. off. 1, 12 extr. al. ) om. cett. a quibus cum cecinit cecidit X corr. 2 receptui, inpellit receptuimpellit VHK c (receptaimp. K 1 )G 2 (receptum pellit 1 ) receptū impellit R rursum et incitat ad conspiciendas totaque mente contrectandas contractandas K ( ex -tes 1 ) H varias voluptates, vetat... 335, 4 voluptates H quibus ille et praeteritarum memoria et spe consequentium sapientis vitam refertam putat. refert amputat G 1 R 1 V 1 Haec nostro more nos diximus, Epicurii epicurei R c K 2 dicunt suo; sed quae quae ex qui V 2 dicant, videamus, quo modo, neglegamus. 3.58. similiter commemorandis exemplis orbitates quoque liberum liberorum V c praedicantur, eorumque, eorum quoque K 1 qui gravius ferunt, luctus aliorum exemplis leniuntur. sic perpessio ceterorum facit, ut ea quae acciderint multo minora maiora ex minora V c quam quanta sint existimata, videantur. ita fit, sensim cogitantibus ut, quantum sit ementita opinio, appareat. atque hoc idem et Telamo ille declarat: ego cum genui et Theseus: futuras mecum commentabar miserias tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli add. R 2, moriturum scivi V 3 et Anaxagoras: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. cf. p. 332, 9 sqq. hi enim omnes diu cogitantes de rebus humanis intellegebant eas nequaquam pro opinione volgi esse extimescendas. extimescendas KR 1 existimescendas R c G existimiscendas G 1 e corr. V et mihi quidem videtur idem fere accidere is qui ante meditantur, quod is quibus medetur dies, nisi quod ratio ratio V ratione GKR ( unde in hoc quae- dam 2? ) quaedam sanat illos, hos ipsa natura intellecto eo quod rem continet, illud illud continet X trp. B malum, quod opinatum sit esse maxumum, nequaquam esse tantum, ut vitam beatam possit evertere. 5.96. quocirca corpus gaudere tam diu, dum praesentem sentiret voluptatem, animum et praesentem percipere pariter cum corpore et prospicere venientem nec praeteritam praeterfluere sinere. ita perpetuas et contextas contestas ex contentas K c voluptates in sapiente fore semper, cum expectatio expectatione G 1 speratarum voluptatum cum cum add. Lb. perceptarum memoria iungeretur. | |
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6. Cicero, De Finibus, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170 | 3.51. Again among things valuable â e.g. health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like â they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proÄgmena and the opposite, apoproÄgmena â for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. |
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7. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170| 3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE | 3.50. But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. |
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| 8. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 97 |
9. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.947-3.949 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235| 3.947. confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant, 3.948. omnia si perges vivendo vincere saecla, 3.949. atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus', | |
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| 10. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 7.2.4-7.2.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 11. Plutarch, On The Control of Anger, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 12. Plutarch, Letter of Condolence To Apollonius, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 13. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 171 |
| 14. Epictetus, Discourses, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170 |
| 15. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 16. Seneca The Younger, De Constantia Sapientis, 15.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 17. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 16.3, 22.4, 23.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, end or goal of life •end or goal of life (telos), antipater, end of aiming well distinguished from target •end or goal of life (telos), diogenes of babylon Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170, 171 |
18. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 12.9, 23.5, 78.16, 101.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 171, 235| 95. educam et imo Ditis e regno extraham | |
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| 19. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylon, stoic, end or goal of life •end or goal of life (telos), antipater, end of aiming well distinguished from target •end or goal of life (telos), diogenes of babylon •end or goal of life (telos), posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 98, 171 |
| 20. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170 |
| 21. Aelian, Varia Historia, 3.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 22. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.3.4, 4.3.8, 4.5.26-4.5.44, 4.7.6-4.7.11, 4.7.19, 4.7.24, 4.7.28, 4.7.32-4.7.33, 4.7.35-4.7.37, 5.5.3-5.5.14, 5.5.21, 5.5.36-5.5.38, 5.6.1, 5.6.9-5.6.12, 5.6.14, 5.6.17-5.6.18, 5.6.20-5.6.22, 5.6.28 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), posidonius •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 97, 98, 235 |
| 23. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170 |
| 24. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 2.5, 7.69 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
25. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170 | 7.105. they being quite capable of exciting inclination or aversion. Hence of these latter some are taken by preference, others are rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense affords no ground for either choosing or avoiding.of things indifferent, as they express it, some are preferred, others rejected. Such as have value, they say, are preferred, while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are rejected. Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the life according to nature: which is as much as to say any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts – as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in. |
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| 26. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 31.196 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
27. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.7-3.8 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 97 | 3.7. Let us now pass to the other part of philosophy, which they themselves call moral, in which is contained the method of the whole of philosophy, since in natural philosophy there is only delight, in this there is utility also. And since it is more dangerous to commit a fault in arranging the condition of life and in forming the character, greater diligence must be used, that we may know how we ought to live. For in the former subject some indulgence may be granted: for whether they say anything, they bestow no advantage; or if they foolishly rave, they do no injury. But in this subject there is no room for difference of opinion, none for error. All must entertain the same sentiments, and philosophy itself must give instructions as it were with one mouth; because if any error shall be committed, life is altogether overthrown. In that former part, as there is less danger, so there is more difficulty; because the obscurity of the subject compels us to entertain different and various opinions. But in this, as there is more danger, so there is less difficulty; because the very use of the subjects and daily experiments are able to teach what is truer and better. Let us see, therefore, whether they agree, or what assistance they give us for the better guidance of life. It is not necessary to enlarge on every point; let us select one, and especially that which is the chief and principal thing, in which the whole of wisdom centres and depends. Epicurus deems that the chief good consists in pleasure of mind, Aristippus in pleasure of the body. Callipho and Dinomachus united virtue with pleasure, Diodorus with the privation of pain, Hieronymus placed the chief good in the absence of pain; the Peripatetics, again, in the goods of the mind, the body, and fortune. The chief good of Herillus is knowledge; that of Zeno, to live agreeably to nature; that of certain Stoics, to follow virtue. Aristotle placed the chief good in integrity and virtue. These are the sentiments of nearly all. In such a difference of opinions, whom do we follow? Whom do we believe? All are of equal authority. If we are able to select that which is better, it follows that philosophy is not necessary for us; because we are already wise, inasmuch as we judge respecting the opinions of the wise. But since we come for the sake of learning wisdom, how can we judge, who have not yet begun to be wise? Especially when the Academic is close at hand, to draw us back by the cloak, and forbid us to believe any one, without bringing forward that which we may follow. 3.8. What then remains, but that we leave raving and obstinate wranglers, and come to the judge, who is in truth the giver of simple and calm wisdom? Which is able not only to mould us, and lead us into the way, but also to pass an opinion on the controversies of those men. This teaches us what is the true and highest good of man; but before I begin to speak on this subject, all those opinions must be refuted, that it may appear that no one of those philosophers was wise. Since the inquiry is respecting the duty of man, the chief good of the chief animal ought to be placed in that which it cannot have in common with the other animals. But as teeth are the peculiar property of wild beasts, horns of cattle, and wings of birds, so something peculiar to himself ought to be attributed to man, without which he would lose the fixed order of his condition. For that which is given to all for the purpose of life or generation, is indeed a natural good; but still it is not the greatest, unless it be peculiar to each class. Therefore he was not a wise man who believed that pleasure of the mind is the chief good, since that, whether it be freedom from anxiety or joy, is common to all. I do not consider Aristippus even worthy of an answer; for since he is always rushing into pleasures of the body, and is only the slave of sensual indulgences, no one can regard him as a man: for he lived in such a manner that there was no difference between him and a brute, except this only, that he had the faculty of speech. But if the power of speaking were given to the ass, or the dog, or swine, and you were to inquire from these why they so furiously pursue the females, that they can scarcely be separated from them, and even neglect their food and I drink; why they either drive away other males, or do not abstain from the pursuit even when vanquished, but often, when bruised by stronger animals, they are more determined in their pursuit; why they dread neither rain nor cold; why they undertake labour, and do not shrink from danger - what other answer will they give, but that the chief good is bodily pleasure?