1. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 18.15-18.16 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 323| 18.15. "כָּל־פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם לְכָל־בָּשָׂר אֲשֶׁר־יַקְרִיבוּ לַיהוָה בָּאָדָם וּבַבְּהֵמָה יִהְיֶה־לָּךְ אַךְ פָּדֹה תִפְדֶּה אֵת בְּכוֹר הָאָדָם וְאֵת בְּכוֹר־הַבְּהֵמָה הַטְּמֵאָה תִּפְדֶּה׃", 18.16. "וּפְדוּיָו מִבֶּן־חֹדֶשׁ תִּפְדֶּה בְּעֶרְכְּךָ כֶּסֶף חֲמֵשֶׁת שְׁקָלִים בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ עֶשְׂרִים גֵּרָה הוּא׃", | 18.15. "Every thing that openeth the womb, of all flesh which they offer unto the LORD, both of man and beast, shall be thine; howbeit the first-born of man shalt thou surely redeem, and the firstling of unclean beasts shalt thou redeem.", 18.16. "And their redemption-money—from a month old shalt thou redeem them—shall be, according to thy valuation, five shekels of silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary—the same is twenty gerahs.", |
|
2. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 9.20, 15.2-15.3, 16.3, 17.17, 18.11-18.12, 21.5, 21.7 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 323, 377; Geljon and Runia (2013) 246, 250| 15.2. "וְאֶת־הַחִתִּי וְאֶת־הַפְּרִזִּי וְאֶת־הָרְפָאִים׃", 15.2. "וַיֹּאמֶר אַבְרָם אֲדֹנָי יֱהוִה מַה־תִּתֶּן־לִי וְאָנֹכִי הוֹלֵךְ עֲרִירִי וּבֶן־מֶשֶׁק בֵּיתִי הוּא דַּמֶּשֶׂק אֱלִיעֶזֶר׃", 15.3. "וַיֹּאמֶר אַבְרָם הֵן לִי לֹא נָתַתָּה זָרַע וְהִנֵּה בֶן־בֵּיתִי יוֹרֵשׁ אֹתִי׃", 16.3. "וַתִּקַּח שָׂרַי אֵשֶׁת־אַבְרָם אֶת־הָגָר הַמִּצְרִית שִׁפְחָתָהּ מִקֵּץ עֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים לְשֶׁבֶת אַבְרָם בְּאֶרֶץ כְּנָעַן וַתִּתֵּן אֹתָהּ לְאַבְרָם אִישָׁהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה׃", 17.17. "וַיִּפֹּל אַבְרָהָם עַל־פָּנָיו וַיִּצְחָק וַיֹּאמֶר בְּלִבּוֹ הַלְּבֶן מֵאָה־שָׁנָה יִוָּלֵד וְאִם־שָׂרָה הֲבַת־תִּשְׁעִים שָׁנָה תֵּלֵד׃", 18.11. "וְאַבְרָהָם וְשָׂרָה זְקֵנִים בָּאִים בַּיָּמִים חָדַל לִהְיוֹת לְשָׂרָה אֹרַח כַּנָּשִׁים׃", 18.12. "וַתִּצְחַק שָׂרָה בְּקִרְבָּהּ לֵאמֹר אַחֲרֵי בְלֹתִי הָיְתָה־לִּי עֶדְנָה וַאדֹנִי זָקֵן׃", 21.5. "וְאַבְרָהָם בֶּן־מְאַת שָׁנָה בְּהִוָּלֶד לוֹ אֵת יִצְחָק בְּנוֹ׃", 21.7. "וַתֹּאמֶר מִי מִלֵּל לְאַבְרָהָם הֵינִיקָה בָנִים שָׂרָה כִּי־יָלַדְתִּי בֵן לִזְקֻנָיו׃", | 9.20. "And Noah, the man of the land, began and planted a vineyard.", 15.2. "And Abram said: ‘O Lord GOD, what wilt Thou give me, seeing I go hence childless, and he that shall be possessor of my house is Eliezer of Damascus?’", 15.3. "And Abram said: ‘Behold, to me Thou hast given no seed, and, lo, one born in my house is to be mine heir.’", 16.3. "And Sarai Abram’s wife took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, after Abram had dwelt ten years in the land of Canaan, and gave her to Abram her husband to be his wife.", 17.17. "Then Abraham fell upon his face, and laughed, and said in his heart: ‘Shall a child be born unto him that is a hundred years old? and shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?’", 18.11. "Now Abraham and Sarah were old, and well stricken in age; it had ceased to be with Sarah after the manner of women.—", 18.12. "And Sarah laughed within herself, saying: ‘After I am waxed old shall I have pleasure, my lord being old also?’", 21.5. "And Abraham was a hundred years old, when his son Isaac was born unto him.", 21.7. "And she said: ‘Who would have said unto Abraham, that Sarah should give children suck? for I have borne him a son in his old age.’", |
|
3. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 13.11-13.15, 22.6, 22.28, 34.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 323; Geljon and Runia (2013) 246| 13.11. "וְהָיָה כִּי־יְבִאֲךָ יְהוָה אֶל־אֶרֶץ הַכְּנַעֲנִי כַּאֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּע לְךָ וְלַאֲבֹתֶיךָ וּנְתָנָהּ לָךְ׃", 13.12. "וְהַעֲבַרְתָּ כָל־פֶּטֶר־רֶחֶם לַיהֹוָה וְכָל־פֶּטֶר שֶׁגֶר בְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה לְךָ הַזְּכָרִים לַיהוָה׃", 13.13. "וְכָל־פֶּטֶר חֲמֹר תִּפְדֶּה בְשֶׂה וְאִם־לֹא תִפְדֶּה וַעֲרַפְתּוֹ וְכֹל בְּכוֹר אָדָם בְּבָנֶיךָ תִּפְדֶּה׃", 13.14. "וְהָיָה כִּי־יִשְׁאָלְךָ בִנְךָ מָחָר לֵאמֹר מַה־זֹּאת וְאָמַרְתָּ אֵלָיו בְּחֹזֶק יָד הוֹצִיאָנוּ יְהוָה מִמִּצְרַיִם מִבֵּית עֲבָדִים׃", 13.15. "וַיְהִי כִּי־הִקְשָׁה פַרְעֹה לְשַׁלְּחֵנוּ וַיַּהֲרֹג יְהֹוָה כָּל־בְּכוֹר בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם מִבְּכֹר אָדָם וְעַד־בְּכוֹר בְּהֵמָה עַל־כֵּן אֲנִי זֹבֵחַ לַיהוָה כָּל־פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם הַזְּכָרִים וְכָל־בְּכוֹר בָּנַי אֶפְדֶּה׃", 22.6. "כִּי־יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ כֶּסֶף אוֹ־כֵלִים לִשְׁמֹר וְגֻנַּב מִבֵּית הָאִישׁ אִם־יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנָיִם׃", 22.28. "מְלֵאָתְךָ וְדִמְעֲךָ לֹא תְאַחֵר בְּכוֹר בָּנֶיךָ תִּתֶּן־לִּי׃", | 13.11. "And it shall be when the LORD shall bring thee into the land of the Canaanite, as He swore unto thee and to thy fathers, and shall give it thee,", 13.12. "that thou shalt set apart unto the LORD all that openeth the womb; every firstling that is a male, which thou hast coming of a beast, shall be the LORD’s.", 13.13. "And every firstling of an ass thou shalt redeem with a lamb; and if thou wilt not redeem it, then thou shalt break its neck; and all the first-born of man among thy sons shalt thou redeem.", 13.14. "And it shall be when thy son asketh thee in time to come, saying: What is this? that thou shalt say unto him: By strength of hand the LORD brought us out from Egypt, from the house of bondage;", 13.15. "and it came to pass, when Pharaoh would hardly let us go that the LORD slew all the firstborn in the land of Egypt, both the first-born of man, and the first-born of beast; therefore I sacrifice to the LORD all that openeth the womb, being males; but all the first-born of my sons I redeem.", 22.6. "If a man deliver unto his neighbour money or stuff to keep, and it be stolen out of the man’s house; if the thief be found, he shall pay double.", 22.28. "Thou shalt not delay to offer of the fulness of thy harvest, and of the outflow of thy presses. The first-born of thy sons shalt thou give unto Me.", 34.20. "And the firstling of an ass thou shalt redeem with a lamb; and if thou wilt not redeem it, then thou shalt break its neck. All the first-born of thy sons thou shalt redeem. And none shall appear before Me empty.", |
|
4. Plato, Critias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269| 109d. καὶ φρονήσει πεφυκυῖαν, ἄνδρας δὲ ἀγαθοὺς ἐμποιήσαντες αὐτόχθονας ἐπὶ νοῦν ἔθεσαν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τάξιν· ὧν τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα σέσωται, τὰ δὲ ἔργα διὰ τὰς τῶν παραλαμβανόντων φθορὰς καὶ τὰ μήκη τῶν χρόνων ἠφανίσθη. τὸ γὰρ περιλειπόμενον ἀεὶ γένος, ὥσπερ καὶ πρόσθεν ἐρρήθη, κατελείπετο ὄρειον καὶ ἀγράμματον, τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ δυναστῶν τὰ ὀνόματα ἀκηκοὸς μόνον καὶ βραχέα πρὸς αὐτοῖς τῶν ἔργων. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα τοῖς ἐκγόνοις ἐτίθεντο | 109d. and for wisdom, and therein they planted as native to the soil men of virtue and ordained to their mind the mode of government. And of these citizens the names are preserved, but their works have vanished owing to the repeated destruction of their successors and the length of the intervening periods. For, as was said before, the stock that survived on each occasion was a remt of unlettered mountaineers which had heard the names only of the rulers, and but little besides of their works. So though they gladly passed on these name |
|
5. Plato, Statesman, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269| 270b. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. φαίνεται γοῦν δὴ καὶ μάλα εἰκότως εἰρῆσθαι πάνθʼ ὅσα διελήλυθας. ΞΕ. λογισάμενοι δὴ συννοήσωμεν τὸ πάθος ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεχθέντων, ὃ πάντων ἔφαμεν εἶναι τῶν θαυμαστῶν αἴτιον. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν δὴ τοῦτʼ αὐτό. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον; ΞΕ. τὸ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν τοτὲ μὲν ἐφʼ ἃ νῦν κυκλεῖται φέρεσθαι, τοτὲ δʼ ἐπὶ τἀναντία. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς δή; ΞΕ. ταύτην τὴν μεταβολὴν ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν περὶ τὸν | 270b. Y. Soc. All that account of yours appears, at any rate, very reasonable. Str. Then, in the light of what has been said, let us consider and gain understanding of the event which we said was the cause of all those wonderful portents; for it is really just this. Y. Soc. Just what? Str. The fact that at certain periods the universe has its present circular motion, and at other periods it revolves in the reverse direction. Y. Soc. How was this the cause? Str. We cannot help believing that of all the changes which take place in the heavens this reversal i |
|
6. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269| 21d. καταμελῆσαι, κατά γε ἐμὴν δόξαν οὔτε Ἡσίοδος οὔτε Ὅμηρος οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ποιητὴς εὐδοκιμώτερος ἐγένετο ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ. τίς δʼ ἦν ὁ λόγος, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὦ Κριτία; ἦ περὶ μεγίστης, ἔφη, καὶ ὀνομαστοτάτης πασῶν δικαιότατʼ ἂν πράξεως οὔσης, ἣν ἥδε ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε μέν, διὰ δὲ χρόνον καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ἐργασαμένων οὐ διήρκεσε δεῦρο ὁ λόγος. λέγε ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἦ δʼ ὅς, τί τε καὶ πῶς καὶ παρὰ τίνων ὡς ἀληθῆ διακηκοὼς ἔλεγεν ὁ Σόλων. | 21d. why then, I say, neither Hesiod nor Homer nor any other poet would ever have proved more famous than he. And what was the story, Critias? said the other. Its subject, replied Critias, was a very great exploit, worthy indeed to be accounted the most notable of all exploits, which was performed by this city, although the record of it has not endured until now owing to lapse of time and the destruction of those who wrought it. Tell us from the beginning, said Amyder, what Solon related and how, and who were the informants who vouched for its truth. |
|
7. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269| 677a. ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὑμῖν οἱ παλαιοὶ λόγοι ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν τινὰ δοκοῦσιν; ΚΛ. ποῖοι δή; ΑΘ. τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος. ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν πιθανὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον πᾶν παντί. ΑΘ. φέρε δή, νοήσωμεν μίαν τῶν πολλῶν ταύτην τὴν τῷ κατακλυσμῷ ποτε γενομένην. ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς διανοηθέντες; | 677a. Ath. Do you consider that there is any truth in the ancient tales? Clin. What tales? Ath. That the world of men has often been destroyed by floods, plagues, and many other things, in such a way that only a small portion of the human race has survived. Clin. Everyone would regard such accounts as perfectly credible. Ath. Come now, let us picture to ourselves one of the many catastrophes,—namely, that which occurred once upon a time through the Deluge. Clin. And what are we to imagine about it? |
|
8. Plato, Cratylus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 72| 402a. ΣΩ. γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ πιθανότητα ἔχον. ΕΡΜ. τίνα ταύτην; ΣΩ. τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαίʼ ἄττα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν. ΕΡΜ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης. ΕΡΜ. ἔστι ταῦτα. | 402a. Socrates. It sounds absurd, but I think there is some probability in it. Hermogenes. What is this probability? Socrates. I seem to have a vision of Heracleitus saying some ancient words of wisdom as old as the reign of Cronus and Rhea, which Homer said too. Hermogenes. What do you mean by that? Socrates. Heracleitus says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream. Hermogenes. True. |
|
| 9. Aristotle, On The Universe, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269 |
| 10. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 172 |
| 11. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2.19 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 275 |
| 12. Aristotle, Meteorology, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269 |
| 13. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 72 |
| 14. Theophrastus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 181 |
| 15. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 164 |
| 16. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 172 |
