| 1. Xenophon, The Persian Expedition, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 114 |
2. Plato, Theages, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 115, 177| 128d. ΣΩ. οὔκ, ὠγαθέ, ἀλλά σε λέληθεν οἷον τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ἐγὼ δέ σοι φράσω. ἔστι γάρ τι θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἣ ὅταν γένηται ἀεί μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι τῶν φίλων ἀνακοινῶται καὶ γένηται ἡ φωνή, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, ἀποτρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πράττειν. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. Χαρμίδην γὰρ τουτονὶ γιγνώσκετε τὸν καλὸν | 128d. Soc. No, good sir, the meaning of it escapes you; but I will tell it you. There is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything; and if one of my friends consults me and the voice occurs, the same thing happens: it prohibits, and does not allow him to act. And I will produce witnesses to convince you of these facts. You know our Charmides here, who has grown so handsome, the son of Glaucon: |
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3. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 118| 150c. τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοί μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαί με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς | |
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4. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 244| 203c. τε παρʼ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκύησε τὸν ἔρωτα. διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκόλουθος καὶ θεράπων γέγονεν ὁ Ἔρως, γεννηθεὶς ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνης γενεθλίοις, καὶ ἅμα φύσει ἐραστὴς ὢν περὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης καλῆς οὔσης. ἅτε οὖν Πόρου καὶ Πενίας ὑὸς ὢν ὁ Ἔρως ἐν τοιαύτῃ τύχῃ καθέστηκεν. πρῶτον μὲν πένης ἀεί ἐστι, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ ἁπαλός τε καὶ καλός, οἷον οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἀλλὰ σκληρὸς | 203c. and lying down by his side she conceived Love. Hence it is that Love from the beginning has been attendant and minister to Aphrodite, since he was begotten on the day of her birth, and is, moreover, by nature a lover bent on beauty since Aphrodite is beautiful. Now, as the son of Resource and Poverty, Love is in a peculiar case. First, he is ever poor, and far from tender or beautiful as most suppose him: |
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| 5. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 115, 116 |
6. Plato, Statesman, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 25| 272e. δὴ καὶ τὸ γήινον ἤδη πᾶν ἀνήλωτο γένος, πάσας ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς γενέσεις ἀποδεδωκυίας, ὅσα ἦν ἑκάστῃ προσταχθὲν τοσαῦτα εἰς γῆν σπέρματα πεσούσης, τότε δὴ τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης, οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος, εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη, τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία. ΞΕ. πάντες οὖν οἱ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους συνάρχοντες τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονι θεοί, γνόντες ἤδη τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀφίεσαν αὖ τὰ μέρη τοῦ | 272e. ince every soul had fulfilled all its births by falling into the earth as seed its prescribed number of times, then the helmsman of the universe dropped the tiller and withdrew to his place of outlook, and fate and innate desire made the earth turn backwards. Str. So, too, all the gods who share, each in his own sphere, the rule of the Supreme Spirit, promptly perceiving what was taking place, let go the parts of the world which were under their care. |
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7. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 115| 242b. λόγων μηδένα πλείους ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι γεγενῆσθαι ἤτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα —Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πάμπολυ κρατεῖς—καὶ νῦν αὖ δοκεῖς αἴτιός μοι γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι. ΦΑΙ. οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτῳ; ΣΩ. ἡνίκʼ ἔμελλον, ὠγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο | 242b. no one of all those who have been born in your lifetime has produced more discourses than you, either by speaking them yourself or compelling others to do so. I except Simmias the Theban; but you are far ahead of all the rest. And now I think you have become the cause of another, spoken by me. Phaedrus. That is not exactly a declaration of war! But how is this, and what is the discourse? Socrates. My good friend, when I was about to cross the stream, the spirit and the sign |
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| 8. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 244 |
9. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177| 195e. ΛΑ. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε τοὺς μάντεις καλεῖ τοὺς ἀνδρείους· τίς γὰρ δὴ ἄλλος εἴσεται ὅτῳ ἄμεινον ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι; καίτοι σύ, ὦ Νικία, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς μάντις εἶναι ἢ οὔτε μάντις οὔτε ἀνδρεῖος; ΝΙ. τί δέ; μάντει αὖ οἴει προσήκει τὰ δεινὰ γιγνώσκειν καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα; ΛΑ. ἔγωγε· τίνι γὰρ ἄλλῳ; ΝΙ. ὧι ἐγὼ λέγω πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε· ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα μόνον δεῖ γιγνώσκειν τῶν ἐσομένων, εἴτε τῳ θάνατος εἴτε νόσος εἴτε ἀποβολὴ χρημάτων ἔσται, | 195e. Lach. I do: it seems to be the seers whom he calls the courageous: for who else can know for which of us it is better to be alive than dead? And yet, Nicias, do you avow yourself to be a seer, or to be neither a seer nor courageous? Nic. What! Is it now a seer, think you, who has the gift of judging what is to be dreaded and what to be dared? Lach. That is my view: who else could it be? Nic. Much rather the man of whom I speak, my dear sir: for the seer’s business is to judge only the signs of what is yet to come—whether a man is to meet with death or disease or loss of property, |
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10. Plato, Greater Hippias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 116| 304b. τινὶ ἀρχῇ, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, πείσαντα οἴχεσθαι φέροντα οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἄθλων, σωτηρίαν αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ χρημάτων καὶ φίλων. τούτων οὖν χρὴ ἀντέχεσθαι, χαίρειν ἐάσαντα τὰς σμικρολογίας ταύτας, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ λίαν ἀνόητος εἶναι λήρους καὶ φλυαρίας ὥσπερ νῦν μεταχειριζόμενος. ΣΩ. ὦ Ἱππία φίλε, σὺ μὲν μακάριος εἶ, ὅτι τε οἶσθα ἃ χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἐπιτετήδευκας ἱκανῶς, ὡς | 304b. to convince the audience and to carry off, not the smallest, but the greatest of prizes, the salvation of oneself, one’s property, and one’s friends. For these things, therefore, one must strive, renouncing these petty arguments, that one may not, by busying oneself, as at present, with mere talk and nonsense, appear to be a fool. Soc. My dear Hippias, you are blessed because you know the things a man ought to practise, and have, as you say, practised them satisfactorily. But I, as it seems, am possessed by some accursed fortune, |
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11. Plato, Euthyphro, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 25, 114, 115| 3b. ΣΩ. ἄτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτω γʼ ἀκοῦσαι. φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεοὺς τοὺς δʼ ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν. ΕΥΘ. μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῂς σαυτῷ ἑκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, | 3b. Socrates. Absurd things, my friend, at first hearing. For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says. Euthyphro. I understand, Socrates; it is because you say the divine monitor keeps coming to you. So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion, and he is going into court to slander you, knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people. Why, they even laugh at me and say I am crazy |
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12. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 115 | 272e. to expound the whole thing from the beginning. By some providence I chanced to be sitting in the place where you saw me, in the undressing-room, alone, and was just intending to get up and go; but the moment I did so, there came my wonted spiritual sign. Soc. So I sat down again, |
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13. Plato, Crito, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 116| 54e. ΣΩ. ἔα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται. | 54e. Socrates. Then, Crito, let it be; and let us act in this way, since it is in this way that God leads us. |
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14. Plato, Cratylus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 244| 404c. ἀέρα Ἥραν ὠνόμασεν ἐπικρυπτόμενος, θεὶς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τελευτήν· γνοίης δʼ ἄν, εἰ πολλάκις λέγοις τὸ τῆς Ἥρας ὄνομα. Φερρέφαττα δέ· πολλοὶ μὲν καὶ τοῦτο φοβοῦνται τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος. καὶ γὰρ μεταβάλλοντες σκοποῦνται τὴν Φερσεφόνην, καὶ δεινὸν αὐτοῖς φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ μηνύει | 404c. ἐρατή ), as indeed, Zeus is said to have married her for love. But perhaps the lawgiver had natural phenomena in mind, and called her Hera ( Ἥρα ) as a disguise for ἀήρ (air), putting the beginning at the end. You would understand, if you were to repeat the name Hera over and over. And Pherephatta!—How many people fear this name, and also Apollo! I imagine it is because they do not know about correctness of names. You see they change the name to Phersephone and its aspect frightens them. But really the name indicates that the goddess is wise; |
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15. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 118| 29d. ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῇ —εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, | 29d. if you should let me go on this condition which I have mentioned, I should say to you, Men of Athens , I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way: Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens , the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth |
