1. Theophrastus, Fragments, 561, 567b (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268 |
2. Cicero, Academica, 2.118 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 |
3. Cicero, On Divination, 1.5, 1.112, 2.28, 2.30, 2.33-2.34, 2.124, 2.142 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 1.5. Atque haec, ut ego arbitror, veteres rerum magis eventis moniti quam ratione docti probaverunt. Philosophorum vero exquisita quaedam argumenta, cur esset vera divinatio, collecta sunt; e quibus, ut de antiquissumis loquar, Colophonius Xenophanes unus, qui deos esse diceret, divinationem funditus sustulit; reliqui vero omnes praeter Epicurum balbutientem de natura deorum divinationem probaverunt, sed non uno modo. Nam cum Socrates omnesque Socratici Zenoque et ii, qui ab eo essent profecti, manerent in antiquorum philosophorum sententia vetere Academia et Peripateticis consentientibus, cumque huic rei magnam auctoritatem Pythagoras iam ante tribuisset, qui etiam ipse augur vellet esse, plurumisque locis gravis auctor Democritus praesensionem rerum futurarum conprobaret, Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit, Cratippusque, familiaris noster, quem ego parem summis Peripateticis iudico, isdem rebus fidem tribuit, reliqua divinationis genera reiecit. 1.112. Animadverterat fortasse quadam scientia olearum ubertatem fore. Et quidem idem primus defectionem solis, quae Astyage regte facta est, praedixisse fertur. Multa medici, multa gubernatores, agricolae etiam multa praesentiunt, sed nullam eorum divinationem voco, ne illam quidem, qua ab Anaximandro physico moniti Lacedaemonii sunt, ut urbem et tecta linquerent armatique in agro excubarent, quod terrae motus instaret, tum cum et urbs tota corruit et e monte Taygeto extrema montis quasi puppis avolsa est. Ne Pherecydes quidem, ille Pythagorae magister, potius divinus habebitur quam physicus, quod, cum vidisset haustam aquam de iugi puteo, terrae motus dixit instare. 2.28. Ut ordiar ab haruspicina, quam ego rei publicae causa communisque religionis colendam censeo. Sed soli sumus; licet verum exquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitanti. Inspiciamus, si placet, exta primum. Persuaderi igitur cuiquam potest ea, quae significari dicuntur extis, cognita esse ab haruspicibus observatione diuturna? Quam diuturna ista fuit? aut quam longinquo tempore observari potuit? aut quo modo est conlatum inter ipsos, quae pars inimica, quae pars familiaris esset, quod fissum periculum, quod commodum aliquod ostenderet? An haec inter se haruspices Etrusci, Elii, Aegyptii, Poeni contulerunt? At id, praeterquam quod fieri non potuit, ne fingi quidem potest; alios enim alio more videmus exta interpretari, nec esse unam omnium disciplinam. 2.30. Democritus tamen non inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil adrogantius: Quód est ante pedes, némo spectat, caéli scrutantúr plagas. Verum is tamen habitu extorum et colore declarari censet haec dumtaxat: pabuli genus et earum rerum, quas terra procreet, vel ubertatem vel tenuitatem; salubritatem etiam aut pestilentiam extis significari putat. O mortalem beatum! cui certo scio ludum numquam defuisse; huncine hominem tantis delectatum esse nugis, ut non videret tum futurum id veri simile, si omnium pecudum exta eodem tempore in eundem habitum se coloremque converterent? Sed si eadem hora aliae pecudis iecur nitidum atque plenum est, aliae horridum et exile, quid est, quod declarari possit habitu extorum et colore? 2.33. Haec observari certe non potuerunt, ut supra docui. Sunt igitur artis inventa, non vetustatis, si est ars ulla rerum incognitarum; cum rerum autem natura quam cognationem habent? quae ut uno consensu iuncta sit et continens, quod video placuisse physicis, eisque maxume, qui omne, quod esset, unum esse dixerunt, quid habere mundus potest cum thesauri inventione coniunctum? Si enim extis pecuniae mihi amplificatio ostenditur idque fit natura, primum exta sunt coniuncta mundo, deinde meum lucrum natura rerum continetur. Nonne pudet physicos haec dicere? Ut enim iam sit aliqua in natura rerum contagio, quam esse concedo (multa enim Stoici colligunt; nam et musculorum iecuscula bruma dicuntur augeri, et puleium aridum florescere brumali ipso die, et inflatas rumpi vesiculas, et semina malorum, quae in iis mediis inclusa sint, in contrarias partis se vertere, iam nervos in fidibus aliis pulsis resonare alios, ostreisque et conchyliis omnibus contingere, ut cum luna pariter crescant pariterque decrescant, arboresque ut hiemali tempore cum luna simul senescente, quia tum exsiccatae sint, tempestive caedi putentur. 