17. Cicero, Academica, 1.33, 1.35 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Bryan (2018) 271, 272; Wardy and Warren (2018) 271, 272| 1.33. Haec forma forma om. *d erat illis prima, a Platone tradita; cuius quas acceperim dissupationes dissupationes Bai. disputat- *g*d si vultis exponam.' Nos vero volumus inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam. ATT. Et recte quidem quidem om. *d inquit respondes; praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. VA. “Aristoteles igitur igitur om. *d primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, quas ... erat amplexatus pars codicum Non. p. 470 ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, ferret Ern. vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 1.35. sed Zeno, cum Arcesilam Archesilaum p 1 w anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. eam quoque si videtur correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus.” Mihi vero inquam videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium. VA. 'Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat qui ut Theophrastus nervos neruis p virtutis inciderit, incideret s Lb. -rent n sed contra qui omnia quae que om. s quaecumque Reid ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis idque appellaret honestum quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. | |
|
18. Cicero, On Divination, 1.2, 1.36, 2.97 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269| 1.2. Gentem quidem nullam video neque tam humanam atque doctam neque tam inmanem tamque barbaram, quae non significari futura et a quibusdam intellegi praedicique posse censeat. Principio Assyrii, ut ab ultumis auctoritatem repetam, propter planitiam magnitudinemque regionum, quas incolebant, cum caelum ex omni parte patens atque apertum intuerentur, traiectiones motusque stellarum observitaverunt, quibus notatis, quid cuique significaretur, memoriae prodiderunt. Qua in natione Chaldaei non ex artis, sed ex gentis vocabulo nominati diuturna observatione siderum scientiam putantur effecisse, ut praedici posset, quid cuique eventurum et quo quisque fato natus esset. Eandem artem etiam Aegyptii longinquitate temporum innumerabilibus paene saeculis consecuti putantur. Cilicum autem et Pisidarum gens et his finituma Pamphylia, quibus nationibus praefuimus ipsi, volatibus avium cantibusque ut certissimis signis declarari res futuras putant. 1.36. Quid? qui inridetur, partus hic mulae nonne, quia fetus extitit in sterilitate naturae, praedictus est ab haruspicibus incredibilis partus malorum? Quid? Ti. Gracchus P. F., qui bis consul et censor fuit, idemque et summus augur et vir sapiens civisque praestans, nonne, ut C. Gracchus, filius eius, scriptum reliquit, duobus anguibus domi conprehensis haruspices convocavit? qui cum respondissent, si marem emisisset, uxori brevi tempore esse moriendum, si feminam, ipsi, aequius esse censuit se maturam oppetere mortem quam P. Africani filiam adulescentem; feminam emisit, ipse paucis post diebus est mortuus. Inrideamus haruspices, vanos, futtiles esse dicamus, quorumque disciplinam et sapientissimus vir et eventus ac res conprobavit, contemnamus, condemnemus etiam Babylonem et eos, qui e Caucaso caeli signa servantes numeris et modis stellarum cursus persequuntur, condemnemus, inquam, hos aut stultitiae aut vanitatis aut inpudentiae, qui quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum, ut ipsi dicunt, monumentis conprehensa continent, et mentiri iudicemus nec, saeculorum reliquorum iudicium quod de ipsis futurum sit, pertimescere. 2.97. Ex quo intellegitur plus terrarum situs quam lunae tactus ad nascendum valere. Nam quod aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis experiundisque pueris, quicumque essent nati, Babylonios posuisse, fallunt; si enim esset factitatum, non esset desitum; neminem autem habemus auctorem, qui id aut fieri dicat aut factum sciat. Videsne me non ea dicere, quae Carneades, sed ea, quae princeps Stoicorum Panaetius dixerit? Ego autem etiam haec requiro: omnesne, qui Cannensi pugna ceciderint, uno astro fuerint; exitus quidem omnium unus et idem fuit. Quid? qui ingenio atque animo singulares, num astro quoque uno? quod enim tempus, quo non innumerabiles nascantur? at certe similis nemo Homeri. | 1.2. Now I am aware of no people, however refined and learned or however savage and ignorant, which does not think that signs are given of future events, and that certain persons can recognize those signs and foretell events before they occur. First of all — to seek authority from the most distant sources — the Assyrians, on account of the vast plains inhabited by them, and because of the open and unobstructed view of the heavens presented to them on every side, took observations of the paths and movements of the stars, and, having made note of them, transmitted to posterity what significance they had for each person. And in that same nation the Chaldeans — a name which they derived not from their art but their race — have, it is thought, by means of long-continued observation of the constellations, perfected a science which enables them to foretell what any mans lot will be and for what fate he was born.The same art is believed to have been acquired also by the Egyptians through a remote past extending over almost countless ages. Moreover, the Cilicians, Pisidians, and their neighbours, the Pamphylians — nations which I once governed — think that the future is declared by the songs and flights of birds, which they regard as most infallible signs. 1.36. Why, then, when here recently a mule (which is an animal ordinarily sterile by nature) brought forth a foal, need anyone have scoffed because the soothsayers from that occurrence prophesied a progeny of countless evils to the state?What, pray, do you say of that well-known incident of Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius? He was censor and consul twice; beside that he was a most competent augur, a wise man and a pre-eminent citizen. Yet he, according to the account left us by his son Gaius, having caught two snakes in his home, called in the soothsayers to consult them. They advised him that if he let the male snake go his wife must die in a short time; and if he released the female snake his own death must soon occur. Thinking it more fitting that a speedy death should overtake him rather than his young wife, who was the daughter of Publius Africanus, he released the female snake and died within a few days.[19] Let us laugh at the soothsayers, brand them as frauds and impostors and scorn their calling, even though a very wise man, Tiberius Gracchus, and the results and circumstances of his death have given proof of its trustworthiness; let us scorn the Babylonians, too, and those astrologers who, from the top of Mount Caucasus, observe the celestial signs and with the aid of mathematics follow the courses of the stars; let us, I say, convict of folly, falsehood, and shamelessness the men whose records, as they themselves assert, cover a period of four hundred and seventy thousand years; and let us pronounce them liars, utterly indifferent to the opinion of succeeding generations. 2.97. Hence it is evident that ones birth is more affected by local environment than by the condition of the moon. of course, the statement quoted by you that the Babylonians for 470, years had taken the horoscope of every child and had tested it by the results, is untrue; for if this had been their habit they would not have abandoned it. Moreover we find no writer who says that the practice exists or who knows that it ever did exist.[47] You observe that I am not repeating the arguments of Carneades, but those of Panaetius, the head of the Stoic school. But now on my own initiative I put the following questions: Did all the Romans who fell at Cannae have the same horoscope? Yet all had one and the same end. Were all the men eminent for intellect and genius born under the same star? Was there ever a day when countless numbers were not born? And yet there never was another Homer. |
|
19. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.17, 3.42, 3.73, 4.14, 5.12, 5.14, 5.18, 5.21, 5.44, 5.46-5.47, 5.58-5.59, 5.61, 5.65-5.66, 5.75, 5.84 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •didymus (arius?), epitome of peripatetic ethics •didymus (arius?) •arius didymus Found in books: Bryan (2018) 271, 272; Tsouni (2019) 121, 126, 129, 159, 164, 172, 181; Wardy and Warren (2018) 271, 272, 275; Wilson (2022) 25 | 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.42. "Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. 3.73. "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to 'obey occasion,' 'follow God,' 'know thyself,' and 'moderation in all things.' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature's secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. 4.14. "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.' 5.12. "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.21. "These then are the six simple views about the End of Goods and Evils; two of them without a champion, and four actually upheld. of composite or dualistic definitions of the Supreme Good there have been three in all; nor were more than three possible, if you examine the nature of the case closely. There is the combination of Morality with pleasure, adopted by Callipho and Dinomachus; with freedom from pain, by Diodorus; or with the primary objects of nature, the view of the ancients, as we entitle both the Academics and the Peripatetics."But it is impossible to set forth the whole of our position at once; so for the present we need only notice that pleasure must be discarded, on the ground that, as will be shown later, we are intended by nature for greater things. Freedom from pain is open to practically the same objections as pleasure. 5.44. "We must therefore penetrate into the nature of things, and come to understand thoroughly its requirements; otherwise we cannot know ourselves. That maxim was too lofty for it to be thought to have emanated from a human being, and it was therefore ascribed to a god. Accordingly the Pythian Apollo bids us 'learn to know ourselves'; but the sole road to self-knowledge is to know our powers of body and of mind, and to follow the path of life that gives us their full employment."Now inasmuch as our original instinct of desire was for the possession of the parts aforesaid in their fullest natural perfection, it must be allowed that, when we have attained the object of our desire, our nature takes its stand in this as its final End, and this constitutes our Chief Good; and that this End as a whole must be desired intrinsically and in and for itself, follows of necessity from the fact that the several parts of it also have already been proved to be desirable for themselves. 5.46. "So far as our argument has proceeded hitherto, it has been based entirely upon the primary attractions of nature. But from this point on let us adopt a different line of reasoning, namely to show that, in addition to the argument from self-love, the fact that each part of our nature, both mental and bodily, possesses its own peculiar faculty goes to prove that the activity of our several parts is preâeminently spontaneous. To start with the body, do you notice how men try to hide a deformed or infirm or maimed limb? They actually take great pains and trouble to conceal, if they possibly can, their bodily defect, or at all events to let it be seen as little as possible; they even undergo painful courses of treatment in order to restore the natural appearance of their limbs, even though the actual use of them will not only not be improved but will even be diminished. In fact, since every man instinctively thinks that he himself in his entirety is a thing to be desired, and this not for the sake of anything else but for his own sake, it follows that when a thing is desired as a whole for its own sake, the parts also of that thing are desired for their own sakes. 5.47. Again, is there nothing in the movements and postures of the body which Nature herself judges to be of importance? A man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular cast of features and expression â is there nothing in these things that we consider worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not often think people deserving of dislike, who by some movement or posture appear to have violated a law or principle of nature? And since people try to get rid of these defects of bearing, why should not even beauty have a good claim to be considered as desirable for its own sake? For we think imperfection or mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps still greater reason pursue distinction of form for its own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily movement and posture, why should we not pursue beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility but also for their own sakes. For since our nature aims at the full development of all its parts, she desires for its own sake that state of body which is most in accordance with himself; because she is thrown into utter disorder if the body is diseased or in pain or weak. 5.58. "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later. 5.59. In generating and developing the human body, Nature's procedure was to make some parts perfect at birth, and to fashion other parts as it grew up, without making much use of external and artificial aids. The mind on the other hand she endowed with its remaining faculties in the same perfection as the body, equipping it with senses already adapted to their function of perception and requiring little or no assistance of any kind to complete their development; but the highest and noblest part of man's nature she neglected. It is true she bestowed an intellect capable of receiving every virtue, and implanted in it at birth and without instruction embryonic notions of the loftiest ideas, laying the foundation of its education, and introducing among its endowments the elementary constituents, so to speak, of virtue. But of virtue itself she merely gave the germ and no more. 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. 5.65. But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which, coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by the ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I speak, is termed Justice; connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared by the remaining virtues. 5.66. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature. 5.75. After these words he paused, and then added: "How now? Do you think I have made good use of my privilege of having you hear me say over my lesson?" "Why, Piso," I replied, "you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils." "That is true," said he; "but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' |