- that they eagerly seek it, in order that they may be affected with the most agreeable sensations; and that these are of so much importance, that, for the sake of attaining them, they imagine that no labour, nor wounds, nor death itself, ought to be refused by them? Shall we then seek precepts of living from these men, who have no other feelings than those of the irrational creatures? The Cyrenaics say that virtue itself is to be praised on this account, because it is productive of pleasure. True, says the filthy dog, or the swine wallowing in the mire. For it is on this account that I contend with my adversary with the utmost exertion of strength, that my valour may procure for me pleasure; of which I must necessarily be deprived if I shall come off vanquished. Shall we therefore learn wisdom from these men, who differ from cattle and the brutes, not in feeling, but in language? To regard the absence of pain as the chief good, is not indeed the part of Peripatetic and Stoic, but of clinical philosophers. For who would not imagine that the discussion was carried on by those who were ill, and under the influence of some pain? What is so ridiculous, as to esteem that the chief good which the physician is able to give? We must therefore feel pain in order that we may enjoy good; and that, too, severely and frequently, that afterwards the absence of pain may be attended with greater pleasure. He is therefore most wretched who has never felt pain, because he is without that which is good; whereas we used to regard him as most happy, because he was without evil. He was not far distant from this folly, who said that the entire absence of pain was the chief good. For, besides the fact that every animal avoids pain, who can bestow upon himself that good, towards the obtaining of which we can do no more than wish? But the chief good cannot make any one happy, unless it shall be always in his power; and it is not virtue, nor learning, nor labour, which affords this to man, but nature herself bestows it upon all living creatures. They who joined pleasure with virtuous principle, wished to avoid this common blending together of all, but they made a contradictory kind of good; since he who is abandoned to pleasure must of necessity be destitute of virtuous principle, and he who aims at principle must be destitute of pleasure. The chief good of the Peripatetics may possibly appear excessive, various, and - excepting those goods which belong to the mind, and what they are is a great subject of dispute - common to man with the beasts. For goods belonging to the body - that is, safety, freedom from pain, health - are no less necessary for dumb creatures than for man; and I know not if they are not more necessary for them, because man can be relieved by remedies and services, the dumb animals cannot. The same is true of those which they call the goods of fortune; for as man has need of resources for the support of life, so have they need of prey and pasture. Thus, by introducing a good which is not within the power of man, they made man altogether subject to the power of another. Let us also hear Zeno, for he at times dreams of virtue. The chief good, he says, is to live in accordance with nature. Therefore we must live after the manner of the brutes. For in these are found all the things which ought to be absent from man: they are eager for pleasures, they fear, they deceive, they lie in wait, they kill; and that which is especially to the point, they have no knowledge of God. Why, therefore, does he teach me to live according to nature, which is of itself prone to a worse course, and under the influence of some more soothing blandishments plunges headlong into vices? Or if he says that the nature of brutes is different from the nature of man, because man is born to virtue, he says something to the purpose; but, however, it will not be a definition of the chief good, because there is no animal which does not live in accordance with its nature. He who made knowledge the chief good, gave something peculiar to man; but men desire knowledge for the sake of something else, and not for its own sake. For who is contented with knowing, without seeking some advantage from his knowledge? The arts are learned for the purpose of being put into exercise; but they are exercised either for the support of life, or pleasure, or for glory. That, therefore, is not the chief good which is not sought for on its own account. What difference, therefore, does it make, whether we consider knowledge to be the chief good, or those very things which knowledge produces from itself, that is, means of subsistence, glory, pleasure? And these things are not peculiar to man, and therefore they are not the chief goods; for the desire of pleasure and of food does not exist in man alone, but also in the brutes. How is it with regard to the desire of glory? Is it not discovered in horses, since they exult in victory, and are grieved when vanquished? So great is their love of praises, so great is their eagerness for victory. Nor without reason does that most excellent poet say that we must try what grief they feel when overcome, and how they rejoice in victory. But if those things which knowledge produces are common to man with other animals, it follows that knowledge is not the chief good. Moreover, it is no slight fault of this definition that bare knowledge is set forth. For all will begin to appear happy who shall have the knowledge of any art, even those who shall know mischievous subjects; so that he who shall have learned to mix poisons, is as happy as he who has learned to apply remedies. I ask, therefore, to what subject knowledge is to be referred. If to the causes of natural things, what