1. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 19.18 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Agriculture, Division of • Heresy, division/multiplicity of
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 153; Brooks (1983) 35
19.18. לֹא־תִקֹּם וְלֹא־תִטֹּר אֶת־בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ אֲנִי יְהוָה׃''. None | 19.18. Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.''. None |
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2. Homer, Iliad, 2.559-2.590, 15.187-15.193 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Peloponnese, fluid regional divisions in • Trojan War, division between mythical and historical periods • division of inheritance • inheritance, division
Found in books: Bremmer (2008) 66; Farrell (2021) 179; Humphreys (2018) 166; Kowalzig (2007) 306, 307
2.559. οἳ δʼ Ἄργός τʼ εἶχον Τίρυνθά τε τειχιόεσσαν 2.560. Ἑρμιόνην Ἀσίνην τε, βαθὺν κατὰ κόλπον ἐχούσας, 2.561. Τροιζῆνʼ Ἠϊόνας τε καὶ ἀμπελόεντʼ Ἐπίδαυρον, 2.562. οἵ τʼ ἔχον Αἴγιναν Μάσητά τε κοῦροι Ἀχαιῶν, 2.563. τῶν αὖθʼ ἡγεμόνευε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης 2.564. καὶ Σθένελος, Καπανῆος ἀγακλειτοῦ φίλος υἱός· 2.565. τοῖσι δʼ ἅμʼ Εὐρύαλος τρίτατος κίεν ἰσόθεος φὼς 2.566. Μηκιστέος υἱὸς Ταλαϊονίδαο ἄνακτος· 2.567. συμπάντων δʼ ἡγεῖτο βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης· 2.568. τοῖσι δʼ ἅμʼ ὀγδώκοντα μέλαιναι νῆες ἕποντο. 2.569. οἳ δὲ Μυκήνας εἶχον ἐϋκτίμενον πτολίεθρον 2.570. ἀφνειόν τε Κόρινθον ἐϋκτιμένας τε Κλεωνάς, 2.571. Ὀρνειάς τʼ ἐνέμοντο Ἀραιθυρέην τʼ ἐρατεινὴν 2.572. καὶ Σικυῶνʼ, ὅθʼ ἄρʼ Ἄδρηστος πρῶτʼ ἐμβασίλευεν, 2.573. οἵ θʼ Ὑπερησίην τε καὶ αἰπεινὴν Γονόεσσαν 2.574. Πελλήνην τʼ εἶχον ἠδʼ Αἴγιον ἀμφενέμοντο 2.575. Αἰγιαλόν τʼ ἀνὰ πάντα καὶ ἀμφʼ Ἑλίκην εὐρεῖαν, 2.576. τῶν ἑκατὸν νηῶν ἦρχε κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων 2.577. Ἀτρεΐδης· ἅμα τῷ γε πολὺ πλεῖστοι καὶ ἄριστοι 2.578. λαοὶ ἕποντʼ· ἐν δʼ αὐτὸς ἐδύσετο νώροπα χαλκὸν 2.579. κυδιόων, πᾶσιν δὲ μετέπρεπεν ἡρώεσσιν 2.580. οὕνεκʼ ἄριστος ἔην πολὺ δὲ πλείστους ἄγε λαούς. 2.581. οἳ δʼ εἶχον κοίλην Λακεδαίμονα κητώεσσαν, 2.582. Φᾶρίν τε Σπάρτην τε πολυτρήρωνά τε Μέσσην, 2.583. Βρυσειάς τʼ ἐνέμοντο καὶ Αὐγειὰς ἐρατεινάς, 2.584. οἵ τʼ ἄρʼ Ἀμύκλας εἶχον Ἕλος τʼ ἔφαλον πτολίεθρον, 2.585. οἵ τε Λάαν εἶχον ἠδʼ Οἴτυλον ἀμφενέμοντο, 2.586. τῶν οἱ ἀδελφεὸς ἦρχε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος 2.587. ἑξήκοντα νεῶν· ἀπάτερθε δὲ θωρήσσοντο· 2.588. ἐν δʼ αὐτὸς κίεν ᾗσι προθυμίῃσι πεποιθὼς 2.589. ὀτρύνων πόλεμον δέ· μάλιστα δὲ ἵετο θυμῷ 2.590. τίσασθαι Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε.
15.187. τρεῖς γάρ τʼ ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφεοὶ οὓς τέκετο Ῥέα 15.188. Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δʼ Ἀΐδης ἐνέροισιν ἀνάσσων. 15.189. τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δʼ ἔμμορε τιμῆς· 15.190. ἤτοι ἐγὼν ἔλαχον πολιὴν ἅλα ναιέμεν αἰεὶ 15.191. παλλομένων, Ἀΐδης δʼ ἔλαχε ζόφον ἠερόεντα, 15.192. Ζεὺς δʼ ἔλαχʼ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσι· 15.193. γαῖα δʼ ἔτι ξυνὴ πάντων καὶ μακρὸς Ὄλυμπος.''. None | 2.559. Only Nestor could vie with him, for he was the elder. And with him there followed fifty black ships.And Aias led from Salamis twelve ships, and stationed them where the battalions of the Athenians stood.And they that held Argos and Tiryns, famed for its walls, 2.560. and Hermione and Asine, that enfold the deep gulf, Troezen and Eïonae and vine-clad Epidaurus, and the youths of the Achaeans that held Aegina and Mases,—these again had as leaders Diomedes, good at the war-cry, and Sthenelus, dear son of glorious Capaneus. 2.565. And with them came a third, Euryalus, a godlike warrior, son of king Mecisteus, son of Talaus; but leader over them all was Diomedes, good at the war-cry. And with these there followed eighty black ships.And they that held Mycenae, the well-built citadel, 2.570. and wealthy Corinth, and well-built Cleonae, and dwelt in Orneiae and lovely Araethyrea and Sicyon, wherein at the first Adrastus was king; and they that held Hyperesia and steep Gonoessa and Pellene, 2.575. and that dwelt about Aegium and throughout all Aegialus, and about broad Helice,—of these was the son of Atreus, lord Agamemnon, captain, with an hundred ships. With him followed most people by far and goodliest; and among them he himself did on his gleaming bronze, a king all-glorious, and was pre-eminent among all the warriors, 2.580. for that he was noblest, and led a people far the most in number. 2.584. for that he was noblest, and led a people far the most in number. And they that held the hollow land of Lacedaemon with its many ravines, and Pharis and Sparta and Messe, the haunt of doves, and that dwelt in Bryseiae and lovely Augeiae, and that held Amyclae and Helus, a citadel hard by the sea, ' "2.585. and that held Laas, and dwelt about Oetylus,—these were led by Agamemnon's brother, even Menelaus, good at the war-cry, with sixty ships; and they were marshalled apart. And himself he moved among them, confident in his zeal, urging his men to battle; and above all others was his heart fain " "2.590. to get him requital for his strivings and groanings for Helen's sake.And they that dwelt in Pylos and lovely Arene and Thryum, the ford of Alpheius, and fair-founded Aepy, and that had their abodes in Cyparisseïs and Amphigeneia and Pteleos and Helus and Dorium, " '
15.187. Out upon it, verily strong though he be he hath spoken overweeningly, if in sooth by force and in mine own despite he will restrain me that am of like honour with himself. For three brethren are we, begotten of Cronos, and born of Rhea,—Zeus, and myself, and the third is Hades, that is lord of the dead below. And in three-fold wise are all things divided, and unto each hath been apportioned his own domain. 15.190. I verily, when the lots were shaken, won for my portion the grey sea to be my habitation for ever, and Hades won the murky darkness, while Zeus won the broad heaven amid the air and the clouds; but the earth and high Olympus remain yet common to us all. Wherefore will I not in any wise walk after the will of Zeus; nay in quiet 15.193. I verily, when the lots were shaken, won for my portion the grey sea to be my habitation for ever, and Hades won the murky darkness, while Zeus won the broad heaven amid the air and the clouds; but the earth and high Olympus remain yet common to us all. Wherefore will I not in any wise walk after the will of Zeus; nay in quiet ''. None |