|
| 20. Cicero, Somnium Scipionem, 7.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269 |
21. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 1.30 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Maso (2022) 118; Motta and Petrucci (2022) 36 | 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.30. The inconsistencies of Plato are a long story. In the Timaeus he says that it is impossible to name the father of this universe; and in the Laws he deprecates all inquiry into the nature of the deity. Again, he holds that god is entirely incorporeal (in Greek, asomatos); but divine incorporeity is inconceivable, for an incorporeal deity would necessarily be incapable of sensation, and also of practical wisdom, and of pleasure, all of which are attributes essential to our conception of deity. Yet both in the Timaeus and the Laws he says that the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls are gods, in addition to those in whom we have been taught to believe; but it is obvious that these propositions are both inherently false and mutually destructive. |
|
22. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.15, 3.17, 3.42, 3.51-3.52, 3.73, 4.14, 5.12, 5.14, 5.18, 5.21, 5.44, 5.46-5.47, 5.58-5.59, 5.61, 5.65-5.66, 5.75, 5.84 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus •didymus (arius?), epitome of peripatetic ethics •didymus (arius?) Found in books: Bryan (2018) 271, 272; Maso (2022) 118; Tsouni (2019) 121, 126, 129, 159, 164, 172, 181; Wardy and Warren (2018) 271, 272, 275; Wilson (2022) 25| 3.15. Experiamur igitur, inquit, etsi habet haec Stoicorum ratio difficilius quiddam et obscurius. nam cum in Graeco sermone haec ipsa quondam rerum rerum om. BE nomina novarum * * non videbantur, novarum non videbantur ARV, N (syll. rum ab alt. m. in ras. compendio ser.); vocarunt non videbantur BE; excidisse aliquid vidit Mdv., qui suspicatur fuisse aut cum ... quondam rerum nomina novarum nova erant, ferenda non videbantur aut cum ... quondam nomina nova erant, ferenda non videbantur aut cum ... quondam nomina nova erant, ridebantur quae nunc consuetudo diuturna trivit; quid censes in Latino fore? Facillimum id quidem est, inquam. si enim Zenoni licuit, cum rem aliquam invenisset inusitatam, inauditum quoque ei rei nomen inponere, cur non liceat Catoni? nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum, quod idem declaret, magis idem declaret magis magis idem declarat R usitatum. equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere. et tamen puto concedi nobis oportere ut Graeco verbo utamur, si quando minus minus NV munus occurret Latinum, ne hoc ephippiis et acratophoris potius quam proe+gmenis et apoproe+gmenis concedatur; quamquam haec quidem praeposita proposita R posita V recte et reiecta dicere licebit. 3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.42. An vero certius quicquam potest esse quam illorum ratione, illorum ratione Lamb. illo ratione (rōe R) AR illa ratione BEV illa ratio est N qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse sapientem beatum esse, cum eculeo equuleo R torqueatur? eorum autem, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit ut in omnibus ut in omnibus NV uti n oi ibus R uti nominibus ABE tormentis conservetur beata vita beata vitaz ARN vita beata BEV sapienti. etenim si dolores eosdem tolerabilius patiuntur qui excipiunt eos pro patria quam qui leviore leviori BE de causa, opinio facit, non natura, vim doloris aut maiorem aut minorem. 3.51. quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valitudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum ' ipsius Ciceronis in scribendo lapsus' Mdv. similium rerum in usu O. Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 246 alia alii AR autem non esse eius modi, itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno prohgme/non, contraque quod a)poprohgme/non nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi verbi ( post huius) om. A faciendi Zenonis exponere. 3.52. Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim id est enim Mdv. idem enim est ( in N enim ab alt. m. superscr. ; V om. enim) prohgme/non ), sed eos, qui in aliquo honore sunt, sunt R sint quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primo loco primo loco O. Heinius ibid. p. 245 pri- morie A p'mori e loco BE primove R primorie (o corr. in a) N primore V sunt, sed ea, quae ' In primorie latet primo ordine, quam vocem adscripsit qui haec ad antecedentia quorum ordo proxime accedit ut secundus sit accommodare studeret' H. A. Koch p. 37. Cf. etiam p. 110, 5 sq. secundum locum optinent, prohgme/na, id est producta, nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus—id erit verbum e verbo—vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta. re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus. 3.73. physicae quoque quoque quidem BE non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei ei V et ABER ei et N proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere parere pariete R et sequi sequi et deum et se BE deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus adversus advorsum Non. deos nec quanta iis iis Mdv. his expiatione ( explatione L 1 ut vid. Lindsay ) Non. gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. nec vero ... potest Non. p. 232 s. v. advorsum 4.14. Sed haec hactenus. nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit, quam ob rem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret. hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum, finis hic bonorum qui continet del. Bentl., Ern. philosophiam et quis quis ARV quid (d ab alt. m. in ras. ) N qui BE a Stoicis et quem ad modum diceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus, si potuerimus, quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, dixissent edd. dixisset his verbis tria significari significari BE significare Stoici dicunt, unum eius modi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent. hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere. 5.12. De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod e)cwteriko/n appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. sed cum beata vita quaeratur idque sit unum, quod philosophia philosophia dett. philosophiam spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut labefactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo non numquam variari inter eos inter eos variari R et dubitari videtur. quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam praestare vitam vitam praestare BE sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, delicatior videtur NV ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis et roboris. Simus igitur contenti his. 5.14. praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet. 5.18. ab iis iis Lamb. 2, Mdv. ; his alii, quae prima secundum naturam nomit, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valitudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima prima om. R in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid aliquid Wes. aliquod sit, quo primum primum dett. prima BE primo RNV natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad ad ( prius ) om. BERN repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid aliquod BE referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. 5.21. Sex igitur hae hee E, h (= haec) R summo BERNV summa dett. sunt simplices de summo bonorum malorumque sententiae, duae sine patrono, quattuor defensae. quatuor defense quatuor BE iunctae autem et duplices expositiones summi boni tres omnino fuerunt, nec vero plures, si penitus rerum naturam videas, esse potuerunt. nam aut voluptas adiungi potest ad honestatem, ut Calliphonti Dinomachoque placuit, aut doloris vacuitas, ut Diodoro, aut prima naturae, ut antiquis, quos eosdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominavimus. nominavimus BER ( cf. p. 158, 30 sqq. ) nominamus NV sed quoniam quoniam q uo R non possunt omnia simul dici, haec in praesentia nota esse debebunt, voluptatem semovendam esse, quando ad maiora quaedam, ut iam apparebit, nati sumus. de vacuitate doloris eadem fere dici solent, quae de voluptate. Quando igitur et de voluptate secl. Nissenius ( sec. Gz. ); cf. Muret. var. lect. 14, 20 cum Torquato et de honestate, in qua una omne bonum poneretur, cum Catone est disputatum, primum, quae contra voluptatem dicta sunt, eadem fere cadunt contra vacuitatem doloris. 5.44. Intrandum est igitur igitur est BE in rerum naturam et penitus quid ea postulet pervidendum; aliter enim nosmet ipsos nosse non possumus. quod praeceptum quia maius erat, quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco assignatum est deo. iubet igitur nos Pythius Apollo noscere nosmet ipsos. cognitio autem haec est una nostri, ut vim corporis nostri, ut vim corporis Mdv. nostri ut corporis BER vim ut nostri corporis (vim in ras., nostri ab alt. m. superscr. ) N ut vim nostri corporis V animique norimus sequamurque eam vitam, quae rebus iis rebus iis (hys) BE rebus ( pro reb; us = rebus is) RNV ipsis ipsis om. BE ( vi corporis animique opponuntur res eae ipsae cf. p. 179, 7 sq ) perfruatur. quoniam autem is animi appetitus a principio fuit, ut ea, quae dixi, quam perfectissima natura haberemus, confitendum est, cum id adepti simus, quod appetitum sit, in eo quasi in in ( post quasi) om. NV ultimo consistere naturam, atque id esse summum bonum; quod certe universum sua sponte ipsum expeti et propter se necesse est, quoniam ante demonstratum est etiam singulas eius partes esse per se expetendas. 5.46. Et adhuc quidem ita nobis progressa ratio est, ut ea duceretur omnis a prima commendatione naturae. nunc autem aliud iam argumentandi sequamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus, sed quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summe summe M. Brutus apud Dav. ; summa nostra sponte moveamur. atque ut a corpore ordiar, videsne ut, si ut si dett. si quae in membris prava aut debilitata aut inminuta sint, occultent homines? ut etiam contendant et elaborent, si efficere possint, ut aut non appareat corporis vitium aut quam minimum appareat? multosque etiam dolores curationis causa perferant, ut, si ipse usus membrorum non modo non maior, verum etiam minor futurus sit, eorum tamen species ad naturam revertatur? etenim, cum omnes omnis BERN natura totos se expetendos putent, nec id ob aliam rem, sed propter ipsos, necesse est eius etiam partis propter se expeti, quod universum propter se expetatur. 