2.34. Quid de fretis aut de marinis aestibus plura dicam? quorum accessus et recessus lunae motu gubertur. Sescenta licet eiusdem modi proferri, ut distantium rerum cognatio naturalis appareat)—demus hoc; nihil enim huic disputationi adversatur; num etiam, si fissum cuiusdam modi fuerit in iecore, lucrum ostenditur? qua ex coniunctione naturae et quasi concentu atque consensu, quam sumpa/qeian Graeci appellant, convenire potest aut fissum iecoris cum lucello meo aut meus quaesticulus cum caelo, terra rerumque natura? Concedam hoc ipsum, si vis, etsi magnam iacturam causae fecero, si ullam esse convenientiam naturae cum extis concessero; 2.124. Sed haec quoque in promptu fuerint; nunc interiora videamus. Aut enim divina vis quaedam consulens nobis somniorum significationes facit, aut coniectores ex quadam convenientia et coniunctione naturae, quam vocant sumpa/qeian, quid cuique rei conveniat ex somniis, et quid quamque rem sequatur, intellegunt, aut eorum neutrum est, sed quaedam observatio constans atque diuturna est, cum quid visum secundum quietem sit, quid evenire et quid sequi soleat. Primum igitur intellegendum est nullam vim esse divinam effectricem somniorum. Atque illud quidem perspicuum est, nulla visa somniorum proficisci a numine deorum; nostra enim causa di id facerent, ut providere futura possemus. 2.142. Nunc quidem propter intermissionem forensis operae et lucubrationes detraxi et meridiationes addidi, quibus uti antea non solebam, nec tam multum dormiens ullo somnio sum admonitus, tantis praesertim de rebus, nec mihi magis umquam videor, quam cum aut in foro magistratus aut in curia senatum video, somniare. Etenim (ex divisione hoc secundum est) quae est continuatio coniunctioque naturae, quam, ut dixi, vocant sumpa/qeian, eius modi, ut thensaurus ex ovo intellegi debeat? Nam medici ex quibusdam rebus et advenientis et crescentis morbos intellegunt, non nullas etiam valetudinis significationes, ut hoc ipsum, pleni enectine simus, ex quodam genere somniorum intellegi posse dicunt. Thensaurus vero et hereditas et honos et victoria et multa generis eiusdem qua cum somniis naturali cognatione iunguntur? | 1.5. Now my opinion is that, in sanctioning such usages, the ancients were influenced more by actual results than convinced by reason. However certain very subtle arguments to prove the trustworthiness of divination have been gathered by philosophers. of these — to mention the most ancient — Xenophanes of Colophon, while asserting the existence of gods, was the only one who repudiated divination in its entirety; but all the others, with the exception of Epicurus, who babbled about the nature of the gods, approved of divination, though not in the same degree. For example, Socrates and all of the Socratic School, and Zeno and his followers, continued in the faith of the ancient philosophers and in agreement with the Old Academy and with the Peripatetics. Their predecessor, Pythagoras, who even wished to be considered an augur himself, gave the weight of his great name to the same practice; and that eminent author, Democritus, in many passages, strongly affirmed his belief in a presentiment of things to come. Moreover, Dicaearchus, the Peripatetic, though he accepted divination by dreams and frenzy, cast away all other kinds; and my intimate friend, Cratippus, whom I consider the peer of the greatest of the Peripatetics, also gave credence to the same kinds of divination but rejected the rest. 1.5. We read in a history by Agathocles that Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, during his siege of Syracuse heard a voice in his sleep telling him that he would dine the next day in Syracuse. At daybreak the following day a serious conflict broke out in his camp between the troops of the Carthaginians and their allies, the Siculi. When the Syracusans saw this they made a sudden assault on the camp and carried Hamilcar off alive. Thus the event verified the dream.History is full of such instances, and so is everyday life. 1.112. Perhaps he had observed, from some personal knowledge he had on the subject, that the crop would be abundant. And, by the way, he is said to have been the first man to predict the solar eclipse which took place in the reign of Astyages.[50] There are many things foreseen by physicians, pilots, and also by farmers, but I do not call the predictions of any of them divination. I do not even call that a case of divination when Anaximander, the natural philosopher, warned the Spartans to leave the city and their homes and to sleep in the fields under arms, because an earthquake was at hand. Then the whole city fell down in ruins and the extremity of Mount Taygetus was torn away like the stern of a ship in a storm. Not even Pherecydes, the famous teacher of Pythagoras, will be considered a prophet because he predicted an earthquake from the appearance of some water drawn from an unfailing well. 2.28. In discussing separately the various methods of divination, I shall begin with soothsaying, which, according to my deliberate judgement, should be cultivated from reasons of political expediency and in order that we may have a state religion. But we are alone and for that reason we may, without causing ill-will, make an earnest inquiry into the truth of soothsaying — certainly I can do so, since in most things my philosophy is that of doubt. In the first place, then, if you please, let