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16. Plato, Alcibiades Ii, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 244| 143b. αὐτοὺς διὰ ταύτην καὶ πράττοντες καὶ τό γε ἔσχατον εὐχόμενοι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ κάκιστα. ὅπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς ἂν οἰηθείη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν οἴοιτο ἱκανὸς εἶναι, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εὔξασθαι, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ κάκιστα. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατάρᾳ τινὶ ἀλλʼ οὐκ εὐχῇ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως, ὦ βέλτιστε, φαίη ἄν τις ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ σοφώτερος ὢν τυγχάνοι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς | 143b. but—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer! Soc. But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance, |
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17. Plato, Alcibiades I, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 116| 124c. βέλτιστοι γενοίμεθα. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι οὐ περὶ μὲν σοῦ λέγω ὡς χρὴ παιδευθῆναι, περὶ ἐμοῦ δὲ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅτῳ σου διαφέρω πλήν γʼ ἑνί. ΑΛ. τίνι; ΣΩ. ὁ ἐπίτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ σοφώτερος ἢ Περικλῆς ὁ σός. ΑΛ. τίς οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. θεός, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὅσπερ σοί με οὐκ εἴα πρὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας διαλεχθῆναι· ᾧ καὶ πιστεύων λέγω ὅτι ἡ ἐπιφάνεια διʼ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου σοι ἔσται ἢ διʼ ἐμοῦ. | 124c. we can improve ourselves to the utmost. For observe that when I speak of the need of being educated I am not referring only to you, apart from myself; since my case is identical with yours except in one point. Alc. What is that ? Soc. My guardian is better and wiser than your one, Pericles. Alc. Who is he, Socrates? Soc. God, Alcibiades, who until this day would not let me converse with you; and trusting in him I say that through no other man but me will you attain to eminence. |
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| 18. Xenophon, Symposium, 4.47-4.49, 8.5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 116, 118, 177, 244 |
| 19. Xenophon, Apology, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 115, 117, 118, 177 |
20. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 120| 71a. τὸ κράτιστον καθʼ ἡσυχίαν περὶ τοῦ πᾶσι κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ συμφέροντος ἐῷ βουλεύεσθαι, διὰ ταῦτα ἐνταῦθʼ ἔδοσαν αὐτῷ τὴν τάξιν. εἰδότες δὲ αὐτὸ ὡς λόγου μὲν οὔτε συνήσειν ἔμελλεν, εἴ τέ πῃ καὶ μεταλαμβάνοι τινὸς αὐτῶν αἰσθήσεως, οὐκ ἔμφυτον αὐτῷ τὸ μέλειν τινῶν ἔσοιτο λόγων, ὑπὸ δὲ εἰδώλων καὶ φαντασμάτων νυκτός τε καὶ μεθʼ ἡμέραν μάλιστα ψυχαγωγήσοιτο, τούτῳ δὴ θεὸς ἐπιβουλεύσας αὐτῷ τὴν ἥπατος | 71a. concerning what benefits all, both individually and in the mass,—for these reasons they stationed it in that position. And inasmuch as they knew that it would not understand reason, and that, even if it did have some share in the perception of reasons, it would have no natural instinct to pay heed to any of them but would be bewitched for the most part both day and night by images and phantasms,—to guard against this God devised and constructed the form of the liver and placed it in that part’s abode; |
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| 21. Xenophon, On Household Management, 5.19-6.1, 11.7, 11.8 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177 |
22. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.1.2-1.1.9, 1.1.18-1.1.20, 1.3.2, 1.3.4, 1.4.14-1.4.18, 4.3.12, 4.7.10, 4.8.1-4.8.6, 4.8.11, 4.14.19-4.14.25 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 25, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 120, 155, 177, 244| 1.1.2. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς, ποίῳ ποτʼ ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἦν. διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. 1.1.3. ὁ δʼ οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὗτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κἀκεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν. 1.1.4. ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοί φασιν ὑπό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντώντων ἀποτρέπεσθαί τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι· Σωκράτης δʼ ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε. 1.1.5. καίτοι τίς οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν αὐτὸν βούλεσθαι μήτʼ ἠλίθιον μήτʼ ἀλαζόνα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς συνοῦσιν; ἐδόκει δʼ ἂν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, εἰ προαγορεύων ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ φαινόμενα καὶ ψευδόμενος ἐφαίνετο. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν προέλεγεν, εἰ μὴ ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύσειν. ταῦτα δὲ τίς ἂν ἄλλῳ πιστεύσειεν ἢ θεῷ; πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς πῶς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τάδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους. 1.1.6. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστʼ ἂν πραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσομένους ἔπεμπεν, εἰ ποιητέα. 1.1.7. καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ λογιστικὸν ἢ οἰκονομικὸν ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ αἱρετὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι· 1.1.8. τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ καλῶς ἀγρὸν φυτευσαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις καρπώσεται, οὔτε τῷ καλῶς οἰκίαν οἰκοδομησαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις ἐνοικήσει, οὔτε τῷ στρατηγικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει στρατηγεῖν, οὔτε τῷ πολιτικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει τῆς πόλεως προστατεῖν, οὔτε τῷ καλὴν γήμαντι, ἵνʼ εὐφραίνηται, δῆλον εἰ διὰ ταύτην ἀνιάσεται, οὔτε τῷ δυνατοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει κηδεστὰς λαβόντι δῆλον εἰ διὰ τούτους στερήσεται τῆς πόλεως. 1.1.9. τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης, δαιμονᾶν ἔφη· δαιμονᾶν δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντευομένους ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν (οἷον εἴ τις ἐπερωτῴη πότερον ἐπιστάμενον ἡνιοχεῖν ἐπὶ ζεῦγος λαβεῖν κρεῖττον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, ἢ πότερον ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν κρεῖττον λαβεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον), ἢ ἃ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας ἢ μετρήσαντας ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι· τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθανομένους ἀθέμιτα ποιεῖν ἡγεῖτο. ἔφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μανθάνειν, ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἵλεῳ σημαίνειν. 1.1.18. βουλεύσας γάρ ποτε καὶ τὸν βουλευτικὸν ὅρκον ὀμόσας, ἐν ᾧ ἦν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλεύσειν, ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγοὺς μιᾷ ψήφῳ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον καὶ Ἐρασινίδην ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσαι, ὀργιζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων· ἀλλὰ περὶ πλείονος ἐποιήσατο εὐορκεῖν ἢ χαρίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ φυλάξασθαι τοὺς ἀπειλοῦντας. 1.1.19. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ὃν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν· οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ μὲν εἰδέναι, τὰ δʼ οὐκ εἰδέναι· Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων. 1.1.20. θαυμάζω οὖν ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπείσθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι Σωκράτην περὶ θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν, τὸν ἀσεβὲς μὲν οὐδέν ποτε περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτʼ εἰπόντα οὔτε πράξαντα, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ λέγοντα καὶ πράττοντα περὶ θεῶν οἷά τις ἂν καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων εἴη τε καὶ νομίζοιτο εὐσεβέστατος. 1.3.2. καὶ ηὔχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἁπλῶς τἀγαθὰ διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὁποῖα ἀγαθά ἐστι· τοὺς δʼ εὐχομένους χρυσίον ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν διάφορον ἐνόμιζεν εὔχεσθαι ἢ εἰ κυβείαν ἢ μάχην ἢ ἄλλο τι εὔχοιντο τῶν φανερῶς ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο. 1.3.4. εἰ δέ τι δόξειεν αὐτῷ σημαίνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἧττον ἂν ἐπείσθη παρὰ τὰ σημαινόμενα ποιῆσαι ἢ εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἔπειθεν ὁδοῦ λαβεῖν ἡγεμόνα τυφλὸν καὶ μὴ εἰδότα τὴν ὁδὸν ἀντὶ βλέποντος καὶ εἰδότος· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ μωρίαν κατηγόρει, οἵτινες παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν σημαινόμενα ποιοῦσί τι, φυλαττόμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδοξίαν· αὐτὸς δὲ πάντα τἀνθρώπινα ὑπερεώρα πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμβουλίαν. 1.4.14. οὐ γὰρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον ὅτι παρὰ τἆλλα ζῷα ὥσπερ θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες; οὔτε γὰρ βοὸς ἂν ἔχων σῶμα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ γνώμην ἐδύνατʼ ἂν πράττειν ἃ ἐβούλετο, οὔθʼ ὅσα χεῖρας ἔχει, ἄφρονα δʼ ἐστί, πλέον οὐδὲν ἔχει. σὺ δʼ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πλείστου ἀξίων τετυχηκὼς οὐκ οἴει σοῦ θεοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; ἀλλʼ ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι, νομιεῖς αὐτοὺς σοῦ φροντίζειν; 1.4.15. ὅταν πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σὺ φὴς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. ὅταν δὲ Ἀθηναίοις, ἔφη, πυνθανομένοις τι διὰ μαντικῆς φράζωσιν, οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖς φράζειν αὐτούς, οὐδʼ ὅταν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τέρατα πέμποντες προσημαίνωσιν, οὐδʼ ὅταν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ μόνον σὲ ἐξαιροῦντες ἐν ἀμελείᾳ κατατίθενται; 1.4.16. οἴει δʼ ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι ὡς ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατωμένους τὸν πάντα χρόνον οὐδέποτʼ ἂν αἰσθέσθαι; οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολυχρονιώτατα καὶ σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη, θεοσεβέστατά ἐστι, καὶ αἱ φρονιμώταται ἡλικίαι θεῶν ἐπιμελέσταται; 1.4.17. ὠγαθέ, ἔφη, κατάμαθε ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται. οἴεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν, μηδὲ τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φροντίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἱκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. 