5.47. Quid? in quid in RNV quod in BE motu et et etiam BE in statu corporis nihil inest, quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? quem ad modum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui ductus oris, qui vultus in quoque sit? nihilne est in his rebus, quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? nonne odio multos dignos putamus, qui quodam motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum contempsisse? et quoniam haec deducuntur ducuntur NV de corpore, quid est cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur? nam si pravitatem inminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam fugienda BER putamus, cur non etiam, ac etiam ac N 2 iam et hanc BE etiam (eciam V) hac RV etiam hanc N 1 fortasse magis, propter se formae dignitatem sequamur? et si turpitudinem fugimus fugimus P. Man. fugiamus in statu et motu corporis, quid est cur pulchritudinem non sequamur? atque etiam valitudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter utilitatem solum, sed etiam ipsas propter se expetemus. quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit, qui est maxime e natura, quae tota perturbatur, si aut aegrum corpus corpus V opus est aut dolet aut caret viribus. 5.58. Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora maioribus, minora maioribus maioribus minoribus BE maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque cognitioque N cognitione rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes latentes iacentes R indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum scientia, tum sciendi que (ēdi que ab alt. m. in ras. ) N prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta fortis, iusta Mdv. forti si iusta B E fortis. Si iusta R fortis et iusta (& in N ab alt. m. in ras. ) NV ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeeunte deducimur. omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas teneritas NV Non. temeritas BER ac mollitia mollitia BE Non. mollities RN mollicies V quaedam, in primo ... moll. quaedam Non. p. 495 ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus. 5.59. Natura igitur corpus quidem hominis sic et genuit et formavit, ut alia in primo ortu perficeret, alia progrediente aetate fingeret neque sane multum adiumentis externis et adventiciis uteretur. animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut corpus; sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adiumento ullo ad suam confirmationem indigerent; indigerent Brem. indigeret quod autem in homine praestantissimum atque optimum est, id deseruit. etsi dedit talem mentem, quae omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi instituit docere et induxit in ea, quae inerant, tamquam elementa virtutis. sed virtutem ipsam inchoavit, nihil amplius. 5.61. Hoc autem loco tantum explicemus haec honesta, quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. indicant iudicant BER pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. quanta studia decertantium sunt! sunt R sint quanta ipsa certamina! ut illi efferuntur laetitia, cum vicerunt! vicerunt Mdv. vicerint ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores non perferunt, ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! atque ea in optima quaque indole indole quaque BE maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta, quae intellegimus, a natura tamquam adumbrantur. 5.65. in omni autem autem enim BE honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani. quae nata a primo satu, quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et iis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae. quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc, quam dico, societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tuens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. atque haec ita iustitiae propria sunt, ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia. 5.66. nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam quoddam BE ingenitum ingenitum B E innatum RN in natum V quasi civile atque populare, quod Graeci politiko/n vocant, quicquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea, quam quam que RN exposui, caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa se fundet fundet se BE in in N post fundet ab alt. m. superscr. est (= scilicet) usu ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet. servari enim iustitia nisi a forti forte RNV viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. qualis est igitur omnis haec, quam dico, conspiratio consensusque virtutum, tale est illud ipsum honestum, quandoquidem honestum aut ipsa virtus est aut res gesta virtute; quibus rebus in rebus R et (ī ab alt. m. superscr. ) N 2 vita consentiens virtutibusque respondens recta et honesta et constans et naturae congruens existimari potest. 5.75. inquit; satisne vobis videor pro meo iure in vestris auribus commentatus? comentatus R commentatus ( prior t in ras. paulo capaciore ) N commendatus (conm. E) BE comendatus V Et ego: Tu vero, inquam, Piso, ut saepe alias, alias N 2 alia sic hodie ita nosse ista visus es, ut, si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non multum Graecis supplicandum putarem. quod quidem eo probavi magis, quia memini Staseam Neapolitanum, doctorem illum tuum, nobilem sane Peripateticum, aliquanto aliquando BE ista secus dicere solitum, assentientem iis, qui multum in fortuna secunda aut adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis ponerent. Est, ut dicis, inquit; sed haec ab Antiocho, familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius, quam a Stasea dicebantur. quamquam ego non quaero, quid tibi a me probatum sit, sed huic Ciceroni nostro, quem discipulum cupio a te abducere. 5.84. dato dato edd. date hoc dandum erit erit est BE illud. Quod vestri non item. 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi proclivis V currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, potes cod. Glogav., Dav. ; potest nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse esse beatus BE nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, in crucem qui agitur cod. Mor., marg. Crat. ; in crucem quia igitur BE in cruce. Quia igitur RV beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser miser Mdv. miserum RV om. BE morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sustinebis BE substinebis V sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: eculeo dett. aculeo quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam tam dett., om. BERV docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. | 3.15. "Then let us make the attempt," said he, "albeit there is a considerable element of difficulty and obscurity in this Stoic system. For at one time even the terms employed in Greek for its novel conceptions seemed unendurable, when they were novel, though now daily use has made them familiar; what then to you think will be the case in Latin?" "Do not feel the least difficulty on that score," said I. "If when Zeno invented some novel idea he was permitted to denote it by an equally unheardâof word, why should not Cato be permitted to do so too? Though all the same it need not be a hard and fast rule that every word shall be represented by its exact counterpart, when there is a more familiar word conveying the same meaning. That is the way of a clumsy translator. Indeed my own practice is to use several words to give what is expressed in Greek by one, if I cannot convey the sense ')" onMouseOut="nd();" otherwise. At the same time I hold that we may fairly claim the licence to employ a Greek word when no Latin word is readily forthcoming. Why should this licence be granted to ephippia (saddles) and acratophora (jars for neat wine) more than to proÄgmena and apoproÄgmena? These latter however it is true may be correctly translated 'preferred' and 'rejected.' " 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.42. "Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. 3.51. Again among things valuable â e.g. health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like â they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proÄgmena and the opposite, apoproÄgmena â for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. 3.52. "In a royal court, Zeno remarks, no one speaks of the king himself as 'promoted' to honour (for that is the meaning of proÄgmenon), but the term is applied to those holding some office of state whose rank most nearly approaches, though it is second to, the royal preâeminence; similarly in the conduct of life the title proÄgmenon, that is, 'promoted,' is to be given not to those things which are in the first rank, but to those which hold the second place; for these we may use either the term suggested (for that will be a literal translation) or 'advanced' and 'degraded,' or the term we have been using all along, 'preferred' or 'superior,' and for the opposite 'rejected.' If the meaning is intelligible we need not be punctilious about the use of words. 3.73. "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to 'obey occasion,' 'follow God,' 'know thyself,' and 'moderation in all things.' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature's secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. 4.14. "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.' 5.12. "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.21. "These then are the six simple views about the End of Goods and Evils; two of them without a champion, and four actually upheld. of composite or dualistic definitions of the Supreme Good there have been three in all; nor were more than three possible, if you examine the nature of the case closely. There is the combination of Morality with pleasure, adopted by Callipho and Dinomachus; with freedom from pain, by Diodorus; or with the primary objects of nature, the view of the ancients, as we entitle both the Academics and the Peripatetics."But it is impossible to set forth the whole of our position at once; so for the present we need only notice that pleasure must be discarded, on the ground that, as will be shown later, we are intended by nature for greater things. Freedom from pain is open to practically the same objections as pleasure. 5.44. "We must therefore penetrate into the nature of things, and come to understand thoroughly its requirements; otherwise we cannot know ourselves. That maxim was too lofty for it to be thought to have emanated from a human being, and it was therefore ascribed to a god. Accordingly the Pythian Apollo bids us 'learn to know ourselves'; but the sole road to self-knowledge is to know our powers of body and of mind, and to follow the path of life that gives us their full employment."Now inasmuch as our original instinct of desire was for the possession of the parts aforesaid in their fullest natural perfection, it must be allowed that, when we have attained the object of our desire, our nature takes its stand in this as its final End, and this constitutes our Chief Good; and that this End as a whole must be desired intrinsically and in and for itself, follows of necessity from the fact that the several parts of it also have already been proved to be desirable for themselves. 5.46. "So far as our argument has proceeded hitherto, it has been based entirely upon the primary attractions of nature. But from this point on let us adopt a different line of reasoning, namely to show that, in addition to the argument from self-love, the fact that each part of our nature, both mental and bodily, possesses its own peculiar faculty goes to prove that the activity of our several parts is preâeminently spontaneous. To start with the body, do you notice how men try to hide a deformed or infirm or maimed limb? They actually take great pains and trouble to conceal, if they possibly can, their bodily defect, or at all events to let it be seen as little as possible; they even undergo painful courses of treatment in order to restore the natural appearance of their limbs, even though the actual use of them will not only not be improved but will even be diminished. In fact, since every man instinctively thinks that he himself in his entirety is a thing to be desired, and this not for the sake of anything else but for his own sake, it follows that when a thing is desired as a whole for its own sake, the parts also of that thing are desired for their own sakes. 5.47. Again, is there nothing in the movements and postures of the body which Nature herself judges to be of importance? A man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular cast of features and expression â is there nothing in these things that we consider worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not often think people deserving of dislike, who by some movement or posture appear to have violated a law or principle of nature? And since people try to get rid of these defects of bearing, why should not even beauty have a good claim to be considered as desirable for its own sake? For we think imperfection or mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps still greater reason pursue distinction of form for its own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily movement and posture, why should we not pursue beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility but also for their own sakes. For since our nature aims at the full development of all its parts, she desires for its own sake that state of body which is most in accordance with himself; because she is thrown into utter disorder if the body is diseased or in pain or weak. 5.58. "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later. 5.59. In generating and developing the human body, Nature's procedure was to make some parts perfect at birth, and to fashion other parts as it grew up, without making much use of external and artificial aids. The mind on the other hand she endowed with its remaining faculties in the same perfection as the body, equipping it with senses already adapted to their function of perception and requiring little or no assistance of any kind to complete their development; but the highest and noblest part of man's nature she neglected. It is true she bestowed an intellect capable of receiving every virtue, and implanted in it at birth and without instruction embryonic notions of the loftiest ideas, laying the foundation of its education, and introducing among its endowments the elementary constituents, so to speak, of virtue. But of virtue itself she merely gave the germ and no more. 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. 5.65. But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which, coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by the ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I speak, is termed Justice; connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared by the remaining virtues. 5.66. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature. 5.75. After these words he paused, and then added: "How now? Do you think I have made good use of my privilege of having you hear me say over my lesson?" "Why, Piso," I replied, "you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils." "That is true," said he; "but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' |