us make an inspection of entrails! Now can anybody be induced to believe that the things said to be predicted by means of entrails were learned by the soothsayers through long-continued observation? How long, pray, did the observations last? How could the observations have continued for a long time? How did the soothsayers manage to agree among themselves what part of the entrails was unfavourable, and what part favourable; or what cleft in the liver indicated danger and what promised some advantage? Are the soothsayers of Etruria, Elis, Egypt, and of Carthage in accord on these matters? Apart from such an agreement being impossible in fact, it is impossible even to imagine; and, moreover, we see some nations interpreting entrails in one way and some in another; hence there is no uniformity of practice. 2.33. Such signs, as I have shown before, certainly could not come within your classification of the kinds of divination dependent on observation. Therefore they are not the result of immemorial usage, but they are the inventions of art — if there can be any art in the occult. But what relationship have they with the laws of nature? Assuming that all the works of nature are firmly bound together in a harmonious whole (which, I observe, is the view of the natural philosophers and especially of those men who maintain that the universe is a unit), what connexion can there be between the universe and the finding of a treasure? For instance, if the entrails foretell an increase in my fortune and they do so in accordance with some law of nature, then, in the first place, there is some relationship between them and the universe, and in the second place, my ficial gain is regulated by the laws of nature. Are not the natural philosophers ashamed to utter such nonsense? And yet a certain contact between the different parts of nature may be admitted and I concede it. The Stoics have collected much evidence to prove it. They claim, for example, that the livers of mice become larger in winter; that the dry pennyroyal blooms the very day of the winter solstice, and that its seed-pods become inflated and burst and the seeds enclosed thither are sent in various directions; that at times when certain strings of the lyre are struck others sound; that it is the habit of oysters and of all shell-fish to grow with the growth of the moon and to become smaller as it wanes; and that trees are considered easiest to cut down in winter and in the dark of the moon, because they are then free from sap. 2.34. There is no need to go on and mention the seas and straits with their tides, whose ebb and flow are governed by the motion of the moon. Innumerable instances of the same kind may be given to prove that some natural connexion does exist between objects apparently unrelated. Concede that it does exist; it does not contravene the point I make, that no sort of a cleft in a liver is prophetic of ficial gain. What natural tie, or what symphony, so to speak, or association, or what sympathy, as the Greeks term it, can there be between a cleft in a liver and a petty addition to my purse? Or what relationship between my miserable money-getting, on the one hand, and heaven, earth, and the laws of nature on the other?[15] However, I will concede even this if you wish, though it will greatly weaken my case to admit that there is any connexion between nature and the condition of the entrails; 2.124. But, though the conclusion just stated is obvious, let us now look deeper into the question. Surely you must assume, either that there is a Divine Power which, in planning for our good, gives us information by means of dreams; or that, because of some natural connexion and association — the Greeks call it συμπάθεια — interpreters of dreams know what sort of a dream is required to fit any situation and what sort of a result will follow any dream; or that neither of these suppositions is true, but that the usual result or consequence of every dream is known by a consistent system of rules based on long-continued observation. In the first place, then, it must be understood that there is no divine power which creates dreams. And indeed it is perfectly clear that none of the visions seen in dreams have their origin in the will of the gods; for the gods, for our sakes, would so interpose that we might be able to foresee the future. 2.142. Moreover, at the present time, owing to the interruption of my public labours, I have ceased my nocturnal studies, and (contrary to my former practice) I have added afternoon naps. Yet despite all this time spent in sleep I have not received a single prophecy in a dream, certainly not one about the great events now going on. Indeed, I never seem to be dreaming more than when I see the magistrates in the forum and the Senate in its chamber.[69] Coming now to the second branch of the present topic, is there some such natural connecting link, which, as I said before, the Greeks call συμπάθεια, that the finding of a treasure must be deduced from dreaming of an egg? of course physicians, from certain symptoms, know the incipiency and progress of a disease; and it is claimed that from some kinds of dreams they even can gather certain indications as to a patients health, as whether the internal humours of the body are excessive or deficient. But what natural bond of union is there between dreams, on the one hand, and treasures, legacies, public office, victory and many other things of the same kind, on the other? |