1.4.18. ἂν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύων γιγνώσκεις τοὺς ἀντιθεραπεύειν ἐθέλοντας καὶ χαριζόμενος τοὺς ἀντιχαριζομένους καὶ συμβουλευόμενος καταμανθάνεις τοὺς φρονίμους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν θεῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνῃς θεραπεύων, εἴ τί σοι θελήσουσι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνθρώποις συμβουλεύειν, γνώσει τὸ θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥσθʼ ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτούς . 4.3.12. τὸ δὲ καὶ ἑρμηνείαν δοῦναι, διʼ ἧς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδίδομέν τε ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν καὶ νόμους τιθέμεθα καὶ πολιτευόμεθα; παντάπασιν ἐοίκασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ θεοὶ πολλὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ καί, ᾗ ἀδυνατοῦμεν τὰ συμφέροντα προνοεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων, ταύτῃ αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν συνεργεῖν, διὰ μαντικῆς τοῖς πυνθανομένοις φράζοντας τὰ ἀποβησόμενα καὶ διδάσκοντας ᾗ ἂν ἄριστα γίγνοιτο; σοὶ δʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή. 4.7.10. εἰ δέ τις μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν ὠφελεῖσθαι βούλοιτο, συνεβούλευε μαντικῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τὸν γὰρ εἰδότα διʼ ὧν οἱ θεοὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σημαίνουσιν οὐδέποτʼ ἔρημον ἔφη γίγνεσθαι συμβουλῆς θεῶν. 4.8.1. εἰ δέ τις, ὅτι φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἅ τε δέοι καὶ ἃ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος, οἴεται αὐτὸν ἐλέγχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου ψευδόμενον, ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὕτως ἤδη τότε πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἦν, ὥστʼ, εἰ καὶ μὴ τότε, οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ ὕστερον τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον· εἶτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀχθεινότατόν τε τοῦ βίου καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντες τὴν διάνοιαν μειοῦνται ἀπέλιπεν, ἀντὶ δὲ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ῥώμην ἐπιδειξάμενος εὔκλειαν προσεκτήσατο, τήν τε δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιότατα εἰπὼν καὶ τὴν κατάγνωσιν τοῦ θανάτου πραότατα καὶ ἀνδρωδέστατα ἐνέγκας. 4.8.2. ὁμολογεῖται γὰρ οὐδένα πω τῶν μνημονευομένων ἀνθρώπων κάλλιον θάνατον ἐνεγκεῖν. ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βιῶναι διὰ τὸ Δήλια μὲν ἐκείνου τοῦ μηνὸς εἶναι, τὸν δὲ νόμον μηδένα ἐᾶν δημοσίᾳ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἕως ἂν ἡ θεωρία ἐκ Δήλου ἐπανέλθῃ, καὶ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἅπασι τοῖς συνήθεσι φανερὸς ἐγένετο οὐδὲν ἀλλοιότερον διαβιοὺς ἢ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον· καίτοι τὸν ἔμπροσθέν γε πάντων ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα ἐθαυμάζετο ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμως τε καὶ εὐκόλως ζῆν. 4.8.3. καὶ πῶς ἄν τις κάλλιον ἢ οὕτως ἀποθάνοι; ἢ ποῖος ἂν εἴη θάνατος καλλίων ἢ ὃν κάλλιστά τις ἀποθάνοι; ποῖος δʼ ἂν γένοιτο θάνατος εὐδαιμονέστερος τοῦ καλλίστου; ἢ ποῖος θεοφιλέστερος τοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου; 4.8.4. λέξω δὲ καὶ ἃ Ἑρμογένους τοῦ Ἱππονίκου ἤκουσα περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἔφη γάρ, ἤδη Μελήτου γεγραμμένου αὐτὸν τὴν γραφήν, αὐτὸς ἀκούων αὐτοῦ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῆς δίκης διαλεγομένου λέγειν αὐτῷ ὡς χρὴ σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἀπολογήσεται. τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι τοῦτο μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι; ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὅπως, εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιῶν διαγεγένηται ἢ διασκοπῶν μὲν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπεχόμενος, ἥνπερ νομίζοι καλλίστην μελέτην ἀπολογίας εἶναι. 4.8.5. αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν εἰπεῖν· οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἱ Ἀθήνησι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέλυσαν; ἀλλὰ νὴ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἠναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. 