happiness will be proposed to me, if I shall know the sources of the Nile, or the vain dreams of the natural philosophers respecting the heaven? Why should I mention that on these subjects there is no knowledge, but mere conjecture, which varies according to the abilities of men? It only remains that the knowledge of good and evil things is the chief good. Why, then, did he call knowledge the chief good more than wisdom, when both words have the same signification and meaning? But no one has yet said that the chief good is wisdom, though this might more properly have been said. For knowledge is insufficient for the undertaking of that which is good and avoiding that which is evil, unless virtue also is added. For many of the philosophers, though they discussed the nature of good and evil things, yet from the compulsion of nature lived in a manner different from their discourse, because they were without virtue. But virtue united with knowledge is wisdom. It remains that we refute those also who judged virtue itself to be the chief good, and Marcus Tullius was also of this opinion; and in this they were very inconsiderate. For virtue itself is not the chief good, but it is the contriver and mother of the chief good; for this cannot be attained without virtue. Each point is easily understood. For I ask whether they imagine that it is easy to arrive at that distinguished good, or that it is reached only with difficulty and labour? Let them apply their ingenuity, and defend error. If it is easily attained to, and without labour, it cannot be the chief good. For why should we torment ourselves, why wear ourselves out with striving day and night, seeing that the object of our pursuit is so close at hand, that any one who wishes may grasp it without any effort of the mind? But if we do not attain even to a common and moderate good except by labour, since good things are by their nature arduous and difficult, whereas evil things have a downward tendency, it follows that the greatest labour is necessary for the attainment of the greatest good. And if this is most true, then there is need of another virtue, that we may arrive at that virtue which is called the chief good; but this is incongruous and absurd, that virtue should arrive at itself by means of itself. If no good can be reached unless by labour, it is evident that it is virtue by which it is reached, since the force and office of virtue consist in the undertaking and carrying through of labours. Therefore the chief good cannot be that by which it is necessary to arrive at another. But they, since they were ignorant of the effects and tendency of virtue, and could discover nothing more honourable, stopped at the very name of virtue, and said that it ought to be sought, though no advantage was proposed from it; and thus they fixed for themselves a good which itself stood in need of a good. From these Aristotle was not far removed, who thought that virtue together with honour was the chief good; as though it were possible for any virtue to exist unless it were honourable, and as though it would not cease to be virtue if it had any measure of disgrace. But he saw that it might happen that a bad opinion is entertained respecting virtue by a depraved judgment, and therefore he thought that deference should be paid to what in the estimation of men constitutes a departure from what is right and good, because it is not in our power that virtue should be honoured simply for its own deserts. For what is honourable character, except perpetual honour, conferred on any one by the favourable report of the people? What, then, will happen, if through the error and perverseness of men a bad reputation should ensue? Shall we cast aside virtue because it is judged to be base and disgraceful by the foolish? And since it is capable of being oppressed and harassed, in order that it may be of itself a peculiar and lasting good, it ought to stand in need of no outward assistance, so as not to depend by itself upon its own strength, and to remain steadfast. And thus no good is to be hoped by it from man, nor is any evil to be refused. |
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| 28. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 6, 269 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 29. Augustine, Confessions, 4.6.12, 4.8.13 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 30. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 6, 269 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 31. Jerome, Letters, 60.5.1 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 32. Jerome, Letters, 60.5.1 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 33. Jerome, Letters, 60.5.1 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 34. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 170 |
| 35. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 18, 3, 29 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201 |
| 36. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 37. Philodemus, On Choices And Avoidances, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201 |
| 38. Posidonius, Ed.Edelstein–Kidd (See Also Galen, Php, Books 4–5), Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), posidonius Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 98 |
| 39. Antiphon, On Emotions, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
| 40. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 127, 131-132, 136 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 201 |
| 41. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 14 Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 235 |
