1. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 8.6-8.8 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 250| 8.6. שִׁמְעוּ כִּי־נְגִידִים אֲדַבֵּר וּמִפְתַּח שְׂפָתַי מֵישָׁרִים׃ 8.7. כִּי־אֱמֶת יֶהְגֶּה חִכִּי וְתוֹעֲבַת שְׂפָתַי רֶשַׁע׃ 8.8. בְּצֶדֶק כָּל־אִמְרֵי־פִי אֵין בָּהֶם נִפְתָּל וְעִקֵּשׁ׃ | 8.6. Hear, for I will speak excellent things, And the opening of my lips shall be right things. 8.7. For my mouth shall utter truth, And wickedness is an abomination to my lips. 8.8. All the words of my mouth are in righteousness, There is nothing perverse or crooked in them. |
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| 2. Plato, Republic, 7.531c, 7.534c, 7.530ab (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 175 |
3. Plato, Philebus, 16c (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •mathematics/mathematical and dialectic Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 186| 16c. ΣΩ. ἣν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, χρῆσθαι δὲ παγχάλεπον· πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ἣν λέγω. ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον. ΣΩ. θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν | 16c. Soc. One which is easy to point out, but very difficult to follow for through it all the inventions of art have been brought to light. See this is the road I mean. Pro. Go on what is it? Soc. A gift of gods to men, as I believe, was tossed down from some divine source through the agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming fire; and the ancients, who were better than we and lived nearer the gods, handed down the tradition that all the things which are ever said to exist are sprung from one and many and have inherent in them the finite and the infinite. This being the way in which these things are arranged, |
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| 4. Plato, Laws, 12.963e1-3, 12.966b4-6, 12.966a5-7, 12.966a-b, 12.966b, 12.966b8, 12.962b-d, 12.966e1-2, 12.966c, 12.966d9-e4, 12.966b7, 12.966b2, 12.964a, 12.964b, 12.963b, 12.964c-d, 12.965b7-9, 12.962c, 12.963d5, 12.965c2-3, 12.966a, 12.966a5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Bartninkas, Traditional and Cosmic Gods in Later Plato and the Early Academy (2023) 194 |
5. Plato, Gorgias, 508a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •mathematics/mathematical and dialectic Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 179| 508a. γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. εἶεν· ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος | 508a. and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of order, not of disorder or dissoluteness. Now you, as it seems to me, do not give proper attention to this, for all your cleverness, but have failed to observe the great power of geometrical equality amongst both gods and men: you hold that self-advantage is what one ought to practice, because you neglect geometry. Very well: either we must refute this statement, that it is by the possession |
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| 6. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b8-33 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 33 |
| 7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140b31-1141a8 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 33 |
| 8. Aristotle, Topics, 100a29 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 33 |
| 9. Menander, Monostichoi, 53 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 80 |
10. Varro, On The Latin Language, 6.56 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 79 | 6.56. Loqui 'to talk,' is said from locus 'place.' Because he who is said to speak now for the first time, utters the names and other words before he can say them each in its own locus 'place,' such a person Chrysippus says does not loqui talk,' but quasitalks; and that therefore, as a man's sculptured bust is not the real man, so in the case of ravens, crows,' and boys making their first attempts to speak, their words are not real words, because they are not talking. Therefore he loquitur 'talks,' who with understanding puts each word in its own place, and he has then prolocutus 'spoken forth,' when he has by loquendo 'talking' expressed what he had in his spirit. |
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11. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 32| 3.3. ipse etiam dicit dicit cf. p. 13, 24—29 Epicurus ne ne nec RNV argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. nec enim in Torquati sermone quicquam sermone quicquam VN 2 sermone nec quicquam (quitquam ABE) implicatum inpl. R aut tortuosum fuit, nostraque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt inponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur cogitans in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur. | 3.3. In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. < |
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| 12. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, §14 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 70 |