4.8.6. καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν· θαυμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸν δέ, θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἤδη; οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἐγὼ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἂν οὔτε βέλτιον οὔθʼ ἥδιον ἐμαυτοῦ βεβιωκέναι; ἄριστα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ζῆν τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δὲ τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους ὅτι βελτίους γίγνονται. 4.8.11. τῶν δὲ Σωκράτην γιγνωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν, οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἔτι καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐμοὶ μὲν δή, τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷον ἐγὼ διήγημαι, εὐσεβὴς μὲν οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν, δίκαιος δὲ ὥστε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδένα, ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὥστε μηδέποτε προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ ἥδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος, φρόνιμος δὲ ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ λόγῳ εἰπεῖν τε καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλως δοκιμάσαι τε καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἐλέγξαι καὶ προτρέψασθαι ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ καλοκαγαθίαν, ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός τε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. εἰ δέ τῳ μὴ ἀρέσκει ταῦτα, παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ἦθος πρὸς ταῦτα οὕτω κρινέτω. | 1.1.2. First then, that he rejected the gods acknowledged by the state — what evidence did they produce of that? He offered sacrifices constantly, and made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the altars of the state temples, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy. Indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by the deity: That immanent divine something, as Cicero terms it, which Socrates claimed as his peculiar possession. it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities arose. 1.1.3. He was no more bringing in anything strange than are other believers in divination, who rely on augury, oracles, coincidences and sacrifices. For these men’s belief is not that the birds or the folk met by accident know what profits the inquirer, but that they are the instruments by which the gods make this known; and that was Socrates ’ belief too. 1.1.4. Only, whereas most men say that the birds or the folk they meet dissuade or encourage them, Socrates said what he meant: for he said that the deity gave him a sign. Many of his companions were counselled by him to do this or not to do that in accordance with the warnings of the deity: and those who followed his advice prospered, and those who rejected it had cause for regret. 1.1.5. And yet who would not admit that he wished to appear neither a knave nor a fool to his companions? but he would have been thought both, had he proved to be mistaken when he alleged that his counsel was in accordance with divine revelation. Obviously, then, he would not have given the counsel if he had not been confident that what he said would come true. And who could have inspired him with that confidence but a god? And since he had confidence in the gods, how can he have disbelieved in the existence of the gods? 1.1.6. Another way he had of dealing with intimate friends was this: if there was no room for doubt, he advised them to act as they thought best; but if the consequences could not be foreseen, he sent them to the oracle to inquire whether the thing ought to be done. 1.1.7. Those who intended to control a house or a city, he said, needed the help of divination. For the craft of carpenter, smith, farmer or ruler, and the theory of such crafts, and arithmetic and economics and generalship might be learned and mastered by the application of human powers; 1.1.8. but the deepest secrets of these matters the gods reserved to themselves; they were dark to men. You may plant a field well; but you know not who shall gather the fruits: you may build a house well; but you know not who shall dwell in it: able to command, you cannot know whether it is profitable to command: versed in statecraft, you know not whether it is profitable to guide the state: though, for your delight, you marry a pretty woman, you cannot tell whether she will bring you sorrow: though you form a party among men mighty in the state, you know not whether they will cause you to be driven from the state. 1.1.9. If any man thinks that these matters are wholly within the grasp of the human mind and nothing in them is beyond our reason, that man, he said, is irrational. But it is no less irrational to seek the guidance of heaven in matters which men are permitted by the gods to decide for themselves by study: to ask, for instance, Is it better to get an experienced coachman to drive my carriage or a man without experience? Cyropaedia I. vi. 6. Is it better to get an experienced seaman to steer my ship or a man without experience? So too with what we may know by reckoning, measurement or weighing. To put such questions to the gods seemed to his mind profane. In short, what the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination: for to him that is in their grace the gods grant a sign. 1.1.18. For instance, when he was on the Council and had taken the counsellor’s oath by which he bound himself to give counsel in accordance with the laws, it fell to his lot to preside in the Assembly when the people wanted to condemn Thrasyllus and Erasinides and their colleagues to death by a single vote. That was illegal, and he refused the motion in spite of popular rancour and the threats of many powerful persons. It was more to him that he should keep his oath than that he should humour the people in an unjust demand and shield himself from threats. 