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4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 5.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 5.13. namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, lyco V lico R lisias et N 2 ( versu ultra marg. continuato; ex priore script. lic cognosci posse videtur ); om. BE spatio vacuo rel. oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ipsi rebus R ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet. | 5.13. Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. < |
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5. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.28, 3.28 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 | 1.28. Again, if the soul of man is divine, why is it not omniscient? Moreover, if the Pythagorean god is pure soul, how is he implanted in, or diffused throughout, the world? Next, Xenophanes endowed the universe with mind, and held that, as being infinite, it was god. His view of mind is as open to objection as that of the rest; but on the subject of infinity he incurs still severer criticism, for the infinite can have no sensation and no contact with anything outside. As for Parmenides, he invents a purely fanciful something resembling a crown — stephanè is his name for it —, an unbroken ring of glowing lights, encircling the sky, which he entitles god; but no one can imagine this to possess divine form, or sensation. He also has many other portentous notions; he deifies war, strife, lust and the like, things which can be destroyed by disease or sleep or forgetfulness or lapse of time; and he also deifies the stars, but this has been criticized in another philosopher and need not be dealt with now in the case of Parmenides. 3.28. And so I fully agreed with the part of your discourse that dealt with nature's punctual regularity, and what you termed its concordant interconnexion and correlation; but I could not accept your assertion that this could not have come about were it not held together by a single divine breath. On the contrary, the system's coherence and persistence is due to nature's forces and not to drive power; she does possess that 'concord' (the Greek term is sympatheia) of which you spoke, but the greater this is as a spontaneous growth, the less possible is it to suppose that it was created by divine reason. |
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6. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.68-4.76, 5.105 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268; Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 4.68. haec laetitia quam turpis sit, satis est diligenter attendentem penitus videre. Et ut turpes sunt, qui ecferunt haec 13 effe om. V 1, add. V rec in mg., runt se eadem m. in r. se laetitia tum cum hecferunt K haec ferunt G qui efferunt R (i et ef m. rec. ) fruuntur Veneriis voluptatibus, sic flagitiosi, quiaesinflammato K 1 inflamato GRV qui eas inflammato animo concupiscunt. totus vero iste, qui volgo appellatur appellantur V 1 amor—nec nec ex ne V c hercule invenio, quo nomine alio possit appellari—, tantae levitatis est, ut nihil videam quod putem conferendum. quem Caecilius fr. 259 deum qui non summum putet, aut stultum aut rerum esse imperitum existumat, existumat s existumet X Cui cui Ciceroni trib. Mue. cuii Ribb. i/n manu sit, quem e/sse demente/m demente GRV 1 velit, Quem sa/pere, quem sana/ri, sanari Man. insanare K 1 insanire GRVK c quem in morbum i/nici, Quem co/ntra amari, quem e/xpeti, quem arce/ssier. hunc fere versum excidisse statuit Bentl. : quem odio esse, quem contemni, quem excludi foras arces sier Bentl. arcessiri (arcesciri V 1 )X o praeclaram emendatricem vitae poëticam, quae amo- 4.69. rem amore X ( in K s in fine eras. ) flagitii et levitatis auctorem in concilio deorum conlocandum conlocari dum G 1 putet! de comoedia loquor, quae, si haec flagitia non non s nos X ( cf.p.381, 26 ) nos non Ro b b. p. 103 probaremus, nulla esset omnino; quid ait ex tragoedia princeps ille Argonautarum? argonautarū V (rū in r. V c ) Tu/ me amoris tumamoris K tum ea moris R ma/gis quam honoris se/rvavisti servavisti Crat. servasti gra/tia. Ennius Med. exul 278 quid ergo? hic amor Medeae quanta miseriarum excitavit incendia! atque ea tamen apud alium poëtam patri dicere audet se se s V 3 sed X Trag. inc. 174 coniugem habuisse illum, Amor quem dederat, qui plus pollet potiorque est est G ( exp. 1 est ss. 2 ) patre. 