|
23. Cicero, On Duties, 1.51-1.52, 1.80-1.81, 3.15, 3.51-3.52 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •didymus (arius?), epitome of peripatetic ethics •arius didymus Found in books: Maso (2022) 70, 118; Tsouni (2019) 162| 1.51. Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium autem communia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in permultas potest: Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam, Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit. Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet, cum illi accénderit. Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; 1.52. ex quo sunt illa communia: non prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit, consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem: Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales. 1.80. Quare expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo, sed cavendum, ne id bellandi magis fuga quam utilitatis ratione faciamus. Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur. Fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nec tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti et consilio nec a ratione discedere. 1.81. Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni est, praecipere cogitatione futura et aliquanto ante constituere, quid accidere possit in utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit: Non putaram. Haec sunt opera magni animi et excelsi et prudentia consilioque fidentis; temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda. 3.15. Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant, id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus quid absit a perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum; quod idem in poematis, in picturis usu venit in aliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in iis aliquid probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem, quid in una quaque re vitii sit, nequeant iudicare; itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt facile sententia. Haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia. 3.51. In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo. Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid om-nino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam vendat, velle quam optime vendere. Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quain ceteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria? 3.52. Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu cum horninibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nune te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. | 1.51. This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common." Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and, though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally: "Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his: No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit." In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. 1.52. On this principle we have the following maxims:"Deny no one the water that flows by;" "Let anyone who will take fire from our fire;" "Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;" for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss. We should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing something to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are limited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of universal liberality must be regulated according to that test of Ennius â "No less shines his" â in order that we may continue to have the means for being generous to our friends. 1.80. And so diplomacy in the friendly settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage in settling them on the battlefield; but we must be careful not to take that course merely for the sake of avoiding war rather than for the sake of public expediency. War, however, should be undertaken in such a way as to make it evident that it has no other object than to secure peace. But it takes a brave and resolute spirit not to be disconcerted in times of difficulty or ruffled and thrown off one's feet, as the saying is, but to keep one's presence of mind and one's self-possession and not to swerve from the path of reason. 1.81. Now all this requires great personal courage; but it calls also for great intellectual ability by reflection to anticipate the future, to discover some time in advance what may happen whether for good or for ill, and what must be done in any possible event, and never to be reduced to having to say, "I had not thought of that." These are the activities that mark a spirit strong, high, and self-reliant in its prudence and wisdom. But to mix rashly in the fray and to fight hand to hand with the enemy is but a barbarous and brutish kind of business. Yet when the stress of circumstances demands it, we must gird on the sword and prefer death to slavery and disgrace. 3.15. On the other hand, when some act is performed in which we see "mean" duties manifested, that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of real perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, they think there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the estimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art: ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The reason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of excellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have not the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular piece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts, they readily abandon their former opinion. The performance of the duties, then, which I am discussing in these books, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness, not the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all mankind. 3.51. In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater, a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage, provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation. "I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my competitors â perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is wronged?" 3.52. "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?" "It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told." |
|
24. Polybius, Histories, 18.35.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 377| 18.35.9. καὶ μὴν Πόπλιος Σκιπίων, ὁ τούτου μὲν κατὰ φύσιν υἱός, Ποπλίου δὲ τοῦ μεγάλου κληθέντος κατὰ θέσιν υἱωνός, κύριος γενόμενος τῆς Καρχηδόνος, ἥτις ἐδόκει πολυχρημονεστάτη τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην εἶναι πόλεων, ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης οὐδὲν εἰς τὸν ἴδιον βίον μετήγαγεν, οὔτʼ ὠνησάμενος οὔτʼ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ κτησάμενος οὐδέν, | 18.35.9. Again, take the case of Publius Scipio, Aemilius's son by birth, but grandson by adoption of Publius Scipio, known as the great. When he became master of Carthage, which was considered the wealthiest city in the world, he took absolutely nothing from it to add to his own fortune, either by purchase or by any other means of acquisition, and this although he was not particularly well off, but only moderately so for a Roman. |
|
| 25. Cicero, Letters, 12.52.3, 16.11.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Maso (2022) 70 |
| 26. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 2.90, 3.249 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 246 |
27. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 2.245 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 377 | 2.245. But since the law permits the property of parents to be inherited by the children, but does not allow the parents themselves to inherit, he has abstained from any express mention of the subject as one to be deprecated and of evil omen, in order that the father and mother might not seem to receive any gain from the inconsolable affliction of the loss of children dying prematurely; but he indirectly intimated their right to be invited to such an inheritance when he conceded it to the uncles, in order that in this way he might attain the best objects of cultivating propriety and of avoiding the improper alienation of the estate. And, after the uncles, the fifth class of inheritors was to be composed of the nearest relations, to the first of whom he invariably assigns the inheritance. |
|
28. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 22 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Wilson (2022) 25 | 22. For he has learnt to disregard all the commands which those most unlawful masters of the soul seek to imposed upon him, out of his admiration and desire for freedom, of which independence and spontaneousness of action are the most especial and inalienable inheritance; and by some persons the poet is praised who composed this iambic-- "No man's a slave who does not fear to Die," as having had an accurate idea of the consequences of such courage; for he conceived that nothing is so calculated to enslave the mind as a fear of death, arising from an excessive desire of living. IV. |
|
29. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.47, 1.137-1.140 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 323; Geljon and Runia (2013) 250 | 1.47. And though they are by nature incomprehensible in their essence, still they show a kind of impression or copy of their energy and operation; as seals among you, when any wax or similar kind of material is applied to them, make an innumerable quantity of figures and impressions, without being impaired as to any portion of themselves, but still remaining unaltered and as they were before; so also you must conceive that the powers which are around me invest those things which have no distinctive qualities with such qualities, and those which have no forms with precise forms, and that without having any portion of their own everlasting nature dismembered or weakened. 1.137. Moreover the law, going beyond all these enactments in their favour, commands the people to bring them the first fruits, not only of all their possessions of every description, but also of their own lives and bodies; for the children are separable portions of their parents as one may say; but if one must tell the plain truth, they are inseparable as being of kindred blood, [...]{18}{the above passage is quite unintelligible in the Greek, and is given up by Mangey as irremediably corrupt.} and being bound to them by the allurements of united good will, and by the indissoluble bonds of nature. 1.138. But nevertheless, he consecrates also their own first-born male children after the fashion of other first fruits, as a sort of thanks-offering for fertility, and a number of children both existing and hoped for, and wishing at the same time that their marriages should be not only free from all blame, but even very deserving of praise, the first fruit arising from which is consecrated to God; and keeping this in their minds, both husbands and wives ought to cling to modesty, and to attend to their household concerns, and to cherish uimity, agreeing with one another, so that what is called a communion and partnership may be so in solid truth, not only in word, but likewise in deed. 1.139. And with reference to the dedication of the first-born male children, in order that the parents may not be separated from their children, nor the children from their parents, he values the first fruits of them himself at a fixed price in money ordering everyone both poor and rich to contribute an equal sum, not having any reference to the ability of the contributors, nor to the vigour or beauty of the children who were born; but considering how much even a very poor man might be able to give; 1.140. for since the birth of children happens equally to the most noble and to the most obscure persons of the race, he thought it just to enact that their contribution should also be equal, aiming, as I have already said, particularly to fix a sum which should be in the power of everyone to give.XXVIII. |
