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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

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4 results for "diogenes"
1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 9.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylonia Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 225, 228, 229
9.20. "And Noah, the man of the land, began and planted a vineyard.",
2. Homer, Iliad, 3.30 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylonia Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 228
3.30. / But when godlike Alexander was ware of him as he appeared among the champions, his heart was smitten, and back he shrank into the throng of his comrades, avoiding fate. And even as a man at sight of a snake in the glades of a mountain starteth back, and trembling seizeth his limbs beneath him,
3. Philo of Alexandria, On The Preliminary Studies, 149 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylonia Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 225
4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.57-7.58, 7.63, 7.66, 7.68-7.69, 7.71-7.75 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •diogenes of babylonia Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 225, 228, 229
7.57. Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible – which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse. 7.58. There are, as stated by Diogenes in his treatise on Language and by Chrysippus, five parts of speech: proper name, common noun, verb, conjunction, article. To these Antipater in his work On Words and their Meaning adds another part, the mean.A common noun or appellative is defined by Diogenes as part of a sentence signifying a common quality, e.g. man, horse; whereas a name is a part of speech expressing a quality peculiar to an individual, e.g. Diogenes, Socrates. A verb is, according to Diogenes, a part of speech signifying an isolated predicate, or, as others define it, an un-declined part of a sentence, signifying something that can be attached to one or more subjects, e.g. I write, I speak. A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech, binding the various parts of a statement together; and an article is a declinable part of speech, distinguishing the genders and numbers of nouns, e.g. ὁ, ἡ, τό, οἱ, αἱ, τά. 7.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries. 7.66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place. 7.68. There is also, differing from a proposition or judgement, what may be called a timid suggestion, the expression of which leaves one at a loss, e.g.Can it be that pain and life are in some sort akin?Interrogations, inquiries and the like are neither true nor false, whereas judgements (or propositions) are always either true or false.The followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and Crinis divide propositions into simple and not simple. Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as It is day. Not simple are those that consist of one or more ambiguous propositions. 7.69. They may, that is, consist either of a single ambiguous proposition, e.g. If it is day, it is day, or of more than one proposition, e.g. If it is day, it is light.With simple propositions are classed those of negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definitive and the indefinitive; with those that are not simple the hypothetical, the inferential, the coupled or complex, the disjunctive, the causal, and that which indicates more or less. An example of a negative proposition is It is not day. of the negative proposition one species is the double negative. By double negative is meant the negation of a negation, e.g. It is not not-day. Now this presupposes that it is day. 7.71. of propositions that are not simple the hypothetical, according to Chrysippus in his Dialectics and Diogenes in his Art of Dialectic, is one that is formed by means of the conditional conjunction If. Now this conjunction promises that the second of two things follows consequentially upon the first, as, for instance, If it is day, it is light. An inferential proposition according to Crinis in his Art of Dialectic is one which is introduced by the conjunction Since and consists of an initial proposition and a conclusion; for example, Since it is day-time, it is light. This conjunction guarantees both that the second thing follows from the first and that the first is really a fact. 7.72. A coupled proposition is one which is put together by certain coupling conjunctions, e.g. It is day-time and it is light. A disjunctive proposition is one which is constituted such by the disjunctive conjunction Either, as e.g. Either it is day or it is night. This conjunction guarantees that one or other of the alternatives is false. A causal proposition is constructed by means of the conjunction Because, e.g. Because it is day, it is light. For the first clause is, as it were, the cause of the second. A proposition which indicates more or less is one that is formed by the word signifying rather and the word than in between the clauses, as, for example, It is rather day-time than night. 7.73. Opposite in character to the foregoing is a proposition which declares what is less the fact, as e.g. It is less or not so much night as day. Further, among propositions there are some which in respect of truth and falsehood stand opposed to one another, of which the one is the negative of the other, as e.g. the propositions It is day and It is not day. A hypothetical proposition is therefore true, if the contradictory of its conclusion is incompatible with its premiss, e.g. If it is day, it is light. This is true. For the statement It is not light, contradicting the conclusion, is incompatible with the premiss It is day. On the other hand, a hypothetical proposition is false, if the contradictory of its conclusion does not conflict with the premiss, e.g. If it is day, Dion is walking. For the statement Dion is not walking does not conflict with the premiss It is day. 7.74. An inferential proposition is true if starting from a true premiss it also has a consequent conclusion, as e.g. Since it is day, the sun is above the horizon. But it is false if it starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion, as e.g. Since it is night, Dion is walking, if this be said in day-time. A causal proposition is true if its conclusion really follows from a premiss itself true, though the premiss does not follow conversely from the conclusion, as e.g. Because it is day, it is light, where from the it is day the it is light duly follows, though from the statement it is light it would not follow that it is day. But a causal proposition is false if it either starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion or has a premiss that does not correspond with the conclusion, as e.g. Because it is night, Dion is walking. 7.75. A probable judgement is one which induces to assent, e.g. Whoever gave birth to anything, is that thing's mother. This, however, is not necessarily true; for the hen is not mother of an egg.Again, some things are possible, others impossible; and some things are necessary, others are not necessary. A proposition is possible which admits of being true, there being nothing in external circumstances to prevent it being true, e.g. Diocles is alive. Impossible is one which does not admit of being true, as e.g. The earth flies. That is necessary which besides being true does not admit of being false or, while it may admit of being false, is prevented from being false by circumstances external to itself, as Virtue is beneficial. Not necessary is that which, while true, yet is capable of being false if there are no external conditions to prevent, e.g. Dion is walking.