4.70. Sed poëtas ludere sinamus, quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari ipsum videmus Iovem: ad at G 1 magistros virtutis philosophos veniamus, qui amorem quimorem quā orem K 1 -i amorem in r. G 2 negant stupri esse St. fr. 3, 653 Epic. 483 et in eo litigant cum Epicuro non multum, ut opinio mea fert, mentiente. quis est enim iste ista K 1 amor amicitiae? cur neque deformem adulescentem quisquam amat neque formosum senem? mihi quidem haec in Graecorum gymnasiis nata consuetudo videtur, in quibus isti liberi et concessi sunt amores. bene ergo Ennius: Ennius sc. 395 Fla/giti flagitii X cives G(?)R rec princi/pium est nudare i/nter civis co/rpora. qui ut sint, quod fieri posse video, pudici, solliciti tamen et anxii sunt, eoque magis, quod se ipsi continent et coërcent. 4.71. atque, ut muliebris amores omittam, quibus maiorem licentiam natura concessit, quis aut de Ganymedi ganumedi K nymedi G 1 ganymedis V rec raptu dubitat, quid poëtae velint, aut non intellegit, quid apud Euripidem et loquatur et cupiat Eurip. Chrysippo p. 632 N. Laius? quid denique homines doctissimi et summi poë- tae de se ipsis et carminibus edunt edunt Lb. edant cf. praef. et cantibus? fortis vir in sua re p. cognitus quae de iuvenum amore scribit Alcaeus! nam Anacreontis quidem tota poësis est amatoria. maxume vero omnium flagrasse amore Reginum Ibycum apparet ex scriptis. Atque horum omnium lubidinosos esse amores videmus: philosophi sumus exorti, et et ex G 1 auctore quidem nostro Platone, quem non iniuria Dicaearchus accusat, qui amori auctoritatem tribueremus. 4.72. Stoici vero et sapientem amaturum esse St. fr. 3, 652 dicunt et amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt. qui si qui si quin V quis est in rerum natura sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine cura, sine suspirio, sit sane; vacat enim omni libidine; haec autem de libidine oratio est. sin autem est aliquis amor, ut est certe, qui nihil absit aut non multum ab insania, qualis in Leucadia est: si quidem sit quisquam Turpil. 115 deus, cui cuii Ribb. ad V ego sim curae — 4.73. at id erat deis dehis X (de is V) omnibus curandum, quem ad modum hic frueretur voluptate amatoria! heu me infelicem! —nihil verius. probe et ille: sanusne es, sanun es Wo. qui temere lamentare? sic sic hic Mdv. ( at cf. ita div. 2, 82 ) insanus videtur etiam suis. at at ad KR effecit KRG (tragoediasfeffecit) V rec (affecit V 1 ) efficit s quas tragoedias efficit! Te, te s et X Apo/llo sancte, fe/r opem, teque, amni/potens tequea omnipotens GR tequeaomnipotens K te- que omnipotens V amnipotens Wölfflin ap. Ribb. omnip. vulgo Neptune, i/nvoco, Vosque a/deo, Venti! mundum totum se ad amorem suum sublevandum conversurum putat, Venerem unam excludit ut iniquam: nam quid quid add. K c ego te appellem, Venus? eam prae lubidine lib. V negat curare quicquam: quasi vero ipse non propter lubidinem lib. V tanta flagitia et faciat et dicat. 4.74. —sic igitur adfecto haec adhibenda curatio est, ut et illud quod cupiat ostendatur ostendat s ostendatur Dav. ostendas Bouhier quam leve, quam contemnendum, quam nihili nihil V sit omnino, quam facile vel aliunde vel aliunde bis K 1 vel ali ende G (i in r. et u? ) vel alio modo perfici vel omnino neglegi possit; abducendus etiam est non etiam est non in r. V c numquam ad alia studia sollicitudines curas negotia, loci denique mutatione tamquam aegroti non convalescentes saepe curandus est; 4.75. etiam novo quidam amore veterem amorem Hier. epist. 125, 14 tamquam clavo clavo clava V clavum eiciendum putant; maxume autem admonendus idmonendus V 3 est, quantus sit furor amoris. add. Bai. omnibus enim ex animi perturbationibus est profecto nulla vehementior, ut, si iam ipsa illa accusare accuss. K nolis, stupra dico et corruptelas et adulteria, incesta denique, quorum omnium accusabilis accuss. K est turpitudo,—sed ut haec omittas, omittas ex comitas V 3 perturbatio ipsa mentis in amore foeda per se est. 4.76. nam ut illa praeteream, quae sunt furoris, futuris K 1 furoris haec ipsa per sese sese V ( exp. 3 ) quam habent levitatem, quae videntur esse mediocria, Iniu/riae Ter. Eun. 59–63 Suspi/ciones i/nimicitiae induciae RV indu/tiae Bellu/m pax rursum! ince/rta haec si tu si tu s sit ut X ( prius t exp. V 3 ) po/stules Ratio/ne certa fa/cere, nihilo plu/s plus add. G 2 agas, Quam si/ des operam, ut cu/m ratione insa/nias. haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa pravitate deterreat? est etiam etiam Man. enim illud, quod in omni perturbatione dicitur, demonstrandum, nullam esse nisi opinabilem, nisi iudicio susceptam, nisi voluntariam. etenim si naturalis amor esset, amor esset ex amorem et K c et amarent omnes et semper amarent et idem amarent, et idem amarent om. H neque alium pudor, alium cogitatio, alium satietas deterreret. etenim ... 26 deterreret H deterret G 1 Ira vero, quae quae -ae in r. V 2 quam diu perturbat animum, dubitationem insaniae non habet, cuius inpulsu imp. KR existit etiam inter fratres tale iurgium: | |
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7. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 4, 6, 8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 |
