Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

   Search:  
validated results only / all results

and or

Filtering options: (leave empty for all results)
By author:     
By work:        
By subject:
By additional keyword:       



Results for
Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.





19 results for "definition"
1. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Carter (2019), Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of Soul, 62
2. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Carter (2019), Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of Soul, 62
3. Aristotle, Physics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •body, dialectical definition of Found in books: Carter (2019), Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of Soul, 62
4. Cicero, On Invention, 1.19 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •definition in dialectic Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 184
1.19. firmamentum est firmissima argu- mentatio defensoris et appositissima ad iudicationem: ut si velit Orestes dicere eiusmodi animum matris suae fuisse in patrem suum, in se ipsum ac sorores, in regnum, in famam generis et familiae, ut ab ea poenas liberi sui potissimum petere debuerint. Et in ceteris quidem constitutionibus ad hunc modum iudicationes reperiuntur; in coniecturali autem constitutione, quia ratio non est—factum enim non conceditur—, non potest ex deductione rationis nasci iudicatio. quare ne- cesse est eandem esse quaestionem et iudicationem: factum est, non est factum, factumne sit? quot autem in causa constitutiones aut earum partes erunt, totidem necesse erit quaestiones, rationes, iudicationes, firma- menta reperire. Tum his omnibus in causa repertis denique sin- gulae partes totius causae considerandae sunt. nam non ut quidque dicendum primum est, ita primum animad- vertendum videtur; ideo quod illa, quae prima dicun- tur, si vehementer velis congruere et cohaerere cum causa, ex iis ducas oportet, quae post dicenda sunt. quare cum iudicatio et ea, quae ad iudicationem oportet argumenta inveniri, diligenter erunt artificio reperta, cura et cogitatione pertractata, tum denique ordidae sunt ceterae partes orationis. eae partes sex esse om- nino nobis videntur: exordium, narratio, partitio, con- firmatio, reprehensio, conclusio. Nunc quoniam exordium princeps debet esse, nos quoque primum in rationem exordiendi praecepta da- bimus.
5. Cicero, Lucullus, 113 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
6. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.41-7.42, 7.49, 7.121, 7.162, 7.177, 7.201 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 22, 61
7.41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius. Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions. 7.42. Now the part which deals with canons or criteria they admit as a means for the discovery of truth, since in the course of it they explain the different kinds of perceptions that we have. And similarly the part about definitions is accepted as a means of recognizing truth, inasmuch as things are apprehended by means of general notions. Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false.Rhetoric itself, they say, has three divisions: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric. 7.49. The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation. 7.121. But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal.Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him – so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life – since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same; 7.162. After meeting Polemo, says Diocles of Magnesia, while Zeno was suffering from a protracted illness, he recanted his views. The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses. 7.177. 6. SPHAERUSAmongst those who after the death of Zeno became pupils of Cleanthes was Sphaerus of Bosporus, as already mentioned. After making considerable progress in his studies, he went to Alexandria to the court of King Ptolemy Philopator. One day when a discussion had arisen on the question whether the wise man could stoop to hold opinion, and Sphaerus had maintained that this was impossible, the king, wishing to refute him, ordered some waxen pomegranates to be put on the table. Sphaerus was taken in and the king cried out, You have given your assent to a presentation which is false. But Sphaerus was ready with a neat answer. I assented not to the proposition that they are pomegranates, but to another, that there are good grounds for thinking them to be pomegranates. Certainty of presentation and reasonable probability are two totally different things. Mnesistratus having accused him of denying that Ptolemy was a king, his reply was, Being of such quality as he is, Ptolemy is indeed a king. 7.201. [2] Ethics dealing with the common view and the sciences and virtues thence arising.First series:Against the Touching up of Paintings, addressed to Timonax, one book.How it is we name each Thing and form a Conception of it, one book.of Conceptions, addressed to Laodamas, two books.of Opinion or Assumption, addressed to Pythonax, three books.Proofs that the Wise Man will not hold Opinions, one book.of Apprehension, of Knowledge and of Ignorance, four books.of Reason, two books.of the Use of Reason, addressed to Leptines.Second series:That the Ancients rightly admitted Dialectic as well as Demonstration, addressed to Zeno, two books.
7. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.4 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
3.4. Zeno and the Stoics, then, were right in repudiating conjecture. For to conjecture that you know that which you do not know, is not the part of a wise, but rather of a rash and foolish man. Therefore if nothing can be known, as Socrates taught, or ought to be conjectured, as Zeno taught, philosophy is entirely removed. Why should I say that it is not only overthrown by these two, who were the chiefs of philosophy, but by all, so that it now appears to have been long ago destroyed by its own arms? Philosophy has been divided into many sects; and they all entertain various sentiments. In which do we place the truth? It certainly cannot be in all. Let us point out some one; it follows that all the others will be without wisdom. Let us pass through them separately; in the same manner, whatever we shall give to one we shall take away from the others. For each particular sect overturns all others, to confirm itself and its own doctrines : nor does it allow wisdom to any other, lest it should confess that it is itself foolish; but as it takes away others, so is it taken away itself by all others. For they are nevertheless philosophers who accuse it of folly. Whatever sect you shall praise and pronounce true, that is censured by philosophers as false. Shall we therefore believe one which praises itself and its doctrine, or the many which blame the ignorance of each other? That must of necessity be better which is held by great numbers, than that which is held by one only. For no one can rightly judge concerning himself, as the renowned poet testifies; for the nature of men is so arranged, that they see and distinguish the affairs of others better than their own. Since, therefore, all things are uncertain, we must either believe all or none: if we are to believe no one, then the wise have no existence, because while they separately affirm different things they think themselves wise; if all, it is equally true that there are no wise men, because all deny the wisdom of each individually. Therefore all are in this manner destroyed; and as those fabled sparti of the poets, so these men mutually slay one another, so that no one remains of all; which happens on this account, because they have a sword, but have no shield. If, therefore, the sects individually are convicted of folly by the judgment of many sects, it follows that all are found to be vain and empty; and thus philosophy consumes and destroys itself. And since Arcesilas the founder of the Academy understood this, he collected together the mutual censures of all, and the confession of ignorance made by distinguished philosophers, and armed himself against all. Thus he established a new philosophy of not philosophizing. From this founder, therefore, there began to be two kinds of philosophy: one the old one, which claims to itself knowledge; the other a new one, opposed to the former, and which detracts from it. Between these two kinds of philosophy I see that there is disagreement, and as it were civil war. On which side shall we place wisdom, which cannot be torn asunder? If the nature of things can be known, this troop of recruits will perish; if it cannot, the veterans will be destroyed: if they shall be equal, nevertheless philosophy, the guide of all, will still perish, because it is divided; for nothing can be opposed to itself without its own destruction. But if, as I have shown, there can be no inner and peculiar knowledge in man on account of the frailty of the human condition, the party of Arcesilas prevails. But not even will this stand firm, because it cannot be the case that nothing at all is known.
8. Plotinus, Enneads, a b c d\n0 5.8 [31] 1 5.8 [31] 1 5 8 [31] 1 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •definition in dialectic Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 184
9. Augustine, Contra Academicos, 2.11 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
10. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 7.157, 9.162 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
11. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.112.2, 2.113.10-2.113.11 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
12. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.53-1.54, 1.625, 2.17, 2.41, 2.48, 2.52, 2.131, 2.174, 3.266, 3.274, 3.548-3.550, 3.553, 3.598  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 22, 61
13. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, 389.19 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
14. Fds, Fds, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
15. Plutarch, Synopsis, None  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
17. Cicero, Varro, 42  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
18. Pausanias, Fr.In Ll., None  Tagged with subjects: •dialectic, definition of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 61
19. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 22