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3. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • division of inheritance • inheritance, division
Found in books: Bremmer (2008) 66; Humphreys (2018) 165
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4. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • division of inheritance • property, division of
Found in books: Humphreys (2018) 148; Parker (2005) 11
776a. τῷ κλήρῳ τὴν ἑτέραν οἷον νεοττῶν ἐγγέννησιν καὶ τροφήν, χωρισθέντα ἀπὸ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς τὸν γάμον ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν οἴκησιν καὶ τὴν τροφὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν τέκνων. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς φιλίαις ἐὰν μὲν πόθος ἐνῇ τις, κολλᾷ καὶ συνδεῖ πάντα ἤθη· κατακορὴς δὲ συνουσία καὶ οὐκ ἴσχουσα τὸν διὰ χρόνου πόθον ἀπορρεῖν ἀλλήλων ποιεῖ ὑπερβολαῖς πλησμονῆς. ὧν δὴ χάριν μητρὶ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς τῆς γυναικὸς οἰκείοις παρέντας χρὴ τὰς αὑτῶν οἰκήσεις, οἷον''. None | 776a. in his allotment, to be, as it were, the nest and home of his chicks, and make therein his marriage and the dwelling and home of himself and his children. For in friendships the presence of some degree of longing seems to cement various dispositions and bind them together; but unabated proximity, since it lacks the longing due to an interval, causes friends to fall away from one another owing to an excessive surfeit of each other’s company. Therefore the married pair must leave their own houses to their parents and the bride’s relations,''. None |
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5. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Intellect, rejection of division • matter, divisibility • soul, division of
Found in books: Ebrey and Kraut (2022) 491; Frede and Laks (2001) 64, 66; Gerson and Wilberding (2022) 54
39e. ὡς ὁμοιότατον ᾖ τῷ τελέῳ καὶ νοητῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως. ΤΙ. εἰσὶν δὴ τέτταρες, μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ'90d. καὶ περιφοραί· ταύταις δὴ συνεπόμενον ἕκαστον δεῖ, τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφθαρμένας ἡμῶν περιόδους ἐξορθοῦντα διὰ τὸ καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. '. None | 39e. Nature thereof. Tim. And these Forms are four,—one the heavenly kind of gods;'90d. are the intellections and revolutions of the Universe. These each one of us should follow, rectifying the revolutions within our head, which were distorted at our birth, by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the Universe, and thereby making the part that thinks like unto the object of its thought, in accordance with its original nature, and having achieved this likeness attain finally to that goal of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both for the present and for the time to come. '. None |
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6. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Academy, division of presbyteroi and neaniskoi
Found in books: Bryan (2018) 81; Wardy and Warren (2018) 81
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7. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.71, 2.35, 4.21, 4.33-4.41, 5.16, 5.19, 5.22 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Carneades, his division of ethical positions (carneadea divisio) • Division / divisio / diairesis
Found in books: Maso (2022) 27, 28, 30, 103; Tsouni (2019) 60, 70, 90, 91, 93
2.35. ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Carneadi carneadis A 2 V tertius, tres, in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione, Polemonis, Calliphontis, Diodori, una simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, posita in decore tota, id est in honestate; id est in honestate dett. id est honestate BERNV idē honestate A nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus iam diu abiecti. reliqui sibi constiterunt, ut extrema cum initiis convenirent, ut Aristippo voluptas, Hieronymo doloris vacuitas, Carneadi frui principiis naturalibus esset extremum. Epicurus autem cum in prima commendatione voluptatem dixisset, si eam, quam Aristippus, idem tenere debuit ultimum bonorum, quod ille; sin eam, quam Hieronymus, ne add. Se. cf. § 32: Epicurus semper hoc utitur... inest nihil dolere) fecisset idem, ut voluptatem illam Aristippi Aristippi secl. cum allis Mdv. aristippo BE in prima commendatione poneret.
4.21. O magnam vim ingenii causamque iustam, cur nova existeret disciplina! Perge porro. sequuntur enim ea, quae tu scientissime complexus es, complexus es p. 107, 17-30 omnium insipientiam, iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, omniaque peccata esse paria, eosque, qui natura doctrinaque longe ad virtutem processissent, nisi eam plane consecuti essent, summe esse miseros, neque inter eorum vitam et improbissimorum quicquam omnino interesse, ut Plato, tantus ille vir, si sapiens non fuerit, nihilo melius quam quivis improbissimus nec beatius beatius dett. beatus vixerit. haec videlicet est correctio correctio V correptio philosophiae veteris et emendatio, quae omnino aditum habere nullum nullum habere BE potest in urbem, in forum, in curiam. quis enim ferre posset ita loquentem eum, qui se auctorem vitae graviter et sapienter agendae profiteretur, nomina rerum commutantem, cumque idem sentiret quod omnes, quibus rebus eandem vim tribueret, alia nomina inponentem, verba modo mutantem, de opinionibus nihil detrahentem?