8. Strabo, Geography, 10.4.12 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268 | 10.4.12. From Leben came Leucocomas and his lover Euxynthetus, the story of whom is told by Theophrastus in his treatise On Love. of the tasks which Leucocomas assigned to Euxynthetus, one, he says, was this — to bring back his dog from Prasus. The country of the Prasians borders on that of the Lebenians, being seventy stadia distant from the sea and a hundred and eighty from Gortyn. As I have said, Prasus belonged to the Eteo-Cretans; and the sanctuary of the Dictaean Zeus was there; for Dicte is near it, not close to the Idaean Mountain, as Aratus says, for Dicte is a thousand stadia distant from Ida, being situated at that distance from it towards the rising sun, and a hundred from Samonium. Prasus was situated between Samonium and the Cherronesus, sixty stadia above the sea; it was razed to the ground by the Hierapytnians. And neither is Callimachus right, they say, when he says that Britomartis, in her flight from the violence of Minos, leaped from Dicte into fishermen's nets, and that because of this she herself was called Dictynna by the Cydoniatae, and the mountain Dicte; for Cydonia is not in the neighborhood of these places at all, but lies near the western limits of the island. However, there is a mountain called Tityrus in Cydonia, on which is a sanctuary, not the Dictaean, but the Dictynnaean. |
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9. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 4.1069-4.1072 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268 4.1069. inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna gravescit, 4.1070. si non prima novis conturbes volnera plagis 4.1071. volgivagaque vagus Venere ante recentia cures 4.1072. aut alio possis animi traducere motus. | |
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10. Plutarch, On The Delays of Divine Vengeance, 567b, 562e (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 77 |
11. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, 409 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268 |
12. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.14.1-1.14.2, 1.14.5-1.14.6, 1.14.9-1.14.10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 |
13. Plutarch, Dialogue On Love, 766c, 750b (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268 |
14. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, 4, 6, 8 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 |
15. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, 13.21, 562e, 57e, 602b (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 77, 79, 268 |
16. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 6.10 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 |
17. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.122, 2.124, 5.22-5.27, 5.43, 5.87, 6.80, 7.130, 7.140, 7.143, 7.175, 9.19, 10.119 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 77, 79, 268; Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 164 | 2.122. 13. SIMONSimon was a citizen of Athens and a cobbler. When Socrates came to his workshop and began to converse, he used to make notes of all that he could remember. And this is why people apply the term leathern to his dialogues. These dialogues are thirty-three in number, extant in a single volume:of the Gods.of the Good.On the Beautiful.What is the Beautiful.On the Just: two dialogues.of Virtue, that it cannot be taught.of Courage: three dialogues.On Law.On Guiding the People.of Honour.of Poetry.On Good Eating.On Love.On Philosophy.On Knowledge.On Music.On Poetry.What is the Beautiful 5.22. of Justice, four books.On Poets, three books.On Philosophy, three books.of the Statesman, two books.On Rhetoric, or Grylus, one book.Nerinthus, one book.The Sophist, one book.Menexenus, one book.Concerning Love, one book.Symposium, one book.of Wealth, one book.Exhortation to Philosophy, one book.of the Soul, one book.of Prayer, one book.On Noble Birth, one book.On Pleasure, one book.Alexander, or a Plea for Colonies, one book.On Kingship, one book.On Education, one book.of the Good, three books.Extracts from Plato's Laws, three books.Extracts from the Republic, two books.of Household Management, one book.of Friendship, one book.On being or having been affected, one book.of Sciences, one book.On Controversial Questions, two books.Solutions of Controversial Questions, four books.Sophistical Divisions, four books.On Contraries, one book.On Genera and Species, one book.On Essential Attributes, one book. 5.23. Three note-books on Arguments for Purposes of Refutation.Propositions concerning Virtue, two books.Objections, one book.On the Various Meanings of Terms or Expressions where a Determit is added, one book.of Passions or of Anger, one book.Five books of Ethics.On Elements, three books.of Science, one book.of Logical Principle, one book.Logical Divisions, seventeen books.Concerning Division, one book.On Dialectical Questioning and Answering, two books.of Motion, one book.Propositions, one book.Controversial Propositions, one book.Syllogisms, one book.Eight books of Prior Analytics.Two books of Greater Posterior Analytics.of Problems, one book.Eight books of Methodics.of the Greater Good, one book.On the Idea, one book.Definitions prefixed to the Topics, seven books.Two books of Syllogisms. 