1. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dicaearchus • Dicaearchus, Aristotelian, Soul nothing but an attunement of hot, cold, fluid, dry
Found in books: Carter (2019), Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of Soul, 123; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 254
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2. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dicaearchus
Found in books: Augoustakis (2014), Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past, 321; Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 321
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3.11 \xa0"That all sounds very fine, Cato," I\xa0replied, "but are you aware that you share your lofty pretensions with Pyrrho and with Aristo, who make all things equal in value? I\xa0should like to know what your opinion is of them." "My opinion?" he said. "You ask what my opinion is? That those good, brave, just and temperate men, of whom history tells us, or whom we have ourselves seen in our public life, who under the guidance of Nature herself, without the aid of any learning, did many glorious deeds, â\x80\x94 that these men were better educated by nature than they could possibly have been by philosophy had they accepted any other system of philosophy than the one that counts Moral Worth the only good and Moral Baseness the only evil. All other philosophical systems â\x80\x94 in varying degrees no doubt, but still all, â\x80\x94 which reckon anything of which virtue is not an element either as a good or an evil, do not merely, as I\xa0hold, give us no assistance or support towards becoming better men, but are actually corrupting to the character. Either this point must be firmly maintained, that Moral Worth is the sole good, or it is absolutely impossible to prove that virtue constitutes happiness. And in that case I\xa0do not see why we should trouble to study philosophy. For if anyone who is wise could be miserable, why, I\xa0should not set much value on your vaunted and belauded virtue." <'' None |
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3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dicaearchus
Found in books: Augoustakis (2014), Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past, 321; Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 321
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3.11 de quibus cupio scire quid sentias. Egone quaeris, inquit, inquit N inquam quid sentiam? quos bonos viros, fortes, iustos, moderatos aut audivimus in re publica fuisse aut ipsi vidimus, qui sine ulla doctrina naturam ipsam secuti multa laudabilia fecerunt, eos melius a natura institutos fuisse, quam institui potuissent a philosophia, si ullam aliam probavissent praeter eam, quae nihil aliud in bonis haberet nisi honestum, nihil nisi turpe in malis; ceterae philosophorum disciplinae, omnino alia magis alia, sed tamen omnes, quae rem ullam virtutis expertem expertem virtutis BE aut in bonis aut in malis numerent, eas non modo nihil adiuvare arbitror neque firmare, firmare affirmare (adfirmare A). ' Aut confirmare cum Or. scribendum est aut potius firmare, cui ex altero verbo (adiuvare) praepositio adhaesit' Mdv. quo meliores simus, sed ipsam depravare naturam. nam nisi hoc optineatur, id solum bonum esse, quod honestum sit, nullo modo probari possit beatam vitam virtute effici. quod si ita sit, cur cur N om. ABERV opera philosophiae sit danda nescio. si enim sapiens aliquis miser esse possit, ne ego istam gloriosam memorabilemque virtutem non magno aestimandam putem."" None | sup>
3.11 \xa0"That all sounds very fine, Cato," I\xa0replied, "but are you aware that you share your lofty pretensions with Pyrrho and with Aristo, who make all things equal in value? I\xa0should like to know what your opinion is of them." "My opinion?" he said. "You ask what my opinion is? That those good, brave, just and temperate men, of whom history tells us, or whom we have ourselves seen in our public life, who under the guidance of Nature herself, without the aid of any learning, did many glorious deeds, â\x80\x94 that these men were better educated by nature than they could possibly have been by philosophy had they accepted any other system of philosophy than the one that counts Moral Worth the only good and Moral Baseness the only evil. All other philosophical systems â\x80\x94 in varying degrees no doubt, but still all, â\x80\x94 which reckon anything of which virtue is not an element either as a good or an evil, do not merely, as I\xa0hold, give us no assistance or support towards becoming better men, but are actually corrupting to the character. Either this point must be firmly maintained, that Moral Worth is the sole good, or it is absolutely impossible to prove that virtue constitutes happiness. And in that case I\xa0do not see why we should trouble to study philosophy. For if anyone who is wise could be miserable, why, I\xa0should not set much value on your vaunted and belauded virtue." <'' None |
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4. Cicero, On Duties, 2.16-2.17, 3.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dicaearchus • Dicaearchus of Messana • Dicaearchus,
Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 249; Augoustakis (2014), Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past, 321; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 198; Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 321
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2.16 Longiores hoc loco sumus, quam necesse est. Quis est enim, cui non perspicua sint illa, quae pluribus verbis a Panaetio commemorantur, neminem neque ducem bello nec principem domi magnas res et salutares sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse? Commemoratur ab eo Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine adiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse. Utitur in re non dubia testibus non necessariis. Atque ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum atque consensu, sic nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, quae non homini ab homine nascatur. Est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici magni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae, vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde comparat, quanto plures deleti sint homines hominum impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus, quam omni reliqua calamitate. 2.17 Cum igitur hie locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, proprium hoc statuo esse virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere. Itaque, quae in rebus iimis quaeque in usu et tractatione beluarum fiunt utiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea tribuuntur operosis, hominum autem studia ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute excitantur.
