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43 results for "eleazar"
1. Hebrew Bible, Malachi, 3.23 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 87
3.23. "הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי שֹׁלֵחַ לָכֶם אֵת אֵלִיָּה הַנָּבִיא לִפְנֵי בּוֹא יוֹם יְהוָה הַגָּדוֹל וְהַנּוֹרָא׃", 3.23. "Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet Before the coming of the great and terrible day of the LORD.",
2. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 6.8, 21.3 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119; Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 87
6.8. "וְהֵבֵאתִי אֶתְכֶם אֶל־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר נָשָׂאתִי אֶת־יָדִי לָתֵת אֹתָהּ לְאַבְרָהָם לְיִצְחָק וּלְיַעֲקֹב וְנָתַתִּי אֹתָהּ לָכֶם מוֹרָשָׁה אֲנִי יְהוָה׃", 21.3. "אִם־כֹּפֶר יוּשַׁת עָלָיו וְנָתַן פִּדְיֹן נַפְשׁוֹ כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר־יוּשַׁת עָלָיו׃", 21.3. "אִם־בְּגַפּוֹ יָבֹא בְּגַפּוֹ יֵצֵא אִם־בַּעַל אִשָּׁה הוּא וְיָצְאָה אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ׃", 6.8. "And I will bring you in unto the land, concerning which I lifted up My hand to give it to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob; and I will give it you for a heritage: I am the LORD.’", 21.3. "If he come in by himself, he shall go out by himself; if he be married, then his wife shall go out with him.",
3. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 16.3 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah Found in books: Samely (2002), Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah, 73
16.3. "לֹא־תֹאכַל עָלָיו חָמֵץ שִׁבְעַת יָמִים תֹּאכַל־עָלָיו מַצּוֹת לֶחֶם עֹנִי כִּי בְחִפָּזוֹן יָצָאתָ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם לְמַעַן תִּזְכֹּר אֶת־יוֹם צֵאתְךָ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם כֹּל יְמֵי חַיֶּיךָ׃", 16.3. "Thou shalt eat no leavened bread with it; seven days shalt thou eat unleavened bread therewith, even the bread of affliction; for in haste didst thou come forth out of the land of Egypt; that thou mayest remember the day when thou camest forth out of the land of Egypt all the days of thy life.",
4. Hebrew Bible, Joshua, 7.22, 7.25 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah Found in books: Samely (2002), Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah, 165
7.22. "וַיִּשְׁלַח יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מַלְאָכִים וַיָּרֻצוּ הָאֹהֱלָה וְהִנֵּה טְמוּנָה בְּאָהֳלוֹ וְהַכֶּסֶף תַּחְתֶּיהָ׃", 7.25. "וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מֶה עֲכַרְתָּנוּ יַעְכֳּרְךָ יְהוָה בַּיּוֹם הַזֶּה וַיִּרְגְּמוּ אֹתוֹ כָל־יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶבֶן וַיִּשְׂרְפוּ אֹתָם בָּאֵשׁ וַיִּסְקְלוּ אֹתָם בָּאֲבָנִים׃", 7.22. "So Joshua sent messengers, and they ran unto the tent; and, behold, it was hid in his tent, and the silver under it.", 7.25. "And Joshua said: ‘Why hast thou troubled us? the LORD shall trouble thee this day.’ And all Israel stoned him with stones; and they burned them with fire, and stoned them with stones.",
5. Hebrew Bible, Jeremiah, 9.25 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah Found in books: Samely (2002), Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah, 389
9.25. "עַל־מִצְרַיִם וְעַל־יְהוּדָה וְעַל־אֱדוֹם וְעַל־בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן וְעַל־מוֹאָב וְעַל כָּל־קְצוּצֵי פֵאָה הַיֹּשְׁבִים בַּמִּדְבָּר כִּי כָל־הַגּוֹיִם עֲרֵלִים וְכָל־בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל עַרְלֵי־לֵב׃", 9.25. "Egypt, and Judah, and Edom, and the children of Ammon, and Moab, and all that have the corners of their hair polled, that dwell in the wilderness; For all the nations are uncircumcised, But all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart.",
6. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 58.7 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
58.7. "הֲלוֹא פָרֹס לָרָעֵב לַחְמֶךָ וַעֲנִיִּים מְרוּדִים תָּבִיא בָיִת כִּי־תִרְאֶה עָרֹם וְכִסִּיתוֹ וּמִבְּשָׂרְךָ לֹא תִתְעַלָּם׃", 58.7. "Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, And that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? When thou seest the naked, that thou cover him, And that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh?",
7. Tosefta, Ketuvot, 4.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
4.8. "מצוה לזון את הבנות ואין צריך לומר את הבנים ר' יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר חובה לזון את הבנות.", 4.8. "Ideally, one should feed [his] daughters, and it is not necessary to say [also his] sons. Rabbi Yoha ben Berokah says: It is required to feed daughters.",
8. Musonius Rufus, Fragments, None (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
9. Mishnah, Shabbat, 1.9, 5.7, 9.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah Found in books: Samely (2002), Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah, 165; Simon-Shushan (2012), Stories of the Law: Narrative Discourse and the Construction of Authority in the Mishna, 42
1.9. "אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, נוֹהֲגִין הָיוּ בֵּית אַבָּא שֶׁהָיוּ נוֹתְנִין כְּלֵי לָבָן לְכוֹבֵס נָכְרִי שְׁלשָׁה יָמִים קֹדֶם לַשַּׁבָּת. וְשָׁוִין אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ, שֶׁטּוֹעֲנִין קוֹרוֹת בֵּית הַבַּד וְעִגּוּלֵי הַגָּת: \n", 9.3. "מִנַּיִן לְפוֹלֶטֶת שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי שֶׁהִיא טְמֵאָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות יט) הֱיוּ נְכוֹנִים לִשְׁלשֶׁת יָמִים. מִנַּיִן שֶׁמַּרְחִיצִין אֶת הַמִּילָה בַיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי שֶׁחָל לִהְיוֹת בְּשַׁבָּת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (בראשית לד) וַיְהִי בַיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי בִּהְיוֹתָם כֹּאֲבִים. מִנַּיִן שֶׁקּוֹשְׁרִין לָשׁוֹן שֶׁל זְהוֹרִית בְּרֹאשׁ שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה א) אִם יִהְיוּ חֲטָאֵיכֶם כַּשָּׁנִים כַּשֶּׁלֶג יַלְבִּינוּ: \n", 1.9. "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: My father’s house was accustomed to giving white clothing to a non-Jewish launderer three days before Shabbat. And these and these agree that they lay down an olive press beams and wine press rollers.", 9.3. "How do we know that if one [a woman] discharges semen on the third day she is unclean? Because it is said, “Be ready for the third day” (Exodus 19:15). How do we know that one who has been circumcised may be bathed on the third day [after circumcision] which falls on Shabbat? Because it is said, “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain” (Genesis 34:25). How do we know that a crimson-colored strap is tied to the head of the goat that is sent [to Azazel]? Because it is said, “If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow” (Isaiah 1:18).",
10. Mishnah, Nedarim, 3.11 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah Found in books: Samely (2002), Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah, 165
3.11. "קוֹנָם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לִבְנֵי נֹחַ, מֻתָּר בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָסוּר בְּאֻמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם. שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לְזֶרַע אַבְרָהָם, אָסוּר בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וּמֻתָּר בְּאֻמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם. שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, לוֹקֵחַ בְּיוֹתֵר וּמוֹכֵר בְּפָחוֹת. שֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל נֶהֱנִין לִי, לוֹקֵחַ בְּפָחוֹת וּמוֹכֵר בְּיוֹתֵר, אִם שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לָהֶן וְהֵן לִי, יְהַנֶּה לַנָּכְרִים. קוֹנָם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לָעֲרֵלִים, מֻתָּר בְּעַרְלֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָסוּר בְּמוּלֵי הַגּוֹיִם. קוֹנָם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לַמּוּלִים, אָסוּר בְּעַרְלֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמֻתָּר בְּמוּלֵי הַגּוֹיִם, שֶׁאֵין הָעָרְלָה קְרוּיָה אֶלָּא לְשֵׁם הַגּוֹיִם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ירמיה ט) כִּי כָל הַגּוֹיִם עֲרֵלִים וְכָל בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל עַרְלֵי לֵב, וְאוֹמֵר (שמואל א יז) וְהָיָה הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הֶעָרֵל הַזֶּה, וְאוֹמֵר (שמואל ב א) פֶּן תִּשְׂמַחְנָה בְּנוֹת פְּלִשְׁתִּים, פֶּן תַּעֲלֹזְנָה בְּנוֹת הָעֲרֵלִים. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר, מְאוּסָה עָרְלָה שֶׁנִּתְגַּנּוּ בָהּ הָרְשָׁעִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר, כִּי כָל הַגּוֹיִם עֲרֵלִים. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, גְּדוֹלָה מִילָה שֶׁנִּכְרְתוּ עָלֶיהָ שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה בְרִיתוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, גְּדוֹלָה מִילָה, שֶׁדּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת הַחֲמוּרָה. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קָרְחָה אוֹמֵר, גְּדוֹלָה מִילָה, שֶׁלֹּא נִתְלָה לוֹ לְמֹשֶׁה הַצַדִּיק עָלֶיהָ מְלֹא שָׁעָה. רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר, גְּדוֹלָה מִילָה, שֶׁדּוֹחָה אֶת הַנְּגָעִים. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר, גְּדוֹלָה מִילָה, שֶׁכָּל הַמִּצְוֹת שֶׁעָשָׂה אַבְרָהָם אָבִינוּ לֹא נִקְרָא שָׁלֵם, עַד שֶׁמָּל, שֶׁנֱּאֶמַר (בראשית יז), הִתְהַלֵּךְ לְפָנַי וֶהְיֵה תָמִים. דָּבָר אַחֵר, גְּדוֹלָה מִילָה, שֶׁאִלְמָלֵא הִיא, לֹא בָרָא הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אֶת עוֹלָמוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ירמיה לג), כֹּה אָמַר ה' אִם לֹא בְרִיתִי יוֹמָם וָלָיְלָה, חֻקּוֹת שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ לֹא שָׂמְתִּי: \n", 3.11. "[If one says,] “Konam that I do not benefit from the Children of Noah,” he may benefit from Israelites, and he is forbidden to benefit from the nations of the world. [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from the seed of Abraham,” he is forbidden [to benefit] from Israelites, but permitted [to benefit] from the nations of the world. [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from Israelites”, he may buy things from them for more [than their worth] and sell them for less. [If he says, “Konam] if Israelites benefit from me, he must buy from them for less and sell for more [than their worth], if they will listen to him. [If he says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from them, nor they from me”, he may benefit only from non-Jews. [If one says,] “Konam that I do not benefit from the uncircumcised”, he may benefit from uncircumcised Israelites but not from circumcised heathens”; [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from the circumcised,” he is forbidden to benefit from uncircumcised Israelites but not from circumcised non-Jews, because “uncircumcised” is a term applicable only to non-Jews, as it says, “For all the nations are uncircumcised and all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart” (Jeremiah 9:25). And it says, “And this uncircumcised Philistine shall be [as one of them]” (I Samuel 17:6). And it says, “Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised exult” (II Samuel 1:20). Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says: The foreskin is loathsome, since it is a term of disgrace for the wicked, as it says, “For all the nations are uncircumcised”. Rabbi Ishmael says: Great is circumcision, since thirteen covets were made upon it. Rabbi Yose says: Great is circumcision, for it overrides the Sabbath. Rabbi Joshua ben Karha says: Great is circumcision for Moses’s punishment for neglecting it was not suspended even for one hour. Rabbi Nehemiah says: Great is circumcision, since it overrides the laws of leprosy. Rabbi says: Great is circumcision, for despite all of the commandments which Abraham fulfilled he was not designated complete until he circumcised himself, as it says, “Walk before me, and be complete” (Genesis 17:1). Another explanation: “Great is circumcision, for were it not for it, the Holy One, Blessed Be He, would not have created the world, as it says, “Were it not for my covet by day and night, I would not have appointed the ordices of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:35).",
11. Mishnah, Ketuvot, 4.6, 4.11 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 114, 119
4.6. "הָאָב אֵינוֹ חַיָּב בִּמְזוֹנוֹת בִּתּוֹ. זֶה מִדְרָשׁ דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים בַּכֶּרֶם בְּיַבְנֶה, הַבָּנִים יִירְשׁוּ וְהַבָּנוֹת יִזּוֹנוּ, מָה הַבָּנִים אֵינָן יוֹרְשִׁין אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתַת הָאָב, אַף הַבָּנוֹת אֵינָן נִזּוֹנוֹת אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתַת אֲבִיהֶן: \n", 4.11. "בְּנָן נֻקְבִין דְּיֶהֶוְיָן לִיכִי מִנַּאי, יֶהֶוְיָן יָתְבָן בְּבֵיתִי וּמִתְּזָנָן מִנִּכְסַי עַד דְּתִנַּסְּבָן לְגֻבְרִין, חַיָּב, שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין: \n", 4.6. "A father is not obligated to maintain his daughter. This exposition was made by Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah in front of the sages in the vineyard of Yavneh: “The sons shall inherit [their mother’s kethubah] and the daughters shall be maintained [out of their father’s estate” just as the sons do not inherit except after the death of their father, so the daughters are not maintained except after the death of their father.", 4.11. "If he did not write for her, “the female children that I will have from you will dwell in my house and be maintained out of my estate until they are taken in marriage”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court.",
12. Mishnah, Arakhin, 1.7 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 47
13. Anon., The Life of Adam And Eve, 7.9-7.11 (1st cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 47
14. Tosefta, Pesahim, 10.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 87
10.12. "מעשה ברבן גמליאל וזקנים שהיו מסובין בבית ביתוס בן זונין בלוד והיו [עוסקין בהלכות הפסח] כל הלילה עד קרות הגבר, הגביהו מלפניהם ונועדו והלכו [להן] לבית המדרש.", 10.12. "Once, Rabban Gamliel and the elders were reclining in the house of Boethus ben Zonin in Lod, and they were occupied in studying the laws of Pesach all that night, until the cock crowed. They lifted the table, made themselves ready and went to the house of study [to pray].",
15. Anon., Leviticus Rabba, 34 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
16. Palestinian Talmud, Horayot, 8 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 114, 119
17. Anon., Genesis Rabba, 17 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
18. Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
79a. ואיבעית אימא רב דאמר כר' יהושע דתניא רבי יהושע אומר כל הזבחים שבתורה בין שנטמא בשר וחלב קיים בין שנטמא חלב ובשר קיים זורק את הדם,נזיר ועושה פסח נטמא חלב ובשר קיים זורק את הדם נטמא בשר וחלב קיים אין זורק את הדם ואם זרק הורצה,נטמאו הבעלים במת לא יזרוק ואם זרק לא הורצה:,במוקדשין אינו כן וכו': מתני׳ מני,רבי יהושע היא דתניא רבי יהושע אומר כל הזבחים שבתורה שנשתייר מהן כזית בשר או כזית חלב זורק את הדם כחצי זית בשר וכחצי זית חלב אין זורק את הדם,ובעולה אפילו כחצי זית בשר וכחצי זית חלב זורק את הדם מפני שכולה כליל ובמנחה אע"פ שכולה קיימת לא יזרוק,מנחה מאי עבידתה אמר רב פפא מנחת נסכים סלקא דעתך אמינא כיון דקא אתיא מכח זבח כגופיה דזבח דמי קמ"ל,חלב מנא לן אמר ר' יוחנן משום ר' ישמעאל ומטו בה משום רבי יהושע בן חנניה דאמר קרא (ויקרא יז, ו) והקטיר החלב לריח ניחוח לה' חלב אע"פ שאין בשר,אשכחן חלב יותרת הכבד ושתי כליות מנא לן,היכא אמרינן דזרקינן מדקתני ובמנחה אע"פ שכולה קיימת לא יזרוק מנחה הוא דלא אבל יותרת הכבד ושתי הכליות שפיר דמי מנא לן,רבי יוחנן דידיה אמר אמר קרא לריח ניחוח כל שאתה מעלה לריח ניחוח,ואיצטריך למכתב חלב ואיצטריך למכתב ריח ניחוח דאי כתב רחמנא חלב הוה אמינא חלב אין יותרת הכבד ושתי הכליות לא כתב רחמנא לריח ניחוח ואי כתב רחמנא לריח ניחוח הוה אמינא כל העולין לריח ניחוח ואפי' מנחה כתב רחמנא חלב:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big נטמא קהל או רובו או שהיו הכהנים טמאים והקהל טהורים יעשו בטומאה נטמא מיעוט הקהל הטהורין עושין את הראשון והטמאין עושין את השני:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big ת"ר הרי שהיו ישראל טמאין וכהנים וכלי שרת טהורין או שהיו ישראל טהורין וכהנים וכלי שרת טמאין ואפילו ישראל וכהנים טהורין וכלי שרת טמאין יעשו בטומאה שאין קרבן ציבור חלוק,אמר רב חסדא לא שנו אלא שנטמא הסכין בטמא מת דרחמנא אמר (במדבר יט, טז) בחלל חרב חרב הרי הוא כחלל,וקא מטמא לגברא דמעיקרא כי מיתעביד בטומאת הגוף דכרת קא מיתעביד,אבל נטמא הסכין בטומאת שרץ דבשר הוא דמטמיא ליה לגברא לא מטמיא ליה טהורין עביד טמאין לא עביד מוטב יאכל בטומאת בשר בלאו ואל יאכל בשר בטומאת הגוף שהוא בכרת,אלמא קסבר רב חסדא טומאה דחויה היא בציבור וכן אמר ר' יצחק טומאה דחויה היא בציבור,ורבא אמר אפילו טמאין נמי עבדי מאי טעמא דכתיב (ויקרא ז, יט) והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל באש ישרף והבשר כל טהור יאכל בשר,כל היכא דלא קרינן ביה והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל לא קרינן ביה והבשר כל טהור יאכל בשר כל היכא דקרינן ביה והבשר אשר יגע בכל טמא לא יאכל קרינן ביה והבשר כל טהור יאכל בשר,איתמר הרי שהיו ישראל מחצה טהורין ומחצה טמאין רב אמר מחצה על מחצה כרוב ורב כהנא אמר מחצה על מחצה אינו כרוב,רב אמר מחצה על מחצה כרוב הללו עושין לעצמן והללו עושין לעצמן ור"כ אמר מחצה על מחצה אינו כרוב טהורין עושין את הראשון וטמאין עושין את השני,איכא דאמרי אמר רב כהנא מחצה על מחצה אינו כרוב טהורין עושין את הראשון 79a. b And if you wish, say /b that b Rav, who said /b that, according to the mishna, if one did sprinkle the blood it is accepted, holds b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehoshua, /b that eating the Paschal lamb is not essential. b As it was taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi Yehoshua says: /b With regard to b all offerings in the Torah, whether the meat became ritually impure and the fat remains /b pure, b or the fat became ritually impure and the meat remains /b pure, b one /b may b sprinkle the blood. /b ,With regard to the offerings of b a nazirite and one who performs /b the ritual of b a Paschal lamb, /b if b the fat became impure and the meat remains /b pure, b one /b may b sprinkle the blood. /b If b the meat became impure and the fat remains /b pure, b one /b may b not sprinkle the blood /b because eating the offering is a part of the mitzva itself and the impure meat may not be eaten. However, b if he sprinkled /b the blood, b it was accepted. /b ,If b the owners became ritually impure from a corpse /b and therefore cannot eat the offering, b one /b may b not sprinkle /b the blood; b and if one sprinkled /b it, b it was not accepted. /b Although failure to eat the offering does not preclude it from being accepted, that rule applies only when the owner of the offering is personally fit to eat it.,It was taught in the mishna: b With regard to /b other b offerings it is not so; /b even if the meat has become ritually impure, if the fat remains pure, the blood is sprinkled on the altar. The Gemara asks: b Who is /b the i tanna /i of b the mishna? /b ,The Gemara answers: b It is Rabbi Yehoshua. As it was taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi Yehoshua says: /b With regard to b all the offerings in the Torah from which there remains an olive-bulk of meat /b that is fit to be eaten b or an olive-bulk of fat /b that is fit to be sacrificed on the altar, b one /b may b sprinkle the blood. /b If all that remains is b half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, one /b may b not sprinkle the blood. /b The fat is burned on the altar and the meat is eaten by the priests. Since the meat and fat serve different functions, they do not combine to equal the minimum amount that must remain in order to sprinkle the blood., b And with regard to a burnt-offering, even /b if all that was left was b half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, one /b may b sprinkle the blood because it is all consumed /b on the altar. Since both the meat and the fat are sacrificed on the altar, they can be combined. b And with regard to a meal-offering, although all of it remains /b pure, b one /b may b not sprinkle /b the blood of the animal offering that is brought together with it.,The Gemara expresses surprise: b What is /b the mention of b a meal-offering doing /b here? The discussion is about sprinkling blood, which is not relevant in the case of a meal-offering. b Rav Pappa said: /b The meal-offering under discussion is b the meal-offering /b brought with the b libations /b that accompany animal offerings. b It could enter your mind to say: Since it comes due to the offering, it is comparable to the offering itself. /b One might think that even if the offering became impure but the meal-offering remained pure, one would be permitted to sprinkle the blood of the animal due to the remaining meal-offering. Consequently, b it teaches us /b that this is not the case., b From where do we /b derive that if only the b fat /b remains, one may sprinkle the blood of the offering? b Rabbi Yoḥa said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, and /b there are those who b determined /b that b this /b i halakha /i was stated b in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥaya: As the verse states: /b “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar of the Lord at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting; b and he shall make the fat smoke for a satisfying aroma to the Lord” /b (Leviticus 17:6). This verse indicates that one may sprinkle the blood if the b fat /b remains pure b although there is no /b pure b meat. /b ,The Gemara asks: b We have found /b a source for the i halakha /i that one may sprinkle the blood if only b fat /b remains; but if all that is left is b the diaphragm and /b the b two kidneys, /b which are also sacrificed on the altar, b from where do we /b derive that one may sprinkle the blood?,The Gemara responds: b Where did we say that one /b may b sprinkle /b the blood in such a case? The Gemara answers: The fact that one may sprinkle the blood in that case is clear b from /b the fact b that it is taught /b at the end of the i baraita /i : b And with regard to a meal-offering, although all of it remains /b pure, b one /b may b not sprinkle /b the blood. It can be deduced from this statement that b it is a meal-offering /b for which b one /b may b not sprinkle /b the blood, as the meal-offering is not part of the animal; b but /b with regard to b the diaphragm and the two kidneys, it seems well /b to sprinkle the blood if they remain. That being the case, b from where do we /b derive this i halakha /i ?,The Gemara answers: b Rabbi Yoḥa himself said, /b this time without quoting i tanna /i ’ i im /i : b The verse /b we quoted above b states: For a satisfying aroma, /b which indicates that b anything you raise as a satisfying aroma, /b i.e., anything burned on the altar, is enough to sprinkle the blood.,The Gemara notes: b And /b it is b necessary to write fat /b in that verse b and /b it is b necessary to write: For a satisfying aroma. As, if the Merciful One had written /b only b fat, I would have said /b that if b fat /b remains, b yes, /b the blood may be sprinkled, but if only b the diaphragm and two kidneys /b remain, which are not as significant as the fat, b no, /b the blood may not be sprinkled. Therefore, b the Merciful One writes: For a satisfying aroma. And if the Merciful One had written /b only: b For a satisfying aroma, I would have said /b that it includes b anything that rises as a satisfying aroma, and even a meal-offering /b is included. Therefore, b the Merciful One writes fat, /b to teach that this i halakha /i applies only to sacrificial parts of the animal and not to accompanying libations and meal-offerings., strong MISHNA: /strong If the entire b community or most of it became ritually impure, or the priests were /b all b impure and the community was pure, they should perform /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb b in ritual impurity. /b If b a minority of the community became impure, /b even if they are many people, b those who are pure perform /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb on b the first /b i Pesaḥ /i , b and those who are impure perform /b the ritual on b the second /b i Pesaḥ /i ., strong GEMARA: /strong b The Sages taught: /b If most or all of b the Jewish people were impure and the priests and sacred vessels /b used in the Temple service were b pure; or, /b conversely, if b the Jewish people were pure and the priests and sacred vessels /b were b impure; and even /b in a situation in which b the Jewish people and the priests were pure and the sacred vessels /b were b impure, they /b may b perform /b any part of the ritual of the Paschal lamb b in ritual impurity. /b The reason for this is that b a communal offering, /b which is sacrificed even in a state of ritual impurity, b is not divided. /b Therefore, since some of the service must be performed in a state of ritual impurity, it may all be performed in a state of ritual impurity., b Rav Ḥisda said: They taught /b that the service may be done in a state of ritual impurity if the sacred vessels are impure b only /b in a case where b the knife /b to be used for slaughtering b became impure through /b contact with b one who was ritually impure /b due to contact with b a corpse, as the Merciful One states: /b “And whoever shall touch on the open field b one slain with a sword, /b or one that died, or the bone of a man, or a grave, shall be impure for seven days” (Numbers 19:16). The Sages expounded: b A sword is like a corpse. /b Therefore, a sword or another metal implement that touches a corpse attains the same level of impurity as the corpse itself, which is the ultimate primary source of ritual impurity. Similarly, a knife that touches a person who is a primary source of ritual impurity due to contact with a corpse attains that same status.,Therefore, b it renders impure the person /b who uses it for slaughtering. In this case, b when /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb b is initially performed, it is performed in /b a state of b ritual impurity of the body. /b Generally, one who is impure in this way is liable to receive b i karet /i /b if he eats sacrificial meat or enters the Temple., b However, /b if b the knife became ritually impure with the impurity of a creeping animal, which renders the meat impure but does not render the person impure, /b because something rendered impure by a primary source of ritual impurity becomes a secondary source of ritual impurity, which can render food impure but not people, b those who are pure /b may b perform /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb, but b those who are impure may not perform /b the ritual. This is because b it is preferable that one eat /b the Paschal lamb b with impurity of the meat, /b as the nature of its prohibition is that of a regular b negative commandment, and one should not eat the meat with impurity of the body, which /b renders one liable to receive b i karet /i . /b ,The Gemara comments on Rav Ḥisda’s attempt to distinguish between different types of impurity and to claim that the entire community sacrifices the Paschal lamb in a state of ritual impurity only when the people have become impure with a severe form of impurity. b Apparently, Rav Ḥisda holds /b that b impurity is overridden in /b cases involving b the public. /b The prohibition of sacrificing offerings in a state of impurity is not wholly permitted for a community; rather, it is overridden in cases of great need. Therefore, whenever it is possible to minimize the severity of the impurity, it is necessary to do so. b And, so too, Rabbi Yitzḥak said /b explicitly: b Impurity is overridden in /b cases involving b the public. /b , b And Rava said /b that whenever there is any form of ritual impurity involved in the service, b even those who are ritually impure may also perform /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb. b What is the reason /b for this? b As it is written: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten, it shall be burned in fire; and the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh” /b (Leviticus 7:19).,Rava derives from this verse that b anywhere that we do not apply /b the i halakha /i that b “the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten” /b and the meat may be eaten despite being impure, b we /b also b do not apply “and the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh.” /b In that case, the meat may be eaten even by one who is impure. Just as the first half of the verse is not applicable, the second half is also not applicable. It is only b anywhere that we apply /b the i halakha /i that b “the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten” /b that b we /b also b apply /b the second half of the verse: b “And the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh.” /b Therefore, when the offering is sacrificed in a state of ritual impurity, there is no prohibition for impure people to eat it., b It was stated /b that the i amora’im /i disagreed with regard to the mishna’s statement that the Paschal lamb may be sacrificed in a state of impurity if the majority of the public is impure. In a case where b the Jewish people were /b divided, and exactly b half /b were b pure and half /b were b impure, Rav said half and half is like the majority, and Rav Kahana said half and half is not like the majority. /b ,The Gemara explains the dispute between Rav and Rav Kahana. b Rav said: Half and half is like the majority, /b meaning that each of the two groups has the status of the majority of the public. Therefore, b those /b who are pure b perform /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb b for themselves /b in a state of ritual purity. b And those /b who are impure b perform /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb b for themselves /b in a state of ritual impurity. They are also considered like the majority of the public, and the sacrifice of the majority of the public is not deferred to the second i Pesaḥ /i . b And Rav Kahana said: Half and half is not like the majority. /b Therefore, those who are b pure perform /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb on b the first /b i Pesaḥ /i , b and /b those who are b impure perform /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb on b the second /b i Pesaḥ /i ., b Some say /b that what was stated above is not the correct conclusion based on Rav Kahana’s statement. Rather, b Rav Kahana said: Half and half is not like the majority. /b Therefore, b those who are pure perform /b the ritual of the Paschal lamb on the b first /b i Pesaḥ /i ,
19. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
141a. אלא לאביי מאי ניזון כבת ולטעמיך לרבא מאי יורש כבן אלא ראוי לירש ואין לו ה"נ ראוי לזון ואין לו:,האומר אם ילדה אשתי זכר וכו': למימרא דבת עדיפא ליה מבן והא אמר ר' יוחנן משום רשב"י כל שאינו מניח בן ליורשו הקב"ה מלא עליו עברה שנאמר (במדבר כז, ח) והעברתם את נחלתו לבתו ואין העברה אלא עברה שנאמר (צפניה א, טו) יום עברה היום ההוא,לענין ירושה בן עדיף ליה לענין הרווחה בתו עדיפא ליה,ושמואל אמר הכא במבכרת עסקינן וכדרב חסדא דאמר רב חסדא בת תחלה סימן יפה לבנים איכא דאמרי דמרביא לאחהא ואיכא דאמרי דלא שלטא ביה עינא בישא אמר רב חסדא ולדידי בנתן עדיפן לי מבני,ואיבעית אימא הא מני ר' יהודה היא,הי רבי יהודה אילימא רבי יהודה דבכל דתניא (בראשית כד, א) וה' ברך את אברהם בכל רבי מאיר אומר שלא היה לו בת רבי יהודה אומר שהיתה לו בת ובכל שמה אימור דשמעת ליה לרבי יהודה ברתא נמי לא חסריה רחמנא לאברהם דעדיפא מבן מי שמעת ליה,אלא הא רבי יהודה דתניא מצוה לזון את הבנות וק"ו לבנים דעסקי בתורה דברי ר"מ רבי יהודה אומר מצוה לזון את הבנים וק"ו לבנות דלא ליתזלן,אלא הא דתניא ילדה זכר ונקבה הזכר נוטל ששה דינרין והנקבה נוטלת שני דינרין במאי,אמר רב אשי אמריתה לשמעתא קמיה דרב כהנא במסרס דאמר זכר תחלה מאתים נקבה אחריו ולא כלום נקבה תחלה מנה זכר אחריה מנה וילדה זכר ונקבה ולא ידעינן הי מינייהו נפק ברישא זכר שקיל מנה ממה נפשך אידך מנה הוה ממון המוטל בספק וחולקין,והא דתניא ילדה זכר ונקבה אין לו אלא מנה היכי משכחת לה אמר רבינא במבשרני 141a. b But according to /b the opinion of b Abaye, what /b does it mean that the i tumtum /i b is sustained as a daughter, /b since Abaye maintains that the i tumtum /i does not have the rights of a daughter? The Gemara responds: b And according to your reasoning, /b even b according to Rava, what /b does it mean that a i tumtum /i b inherits as a son, /b since Rava concedes that the i tumtum /i and sons do not actually inherit anything? b Rather, /b the i baraita /i means that it is b fitting /b for the i tumtum /i b to inherit but he does not /b actually inherit. b Here too, /b with regard to sustece, according to Abaye, the i baraita /i means that it is b fitting /b for the i tumtum /i b to be sustained, but he is not /b actually sustained.,§ The mishna teaches: With regard to b one who says: If my wife gives birth to a male /b the offspring shall receive one hundred dinars, if she in fact gave birth to a male, the offspring receives one hundred dinars. If he says: If my wife gives birth to a female the offspring shall receive two hundred dinars, if she in fact gave birth to a female, the offspring receives two hundred dinars. The Gemara asks: b Is this to say that for him a daughter is preferable to a son? But /b this seems to contradict what b Rabbi Yoḥa says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: /b With regard to b anyone who does not leave /b behind b a son to inherit /b from b him, the Holy One, Blessed be He, is filled with wrath upon him, as it is stated: /b “If a man dies, and has no son, b then you shall cause his inheritance to pass [ i veha’avartem /i ] to his daughter” /b (Numbers 27:8). The term b i ha’avara /i /b means b nothing other /b than b wrath, as it is stated: “That day is a day of wrath [ i evra /i ]” /b (Zephaniah 1:15).,The Gemara resolves the contradiction: b With regard to the matter of inheritance, for him a son is preferable /b to a daughter, as a son bears his name and retains his ancestral heritage within his father’s tribe, but b with regard to the matter of /b providing for his offspring’s b comfort, for him his daughter is preferable /b to his son, as a son is more capable of coping for himself and the daughter needs more support., b And Shmuel said: Here we are dealing with /b a mother who is b giving birth for the first time, and /b this is b in accordance with /b the statement b of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: /b If one gives birth to b a daughter first, /b it b is a good sign for sons. There are /b those b who say /b that this is b because she raises her brothers, /b i.e., helps in their upbringing, b and there are /b those b who say /b that this is b because the evil eye does not have dominion over /b the father. b Rav Ḥisda said: And /b as b for myself, I prefer daughters to sons. /b ,The Gemara adds: b And if you wish, say: /b In accordance with b whose /b statement is b this /b mishna in which preference is given to the daughter? b It is /b in accordance with the statement of b Rabbi Yehuda. /b ,The Gemara asks: b Which /b statement of b Rabbi Yehuda /b is this referring to? b If we say /b it is referring to the statement of b Rabbi Yehuda with regard to /b the term b “with everything [ i bakkol /i ],” /b that is difficult. The Gemara cites Rabbi Yehuda’s statement. b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : “And Abraham was old, well stricken in age; b and the Lord had blessed Abraham with everything [ i bakkol /i ]” /b (Genesis 24:1). b Rabbi Meir says: /b The blessing was b that he did not have a daughter. Rabbi Yehuda says: /b The blessing was b that he had a daughter, and her name /b was b Bakkol. /b Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda understands the birth of a daughter to be a blessing. The Gemara explains the difficulty: b Say that you heard Rabbi Yehuda /b explain that the blessing was that b the Merciful One did not even deprive Abraham /b of b a daughter, /b in addition to his sons. b Did you hear him /b say b that /b a daughter is b preferable to a son? /b ,The Gemara proposes another of Rabbi Yehuda’s statements: b Rather, /b it is referring to b this /b other statement of b Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : One is not halakhically obligated to provide sustece for his children beyond the age of six. Nevertheless, it is b a mitzva to provide sustece for the daughters. And /b one can infer b i a fortiori /i /b that it is certainly a mitzva to provide b for sons, who are engaged in /b the study of b the Torah; /b this is b the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: /b It is b a mitzva to provide sustece for the sons. And /b one can infer b i a fortiori /i /b that it is certainly a mitzva to provide b for daughters, /b so b that they not be disgraced /b by having to beg for their livelihood. This indicates that with regard to providing sustece for one’s children, Rabbi Yehuda gives preference to the daughters.,§ The mishna discusses a case where one stipulated that if his wife gives birth to a male the offspring shall receive one hundred dinars, and if she gives birth to a female the offspring shall receive two hundred dinars. The mishna states that if she gave birth to both a male and a female, the male receives one hundred dinars and the female receives two hundred. The Gemara asks: b But /b with regard to b that which is taught /b in a i baraita /i ( i Tosefta /i 9:4): If she b gave birth to a male and a female, the male receives six dinars /b of gold, which are equivalent to one hundred fifty dinars of silver, b and the female receives two dinars /b of gold, equivalent to fifty dinars of silver, b with what /b situation is this i baraita /i dealing?, b Rav Ashi said: I said this i halakha /i before Rav Kahana, /b and he explained it as teaching b about one who inverted /b the stipulations of his gift. The i baraita /i is referring to one b who said: /b If b a male /b is born b first /b he will receive b two hundred /b dinars, and if b a female /b is born b after him /b she will receive b nothing. /b And if b a female /b is born b first /b she will receive b one hundred dinars, /b and if b a male /b is born b after her /b he will receive b one hundred dinars. And /b the mother b gave birth to a male and a female, but we do not know which of them emerged /b from the womb b first. /b In this case, the b male takes one hundred dinars, /b as b whichever way you /b look at it, this sum is due to him. b The other one hundred dinars are property of uncertain ownership and are divided /b equally between the male and female.,The Gemara asks: b And /b with regard to b that which is taught /b in another i baraita /i : If b she gave birth to a male and a female, he /b receives b only one hundred dinars, how can you find these /b circumstances? b Ravina said: /b This is referring b to /b one who said: I shall give a certain sum to whoever b informs me. /b
20. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Qamma, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
33a. אחר לית ליה אימתא דרביה האי אית ליה אימתא דרביה,רב זביד משמיה דרבא מתני לה אהא ומצא פרט לממציא את עצמו מכאן א"ר אליעזר בן יעקב מי שיצתה אבן מתחת ידו והוציא הלה את ראשו וקיבלה פטור א"ר יוסי בר חנינא פטור מגלות וחייב בארבעה דברים,מאן דמתני לה אהא כ"ש אקמייתא ומאן דמתני לה אקמייתא אבל אהא פטור לגמרי:,ת"ר פועלים שבאו לתבוע שכרן מבעל הבית ונגחן שורו של בעל הבית ונשכן כלבו של בעה"ב ומת פטור אחרים אומרים רשאין פועלין לתבוע שכרן מבעל הבית,ה"ד אי דשכיח במתא מ"ט דאחרים אי דשכיח בבית מ"ט דת"ק,לא צריכא בגברא דשכיח ולא שכיח וקרי אבבא ואמר להו אין מר סבר אין עול תא משמע ומ"ס אין קום אדוכתך משמע,תניא כמ"ד אין קום אדוכתך משמע דתניא פועל שנכנס לתבוע שכרו מבעה"ב ונגחו שורו של בעה"ב או נשכו כלבו פטור אע"פ שנכנס ברשות אמאי פטור אלא לאו דקרי אבבא ואמר ליה אין וש"מ אין קום אדוכתך משמע:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big שני שוורין תמין שחבלו זה את זה משלמין במותר חצי נזק שניהן מועדין משלמין במותר נזק שלם,אחד תם ואחד מועד מועד בתם משלם במותר נ"ש תם במועד משלם במותר חצי נזק,וכן שני אנשים שחבלו זה בזה משלמין במותר נזק שלם,אדם במועד ומועד באדם משלם במותר נזק שלם אדם בתם ותם באדם אדם בתם משלם במותר נזק שלם תם באדם משלם במותר חצי נזק ר' עקיבא אומר אף תם שחבל באדם משלם במותר נזק שלם:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big ת"ר (שמות כא, לא) כמשפט הזה יעשה לו כמשפט שור בשור כך משפט שור באדם מה שור בשור תם משלם חצי נזק ומועד נזק שלם אף שור באדם תם משלם חצי נזק ומועד נזק שלם,ר' עקיבא אומר כמשפט הזה כתחתון ולא כעליון,יכול משלם מן העלייה ת"ל יעשה לו מגופו משלם ואינו משלם מן העלייה,ורבנן זה למה לי לפוטרו מארבעה דברים,ורבי עקיבא לפוטרו מארבעה דברים מנא ליה נפקא ליה (ויקרא כד, יט) מאיש כי יתן מום בעמיתו איש בעמיתו ולא שור בעמיתו,ורבנן אי מההיא הוה אמינא צער לחודיה אבל ריפוי ושבת אימא ליתן ליה קמ"ל:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big שור שוה מנה שנגח שור שוה מאתים ואין הנבילה יפה כלום נוטל את השור:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big מתניתין מני רבי עקיבא היא דתניא יושם השור בב"ד דברי רבי ישמעאל רבי עקיבא אומר הוחלט השור,במאי קמיפלגי ר' ישמעאל סבר בעל חוב הוא וזוזי הוא דמסיק ליה ור' עקיבא סבר שותפי נינהו,וקמיפלגי בהאי קרא (שמות כא, לה) ומכרו את השור החי וחצו את כספו ר' ישמעאל סבר לבי דינא קמזהר רחמנא ור"ע סבר לניזק ומזיק מזהר להו רחמנא,מאי בינייהו הקדישו ניזק איכא בינייהו,בעא מיניה רבא מר"נ מכרו מזיק לר' ישמעאל מהו כיון דא"ר ישמעאל בעל חוב הוא וזוזי הוא דמסיק ליה מכור או דלמא 33a. The Gemara answers: b Another /b person b does not have awe of his mentor. /b Therefore, even if the welder urges another person to leave, he must ascertain that that person actually did so, and otherwise he is liable to be exiled. By contrast, b this /b apprentice b has awe of his mentor, /b and so the welder may assume that if he instructed him to leave, he certainly did. Therefore, if in reality the apprentice did not leave and is killed by the sparks, the welder is not liable to be exiled, as he is not held accountable., b Rav Zevid taught in the name of Rava /b that b this /b aforementioned statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina is in reference not to the above i baraita /i but is b in reference to this /b i baraita /i : It is stated in the verse concerning one who kills unintentionally: “And the head slips off the helve, b and finds /b his neighbor, and he dies” (Deuteronomy 19:5); this serves to b exclude /b one b who introduces himself /b into an area of danger, in which case the one who kills unintentionally is exempt from exile. b From here Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: /b With regard to b one whom a stone departed from his hand, and another /b person b stuck out his head and received /b a blow from b it /b and died, the one who threw the stone is b exempt /b from exile. It is in reference to this statement that b Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: He is exempt from exile /b for killing him. b But /b if the victim was merely injured, he is b liable to /b pay b four types of indemnity. /b ,The Gemara comments: b The one who teaches this /b statement b in reference to this /b i baraita /i , b all the more so /b he would teach it b in reference to the first /b i baraita /i , where one entered the workshop of the carpenter. b But the one who teaches it with regard to the first /b i baraita /i teaches it only in reference to that i baraita /i . b But in this /b i baraita /i he is b entirely exempt /b from liability for injury, as one could claim that he is completely blameless.,§ b The Sages taught: /b With regard to salaried b laborers who came /b into their employer’s courtyard b to claim their wages from the homeowner, and the homeowner’s ox gored them, or the homeowner’s dog bit them, and /b a laborer b died, /b the homeowner is b exempt. Others say /b that he is liable, as salaried b laborers are allowed /b to enter their employer’s property b to claim their wages from the homeowner. /b ,The Gemara asks: b What are the circumstances? If /b the employer b can be found in the city, what is the reason of the others, /b who hold him liable? The laborers could have met him in the city to claim their wages and did not need to enter his courtyard. b If he can be found /b only b at home, what is the reason of the first i tanna /i , /b who exempts him? Clearly they are entitled to claim their wages.,The Gemara answers: b No, /b these are not the circumstances under discussion. This i halakha /i is b necessary /b only b with regard to a man who can /b sometimes b be found /b in town b and /b sometimes b cannot be found /b in town, b and /b the laborers b called /b to him b at the gate /b of his courtyard, b and he said to them: Yes. /b One b Sage, /b referred to as the others, b holds /b that the term b yes /b in this context b indicates: Come in. /b Therefore, he is liable for their death. b And /b one b Sage, /b the first i tanna /i , b holds /b that the term b yes /b in this context b indicates: Stand in your place /b and I will come out to you. Since he did not give them permission to enter, he is exempt., b It is taught /b in a i baraita /i b in accordance with /b the opinion of b the one who says /b that b yes /b in this context b indicates: Stand in your place. As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : With regard to a salaried b laborer who entered /b his employer’s courtyard b to claim his wages from the homeowner, and the homeowner’s ox gored him, or his dog bit him, /b the homeowner b is exempt, although /b the laborer b entered with permission. /b The Gemara asks: b Why /b is he b exempt /b if the laborer entered with permission? b Rather, is it not /b because it is a case b where /b the laborer b called /b him b at the gate, and /b he b said to him: Yes? Conclude from it /b that b yes /b in this context b indicates: Stand in your place. /b , strong MISHNA: /strong With regard to b two innocuous oxen that injured each other, /b the respective damages are evaluated, and if one amount is more than the other, the owner b pays half the damages with regard to the difference. /b In other words, the owner of the ox that caused the greater damage pays the other owner half the difference. If b both oxen were forewarned, /b the owner of the ox that caused the greater damage b pays the full /b cost of the b damage with regard to the difference. /b ,In a case where b one /b of the oxen was b innocuous and /b the other b one /b was b forewarned, /b if the b forewarned /b ox caused greater damage b to /b the b innocuous /b ox than the reverse, the owner of the forewarned ox b pays the full /b cost of the b damage with regard to the difference. /b If the b innocuous /b ox caused greater damage b to /b the b forewarned /b ox, its owner b pays half the damage with regard to the difference. /b , b And similarly, /b with regard to b two people who injured each other, /b the one who did greater damage b pays the full /b cost of the b damage with regard to the difference, /b since one is always considered forewarned with regard to damage he causes.,If b a person /b caused damage b to a forewarned /b ox b and /b the b forewarned /b ox caused damage b to /b the b person, /b whichever side caused the greater damage b pays the full /b cost of the b damage with regard to the difference. /b In a case where b a person /b caused damage b to an innocuous /b ox b and /b the b innocuous /b ox caused damage b to /b the b person, /b if b the person /b caused greater ficial damage b to /b the b innocuous /b ox b he pays the full /b cost of the b damage with regard to the difference. /b If the b innocuous /b ox caused greater damage b to the person, /b its owner b pays /b only b half the damage with regard to the difference. Rabbi Akiva says: /b The owner of the b innocuous /b ox b that injured a person also pays the full /b cost of the b damage with regard to the difference. /b Rabbi Akiva does not distinguish between an innocuous and a forewarned ox in a case where an ox injures a person., strong GEMARA: /strong With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis about a case where an ox injures a person, b the Sages taught: /b It is derived from the verse: “Whether it has gored a son, or has gored a daughter, b according to this judgment shall it be done to him” /b (Exodus 21:31), that b as is the judgment /b concerning b an ox /b that causes damage b to an ox, so is the judgment /b with regard to b an ox /b that causes damage b to a person. Just as /b with regard to b an ox /b that causes damage b to an ox, /b if it is b innocuous /b its owner b pays half /b the cost of b the damage and /b if it is b forewarned /b he pays the b full /b cost of the b damage, so too, /b with regard to b an ox /b that causes damage b to a person, /b if it is an b innocuous /b ox its owner b pays half /b the cost of b the damage and /b if it is a b forewarned /b ox the owner pays the b full /b cost of the b damage. /b , b Rabbi Akiva says: /b It is derived from the phrase b “according to this judgment” /b that the i halakha /i with regard to an ox that gores a person is judged b like /b the case that appears in b the lower /b verse, i.e., the case of a forewarned ox, which appears in Exodus 21:29, b and not like /b the case that appears in b the upper /b verse, i.e., the case of an innocuous ox, which appears in Exodus 21:28.,One b might /b have thought that since the case of an ox that gored a person is compared to the case of a forewarned ox, the owner also b pays from /b his b superior-quality /b property. Therefore, b the verse states: “Shall it be done to him [ i lo /i ],” /b indicating b he pays /b restitution exclusively b from /b the proceeds of the sale of the b body /b of his belligerent ox b and does not pay from /b his b superior-quality /b property, as the word i lo /i can also be understood as referring to the ox. In this manner the case of an innocuous ox that gores a person is compared to the i halakha /i of an innocuous ox that gores another ox, whereas with regard to the amount of restitution, it is compared to the case of a forewarned ox.,The Gemara asks: b And /b according to the opinion of b the Rabbis, /b who do not differentiate between an ox that gores a person and one that gores an animal, inasmuch as the distinction between an innocuous and a forewarned ox applies in both cases, b why do I /b need the seemingly superfluous word b “this”? /b The Gemara answers: The word is stated b to exempt him from the four types of indemnity /b that one who injures another person is liable to pay, thereby emphasizing the comparison to the case of an ox that gores an ox.,The Gemara asks: b And from where does Rabbi Akiva /b derive the i halakha /i b exempting him from /b paying these b four types of indemnity? /b The Gemara answers: b He derives it from /b the verse: b “And if a man maims his neighbor, /b as he has done, so shall be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19). Rabbi Akiva derives from here that only when b a man /b injures b his neighbor /b is he liable to pay these four types of indemnity, b but not /b when b an ox /b injures b his neighbor. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And /b why do b the Rabbis /b not derive this i halakha /i from that verse? The Gemara answers: b If /b it would have been derived b from that /b verse, b I would have said /b that he is exempt b only /b from paying for b pain, but /b for b medical costs and loss of liveli-hood, /b I would b say /b that he is liable b to give him /b compensation. Therefore, the phrase “according to this judgment” b teaches us /b that he is not liable to pay compensation for anything other than the damage itself., strong MISHNA: /strong With regard to an innocuous b ox worth one hundred dinars that gored an ox worth two hundred /b dinars, b and the carcass /b of the dead ox b is not worth anything, /b its owner b takes the /b entire b ox /b that gored it, since it is worth half the value of the damage., strong GEMARA: /strong b Whose /b opinion is expressed in the b mishna, /b which rules that the injured party takes the ox immediately? b It is /b the opinion of b Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : After it gores another ox, b the /b belligerent b ox shall be appraised in court /b before it is taken by the injured party, this is b the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The ox was /b already b assigned /b to the owner of the dead ox as payment, and if the amount of damages is not contested by the owner of the goring ox, no further legal steps are required.,The Gemara explains: b With regard to what /b principle b do /b they b disagree? Rabbi Yishmael holds /b that the owner of the dead ox b is /b considered b a creditor /b of the owner of the belligerent ox, b and it is money that he is claiming from him, /b but he has no ownership of the body of the belligerent ox. b And Rabbi Akiva holds /b that b they are partners, /b i.e., from the time the innocuous ox killed the other ox, the owner of the dead ox has a share of ownership in the belligerent ox., b And they disagree with regard to /b the meaning of b this verse: “Then they shall sell the live ox, and divide its monetary value” /b (Exodus 21:35). b Rabbi Yishmael holds /b that b the Merciful One is commanding the court /b to evaluate the damages in this manner, b and Rabbi Akiva holds /b that b the Merciful One is commanding the injured /b party b and the one liable for damage /b to split ownership of the live ox, without the involvement of the court.,The Gemara asks: b What is /b the practical difference b between /b the two opinions as to whether or not they are considered partners? The Gemara answers: There b is /b a practical difference b between them /b in a case where b the injured /b party b consecrated /b the ox to the Temple. According to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, until the court transfers the ox to the injured party, it still belongs to its owner, and therefore the injured party cannot consecrate it. According to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, the injured party owns the ox from the time the damage was inflicted, and he can therefore consecrate it., b Rava asked Rav Naḥman: /b If b the one liable for damage sold /b the ox, b what is /b the i halakha /i b according to Rabbi Yishmael? /b Is it that b since Rabbi Yishmael says /b that the injured party b is /b considered b a creditor, and it is /b merely b money that he is claiming from him, it is sold? Or perhaps /b