|
30. Philo of Alexandria, On Curses, 108 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 377 | 108. A lyre, indeed, or any similar instrument, if it be not struck by some one, is silent; and speech, too, if it be not struck by the principal part, that is to say, the mind, is of necessity tranquil. And, again, as musical instruments are transposed and adapted to an infinite number of mixtures of airs, so also speech corresponds to them, becoming an interpreter of things; |
|
31. Philo of Alexandria, On The Posterity of Cain, 135 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 323 | 135. on which account Moses, in strict accordance with the principles of natural philosophy, represents Leah as Hated. For those whom the charms of pleasures, which are with Rachel, that is to say, with the outward sense, cannot be endured by Leah, who is situated out of the reach of the passions; on which account they repudiate and detest her. But as far as she herself is concerned, her alienation from the creature produces her a close connection with God, from whom she receives the seeds of wisdom, and conceives, and travails, and brings forth virtuous ideas, worthy of the father who begot them. If therefore, you, O my soul, imitating Leah, reject mortal things, you will of necessity turn to the incorruptible God, who will shed over you all the fountains of his good. XLI. |
|
32. Philo of Alexandria, On Drunkenness, 50 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 323 | 50. But he acts cunningly in opposition to these principles, wishing us to take to ourselves the elder sister first, not in order that we may have her in a lasting manner, but that being attracted by the allurements of the younger, we may hereafter relax in our desire for the elder one. XIII. |
|
| 33. Philo of Alexandria, On The Preliminary Studies, 71-72, 112 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 250 |
34. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, 153 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 377 | 153. It is a good thing, no doubt, to take care of one's walls, to collect one's revenues, to feast, to revel in wine, to contract marriages, to go courting the old and withered dames (as the proverb calls them); but these are the employments of peace, and to do all these things in the crisis of a war raging in all its freshness and vigour, |
|
| 35. Philo of Alexandria, That The Worse Attacks The Better, 75-77 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 250 |
36. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 5.338-5.347, 5.380-5.415 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269| 5.338. Quod si forte fuisse ante hac eadem omnia credis, 5.339. sed periise hominum torrenti saecla vapore, 5.340. aut cecidisse urbis magno vexamine mundi, 5.341. aut ex imbribus adsiduis exisse rapaces 5.342. per terras amnes atque oppida coperuisse. 5.343. tanto quique magis victus fateare necessest 5.344. exitium quoque terrarum caelique futurum; 5.345. nam cum res tantis morbis tantisque periclis 5.346. temptarentur, ibi si tristior incubuisset 5.347. causa, darent late cladem magnasque ruinas. 5.380. Denique tantopere inter se cum maxima mundi 5.381. pugnent membra, pio nequaquam concita bello, 5.382. nonne vides aliquam longi certaminis ollis 5.383. posse dari finem, vel cum sol et vapor omnis 5.384. omnibus epotis umoribus exsuperarint? 5.385. quod facere intendunt, neque adhuc conata patrantur; 5.386. tantum suppeditant amnes ultraque mitur 5.387. omnia diluviare ex alto gurgite ponti: 5.388. ne quiquam, quoniam verrentes aequora venti 5.389. deminuunt radiisque retexens aetherius sol, 5.390. et siccare prius confidunt omnia posse 5.391. quam liquor incepti possit contingere finem. 5.392. tantum spirantes aequo certamine bellum 5.393. magnis inter se de rebus cernere certant, 5.394. cum semel interea fuerit superantior ignis 5.395. et semel, ut fama est, umor regnarit in arvis. 5.396. ignis enim superavit et ambiens multa perussit, 5.397. avia cum Phaethonta rapax vis solis equorum 5.398. aethere raptavit toto terrasque per omnis. 5.399. at pater omnipotens ira tum percitus acri 5.400. magimum Phaethonta repenti fulminis ictu 5.401. deturbavit equis in terram, Solque cadenti 5.402. obvius aeternam succepit lampada mundi 5.403. disiectosque redegit equos iunxitque trementis, 5.404. inde suum per iter recreavit cuncta gubers, 5.405. scilicet ut veteres Graium cecinere poetae poëtae . 5.406. quod procul a vera nimis est ratione repulsum. 5.407. ignis enim superare potest ubi materiai 5.408. ex infinito sunt corpora plura coorta; 5.409. inde cadunt vires aliqua ratione revictae, 5.410. aut pereunt res exustae torrentibus auris. 5.411. umor item quondam coepit superare coortus, 5.412. ut fama est, hominum vitas quando obruit undis; 5.413. inde ubi vis aliqua ratione aversa recessit, 5.414. ex infinito fuerat quae cumque coorta, 5.415. constiterunt imbres et flumina vim minuerunt. | |
|
| 37. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 17 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 36 |
| 38. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 4-5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 37 |
39. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.9, 7.15, 7.20, 7.21, 7.23, 7.27, 7.32, 7.33, 7.34, 7.35, 7.37, 8.1-11.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022) 134| 7.20. ἕκαστος ἐν τῇ κλήσει ᾗ ἐκλήθη ἐν ταύτῃ μενέτω. | 7.20. Let eachman stay in that calling in which he was called. |
|
| 40. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.29.59, 1.30.2-1.30.4, 2.21.22, 3.22.69, 3.24.35, 3.25.10, 4.4.6, 4.9.4, 4.11.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Wilson (2022) 34, 134 |
| 41. Aspasius, Nicomachian Ethics, 1.14-2.4, 2.12, 2.13 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 23 |
| 42. New Testament, James, 2.11-3.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 720 |
43. New Testament, Galatians, 2.5, 2.18, 2.21, 3.28, 4.10, 5.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022) 119| 2.5. — οἷς οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν εἴξαμεν τῇ ὑποταγῇ, ἵνα ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ εὐαγγελίου διαμείνῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς. 2.18. εἰ γὰρ ἃ κατέλυσα ταῦτα πάλιν οἰκοδομῶ, παραβάτην ἐμαυτὸν συνιστάνω. 2.21. Οὐκ ἀθετῶ τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ· εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα Χριστὸς δωρεὰν ἀπέθανεν. 3.28. οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστὲ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 4.10. ἡμέρας παρατηρεῖσθε καὶ μῆνας καὶ καιροὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτούς. 5.2. Ἴδε ἐγὼ Παῦλος λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐὰν περιτέμνησθε Χριστὸς ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ὠφελήσει. | 2.5. to whom we gave no place in the way ofsubjection, not for an hour, that the truth of the gospel mightcontinue with you. 2.18. For if I build up again those things which I destroyed, I provemyself a law-breaker. 2.21. I don't make void the grace of God.For if righteousness is through the law, then Christ died for nothing! 3.28. There is neither Jewnor Greek, there is neither slave nor free man, there is neither malenor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. 4.10. You observe days, months,seasons, and years. 5.2. Behold, I, Paul, tell you that if you receive circumcision, Christ willprofit you nothing. |
|
44. New Testament, Romans, 6.21, 10.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Wilson (2022) 25| 6.21. τίνα οὖν καρπὸν εἴχετε τότε ἐφʼ οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε; τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἐκείνων θάνατος· 10.4. τέλος γὰρ νόμου Χριστὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι. | 6.21. What fruit then did you have at that time in the things of which you are now ashamed? For the end of those things is death. 10.4. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes. |
|
| 45. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 113.2-113.4, 113.7, 113.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Jedan (2009) 179 |
| 46. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 65.4-65.7, 83.9, 94.1-94.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 165; Geljon and Runia (2019) 256; Malherbe et al (2014) 720 |
| 47. Seneca The Younger, Natural Questions, 3.29 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269 |
| 48. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 72 |
49. Plutarch, Cicero, 4.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •didymus (arius?), epitome of peripatetic ethics Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 170| 4.3. ἐπεὶ δʼ αὐτῷ Σύλλας τε προσηγγέλθη τεθνηκώς, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῖς γυμνασίοις ἀναρρωννύμενον εἰς ἕξιν ἐβάδιζε νεανικήν, ἥ τε φωνὴ λαμβάνουσα πλάσιν ἡδεῖα μὲν πρὸς ἀκοὴν ἐτέθραπτο, ἐτέθραπτο the words καὶ πολλή ( and full ) which follow this verb in the MSS. are deleted by Gudeman as contradictory to iii. 5 and due to the double πολλὰ below. μετρίως δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν ἥρμοστο τοῦ σώματος, πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἀπὸ Ῥώμης φίλων γραφόντων καὶ δεομένων, πολλὰ δʼ Ἀντιόχου παρακελευομένου τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐπιβαλεῖν πράγμασιν, αὖθις ὥσπερ ὄργανον ἐξηρτύετο ἐξηρτύετο Graux, after Madvig: ἐξήρτυε . τὸν ῥητορικὸν λόγον καὶ ἀνεκίνει τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν, αὑτόν τε ταῖς μελέταις διαπονῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινουμένους μετιὼν ῥήτορας. | 4.3. |
|
| 50. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 75 |
| 51. Maximus of Tyre, Dialexeis, 11.8.186-11.8.191 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: O, Brien (2015) 119 |
| 52. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, a b c d\n0 5.13 5.13 5 13 \n1 10.188 10.188 10 188\n2 '7.16 '7.16 '7 16 \n3 7.157 7.157 7 157\n4 7.247 7.247 7 247 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269 |
| 53. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 3.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Wilson (2022) 134 |
| 54. Galen, On The Powers of Simple Remedies, 44.4-44.51 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269 |
55. Tertullian, Apology, 21.10 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 37| 21.10. Iam ediximus deum universitatem hanc mundi verbo et ratione et virtute molitum. Apud vestros quoque sapientes lo/gon , id est sermonem atque rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis. Hunc enim Zeno determinat factitatorem, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit; eundem et fatum vocari et deum et animum Iovis et necessitatem omnium rerum. Haec Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis adfirmat. | |
|
| 56. Aristocles of Messene, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 57. Aristocles of Messene, Fragments, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 58. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.230, 7.236 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 75 |
| 59. Atticus, Fragments, 5.39-5.41 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 165 |
| 60. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 129 |
| 61. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, None (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 165 |
| 62. Gellius, Attic Nights, 13.28 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Maso (2022) 70 |