4.33. quo modo autem, quod ipsi etiam fatentur constatque inter omnis, conservabitur ut simile sit omnium naturarum naturarum dett. naturale illud ultimum, de quo quaeritur? tum enim esset simile, si in ceteris quoque naturis id cuique esset ultimum, quod in quaque excelleret. tale enim visum est est Mdv. esset ultimum ultimum BN 2 V ultimi ERN 1 Stoicorum. 4.34. Quid dubitas igitur mutare principia naturae? quid enim dicis dicis BERN om. V omne animal, simul atque sit ortum, applicatum esse ad se diligendum esseque in se conservando occupatum? quin potius ita dicis, omne animal applicatum esse ad id, quod in eo sit optimum, et in eius unius occupatum esse custodia, reliquasque naturas nihil aliud agere, nisi ut id conservent, quod in quaque optimum sit? quo modo autem optimum, si bonum praeterea nullum est? sin autem reliqua appetenda sunt, cur, quod est ultimum rerum appetendarum, appetendarum V appetendum BER appeten- tium N id non aut ex omnium omni BE earum aut ex plurimarum et maximarum appetitione concluditur? ut Phidias potest a primo instituere signum idque perficere, potest ab alio inchoatum accipere et absolvere, huic est sapientia similis; similis est sapientia BE non enim ipsa genuit hominem, sed accepit a natura inchoatum. hanc ergo intuens debet institutum illud quasi signum absolvere. Qualem igitur hominem natura inchoavit? 4.35. et quod est munus, quod opus sapientiae? quid est, quod ab ea absolvi et perfici debeat? si est si est Se. sic ( pro si ē) BE sit RN 1 V si N 1 eo gen. neutr. nihil in eo, quod perficiendum est, praeter motum ingenii quendam, id est rationem, necesse est huic ultimum esse ex ex e R virtute agere; agere BE R vitam augere NV rationis enim perfectio est virtus; si est si est Se. sic BE sit RNV nihil nisi corpus, summa erunt erunt erit N esset V illa: valitudo, vacuitas doloris, pulchritudo, cetera. 4.36. nunc de hominis summo bono quaeritur; queritur bono BE quid igitur igitur BERNV dubitamus in tota eius natura quaerere quid sit effectum? cum enim constet inter omnes omne officium munusque sapientiae in hominis cultu esse occupatum, alii—ne me existimes contra Stoicos solum dicere—eas sententias afferunt, ut summum bonum in eo genere pot, quod sit extra nostram potestatem, tamquam de iimo aliquo iimo aliquo Mdv. in animali quo B in annali quo E animali quo R iimali quo N iimato aliquo V loquantur, alii contra, quasi corpus nullum sit hominis, ita praeter animum nihil curant, cum praesertim ipse quoque animus non ie nescio quid sit—neque enim enim om. BER id possum intellegere—, sed in quodam genere corporis, ut ne is quidem virtute una contentus sit, sed appetat vacuitatem doloris. quam ob rem utrique idem faciunt, ut si laevam partem neglegerent, dexteram dextram RN tuerentur, aut ipsius animi, ut fecit Erillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem relinquerent. eorum enim omnium multa praetermittentium, dum eligant aliquid, quod sequantur, quasi curta sententia; at vero illa perfecta atque plena eorum, qui cum de hominis summo bono quaererent, nullam in eo neque animi neque corporis partem vacuam tutela reliquerunt. 4.37. Vos autem, Cato, quia virtus, ut omnes fatemur, altissimum locum in homine et maxime excellentem tenet, et quod eos, qui sapientes sunt, absolutos et perfectos putamus, aciem animorum nostrorum virtutis splendore praestringitis. in omni enim animante est summum aliquid atque optimum, ut in equis, in canibus, quibus tamen et dolore vacare opus est et valere; sic igitur in homine perfectio ista in eo potissimum, quod est optimum, id est in virtute, laudatur. itaque mihi non satis videmini considerare quod iter sit iter sit N inter sit V intersit BE interfit R naturae quaeque progressio. non enim, quod non enim quod RNV quod ( om. non enim) BE facit in frugibus, ut, cum ad spicam perduxerit ab herba, relinquat et pro nihilo habeat herbam, idem facit in homine, cum eum ad rationis habitum perduxit. perduxit Mdv. perduxerit semper enim ita adsumit aliquid, ut ea, quae prima dederit, non non ne R deserat. 4.38. itaque sensibus rationem adiunxit et ratione effecta sensus non reliquit. relinquit NV Ut si cultura vitium, cuius hoc munus est, ut efficiat, ut vitis cum partibus suis omnibus omnibus partibus suis BE quam optime se habeat—, sed sic intellegamus—licet enim, ut vos quoque soletis, fingere aliquid docendi causa—: si igitur illa cultura vitium in vite insit ipsa, cetera, credo, velit, quae ad colendam vitem attinebunt, sicut antea, se autem omnibus vitis partibus praeferat statuatque nihil esse melius melius esse BE in vite quam se. similiter sensus, cum accessit ad naturam, tuetur illam quidem, sed etiam se tuetur; cum autem assumpta autem hijs assumpta N ratio est, est ratio BE tanto in dominatu locatur, ut omnia illa prima naturae huius tutelae subiciantur. 4.39. itaque non discedit ab eorum curatione, quibus praeposita vitam omnem debet gubernare, ut mirari satis istorum istorum Wes. apud Mdv. eorum inconstantiam non possim. possim marg. ed. Cratandr. possum BE possimus RNV naturalem enim appetitionem, quam vocant o(rmh/n, itemque officium, ipsam etiam virtutem tuentem tuentem om. BE ( cf. p. 136, 33 sqq. et p. 138, 4 sqq. 11 expetamus Bai. ea petamus BEV ea p utamus R earum petamus N 1 earum apetamus N 2 volunt esse earum rerum, quae secundum naturam sunt. cum autem ad summum bonum volunt pervenire, transiliunt omnia et duo nobis opera pro uno relinquunt, ut alia sumamus, alia expetamus, potius quam uno fine utrumque concluderent.' "4.40. At enim iam dicitis iam dicitis R nam dicitis BEN 1 V natura ( comp. scr. ) dicitis N 2 nam dicitis Mdv. ( an fuit at enimuero dicitis? ua pro uo ) virtutem non posse constitui, si ea, quae extra virtutem sint, ad beate vivendum pertineant. quod totum contra est. introduci enim virtus nullo modo potest, nisi omnia, quae leget quaeque reiciet, unam referentur referentem R ad summam. nam si †omnino nos† ' potest ad hanc formam scriptum fuisse : omnino omnia praeter animos negl. aut similem' Mdv. neglegemus, neglegemus Lamb. negligemus R negligimus BENV in Aristonea vitia incidemus et peccata obliviscemurque quae virtuti ipsi principia dederimus; sin ea non neglegemus negligemus B intelligemus E negligimus RNV neque tamen ad finem summi boni referemus, non multum ab Erilli levitate aberrabimus. aberrabimus NV aberravimus duarum enim vitarum nobis erunt instituta capienda. facit enim ille duo seiuncta ultima bonorum, quae ut essent vera, coniungi debuerunt; nunc ita ita P.Man. ista separantur, ut disiuncta disiuncta RNV se- iuncta BE sint, quo nihil potest esse perversius." '4.41. Itaque contra est, ac dicitis; nam constitui virtus nullo modo potest, nisi ea, quae sunt prima naturae, ut ad summam ad summam A.Man. (?); ad summum (assummum V) pertinentia tenebit. quaesita enim virtus est, non quae relinqueret naturam, sed quae tueretur. at illa, ut vobis placet, partem quandam tuetur, reliquam deserit. Atque ipsa hominis institutio si loqueretur, hoc diceret, primos suos quasi coeptus coeptus ceptus RN conceptus V appetendi fuisse, ut se conservaret in ea natura, in qua ortus esset. nondum autem explanatum satis erat, quid maxime natura vellet. explanetur igitur. quid ergo ergo g (= igitur) R aliud intellegetur intelligetur dett. intelligeretur nisi uti ne quae uti ne quae ut ineque BER ut eque NV pars naturae neglegatur? in qua si nihil est praeter rationem, sit in una virtute finis bonorum; sin est etiam corpus, ista explanatio naturae nempe hoc effecerit, ut ea, quae ante explanationem tenebamus, relinquamus. ergo id est convenienter naturae vivere, a natura discedere.