5.24. Concerning Syllogism with Definitions, one book.of the Desirable and the Contingent, one book.Preface to Commonplaces, one book.Two books of Topics criticizing the Definitions.Affections or Qualities, one book.Concerning Logical Division, one book.Concerning Mathematics, one book.Definitions, thirteen books.Two books of Refutations.of Pleasure, one book.Propositions, one book.On the Voluntary, one book.On the Beautiful, one book.Theses for Refutation, twenty-five books.Theses concerning Love, four books.Theses concerning Friendship, two books.Theses concerning the Soul, one book.Politics, two books.Eight books of a course of lectures on Politics like that of Theophrastus.of Just Actions, two books.A Collection of Arts [that is, Handbooks], two books.Two books of the Art of Rhetoric.Art, a Handbook, one book.Another Collection of Handbooks, two books.Concerning Method, one book.Compendium of the Art of Theodectes, one book.A Treatise on the Art of Poetry, two books.Rhetorical Enthymemes, one book.of Degree, one book.Divisions of Enthymemes, one book.On Diction, two books.of Taking Counsel, one book. 5.25. A Collection or Compendium, two books.On Nature, three books.Concerning Nature, one book.On the Philosophy of Archytas, three books.On the Philosophy of Speusippus and Xenocrates, one book.Extracts from the Timaeus and from the Works of Archytas, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Melissus, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Alcmaeon, one book.A Reply to the Pythagoreans, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Gorgias, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Xenophanes, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Zeno, one book.On the Pythagoreans, one book.On Animals, nine books.Eight books of Dissections.A selection of Dissections, one book.On Composite Animals, one book.On the Animals of Fable, one book.On Sterility, one book.On Plants, two books.Concerning Physiognomy, one book.Two books concerning Medicine.On the Unit, one book. 5.26. Prognostics of Storms, one book.Concerning Astronomy, one book.Concerning Optics, one book.On Motion, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Memory, one book.Six books of Homeric Problems.Poetics, one book.Thirty-eight books of Physics according to the lettering.Two books of Problems which have been examined.Two books of Routine Instruction.Mechanics, one book.Problems taken from the works of Democritus, two books.On the Magnet, one book.Analogies, one book.Miscellaneous Notes, twelve books.Descriptions of Genera, fourteen books.Claims advanced, one book.Victors at Olympia, one book.Victors at the Pythian Games, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Delphi, one book.Criticism of the List of Pythian Victors, one book.Dramatic Victories at the Dionysia, one book.of Tragedies, one book.Dramatic Records, one book.Proverbs, one book.Laws of the Mess-table, one book.Four books of Laws.Categories, one book.De Interpretatione, one book. 5.27. Constitutions of 158 Cities, in general and in particular, democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, tyrannical.Letters to Philip.Letters of Selymbrians.Letters to Alexander, four books.Letters to Antipater, nine books.To Mentor, one book.To Ariston, one book.To Olympias, one book.To Hephaestion, one book.To Themistagoras, one book.To Philoxenus, one book.In reply to Democritus, one book.Verses beginning Ἁγνὲ θεῶν πρέσβισθ᾽ ἑκατηβόλε (Holy One and Chiefest of Gods, far-darting).Elegiac verses beginning Καλλιτέκνου μητρὸς θύγατερ (Daughter of a Mother blessed with fair offspring).In all 445,270 lines. 5.43. of Old Age, one book.On the Astronomy of Democritus, one book.On Meteorology, one book.On Visual Images or Emanations, one book.On Flavours, Colours and Flesh, one book.of the Order of the World, one book.of Mankind, one book.Compendium of the Writings of Diogenes, one book.Three books of Definitions.Concerning Love, one book.Another Treatise on Love, one book.of Happiness, one book.On Species or Forms, two books.On Epilepsy, one book.On Frenzy, one book.Concerning Empedocles, one book.Eighteen books of Refutative Arguments.Three books of Polemical Objections.of the Voluntary, one book.Epitome of Plato's Republic, two books.On the Diversity of Sounds uttered by Animals of the same Species, one book.of Sudden Appearances, one book.of Animals which bite or gore, one book.of Animals reputed to be spiteful, one book.of the Animals which are confined to Dry Land, one book. 5.87. of Government, one book.On Laws, one book, and on subjects kindred to these.of Names, one book.Agreements, one book.On the Involuntary, one book.Concerning Love, and Clinias, one book.Others are physical treatises:of Reason.of the Soul, and a separate treatise with the same title.of Nature.of Images.Against Democritus.of Celestial Phenomena, one bookof Things in the Under-world.On Various Ways of Life, two books.The Causes of Diseases, one book.of the Good, one book.Against Zeno's Doctrines, one book.A Reply to Metron's Doctrines, one book.To grammar and criticism belong:of the Age of Homer and Hesiod, two booksof Archilochus and Homer, two books.of a literary nature are:A work on passages in Euripides and Sophocles, three books.On Music, two books. 