| 13. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1035a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 70 |
| 14. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 1.92-1.93 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 34 |
| 15. Palestinian Talmud, Yevamot, 1.6 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stammaim, and theme of dialectics Found in books: Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (2003) 47 |
| 16. Galen, On The Differences of The Pulses, 3.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 79 |
| 17. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaries On Eight Books of Aristotle'S Topics, 1.8-1.14 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 28 |
| 18. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 7.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 70 |
| 19. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.81-2.83 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 32 |
20. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.39-7.44, 7.55-7.57, 7.65-7.68, 7.83, 7.180 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 32, 33, 34, 70, 77, 78, 80 | 7.39. Philosophic doctrine, say the Stoics, falls into three parts: one physical, another ethical, and the third logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to make this division in his Exposition of Doctrine, and Chrysippus too did so in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine and the first book of his Physics; and so too Apollodorus and Syllus in the first part of their Introductions to Stoic Doctrine, as also Eudromus in his Elementary Treatise on Ethics, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Posidonius.These parts are called by Apollodorus Heads of Commonplace; by Chrysippus and Eudromus specific divisions; by others generic divisions. 7.40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus. 7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions. 7.42. Now the part which deals with canons or criteria they admit as a means for the discovery of truth, since in the course of it they explain the different kinds of perceptions that we have. And similarly the part about definitions is accepted as a means of recognizing truth, inasmuch as things are apprehended by means of general notions. Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false.Rhetoric itself, they say, has three divisions: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric. 7.43. Rhetoric according to them may be divided into invention of arguments, their expression in words, their arrangement, and delivery; and a rhetorical speech into introduction, narrative, replies to opponents, and peroration.Dialectic (they hold) falls under two heads: subjects of discourse and language. And the subjects fall under the following headings: presentations and the various products to which they give rise, propositions enunciated and their constituent subjects and predicates, and similar terms whether direct or reversed, genera and species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms and fallacies whether due to the subject matter or to the language; 7.44. these including both false and true and negative arguments, sorites and the like, whether defective, insoluble, or conclusive, and the fallacies known as the Veiled, or Horned, No man, and The Mowers.The second main head mentioned above as belonging to Dialectic is that of language, wherein are included written language and the parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers chapters on terms, divisions, and style. 7.55. In their theory of dialectic most of them see fit to take as their starting-point the topic of voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air or the proper object of the sense of hearing, as Diogenes the Babylonian says in his handbook On Voice. While the voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, man's voice is articulate and, as Diogenes puts it, an utterance of reason, having the quality of coming to maturity at the age of fourteen. Furthermore, voice according to the Stoics is something corporeal: I may cite for this Archedemus in his treatise On Voice, Diogenes, Antipater and Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics. 7.56. For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. Reduced to writing, what was voice becomes a verbal expression, as day; so says Diogenes. A statement or proposition is speech that issues from the mind and signifies something, e.g. It is day. Dialect (διάλεκτος) means a variety of speech which is stamped on one part of the Greek world as distinct from another, or on the Greeks as distinct from other races; or, again, it means a form peculiar to some particular region, that is to say, it has a certain linguistic quality; e.g. in Attic the word for sea is not θάλασσα but θάλαττα, and in Ionic day is not ἡμέρα but ἡμέρη.Elements of language are the four-and-twenty letters. Letter, however, has three meanings: (1) the particular sound or element of speech; (2) its written symbol or character; (3) its name, as Alpha is the name of the sound A. 7.57. Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible – which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse. 7.65. for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative.A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions: A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. `It is day,' `Dion is walking.' The Greek word for judgement (ἀξίωμα) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection; for when you say It is day, you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false. 7.66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place. 7.67. An imperative is something which conveys a command: e.g.Go thou to the waters of Inachus.An adjurative utterance is something ... A vocative utterance is something the use of which implies that you are addressing some one; for instance:Most glorious son of Atreus, Agamemnon, lord of men.A quasi-proposition is that which, having the enunciation of a judgement, yet in consequence of the intensified tone or emotion of one of its parts falls outside the class of judgements proper, e.g.Yea, fair indeed the Parthenon!How like to Priam's sons the cowherd is! 7.68. There is also, differing from a proposition or judgement, what may be called a timid suggestion, the expression of which leaves one at a loss, e.g.Can it be that pain and life are in some sort akin?Interrogations, inquiries and the like are neither true nor false, whereas judgements (or propositions) are always either true or false.The followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and Crinis divide propositions into simple and not simple. Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as It is day. Not simple are those that consist of one or more ambiguous propositions. 7.83. Such, then, is the logic of the Stoics, by which they seek to establish their point that the wise man is the true dialectician. For all things, they say, are discerned by means of logical study, including whatever falls within the province of Physics, and again whatever belongs to that of Ethics. For else, say they, as regards statement and reasoning Physics and Ethics could not tell how to express themselves, or again concerning the proper use of terms, how the laws have defined various actions. Moreover, of the two kinds of common-sense inquiry included under Virtue one considers the nature of each particular thing, the other asks what it is called. Thus much for their logic. 7.180. So renowned was he for dialectic that most people thought, if the gods took to dialectic, they would adopt no other system than that of Chrysippus. He had abundance of matter, but in style he was not successful. In industry he surpassed every one, as the list of his writings shows; for there are more than 705 of them. He increased their number by arguing repeatedly on the same subject, setting down anything that occurred to him, making many corrections and citing numerous authorities. So much so that in one of his treatises he copied out nearly the whole of Euripides' Medea, and some one who had taken up the volume, being asked what he was reading, replied, The Medea of Chrysippus. |
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| 21. Origen, Commentary On Matthew, 17.7 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 70 |
22. Origen, Against Celsus, 2.72, 6.62 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 78 | 2.72. After the above statements, he continues: If he wished to remain hid, why was there heard a voice from heaven proclaiming him to be the Son of God? And if he did not seek to remain concealed, why was he punished? Or why did he die? Now, by such questions he thinks to convict the histories of discrepancy, not observing that Jesus neither desired all things regarding Himself to be known to all whom He happened to meet, nor yet all things to be unknown. Accordingly, the voice from heaven which proclaimed Him to be the Son of God, in the words, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased, is not stated to have been audible to the multitudes, as this Jew of Celsus supposed. The voice from the cloud on the high mountain, moreover, was heard only by those who had gone up with Him. For the divine voice is of such a nature, as to be heard only by those whom the speaker wishes to hear it. And I maintain, that the voice of God which is referred to, is neither air which has been struck, nor any concussion of the air, nor anything else which is mentioned in treatises on the voice; and therefore it is heard by a better and more divine organ of hearing than that of sense. And when the speaker will not have his voice to be heard by all, he that has the finer ear hears the voice of God, while he who has the ears of his soul deadened does not perceive that it is God who speaks. These things I have mentioned because of his asking, Why was there heard a voice from heaven proclaiming him to be the Son of God? while with respect to the query, Why was he punished, if he wished to remain hid? what has been stated at greater length in the preceding pages on the subject of His suffering may suffice. 