5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam.
5.19. ex eo autem, quod statuerit esse, quo primum natura moveatur, existet recti etiam ratio atque honesti, quae cum uno aliquo aliquo uno BE ex tribus illis congruere possit, possit. u aut non dolendi ita sit ut quanta ( v. 19 ) R rell. om. ut aut id honestum sit, facere omnia aut voluptatis causa, etiam si eam secl. Mdv. non consequare, aut non dolendi, etiam etiam N 2 in ras., aut BEV si id assequi nequeas, aut eorum, quae secundum naturam sunt, adipiscendi, etiam si nihil consequare. ita ita N 2 aut non dolendi ita R ( cf. ad v. 14 ), N 1 V; aut nichil dolendi ita BE fit ut, quanta differentia est in principiis naturalibus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum malorumque dissimilitudo. alii rursum isdem a principiis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem aut ad non dolendum aut ad prima illa secundum naturam optinenda.
5.22. nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadeam illam sententiam. quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id id ( post vult) om. RNV efficit turpe. ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquitis. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. hos contra singulos dici est melius. sed nunc, quod quod quid BE quid (= quidem) R agimus;' '. None | 2.35. \xa0Thus there are three Ends that do not include moral worth, one that of Aristippus or Epicurus, the second that of Hieronymus, and the third that of Carneades; three that comprise moral goodness together with some additional element, those of Polemo, Callipho and Diodorus; and one theory that is simple, of which Zeno was the author, and which is based entirely on propriety, that is, on moral worth. (As for Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus, they have long ago been exploded.) All of these but Epicurus were consistent, and made their final ends agree with their first principles, â\x80\x94 Aristippus holding the End to be Pleasure, Hieronymus freedom from pain, Carneades the enjoyment of the primary natural objects. \xa0Whereas Epicurus, if in saying that pleasure was the primary object of attraction, he meant pleasure in the sense of Aristippus, ought to have maintained the same ultimate Good as Aristippus; or if he made pleasure in the sense of Hieronymus his Chief Good, should he at the same time have allowed himself to make the former kind of pleasure, that of Aristippus, the primary attraction? <
4.21. \xa0"What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy! But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, that all men\'s folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in public life, in the lawâ\x80\x91courts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everyone else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched? <' "
4.33. \xa0How then came it about that, of all the existing species, mankind alone should relinquish man's nature, forget the body, and find its Chief Good not in the whole man but in a part of man? How moreover is the axiom to be retained, admitted as it is even by the Stoics and accepted universally, that the End which is the subject of our inquiry is analogous for all species? For the analogy to hold, every other species also would have to find its End in that part of the organism which in that particular species is the highest part; since that, as we have seen, is how the Stoics conceive the End of man. <" '4.34. \xa0Why then do you hesitate to alter your conception of the primary instincts to correspond? Instead of saying that every animal from the moment of its birth is devoted to love of itself and engrossed in preserving itself, why do you not rather say that every animal is devoted to the best part of itself and engrossed in protecting that alone, and that every other species is solely engaged in preserving the part that is respectively best in each? But in what sense is one part the best, if nothing beside it is good at all? While if on the contrary other things also are desirable, why does not the supremely desirable thing consist in the attainment of all, or of the greatest possible number and the most important, of these things? A\xa0Pheidias can start to make a statue from the beginning and carry it to completion, or he can take one rough-hewn by someone else and finish that. The latter case typifies the work of Wisdom. She did not create man herself, but took him over in the rough from Nature; her business is to finish the statue that Nature began, keeping her eyes on Nature meanwhile. <' "4.35. \xa0What sort of thing then is man as rough-hewn by Nature? and what is the function and the task of Wisdom? what is it that needs to be consummated by her finishing touch? If it is a creature consisting solely of a certain operation of the intellect, that is, reason, its highest good must be activity in accordance with virtue since virtue is reason's consummation. If it is nothing but a body, the chief things will be health, freedom from pain, beauty and the rest. \xa0<" "4.36. \xa0But as a matter of fact the creature whose Chief Good we are seeking is man. Surely then our course is to inquire what has been achieved in the whole of man's nature. All are agreed that the duty and function of Wisdom is entirely centred in the work of perfecting man; but then some thinkers (for you must not imagine that I\xa0am tilting at the Stoics only) produce theories which place the Chief Good in the class of things entirely outside our control, as though they were discussing some creature devoid of a mind; while others on the contrary ignore everything but mind, just as if man had no body; and that though even the mind is not an empty, impalpable something (a\xa0conception to me unintelligible), but belongs to a certain kind of material substance, and therefore even the mind is not satisfied with virtue alone, but desires freedom from pain. In fact, with each school alike it is just as if they should ignore the left side of their bodies and protect the right, or, in the mind, like Erillus, recognize cognition but leave the practical faculty out of account. They pick and choose, pass over a great deal and fasten on a single aspect; so all their systems are oneâ\x80\x91sided. The full and perfect philosophy was that which, investigating the Chief Good of man, left no part either of his mind or body uncaredâ\x80\x91for. <" "4.37. \xa0Whereas your friends, Cato, on the strength of the fact, which we all admit, that virtue is man's highest and supreme excellence and that the Wise Man is the perfect and consummate type of humanity, try to dazzle our mental vision with virtue's radiance. Every animal, for instance the horse, or the dog, has some supreme good quality, yet at the same time they require to have health and freedom from pain; similarly therefore in man that consummation you speak of attains its chief glory in what is his chief excellence, namely virtue. This being so, I\xa0feel you do not take sufficient pains to study Nature's method of procedure. With the growing corn, no doubt, her way is to guide its development from blade to ear, and then discard the blade as of no value; but she does not do the same with man, when she has developed in him the faculty of reason. For she continually superadds fresh faculties without abandoning her previous gifts. <" "4.38. \xa0Thus she added to sensation reason, and after creating reason did not discard sensation. Suppose the art of viticulture, whose function is to bring the vine with all its parts into the most thriving condition â\x80\x94 at least let us assume it to be so (for we may invent an imaginary case, as you are fond of doing, for purposes of illustration); suppose then the art of viticulture were a faculty residing in the vine itself, this faculty would doubtless desire every condition requisite for the health of the vine as before, but would rank itself above all the other parts of the vine, and would consider itself the noblest element in the vine's organism. Similarly when an animal organism has acquired the faculty of sensation, this faculty protects the organism, it is true, but also protects itself; but when reason has been superadded, this is placed in such a position of domice that all those primary gifts of nature are placed under its protection. <" "4.39. \xa0Accordingly each never abandons its task of safeguarding the earlier elements; its business is by controlling these to steer the whole course of life; so that I\xa0cannot sufficiently marvel at the inconsistency of your teachers. Natural desire, which they term hormÄ\x93, and also duty, and even virtue itself they reckon among things according to Nature. Yet