| 63. Plotinus, Enneads, (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 171 |
64. Origen, Against Celsus, 6.64 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269 | 6.64. Celsus, again, brings together a number of statements, which he gives as admissions on our part, but which no intelligent Christian would allow. For not one of us asserts that God partakes of form or color. Nor does He even partake of motion, because He stands firm, and His nature is permanent, and He invites the righteous man also to do the same, saying: But as for you, stand here by Me. And if certain expressions indicate a kind of motion, as it were, on His part, such as this, They heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day, we must understand them in this way, that it is by sinners that God is understood as moving, or as we understand the sleep of God, which is taken in a figurative sense, or His anger, or any other similar attribute. But God does not partake even of substance. For He is partaken of (by others) rather than that Himself partakes of them, and He is partaken of by those who have the Spirit of God. Our Saviour, also, does not partake of righteousness; but being Himself righteousness, He is partaken of by the righteous. A discussion about substance would be protracted and difficult, and especially if it were a question whether that which is permanent and immaterial be substance properly so called, so that it would be found that God is beyond substance, communicating of His substance, by means of office and power, to those to whom He communicates Himself by His Word, as He does to the Word Himself; or even if He is substance, yet He is said be in His nature invisible, in these words respecting our Saviour, who is said to be the image of the invisible God, while from the term invisible it is indicated that He is immaterial. It is also a question for investigation, whether the only-begotten and first-born of every creature is to be called substance of substances, and idea of ideas, and the principle of all things, while above all there is His Father and God. |
|
| 65. Porphyry, Fragments, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 165, 172 |
| 66. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 46-50, 45 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 720 |
67. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, a b c d\n0 7.157 7.157 7 157\n1 7.151 7.151 7 151\n2 7.152 7.152 7 152\n3 7.153 7.153 7 153\n4 7.154 7.154 7 154\n5 7.155 7.155 7 155\n6 5.30 5.30 5 30 \n7 7.33 7.33 7 33 \n8 '3.50 '3.50 '3 50 \n9 '3.70 '3.70 '3 70 \n10 7.127 7.127 7 127\n11 10.119 10.119 10 119\n12 7.139 7.139 7 139\n13 7.88 7.88 7 88 \n14 7.106 7.106 7 106\n15 7.105 7.105 7 105\n16 7.87 7.87 7 87 \n17 7.86 7.86 7 86 \n18 7.40 7.40 7 40 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 72 | 7.157. Zeno of Citium and Antipater, in their treatises De anima, and Posidonius define the soul as a warm breath; for by this we become animate and this enables us to move. Cleanthes indeed holds that all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration; but Chrysippus says that only the souls of the wise do so.They count eight parts of the soul: the five senses, the generative power in us, our power of speech, and that of reasoning. They hold that we see when the light between the visual organ and the object stretches in the form of a cone: so Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics and Apollodorus. The apex of the cone in the air is at the eye, the base at the object seen. Thus the thing seen is reported to us by the medium of the air stretching out towards it, as if by a stick. |
|
| 68. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 15.14.1, 15.15.1-15.15.2, 15.15.5, 15.20.2-15.20.3 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 37; Erler et al (2021) 72 |
69. Augustine, The City of God, 19.3 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •didymus (arius?), epitome of peripatetic ethics Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 170 | 19.3. Which of these three is true and to be adopted he attempts to show in the following manner. As it is the supreme good, not of a tree, or of a beast, or of a god, but of man that philosophy is in quest of, he thinks that, first of all, we must define man. He is of opinion that there are two parts in human nature, body and soul, and makes no doubt that of these two the soul is the better and by far the more worthy part. But whether the soul alone is the man, so that the body holds the same relation to it as a horse to the horseman, this he thinks has to be ascertained. The horseman is not a horse and a man, but only a man, yet he is called a horseman, because he is in some relation to the horse. Again, is the body alone the man, having a relation to the soul such as the cup has to the drink? For it is not the cup and the drink it contains which are called the cup, but the cup alone; yet it is so called because it is made to hold the drink. Or, lastly, is it neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but both together, which are man, the body and the soul being each a part, but the whole man being both together, as we call two horses yoked together a pair, of which pair the near and the off horse is each a part, but we do not call either of them, no matter how connected with the other, a pair, but only both together? of these three alternatives, then, Varro chooses the third, that man is neither the body alone, nor the soul alone, but both together. And therefore the highest good, in which lies the happiness of man, is composed of goods of both kinds, both bodily and spiritual. And consequently he thinks that the primary objects of nature are to be sought for their own sake, and that virtue, which is the art of living, and can be communicated by instruction, is the most excellent of spiritual goods. This virtue, then, or art of regulating life, when it has received these primary objects of nature which existed independently of it, and prior to any instruction, seeks them all, and itself also, for its own sake; and it uses them, as it also uses itself, that from them all it may derive profit and enjoyment, greater or less, according as they are themselves greater or less; and while it takes pleasure in all of them, it despises the less that it may obtain or retain the greater when occasion demands. Now, of all goods, spiritual or bodily, there is none at all to compare with virtue. For virtue makes a good use both of itself and of all other goods in which lies man's happiness; and where it is absent, no matter how many good things a man has, they are not for his good, and consequently should not be called good things while they belong to one who makes them useless by using them badly. The life of man, then, is called happy when it enjoys virtue and these other spiritual and bodily good things without which virtue is impossible. It is called happier if it enjoys some or many other good things which are not essential to virtue; and happiest of all, if it lacks not one of the good things which pertain to the body and the soul. For life is not the same thing as virtue, since not every life, but a wisely regulated life, is virtue; and yet, while there can be life of some kind without virtue, there cannot be virtue without life. This I might apply to memory and reason, and such mental faculties; for these exist prior to instruction, and without them there cannot be any instruction, and consequently no virtue, since virtue is learned. But bodily advantages, such as swiftness of foot, beauty, or strength, are not essential to virtue, neither is virtue essential to them, and yet they are good things; and, according to our philosophers, even these advantages are desired by virtue for its own sake, and are used and enjoyed by it in a becoming manner. They say that this happy life is also social, and loves the advantages of its friends as its own, and for their sake wishes for them what it desires for itself, whether these friends live in the same family, as a wife, children, domestics; or in the locality where one's home is, as the citizens of the same town; or in the world at large, as the nations bound in common human brotherhood; or in the universe itself, comprehended in the heavens and the earth, as those whom they call gods, and provide as friends for the wise man, and whom we more familiarly call angels. Moreover, they say that, regarding the supreme good and evil, there is no room for doubt, and that they therefore differ from the New Academy in this respect, and they are not concerned whether a philosopher pursues those ends which they think true in the Cynic dress and manner of life or in some other. And, lastly, in regard to the three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, they declare in favor of the third. That these were the opinions and doctrines of the Old Academy, Varro asserts on the authority of Antiochus, Cicero's master and his own, though Cicero makes him out to have been more frequently in accordance with the Stoics than with the Old Academy. But of what importance is this to us, who ought to judge the matter on its own merits, rather than to understand accurately what different men have thought about it? |
|
| 70. Libanius, Orations, 64.48.6 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 323 |
| 71. Stobaeus, Anthology, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 165 |
| 72. Philoponus John, Philoponi (Olim Ammonii) In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, 1.5.15-1.5.20 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 17 |
| 73. Nicolaus Damascenus, De Philosophia Aristotelis, 4.1 Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 17 |
| 74. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria, 10.25-11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 320.20, 320.21, 320.22, 320.23, 320.24, 320.25, 320.26, 320.27, 320.28, 320.29, 320.30, 320.31, 320.32 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 171 |
75. Strabo, Geography, 1.1.23, 2.5.3, 6.1.8, 12.3.16, 14.1.48, 14.5.4, 14.5.14, 16.4.21 Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Bianchetti et al (2015) 240; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 377 | 1.1.23. Having already compiled our Historical Memoirs, which, as we conceive, are a valuable addition both to political and moral philosophy, we have now determined to follow it up with the present work, which has been prepared on the same system as the former, and for the same class of readers, but more particularly for those who are in high stations of life. And as our former production contains only the most striking events in the lives of distinguished men, omitting trifling and unimportant incidents; so here it will be proper to dismiss small and doubtful particulars, and merely call attention to great and remarkable transactions, such in fact as are useful, memorable, and entertaining. In the colossal works of the sculptor we do not descend into a minute examination of particulars, but look principally for perfection in the general ensemble. This is the only method of criticism applicable to the present work. Its proportions, so to speak, are colossal; it deals in the generalities and main outlines of things, except now and then, when some minor detail can be selected, calculated to be serviceable to the seeker after knowledge, or the man of business. We now think we have demonstrated that our present undertaking is one that requires great care, and is well worthy of a philosopher. 