6.62. Celsus, again, having perhaps misunderstood the words, For the mouth of the Lord has spoken it, or perhaps because some ignorant individuals had rashly ventured upon the explanation of such things, and not understanding, moreover, on what principles parts called after the names of the bodily members are assigned to the attributes of God, asserts: He has neither mouth nor voice. Truly, indeed, God can have no voice, if the voice is a concussion of the air, or a stroke on the air, or a species of air, or any other definition which may be given to the voice by those who are skilled in such matters; but what is called the voice of God is said to be seen as God's voice by the people in the passage, And all the people saw the voice of God; the word saw being taken, agreeably to the custom of Scripture, in a spiritual sense. Moreover, he alleges that God possesses nothing else of which we have any knowledge; but of what things we have knowledge he gives no indication. If he means limbs, we agree with him, understanding the things of which we have knowledge to be those called corporeal, and pretty generally so termed. But if we are to understand the words of which we have knowledge in a universal sense, then there are many things of which we have knowledge, (and which may be attributed to God); for He possesses virtue, and blessedness, and divinity. If we, however, put a higher meaning upon the words, of which we have knowledge, since all that we know is less than God, there is no absurdity in our also admitting that God possesses none of those things of which we have knowledge. For the attributes which belong to God are far superior to all things with which not merely the nature of man is acquainted, but even that of those who have risen far above it. And if he had read the writings of the prophets, David on the one hand saying, But You are the same, and Malachi on the other, I am (the Lord), and change not, he would have observed that none of us assert that there is any change in God, either in act or thought. For abiding the same, He administers mutable things according to their nature, and His word elects to undertake their administration. |
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23. Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin, 13b (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stammaim, and theme of dialectics Found in books: Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (2003) 47 13b. ונמלך ומצאו בן עירו ואמר שמך כשמי ושם אשתך כשם אשתי פסול לגרש בו,הכי השתא התם (דברים כד, א) וכתב לה כתיב בעינן כתיבה לשמה הכא ועשה לה כתיב בעינן עשייה לשמה עשייה דידה מחיקה היא,א"ר אחא בר חנינא גלוי וידוע לפני מי שאמר והיה העולם שאין בדורו של רבי מאיר כמותו ומפני מה לא קבעו הלכה כמותו שלא יכלו חביריו לעמוד על סוף דעתו שהוא אומר על טמא טהור ומראה לו פנים על טהור טמא ומראה לו פנים,תנא לא ר"מ שמו אלא רבי נהוראי שמו ולמה נקרא שמו ר"מ שהוא מאיר עיני חכמים בהלכה ולא נהוראי שמו אלא רבי נחמיה שמו ואמרי לה רבי אלעזר בן ערך שמו ולמה נקרא שמו נהוראי שמנהיר עיני חכמים בהלכה,אמר רבי האי דמחדדנא מחבראי דחזיתיה לר' מאיר מאחוריה ואילו חזיתיה מקמיה הוה מחדדנא טפי דכתיב (ישעיהו ל, כ) והיו עיניך רואות את מוריך,א"ר אבהו א"ר יוחנן תלמיד היה לו לר"מ וסומכוס שמו שהיה אומר על כל דבר ודבר של טומאה ארבעים ושמונה טעמי טומאה ועל כל דבר ודבר של טהרה ארבעים ושמונה טעמי טהרה,תנא תלמיד ותיק היה ביבנה שהיה מטהר את השרץ במאה וחמשים טעמים,אמר רבינא אני אדון ואטהרנו ומה נחש שממית ומרבה טומאה טהור שרץ שאין ממית ומרבה טומאה לא כ"ש,ולא היא מעשה קוץ בעלמא קעביד,א"ר אבא אמר שמואל שלש שנים נחלקו ב"ש וב"ה הללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו והללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו יצאה בת קול ואמרה אלו ואלו דברי אלהים חיים הן והלכה כב"ה,וכי מאחר שאלו ואלו דברי אלהים חיים מפני מה זכו ב"ה לקבוע הלכה כמותן מפני שנוחין ועלובין היו ושונין דבריהן ודברי ב"ש ולא עוד אלא שמקדימין דברי ב"ש לדבריהן,כאותה ששנינו מי שהיה ראשו ורובו בסוכה ושלחנו בתוך הבית בית שמאי פוסלין וב"ה מכשירין אמרו ב"ה לב"ש לא כך היה מעשה שהלכו זקני ב"ש וזקני ב"ה לבקר את ר' יוחנן בן החורנית ומצאוהו יושב ראשו ורובו בסוכה ושלחנו בתוך הבית אמרו להן בית שמאי (אי) משם ראיה אף הן אמרו לו אם כך היית נוהג לא קיימת מצות סוכה מימיך,ללמדך שכל המשפיל עצמו הקב"ה מגביהו וכל המגביה עצמו הקב"ה משפילו כל המחזר על הגדולה גדולה בורחת ממנו וכל הבורח מן הגדולה גדולה מחזרת אחריו וכל הדוחק את השעה שעה דוחקתו וכל הנדחה מפני שעה שעה עומדת לו,ת"ר שתי שנים ומחצה נחלקו ב"ש וב"ה הללו אומרים נוח לו לאדם שלא נברא יותר משנברא והללו אומרים נוח לו לאדם שנברא יותר משלא נברא נמנו וגמרו נוח לו לאדם שלא נברא יותר משנברא עכשיו שנברא יפשפש במעשיו ואמרי לה ימשמש במעשיו,| 13b. but later reconsidered and did not divorce her, and a resident of his city found him and said: Your name is the same as my name, and your wife’s name is the same as my wife’s name, and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce, and I will use it to divorce my wife, then this document is invalid to divorce with it? Apparently, a man may not divorce his wife with a bill of divorce written for another woman, and the same should apply to the scroll of a sota.,The Gemara rejects this argument: How can you compare the two cases? There, with regard to a bill of divorce, it is written: “And he shall write for her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and therefore we require writing it in her name, specifically for her; whereas here, with regard to a sota, it is written: “And he shall perform with her all this ritual” (Numbers 5:30), and therefore we require performance in her name. In her case, the performance is erasure; however, writing of the scroll need not be performed specifically for her.,On the topic of Rabbi Meir and his Torah study, the Gemara cites an additional statement. Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: It is revealed and known before the One Who spoke and the world came into being that in the generation of Rabbi Meir there was no one of the Sages who is his equal. Why then didn’t the Sages establish the halakha in accordance with his opinion? It is because his colleagues were unable to ascertain the profundity of his opinion. He was so brilliant that he could present a cogent argument for any position, even if it was not consistent with the prevalent halakha. As he would state with regard to a ritually impure item that it is pure, and display justification for that ruling, and likewise he would state with regard to a ritually pure item that it is impure, and display justification for that ruling. The Sages were unable to distinguish between the statements that were halakha and those that were not.,It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir was not his name; rather, Rabbi Nehorai was his name. And why was he called by the name Rabbi Meir? It was because he illuminates [meir] the eyes of the Sages in matters of the halakha. And Rabbi Nehorai was not the name of the tanna known by that name; rather, Rabbi Neḥemya was his name, and some say: Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh was his name. And why was he called by the name Rabbi Nehorai? It is because he enlightens [manhir] the eyes of the Sages in matters of the halakha.,The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The fact that I am more incisive than my colleagues is due to the fact that I saw Rabbi Meir from behind, i.e., I sat behind him when I was his student. Had I seen him from the front, I would be even more incisive, as it is written: “And your eyes shall see your teacher” (Isaiah 30:20). Seeing the face of one’s teacher increases one’s understanding and sharpens one’s mind.,And the Gemara stated that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥa said: Rabbi Meir had a disciple, and his name was Sumakhus, who would state with regard to each and every matter of ritual impurity forty-eight reasons in support of the ruling of impurity, and with regard to each and every matter of ritual purity forty-eight reasons in support of the ruling of purity.,It was taught in a baraita: There was a distinguished disciple at Yavne who could with his incisive intellect purify the creeping animal, explicitly deemed ritually impure by the Torah, adducing one hundred and fifty reasons in support of his argument.,Ravina said: I too will deliberate and purify it employing the following reasoning: And just as a snake that kills people and animals and thereby increases ritual impurity in the world, as a corpse imparts impurity through contact, through being carried, and by means of a tent, is ritually pure and transmits no impurity, a creeping animal that does not kill and does not increase impurity in the world, all the more so should it be pure.,The Gemara rejects this: And it is not so; that is not a valid a fortiori argument, as it can be refuted. A snake is performing a mere act of a thorn. A thorn causes injury and even death; nevertheless, it is not ritually impure. The same applies to a snake, and therefore this a fortiori argument is rejected.,Rabbi Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. Ultimately, a Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and those are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.,The Gemara asks: Since both these and those are the words of the living God, why were Beit Hillel privileged to have the halakha established in accordance with their opinion? The reason is that they were agreeable and forbearing, showing restraint when affronted, and when they taught the halakha they would teach both their own statements and the statements of Beit Shammai. Moreover, when they formulated their teachings and cited a dispute, they prioritized the statements of Beit Shammai to their own statements, in deference to Beit Shammai.,As in the mishna that we learned: In the case of one whose head and most of his body were in the sukka, but his table was in the house, Beit Shammai deem this sukka invalid; and Beit Hillel deem it valid. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: Wasn’t there an incident in which the Elders of Beit Shammai and the Elders of Beit Hillel went to visit Rabbi Yoḥa ben HaḤoranit, and they found him sitting with his head and most of his body in the sukka, but his table was in the house? Beit Shammai said to them: From there do you seek to adduce a proof? Those visitors, too, said to him: If that was the manner in which you were accustomed to perform the mitzva, you have never fulfilled the mitzva of sukka in all your days. It is apparent from the phrasing of the mishna that when the Sages of Beit Hillel related that the Elders of Beit Shammai and the Elders of Beit Hillel visited Rabbi Yoḥa ben HaḤoranit, they mentioned the Elders of Beit Shammai before their own Elders.,This is to teach you that anyone who humbles himself, the Holy One, Blessed be He, exalts him, and anyone who exalts himself, the Holy One, Blessed be He, humbles him. Anyone who seeks greatness, greatness flees from him, and, conversely, anyone who flees from greatness, greatness seeks him. And anyone who attempts to force the moment and expends great effort to achieve an objective precisely when he desires to do so, the moment forces him too, and he is unsuccessful. And conversely, anyone who is patient and yields to the moment, the moment stands by his side, and he will ultimately be successful.,The Sages taught the following baraita: For two and a half years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These say: It would have been preferable had man not been created than to have been created. And those said: It is preferable for man to have been created than had he not been created. Ultimately, they were counted and concluded: It would have been preferable had man not been created than to have been created. However, now that he has been created, he should examine his actions that he has performed and seek to correct them. And some say: He should scrutinize his planned actions and evaluate whether or not and in what manner those actions should be performed, so that he will not sin.,The cross beam, which the Sages stated may be used to render an alleyway fit for one to carry within it, must be wide enough to receive and hold a small brick. And this small brick is half a large brick, which measures three handbreadths, i.e., a handbreadth and a half. It is sufficient that the cross beam will be a handbreadth in width, not a handbreadth and a half, enough to hold a small brick across its width.,And the cross beam must be wide enough to hold a small brick and also sturdy enough to hold a small brick and not collapse. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it is wide enough to hold the brick, even though it is not sturdy enough to actually support it, it is sufficient. Therefore, even if the cross beam is made of straw or reeds, one considers it as though it were made of metal.,If the cross beam is curved, so that a small brick cannot rest on it, one considers it as though it were straight; if it is round, one considers it as though it were square. The following principle was stated with regard to a round cross beam: Any beam with a circumference of three handbreadths is a handbreadth in width, i.e., in diameter. | |
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| 24. Marinus, Vita Proclus, 9.17-9.19 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •mathematics/mathematical and dialectic Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 179 |
| 25. Ambrose, On Paradise, 10.36-11.14 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •mathematics/mathematical and dialectic Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 186 |
| 26. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 1.41.21, 2.171.11 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •mathematics/mathematical and dialectic Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 171, 175 |
| 27. Proclus, Commentary On Plato'S Republic, 42.1-69.19, 56.2, 70.1-205.23 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 179 |
| 28. Proclus, Hypotyposis Astronomicarum Positionum, 1.8, 3.73, 4.20-4, 7.51-3, 7.54, 7.57, 76.22-3, 236.17-25, 236.25-238.8, 238.17-20 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan |
| 29. Proclus, In Platonis Cratylum Commentaria, 1.10-2.4, 2 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 30. Proclus, In Primum Euclidis Librum Commentarius, 6.20, 6.21, 7.13-10.14, 7.18, 7.19, 9.24, 18.10-20.7, 21.25-25.15, 21.25-22.16, 23.12-24.3, 24.4, 24.5, 24.6, 24.7, 24.8, 24.9, 24.10, 24.11, 24.12, 24.13, 24.14, 24.15, 24.16, 24.17, 24.18, 24.19, 24.20, 24.21, 24.22, 24.23, 24.24, 24.25, 29.14, 30.8-32.2, 35.17-36.12, 36.12-37.26, 38.1, 42.2, 43.25-44.14, 68.21, 68.22, 68.23, 69.14, 69.15, 69.16, 69.17, 69.18, 69.19, 141.4, 141.5, 141.6, 141.7, 141.8, 141.9, 141.10, 141.11, 141.12, 141.13, 141.14, 141.15, 141.16, 141.17, 203.1, 203.2, 203.3, 203.4, 203.5, 241.18, 384.2, 384.3, 384.4, 398.18, 398.19 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn, All From One: A Guide to Proclus (2017) 173 |
| 31. Proclus, Theologia Platonica ( ), 1.5, 25.24-26.4 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 32. Aetius Amidenus, Iatricorum Liber, i. preface.2 Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, and the stoics Found in books: James, Learning the Language of Scripture: Origen, Wisdom, and the Logic of Interpretation (2021) 70 |