21. Babylonian Talmud, Berachot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 27
27a. היינו רבנן,אלא מאי עד ולא עד בכלל אימא סיפא ושל מוספין כל היום ר' יהודה אומר עד שבע שעות ותניא היו לפניו שתי תפלות אחת של מוסף ואחת של מנחה מתפלל של מנחה ואחר כך של מוסף שזו תדירה וזו אינה תדירה רבי יהודה אומר מתפלל של מוסף ואחר כך של מנחה שזו עוברת וזו אינה עוברת,אי אמרת בשלמא עד ועד בכלל היינו דמשכחת להו שתי תפלות בהדי הדדי אלא אי אמרת עד ולא עד בכלל היכי משכחת להו שתי תפלות בהדי הדדי כיון דאתיא לה של מנחה אזלא לה של מוספין,אלא מאי עד ועד בכלל קשיא רישא מאי איכא בין רבי יהודה לרבנן מי סברת דהאי פלג מנחה פלג אחרונה קאמר פלג ראשונה קאמר והכי קאמר אימת נפיק פלג ראשונה ועייל פלג אחרונה מכי נפקי י"א שעות חסר רביע,אמר רב נחמן אף אנן נמי תנינא,רבי יהודה בן בבא העיד חמשה דברים שממאנין את הקטנה ושמשיאין את האשה על פי עד אחד ועל תרנגול שנסקל בירושלים על שהרג את הנפש ועל יין בן ארבעים יום שנתנסך על גבי המזבח ועל תמיד של שחר שקרב בארבע שעות,ש"מ עד ועד בכלל ש"מ,אמר רב כהנא הלכה כרבי יהודה הואיל ותנן בבחירתא כוותיה:,ועל תמיד של שחר שקרב בארבע שעות: מאן תנא להא דתנן (שמות טז, כא) וחם השמש ונמס בארבע שעות,אתה אומר בארבע שעות או אינו אלא בשש שעות כשהוא אומר (בראשית יח, א) כחום היום הרי שש שעות אמור הא מה אני מקיים וחם השמש ונמס בארבע שעות מני לא רבי יהודה ולא רבנן אי רבי יהודה עד ארבע שעות נמי צפרא הוא אי רבנן עד חצות נמי צפרא הוא,אי בעית אימא רבי יהודה אי בעית אימא רבנן אי בעית אימא רבנן אמר קרא בבקר בבקר חלקהו לשני בקרים ואי בעית אימא רבי יהודה האי בקר יתירא להקדים לו שעה אחת דכולא עלמא מיהא וחם השמש ונמס בארבע שעות,מאי משמע אמר רבי אחא בר יעקב אמר קרא וחם השמש ונמס איזו היא שעה שהשמש חם והצל צונן הוי אומר בארבע שעות:,תפלת המנחה עד הערב וכו': אמר ליה רב חסדא לרב יצחק התם אמר רב כהנא הלכה כרבי יהודה הואיל ותנן בבחירתא כוותיה הכא מאי אישתיק ולא אמר ליה ולא מידי אמר רב חסדא נחזי אנן מדרב מצלי של שבת בערב שבת מבעוד יום ש"מ הלכה כרבי יהודה,אדרבה מדרב הונא ורבנן לא הוו מצלו עד אורתא שמע מינה אין הלכה כרבי יהודה השתא דלא אתמר הלכתא לא כמר ולא כמר דעבד כמר עבד ודעבד כמר עבד,רב איקלע לבי גניבא וצלי של שבת בערב שבת והוה מצלי רבי ירמיה בר אבא לאחוריה דרב וסיים רב ולא פסקיה לצלותיה דרבי ירמיה שמע מינה תלת שמע מינה מתפלל אדם של שבת בערב שבת ושמע מינה מתפלל תלמיד אחורי רבו ושמע מינה אסור לעבור כנגד המתפללין,מסייע ליה לרבי יהושע בן לוי דאמר רבי יהושע בן לוי אסור לעבור כנגד המתפללין איני והא רבי אמי ורבי אסי חלפי רבי אמי ורבי אסי חוץ לארבע אמות הוא דחלפי,ורבי ירמיה היכי עביד הכי והא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב לעולם אל יתפלל אדם 27a. b is /b identical to the opinion of b the Rabbis, /b as the end of the period that begins with the midpoint of the afternoon is sunset.,The Gemara immediately rejects this proof: b Rather, what /b is the alternative? That b until /b means b until and not including? /b It remains problematic. b Say the latter clause /b of the mishna: b The additional prayer /b may be recited b all day. Rabbi Yehuda says: /b It may be recited b until the seven hours. And it was taught /b in a i baraita /i : b If /b the obligation to recite b two prayers was before him, one the additional prayer and one the afternoon prayer, he prays the afternoon prayer /b first b and the additional prayer thereafter, /b because b this, /b the afternoon prayer, b is /b recited on a b frequent /b basis, b and that, /b the additional prayer, b is /b recited on a relatively b infrequent /b basis as it is only recited on Shabbat, the New Moon, and Festivals. The principle states: When a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice. b Rabbi Yehuda says: He recites the additional prayer /b first b and the afternoon prayer thereafter, /b because the time to recite b this, the additional prayer, /b will soon b elapse, and this, /b the time to recite b the afternoon prayer, /b will b not /b soon b elapse, /b as one may recite it until the midpoint of the afternoon.,The relevant point is: b Granted, if you say /b that b until /b means b until and including, that is how you can find /b a situation where the times to recite b two prayers, /b the afternoon prayer and the additional prayer, b overlap. But if you say /b that b until /b means b until and not including, /b and that until seven hours means until the beginning of the seventh hour, noon, then b how can you find /b a situation where the times to recite b two prayers overlap? Once /b the time to recite b the afternoon prayer, /b a half hour past noon, b has arrived, /b the time to recite b the additional prayer /b is already b gone? /b , b Rather, what /b is the alternative? That b until /b means b until and including? /b Then b the first clause /b of the mishna b is difficult, /b as explained above with regard to the midpoint of the afternoon: b What is /b the halakhic difference b between /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda and /b the opinion of b the Rabbis? /b The Gemara answers: b Do you think that /b when b this midpoint of the afternoon /b was mentioned it was b speaking of /b the period following b the midpoint, the last /b part of the afternoon, from an hour-and-a-quarter before sunset until sunset? This was not the intention. Rather, it was b speaking of /b the period prior to b the midpoint, the first /b part of the afternoon, which, as explained above, is from nine-and-a-half hours after sunrise until an hour-and-a-quarter before sunset. Consequently, until the midpoint of the afternoon means until the end of the first half of that afternoon period. b And this is what he is saying: When does the first half leave and the second half enter? From when eleven hours minus a quarter have passed /b since sunrise. Rabbi Yehuda’s use of the term until always means until and including.,Practically speaking, this means that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is permissible to recite the morning prayer until the end of the fourth hour. In support of this b Rav Naḥman said: We, too, learned /b this in a mishna:, b Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava testified /b about b five matters of /b i halakha /i : br When an orphan girl, who was married off by her mother or brother before reaching the age of majority, reaches the age of majority, she may refuse to continue living with her husband and thereby retroactively annul their marriage. Normally, marriage refusals are discouraged. However, in specific instances where it is clear that if the marriage were to remain in effect it would engender problems related to levirate marriage and i ḥalitza /i , Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava testified that b one may persuade the minor girl to refuse /b to continue living with her husband, thereby resolving the complications involved in this case. br b And /b he testified b that one may /b allow b a woman /b who, after hearing of her husband’s death, seeks to remarry, b to marry based on /b the testimony of b one witness, /b as opposed to the two witnesses required for other testimonies of the Torah. br b And /b he testified b about a rooster that was stoned /b to death b in Jerusalem for killing a person, /b in order to teach that the Torah law (Exodus 21:28) which requires the stoning of an ox that killed a person, applies to other animals as well. br b And /b he testified b about forty-day-old wine that was /b used for b libation on the altar. /b br b And /b he testified b about /b the b daily morning offering that was sacrificed at four hours /b of the day., b Learn from this /b final testimony, which is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that b until /b means b until and including. /b The Gemara concludes: Indeed, b learn from this. /b ,Based on this mishna, b Rav Kahana said: The i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda since we learned /b in a mishna in the b preferred /b tractate, i Eduyyot /i , b in accordance with his /b opinion. Since the i halakha /i is ruled in accordance with all of the i mishnayot /i in i Eduyyot /i , the opinion of a i tanna /i who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in that mishna means that the i halakha /i is in accordance with that opinion., b And about /b the b daily morning offering that was sacrificed at four hours. /b Based on this, the Gemara attempts to identify b the i tanna /i who taught that which we learned /b in the mishna about the manna that fell for the children of Israel in the desert: “And they gathered it morning by morning, each according to what he eats, b and when the sun grew hot it melted” /b (Exodus 16:21); that took place b four hours /b into the day.,The i baraita /i continues: Do b you say /b that the time when the sun grew hot was b at four hours, or /b perhaps b it was only at six hours /b of the day? b When /b the verse b says: “In the heat of the day” /b (Genesis 18:1), b six hours is /b already b mentioned /b in the Torah as the heat of the day. b How, then, do I establish /b the verse: b “And when the sun grew hot it melted”? /b This must refer to an earlier time, b at four hours. /b The Gemara asks: b Who /b is the i tanna /i of this mishna? It is b neither Rabbi Yehuda nor the Sages. If /b it was in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, until four hours is also /b considered b morning, /b as he holds that the daily morning offering may still be sacrificed then, while here it says that in the morning the manna was gathered and it melted after the morning. b If /b it was in accordance with the opinion of b the Rabbis, until noon is also /b considered b morning, /b since, according to the Sages, the daily morning offering could be sacrificed until noon. Apparently, this is an entirely new position.,The Gemara responds: b If you wish, say /b that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b and b if you wish, say /b instead that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of b the Rabbis. /b The Gemara explains: b If you wish, say /b in accordance with the opinion of b the Rabbis. The verse states: Morning by morning, divide it into two mornings. /b Morning, according to the Rabbis, lasts until noon. The repetition of the term morning in the Torah indicates that the period when the manna was gathered ended at the conclusion of the first half of the morning, i.e., the end of the third hour. b And if you wish, say /b instead in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b who would say that: b This extra morning /b in the phrase morning by morning comes to b make /b the end of the period when the manna was gathered b an hour earlier. /b In any event, b everyone agrees /b that the verse, b And when the sun grew hot it melted, /b refers to b four hours /b of the day.,The Gemara asks: b From where is the inference /b drawn that this is the meaning of the verse? b Rabbi Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: The verse states: “When the sun grew hot it melted.” Which is the hour that the sun is hot but the shade /b remains b cool, /b before the heat of the day, when even the shade is hot? b You must say at four hours. /b ,We learned in the mishna: The Rabbis hold that b the afternoon prayer /b may be recited b until the evening. /b Rabbi Yehuda says: It may be recited only until the midpoint of the afternoon. b Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Yitzḥak: There, /b with regard to the morning prayer, b Rav Kahana said: The i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, since we learned /b in a mishna in the b preferred /b tractate, i Eduyyot /i , b in accordance with his /b opinion. b Here, what /b is the ruling? b He was silent and said nothing to him, /b as he was familiar with no established ruling in this matter. b Rav Ḥisda said: Let us see /b and try to resolve this ourselves b from /b the fact b that Rav prayed /b the b Shabbat /b prayers on the eve of Shabbat b while it was still day. Learn from this /b that b the i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b and the time for the afternoon prayer ends at the midpoint of the afternoon, after which time one may recite the evening prayer.,The Gemara immediately rejects the proof based on Rav’s practice: b On the contrary, from /b the fact b that Rav Huna and the Sages, /b students of Rav, b would not pray until evening, learn from that /b that b the i halakha /i is not in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda. /b The Gemara concludes: b Now that the i halakha /i was stated neither in accordance with /b the opinion of this b Sage nor in accordance with /b the opinion of that b Sage, one who acted in accordance with /b the opinion of this b Sage has acted /b legitimately, b and one who acted in accordance with /b the opinion of that b Sage has acted /b legitimately, as this i halakha /i is left to the decision of each individual.,The Gemara relates: b Rav happened by the house of /b the Sage, b Geniva, and he prayed /b the b Shabbat /b prayer b on the eve of Shabbat /b before nightfall. b Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba was praying behind Rav, and Rav finished /b his prayer b but did not /b take three steps back and b interrupt the prayer /b of b Rabbi Yirmeya. Derive from this /b incident b three /b i halakhot /i : b Derive from this /b that b one may pray the Shabbat /b prayer b on the eve of Shabbat /b before nightfall. b And derive from this that a student /b may b pray behind his rabbi. And derive from this /b that it is b prohibited to pass before those who are praying. /b ,The Gemara responds: This b supports /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, /b as b Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: It is prohibited to pass before those who are praying. /b The Gemara asks: b Is that so? Didn’t Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi pass /b before those who were praying? The Gemara responds: b Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi /b were b beyond four cubits /b from those who were praying b when they passed. /b ,One particular detail was surprising: b How did Rabbi Yirmeya act that way /b and pray behind Rav? b Didn’t Rav Yehuda say /b that b Rav said: A person should never pray /b
22. Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
71a. אע"פ שהחזיק ישראל אחר בנכסיו אוסר משחשיכה אע"פ שלא החזיק ישראל אחר אינו אוסר,הא גופא קשיא אמרת מבעוד יום אע"פ שהחזיק ולא מיבעיא כי לא החזיק אדרבה כי לא החזיק לא אסר,אמר רב פפא אימא אע"פ שלא החזיק והא אע"פ שהחזיק קתני,ה"ק אע"פ שלא החזיק מבעוד יום אלא משחשיכה כיון דהוה ליה להחזיק מבעוד יום אוסר משחשיכה אע"פ שלא החזיק ישראל אחר אינו אוסר,אע"פ שלא החזיק ישראל אחר ולא מיבעיא כי החזיק אדרבה כי החזיק אסר,אמר רב פפא אימא אע"פ שהחזיק והא אע"פ שלא החזיק קתני ה"ק אע"פ שהחזיק משחשיכה כיון דלא הוה ליה להחזיק מבעוד יום אינו אוסר,קתני מיהת רישא אוסר אמאי אוסר ניבטל,מאי אוסר דקתני עד שיבטל,ר' יוחנן אמר מתני' מני ב"ש היא דאמרי אין ביטול רשות בשבת דתנן מאימתי נותנין רשות ב"ש אומרים מבעוד יום וב"ה אומרים משתחשך,אמר עולא מ"ט דב"ה נעשה כאומר כלך אצל יפות,אמר אביי מת נכרי בשבת מאי כלך אצל יפות איכא,אלא הכא בהא קמיפלגי דב"ש סברי ביטול רשות מיקנא רשותא הוא ומיקנא רשותא בשבת אסור וב"ה סברי אסתלוקי רשותא בעלמא הוא ואסתלוקי רשותא בשבת שפיר דמי:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big בעל הבית שהיה שותף לשכניו לזה ביין ולזה ביין אינן צריכין לערב,לזה ביין ולזה בשמן צריכין לערב ר"ש אומר אחד זה ואחד זה אינן צריכין לערב:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big אמר רב ובכלי אחד אמר רבא דיקא נמי דקתני לזה ביין ולזה בשמן צריכין לערב אי אמרת בשלמא רישא בכלי אחד וסיפא בשני כלים שפיר אלא אי אמרת רישא בשני כלים וסיפא בשני כלים מה לי יין ויין מה לי יין ושמן,א"ל אביי יין ויין ראוי לערב יין ושמן אין ראוי לערב:,ר"ש אומר אחד זה ואחד זה אין צריכין לערב: ואפילו לזה ביין ולזה בשמן אמר רבה הכא במאי עסקינן בחצר שבין שני מבואות ור"ש לטעמיה,דתנן אמר ר"ש למה הדבר דומה לשלש חצירות הפתוחות זו לזו ופתוחות לרה"ר עירבו שתים החיצונות עם האמצעית היא מותרת עמהן והן מותרות עמה ושתים החיצונות אסורות זו עם זו,א"ל אביי מי דמי התם קתני שתים החיצונות אסורות הכא קתני אין צריכין לערב כלל,מאי אין צריכין לערב שכנים בהדי בעל הבית אבל שכנים בהדי הדדי צריכין לערב 71a. In such a case, b even though a different Jew took possession of /b the convert’s b property, /b the one who acquires it renders carrying b prohibited. /b If, however, he died b after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of /b his property, b it, /b i.e., carrying, b is not prohibited, /b for carrying had already been permitted on that Shabbat.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: The i baraita /i b itself is difficult. You /b first b said: /b If the convert died b while it was still day, even though a different Jew took possession of /b his property, the latter renders carrying prohibited, which implies that b it is not necessary /b to say so b where /b another Jew b did not take possession of /b the property, for in such a case it is certainly prohibited. But this is incorrect. b On the contrary, /b in a case b where /b a different person b did not take possession of /b the property, b it is /b certainly b not prohibited, /b for in such a case the convert’s property is ownerless and there is nobody to render carrying in the courtyard prohibited., b Rav Pappa said: Say /b that the i baraita /i should read as follows: b Even though /b a different Jew b did not take possession of /b it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can it be corrected in this manner? b But doesn’t it teach: Even though he took possession of /b it?,The Gemara answers: b This is /b what the i baraita /i b is saying: /b If the convert died while it was still day, then b even though /b a different Jew b did not take possession of /b the property b while it was still day but /b only b after nightfall, since he had /b the possibility b of taking possession /b of it b while it was still day, /b the person who acquires it renders carrying b prohibited. /b If, however, the convert died b after nightfall, even though a different Jew did not take possession of /b his property, b it does not render /b it b prohibited /b to carry.,The Gemara now considers the next clause of the i baraita /i , which states: If the convert died after nightfall, b even though a different Jew did not take possession of /b his property, carrying is not prohibited. This implies that b it is not necessary /b to say so b where /b another Jew b did take possession of /b the property, for in such a case it is certainly not prohibited. But, b on the contrary, where /b a different person b takes possession of /b the property, b he /b renders carrying b prohibited. /b , b Rav Pappa said: Say /b that the i baraita /i should read as follows: b Even though /b a different Jew b took possession of /b it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: b But didn’t /b the i baraita /i b teach: Even though he did not take possession of /b it? The Gemara explains: b This is /b what the i baraita /i b is saying: /b If the convert died after nightfall, b even though /b a different Jew b took possession of /b his property b after nightfall, since he did not have /b the possibility b of taking possession /b of it b while it was still day, he does not /b render carrying b prohibited. /b ,After explaining the i baraita /i , the Gemara proceeds to clarify the issue at hand: b In any event, the first clause is teaching /b that the person who acquires the convert’s property b renders /b carrying b prohibited; /b but b why does he render /b carrying b prohibited? Let him renounce /b his rights in the domain like an heir. The implication then is that he does not have the option of renunciation, in contrast to the opinion of Rav Naḥman.,Rav Naḥman replied: b What is /b the meaning of the word b prohibits that it teaches /b here? It means he renders carrying prohibited b until he renounces /b his rights, but renunciation is effective., b Rabbi Yoḥa said: Who is the i tanna /i of the /b problematic b i baraitot /i /b that imply that an heir cannot renounce rights, and from which objections were brought against Rav Naḥman? b It is Beit Shammai, who say /b that b there is no renunciation of rights on Shabbat /b at all, even for the owner of the property. b As we learned /b in the mishna: b When may one give away rights /b in a domain? b Beit Shammai say: While it is still day. And Beit Hillel say: /b Even b after nightfall. /b ,With regard to this dispute itself, b Ulla said: What is the reason of Beit Hillel /b that one may renounce rights even after nightfall? This should be considered an act of acquisition, which is prohibited on Shabbat. He explains: b It is comparable to one who says: Turn toward the high-quality ones. /b If a person sets aside i teruma /i from another person’s produce without the latter’s knowledge, and when the owner finds out he says: Why did you set aside this produce? Turn toward the high-quality ones, i.e., you should have gone to find better produce to use as i teruma /i , then the i teruma /i that was separated is considered i teruma /i , provided there was indeed quality produce in that place. The reason is that the owner has demonstrated his retroactive acquiescence to the other person’s setting aside of i teruma /i . Therefore, the latter is considered his agent for this purpose. The same applies to our issue. If a person intended to permit both himself and others to carry in a courtyard by means of establishing an i eiruv /i but forgot to do so, by renouncing his rights after nightfall, he retroactively makes plain his desire that his domain should be mingled with that of his neighbors. What he then does on Shabbat is not a complete action, but merely a demonstration of his intentions., b Abaye said: /b This explanation is unsatisfactory, as when b a gentile dies on Shabbat, what /b connection b is there to /b the concept: b Turn toward the high-quality ones? /b When a gentile dies on Shabbat, his Jewish neighbors may renounce their rights in the courtyard to each other and thus render carrying in the courtyard permitted, even though such renunciation would have been ineffective prior to his passing. Consequently, it cannot be said that it works retroactively., b Rather, /b the Gemara rejects Ulla’s explanation and states that b here they disagree over the following: Beit Shammai hold /b that b renunciation of a domain is /b equivalent to b acquisition of a domain, and acquisition of a domain is prohibited on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel hold /b that b it is merely withdrawal from a domain, and withdrawal from a domain seems well on Shabbat, /b i.e., it is permitted. As such, there is no reason to prohibit renunciation as a form of acquisition, which is prohibited as a part of a decree against conducting commerce on Shabbat., strong MISHNA: /strong If b a homeowner was in partnership with his neighbors, with this /b one b in wine and with that /b one b in wine, they need not establish an i eiruv /i , /b for due to their authentic partnership they are considered to be one household, and no further partnership is required.,If, however, he was in partnership b with this /b one b in wine and with that /b one b in oil, they must establish an i eiruv /i . /b As they are not partners in the same item, they are not all considered one partnership. b Rabbi Shimon says: /b In b both this /b case b and that /b case, i.e., even if he partners with his neighbors in different items, b they need not establish an i eiruv /i . /b , strong GEMARA: /strong b Rav said: /b The i halakha /i that one who is in partnership in wine with both his neighbors need not establish an i eiruv /i applies only if their wine is b in one vessel. Rava said: /b The language of the mishna b is also precise, as it teaches: /b If he was in partnership b with this one in wine and with the /b other b one in oil, they must establish an i eiruv /i . Granted, if you say /b that b the first clause /b of the mishna deals b with one vessel, and the latter clause /b deals b with two vessels, /b one of wine and one of oil, b it is well. But, if you say /b that b the first clause /b of the mishna speaks b of two vessels, and the latter clause /b also speaks b of two vessels, what /b difference is it b to me /b if it is b wine and wine or wine and oil? /b The i halakha /i should be the same in both cases., b Abaye said to him: /b This is no proof, and the first clause can be referring to a case where the wine was in separate vessels as well. The difference is that b wine and wine is suitable for mixing /b together, and therefore can be considered a single unit even if divided into two containers. b Wine and oil, /b however, b are not suitable for mixing. /b ,We learned in the mishna: b Rabbi Shimon says: /b In b both this /b case, where they are partners in wine alone, b and that /b case, where the partnerships are in wine and oil, b they need not establish an i eiruv /i . /b The Gemara poses a question: Did he say this b even if /b the partnership is b with this one in wine and with the other one in oil? /b But these are not suitable for mixing. b Rabba said: With what are we dealing here? /b We are dealing b with a courtyard /b positioned b between two alleyways, and Rabbi Shimon /b follows b his /b usual line of b reasoning. /b , b As we learned /b in a mishna: b Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this matter comparable? /b It is comparable b to /b the case of b three courtyards that open into one another and /b also b open into a public domain. If the two outer /b courtyards each b established an i eiruv /i with the middle one, it is permitted /b for residents of the middle one to carry b with /b the two outer ones, b and it is permitted /b for residents of the two outer ones to carry b with /b the middle one. b However, it is prohibited /b for the residents of b the two outer /b courtyards to carry b with each other, /b as they did not establish an i eiruv /i with each other. This teaches that the residents of one courtyard can establish an i eiruv /i with a courtyard on each side, and need not choose between them. Here too, the residents of the courtyard can participate in an i eiruv /i with both alleyways, one by means of wine and the other by means of oil., b Abaye said to him: Are /b the cases really b comparable? There it teaches: It is prohibited /b for the residents of b the two outer /b courtyards to carry with each other, whereas b here it teaches: They need not establish an i eiruv /i , /b indicating that it is permitted for residents of all three domains to carry with each other.,The Gemara explains: b What is /b the subject of the phrase b they need not establish an i eiruv /i ? /b It refers to the b neighbors together with the homeowner, /b i.e., the residents of the courtyards that open into each of the alleyways with the resident of the courtyard in the middle. b But /b with regard to b the neighbors with each other, /b i.e., if the residents of the two alleyways wish to be permitted to carry with each other, b they must establish an i eiruv /i /b and place it in the middle courtyard.