when they want to arrive at the Supreme Good, they leap over all of these, and leave us with two tasks instead of one, some things we are to 'adopt,' others to 'desire'; instead of including both tasks under a single End. <" '4.40. \xa0"But you protest that if other things than virtue go to make up happiness, virtue cannot be established. As a matter of fact it is entirely the other way about: it is impossible to find a place for virtue, unless all the things that she chooses and rejects are reckoned towards one sumâ\x80\x91total of good. For if we entirely ignore ourselves, we shall fall into the mistakes and errors of Aristo, forgetting the things that we assigned as the origins of virtue herself; if while not ignoring these things, we yet do not reckon them in the End or Chief Good, we shall be well on the road towards the extravagances of Erillus, since we shall have to adopt two different rules of life at once. Erillus sets up two separate ultimate Goods, which, supposing his view were true, he ought to have united in one; but as it is he makes them so separate as to be mutually exclusive alternatives, which is surely the extreme of perversity. <' "4.41. \xa0Hence the truth is just the opposite of what you say; virtue is an absolute impossibility, unless it holds to the objects of the primary instincts as going to make up the sum of good. For we started to look for a virtue that should protect, not abandon, nature; whereas virtue as you conceive it protects a particular part of our nature but leaves the remainder in the lurch. Man's constitution itself, if it could speak, would declare that its earliest tentative movements of desire were aimed at preserving itself in the natural character with which it was born into the world. But at that stage the principal intention of nature had not yet been fully revealed. Well, suppose it revealed. What then? will it be construed otherwise than as forbidding that any part of man's nature should be ignored? If man consists solely of a reasoning faculty, let it be granted that the End of Goods is contained in virtue alone; but if he has a body as well, the revelation of our nature, on your showing, will actually have resulted in our relinquishing the things to which we held before that revelation took place. At this rate 'to live in harmony with nature' means to depart from nature. <" '
5.16. \xa0and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. <
5.19. \xa0"Now, from whichever Prudence decides to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may correspond with one or other of the three objects aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeed in attaining it; or at absence of pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them. Hence there is a divergence between the different conceptions of the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely equivalent to the difference of opinion as to the primary natural objects. â\x80\x94 Others again starting from the same primary objects will make the sole standard of right action the actual attainment of pleasure, freedom from pain, or the primary things in accordance with nature, respectively. <
5.22. \xa0Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. <' '. None |
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8. Septuagint, Wisdom of Solomon, 13.1-13.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Hellenistic Judaism, religious divisions in • Heresy, division/multiplicity of
Found in books: Bar Kochba (1997) 179; Boulluec (2022) 144
| 13.1. For all men who were ignorant of God were foolish by nature;and they were unable from the good things that are seen to know him who exists,nor did they recognize the craftsman while paying heed to his works;
13.1. The right hand of the Lord hath covered me; The right hand of the Lord hath spared us. 13.2. The arm of the Lord hath saved us from the sword that passed through, From famine and the death of sinners. 13.2. but they supposed that either fire or wind or swift air,or the circle of the stars, or turbulent water,or the luminaries of heaven were the gods that rule the world. 13.3. If through delight in the beauty of these things men assumed them to be gods,let them know how much better than these is their Lord,for the author of beauty created them. 13.3. Noisome beasts ran upon them: With their teeth they tore their flesh, And with their molars crushed their bones. But from all these things the Lord delivered us, 13.4. The righteous was troubled on account of his errors, Lest he should be taken away along with the sinners; 13.4. And if men were amazed at their power and working,let them perceive from them how much more powerful is he who formed them. 13.5. For terrible is the overthrow of the sinner; But not one of all these things toucheth the righteous. For not alike are the chastening of the righteous (for sins done) in ignorance, And the overthrow of the sinner 13.5. For from the greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception of their Creator." 13.6. Yet these men are little to be blamed,for perhaps they go astray while seeking God and desiring to find him. 13.7. Secretly (?) is the righteous chastened, Lest the sinner rejoice over the righteous. 13.7. For as they live among his works they keep searching,and they trust in what they see, because the things that are seen are beautiful. 13.8. For He correcteth the righteous as a beloved son, And his chastisement is as that of a firstborn. 13.8. Yet again, not even they are to be excused; 13.9. 10) For the Lord spareth His pious ones, And blotteth out their errors by His chastening. For the life of the righteous shall be for ever; 13.9. for if they had the power to know so much that they could investigate the world,how did they fail to find sooner the Lord of these things?''. None |
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9. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Greek/barbarian division • Prophets (Nebi'im, canonical division)
Found in books: Jassen (2014) 51; Stanton (2021) 221
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10. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 103 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Indivisible and divisible being • soul, division of
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 178; Inwood and Warren (2020) 198
| 103. And besides what has been already said, the growth of men from infancy to old age, when measured by the number seven, displays in a most evident manner its perfecting power; for in the first period of seven years, the putting forth of the teeth takes place. And at the end of the second period of the same length, he arrives at the age of puberty: at the end of the third period, the growth of the beard takes place. The fourth period sees him arrive at the fullness of his manly strength. The fifth seven years is the season for marriage. In the sixth period he arrives at the maturity of his understanding. The seventh period is that of the most rapid improvement and growth of both his intellectual and reasoning powers. The eighth is the sum of the perfection of both. In the ninth, his passions assume a mildness and gentleness, from being to a great degree tamed. In the tenth, the desirable end of life comes upon him, while his limbs and organic senses are still unimpaired: for excessive old age is apt to weaken and enfeeble them all. ''. None |
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11. Philo of Alexandria, On The Contemplative Life, 5 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Hellenistic Judaism, religious divisions in • Prophets (Nebi'im, canonical division)
Found in books: Bar Kochba (1997) 173; Jassen (2014) 51
| 5. But what shall we say of those men who worship the perfect things made of them, the sun, the moon, and the other stars, planets, or fixed-stars, or the whole heaven, or the universal world? And yet even they do not owe their existence to themselves, but to some creator whose knowledge has been most perfect, both in mind and degree. ''. None |
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12. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 2.39 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Hellenistic Judaism, religious divisions in • division
Found in books: Bar Kochba (1997) 172; Geljon and Runia (2013) 106
| 2.39. for just as I suppose the things which are proved in geometry and logic do not admit any variety of explanation, but the proposition which was set forth from the beginning remains unaltered, in like manner I conceive did these men find words precisely and literally corresponding to the things, which words were alone, or in the greatest possible degree, destined to explain with clearness and force the matters which it was desired to reveal. ''. None |