6.80. The following writings are attributed to him. Dialogues:Cephalion.Ichthyas.Jackdaw.Pordalus.The Athenian Demos.Republic.Art of Ethics.On Wealth.On Love.Theodorus.Hypsias.Aristarchus.On Death.Letters.Seven Tragedies:Helen.Thyestes.Heracles.Achilles.Medea.Chrysippus.Oedipus.Sosicrates in the first book of his Successions, and Satyrus in the fourth book of his Lives, allege that Diogenes left nothing in writing, and Satyrus adds that the sorry tragedies are by his friend Philiscus, the Aeginetan. Sotion in his seventh book declares that only the following are genuine works of Diogenes: On Virtue, On Good, On Love, A Mendicant, Tolmaeus, Pordalus, Cassandrus, Cephalion, Philiscus, Aristarchus, Sisyphus, Ganymedes, Anecdotes, Letters. 7.130. Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise of Love, and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease. 7.140. The world, they say, is one and finite, having a spherical shape, such a shape being the most suitable for motion, as Posidonius says in the fifth book of his Physical Discourse and the disciples of Antipater in their works on the Cosmos. Outside of the world is diffused the infinite void, which is incorporeal. By incorporeal is meant that which, though capable of being occupied by body, is not so occupied. The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united whole. This is a necessary result of the sympathy and tension which binds together things in heaven and earth. Chrysippus discusses the void in his work On Void and in the first book of his Physical Sciences; so too Apollophanes in his Physics, Apollodorus, and Posidonius in his Physical Discourse, book ii. But these, it is added [i.e. sympathy and tension], are likewise bodies. 7.143. It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. Boethus, however, denies that the world is a living thing. The unity of the world is maintained by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius in the first book of his Physical Discourse. By the totality of things, the All, is meant, according to Apollodorus, (1) the world, and in another sense (2) the system composed of the world and the void outside it. The world then is finite, the void infinite. 7.175. Antiquities.of the Gods.of Giants.of Marriage.On Homer.of Duty, three books.of Good Counsel.of Gratitude.An Exhortation.of the Virtues.of Natural Ability.of Gorgippus.of Envy.of Love.of Freedom.The Art of Love.of Honour.of Fame.The Statesman.of Deliberation.of Laws.of Litigation.of Education.of Logic, three books.of the End.of Beauty.of Conduct.of Knowledge.of Kingship.of Friendship.On the Banquet.On the Thesis that Virtue is the same in Man and in Woman.On the Wise Man turning Sophist.of Usages.Lectures, two books.of Pleasure.On Properties.On Insoluble Problems.of Dialectic.of Moods or Tropes.of Predicates.This, then, is the list of his works. 9.19. Seven and sixty are now the years that have been tossing my cares up and down the land of Greece; and there were then twenty and five years more from my birth up, if I know how to speak truly about these things.He holds that there are four elements of existent things, and worlds unlimited in number but not overlapping [in time]. Clouds are formed when the vapour from the sun is carried upwards and lifts them into the surrounding air. The substance of God is spherical, in no way resembling man. He is all eye and all ear, but does not breathe; he is the totality of mind and thought, and is eternal. Xenophanes was the first to declare that everything which comes into being is doomed to perish, and that the soul is breath. 10.119. Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose. Nor will he drivel, when drunken: so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant; nor will he turn Cynic (so the second book On Life tells us); nor will he be a mendicant. But even when he has lost his sight, he will not withdraw himself from life: this is stated in the same book. The wise man will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta. |
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18. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 18 Tagged with subjects: •diogenes laertios Found in books: Brenk and Lanzillotta, Plutarch on Literature, Graeco-Roman Religion, Jews and Christians (2023) 268 |