23. Babylonian Talmud, Hagigah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 47
24. Babylonian Talmud, Horayot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
7a. צבור מוצא מכלל יחיד ומשיח מוצא מכלל יחיד מה צבור אין חייבין אלא על העלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה אף משיח לא יהא חייב אלא על העלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה,או כלך לדרך זו נשיא מוצא מכלל יחיד ומשיח מוצא מכלל יחיד מה נשיא מביא בשגגת מעשה בלא העלם דבר אף משיח מביא בשגגת מעשה בלא העלם דבר,נראה למי דומה צבור בפר ואין מביאין אשם תלוי ומשיח בפר ואין מביא אשם תלוי מה צבור אינו חייב אלא על העלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה אף משיח לא יהא חייב אלא על העלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה,או כלך לדרך זו נשיא מביא שעירה בעבודת כוכבים ומביא אשם ודאי ומשיח מביא שעירה בעבודת כוכבים ומביא אשם ודאי מה נשיא מביא בשגגת מעשה אף משיח מביא בשגגת מעשה,ת"ל (ויקרא ד, ג) לאשמת העם הרי הוא משיח כצבור מה צבור אינו מביא אלא על העלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה אף משיח אינו מביא אלא על העלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה,אימא מה צבור הורה ועשו אחריו בהוראתו חייבין אף משיח כשהורה ועשו אחריו בהוראתו יהא חייב ת"ל (ויקרא ד, ג) והקריב על חטאתו אשר חטא על מה שחטא הוא מביא ואין מביא על מה שחטאו אחרים,אמר מר משיח בפר ואין מביא אשם תלוי מנא ליה דאין מביא אשם תלוי,דכתיב (ויקרא ה, יח) וכפר עליו הכהן על שגגתו אשר שגג מי שחטאתו ושגגתו שוה יצא משיח שאין שגגתו וחטאתו שוה דכתיב לאשמת העם הרי הוא משיח כצבור,לאשמת העם ע"כ לא קאמר ליה אלא אשם כדי נסבה:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big הורה בפני עצמו ועשה בפני עצמו מתכפר לו בפני עצמו הורה עם הצבור ועשה עם הצבור מתכפר לו עם הצבור שאין ב"ד חייבין עד שיורו לבטל מקצת ולקיים מקצת וכן המשיח ולא בעבודת כוכבים עד שיורו לבטל מקצת ולקיים מקצת:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big מנהני מילי דת"ר הורה עם הצבור ועשה עם הצבור יכול יביא פר לעצמו,ודין הוא נשיא מוצא מכלל יחיד ומשיח מוצא מכלל יחיד מה נשיא חטא בפני עצמו מביא בפני עצמו חטא עם הצבור מתכפר לו עם הצבור אף משיח חטא בפני עצמו מביא בפני עצמו חטא עם הצבור מתכפר לו עם הצבור,לא אם אמרת בנשיא שכן מתכפר לו עם הצבור ביום הכפורים תאמר במשיח שאין מתכפר לו עם הצבור ביום הכפורים,הואיל ואין מתכפר לו עם הצבור ביום הכפורים יכול יביא פר לעצמו ת"ל על חטאתו אשר חטא הא כיצד חטא בפני עצמו מביא בפני עצמו חטא עם הצבור מתכפר לו עם הצבור,היכי דמי אילימא דהוא מופלא והם אינן מופלאין פשיטא דמתכפר לו בפני עצמו הוראה דלהון ולא כלום ובעי אתויי כשבה או שעירה כל חד וחד ואי דאינון מופלאין והוא לאו מופלא אמאי מתכפר לו בפני עצמו הא הוראה דידיה ולא כלום היא 7a. The general b public is removed from the category of an individual, /b as an individual brings a ewe or female goat as a sin-offering, whereas when the general public sins the sin-offering is a bull. b And /b likewise, b an anointed /b priest b is removed from the category of an individual, /b as his sin-offering is also a bull. Therefore, b just as /b the general b public is liable only for absence /b of awareness b of /b the b matter /b by the court together b with unwitting /b performance b of an action /b by the people, b so too, an anointed /b priest b will be liable only for absence /b of awareness b of /b the b matter /b together b with unwitting /b performance b of an action. /b , b Or /b perhaps b go this way /b and draw a different analogy: b A king [ i Nasi /i ] is removed from the category of an individual, /b as his sin-offering is a goat. b And an anointed /b priest b is removed from the category of an individual. /b Therefore, b just as a king brings /b an offering b for unwitting /b performance b of an action, /b even b without absence /b of awareness b of /b the b matter /b leading to an erroneous ruling, like any individual liable to bring a sin-offering, b so too, an anointed /b priest b brings /b an offering b for unwitting /b performance b of an action, /b even b without absence /b of awareness b of /b the b matter /b leading to an erroneous ruling. It is possible to liken the anointed priest to either the general public or to the king.,The Gemara considers these two comparisons: b Let us see to which /b of them, the general public or the king, an anointed priest b is simi-lar. /b The general b public /b achieves atonement b with a bull and does not bring a provisional guilt-offering, and an anointed /b priest achieves atonement b with a bull and does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. /b Therefore one might say: b Just as /b the general b public is liable only for absence /b of awareness b of /b the b matter /b by the court together b with unwitting /b performance b of an action /b by the people, b so too, an anointed /b priest b will be liable only for absence /b of awareness b of /b the b matter /b together b with unwitting /b performance b of an action. /b , b Or /b perhaps b go this way /b and draw a different analogy: b The king brings a female goat for /b unwitting b idol worship and brings a definite guilt-offering /b for certain other transgressions where there is liability to bring a guilt-offering, e.g., misuse of consecrated property and robbery, b and an anointed /b priest b brings a female goat for /b unwitting b idol worship and brings a definite guilt-offering /b for the same transgressions as the king. This is in contrast to the general public, which brings a bull as a sin-offering for unwitting idol worship and does not bring a definite guilt-offering at all. Therefore conclude: b Just as a king brings /b an offering b for unwitting /b performance b of an action /b without absence of awareness of the matter, like any individual liable to bring a sin-offering, b so too, an anointed /b priest b brings /b an offering b for unwitting /b performance b of an action /b without absence of awareness of the matter.,Since either conclusion can be derived logically, another source is necessary. Therefore, b the verse states: /b “If the anointed priest shall sin b so as to bring guilt upon the people” /b (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of the b anointed /b priest b is like /b that of the general b public. /b Therefore, b just as /b the general b public brings /b an offering b only for absence /b of awareness b of /b the b matter /b by the court b with unwitting /b performance b of an action /b by the people, b so too, an anointed /b priest b brings /b an offering b only for absence /b of awareness b of /b the b matter with unwitting /b performance b of an action. /b ,The Gemara challenges the comparison: Based on the comparison between the anointed priest and the general public, why not b say: Just as /b with regard to the general b public, /b if the court b issued a ruling and /b the general public b performed /b the transgression b after its /b ruling and b in accordance with its ruling, /b the court is b liable, so too, /b with regard to b an anointed /b priest, b when he issued a ruling and /b the general public b performed /b the transgression b after his /b ruling and b in accordance with his ruling, he should be liable. /b Therefore, b the verse states /b with regard to the anointed priest: b “Then he shall offer for his sin that he has sinned” /b (Leviticus 4:3), from which it is derived: b He brings /b an offering b for that /b sin b that he sinned /b on the basis of his ruling, b but he does not bring /b an offering b for that /b sin b that others sinned /b on the basis of his ruling.,The Gemara elaborates on that which b the Master said: An anointed /b priest achieves atonement b with a bull and does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. /b The Gemara asks: b From where does /b the i tanna /i derive b that /b an anointed priest b does not bring a provisional guilt-offering? /b ,The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, b as it is written /b with regard to the i halakhot /i of the guilt-offering: b “And the priest shall atone for him for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” /b (Leviticus 5:18), from which it is derived that this i halakha /i applies only to b one whose transgression and his unwitting /b action b are equal, /b i.e., an ordinary person, whose unwitting act is the very transgression that he performed unwittingly. This serves to b exclude an anointed /b priest, b whose unwitting /b action b and his transgression are not equal, /b as his unwitting act is the erroneous ruling and he is liable to bring an offering only if he performed the transgression on the basis of that ruling. b As it is written /b about the anointed priest: b “So as to bring guilt upon the people” /b (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of the b anointed /b priest b is like /b that of the general b public. /b ,The Gemara questions this proof: How can the Gemara base the i halakha /i on an interpretation of the verse: b “So as to bring guilt upon the people”? To this point, /b the i tanna /i of the i baraita /i b did not state /b this verse. The i tanna /i first states that the anointed priest does not bring a provisional guilt-offering and only then cites the verse from which he proves the i halakha /i that an anointed priest brings an offering only for absence of awareness of the matter together with unwitting performance of an action. b Rather, /b he stated the i halakha /i of the provisional guilt-offering b for no reason. /b Although the i halakha /i is correct, there was no reason to cite it in the i baraita /i ., strong MISHNA: /strong If the anointed priest b issued a ruling by himself and performed /b a transgression b by himself, he achieves atonement by himself /b by bringing a bull as his sin-offering. If b he issued a ruling with the /b general b public, /b i.e., the Sanhedrin, b and performed /b a transgression b with the /b general b public, /b i.e., the Jewish people, b he achieves atonement with the /b general b public. As, the court is not liable unless /b the judges b issue a ruling to nullify part /b of a commandment b and to sustain part /b of that commandment, b and likewise /b with regard to the ruling of b the anointed /b priest. b And /b the court and the priest are b not /b liable for a ruling b with regard to idol worship unless they issue a ruling to nullify part /b of that commandment b and to sustain part /b of it., strong GEMARA: /strong Concerning the i halakha /i that there is a difference between an unwitting transgression that the anointed priest performs by himself and one that he performs with the general public, the Gemara asks: b From where is this matter /b derived? The Gemara explains: It is b as the Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : If the anointed priest b issued a ruling with the /b general b public and performed /b a transgression b with the /b general b public, /b one b might /b have thought that he is liable to b bring a bull /b as a sin-offering b for himself. /b ,The i baraita /i continues: b And /b there b is a logical inference /b to support this: b A king is removed from the category of an individual and an anointed /b priest b is removed from the category of an individual, /b as each brings a different sin-offering than an individual. b Just as /b with regard to b a king, /b if b he sinned by himself he brings /b his sin-offering of a goat b by himself, /b and if b he sinned with the /b general b public, he achieves atonement with the /b general b public, so too, /b with regard to b an anointed /b priest, if b he sinned by himself he brings /b his sin-offering of a bull b by himself, /b and if b he sinned with the /b general b public, he achieves atonement with the /b general b public. /b ,The i baraita /i rejects this: b No, if you said with regard to a king /b that he achieves atonement with the general public, that is logical, b as he achieves atonement with the /b general b public on Yom Kippur. Shall you /b also b say /b the same b with regard to an anointed /b priest, b who does not achieve atonement with the /b general b public on Yom Kippur /b but rather brings his own atonement offering?,The i baraita /i continues: b Since he does not achieve atonement with the /b general b public on Yom Kippur, /b one b might /b have thought that b he will bring a bull for himself /b even if he unwittingly performed a transgression with the general public. Therefore, b the verse states: /b “Then he shall offer b for his sin that he has sinned” /b (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that he sinned alone, not with the general public. b How so? /b If b he sinned by himself he brings /b his sin-offering of a bull b by himself; /b if b he sinned with the /b general b public, he achieves atonement with the /b general b public. /b ,The Gemara elaborates: b What are the circumstances /b of an anointed priest issuing a ruling for himself? b If we say /b that it is a case b where /b the High Priest b is a distinguished /b scholar b and /b the judges of the court b are not distinguished /b scholars, it is b obvious that he achieves atonement by himself, /b as b their ruling is nothing /b at all, since they did not consult the generation’s most prominent scholar. b And /b accordingly, b each and every one /b who performed a transgression b needs to bring a ewe or female goat /b as an individual sin-offering. b And /b if it is a case b where /b the judges b are distinguished /b scholars b and he is not a distinguished /b scholar, b why does he achieve atonement by himself? Isn’t his ruling nothing at all, /b and his transgression is an unwitting performance of an action alone, rather than a transgression performed on the basis of a ruling?
25. Babylonian Talmud, Ketuvot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
53b. שקילא טיבותך שדיא אחיזרי כבר תרגמא רב הושעיא לשמעתי' בבבל:,בנן נוקבן דיהויין ליכי מינאי וכו': רב תני עד דתלקחן לגוברין ולוי תני עד דתבגרן לרב אע"ג דבגר ולוי אע"ג דאינסיב,אלא בגר ולא אינסיב אינסיב ולא בגר דכולי עלמא לא פליגי כי פליגי בארוסה ולא בגר וכן תני לוי במתניתיה עד דתבגרן וימטי זמניהון דאינסבן תרתי אלא או תבגרן או ימטי זמניהון לאיתנסבא,כתנאי עד מתי הבת נזונית עד שתארס משום רבי אלעזר אמרו עד שתבגר תני רב יוסף עד דיהוויין איבעיא להו הויה דאירוסין או הויה דנישואין תיקו,אמר ליה רב חסדא לרב יוסף מי שמיע לך מיניה דרב יהודה ארוסה יש לה מזונות או אין לה מזונות אמר ליה משמע לא שמיע לי אלא מסברא לית לה כיון דאירסה לא ניחא ליה דתיתזיל,אמר ליה אם משמע לא שמיע לך מסברא אית לה כיון דלא קים ליה בגוה לא שדי זוזי בכדי,ואיכא דאמרי אמר ליה משמע לא שמיע לי מסברא אית לה כיון דלא קים ליה בגוה לא שדי זוזי בכדי אמר ליה אי משמע לא שמיע לך מסברא לית לה כיון דאירסה לא ניחא ליה דתיתזיל:,סימן דגברי שק זרף מאנה ויבמה שניה ארוסה ואנסה:,בעו מיניה מרב ששת ממאנת יש לה מזונות או אין לה מזונות,אמר להו רב ששת תניתוה אלמנה בבית אביה וגרושה בבית אביה ושומרת יבם בבית אביה יש לה מזונות רבי יהודה אומר עודה בבית אביה יש לה מזונות אינה בבית אביה אין לה מזונות,רבי יהודה היינו ת"ק אלא לאו ממאנת איכא בינייהו דתנא קמא סבר אית לה ורבי יהודה סבר לית לה,בעי ריש לקיש בת יבמה יש לה מזונות או אין לה מזונות,כיון דאמר מר כתובתה על נכסי בעלה הראשון לית לה או דלמא כיון דאי לית לה מראשון תקינו לה רבנן משני אית לה תיקו:,בעי רבי אלעזר בת שניה יש לה מזונות או אין לה מזונות 53b. b Your good is taken /b and b cast on thorns, /b i.e., we do not owe you a debt of gratitude for informing us of this statement, as b Rav Hoshaya /b himself b already interpreted /b and ruled this b i halakha /i /b of yours b in Babylonia. /b ,§ The mishna taught that one of the stipulations of the marriage contract is the clause: Any b female children you will have from me /b will be sustained from my property. The Gemara notes that b Rav /b would b teach /b that the daughters are entitled to sustece b until they are taken /b as wives b by men, and Levi /b would b teach /b that they are entitled to sustece b until they become grown women. /b The Gemara asks: b According to /b the opinion of b Rav, /b are daughters entitled to sustece b even though they have become grown women, /b if they are still unmarried? Yet how can this be correct? After all, adult daughters are no longer under their father’s jurisdiction even in his lifetime. b And /b can b Levi /b possibly maintain that b even though they are married /b they still receive sustece from their father’s estate until they become grown women?, b Rather, /b in a case where b they became grown women and were not married, /b or were b married and had not become grown women, everyone agrees /b that they are not entitled to sustece. b When they disagree /b it is b with regard to /b a daughter b who was betrothed and had not become a grown woman. /b Levi maintains that as she is still unmarried she remains under her father’s jurisdiction. b And Levi likewise taught /b the following version of this stipulation b in his i baraita /i : Until they become grown women and the time arrives for their marriage. /b The Gemara asks: Are these b two /b conditions both necessary? She leaves her father’s domain when one of these conditions is fulfilled. b Rather, /b Levi means that they can continue to receive sustece b either /b until b they become grown women or their time arrives for marriage. /b ,The Gemara observes: The dispute between Rav and Levi is b like /b a dispute between b i tanna’im /i . /b As we have learned: b Until when is a daughter sustained /b from her father’s property? b Until she is betrothed. In the name of Rabbi Elazar they said: Until she becomes a grown woman. Rav Yosef taught /b the version: b Until they become /b married. The meaning of the expression: Until they become married, is unclear, and therefore b a dilemma was raised before /b the scholars: Does this refer to b becoming betrothed or /b to b becoming married? /b No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma b shall stand /b unresolved., b Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Yosef: Have you heard /b anything b from Rav Yehuda /b with regard to whether b a betrothed /b orphan b has sustece /b from the brothers’ inheritance of their father’s estate, b or /b whether b she does not have sustece? /b Rav Yosef b said to him: /b As for b hearing, I have not heard /b anything, b but by logical /b reasoning I can conclude that b she does not have /b sustece from the inheritance. The reason is that b since /b her husband b has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned /b by having to request her sustece from the inheritance, when he himself can provide for her.,Rav Ḥisda b said to /b Rav Yosef: b If you have not heard /b this i halakha /i , b by logical /b reasoning b she /b should b have /b sustece from the brothers. The reason is that b since /b her husband b is not sure /b that he will marry b her, he will not throw away money for nothing. /b , b And some say /b a different version of this discussion. Rav Yosef b said to /b Rav Ḥisda: As for b hearing, I have not heard /b anything, but b by logical /b reasoning I would say that b she does have /b sustece from the brothers: b Since he is not sure /b that he will marry b her, he will not throw away money for nothing. /b In response, Rav Ḥisda b said to him: If you have not heard /b this i halakha /i , b by logical /b reasoning b she /b should b not have /b sustece from the inheritance: b Since he has betrothed her it is not satisfactory for him that she be demeaned /b by having to ask the brothers for food, and he would rather provide for her himself.,§ The Gemara states b a mnemonic /b device b for /b the b men, /b i.e., the Sages, who appear in the following discussion: b i Shin /i , i kuf /i , i zayin /i , i reish /i , i peh /i . /b This refers to Rav Sheshet, Reish Lakish, Rabbi Elazar, Rava, and Rav Pappa. The dilemmas themselves are listed in the following mnemonic: b She refused, and a i yevama /i , a secondary /b forbidden b relationship, a betrothed woman, and woman who was raped. /b ,The Gemara analyzes these cases one by one: The Sages b raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: /b With regard to b one who refused, /b i.e., a minor orphan girl who was married off by her brothers or mother and then refused her husband, thereby nullifying the marriage, does b she have sustece /b from her father’s inheritance b or /b does b she not have sustece? /b Is she considered to have been married, and therefore her right to sustece has lapsed, or does her refusal nullify the marriage to the extent that it is as though she were never married at all, and therefore she is still entitled to sustece?, b Rav Sheshet said to them: You learned it /b in the following i baraita /i : In the case of b a widow in her father’s house, or a divorcée in her father’s house, or a widow awaiting her i yavam /i in her father’s house, she has sustece. Rabbi Yehuda says: /b If b she is still in her father’s house she has sustece; /b if b she is not in her father’s house she does not have sustece. /b ,Rav Sheshet analyzes this i baraita /i : The opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda is /b to all appearances the same as that of b the first i tanna /i . /b What is their dispute? b Rather, is it not /b the case that b there is /b a practical difference b between them /b concerning a girl b who refused /b her husband, b as the first i tanna /i maintains /b that b she has /b sustece, as her marriage has been annulled and it is as though it never occurred, b and Rabbi Yehuda maintains /b that b she does not have /b sustece, as she permanently forfeited this right when she left her father’s house in marriage., b Reish Lakish raised a dilemma: /b With regard to the b daughter /b of b a i yevama /i , /b i.e., a woman who married her i yavam /i in levirate marriage and gave birth to a daughter before he passed away, does b she have sustece /b from the property of the i yavam /i , i.e., the girl’s father, b or /b does b she not have sustece? /b ,The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: b Since the Master said /b that the payment of the b marriage contract /b of a i yevama /i is taken b from the property of her first husband, /b not that of the i yavam /i , her daughter should therefore b not have /b rights to sustece from the property of the i yavam /i . Her sustece is a stipulation of the marriage contract, which does not apply to the i yavam /i . b Or perhaps, since if she does not have /b enough to cover the amount of her marriage contract b from the /b property of the b first /b husband, b the Sages enacted for her /b a marriage contract b from the second /b one, i.e., the i yavam /i . Therefore, her daughter should b have /b sustece from his property. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma b shall stand /b unresolved., b Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma: /b With regard to the b daughter /b of b a secondary /b forbidden b relationship, /b i.e., a girl born to a man and women forbidden to each other by rabbinic law, whose mother is penalized by being deprived of a marriage contract, does her daughter b have sustece or /b does b she not have sustece? /b
26. Babylonian Talmud, Makkot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
13a. מעלים היו שכר ללוים דברי רבי יהודה רבי מאיר אומר לא היו מעלים להן שכר וחוזר לשררה שהיה בה דברי רבי מאיר רבי יהודה אומר לא היה חוזר לשררה שהיה בה:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big אמר רב כהנא מחלוקת בשש דמר סבר (במדבר לה, יב) לכם לקליטה ומר סבר לכם לכל צרכיכם אבל בארבעים ושתים דברי הכל היו מעלין להם שכר,א"ל רבא הא ודאי לכם לכל צרכיכם משמע אלא אמר רבא מחלוקת בארבעים ושתים דמר סבר (במדבר לה, ו) ועליהם תתנו כי הנך לקליטה ומר סבר ועליהם תתנו כי הנך מה הנך לכל צרכיכם אף הני נמי לכל צרכיכם אבל בשש דברי הכל לא היו מעלים להן שכר:,חוזר לשררה שהיה בה כו': תנו רבנן (ויקרא כה, מא) ושב אל משפחתו ואל אחוזת אבותיו ישוב למשפחתו הוא שב ואינו שב למה שהחזיקו אבותיו דברי ר"י ר"מ אומר אף הוא שב למה שהחזיקו אבותיו אל אחוזת אבותיו כאבותיו,וכן בגולה כשהוא אומר ישוב לרבות את הרוצח,מאי וכן בגולה כדתניא (במדבר לה, כח) ישוב הרוצח אל ארץ אחוזתו לארץ אחוזתו הוא שב ואינו שב למה שהחזיקו אבותיו דברי רבי יהודה ר"מ אומר אף הוא שב למה שהחזיקו אבותיו גמר שיבה שיבה מהתם:, br br big strongהדרן עלך אלו הן הגולין /strong /big br br,מתני׳ big strongואלו /strong /big הן הלוקין הבא על אחותו ועל אחות אביו ועל אחות אמו ועל אחות אשתו ועל אשת אחיו ועל אשת אחי אביו ועל הנדה אלמנה לכהן גדול גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט ממזרת ונתינה לישראל בת ישראל לנתין ולממזר,אלמנה וגרושה חייבין עליה משום שני שמות גרושה וחלוצה אינו חייב אלא משום אחת בלבד:,הטמא שאכל את הקדש והבא אל המקדש טמא ואוכל חלב ודם ונותר ופגול וטמא,והשוחט ומעלה בחוץ והאוכל חמץ בפסח והאוכל והעושה מלאכה ביום הכפורים והמפטם את השמן והמפטם את הקטורת והסך בשמן המשחה והאוכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים,אכל טבל ומעשר ראשון שלא נטלה תרומתו ומעשר שני והקדש שלא נפדו,כמה יאכל מן הטבל ויהא חייב רבי שמעון אומר כל שהוא וחכמים אומרים כזית אמר להן רבי שמעון אי אתם מודים לי באוכל נמלה כל שהוא שהוא חייב אמרו לו מפני שהיא כברייתה אמר להן אף חטה אחת כברייתה:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big חייבי כריתות קא תני חייבי מיתות ב"ד לא קתני מתני׳ מני רבי עקיבא היא דתניא אחד חייבי כריתות ואחד חייבי מיתות בית דין 13a. The unintentional murderers b would pay a fee to the Levites /b as rent for their living quarters in the cities of refuge, which were Levite cities; this is b the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: They would not pay a fee to them, /b but would reside rent free, as they are required to live there by Torah law. They also disagreed with regard to the status of the unintentional murderer when he returns home after the death of the High Priest. b He returns to the /b same public b office that he occupied /b prior to his exile; this is b the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not return to the office that he occupied. /b , strong GEMARA: /strong b Rav Kahana said: /b This b dispute /b between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir is with regard to payment of rent to the Levite landlords b in /b the b six /b cities of refuge designated in the Torah and in the book of Joshua, b as /b one b Sage, /b Rabbi Yehuda, b holds /b that in the verse: “They shall be cities of refuge for you” (Numbers 35:11), the term b “for you” /b means that the cities shall be for you only b for providing refuge, /b and therefore they must pay rent to the Levites. b And /b one b Sage, /b Rabbi Meir, b holds /b that the term b “for you” /b means b for all your needs; /b therefore, they are not required to pay rent. b But with regard to the forty-two /b additional Levite cities, which also served as cities of refuge, b everyone agrees /b that the unintentional murderers b would pay rent to /b the Levite landlords., b Rava said to him: But /b the term b “for you” certainly indicates for all your needs; /b therefore, the dispute cannot be as Rav Kahana explains it. b Rather, Rava said: /b The b dispute /b is only b with regard to /b the b forty-two /b Levite cities, b as /b one b Sage, /b Rabbi Yehuda, b holds /b that from the verse: “They shall be the six cities of refuge… b and beside them you shall give /b forty-two cities” (Numbers 35:6), it is derived that the forty-two cities are b like these /b original six cities, only insofar as b with regard to /b the unintentional murderer being b admitted. And /b one b Sage, /b Rabbi Meir, b holds /b that