1.1.19. For, like most men, indeed, he believed that the gods are heedful of mankind, but with an important difference; for whereas they do not believe in the omniscience of the gods, Socrates thought that they know all things, our words and deeds and secret purposes; that they are present everywhere, and grant signs to men of all that concerns man. IV. iii, 2; Cyropaedia I. vi. 46. 1.1.20. I wonder, then, how the Athenians can have been persuaded that Socrates was a freethinker, when he never said or did anything contrary to sound religion, and his utterances about the gods and his behaviour towards them were the words and actions of a man who is truly religious and deserves to be thought so. 1.3.2. And again, when he prayed he asked simply for good gifts, Cyropaedia I. vi. 5. for the gods know best what things are good. To pray for gold or silver or sovereignty or any other such thing, was just like praying for a gamble or a fight or anything of which the result is obviously uncertain. 1.3.4. If ever any warning seemed to be given him from heaven, he would more easily have been persuaded to choose a blind guide who did not know the road in preference to one who could see and knew the way, than to disregard the admonition. All men, in fact, who flouted the warnings of the gods in their anxiety to avoid the censure of men, he denounced for their foolishness. He himself despised all human opinions in comparison with counsel given by the gods. 1.4.14. For is it not obvious to you that, in comparison with the other animals, men live like gods, by nature peerless both in body and in soul? For with a man’s reason and the body of an ox we could not carry out our wishes, and the possession of hands without reason is of little worth. Do you, then, having received the two most precious gifts, yet think that the gods take no care of you? What are they to do, to make you believe that they are heedful of you? 1.4.15. I will believe when they send counsellors, as you declare they do, saying, Do this, avoid that. But when the Athenians inquire of them by divination and they reply, do you not suppose that to you, too, the answer is given? Or when they send portents for warning to the Greeks, or to all the world? Are you their one exception, the only one consigned to neglect? 1.4.16. Or do you suppose that the gods would have put into man a belief in their ability to help and harm, if they had not that power; and that man throughout the ages would never have detected the fraud? Do you not see that the wisest and most enduring of human institutions, cities and nations, are most god-fearing, and that the most thoughtful period of life is the most religious? 1.4.17. Be well assured, my good friend, that the mind within you directs your body according to its will; and equally you must think that Thought indwelling in the Universal disposes all things according to its pleasure. For think not that your eye can travel over many furlongs and yet god’s eye cannot see the the whole world at once; that your soul can ponder on things in Egypt and in Sicily , and god’s thought is not sufficient to pay heed to the whole world at once. 1.4.18. Nay, but just as by serving men you find out who is willing to serve you in return, by being kind who will be kind to you in return, and by taking counsel, discover the masters of thought, so try the gods by serving them, and see whether they will vouchsafe to counsel you in matters hidden from man. Then you will know that such is the greatness and such the nature of the deity that he sees all things Cyropaedia VIII. vii. 22. and hears all things alike, and is present in all places and heedful of all things. 4.3.12. and think of the power of expression, which enables us to impart to one another all good things by teaching and to take our share of them, to enact laws and to administer states. Truly, Socrates , it does appear that the gods devote much care to man. Yet again, in so far as we are powerless of ourselves to foresee what is expedient for the future, Cyropaedia I. vi. 46. the gods lend us their aid, revealing the issues by divination to inquirers, and teaching them how to obtain the best results. With you, Socrates , they seem to deal even more friendly than with other men, if it is true that, even unasked, they warn you by signs what to do and what not to do. 4.7.10. When anyone was in need of help that human wisdom was unable to give he advised him to resort to divination; for he who knew the means whereby the gods give guidance to men concerning their affairs never lacked divine counsel. 