The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Index Database

Results for
Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

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All subjects (including unvalidated):

subject	book bibliographic info
cynics, cyrenaics	Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 6, 19, 204, 212
cyrenaic	Dillon and Timotin (2015), Platonic Theories of Prayer, 29, 90
cyrenaic, advice, sexual activity	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 408
cyrenaic, against erotic love, aristippus	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 280
cyrenaic, aristippus	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236, 375
cyrenaic, death an escape, hegesias	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
cyrenaic, hegesias	Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 97
cyrenaic, only present pleasure to be sought, aristippus	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 239, 298
cyrenaic, school	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 382, 388, 404, 405, 406, 408, 409, 582, 583, 584, 686
cyrenaic, school, plutarch, and the	Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 408, 409
cyrenaic, self, aristippus	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 239
cyrenaics	Bett (2019), How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism, 25, 35, 36, 198, 199, 200, 206 Clarke, King, Baltussen (2023), Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering. 33 Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 65 Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 272 Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 82 Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 89, 91, 92, 93, 97, 101, 104 Vogt (2015), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius. 101
cyrenaics, anticipate misfortune	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
cyrenaics, on unexpected, anticipation of misfortune	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
cyrenaics, unconscious	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236
cyrenaics, unexpected	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 177

List of validated texts:

5 validated results for "cyrenaic"

1. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Anticipation of misfortune, Cyrenaics on unexpected • Aristippus, Cyrenaic • Cyrenaic school • Cyrenaics • Cyrenaics, • Cyrenaics, Anticipate misfortune • Cyrenaics, Unexpected • Hegesias, Cyrenaic, Death an escape • Unconscious, Cyrenaics

Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 162; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 82; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 177, 236; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 388

2. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cyrenaic school • Cyrenaics • Plutarch, and the Cyrenaic school • sexual activity, Cyrenaic advice

Found in books: Erler et al. (2021), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Platonist Tradition, 65; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 404, 408

3. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Cyrenaic school • Cyrenaics

Found in books: Bett (2019), How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism, 25, 35, 36, 198, 206; Vogt (2015), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius. 101; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 382

4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.87-2.97 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristippus, Cyrenaic, Against erotic love • Aristippus, Cyrenaic, Only present pleasure to be sought • Aristippus, Cyrenaic, Self • Cynics,Cyrenaics • Cyrenaic school • Cyrenaics • Hegesias (Cyrenaic)

Found in books: Bett (2019), How to be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism, 199; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 272; Lloyd (1989), The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science, 170; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 6, 204, 212; Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 91, 92, 93, 97; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 239, 280; Vogt (2015), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius. 101; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 582, 583, 584, 686

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2.87 The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work On the Sects, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end. They also hold that there is a difference between end and happiness. Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures. ^2.88 Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceed from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good. ^2.89 The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. ^2.90 For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Again they hold that pleasure is not derived from sight or from hearing alone. At all events, we listen with pleasure to imitation of mourning, while the reality causes pain. They gave the names of absence of pleasure and absence of pain to the intermediate conditions. However, they insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business. ^2.91 They do not accept the doctrine that every wise man lives pleasantly and every fool painfully, but regard it as true for the most part only. It is sufficient even if we enjoy but each single pleasure as it comes. They say that prudence is a good, though desirable not in itself but on account of its consequences; that we make friends from interested motives, just as we cherish any part of the body so long as we have it; that some of the virtues are found even in the foolish; that bodily training contributes to the acquisition of virtue; that the sage will not give way to envy or love or superstition, since these weaknesses are due to mere empty opinion; he will, however, feel pain and fear, these being natural affections; ^2.92 and that wealth too is productive of pleasure, though not desirable for its own sake.They affirm that mental affections can be known, but not the objects from which they come; and they abandoned the study of nature because of its apparent uncertainty, but fastened on logical inquiries because of their utility. But Meleager in his second book On Philosophical Opinions, and Clitomachus in his first book On the Sects, affirm that they maintain Dialectic as well as Physics to be useless, since, when one has learnt the theory of good and evil, it is possible to speak with propriety, to be free from superstition, and to escape the fear of death. ^2.93 They also held that nothing is just or honourable or base by nature, but only by convention and custom. Nevertheless the good man will be deterred from wrong-doing by the penalties imposed and the prejudices that it would arouse. Further that the wise man really exists. They allow progress to be attainable in philosophy as well as in other matters. They maintain that the pain of one man exceeds that of another, and that the senses are not always true and trustworthy.The school of Hegesias, as it is called, adopted the same ends, namely pleasure and pain. In their view there is no such thing as gratitude or friendship or beneficence, because it is not for themselves that we choose to do these things but simply from motives of interest, apart from which such conduct is nowhere found. ^2.94 They denied the possibility of happiness, for the body is infected with much suffering, while the soul shares in the sufferings of the body and is a prey to disturbance, and fortune often disappoints. From all this it follows that happiness cannot be realized. Moreover, life and death are each desirable in turn. But that there is anything naturally pleasant or unpleasant they deny; when some men are pleased and others pained by the same objects, this is owing to the lack or rarity or surfeit of such objects. Poverty and riches have no relevance to pleasure; for neither the rich nor the poor as such have any special share in pleasure. ^2.95 Slavery and freedom, nobility and low birth, honour and dishonour, are alike indifferent in a calculation of pleasure. To the fool life is advantageous, while to the wise it is a matter of indifference. The wise man will be guided in all he does by his own interests, for there is none other whom he regards as equally deserving. For supposing him to reap the greatest advantages from another, they would not be equal to what he contributes himself. They also disallow the claims of the senses, because they do not lead to accurate knowledge. Whatever appears rational should be done. They affirmed that allowance should be made for errors, for no man errs voluntarily, but under constraint of some suffering; that we should not hate men, but rather teach them better. The wise man will not have so much advantage over others in the choice of goods as in the avoidance of evils, making it his end to live without pain of body or mind. ^2.96 This then, they say, is the advantage accruing to those who make no distinction between any of the objects which produce pleasure.The school of Anniceris in other respects agreed with them, but admitted that friendship and gratitude and respect for parents do exist in real life, and that a good man will sometimes act out of patriotic motives. Hence, if the wise man receive annoyance, he will be none the less happy even if few pleasures accrue to him. The happiness of a friend is not in itself desirable, for it is not felt by his neighbour. Instruction is not sufficient in itself to inspire us with confidence and to make us rise superior to the opinion of the multitude. Habits must be formed because of the bad disposition which has grown up in us from the first.' ' None

5. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Cyrenaic school • Cyrenaics

Found in books: Seaford, Wilkins, Wright (2017), Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill. 104; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 404

Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database