from the verse: “They shall be the six cities of refuge… b and beside them you shall give /b forty-two cities,” it is derived that the forty-two cities are b like these /b original six cities in every sense: b Just as those /b six cities were given to you, i.e., the unintentional murderers, b for all your needs, so too, these /b forty-two cities were given to you, i.e., the unintentional murderers, b for all your needs. But with regard to /b the b six /b cities specifically designated as cities of refuge, b everyone agrees /b that unintentional murderers b would not pay /b the Levites b a fee. /b ,§ The mishna teaches that there is a dispute as to whether the unintentional murderer b returns to the /b same public b office that he occupied /b prior to his exile. On a related note, b the Sages taught /b with regard to a Hebrew slave liberated during the Jubilee Year, about whom it is written: b “And he returns to his family, and to the estate of his fathers he shall return” /b (Leviticus 25:41): b He returns to his family, but he does not return to that /b status of prominence and honor b that his ancestors held; /b this is b the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: He even returns to that /b status of prominence and honor b that his ancestors held. /b From the phrase b “to the estate of his fathers /b he shall return,” it is derived that he returns to be b like his fathers. /b , b And likewise, /b the same is true b with regard to an exile /b sent to a city of refuge, as b when /b the verse b states: /b “To the estate of his fathers b he shall return,” /b the term “he shall return” is redundant and it serves b to include the /b unintentional b murderer. /b ,The Gemara asks: b What /b is the meaning of: b And likewise, /b the same is true b with regard to an exile? /b The Gemara explains: It is b as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i with regard to the verse: b “The murderer shall return to his ancestral land” /b (Numbers 35:28), from which it is derived that b he returns to his ancestral land, but he does not return to that /b status of prominence and honor b that his ancestors held; /b this is b the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: He even returns to that /b status of prominence and honor b that his ancestors held. /b Rabbi Meir b derives /b this by means of a verbal analogy b from there, /b i.e., between the term of b “return” /b written with regard to the unintentional murderer, and the term of b “return” /b written with regard to the Hebrew slave. The verbal analogy teaches that just as a Hebrew slave returns to his father’s estate and the status of prominence held by his ancestors, so too, the unintentional murderer returns to his ancestral land and to the status of prominence held by his ancestors.,, strong MISHNA: /strong After enumerating in tractate i Sanhedrin /i those liable to be executed and in the previous chapter those liable to be exiled, the mishna proceeds to enumerate those liable to receive lashes. b These are /b the people b who are flogged /b by Torah law for violating a prohibition: b One who engages in intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with the wife of his father’s brother, or with a menstruating woman. /b Likewise, one is flogged in the case of b a widow /b who married b a High Priest, a divorcée or a i ḥalutza /i /b who married b an ordinary priest, a i mamzeret /i , /b i.e., a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship, b or a Gibeonite woman /b who married b a Jew /b of unflawed lineage, and b a Jewish woman /b of unflawed lineage who married b a Gibeonite or a i mamzer /i , /b i.e., a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship.,The mishna elaborates: If a woman was both b a widow and a divorcée, /b as after she was widowed she remarried and was divorced, a High Priest b is liable /b to receive two sets of lashes b for /b marrying b her due to /b the violation of b two /b different b prohibitions, /b that of his marrying a widow and that of his marrying a divorced woman. If a woman was both b a divorcée and a i ḥalutza /i , /b from two different men, an ordinary priest who marries her b is liable /b to receive b only /b one set of lashes, b due to /b the violation of b one /b prohibition b alone. /b ,The mishna continues enumerating those liable to receive lashes: b A ritually impure person who ate sacrificial /b food b and one who entered the Temple /b while b ritually impure. And one /b who b eats /b the forbidden b fat /b of a domesticated animal; b or blood; or i notar /i , /b leftover flesh from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption; b or i piggul /i , /b an offering invalidated due to intent to sprinkle its blood, burn its fats on the altar, or consume it, beyond its designated time; b or /b one who partakes of an offering that became b impure, /b is flogged., b And one who slaughters /b a sacrificial animal b or sacrifices /b it on an altar b outside /b the Temple courtyard, b and one who eats leavened bread on Passover, and one who eats /b on Yom Kippur b and one who performs labor on Yom Kippur, and one who blends the /b anointing b oil /b for non-sacred use, b and one who blends the incense /b that was burned on the altar in the Sanctuary for non-sacred use, b and one who applies the anointing oil, and one who eats unslaughtered /b animal or bird b carcasses, or i tereifot /i , /b which are animals or birds with a condition that will lead to their death within twelve months, or b repugt creatures, or creeping animals, /b is liable to receive lashes.,If b one ate untithed produce, /b i.e., produce from which i terumot /i and tithes were not separated; b or first-tithe /b produce b whose i teruma /i /b of the tithe b was not taken; or second-tithe /b produce b or sacrificial /b food b that was not redeemed; /b he is liable to receive lashes.,With regard to the measure for liability for eating forbidden food, the mishna asks: b How much does one /b need to b eat from untithed produce and be liable /b to receive lashes? b Rabbi Shimon says: /b If one ate b any amount /b of untithed produce he is liable to receive lashes. b And the Rabbis say: /b He is liable only if he eats b an olive-bulk, /b which is the minimum measure characterized as eating. b Rabbi Shimon said to them: Do you not concede to me with regard to one who eats an ant of any size that he is liable /b to receive lashes? The Rabbis b said to /b Rabbi Shimon: He receives lashes for eating an ant of any size b due to /b the fact b that it is /b an intact entity in the form b of its creation, /b and that is what the Torah prohibited. Rabbi Shimon b said to them: One /b kernel of b wheat /b is b also /b in the form b of its creation, /b and therefore one should be liable to receive lashes for eating any intact entity., strong GEMARA: /strong Apropos the list in the mishna of those liable to receive lashes, the Gemara notes: The i tanna /i b teaches /b those b liable to /b receive b excision from the World-to-Come [ i karet /i ], /b as most of the cases enumerated at the beginning of the mishna include actions that not only entail violation of a prohibition but are also punishable by i karet /i . But the i tanna /i b does not teach /b those b liable to /b be executed with b court /b -imposed b death /b penalties among those liable to receive lashes. Apparently, lashes are not administered to those who violate a prohibition punishable by execution. The Gemara asks: b Whose /b opinion is expressed in b the mishna? It /b is the opinion of b Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i that there is a tannaitic dispute: b Both those liable to /b receive b i karet /i and those liable to /b be executed with b court /b -imposed b death /b penaltie
27. Babylonian Talmud, Megillah, 2.1 (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 47
28. Babylonian Talmud, Menachot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
93a. if the repeated term “his offering” is not needed to counter the i a fortiori /i inferences, b why do I /b need these three b verses? /b The Gemara explains: One instance of b “his offering” /b teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, b but not /b on b an offering of another /b person. Another instance of b “his offering” /b teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, b but not /b on b an offering of a gentile. /b The third instance of b “his offering” /b serves b to include all /b the b owners of /b a jointly owned b offering in /b the requirement of b placing hands, /b i.e., they are all required to place their hands on the offering.,§ The mishna states: If the owner of an offering died, then b the heir /b is regarded as the offering’s owner. Therefore, he b places /b his b hands /b on the offering and brings the accompanying libations, and he can substitute a non-sacred animal for it. Although it is prohibited to perform an act of substitution, if the owner of an offering does this, his attempt is successful to the extent that the non-sacred animal is thereby consecrated, even though the original offering also remains sacred., b Rav Ḥaya taught /b a i baraita /i b in the presence of Rava: An heir does not place hands /b on an offering he inherited, and b an heir cannot substitute /b a non-sacred animal for an offering he inherited. Rava asked: b But didn’t we learn /b in the mishna: b The heir places /b his b hands /b on the offering, b and brings /b the accompanying b libations, and he can substitute /b a non-sacred animal for it and thereby consecrate the non-sacred animal?,Rav Ḥaya b said to /b Rava: b Should I reverse /b the current version of the i baraita /i to have it be in accordance with the mishna? Rava b said to him: No, /b as b whose /b opinion is expressed in b the mishna? It is /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b An heir places hands, /b and b an heir can effect substitution. Rabbi Yehuda says: An heir does not place hands, /b and b an heir cannot effect substitution. /b ,The Gemara clarifies: b What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? /b He expounds the term b “his offering” /b as teaching that one places hands only on one’s own offering, b but not /b on b one’s father’s offering /b that one inherited. b And /b furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda b derives /b the i halakha /i concerning who can substitute a non-sacred animal for an offering, which is b the initial stage of consecration, from /b the i halakha /i concerning who performs the rite of placing hands on the offering, which is b the final stage of consecration: Just as /b with regard to b the final stage of consecration, an heir does not place /b his b hands, so too, /b with regard to b the initial stage of consecration, an heir cannot effect substitution. /b , b And /b as for b the Rabbis, /b from where do they derive their opinion? The verse states: “If b he shall substitute [ i hamer yamir /i ] /b animal for animal” (Leviticus 27:10), with the doubled form of i hamer yamir /i serving b to include the heir /b as one capable of effecting substitution. b And /b furthermore, b they derive /b the i halakha /i concerning who performs the rite of placing hands, which is the b final stage of consecration, from /b the i halakha /i concerning who can effect substitution, which is b an initial stage of consecration: Just as /b with regard to b the initial stage of consecration, an heir can effect substitution, so too, /b with regard to b the final stage of consecration, an heir places /b his b hands. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And /b as for b the Rabbis, what do they do with this /b term: b “His offering”? /b The Gemara explains how the Rabbis expound each mention of the term. One instance of b “his offering” /b teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, b but not /b on b an offering of a gentile. /b Another instance of b “his offering” /b teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, b but not /b on b an offering of another /b person. The third instance of b “his offering” /b serves b to include all /b the b owners of /b a jointly owned b offering in /b the requirement of b placing hands, /b i.e., they are all required to place their hands on the offering.,The Gemara clarifies: b And Rabbi Yehuda does not hold /b that one of the mentions serves b to include all /b the b owners of /b a jointly owned b offering in /b the requirement of b placing hands, /b so he is able to expound it to exclude an heir from the requirement. b Alternatively, /b if b he holds /b that one of the mentions serves to include owners of a jointly owned offering, then he must b derive /b that one does not place hands on the offering of b a gentile or /b of b another /b person b from /b the same b one /b mention in the b verse, /b which b leaves him two /b more mentions in the b verses. One /b he expounds to teach that on b “his offering” /b he places hands, b but not /b on b his father’s offering /b that he inherited, b and the other /b mention remains b to include all /b the b owners of /b a jointly owned b offering in /b the requirement of b placing hands. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And /b as for b Rabbi Yehuda, what does he do /b with the use of the doubled form b in this /b verse: “If b he shall substitute [ i hamer yamir /i ]”? /b The Gemara answers: b He requires it to include a woman /b among those who can effect substitution. b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Since the entire matter /b of substitution b is stated /b in the Torah b only in the masculine form, what /b is the reason that b we ultimately /b come b to include a woman? The verse states: /b “If b he shall substitute [ i hamer yamir /i ],” /b using a doubled form., b And /b as for b the Rabbis, they derive /b that a woman can effect substitution b from /b the term: b “And if” /b (Leviticus 27:10), in the phrase “and if he shall substitute.” b And Rabbi Yehuda does not expound /b the term b “and if” /b at all., strong MISHNA: /strong b Everyone /b who brings an animal offering b places hands /b upon its head, b except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person, a gentile, /b a Canaanite b slave, the agent /b of the owner of the offering who brings the offering on the owner’s behalf, b and a woman. /b , b And /b the requirement of b placing hands is a non-essential mitzva; /b therefore, failure to place hands does not prevent the owner from achieving atonement.,The rite of placing hands is performed by leaning b on the head /b of the offering b with two hands. And in the /b same b location /b in the Temple b that one places hands, one slaughters /b the animal. b And immediately following /b the rite of b placing hands, /b the b slaughter /b is performed., strong GEMARA: /strong The Gemara explains why certain types of people do not place hands on an offering: b Granted, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor /b do not place their hands on the offering, b as they are not mentally competent. /b The exclusion of b a gentile /b is also understandable, as the verses concerning placing hands are introduced with: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them” (Leviticus 1:2), which indicates that b the children of Israel place hands /b upon their offerings, b but gentiles do not place /b their b hands /b upon their offerings. b But /b with regard to b a blind person, what is the reason /b that he does b not /b place his hands on his offering?, b Rav Ḥisda and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi /b disagree as to the source of the exclusion of a blind person. b One said /b that it is b derived /b from a verbal analogy between the mention of b placing hands /b in the passage detailing the general requirement to do so, and the mention of b placing hands /b stated with regard to the bull offering brought for a community-wide violation perpetrated due to an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin, which is performed b by /b the b Elders of /b the b congregation, /b i.e., the judges of the Sanhedrin: Just as the judges may not be blind (see i Sanhedrin /i 34b), so too the rite of placing hands is not performed by a blind person., b And /b the other b one said /b that it is b derived /b from a verbal analogy between the mention of b placing hands /b in the passage detailing the general requirement to do so, and the mention of b placing hands /b stated with regard to the b burnt offering of appearance /b brought by an individual on the pilgrimage Festivals: Just as a blind person is exempt from making the pilgrimage to Jerusalem and bringing the offering (see i Ḥagiga /i 2a), so too he is excluding from the requirement of placing hands.,The Gemara asks: b And according to the one who said /b that the exclusion of a blind person is derived b from /b the b burnt offering of appearance, what is the reason /b that b he does not derive /b this b from /b the placing of hands performed by the b Elders of /b the b congregation? /b
29. Babylonian Talmud, Yoma, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
81b. הוא גופיה שבת איקרי דכתיב תשבתו שבתכם בשלמא רב פפא לא אמר כרב אחא בר יעקב דקרא דכתיב בגופיה עדיף אלא רב אחא בר יעקב מאי טעמא לא אמר כרב פפא,מיבעי ליה לכדתניא (ויקרא כג, לב) ועניתם את נפשותיכם בתשעה לחודש יכול יתחיל ויתענה בתשעה ת"ל בערב אי בערב יכול משתחשך ת"ל בתשעה הא כיצד מתחיל ומתענה מבעוד יום מכאן שמוסיפין מחול על הקודש,ואין לי אלא בכניסתו ביציאתו מנין ת"ל (ויקרא כג, לב) מערב עד ערב ואין לי אלא יוה"כ (ימים טובים) מניין ת"ל (ויקרא כג, לב) תשבתו אין לי אלא (ימים טובים שבתות) מנין ת"ל (ויקרא כג, לב) שבתכם הא כיצד כל מקום שנאמר שבות (מכאן שמוסיפין) מחול על הקודש,ותנא דעצם עצם האי בתשעה לחודש מאי עביד ליה מיבעי ליה לכדתני חייא בר רב מדיפתי דתני חייא בר רב מדיפתי ועניתם את נפשותיכם בתשעה וכי בתשעה מתענין והלא בעשור מתענין אלא לומר לך כל האוכל ושותה בתשיעי מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו התענה תשיעי ועשירי,אכל אוכלין שאין ראוין לאכילה אמר רבא כס פלפלי ביומא דכפורי פטור כס זנגבילא ביומא דכפורי פטור,מיתיבי היה רבי מאיר אומר ממשמע שנאמר (ויקרא יט, כג) וערלתם ערלתו את פריו איני יודע שעץ מאכל הוא אלא מה תלמוד לומר עץ מאכל עץ שטעם עצו ופריו שוה הוי אומר זה פלפלין ללמדך שהפלפלין חייבין בערלה ואין ארץ ישראל חסרה כלום שנא' (דברים ח, ט) לא תחסר כל בה,ל"ק הא ברטיבתא והא ביבישתא,א"ל רבינא למרימר והאמר רב נחמן האי הימלתא דאתי מבי הנדואי שריא ומברכינן עליה בורא פרי האדמה לא קשיא הא ברטיבתא והא ביבישתא,ת"ר אכל עלי קנים פטור לולבי גפנים חייב אלו הן לולבי גפנים אמר רבי יצחק מגדלאה כל שלבלבו מר"ה ועד יוה"כ ורב כהנא אמר כל שלשים יום תניא כוותיה דר' יצחק מגדלאה אכל עלי קנים פטור ולולבי גפנים חייב אלו הן לולבי גפנים כל שלבלבו מר"ה ועד יוה"כ,שתה ציר או מורייס פטור הא חומץ חייב מתני' מני רבי היא דתניא ר' אומר חומץ משיב את הנפש,דרש רב גידל בר מנשה מבירי דנרש אין הלכה כרבי לשנה נפקי כולי עלמא מזגו ושתו חלא שמע רב גידל ואיקפד אמר אימר דאמרי אנא דיעבד לכתחלה מי אמרי אימר דאמרי אנא פורתא טובא מי אמרי אימר דאמרי אנא חי מזוג מי אמרי 81b. Yom Kippur b itself is called “Shabbat,” as it is written: /b “From evening until evening, b you shall rest on your Shabbat” /b (Leviticus 23:32). The Gemara compares the various opinions. b Granted, Rav Pappa did not say as Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov /b did because b a verse that is written about the matter itself is preferable /b to a verbal analogy. b But what is the reason /b that b Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov did not state /b his opinion b in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa? /b ,The Gemara answers: b He requires this /b verse of “keep your Shabbat” b for that which was taught /b in a i baraita /i : The verse states: b “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth day of the month /b at evening, from evening until evening, you shall rest on your Shabbat” (Leviticus 23:32). One b might /b have thought that b one should start to afflict oneself on the ninth /b of Tishrei; therefore, b the verse states “at evening.” If /b the Torah had stated only b “at evening,” /b one b might /b have thought that the fast starts only b when darkness falls; /b therefore, b the verse states “on the ninth,” /b implying that one begins to fast on the ninth of Tishrei. b How /b can these verses be reconciled? b One begins to fast while it is still daytime; from here /b it is derived b that one /b sanctifies and b extends from /b the b non-sacred /b weekday b to /b the b sacred /b day of Yom Kippur., b I have /b derived b only /b that one must add time b at the beginning /b of Yom Kippur. b From where /b do I derive that one adds time b at the conclusion of /b Yom Kippur? b The verse states: “From evening until evening” /b (Leviticus 23:32), implying that one adds at the end as well, just as he does at the beginning. b And I /b have derived b only /b the mitzva of adding to b Yom Kippur; from where /b is it derived that one must also sanctify and append time before and after b Festivals? The verse states: “You shall rest” /b (Leviticus 23:32), to teach that this rule applies even to Festivals, on which one is commanded to rest. b I have /b derived b only /b that one adds an extension to b Festivals; from where /b do I derive that one must also sanctify and append to b i Shabbatot /i ? The verse states: “Your Shabbat” /b (Leviticus 23:32). b How so? Every place the term: Rest [ i shevut /i ] is stated, /b it teaches b from here that one /b sanctifies and b appends from /b the b non-sacred /b weekday b to /b the b sacred. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And the i tanna /i /b who learns a verbal analogy from the words “that b same /b day,” “that b same /b day,” b what does he do with /b the phrase: b “On the ninth day of the month”? /b The Gemara answers: b He requires it, in accordance with /b that b which Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti taught. As Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti taught: /b It states: b “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth /b day of the month” (Leviticus 23:32). b But does one afflict oneself on the ninth /b of Tishrei? b Doesn’t one /b in fact b afflict oneself on the tenth /b of Tishrei? b Rather, /b the verse comes b to tell you: Anyone who eats and drinks on the ninth /b of Tishrei and then fasts on the tenth, b the verse ascribes him /b credit b as though he fasted on /b both the b ninth and the tenth. /b The verse alludes to this when it states that the fast is on the ninth.,§ It was taught in the mishna: If one b ate food that is /b not b fit for eating, /b he is exempt. b Rava said: /b If b one chews /b raw b pepper on Yom Kippur, he is exempt, /b since this is not considered eating. Similarly, if b one chews ginger [ i zangvila /i ] on Yom Kippur, he is exempt. /b ,The Gemara b raises an objection /b to this. b Rabbi Meir would say /b about the verse: “And when you shall come into the land, and shall have planted all manner of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit of it as forbidden [ i orla /i ]; three years it shall be forbidden to you, it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 19:23). b From the implication of what is stated: “Then you shall count the fruit of it as forbidden,” do I not know that /b the verse is referring to b “trees for food,” /b since it uses the word “fruit”? b Rather, what /b is the meaning when b the verse states “trees for food”? /b It includes b a tree whose wood and fruit taste the same, /b i.e., a tree that is itself eaten in addition to its fruit. One b must say /b that b this /b is referring to b pepper /b that grows on a tree, b to teach you that /b even b pepper is subject to /b the i halakha /i b of i orla /i . And /b this also teaches that b Eretz Yisrael lacks nothing, /b as even pepper can grow there, b as it is stated /b among the listed praises of Eretz Yisrael: b “You will not lack anything in it” /b (Deuteronomy 8:9). In any event, it has been derived that pepper is called food, which contradicts Rava’s statement. ,The Gemara answers: b This /b is b not difficult. This /b statement about edible pepper is referring b to /b fresh pepper, which is b moist; and that /b i halakha /i pertaining to Yom Kippur is referring to b dry /b pepper, which is not considered food., b Ravina said to Mareimar: But didn’t Rav Naḥman say /b that b it is permitted /b to eat b this cooked ginger [ i himalta /i ] that comes from India, /b and there is no concern that gentiles may have cooked it. b And we recite the blessing: Who creates the fruit of the ground, over it. /b Apparently, ginger is edible. The Gemara answers: b This /b is b not difficult: This /b statement is referring b to wet /b ginger, which is considered food; b and that /b earlier statement pertaining to Yom Kippur, which maintained that ginger is not food, is referring b to dry /b ginger., b The Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : If b one ate leaves of reeds /b on Yom Kippur, b he is exempt, /b but if one ate b grapevine shoots he is liable. /b The Gemara clarifies: b What are these grapevine shoots? Rabbi Yitzḥak from /b the city of b Migdal said: All /b shoots b that sprouted between Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur /b and are still very soft are considered food. b And Rav Kahana said: /b All shoots that sprouted up to b thirty days /b before Yom Kippur are considered food. The Gemara comments: b It was taught /b in a i baraita /i b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yitzḥak from Migdal: /b If b one ate leaves of reeds he is exempt, but /b if one ate b grapevine shoots he is liable. What are these grapevine shoots? /b They are b all those that sprouted between Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur. /b ,It was taught in the mishna that if on Yom Kippur one b drank fish brine or /b the briny b liquid /b in which fish are pickled, b he is exempt. /b The Gemara comments: From the language of the mishna it may be inferred that b if one drank vinegar, he is liable. Who is /b the i tanna /i of b the mishna? It is Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b as it was taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi b says: Vinegar revives the spirit /b and is therefore considered a beverage.,The Gemara relates: b Rav Giddel bar Menashe from /b the town of b Birei DeNeresh taught /b in a public lecture that the b i halakha /i is not in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, and vinegar is not considered a beverage. b The /b next b year everyone went out and mixed /b vinegar with water b and drank vinegar /b on Yom Kippur. b Rav Giddel heard /b this b and became angry /b with them for their actions. b He said: Say that I said /b one is not liable for drinking vinegar b only after the fact; /b however, b did I say /b it is permitted to drink it b i ab initio /i ? /b Furthermore: b Say that I said /b my statement with regard to one who drinks b a little, /b but b did I say /b it is permitted to drink b a lot? /b Furthermore: b Say that I said /b my statement in reference to b pure /b vinegar, which is very strong, b but did I say /b anything about b diluted /b vinegar? That is certainly prohibited.
30. Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
64b. חוצבתם ואל מקבת בור נוקרתם וכתיב (ישעיהו נא, ב) הביטו אל אברהם אביכם ואל שרה תחוללכם,אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה שרה אמנו אילונית היתה שנאמר (בראשית יא, ל) ותהי שרי עקרה אין לה ולד אפי' בית ולד אין לה,אמר רב יהודה בריה דרב שמואל בר שילת משמיה דרב לא שנו אלא בדורות הראשונים ששנותיהן מרובות אבל בדורות האחרונים ששנותיהן מועטות שתי שנים ומחצה כנגד שלשה עיבורים רבה אמר רב נחמן שלש שנים כנגד שלש פקידות דאמר מר בר"ה נפקדו שרה רחל וחנה,אמר רבה ליתנהו להני כללי מכדי מתני' מאן תקין רבי והא בימי דוד אימעוט שני דכתיב (תהלים צ, י) ימי שנותינו בהם שבעים שנה,והאי שמא לא זכה להבנות הימנה ודלמא איהי דלא זכיא איהי כיון דלא מפקדא אפריה ורביה לא מיענשה,איני והא אמרו ליה רבנן לר' אבא בר זבדא נסיב איתתא ואוליד בני ואמר להו אי זכאי הוו לי מקמייתא התם דחוי קא מדחי להו לרבנן דר' אבא בר זבדא איעקר מפרקיה דרב הונא,רב גידל איעקר מפרקיה דרב הונא רבי חלבו איעקר מפרקיה דרב הונא רב ששת איעקר מפרקיה דרב הונא רב אחא בר יעקב אחדתיה סוסכינתא תליוה בארזא דבי רב ונפק מיניה כהוצא ירקא אמר רב אחא בר יעקב שיתין סבי הוינא וכולהו איעקור מפרקיה דרב הונא לבר מאנא דקיימי בנפשאי (קהלת ז, יב) החכמה תחיה בעליה:,גירשה מותרת וכו': שני אין שלישי לא,מתניתין מני רבי היא דתניא מלה הראשון ומת שני ומת שלישי לא תמול דברי רבי רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר שלישי תמול רביעי לא תמול,והתניא איפכא הי מינייהו אחריניתא,ת"ש דאמר ר' חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן מעשה בארבע אחיות בצפורי שמלה ראשונה ומת שניה ומת שלישית ומת רביעית באת לפני רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אמר לה אל תמולי,ודלמא אי אתיא שלישית נמי הוה אמר לה א"כ מאי אסהדותיה דר' חייא בר אבא ודלמא הא קמ"ל דאחיות מחזקות,אמר רבא השתא דאמרת אחיות מחזקות לא ישא אדם אשה לא ממשפחת נכפין ולא ממשפחת מצורעים והוא דאתחזק תלתא זימני,מאי הוה עלה כי אתא רב יצחק בר יוסף אמר עובדא הוה קמיה דר' יוחנן בכנישתא דמעון ביוה"כ שחל להיות בשבת ומלה ראשונה ומת שניה ומת שלישית באה לפניו אמר לה לכי ומולי,א"ל אביי חזי דקשרית איסורא וסכנתא,סמך עלה אביי ואזל נסבה לחומה ברתא דאיסי בריה דרב יצחק בריה דרב יהודה דנסבה רחבא דפומבדיתא ושכיב רב יצחק בריה דרבה בר בר חנה ושכיב ונסבה הוא ושכיב,אמר רבא ומי איכא דעביד עובדא בנפשיה כי האי והא איהו דאמר אבין דסמכא יצחק סומקא לאו בר סמכא אבין ישנו בחזרה יצחק סומקא אינו בחזרה ועוד אימר דפליגי לענין מילה בנישואין מי פליגי,אין והתניא ניסת לראשון ומת לשני ומת לשלישי לא תנשא דברי רבי רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר לשלישי תנשא לרביעי לא תנשא,בשלמא גבי מילה איכא משפחה דרפי דמא ואיכא משפחה דקמיט דמא אלא נישואין מ"ט א"ל רב מרדכי לרב אשי הכי אמר אבימי מהגרוניא משמיה דרב הונא מעין גורם ורב אשי אמר מזל גורם,מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו דאירסה ומית אי נמי דנפל מדיקלא ומית,א"ל רב יוסף בריה דרבא לרבא בעי מיניה מרב יוסף הלכה כרבי ואמר לי אין הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל ואמר לי אין אחוכי אחיך בי,א"ל לא סתמי היא ופשיט לך נישואין ומלקיות כרבי וסתות ושור המועד כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל,נישואין הא דאמרן מלקיות דתנן מי שלקה ושנה ב"ד כונסין אותו לכיפה ומאכילין אותו שעורים עד שתהא כריסו נבקעת וסתות דתנן אין האשה 64b. b from where you were hewn, and to the hole of the pit from where you were dug” /b (Isaiah 51:1), b and it is written /b in the next verse: b “Look to Abraham your father and to Sarah who bore you” /b (Isaiah 51:2), which indicates that sexual organs were fashioned for them, signified by the words hewn and dug, over the course of time., b Rav Naḥman said /b that b Rabba bar Avuh said: Our mother Sarah was /b initially a b sexually underdeveloped woman [ i aylonit /i ], as it is stated: “And Sarah was barren; she had no child” /b (Genesis 11:30). The superfluous words: “She had no child,” indicate that b she did not have even a place, /b i.e., a womb, b for a child. /b , b Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, said in the name of Rav: They taught /b that he waits ten years b only /b with regard to the people who lived b in former generations, whose years /b were b numerous, /b i.e., they lived longer. b However, /b with regard to the people who live b in later generations, whose years are few, /b he waits only b two and half years /b before divorcing her, b corresponding to /b the time period of b three pregcies. Rabba said /b in the name of b Rav Naḥman: /b He waits b three years, corresponding to /b the b three remembrances /b of barren women by God, b as the Master said: On Rosh HaShana Sarah, Rachel, and Hannah were remembered, /b i.e., God gave them children. Since God determines on Rosh HaShana whether barren women will conceive that year, one may remain married until three such opportunities have passed.,However, b Rabba /b himself b said: These principles are not /b accepted as i halakha /i . Why not? b Now /b consider, b who established /b the content of the b mishna? Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi. Yet, b in the days of /b King b David, /b many years before the time of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, b the years /b of an average lifespan b were /b already b diminished, as it is written: “The days of our years are seventy years, /b and if with strength eighty years” (Psalms 90:10). Consequently, if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi included in the mishna the statement that one remains married for ten years, that must apply even nowadays.,The Gemara asks about the language of the i baraita /i . b And /b what about b this /b expression: b Perhaps he did not merit to be built from her; perhaps /b it was b she who did not merit /b to build a family. The Gemara answers: b She, since she is not commanded /b to be b fruitful and multiply, is not punished. /b Their worthiness therefore depends on him, not her.,The Gemara challenges the mishna’s statement that if one did not have children after ten years he should marry a different woman. b Is that so? Didn’t the Sages say to Rabbi Abba bar Zavda: Marry a woman and have children, and he said to them: If I had merited, I would /b already b have /b children b from /b my b first /b wife? This indicates that there is no obligation to remarry if one did not have children with his first wife. The Gemara answers: b There, /b Rabbi Abba bar Zavda b was /b merely b putting the Rabbis off /b with an excuse, b as /b the real reason why he would not marry was because b Rabbi Abba bar Zavda became impotent from Rav Huna’s discourse. /b Rav Huna’s students would hold back from relieving themselves until his lengthy sermons were finished, which caused them to become sterile.,The Gemara similarly relates that b Rav Giddel became impotent from Rav Huna’s discourse, Rav Ḥelbo became impotent from Rav Huna’s discourse, /b and b Rav Sheshet became impotent from Rav Huna’s discourse. /b The Gemara relates: b Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov was afflicted by i suskhinta /i , /b a disease caused by holding back from urinating. b They suspended him from the cedar /b column that supported b the study hall, and /b a substance that was as b green /b as a palm b leaf emerged from him, /b and he was healed. b Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: We were sixty elders /b present at the time, b and they all became impotent from Rav Huna’s discourse, aside from me, as I fulfilled with regard to myself /b the verse: b “Wisdom preserves the life of he who has it” /b (Ecclesiastes 7:12). I used the above cure to avoid becoming impotent.,§ It was taught in the mishna that if a man b divorced /b his wife after ten years without children, b she is permitted /b to marry a second man, who may remain married to her for ten years. The Gemara comments: b A second /b husband, b yes, /b but b a third /b one, b no. /b Once she has been married to two men without children for ten years each, it is presumed that she is unable to have children.,The Gemara comments: b Who is /b the i tanna /i of b the mishna? It is Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that a legal presumption [ i ḥazaka /i ] is established after two occurrences. b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : If a woman b circumcised /b her b first /b son b and he died /b as a result of the circumcision, and she circumcised her b second /b son b and he /b also b died, she should not circumcise /b her b third /b son, as the deaths of the first two produce a presumption that this woman’s sons die as a result of circumcision. This is b the statement of Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi. b Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She should circumcise /b her b third /b son, as there is not considered to be a legal presumption that her sons die from circumcision, but b she should not circumcise /b her b fourth /b son if her first three sons died from circumcision.,The Gemara asks: b Isn’t the reverse taught /b in a i baraita /i , that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the woman’s third son must be circumcised and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that he is not circumcised? b Which of them /b was composed b later /b and is therefore presumed to be more reliable?,The Gemara suggests: b Come /b and b hear, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said /b that b Rabbi Yoḥa said: An incident /b occurred b involving four sisters in Tzippori, that /b the b first /b sister b circumcised /b her son b and he died, /b and the b second /b sister circumcised her son b and he died, /b and the b third /b one circumcised her son b and he /b too b died. /b The b fourth /b sister b came before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, /b who b said to her: Do not circumcise /b him. This indicates that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel a presumption is established only after three occurrences.,The Gemara refutes this proof: b Perhaps if /b the b third /b sister had b come /b before him b he would also have said to her /b the same ruling. The Gemara asks: b If so, what is /b the purpose b of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s testimony? /b Why would he have related this incident if it does not teach us anything? The Gemara answers: b Perhaps /b he comes to b teach us that sisters establish a presumption /b in a case like this even though the children who died were not from the same mother., b Rava said: Now that you have said /b that b sisters establish a presumption, a man should not marry a woman from a family of epileptics or from a family of lepers, /b as these diseases might be hereditary. The Gemara adds: b And this /b applies only if it b was established three times, /b i.e., three members of the family are afflicted with the disease.,The Gemara asks: b Which /b halakhic conclusion b was about this /b matter? Is a presumption established after two occurrences or only after three? b When Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came /b from Eretz Yisrael, b he said: An incident occurred before Rabbi Yoḥa in the synagogue of /b the town of b Maon on /b a b Yom Kippur that occurred on Shabbat. /b The b first /b sister had b circumcised /b her son b and he died; /b the b second /b sister circumcised her son b and he /b also b died. /b The b third /b sister b came before him, /b and he b said to her: Go and circumcise /b your son, as a presumption is not established after only two occurrences., b Abaye said to /b Rav Yitzḥak: b See /b to it that your report is accurate, b as you are permitting /b an action that would otherwise constitute b a prohibition and a danger. /b If the third baby should not be circumcised, doing so would be a prohibited labor and would endanger the life of the child.,The Gemara comments: b Abaye relied on this /b report b and went /b and b married Ḥuma, the daughter of Isi, son of Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda. /b Ḥuma b had /b previously b married Raḥava of Pumbedita, and he died, /b and then she married b Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, and he died; and he, /b Abaye, b married her /b nevertheless, without concern that she had been established to be a woman whose husbands die; b and he died /b as well while married to her., b Rava said: Is there /b anyone b who performs an action like this /b and endangers b himself /b by marrying such a woman? b Wasn’t it he, /b Abaye, b who said /b that b Avin is reliable /b but b Yitzḥak the Red, /b i.e., Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef, b is not reliable? /b He proceeds to explain the difference between them: b Avin returns /b to Eretz Yisrael and hears whether the Sages there rescind their previous rulings, whereas b Yitzḥak the Red does not return /b to Eretz Yisrael and never finds out if the Sages there rescind their rulings. b And furthermore, say that they disagree with regard to /b whether a presumption is established by two or by three deaths due to b circumcision, /b but b do /b they necessarily b argue with regard to marriage? /b ,The Gemara responds: b Yes, and it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : If a woman b was married to /b her b first /b husband b and he died, to a second /b one b and he /b also b died, she may not get married to a third /b husband. This is b the statement of Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi. b Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She may get married to a third /b husband, but if he also dies, b she may not get married to a fourth /b husband.,The Gemara asks: b Granted with regard to circumcision /b a presumption of death due to circumcision can be established because b there are families whose blood is thin /b and does not clot well, b and there are families whose blood clots. However, /b in the case of b marriage, what is the reason /b for concern that a subsequent husband will die? b Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: Avimi of Hagron-ya said in the name of Rav Huna as follows: /b Her b spring /b is the b cause. /b In other words, the woman has some sort of condition that causes those who have intercourse with her to die. b And Rav Ashi said /b that her b constellation /b is the b cause /b of her husbands’ deaths.,The Gemara asks: b What is /b the practical difference b between them? /b The Gemara answers: b There is /b a difference b between them /b in a case b where /b a man b betrothed her and died /b before the wedding; b alternatively, /b in a case b where he fell off a palm tree and died. /b If the concern is due to intercourse, then in these cases the husband’s death cannot be attributed to his wife. Conversely, if the concern is due to her bad fortune, the husband’s death can be attributed to his wife even in these cases., b Rav Yosef, son of Rava, said to Rava: I inquired of Rav Yosef /b whether the b i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b and he said to me: Yes. /b I subsequently asked him if the b i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and he said to me: Yes. Was he mocking me /b by issuing contradictory rulings?,Rava b said to him: No, there are unattributed /b i mishnayot /i in accordance with each opinion, b and he resolved for you /b that the i halakha /i is in accordance with each opinion in particular cases. With regard to b marriage and lashings /b the i halakha /i is b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi that two occurrences are sufficient for a presumption. Concerning b set patterns /b of menstrual bleeding b and a forewarned ox, /b the i halakha /i is b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel /b that a presumption is established after three occurrences.,The Gemara identifies the aforementioned i halakhot /i . b Marriage /b is referring to b that which we said /b with regard to a woman whose husbands have died. The case of b lashings /b is b as we learned /b in a mishna ( i Nidda /i 63b): b One who was flogged /b for transgressing a Torah law, b and repeated /b the same transgression and was flogged again, if he then repeats the sin a third time, the b court places him in a /b narrow, b vaulted chamber and they feed him barley until his stomach bursts. /b Once he has sinned and been flogged twice he has established a presumption of wickedness, and when he sins again he is caused to die so that he will not continue to sin. The case of b set patterns /b of menstrual bleeding is b as we learned /b in a mishna ( i Nidda /i 63b): b A woman does not /b
31. Babylonian Talmud, Temurah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
13a. שלש שדות ושתי מענות וכמה מלא מענה מאה אמה כדתניא החורש את הקבר עושה בית הפרס מלא מענה מאה אמה,ואין תרומה אחר תרומה כו' מתניתין מני ר"ע היא דתנן השותפין שתרמו זה אחר זה רבי אליעזר אומר תרומת שניהם תרומה,ר"ע אומר אין תרומת שניהם תרומה וחכמים אומרים אם תרם הראשון כשיעור אין תרומת השני תרומה ואם לא תרם כשיעור תרומת השני תרומה,ואין תמורה עושה תמורה כו' מאי טעמא אמר קרא (ויקרא כז, י) ותמורתו ולא תמורת תמורתו,ואין הולד עושה תמורה דאמר קרא הוא הוא ולא ולד,ר' יהודה אומר הולד עושה תמורה דאמר קרא יהיה לרבות את הולד ורבנן לרבות שוגג כמזיד, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big העופות והמנחות אין עושין תמורה שלא נאמר אלא בהמה הציבור והשותפין אין עושין תמורה שנאמר (ויקרא כז, י) לא יחליפנו ולא ימיר יחיד עושה תמורה ואין הצבור והשותפין עושין תמורה קדשי בדק הבית אין עושין תמורה,אמר ר"ש והרי מעשר בכלל היה ולמה יצא,לומר לך מה מעשר קרבן יחיד יצאו קרבנות צבור ומה מעשר קרבן מזבח יצאו קרבנות בדק הבית, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big ת"ר יכול יהו קדשי בדק הבית עושין תמורה ת"ל (ויקרא כז, ט) קרבן מי שנקראו קרבן יצאו קדשי בדק הבית שלא נקראו קרבן,ולא והתניא אי (ויקרא יז, ד) קרבן שומע אני אפילו קדשי בדק הבית שנקראו קרבן כענין שנאמר (במדבר לא, נ) ונקרב את קרבן ה' וגו',ת"ל (ויקרא יז, ד) ואל פתח אהל מועד לא הביאו כל הבא אל פתח אהל מועד חייבין עליו משום שחוטי חוץ וכל שאינו בא לפתח אהל מועד אין חייבין עליו משום שחוטי חוץ אלמא איקרו קרבן,אמר רבי חנינא לא קשיא הא ר"ש הא רבנן לר"ש איקרי קרבן לרבנן לא איקרי קרבן,ולא והכתיב (במדבר לא, נ) ונקרב את קרבן ה' קרבן ה' איקרי קרבן לה' לא איקרי,ת"ר (ויקרא כז, לג) לא יבקר בין טוב לרע ולא ימירנו למה נאמר והלא כבר נאמר (ויקרא כז, י) לא יחליפנו ולא ימיר אותו טוב ברע וגו',לפי שנאמר לא יחליפנו ולא ימיר אותו משמע קרבן יחיד קרבן צבור וקרבן מזבח וקרבן בדק הבית ת"ל לא יבקר,אמר ר"ש והרי מעשר בכלל היה ולמה יצא לומר לך מה מעשר קרבן יחיד וקרבן מזבח ודבר שבא בחובה ודבר שאינו בשותפות אף כל קרבן יחיד וקרבן מזבח ודבר שבא בחובה 13a. A i beit haperas /i extends over b three fields, /b the field that was plowed and the two adjacent fields in the direction it was plowed. For example, if one plowed the field from north to south, each of the fields adjacent to it on the north and south is also considered a i beit haperas /i . b But /b whereas the plowed field is a i beit haperas /i in its entirety, the two adjacent fields are a i beit haperas /i only to the extent of b two furrows, /b one furrow on each side. b And how much /b is the b full /b length of b a furrow [ i ma’ana /i ]? /b It is b one hundred cubits, as it is taught /b in a mishna ( i Oholot /i 17:1): b One who plows /b a field containing b a grave, /b and who may have strewn the bones throughout the field, b renders /b the field b a i beit haperas /i /b up to b the full /b length of b a furrow, /b which is b one hundred cubits. /b ,§ The mishna teaches: b And there is no i teruma /i after i teruma /i . /b Once one designates produce from his crop as i teruma /i , if he then designates additional produce from that crop as i teruma /i , it is not i teruma /i . The Gemara explains: b Whose /b opinion is expressed in b the mishna? It is /b the opinion of b Rabbi Akiva, as we learned /b in a mishna ( i Terumot /i 3:3): In the case of b joint /b owners of produce b who separated i teruma /i one after the other, Rabbi Eliezer says: The i teruma /i of both of them is i teruma /i , /b as each is considered to have separated from his share of the produce., b Rabbi Akiva says: The i teruma /i of neither of them is i teruma /i . /b Since each separated i teruma /i independently, it is clear that neither accepts the separation of the other, and therefore neither is valid. b And the Rabbis say: If the first one separated i teruma /i of /b the correct b measure, /b i.e., one-fiftieth of the produce, the produce is thereby tithed, and therefore b the i teruma /i of the second is not i teruma /i ; but if /b the first b did not separate i teruma /i of /b the correct b measure, /b and he separated too little, b the i teruma /i of the second is i teruma /i . /b ,§ The mishna teaches: b And a substitute /b animal that was consecrated when it was substituted for a consecrated animal b does not render /b a non-sacred animal exchanged for it b a substitute; /b rather, it remains non-sacred. The Gemara explains: b What is the reason, /b i.e., the source for this i halakha /i in the Torah? b The verse states: /b “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal, then both it b and that for which it is substituted /b shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10). The verse teaches that the i halakha /i of substitution applies only to a consecrated animal and its substitute, b but not the substitute of its substitute. /b ,§ The mishna teaches: b And the offspring /b born of a consecrated animal that was not consecrated itself b does not render /b a non-sacred animal exchanged for it b a substitute. /b The Gemara explains: The reason for this is b that the verse states: /b “Then both b it /b and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10), which teaches that only b it, /b a consecrated animal, b but not /b its b offspring, /b renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute.,§ The mishna teaches that b Rabbi Yehuda says: The offspring renders /b a non-sacred animal exchanged for it b a substitute. /b The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda reasons b that /b when b the verse states: “Shall be /b sacred,” this serves b to include the offspring. /b The Gemara adds: b And /b as for b the Rabbis, /b who hold that one cannot substitute for the offspring of a consecrated animal, they maintain that this phrase serves b to include /b one who substitutes b unwittingly, /b so that the substitution is valid b as /b if he had done so b intentionally. /b , strong MISHNA: /strong b The birds /b sacrificed as offerings, i.e., doves and pigeons, b and the meal offerings do not render /b non-sacred items exchanged for them b substitutes, as only /b the term b “an animal” is stated /b with regard to substitution, in the verse: “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal” (Leviticus 27:10). A consecrated animal belonging to b the community or /b to b partners does not render /b a non-sacred animal exchanged for it b a substitute, as it is stated /b in the same verse: b “He shall neither exchange it nor substitute /b it.” One derives from the singular pronoun in the verse that b an individual renders /b a non-sacred animal b a substitute, but the community and partners do not render /b a non-sacred animal b a substitute. /b Items b consecrated for Temple maintece do not render /b non-sacred items exchanged for them b substitutes. /b , b Rabbi Shimon said: /b The fact that animals belonging to the community or partners do not render animals exchanged for them substitutes is derived as follows: The b animal tithe was /b included b in /b the b category /b of all offerings, b and why was it /b singled b out /b in the verse: “And all the tithe of the herd or the flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred unto the Lord. He shall not inquire whether it is good or bad, neither shall he substitute for it; and if he substitutes it, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:32–33)?,Rabbi Shimon explains: It was singled out to juxtapose substitution to the animal tithe, b to tell you: Just as /b the animal b tithe /b is brought exclusively as b an individual offering, /b so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are individual offerings, b excluding communal offerings /b and the offerings of partners from the i halakha /i of substitution. b And just as /b the animal b tithe /b is b an offering /b sacrificed on the b altar, /b so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are offerings sacrificed on the altar, b excluding /b items b consecrated for Temple maintece /b from the i halakha /i of substitution., strong GEMARA: /strong According to the mishna, items consecrated for Temple maintece do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes. b The Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : One b might /b have thought that items b consecrated for Temple maintece render /b non-sacred items exchanged for them b substitutes. /b Therefore, b the verse states: /b “And if it is an animal of which men bring b an offering /b to the Lord…he shall not alter it, nor substitute it, good for bad” (Leviticus 27:9–10). This teaches that the i halakha /i of substitution applies to b that which is called an offering, excluding /b items b consecrated for Temple maintece, which are not called an offering. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And /b are items consecrated for Temple maintece b not /b called offerings? b But isn’t it taught /b in a i baraita /i : The verse states with regard to sacrificial animals: “Or who slaughters it outside the camp, and has not brought it to the entrance to the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). b If /b the verse had mentioned just the word b “offering,” I /b would b derive /b that the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple applies b even /b to items b consecrated for Temple maintece, as /b they too b are called offerings, as is stated in the matter /b of the spoils of the war against Midian: b “And we have brought the Lord’s offering, /b what every man has gotten, of jewels of gold, armlets, and bracelets, signet rings, earrings, and girdles, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). These were certainly not items consecrated for the altar.,The i baraita /i continues: Therefore b the verse states: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” /b (Leviticus 17:4), to teach that b for any /b item b that /b is fit to b come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, /b i.e., that is fit to be sacrificed, b one is liable for it due to /b the prohibition against b slaughtering offerings outside /b of the Temple courtyard. b And /b by contrast, b for any /b animal b that /b is b not /b fit to b come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for it due to /b the prohibition against b slaughtering offerings outside /b of the Temple courtyard. b Evidently, /b as a verse is necessary to exclude items consecrated for Temple maintece, such items b are /b generally b called an offering, /b contrary to the first i baraita /i cited., b Rabbi Ḥanina said: /b This is b not difficult. This /b second i baraita /i is in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Shimon, /b whereas b that /b first i baraita /i is in accordance with the opinion of b the Rabbis. According to /b the opinion of b Rabbi Shimon, /b items consecrated for Temple maintece b are /b in fact b called an offering, /b and therefore in the mishna he derives that items consecrated for Temple maintece are excluded from the i halakhot /i of substitution from the juxtaposition with the animal tithe, not from word “offering.” b According to /b the opinion of b the Rabbis, /b items consecrated for Temple maintece b are not called an offering, /b and they therefore derive the i halakha /i from the word “offering.”,The Gemara asks: b And /b according to the opinion of the Rabbis, are items consecrated for Temple maintece b not /b called an offering? b But isn’t it written: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering” /b (Numbers 31:50)? The Gemara answers: These items b are called: “The Lord’s offering,” /b but b they are not called: “An offering to the Lord,” /b which is used only with regard to offerings sacrificed upon the altar.,§ The mishna teaches that consecrated animals belonging to the community or to partners are not included in the i halakha /i of substitution. b The Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : The verse states with regard to the animal tithe: b “He shall not inquire whether it is good or bad, neither shall he substitute it; /b and if he substitute it at all, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33). b Why is /b the issue of substitution b stated /b here in connection to the animal tithe? b Isn’t it already stated /b earlier: b “He shall not alter it, nor substitute it, good for bad, /b or bad for good, and if he substitutes an animal for an animal, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10)?, b Since it is stated: “He shall not alter it, nor substitute it,” /b the verse apparently b indicates /b that all types of offering are included, whether b an individual offering /b or b a communal offering, and /b whether it is b an offering /b sacrificed on the b altar or an offering consecrated for Temple maintece. /b Therefore, b the verse states /b with regard to the animal tithe: b “He shall not inquire.” /b , b Rabbi Shimon said /b in explanation: The animal b tithe was /b included b in /b the b category /b of all offerings, b and why was it /b singled b out? /b It is b to tell you: Just as /b the animal b tithe /b is b an individual offering, and an offering /b sacrificed on the b altar, and /b it is b an item that comes /b only b as an obligation, /b not as a gift offering, b and /b it is b an item that is not /b brought b in partnership, /b but only by an individual, b so too, all /b offerings that render their substitutes sacred must be b an individual offering, and an offering /b sacrificed on the b altar, and /b it must be b an item that comes /b only b as an obligation, /b
32. Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
54a. מהו דתימא אפילו כרבנן ולאפוקי מדרבי יוחנן דאמר שמע תשע תקיעות בתשע שעות ביום יצא קמ"ל,ואימא הכי נמי אם כן מאי ולא כלום:,ע"ש שבתוך החג כו': ואילו למעלה עשירית לא קתני מתניתין מני רבי אליעזר בן יעקב היא דתניא שלש למעלה עשירית ר' אליעזר בן יעקב אומר שלש על גבי המזבח,האומר למעלה עשירית אינו אומר ע"ג המזבח והאומר ע"ג המזבח אינו אומר למעלה עשירית,מ"ט דר' אליעזר בן יעקב כיון דתקע לפתיחת שערים למעלה עשירית למה לי דתקע האי לאו שער הוא הלכך ע"ג המזבח עדיף ורבנן סברי כיון דתקע למילוי המים ע"ג המזבח למה לי הלכך למעלה העשירית עדיף,כי אתא ר' אחא בר חנינא מדרומא אייתי מתניתא בידיה (במדבר י, ח) ובני אהרן הכהנים יתקעו בחצוצרות שאין ת"ל יתקעו שכבר נאמר (במדבר י, י) ותקעתם בחצוצרות על עולותיכם ועל זבחי שלמיכם ומה ת"ל יתקעו הכל לפי המוספין תוקעין הוא תני לה והוא אמר לה לומר שתוקעין על כל מוסף ומוסף,תנן ע"ש שבתוך החג היו שם מ"ח ואם איתא ליתני שבת שבתוך החג משכחת לה חמשין וחד א"ר זירא לפי שאין תוקעין לפתיחת שערים בשבת,אמר רבא מאן הא דלא חש לקימחא חדא דבכל יום תנן ועוד אי נמי כהדדי נינהו ליתני שבת שבתוך החג היו שם ארבעים ושמונה דשמעת מינה תרתי שמעת מינה דרבי אליעזר בן יעקב ושמעת מינה דר' אחא בר חנינא,אלא אמר רבא לפי שאין תוקעין למילוי מים בשבת דבצרי טובא וליתני נמי ר"ה שחל להיות בשבת דהא איכא תלתא מוספין מוסף דר"ה מוסף דר"ח מוסף דשבת,ע"ש שבתוך החג אצטריך ליה לאשמעינן כדרבי אליעזר בן יעקב אטו מי קאמר ליתני הא ולא ליתני הא ליתני הא וליתני הא תנא ושייר מאי שייר דהאי שייר,שייר ערב הפסח 54a. The Gemara answers: It is not obvious that Rav Kahana’s statement was stated in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. b Lest you say /b that Rav Kahana’s statement is b even in accordance with /b the opinion of b the Rabbis, /b and that he is coming b to exclude /b the opinion b of Rabbi Yoḥa who said: /b If b one heard nine blasts in nine /b different b hours on the day /b of Rosh HaShana, despite the considerable gap between them, b he fulfilled his obligation. /b Therefore, the Gemara b teaches us /b that Rav Kahana holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda alone and he does not allow even a brief pause between the sounds of the i shofar /i .,The Gemara asks: b And say it is indeed so /b that Rav Kahana holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and he merely comes to exclude the view of Rabbi Yoḥa. The Gemara answers: b If so, what is /b the meaning of the phrase: b At all, /b in Rav Kahana’s statement: There is no pause between a i tekia /i and a i terua /i at all? This indicates that Rav Kahana does not allow even a slight pause between blasts, and that could be only in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.,§ The mishna enumerates the number of blasts sounded on b Shabbat eve during the festival /b of i Sukkot /i . Among those blasts were three sounded when pouring the water libation upon the altar. The Gemara infers: b However, /b the mishna b is not teaching /b that the trumpet blasts were sounded when the person carrying the water reached b the tenth stair. /b According to b whose /b opinion is the b mishna? It is /b according to the opinion of b Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Three /b blasts were sounded when arriving b at the tenth stair. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Three /b blasts were sounded when pouring the water libation b upon the altar. /b ,The Gemara explains: b The one who says /b that the trumpets were sounded upon arriving b at the tenth stair does not say /b that they sounded the trumpets when pouring the water libation b upon the altar; and the one who says /b that they sounded the trumpets when pouring the water libation b upon the altar does not say /b that the trumpets were sounded upon arriving b at the tenth stair. /b ,The Gemara asks: b What is the rationale /b for the opinion b of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? /b The Gemara answers: b Since he sounded /b the trumpet b for the opening of the gates, for what do I /b need b to sound /b it again when arriving b at the tenth stair? That is not a gate. Therefore, /b it is b preferable /b to sound the trumpets when pouring the water libation b upon the altar. And the Rabbis hold that since he sounded /b the trumpets b for the filling /b of the vessel with b the water, why do I /b need an additional trumpet blast when pouring the water libation b upon the altar? Therefore, it is preferable /b to sound the trumpets when arriving b at the tenth stair. /b ,§ b When Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina came from the south /b of Eretz Yisrael, from Judea, b he brought a i baraita /i with him /b that he received from the Sages there. It is written: b “And the children of Aaron, the priests, will sound the trumpets” /b (Numbers 10:8). There is b no /b need for b the verse to state: “Shall sound,” as it is already stated: “And you shall sound the trumpets for your burnt-offerings and your peace-offerings” /b (Numbers 10:10). b And what /b then is the meaning when b the verse states: “Shall sound”? /b It appears to be teaching a new i halakha /i ; it is b all according to the additional offerings /b that b one sounds /b trumpet blasts. The Gemara notes: Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina b teaches /b the i baraita /i , b and he said its /b explanation: The verse comes b to say that one sounds /b trumpet blasts b for each and every additional offering /b in and of itself.,The Gemara asks: b We learned /b in the mishna: On b Shabbat eve during the festival /b of i Sukkot /i b there were forty-eight /b blasts, and that was the highest number of blasts sounded on any day in the Temple. b And if it is so, /b Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says: b Let /b the mishna b teach /b the case of b Shabbat during the Festival, /b when b you find /b that there are b fifty-one /b blasts, including additional blasts for the additional offerings of Shabbat. b Rabbi Zeira said: /b Although based on the i baraita /i taught by Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina there would indeed be additional blasts for the additional offerings of Shabbat, they would total forty-eight blasts, b because one does not sound /b the three blasts b for the opening of the gates on Shabbat; /b those blasts were merely a signal., b Rava said: Who is this who is not concerned about the flour /b that his mill is producing, i.e., who is making unconsidered statements? b First, /b the mishna contradicts the explanation of Rabbi Zeira, as, with regard to the order of the blasts, including those for the opening of the gates, b we learned /b that this was the practice b each day, /b including Shabbat. b And furthermore, even if they are equal to each other, /b i.e., the same number of blasts were sounded on Shabbat during the Festival and on Friday during the Festival, b let /b the mishna b teach: /b On b Shabbat during the Festival there are forty-eight /b blasts. b You would learn two /b matters b from /b that case: b You would learn from it that /b the mishna is in accordance with the opinion b of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov /b that the trumpets are not sounded at the tenth step but when pouring the water libation upon the altar. b And you would learn from it /b that i halakha /i b of Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, /b that the trumpet is sounded for each and every additional offering., b Rather, Rava said: /b The reason that the number of offerings on Shabbat during the Festival does not exceed forty-eight is b because one does not sound /b the trumpet b for filling /b the vessels with b water on Shabbat, /b as the mishna stated that they did not draw water from the Siloam pool on Shabbat. Therefore, the blasts sounded on Shabbat during the Festival b were considerably fewer /b than those sounded on Friday. The Gemara asks: b And let /b the mishna b also teach /b the case of b Rosh HaShana that occurs on Shabbat, as /b in that case b there are three additional offerings: /b The b additional offering of Rosh HaShana, /b the b additional offering of the New Moon, /b and the b additional offering of Shabbat. /b The total would be forty-eight blasts. The fact that the mishna did not cite this case indicates that it is contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina.,The Gemara rejects that conclusion. The reason that the mishna did not cite the case of Rosh HaShana is that the i tanna /i held that the case of b Shabbat eve during the Festival is necessary /b in order b to teach /b that the i halakha /i is b in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov /b that one does not sound the trumpet at the tenth stair. The Gemara asks: b Is anyone saying: Let /b the i tanna /i b teach this /b case b and let him not teach that /b case? b Let him teach this /b case b and let him teach that /b case, as there is a novel element in each. The Gemara answers: The i tanna /i did not list all the possible cases; b he taught /b one case b and omitted /b others. The Gemara asks: b What /b other case b did he omit, that he omitted /b this case of Rosh HaShana as well? While the i tanna /i does not typically list all relevant cases, if there are only two that are relevant, he typically cites them in the mishna.,The Gemara answers: b He omitted /b the case of b Passover eve. /b The Paschal lamb was sacrificed in three shifts. When the Paschal lamb was sacrificed they would recite i hallel /i , and the recitation of i hallel /i was accompanied by three blasts. Due to the great number of Paschal lambs sacrificed, they would often recite i hallel /i three times during each shift. Consequently, there could be as many as twenty-seven additional blasts sounded on that day. Added to the twenty-one blasts sounded each day, the total is forty-eight blasts.
33. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Samely (2002), Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah, 165
134b. big strongמתני׳ /strong /big מרחיצין את הקטן בין לפני המילה ובין לאחר המילה ומזלפין עליו ביד אבל לא בכלי ר"א בן עזריה אומר מרחיצין את הקטן ביום השלישי שחל להיות בשבת שנאמר (בראשית לד, כה) ויהי ביום השלישי בהיותם כואבים,ספק ואנדרוגינוס אין מחללין עליו את השבת ורבי יהודה מתיר באנדרוגינוס:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big והא אמרת רישא מרחיצין,רב יהודה ורבה בר אבוה דאמרי תרוייהו כיצד תני מרחיצין את הקטן בין לפני מילה בין לאחר מילה כיצד מזלפין עליו ביד אבל לא בכלי,אמר רבא והא מרחיצין קתני אלא אמר רבא הכי קתני מרחיצין את הקטן בין מלפני מילה בין לאחר המילה ביום הראשון כדרכו וביום השלישי שחל להיות בשבת מזלפין עליו ביד אבל לא בכלי ר"א בן עזריה אומר מרחיצין את הקטן ביום השלישי שחל להיות בשבת שנאמר ויהי ביום השלישי בהיותם כואבים,תניא כוותיה דרבא מרחיצין הקטן בין לפני מילה בין לאחר מילה ביום ראשון כדרכו וביום השלישי שחל להיות בשבת מזלפין עליו ביד ר"א בן עזריה אומר מרחיצין את הקטן ביום השלישי שחל להיות בשבת ואע"פ שאין ראיה לדבר זכר לדבר שנאמר ויהי ביום השלישי בהיותם כואבים,וכשהן מזלפין אין מזלפין לא בכוס ולא בקערה ולא בכלי אלא ביד אתאן לתנא קמא,מאי אע"פ שאין ראיה לדבר זכר לדבר משום דגדול לא סליק בישרא הייא קטן סליק ביה בישרא הייא,ההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבא אורי ליה כשמעתיה איחלש רבא אמר אנא בהדי תרגימנא דסבי למה לי,אמרו ליה רבנן לרבא והתניא כוותיה דמר אמר להו מתניתין כוותייהו דיקא,ממאי מדקאמר רבי אלעזר בן עזריה אומר מרחיצין את הקטן ביום השלישי שחל להיות בשבת אי אמרת בשלמא תנא קמא מזלפין קאמר היינו דקאמר ליה ר"א בן עזריה מרחיצין אלא אי אמרת תנא קמא מרחיצין ביום הראשון קאמר ומזלפין ביום השלישי האי רבי אלעזר בן עזריה אומר מרחיצין אף מרחיצין מיבעי ליה,כי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי אלעזר הלכה כר"א בן עזריה,הוו בה במערבא הרחצת כל גופו או הרחצת מילה,אמר להו ההוא מרבנן ורבי יעקב שמיה מסתברא הרחצת כל גופו דאי ס"ד הרחצת מילה מי גרע מחמין על גבי מכה דאמר רב אין מונעין חמין ושמן מעל גבי מכה בשבת,מתקיף לה רב יוסף ולא שני לך בין חמין שהוחמו בשבת לחמין שהוחמו מע"ש,מתקיף לה רב דימי וממאי דהכא בחמין שהוחמו בשבת פליגי דילמא בחמין שהוחמו בע"ש פליגי אמר אביי אנא בעאי דאישני ליה וקדם ושני ליה רב יוסף מפני שסכנה הוא לו,איתמר נמי כי אתא רבין א"ר אבהו א"ר אלעזר ואמרי לה א"ר אבהו א"ר יוחנן הלכה כר"א בן עזריה בין בחמין שהוחמו בשבת בין בחמין שהוחמו מע"ש בין הרחצת כל גופו בין הרחצת מילה מפני שסכנה היא לו:,גופא אמר רב אין מונעין חמין ושמן מעל גבי מכה בשבת ושמואל אמר נותן חוץ למכה ושותת ויורד למכה,מיתיבי אין נותנין שמן וחמין על גבי מוך ליתן על גבי מכה בשבת התם משום סחיטה,תא שמע אין נותנין חמין ושמן על גבי מוך שעל גבי מכה בשבת התם נמי משום סחיטה,תניא כוותיה דשמואל אין נותנין חמין ושמן על גבי מכה בשבת אבל נותנין חוץ למכה ושותת ויורד למכה,תנו רבנן נותנין על גבי המכה מוך יבש וספוג יבש אבל לא גמי יבש ולא כתיתין יבשין קשיא כתיתין אכתיתין לא קשיא הא בחדתי הא בעתיקי אמר אביי שמע מינה הני כתיתין מסו:,ספק ואנדרוגינוס כו': תנו רבנן (ויקרא יב, ג) ערלתו ערלתו ודאי דוחה את השבת 134b. strong MISHNA: /strong b One may wash the baby /b on Shabbat, b both before the circumcision and after the circumcision. And one may sprinkle /b hot water b on him by hand but not with a vessel, /b in order to depart from the usual manner in which this is done. b Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may wash the baby on the third day /b following his circumcision, even if b that /b third day b occurs on Shabbat. /b On the third day following circumcision, the baby is considered to be in danger, b as it is stated /b with regard to the men of Shekhem, who were circumcised: b “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain” /b (Genesis 34:25). This teaches us that on the third day the pain of circumcision poses a danger.,If there is b uncertainty /b whether or not to circumcise a baby, b and /b likewise in the case of b a hermaphrodite [ i androginos /i ] /b baby, who possesses both male and female genitals, b one does not desecrate Shabbat /b to perform the circumcision, since it is not certain that the circumcision is required. b And Rabbi Yehuda permits /b doing so b for a hermaphrodite /b baby., strong GEMARA: /strong The Gemara questions the mishna’s statement that one may sprinkle hot water on the baby only by hand: b Didn’t you say /b in the b first clause /b of the mishna that b one may wash /b him? If it is permissible to wash the baby, it is certainly permitted to sprinkle water on him with a vessel.,It was b Rav Yehuda and Rabba bar Avuh who both said /b that this mishna b is taught /b employing the style known as: b How. /b In this style, the latter clause clarifies the former. It should be understood as follows: b One may wash the baby both before circumcision and after circumcision. How /b may one wash him? b One sprinkles /b water b on him by hand, but not with a vessel. /b , b Rava said: Doesn’t it teach /b the phrase b one may wash, /b and washing is not sprinkling. b Rather, Rava said that this is /b what the mishna b is teaching: One may wash the baby, both before circumcision and after circumcision. On the first day, /b one may wash him b in his /b usual b manner. However, on the third day /b following his circumcision, if b that /b third day b occurs on Shabbat, one may sprinkle /b water b on him /b only b by hand, but not with a vessel, /b and one may certainly not wash him. b Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may /b even b wash the baby on the third day /b following his circumcision, if b that /b third day b occurs on Shabbat, /b because the baby is considered to be in a state of danger, as b it is stated: “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain.” /b ,A i baraita /i b was taught in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rava: One may wash the baby, both before circumcision /b and b after circumcision. On the first day, /b the baby is washed b in its /b usual b manner; and on the third day that occurs on Shabbat, one sprinkles /b water b on him by hand but not with a vessel, /b and one may not wash him. b Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may /b even b wash the baby on the third day that occurs on Shabbat. And although there is no /b absolute b proof for /b this b matter, /b there is b an allusion to /b this b matter, /b as b it is stated: “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain.” /b ,The i baraita /i continues: b And when one sprinkles /b water, b he may not sprinkle /b it b with a cup or with a bowl or with /b any other b vessel; rather, /b he does so b by hand. /b The Gemara comments: b We have arrived at /b the opinion of the b first i tanna /i , /b as this clarification of how the sprinkling was performed is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rather, it is an elaboration of the statement of the first i tanna /i .,The Gemara comments: b What /b is the meaning of the i baraita’s /i statement: b And although there is no /b absolute b proof for /b this b matter, /b there is b an allusion to /b this b matter? /b Why does the i baraita /i refer to it as a mere allusion when it appears to offer absolute proof that the pain of circumcision is significant on the third day? The Gemara answers: Indeed, it is not a complete proof, b because an adult’s flesh does not heal immediately, /b but b a child’s flesh heals immediately. /b Perhaps a baby is not considered to be in danger on the third day.,The Gemara relates: b A certain /b person b came before Rava /b to ask a question with regard to washing a baby after circumcision. b Rava ruled in accordance with its halakhic /b ruling, that everyone agrees that it is permitted to wash the baby on the first day. Afterward, b Rava became ill. /b He b said: Why /b did b I /b involve myself b in the opinions of the Elders? /b The Sages of the previous generation, Rav Yehuda and Rabba bar Avuh, articulated the i halakha /i in a different, more stringent manner. Rava felt that his illness was divine punishment for taking their opinions lightly., b The Sages said to Rava: Wasn’t it taught /b in the i baraita /i b in accordance with the /b opinion of the b Master, /b so why are you concerned with regard to your ruling, which is correct? Rava b said to them: The /b language of the b mishna is precise according to their /b opinion., b From where /b can this be concluded? b From /b the fact b that it is stated: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may wash the baby on the third day that occurs on Shabbat. Granted, if you say /b that the b first i tanna /i is saying /b only that b one may sprinkle, /b but prohibited washing the baby even on the first day, b that /b explains b what Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said to him /b in response: b One may wash. However, if you say /b that the b first i tanna /i is saying one may wash on the first day and one may sprinkle on the third day, this /b statement: b Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says /b that b one may wash, /b is imprecise. Rather, b he should have /b said that b one may even wash /b on the third day. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya is not disputing whether it is ever permitted to wash the baby, as the first i tanna /i also agrees that it is permitted on the first day; the dispute is whether or not that leniency extends to the third day as well. Since a precise reading of the mishna supports the opinion of Rav Yehuda and Rabba bar Avuh, the i baraita /i supporting Rava’s opinion is not sufficiently authoritative to supplant that understanding., b When Rav Dimi came /b from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that b Rabbi Elazar said: The i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. /b , b They discussed the /b following question b in the West, /b in Eretz Yisrael: Is this referring to b washing the entire body /b of the baby, b or /b to b washing /b the place of b the circumcision? /b , b One of the Sages, named Rabbi Ya’akov, said to them: It /b stands to b reason /b that it is referring to b washing his entire body, as if it should enter your mind /b that the dispute is with regard to b washing /b the place of b the circumcision, is this /b washing any b worse than /b placing b hot water on a wound? Rav said: One does not prevent /b placing b hot water and oil on a wound on Shabbat. /b Therefore, it should certainly be permissible to wash the place of the circumcision., b Rav Yosef strongly objects to /b this proof: b And is there no difference for you between hot water heated on Shabbat and hot water heated on Shabbat eve? /b Placing hot water heated on Shabbat eve on a wound violates only the rabbinic decree prohibiting healing; whereas heating hot water on Shabbat violates a Torah prohibition., b Rav Dimi strongly objects to /b Rav Yosef’s point: b And from where /b do you know b that here /b it is b with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat /b that b they disagree? Perhaps /b it is b with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat eve /b that b they disagree. Abaye said: I wanted to answer him, but Rav Yosef answered him first: /b The dispute is certainly with regard to heating water on Shabbat, b because /b failure to do so poses b a danger for /b the baby., b It was also stated /b that b when Ravin came /b to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael, he said that b Rabbi Abbahu said /b that b Rabbi Elazar said, and others say /b that b Rabbi Abbahu said /b that b Rabbi Yoḥa said: The i halakha /i is in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, both with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat and with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat eve; both /b with regard to b washing the entire body and /b with regard to b washing /b the place of the b circumcision /b alone, b because /b failure to do so poses b a danger for /b the baby.,Rav’s statement with regard to the treatment of a wound on Shabbat was mentioned in passing. The Gemara proceeds to discuss the b matter itself. Rav said: One does not prevent /b placing b hot water and oil on a wound on Shabbat. And Shmuel said: /b It is prohibited to place hot water or oil directly onto the wound, because it appears to be medical treatment. Rather, b one places /b the hot water or the oil b outside the wound, /b above it, b and it flows and descends to the wound /b itself.,The Gemara b raises an objection /b from that which was taught in a i baraita /i : b One may not place oil or hot water on soft material to place /b it b on a wound on Shabbat. /b This supports the opinion of Shmuel, who prohibits performing actions that appear to be medical treatment. However, that ruling contradicts the opinion of Rav. The Gemara answers: b There, /b the i baraita /i prohibited placing oil or hot water on a rag, not because it appears to be medical treatment; b rather, /b it is prohibited b due to /b concern that one might perform the prohibited labor of b squeezing. /b ,The Gemara cites an additional proof. b Come /b and b hear /b that which was taught in a similar i baraita /i : b One may not place oil or hot water on soft material that is on a wound on Shabbat. /b This i baraita /i supports the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara answers: b There too, /b it is prohibited b due to /b concern for b squeezing. /b ,A i baraita /i b was taught /b explicitly b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Shmuel: One may not place oil or hot water on a wound on Shabbat; however, one may place it outside the wound so it flows and descends to the wound. /b , b The Sages taught /b another i baraita /i : b One may place a dry compress and a dry sponge on a wound, but not a dry reed and not dry rags. /b The Gemara comments: This is b difficult, /b as the first statement with regard to b rags, /b i.e., a dry compress which is a type of rag, contradicts the second statement with regard to b rags, /b as the i baraita /i first permitted placing rags on a wound and then prohibited doing so. The Gemara answers: This is b not difficult. This /b statement, which prohibits placing rags on a wound, is referring b to new /b rags, which heal the wound; b that /b statement, which permits placing rags on a wound, is referring b to old /b rags, which are not effective in healing. b Abaye said: Conclude from this /b that b these rags heal, /b which is useful information with regard to the treatment of wounds.,We learned in the mishna: If there is b uncertainty /b whether or not to circumcise a baby, b and /b likewise in the case of b a hermaphrodite /b baby, one does not desecrate Shabbat to perform the circumcision of b a hermaphrodite, /b even on the eighth day following the birth. b The Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : The verse states: “And on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3), and they interpreted the verse: b “His foreskin” /b indicates that only the circumcision of b his /b halakhically b certain foreskin overrides Shabbat, /b
34. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