3.16 Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius aut Aristides iustus nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc iustitiae tamquam a sapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem volumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium.'' None | sup>
2.16 \xa0I\xa0have dwelt longer on this point than was necessary. For who is there to whom those facts which Panaetius narrates at great length are not self-evident â\x80\x94 namely, that no one, either as a general in war or as a statesman at home, could have accomplished great things for the benefit of the state, without the hearty coâ\x80\x91operation of other men? He cites the deeds of Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, who, he says, could not have achieved so great success without the support of other men. He calls in witnesses, whom he does not need, to prove a fact that no one questions. And yet, as, on the one hand, we secure great advantages through the sympathetic cooperation of our fellow-men; so, on the other, there is no curse so terrible but it is brought down by man upon man. There is a book by Dicaearchus on "The Destruction of Human Life." He was a famous and eloquent Peripatetic, and he gathered together all the other causes of destruction â\x80\x94 floods, epidemics, famines, and sudden incursions of wild animals in myriads, by whose assaults, he informs us, whole tribes of men have been wiped out. And then he proceeds to show by way of comparison how many more men have been destroyed by the assaults of men â\x80\x94 that is, by wars or revolutions â\x80\x94 than by any and all other sorts of calamity. <' "2.17 \xa0Since, therefore, there can be no doubt on this point, that man is the source of both the greatest help and the greatest harm to man, I\xa0set it down as the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of men and to attach them to one's own service. And so those benefits that human life derives from iimate objects and from the employment and use of animals are ascribed to the industrial arts; the cooperation of men, on the other hand, prompt and ready for the advancement of our interests, is secured through wisdom and virtue in men of superior ability. <" 3.16 \xa0Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios are mentioned as "brave men" or Fabricius is called "the just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one of them the ideal "wise man." For no one of them was wise in the sense in which we wish to have "wise" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed "the wise." Not even the famous Seven were "wise." But because of their constant observance of "mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and likeness to wise men. <'' None |
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5. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dicaearchus • Dicaearchus, Aristotelian, Soul nothing but an attunement of hot, cold, fluid, dry
Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 220; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 254
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6. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dicaearchus
Found in books: Augoustakis (2014), Flavian Poetry and its Greek Past, 321; Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 321
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7. Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras, 19 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Dicaearchus
Found in books: Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 117; Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 490
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19 Through this he achieved great reputation, he drew great audiences from the city, not only of men, but also of women, among whom was a specially illustrious person named Theano. He also drew audiences from among the neighboring barbarians, among whom were magnates and kings. What he told his audiences cannot be said with certainty, for he enjoined silence upon his hearers. But the following is a matter of general information. He taught that the soul was immortal and that after death it transmigrated into other animated bodies. After certain specified periods, the same events occur again; that nothing was entirely new; that all animated beings were kin, and should be considered as belonging to one great family. Pythagoras was the first one to introduce these teachings into Greece. |
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