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13. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 6.16 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Greek/barbarian division • Heresy, division/multiplicity of
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 153; Stanton (2021) 104
| 6.16. \xa0That for which men gave themselves the most trouble and spent the most money, which caused the razing of many cities and the pitiful destruction of many nations â\x80\x94 this he found the least laborious and most inexpensive of all things to procure. <''. None |
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14. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 1.29 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Greek/barbarian division • Heresy, division/multiplicity of
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 144; Stanton (2021) 221
1.29. ὅπως μὴ καυχήσηται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ.''. None | 1.29. that noflesh should boast before God.''. None |
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15. New Testament, Matthew, 12.25, 18.20, 24.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Corinth, ancient,division in • Greek/barbarian division • Heresy, division/multiplicity of
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 535, 536, 539; Keener(2005) 24; Stanton (2021) 220, 224
12.25. Εἰδὼς δὲ τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις αὐτῶν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς Πᾶσα βασιλεία μερισθεῖσα καθʼ ἑαυτῆς ἐρημοῦται, καὶ πᾶσα πόλις ἢ οἰκία μερισθεῖσα καθʼ ἑαυτῆς οὐ σταθήσεται.
18.20. οὗ γάρ εἰσιν δύο ἢ τρεῖς συνηγμένοι εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα, ἐκεῖ εἰμὶ ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν.
24.7. ἐγερθήσεται γὰρ ἔθνος ἐπὶ ἔθνος καὶ βασιλεία ἐπὶ βασιλείαν, καὶ ἔσονται λιμοὶ καὶ σεισμοὶ κατὰ τόπους·''. None | 12.25. Knowing their thoughts, Jesus said to them, "Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation, and every city or house divided against itself will not stand.
18.20. For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there I am in the midst of them."
24.7. For nation will rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom; and there will be famines, plagues, and earthquakes in various places. ''. None |
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16. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus, Stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for Stoics tended to be ascribed to Chrysippus), Instead of being divided, it oscillates (ptoia) • Cicero, division of emotions • Plato, Tripartite division of soul • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Division of • fear, Stoic division of emotions
Found in books: Agri (2022) 19; Sorabji (2000) 43, 44, 56, 63, 303
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17. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 3.5.3, 3.16.6, 3.18.5, 4.19.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Greek/barbarian division • Heresy, division/multiplicity of
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 175, 177, 185; Stanton (2021) 217, 224
| 3.16.6. But inasmuch as all those before mentioned, although they certainly do with their tongue confess one Jesus Christ, make fools of themselves, thinking one thing and saying another; for their hypotheses vary, as I have already shown, alleging, as they do, that one Being suffered and was born, and that this was Jesus; but that there was another who descended upon Him, and that this was Christ, who also ascended again; and they argue, that he who proceeded from the Demiurge, or he who was dispensational, or he who sprang from Joseph, was the Being subject to suffering; but upon the latter there descended from the invisible and ineffable places the former, whom they assert to be incomprehensible, invisible, and impassible: they thus wander from the truth, because their doctrine departs from Him who is truly God, being ignorant that His only-begotten Word, who is always present with the human race, united to and mingled with His own creation, according to the Father's pleasure, and who became flesh, is Himself Jesus Christ our Lord, who did also suffer for us, and rose again on our behalf, and who will come again in the glory of His Father, to raise up all flesh, and for the manifestation of salvation, and to apply the rule of just judgment to all who were made by Him. There is therefore, as I have pointed out, one God the Father, and one Christ Jesus, who came by means of the whole dispensational arrangements connected with Him, and gathered together all things in Himself. But in every respect, too, He is man, the formation of God; and thus He took up man into Himself, the invisible becoming visible, the incomprehensible being made comprehensible, the impassible becoming capable of suffering, and the Word being made man, thus summing up all things in Himself: so that as in super-celestial, spiritual, and invisible things, the Word of God is supreme, so also in things visible and corporeal He might possess the supremacy, and, taking to Himself the pre-eminence, as well as constituting Himself Head of the Church, He might draw all things to Himself at the proper time." '
3.18.5. If, however, He was Himself not to suffer, but should fly away from Jesus, why did He exhort His disciples to take up the cross and follow Him,--that cross which these men represent Him as not having taken up, but speak of Him as having relinquished the dispensation of suffering? For that He did not say this with reference to the acknowledging of the Stauros (cross) above, as some among them venture to expound, but with respect to the suffering which He should Himself undergo, and that His disciples should endure, He implies when He says, "For whosoever will save his life, shall lose it; and whosoever will lose, shall find it. And that His disciples must suffer for His sake, He implied when He said to the Jews, "Behold, I send you prophets, and wise men, and scribes: and some of them ye shall kill and crucify." And to the disciples He was wont to say, "And ye shall stand before governors and kings for My sake; and they shall scourge some of you, and slay you, and persecute you from city to city." He knew, therefore, both those who should suffer persecution, and He knew those who should have to be scourged and slain because of Him; and He did not speak of any other cross, but of the suffering which He should Himself undergo first, and His disciples afterwards. For this purpose did He give them this exhortation: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him who is able to send both soul and body into hell;" thus exhorting them to hold fast those professions of faith which they had made in reference to Him. For He promised to confess before His Father those who should confess His name before men; but declared that He would deny those who should deny Him, and would be ashamed of those who should be ashamed to confess Him. And although these things are so, some of these men have proceeded to such a degree of temerity, that they even pour contempt upon the martyrs, and vituperate those who are slain on account of the confession of the Lord, and who suffer all things predicted by the Lord, and who in this respect strive to follow the footprints of the Lord\'s passion, having become martyrs of the suffering One; these we do also enrol with the martyrs themselves. For, when inquisition shall be made for their blood, and they shall attain to glory, then all shall be confounded by Christ, who have cast a slur upon their martyrdom. And from this fact, that He exclaimed upon the cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," the long- suffering, patience, compassion, and goodness of Christ are exhibited, since He both suffered, and did Himself exculpate those who had maltreated Him. For the Word of God, who said to us, "Love your enemies, and pray for those that hate you," Himself did this very thing upon the cross; loving the human race to such a degree, that He even prayed for those putting Him to death. If, however, any one, going upon the supposition that there are twoChrists, forms a judgment in regard to them, that Christ shall be found much the better one, and more patient, and the truly good one, who, in the midst of His own wounds and stripes, and the other cruelties inflicted upon Him, was beneficent, and unmindful of the wrongs perpetrated upon Him, than he who flew away, and sustained neither injury nor insult.