67a. סימנא בעלמא:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big המסית זה הדיוט והמסית את ההדיוט אמר יש יראה במקום פלוני כך אוכלת כך שותה כך מטיבה כך מריעה,כל חייבי מיתות שבתורה אין מכמינין עליהם חוץ מזו,אמר לשנים הן עדיו ומביאין אותו לב"ד וסוקלין אותו אמר לאחד הוא אומר יש לי חבירים רוצים בכך,אם היה ערום ואינו יכול לדבר בפניהם מכמינין לו עדים אחורי הגדר והוא אומר לו אמור מה שאמרת ביחוד והלה אומר לו והוא אומר לו היאך נניח את אלהינו שבשמים ונלך ונעבוד עצים ואבנים אם חוזר בו הרי זה מוטב ואם אמר כך היא חובתנו כך יפה לנו העומדין מאחורי הגדר מביאין אותו לבית דין וסוקלין אותו,האומר אעבוד אלך ואעבוד נלך ונעבוד אזבח אלך ואזבח נלך ונזבח אקטיר אלך ואקטיר נלך ונקטיר אנסך אלך ואנסך נלך וננסך אשתחוה אלך ואשתחוה נלך ונשתחוה:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big המסית זה הדיוט טעמא דהדיוט הא נביא בחנק והמסית את ההדיוט טעמא דיחיד הא רבים בחנק,מתני׳ מני ר"ש היא דתניא נביא שהדיח בסקילה ר' שמעון אומר בחנק מדיחי עיר הנדחת בסקילה ר"ש אומר בחנק,אימא סיפא המדיח זה האומר נלך ונעבוד עבודת כוכבים ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב מדיחי עיר הנדחת שנו אתאן לרבנן רישא ר"ש וסיפא רבנן,רבינא אמר כולה רבנן היא ולא זו אף זו קתני,רב פפא אמר כי קתני מסית זה הדיוט להכמנה,דתניא ושאר כל חייבי מיתות שבתורה אין מכמינין עליהן חוץ מזו,כיצד עושין לו מדליקין לו את הנר בבית הפנימי ומושיבין לו עדים בבית החיצון כדי שיהו הן רואין אותו ושומעין את קולו והוא אינו רואה אותן והלה אומר לו אמור מה שאמרת לי ביחוד והוא אומר לו והלה אומר לו היאך נניח את אלהינו שבשמים ונעבוד עבודת כוכבים אם חוזר בו מוטב ואם אמר כך היא חובתנו וכך יפה לנו העדים ששומעין מבחוץ מביאין אותו לבית דין וסוקלין אותו:,[הוספה מחסרונות הש"ס: וכן עשו לבן סטדא בלוד ותלאוהו בערב הפסח,בן סטדא בן פנדירא הוא אמר רב חסדא בעל — סטדא בועל — פנדירא בעל פפוס בן יהודה הוא אלא אֵימא אמו סטדא אמו מרים מגדלא נשיא הואי כדאמרי בפומדיתא סטת דא מבעלה:], big strongמתני׳ /strong /big המדיח זה האומר נלך ונעבוד עבודת כוכבים,המכשף העושה מעשה חייב ולא האוחז את העינים ר"ע אומר משום ר' יהושע שנים לוקטין קשואין אחד לוקט פטור ואחד לוקט חייב העושה מעשה חייב האוחז את העינים פטור:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מדיחי עיר הנדחת שנו כאן:,המכשף זה העושה מעשה וכו': תנו רבנן מכשפה אחד האיש ואחד האשה א"כ מה ת"ל מכשפה מפני שרוב נשים מצויות בכשפים,מיתתן במה רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר נאמר כאן (שמות כב, יז) מכשפה לא תחיה ונאמר להלן (דברים כ, טז) לא תחיה כל נשמה מה להלן בסייף אף כאן בסייף,ר' עקיבא אומר נאמר כאן מכשפה לא תחיה ונאמר להלן (שמות יט, יג) אם בהמה אם איש לא יחיה מה להלן בסקילה אף כאן בסקילה,אמר לו ר' יוסי אני דנתי לא תחיה מלא תחיה ואתה דנת לא תחיה מלא יחיה,אמר לו רבי עקיבא אני דנתי ישראל מישראל שריבה בהן הכתוב מיתות הרבה ואתה דנת ישראל מעובדי כוכבים שלא ריבה בהן הכתוב אלא 67a. It is b merely a mnemonic. /b The verse is not relevant to this i halakha /i , and it is cited merely as a sign indicating that just as the i halakha /i of a betrothed young woman pertains to her first act of sexual intercourse, so too, the i halakha /i of the daughter of a priest who committed adultery pertains to a case where it is her first disqualification from the priesthood., strong MISHNA: /strong With regard to the case of b an inciter, /b listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, b this is an ordinary person, /b not a prophet. b And /b it is referring to b one who incites an ordinary person /b and not a multitude of people. What does the inciter do? b He says: There is an idol in such and such a place, /b which b eats like this, drinks like this, does good /b for its worshippers b like this, /b and b harms /b those who do not worship it b like this. /b ,The mishna states a principle with regard to the i halakha /i of an inciter: With regard to b all of those /b mentioned b in the Torah /b who b are liable to /b receive b the death /b penalty, if there are no witnesses to their transgressions, the court b does not hide /b witnesses in order b to /b ensnare and punish b them, except for this /b case of an inciter.,The mishna elaborates: If the inciter b said /b his words of incitement b to two /b men, b they are his witnesses, and /b he does not need to be warned before the transgression; b they bring him to court and stone him. /b If b he said /b his words of incitement b to one /b man alone, that man’s testimony would not be sufficient to have the inciter executed. Therefore b he says /b to the inciter: b I have friends who are interested in this; /b tell them too. This way there will be more witnesses.,The mishna continues: b If /b the inciter b is cunning, and /b he knows that b he cannot speak in front of /b two men, the court b hides witnesses for him behind the fence /b so that he will not see them, b and /b the man whom the inciter had previously tried to incite b says to him: Say what you said /b to me when we were b in seclusion. And the other /b person, the inciter, b says to him /b again that he should worship the idol. b And he says to /b the inciter: b How can we forsake our God in Heaven and go and worship wood and stones? If /b the inciter b retracts /b his suggestion, b that is good. But if he says: This /b idol worship b is our duty; this /b is what b suits us, /b then b those standing behind the fence bring him to court and have him stoned. /b ,The i halakha /i of an inciter includes b one who says: I shall worship /b idols, or one of the following statements: b I shall go and worship /b idols, or: b let us go and worship /b idols, or: b I shall sacrifice /b an idolatrous offering, or: b I shall go and sacrifice /b an idolatrous offering, or: b Let us go and sacrifice /b an idolatrous offering, or: b I shall burn /b incense as an idolatrous offering, or: b I shall go and burn /b incense, or: b Let us go and burn /b incense, or: b I shall pour /b an idolatrous libation, or: b I shall go and pour /b a libation, or: b Let us go and pour /b a libation, or: b I shall bow /b to an idol, or: b I shall go and bow, /b or: b Let us go and bow. /b , strong GEMARA: /strong The mishna teaches: With regard to the case of b an inciter, this is an ordinary person. /b The Gemara infers: b The reason /b he is executed by stoning is b that he is an ordinary person, but /b if he is b a prophet /b he is executed b by strangulation, /b not by stoning. The mishna states further: b And /b it is referring to b one who incites an ordinary person. /b The Gemara infers: b The reason /b he is executed by stoning is b that /b he incited b an individual, but /b if he subverted b a multitude /b of people, he is executed b by strangulation. /b ,Consequently, b whose /b opinion is expressed in b the mishna? It is /b the opinion of b Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b A prophet who subverted /b others to participate in idol worship is executed b by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: /b He is executed b by strangulation. /b Likewise, b the subverters of an idolatrous city /b are executed b by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: By strangulation. /b ,The Gemara challenges: b Say the last clause /b of the mishna, i.e., say the following mishna: With regard to the case of b the subverter /b listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, b this is one who says: Let us go and worship idols. And Rav Yehuda says /b that b Rav says: /b In this mishna the Sages b taught /b the case of b the subverters of an idolatrous city. /b Here b we arrive at /b the opinion of b the Rabbis, /b who hold that those who incite a multitude of people are also executed by stoning. Is it possible that b the first clause /b of the mishna expresses the opinion of b Rabbi Shimon, and the last clause /b expresses that of b the Rabbis? /b , b Ravina says: The entire /b mishna b is /b in accordance with the opinion of b the Rabbis, and /b the i tanna /i b teaches /b the mishna employing the style of: b Not /b only b this /b but b also that. /b In other words, the mishna should be explained as follows: Not only is one who incites an individual executed by stoning, but even one who subverts an entire city is executed by stoning., b Rav Pappa says: When /b the mishna b teaches /b with regard to one who b incites /b that b this is /b referring to b an ordinary person, /b it is not indicating that a prophet is not included in this i halakha /i . Rather, it is referring b to /b the b hiding /b of witnesses behind a fence in order to ensnare the inciter, as his life is treated with contempt and derision, as though he were an ordinary person, i.e., a simpleton., b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b And /b with regard to b all the rest of those liable to /b receive the b death /b penalty b by Torah /b law, the court b does not hide /b witnesses in order b to /b ensnare b them /b and punish them b except for this /b case of an inciter., b How /b does the court b do /b this b to him? /b The agents of the court b light a candle for him in an inner room, and /b they b place witnesses for him in an outer room /b in the dark, b so that they can see him and hear his voice but he cannot see them. And the other /b person, whom the inciter had previously tried to incite, b says to him: Say what you said to me /b when we were b in seclusion. And he says to him /b again that he should worship the idol. b And the other /b person b says to him: How can we forsake our God in Heaven and worship idols? If /b the inciter b retracts /b his suggestion, b that is good. But if he says: This /b idol worship b is our duty, and this /b is what b suits us, the witnesses, who are listening from outside, bring him to court, and /b they b have him stoned. /b , b And /b the court b did the same to /b an inciter named b ben Setada, from /b the city of b Lod, and they hanged him on Passover eve. /b ,The Gemara asks: Why did they call him b ben Setada, /b when b he was the son of Pandeira? Rav Ḥisda says: /b Perhaps his mother’s b husband, /b who acted as his father, was named b Setada, /b but his mother’s b paramour, /b who fathered this i mamzer /i , was named b Pandeira. /b The Gemara challenges: But his mother’s b husband was Pappos ben Yehuda, /b not Setada. b Rather, /b perhaps b his mother /b was named b Setada, /b and he was named ben Setada after her. The Gemara challenges: But b his mother was Miriam, who braided women’s hair. /b The Gemara explains: That is not a contradiction; Setada was merely a nickname, b as they say in Pumbedita: This one strayed [ i setat da /i ] from her husband. /b , strong MISHNA: /strong With regard to the case of b the subverter /b listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, b this is one who says /b to a multitude of people: b Let us go and worship idols. /b , b The warlock /b is also liable to be executed by stoning. b One who performs /b a real b act /b of sorcery b is liable, but not one who deceives the eyes, /b making it appear as though he is performing sorcery, as that is not considered sorcery. b Rabbi Akiva says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: /b For example, b two /b people can each b gather cucumbers /b by sorcery. b One /b of them b gathers /b cucumbers and he is b exempt, and /b the other b one gathers /b cucumbers and he is b liable. /b How so? b The one who performs /b a real b act /b of sorcery is b liable, /b and b the one who deceives the eyes is exempt. /b , strong GEMARA: /strong With regard to the case of subverters mentioned in the mishna, b Rav Yehuda says /b that b Rav says: /b The Sages b taught here /b the case of b the subverters of an idolatrous city. /b Accordingly, there is no halakhic difference between one who incites individuals to idolatry and one who subverts an entire city; both are liable to be executed by stoning.,The mishna teaches that the case of b the warlock is /b referring to b one who performs /b a real b act /b of sorcery. b The Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : The verse: b “You shall not allow a witch to live” /b (Exodus 22:17), does not refer only to a female who practices sorcery; b both a man and a woman /b are included. b If so, why /b does b verse state “a witch”? /b This is b because most women are familiar with witchcraft. /b , b In what /b manner is b their death /b sentence administered? b Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is stated here: “You shall not allow a witch to live,” and it is stated there, /b with regard to the conquest of the Canaanites: b “You shall allow nothing that breathes to live” /b (Deuteronomy 20:16). b Just as there, /b the Canaanites were to be killed b by /b the b sword /b (see Numbers 21:24), b so too here, /b the execution of a witch is administered b by /b the b sword. /b , b Rabbi Akiva says: It is stated here: “You shall not allow a witch to live,” and it is stated there, /b with regard to Mount Sinai: “No hand shall touch it, for he shall be stoned, or thrown down; b whether it be animal or man, it shall not live” /b (Exodus 19:13). b Just as there, /b the verse speaks b of stoning, so too here, /b a witch is executed b by stoning. /b , b Rabbi Yosei /b HaGelili b said to him: I derived /b the meaning of the verse b “You shall not allow /b a witch b to live” from /b the verse b “You shall allow nothing /b that breathes b to live” /b via a verbal analogy between two similar phrases, b but you derived /b the meaning of the verse b “You shall not allow /b a witch b to live” from /b the verse b “It shall not live,” /b which is a less similar phrase., b Rabbi Akiva said to him: I derived /b a i halakha /i concerning b Jews from /b a i halakha /i concerning b Jews, with regard to whom the verse included many /b types of b death /b penalties. Therefore, the fact that the expression “It shall not live” refers to stoning when stated with regard to Jews is especially significant. b But you derived /b a i halakha /i concerning b Jews from /b a i halakha /i concerning b gentiles, with regard to whom the verse included only /b
35. Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
33a. ואין חותכין אותו בין בדבר שהוא משום שבות ובין בדבר שהוא משום לא תעשה: משום שבות מגלא לא תעשה סכינא,השתא משום שבות אמרת לא לא תעשה מיבעיא זו ואין צריך לומר זו קתני:,אבל אם רצה ליתן לתוכו מים או יין יתן: מים או יין אין מי רגלים לא,מתני' מני אבא שאול היא דתניא אבא שאול אומר מים או יין מותר כדי לצחצחו מי רגלים אסור מפני הכבוד:,אין מעכבין את התינוקות מלתקוע: הא נשים מעכבין והתניא אין מעכבין לא את הנשים ולא את התינוקות מלתקוע ביום טוב אמר אביי ל"ק הא רבי יהודה הא רבי יוסי ורבי שמעון,דתניא (ויקרא א, ב) דבר אל בני ישראל בני ישראל סומכין ואין בנות ישראל סומכות דברי רבי יהודה רבי יוסי ורבי שמעון אומרים נשים סומכות רשות:,אבל מתעסקין בהם עד שילמדו: אמר רבי אלעזר אפילו בשבת תנ"ה מתעסקין בהן עד שילמדו אפילו בשבת ואין מעכבין התינוקות מלתקוע בשבת ואין צריך לומר ביום טוב,הא גופא קשיא אמרת מתעסקין בהן עד שילמדו ואפילו בשבת אלמא לכתחלה אמרינן תקעו והדר תנא אין מעכבין עכובא הוא דלא מעכבין הא לכתחלה לא אמרינן תקעו,לא קשיא כאן 33a. § The mishna stated: b One may not cut /b the i shofar /i if it needs to be prepared, b neither with an object that is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree nor with an object /b that may not be used b due to /b a Torah b prohibition. /b The Gemara explains: An example of an object prohibited b due to a rabbinic decree /b is b a sickle, /b which is not ordinarily used for preparing a i shofar /i ; an example of an object that may not be used due to b a prohibition /b by Torah law is b a knife. /b ,The Gemara asks: b Now /b that b you have said /b that to sound the i shofar /i b one may not /b perform an action that is prohibited b due to rabbinic law, is /b it b necessary /b to say that one may not perform an action that violates b a prohibition /b by Torah law? The Gemara answers: The mishna b teaches /b employing the style: b This, and it is unnecessary to say that. /b ,§ The mishna continues. b However, if one wishes to place water or wine into /b the i shofar /i on Rosh HaShana, so that it should emit a clear sound, b he may place it. /b The Gemara infers: b Water or wine, yes, /b one may insert these substances into a i shofar /i . However, b urine, /b whose acidity is good for the i shofar /i , b no. /b ,The Gemara asks: b Who is /b the i tanna /i of b the mishna? /b The Gemara answers: b It is Abba Shaul, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Abba Shaul says: /b With regard to b water or wine, /b one is b permitted /b to pour these liquids into a i shofar /i on Rosh HaShana b in order to make /b its sound b clear. /b However, with regard to b urine, /b one is b prohibited /b to do so b due to the respect /b that must be shown to the i shofar /i . Although urine is beneficial, it is disrespectful to place it in a i shofar /i , which serves for a mitzva.,§ The mishna further teaches: b One /b need b not prevent children from sounding /b the i shofar /i on Rosh HaShana. The Gemara infers: If b women /b wish to sound the i shofar /i , b one /b indeed b prevents /b them from doing so. The Gemara asks: b Isn’t it taught /b in a i baraita /i that b one does not prevent women or children from sounding /b the i shofar /i b on a Festival? /b The Gemara answers that b Abaye said: /b This is b not difficult: This /b mishna is in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b while b that /b i baraita /i is in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon. /b , b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b “Speak to the children of Israel… /b and he shall place his hands upon the head of the burnt-offering” (Leviticus 1:2–4). The phrase “children of Israel” literally means sons of Israel, and this teaches that b the sons of Israel place /b their hands upon offerings, b but the daughters of Israel do not place /b their hands upon offerings; this is b the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: /b It is b optional /b for b women /b to b place /b their hands on the head of an offering before it is slaughtered, although they are not obligated to do so. Apparently, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, if a woman wishes to perform any mitzva that is not obligatory for her, she is permitted to do so. Here too, one does not prevent a woman from sounding the i shofar /i .,§ The mishna further states: b Rather, one occupies /b himself b with them, /b encouraging and instructing children, b until they learn /b how to sound it properly. b Rabbi Elazar said: /b This applies b even /b when Rosh HaShana occurs b on Shabbat. This is also taught /b in a i baraita /i : b One occupies /b himself b with /b children b until they learn /b to sound the i shofar /i properly, b even on Shabbat. And one does not prevent the children from sounding /b the i shofar /i b on Shabbat, and needless to say /b one does not prevent them b on /b the b festival /b of Rosh HaShana that occurs on a weekday.,The Gemara asks: b This matter itself is difficult, /b i.e., there is an internal contradiction in the i baraita /i . b You said /b that b one occupies /b himself b with /b the children b until they learn /b how to sound the i shofar /i , b and /b this applies b even on Shabbat. Apparently, we say to them i ab initio /i : Sound /b the i shofar /i . b And then /b the i baraita /i b taught: One does not prevent /b them from sounding the i shofar /i , which indicates that although b one does not prevent them /b from sounding it, b we do not say i ab initio /i : Sound /b it.,The Gemara explains: This is b not difficult. Here, /b
36. Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
87a. והא גבי קרעים דכתיב על על דכתיב (שמואל ב א, יב) על שאול ועל יהונתן בנו,ותניא אמרו לו מת אביו וקרע ואחר כך נמצא בנו יצא ידי קריעה,אמרי לא קשיא הא בסתם והא במפרש,והתניא אמרו לו מת אביו וקרע ואחר כך נמצא בנו לא יצא ידי קריעה אמרו לו מת לו מת וכסבור אביו הוא וקרע ואחר כך נמצא בנו יצא ידי קריעה,רב אשי אמר כאן בתוך כדי דבור כאן לאחר כדי דבור,הא דקאמרת יצא ידי קריעה שנמצא בנו בתוך כדי דבור הא דאמרת לא יצא ידי קריעה לאחר כדי דבור,והתניא מי שיש לו חולה בתוך ביתו ונתעלף וכמדומה שמת וקרע ואחר כך מת לא יצא ידי קריעה אמר ר' שמעון בן פזי אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי משום בר קפרא לא שנו אלא שמת לאחר כדי דיבור אבל בתוך כדי דיבור כדבור דמי,והילכתא תוך כדי דבור כדבור דמי חוץ ממגדף ועובד עבודת כוכבים ומקדש ומגרש, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big אמרה קונם תאנים וענבים אלו שאני טועמת קיים לתאנים כולו קיים הפר לתאנים אינו מופר עד שיפר אף לענבים אמרה קונם תאנה שאני טועמת וענבה שאני טועמת הרי אלו שני נדרים, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big מני מתניתין רבי ישמעאל דתניא (במדבר ל, יד) אישה יקימנו ואישה יפרנו אמרה קונם תאנים וענבים אלו שאני טועמת קיים לתאנים כולו קיים 87a. The Gemara comments: b But /b is it not so that b with regard to /b the b tears /b in one’s clothing that are made for the dead, b as it is written “for,” “for,” /b and b about which is written: /b “And David took hold of his garments and rent them, and likewise all the men that were with him, and they wailed, and wept, and fasted until the evening, b for Saul, and for Jonathan his son, /b and for the people of the Lord, and for the house of Israel, because they were fallen by the sword” (II Samuel 1:11–12). The use of the word “for” with regard to each of them indicates that one must make a separate tear in his garment for each person who died.,The Gemara asks: b And /b yet it b is taught /b in a i baraita /i : If b they said to him /b that b his father had died and he rent /b his garment over his death, b and afterward it was discovered /b that it was not his father who died, but b his son, he has fulfilled /b his obligation of b rending /b his garment. This shows that even if a person mistakenly tore his garment for the wrong person he has nevertheless fulfilled the obligation. Here too, if a man nullified the vow of his wife, thinking that it was the vow of his daughter, his nullification should be effective.,The Gemara responds: The apparent contradiction b is not difficult /b . b That /b baraita refers to a case where he received a b non-specific /b report, i.e., he was told that an unspecified relative died. In such a case his obligation to rend his garment has been discharged. And b this /b mishna refers to a case where the bearer of the news mistakenly b specified /b that his daughter had taken the vow, when in reality his wife had. In such a case, his nullification is ineffective., b And it is taught /b similarly in the following i baraita /i : If b they said to him /b that b his father had died and he rent /b his garment over his death, b and afterward it was discovered /b that it was not his father who died, but b his son, he has not fulfilled /b his obligation of b rending /b his garment. If, however, b they said to him /b that a relative b of his had died, and he thought it was his father and he rent /b his garment over his death, b and afterward it was discovered /b that it was not his father who died, but b his son, he has fulfilled /b his obligation of b rending /b his garment. This proves that a distinction is made between one who rends his garment relying on a specific report and one who does so following a non-specific report., b Rav Ashi says /b that the discrepancy between the i baraitot /i with regard to the rending of garments can be reconciled in a different manner: b Here, /b the person who rent his garment for the wrong relative realized his error b within the time required for speaking /b the short phrase: Greetings to you, my teacher. Until that time has passed his action is seen as incomplete and can therefore still be modified. b There, /b the mistake was noted only b after the time required for speaking /b a short phrase., b This /b case, b where you said /b that b he has fulfilled /b his obligation of b rending /b his garment even though he had initially been told explicitly that his father died, deals with a situation b where it was discovered within the time required for speaking /b a short phrase, i.e., immediately after he rent his garment, that the deceased was b his son. /b However, b that /b case, b where you said /b that b he has not fulfilled /b his obligation of b rending /b his garment, deals with a situation where he became aware of his mistake b after the time required for speaking /b a short phrase, i.e., a short while later., b And it is taught /b in the following i baraita /i : b One who has an ill /b relative b in his house, and /b the latter b fainted /b and lost consciousness, b and it seemed /b to him b that /b the ill person had b died and /b therefore b he rent /b his garment over his assumed death, if it turned out that he had not yet actually died at that point b and /b it was only b afterward /b that b he died, /b the relative b has not fulfilled /b his obligation of b rending /b his garment. And with regard to this i baraita /i , b Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said /b that b Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: They taught /b that he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending b only if /b the ill person b died after the time required for speaking /b a short phrase. b But /b if he passed away b within the time required for speaking /b a short phrase, b it is /b all considered b like /b continuous b speech, /b and his relative has fulfilled his obligation. That is to say, his act of rending is not viewed as complete until the time required for saying a short phrase has elapsed, and until that time has passed the act can still be modified.,The Gemara concludes: b And the i halakha /i /b is: The legal status of a pause or retraction b within /b the time required b for speaking /b a short phrase b is like /b that of b continuous speech, /b and so a person can retract what he first said if he issues the retraction within this period of time after he finished speaking. This principle holds true in almost every area of i halakha /i , b except for /b the case of one who b blasphemes /b God; b or /b in the case of b an idol worshipper, /b who verbally accepts an idol as his god; b or /b one who b betroths /b a woman; b or /b one who b divorces /b his wife. In these four cases, a person cannot undo his action, even if he immediately retracts what he said within the time required for saying a short phrase., strong MISHNA: /strong If a woman b said: Tasting these figs and grapes is i konam /i for me, /b and her husband b upheld /b her vow b with regard to figs, the entire /b vow b is upheld, /b but if b he nullified /b it b with regard to figs it is not nullified until he also nullifies /b the vow b with regard to grapes. /b If b she said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are i konam /i for me, these are /b viewed as b two /b separate b vows; /b if the husband upholds one of the vows it has no effect on the other one., strong GEMARA: /strong b Whose /b opinion is expressed in b the mishna? /b The Gemara answers: It follows the opinion of b Rabbi Yishmael, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : The verse concerning vows that states: b “Her husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it” /b (Numbers 30:14), may be expounded as follows. If a woman b said: Tasting these figs and grapes is i konam /i for me, /b and her husband b upheld /b her vow b with regard to figs, the entire /b vow b is upheld. /b
37. Anon., Questions And Answers On The Ascetic Rule, 21.3  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
39. Paul of Elusa, Encomium, None  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
40. Dio Chrysostom, Rhodiaca, None  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 119
41. Mishnah10, 105 122, 252Bis, 253, 254,, 10.6  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Lieber (2014), A Vocabulary of Desire: The Song of Songs in the Early Synagogue, 87
43. Mishnah, ŠebiʿIt, 1.4  Tagged with subjects: •eleazar ben azariah, r. Found in books: Hidary (2017), Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash, 47