4.8.1. As for his claim that he was forewarned by the deity what he ought to do and what not to do, some may think that it must have been a delusion because he was condemned to death. But they should remember two facts. First, he had already reached such an age, that had he not died then, death must have come to him soon after. Secondly, he escaped the most irksome stage of life and the inevitable diminution of mental powers, and instead won glory by the moral strength revealed in the wonderful honesty and frankness and probity of his defence, and in the equanimity and manliness with which he bore the sentence of death. 4.8.2. In fact it is admitted that there is no record of death more nobly borne. For he was forced to live for thirty days after the verdict was given, because it was the month of the Dêlia, See Plato, Phaedo, p. 58 b. The festival was held in the month Thargelion, our May. and the law did not allow any public execution to take place until the sacred embassy had returned from Delos. During this interval, as all his intimate acquaintances could see, he continued to live exactly as before; and, in truth, before that time he had been admired above all men for his cheerfulness and serenity. 4.8.3. How, then, could man die more nobly? Or what death could be nobler than the death most nobly faced? What death more blessed than the noblest? Or what dearer to the gods than the most blessed? 4.8.4. I will repeat what Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, told me about him. When Meletus had actually formulated his indictment, he said, Socrates talked freely in my presence, but made no reference to the case. I told him that he ought to be thinking about his defence. His first remark was, Don’t you think that I have been preparing for it all my life? And when I asked him how, he said that he had been constantly occupied in the consideration of right and wrong, and in doing what was right and avoiding what was wrong, which he regarded as the best preparation for a defence. 4.8.5. Then I said, Don’t you see, Socrates, that the juries in our courts are apt to be misled by argument, so that they often put the innocent to death, and acquit the guilty? Ah, yes, Hermogenes, he answered, but when I did try to think out my defence to the jury, the deity at once resisted. 4.8.6. Strange words, said I; and he, Do you think it strange, if it seems better to God that I should die now? Don’t you see that to this day I never would acknowledge that any man had lived a better or a pleasanter life than I? For they live best, I think, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the pleasantest life is theirs who are conscious that they are growing in goodness. 4.8.11. This was the tenor of his conversation with Hermogenes and with the others. All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was: so religious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled that he never chose the pleasanter rather than the better course; so wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse, and needed no counsellor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them; masterly in expounding and defining such things; no less masterly in putting others to the test, and convincing them of error and exhorting them to follow virtue and gentleness. To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him set the character of other men beside these things; then let him judge. |
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23. Xenophon, The Education of Cyrus, 1.6.46 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 114| 1.6.46. οὕτως ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἶδε τὸ ἄριστον αἱρεῖσθαι ἢ εἰ κληρούμενος ὅ τι λάχοι τοῦτό τις πράττοι. θεοὶ δέ, ὦ παῖ, αἰεὶ ὄντες πάντα ἴσασι τά τε γεγενημένα καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὅ τι ἐξ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται, καὶ τῶν συμβουλευομένων ἀνθρώπων οἷς ἂν ἵλεῳ ὦσι, προσημαίνουσιν ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ οὐ χρή. εἰ δὲ μὴ πᾶσιν ἐθέλουσι συμβουλεύειν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ὧν ἂν μὴ θέλωσιν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. | 1.6.46. |
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| 24. Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.24-7.35 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 155 |
| 25. Xenophon, The Cavalry General, 9.8-9.9 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 114 |
| 26. Anaximenes of Lampsacus, Rhetoric To Alexander, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 244 |
| 27. Bion Proconnesius 3. Jh. N. Chr, Fragments, 29 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177 |
| 28. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 26 |
| 29. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 119 |
| 30. Aristotle, Prophesying By Dreams, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 244 |
| 31. Chrysippus, Fragments, 2.1103-2.1104, 3.4 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 26 |
| 32. Plutarch, Moralia, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 244 |
| 33. €˜Constantius of Lyon’, Life of St Germanus of Auxerre, None Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 119 |
| 34. Diogenes Laertius, Fragments, [G] V B, None Tagged with subjects: •divination, and socrates Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 114 |