2.5.3. The heavens and the earth must be supposed to be divided each into five zones, and the celestial zones to possess the same names as those below. The motives for such a division into zones we have already detailed. These zones may be distinguished by circles drawn parallel to the equator, on either side of it. Two of these will separate the torrid from the temperate zones, and the remaining two, the temperate from the frigid. To each celestial circle there shall be one corresponding on earth, and bearing the same name, and likewise zone for zone. The [two] zones capable of being inhabited, are styled temperate. The remaining [three] are uninhabitable, one on account of the heat, the others because of the extreme cold. The same is the case with regard to the tropical, and also to the arctic circles, in respect of those countries for which arctic circles can be said to exist. Circles on the earth are supposed, corresponding to those in the heavens, and bearing the same name, one for one. As the whole heaven is separated into two parts by its equator, it follows that the earth must, by its equator, be similarly divided. The two hemispheres, both celestial and terrestrial, are distinguished into north and south. Likewise the torrid zone, which is divided into two halves by the equator, is distinguished as having a northern and southern side. Hence it is evident that of the two temperate zones, one should be called northern, the other southern, according to the hemisphere to which it belongs. The northern hemisphere is that containing the temperate zone, in which looking from east to west, you will have the pole on your right hand, and the equator on the left, or, in which, looking south, the west will be on the right hand, and the east on the left. The southern hemisphere is exactly the contrary to this. It is clear that we are in one or other of these hemispheres, namely, the north; we cannot be in both: Broad rivers roll, and awful floods between, But chief the ocean. [Od. xi.] 156, 157. And next is the torrid zone. But neither is there any ocean in the midst of the earth wherein we dwell, dividing the whole thereof, nor yet have we any torrid region. Nor is there any portion of it to be found in which the climata are opposite to those which have been described as characterizing the northern temperate zone. 6.1.8. The Locri Epizephyrii are believed to have been the first people to use written laws. After they had lived under good laws for a very long time, Dionysius, on being banished from the country of the Syracusans, abused them most lawlessly of all men. For he would sneak into the bed-chambers of the girls after they had been dressed up for their wedding, and lie with them before their marriage; and he would gather together the girls who were ripe for marriage, let loose doves with cropped wings upon them in the midst of the banquets, and then bid the girls waltz around unclad, and also bid some of them, shod with sandals that were not mates (one high and the other low), chase the doves around — all for the sheer indecency of it. However, he paid the penalty after he went back to Sicily again to resume his government; for the Locri broke up his garrison, set themselves free, and thus became masters of his wife and children. These children were his two daughters, and the younger of his two sons (who was already a lad), for the other, Apollocrates, was helping his father to effect his return to Sicily by force of arms. And although Dionysius — both himself and the Tarantini on his behalf — earnestly begged the Locri to release the prisoners on any terms they wished, they would not give them up; instead, they endured a siege and a devastation of their country. But they poured out most of their wrath upon his daughters, for they first made them prostitutes and then strangled them, and then, after burning their bodies, ground up the bones and sank them in the sea. Now Ephorus, in his mention of the written legislation of the Locri which was drawn up by Zaleucus from the Cretan, the Laconian, and the Areopagite usages, says that Zaleucus was among the first to make the following innovation — that whereas before his time it had been left to the judges to determine the penalties for the several crimes, he defined them in the laws, because he held that the opinions of the judges about the same crimes would not be the same, although they ought to be the same. And Ephorus goes on to commend Zaleucus for drawing up the laws on contracts in simpler language. And he says that the Thurii, who later on wished to excel the Locri in precision, became more famous, to be sure, but morally inferior; for, he adds, it is not those who in their laws guard against all the wiles of false accusers that have good laws, but those who abide by laws that are laid down in simple language. And Plato has said as much — that where there are very many laws, there are also very many lawsuits and corrupt practices, just as where there are many physicians, there are also likely to be many diseases. 12.3.16. After Themiscyra one comes to Sidene, which is a fertile plain, though it is not well-watered like Themiscyra. It has strongholds on the seaboard: Side, after which Sidene was named, and Chabaca and Phabda. Now the territory of Amisus extends to this point; and the city has produced men note-worthy for their learning, Demetrius, the son of Rhathenus, and Dionysodorus, the mathematicians, the latter bearing the same name as the Melian geometer, and Tyrranion the grammarian, of whom I was a pupil. 14.1.48. Famous men born at Nysa are: Apollonius the Stoic philosopher, best of the disciples of Panaetius; and Menecrates, pupil of Aristarchus; and Aristodemus, his son, whose entire course, in his extreme old age, I in my youth took at Nysa; and Sostratus, the brother of Aristodemus, and another Aristodemus, his cousin, who trained Pompey the Great, proved themselves notable grammarians. But my teacher also taught rhetoric and had two schools, both in Rhodes and in his native land, teaching rhetoric in the morning and grammar in the evening; at Rome, however, when he was in charge of the children of Pompey the Great, he was content with the teaching of grammar. 14.5.4. Then one comes to Holmi, where the present Seleuceians formerly lived; but when Seleucia on the Calycadnus was founded, they migrated there; for immediately on doubling the shore, which forms a promontory called Sarpedon, one comes to the outlet of the Calycadnus. Near the Calycadnus is also Zephyrium, likewise a promontory. The river affords a voyage inland to Seleucia, a city which is well-peopled and stands far aloof from the Cilician and Pamphylian usages. Here were born in my time noteworthy men of the Peripatetic sect of philosophers, Athenaeus and Xenarchus. of these, Athenaeus engaged also in affairs of state and was for a time leader of the people in his native land; and then, having fallen into a friendship with Murena, he was captured along with Murena when in flight with him, after the plot against Augustus Caesar had been detected, but, being clearly proven guiltless, he was released by Caesar. And when, on his return to Rome, the first men who met him were greeting him and questioning him, he repeated the following from Euripides: I am come, having left the vaults of the dead and the gates of darkness. But he survived his return only a short time, having been killed in the collapse, which took place in the night, of the house in which he lived. Xenarchus, however, of whom I was a pupil, did not tarry long at home, but resided at Alexandria and at Athens and finally at Rome, having chosen the life of a teacher; and having enjoyed the friendship both of Areius and of Augustus Caesar, he continued to be held in honor down to old age; but shortly before the end he lost his sight, and then died of a disease. 14.5.14. The following men were natives of Tarsus: among the Stoics, Antipater and Archedemus and Nestor; and also the two Athenodoruses, one of whom, called Cordylion, lived with Marcus Cato and died at his house; and the other, the son of Sandon, called Caites after some village, was Caesar's teacher and was greatly honored by him; and when he returned to his native land, now an old man, he broke up the government there established, which was being badly conducted by Boethus, among others, who was a bad poet and a bad citizen, having prevailed there by currying the favour of the people. He had been raised to prominence by Antony, who at the outset received favorably the poem which he had written upon the victory at Philippi, but still more by that facility prevalent among the Tarsians whereby he could instantly speak offhand and unceasingly on any given subject. Furthermore, Antony promised the Tarsians an office of gymnasiarch, but appointed Boethus instead of a gymnasiarch, and entrusted to him the expenditures. But Boethus was caught secreting, among other things, the olive-oil; and when he was being proven guilty by his accusers in the presence of Antony he deprecated Antony's wrath, saying, among other things, that Just as Homer had hymned the praises of Achilles and Agamemnon and Odysseus, so I have hymned thine. It is not right, therefore, that I should be brought before you on such slanderous charges. When, however, the accuser caught the statement, he said, Yes, but Homer did not steal Agamemnon's oil, nor yet that of Achilles, but you did; and therefore you shall be punished. However, he broke the wrath of Antony by courteous attentions, and no less than before kept on plundering the city until the overthrow of Antony. Finding the city in this plight, Athenodorus for a time tried to induce both Boethus and his partisans to change their course; but since they would abstain from no act of insolence, he used the authority given him by Caesar, condemned them to exile, and expelled them. These at first indicted him with the following inscription on the walls: Work for young men, counsels for the middle-aged, and flatulence for old men; and when he, taking the inscription as a joke, ordered the following words to be inscribed beside it, thunder for old men, someone, contemptuous of all decency and afflicted with looseness of the bowels, profusely bespattered the door and wall of Athenodorus' house as he was passing by it at night. Athenodorus, while bringing accusations in the assembly against the faction, said: One may see the sickly plight and the disaffection of the city in many ways, and in particular from its excrements. These men were Stoics; but the Nestor of my time, the teacher of Marcellus, son of Octavia the sister of Caesar, was an Academician. He too was at the head of the government of Tarsus, having succeeded Athenodorus; and he continued to be held in honor both by the prefects and in the city. 16.4.21. The Nabataeans and Sabaeans, situated above Syria, are the first people who occupy Arabia Felix. They were frequently in the habit of overrunning this country before the Romans became masters of it, but at present both they and the Syrians are subject to the Romans.The capital of the Nabataeans is called Petra. It is situated on a spot which is surrounded and fortified by a smooth and level rock (petra), which externally is abrupt and precipitous, but within there are abundant springs of water both for domestic purposes and for watering gardens. Beyond the enclosure the country is for the most part a desert, particularly towards Judaea. Through this is the shortest road to Jericho, a journey of three or four days, and five days to the Phoenicon (or palm plantation). It is always governed by a king of the royal race. The king has a minister who is one of the Companions, and is called Brother. It has excellent laws for the administration of public affairs.Athenodorus, a philosopher, and my friend, who had been at Petra, used to relate with surprise, that he found many Romans and also many other strangers residing there. He observed the strangers frequently engaged in litigation, both with one another and with the natives; but the natives had never any dispute amongst themselves, and lived together in perfect harmony. |
|
| 76. Xenocrates Historicus, Fragments, 82 (missingth cent. CE - Unknownth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Motta and Petrucci (2022) 17 |
| 77. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.58, 1.65, 1.98, 1.135-1.138, 1.140-1.141, 1.160, 1.216, 1.229, 1.518-1.519, 1.521, 1.525, 2.528, 2.599, 2.625, 2.634, 2.847, 2.1174, 3.4, 3.104, 3.131, 3.366, 3.643, 3.713 Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 37, 68; Erler et al (2021) 72, 75; Frede and Laks (2001) 120, 269; Geljon and Runia (2013) 246; Geljon and Runia (2019) 256; Maso (2022) 118; Wardy and Warren (2018) 275 |
| 78. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 171 |
| 79. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 37 |
| 80. Timaeus Locrus, On The Nature of The World And The Soul, 206.5-206.7 Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 165 |
| 81. Epicurus, Letters, 57-59, 61-65, 60 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2019) 256 |
| 82. Plutarch, Synopsis, None Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 68 |
| 84. Ps.-Plutarch, On Homer, 2.119 Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 37 |
| 85. Arius Didymus, Stobaeus, Eclogae, a b c d\n0 '2.7.26 '2.7.26 '2 7 Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 720 |
| 88. Aristotle, De Philosophia, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 269 |
| 91. Cicero, Academic Books, 19, 22, 33, 20 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 126 |
| 92. Stobaeus, Selections (From Didymus Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 171, 172 |
| 93. Arius Didymus, Apud Stobaeus, 46.50.10-46.50.13 Tagged with subjects: •arius didymus Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018) 272 |
| 95. Anon., Anonymi Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum, 5.22-5.36, 6.17-6.20, 7.20-7.25 Tagged with subjects: •didymus (arius?) Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 163, 164 |