4.19.1. Now the gifts, oblations, and all the sacrifices, did the people receive in a figure, as was shown to Moses in the mount, from one and the same God, whose name is now glorified in the Church among all nations. But it is congruous that those earthly things, indeed, which are spread all around us, should be types of the celestial, being both, however, created by the same God. For in no other way could He assimilate an image of spiritual things to suit our comprehension. But to allege that those things which are super-celestial and spiritual, and, as far as we are concerned, invisible and ineffable, are in their turn the types of celestial things and of another Pleroma, and to say that God is the image of another Father, is to play the part both of wanderers from the truth, and of absolutely foolish and stupid persons. For, as I have repeatedly shown, such persons will find it necessary to be continually finding out types of types, and images of images, and will never be able to fix their minds on one and the true God. For their imaginations range beyond God, they having in their hearts surpassed the Master Himself, being indeed in idea elated and exalted above Him, but in reality turning away from the true God.' ". None |
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18. Justin, Dialogue With Trypho, 35.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Heresy, division/multiplicity of • angels, divide the world by lot
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 56, 57, 100, 480; Williams (2009) 69
| 35.6. Trypho: I believe, however, that many of those who say that they confess Jesus, and are called Christians, eat meats offered to idols, and declare that they are by no means injured in consequence. Justin: The fact that there are such men confessing themselves to be Christians, and admitting the crucified Jesus to be both Lord and Christ, yet not teaching His doctrines, but those of the spirits of error, causes us who are disciples of the true and pure doctrine of Jesus Christ, to be more faithful and steadfast in the hope announced by Him. For what things He predicted would take place in His name, these we do see being actually accomplished in our sight. For he said, 'Many shall come in My name, clothed outwardly in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.' Matthew 7:15 And, 'There shall be schisms and heresies.' 1 Corinthians 11:19 And, 'Beware of false prophets, who shall come to you clothed outwardly in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.' Matthew 7:15 And, 'Many false Christs and false apostles shall arise, and shall deceive many of the faithful.' Matthew 24:11 There are, therefore, and there were many, my friends, who, coming forward in the name of Jesus, taught both to speak and act impious and blasphemous things; and these are called by us after the name of the men from whom each doctrine and opinion had its origin. (For some in one way, others in another, teach to blaspheme the Maker of all things, and Christ, who was foretold by Him as coming, and the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob, with whom we have nothing in common, since we know them to be atheists, impious, unrighteous, and sinful, and confessors of Jesus in name only, instead of worshippers of Him. Yet they style themselves Christians, just as certain among the Gentiles inscribe the name of God upon the works of their own hands, and partake in nefarious and impious rites.) Some are called Marcians, and some Valentinians, and some Basilidians, and some Saturnilians, and others by other names; each called after the originator of the individual opinion, just as each one of those who consider themselves philosophers, as I said before, thinks he must bear the name of the philosophy which he follows, from the name of the father of the particular doctrine. So that, in consequence of these events, we know that Jesus foreknew what would happen after Him, as well as in consequence of many other events which He foretold would befall those who believed on and confessed Him, the Christ. For all that we suffer, even when killed by friends, He foretold would take place; so that it is manifest no word or act of His can be found fault with. Wherefore we pray for you and for all other men who hate us; in order that you, having repented along with us, may not blaspheme Him who, by His works, by the mighty deeds even now wrought through His name, by the words He taught, by the prophecies announced concerning Him, is the blameless, and in all things irreproachable, Christ Jesus; but, believing on Him, may be saved in His second glorious advent, and may not be condemned to fire by Him. "". None |
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19. Tertullian, Apology, 48.11 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Greek/barbarian division • division
Found in books: Lynskey (2021) 44; Stanton (2021) 235
| 48.11. Come now, if some philosopher affirms, as Laberius holds, following an opinion of Pythagoras, that a man may have his origin from a mule, a serpent from a woman, and with skill of speech twists every argument to prove his view, will he not gain acceptance for and work in some the conviction that, on account of this, they should even abstain from eating animal food? May any one have the persuasion that he should so abstain, lest by chance in his beef he eats of some ancestor of his? But if a Christian promises the return of a man from a man, and the very actual Gaius from Gaius, the cry of the people will be to have him stoned; they will not even so much as grant him a hearing. If there is any ground for the moving to and fro of human souls into different bodies, why may they not return into the very substance they have left, seeing this is to be restored, to be that which had been? They are no longer the very things they had been; for they could not be what they were not, without first ceasing to be what they had been. If we were inclined to give all rein upon this point, discussing into what various beasts one and another might probably be changed, we would need at our leisure to take up many points. But this we would do chiefly in our own defense, as setting forth what is greatly worthier of belief, that a man will come back from a man - any given person from any given person, still retaining his humanity; so that the soul, with its qualities unchanged, may be restored to the same condition, thought not to the same outward framework. Assuredly, as the reason why restoration takes place at all is the appointed judgment, every man must needs come forth the very same who had once existed, that he may receive at God's hands a judgment, whether of good desert or the opposite. And therefore the body too will appear; for the soul is not capable of suffering without the solid substance (that is, the flesh; and for this reason, also) that it is not right that souls should have all the wrath of God to bear: they did not sin without the body, within which all was done by them. But how, you say, can a substance which has been dissolved be made to reappear again? Consider yourself, O man, and you will believe in it! Reflect on what you were before you came into existence. Nothing. For if you had been anything, you would have remembered it. You, then, who were nothing before you existed, reduced to nothing also when you cease to be, why may you not come into being again out of nothing, at the will of the same Creator whose will created you out of nothing at the first? Will it be anything new in your case? You who were not, were made; when you cease to be again, you shall be made. Explain, if you can, your original creation, and then demand to know how you shall be re-created. Indeed, it will be still easier surely to make you what you were once, when the very same creative power made you without difficulty what you never were before. There will be doubts, perhaps, as to the power of God, of Him who hung in its place this huge body of our world, made out of what had never existed, as from a death of emptiness and iity, animated by the Spirit who quickens all living things, its very self the unmistakable type of the resurrection, that it might be to you a witness- nay, the exact image of the resurrection. Light, every day extinguished, shines out again; and, with like alternation, darkness succeeds light's outgoing. The defunct stars re-live; the seasons, as soon as they are finished, renew their course; the fruits are brought to maturity, and then are reproduced. The seeds do not spring up with abundant produce, save as they rot and dissolve away - all things are preserved by perishing, all things are refashioned out of death. You, man of nature so exalted, if you understand yourself, taught even by the Pythian words, lord of all these things that die and rise, - shall you die to perish evermore? Wherever your dissolution shall have taken place, whatever material agent has destroyed you, or swallowed you up, or swept you away, or reduced you to nothingness, it shall again restore you. Even nothingness is His who is Lord of all. You ask, Shall we then be always dying, and rising up from death? If so the Lord of all things had appointed, you would have to submit, though unwillingly, to the law of your creation. But, in fact, He has no other purpose than that of which He has informed us. The Reason which made the universe out of diverse elements, so that all things might be composed of opposite substances in unity - of void and solid, of animate and iimate, of comprehensible and incomprehensible, of light and darkness, of life itself and death - has also disposed time into order, by fixing and distinguishing its mode, according to which this first portion of it, which we inhabit from the beginning of the world, flows down by a temporal course to a close; but the portion which succeeds, and to which we look forward continues forever. When, therefore, the boundary and limit, that millennial interspace, has been passed, when even the outward fashion of the world itself - which has been spread like a veil over the eternal economy, equally a thing of time - passes away, then the whole human race shall be raised again, to have its dues meted out according as it has merited in the period of good or evil, and thereafter to have these paid out through the immeasurable ages of eternity. Therefore after this there is neither death nor repeated resurrections, but we shall be the same that we are now, and still unchanged - the servants of God, ever with God, clothed upon with the proper substance of eternity; but the profane, and all who are not true worshippers of God, in like manner shall be consigned to the punishment of everlasting fire- that fire which, from its very nature indeed, directly ministers to their incorruptibility. The philosophers are familiar as well as we with the distinction between a common and a secret fire. Thus that which is in common use is far different from that which we see in divine judgments, whether striking as thunderbolts from heaven, or bursting up out of the earth through mountain-tops; for it does not consume what it scorches, but while it burns it repairs. So the mountains continue ever burning; and a person struck by lighting is even now kept safe from any destroying flame. A notable proof this of the fire eternal! A notable example of the endless judgment which still supplies punishment with fuel! The mountains burn, and last. How will it be with the wicked and the enemies of God? "". None |
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20. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Plato, Tripartite division of soul • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Division of • soul, divisibility into spatial-parts vs. capacity-parts
Found in books: Carter (2019) 218; Sorabji (2000) 95
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21. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.110, 8.32 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, division of emotions • Plato, Tripartite division of soul • Pythagoreans, division of mathematici and acousmati • Soul, seeAristotle, Chrysippus, Plato, Posidonius,; Division of • fear, Stoic division of emotions • soul, division of
Found in books: Agri (2022) 18; Geljon and Runia (2019) 121; Sorabji (2000) 44, 64; Wardy and Warren (2018) 164
| 7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.
8.32. The whole air is full of souls which are called genii or heroes; these are they who send men dreams and signs of future disease and health, and not to men alone, but to sheep also and cattle as well; and it is to them that purifications and lustrations, all divination, omens and the like, have reference. The most momentous thing in human life is the art of winning the soul to good or to evil. Blest are the men who acquire a good soul; they can never be at rest, nor ever keep the same course two days together.''. None |
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22. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History, 4.22.5 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Heresy, division/multiplicity of • angels, divide the world by lot
Found in books: Boulluec (2022) 99, 100; Williams (2009) 69
| 4.22.5. But Thebuthis, because he was not made bishop, began to corrupt it. He also was sprung from the seven sects among the people, like Simon, from whom came the Simonians, and Cleobius, from whom came the Cleobians, and Dositheus, from whom came the Dositheans, and Gorthaeus, from whom came the Goratheni, and Masbotheus, from whom came the Masbothaeans. From them sprang the Medrianists, and Marcionists, and Carpocratians, and Valentinians, and Basilidians, and Saturnilians. Each introduced privately and separately his own peculiar opinion. From them came false Christs, false prophets, false apostles, who divided the unity of the Church by corrupt doctrines uttered against God and against his Christ.''. None |
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23. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • soul, as divided or undivided • soul, divisions of
Found in books: Blidstein (2017) 32; Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 213
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24. Demosthenes, Orations, 48.12
Tagged with subjects: • division of inheritance • inheritance, division
Found in books: Bremmer (2008) 66; Humphreys (2018) 166
| 48.12. When we had exchanged oaths, and the articles had been deposited with Androcleides, I divided the property into two shares, men of the jury. One share consisted of the house in which Comon himself had lived, and the slaves engaged in weaving sackcloth, and the other of another house and the slaves engaged in grinding colors. Whatever ready money Comon left in the bank of Heracleides had been nearly all spent on his burial and the other funeral rites, and on the building of his tomb.''. None |
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25. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • meat of sacrificial victims, division of • meat, division of • victim (sacrificial), divided into nine parts
Found in books: Ekroth (2013) 220, 288, 323, 324; Lupu(2005) 266, 373
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26. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • meat, division of • victim (sacrificial), divided into nine parts
Found in books: Ekroth (2013) 221; Lupu(2005) 373
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