1. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 17.15 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 28| 17.15. "שׂוֹם תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ מִקֶּרֶב אַחֶיךָ תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ לֹא תוּכַל לָתֵת עָלֶיךָ אִישׁ נָכְרִי אֲשֶׁר לֹא־אָחִיךָ הוּא׃", | 17.15. "thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the LORD thy God shall choose; one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee; thou mayest not put a foreigner over thee, who is not thy brother.", |
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2. Hebrew Bible, Ruth, 4.2 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 24| 4.2. "וַיִּקַּח עֲשָׂרָה אֲנָשִׁים מִזִּקְנֵי הָעִיר וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁבוּ־פֹה וַיֵּשֵׁבוּ׃", 4.2. "וְעַמִּינָדָב הוֹלִיד אֶת־נַחְשׁוֹן וְנַחְשׁוֹן הוֹלִיד אֶת־שַׂלְמָה׃", | 4.2. "And he took ten men of the elders of the city, and said: ‘Sit ye down here.’ And they sat down.", |
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3. Hebrew Bible, Ecclesiastes, 7.19 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 24| 7.19. "הַחָכְמָה תָּעֹז לֶחָכָם מֵעֲשָׂרָה שַׁלִּיטִים אֲשֶׁר הָיוּ בָּעִיר׃", | 7.19. "Wisdom is a stronghold to the wise man more than ten rulers that are in a city.", |
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| 4. Dead Sea Scrolls, Damascus Covenant, 9.17-9.22 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 79 |
| 5. Dead Sea Scrolls, (Cairo Damascus Covenant) Cd-A, 9.17-9.22 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 79 |
| 6. Septuagint, Ecclesiasticus (Siracides), 6.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 28 |
| 7. Tosefta, Sanhedrin, 12.7-12.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 79 |
8. Mishnah, Makkot, 1.9 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 79| 1.9. "הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ מֵחַלּוֹן זֶה וּשְׁנַיִם רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ מֵחַלּוֹן זֶה וְאֶחָד מַתְרֶה בוֹ בָּאֶמְצַע, בִּזְמַן שֶׁמִּקְצָתָן רוֹאִין אֵלּוּ אֶת אֵלּוּ, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ עֵדוּת אַחַת. וְאִם לָאו, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שְׁתֵּי עֵדֻיּוֹת. לְפִיכָךְ אִם נִמְצֵאת אַחַת מֵהֶן זוֹמֶמֶת, הוּא וָהֵן נֶהֱרָגִין וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה פְּטוּרָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, לְעוֹלָם אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ פִּי שְׁנֵי עֵדָיו מַתְרִין בּוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יז) עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים. דָּבָר אַחֵר, עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים, שֶׁלֹּא תְהֵא סַנְהֶדְרִין שׁוֹמַעַת מִפִּי הַתֻּרְגְּמָן: \n", | 1.9. "If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.", |
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9. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Qamma, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 28| 56a. בכותל רעוע,אמר מר הכופף קמתו של חבירו בפני הדליקה היכי דמי אילימא דמטיא ליה ברוח מצויה בדיני אדם נמי נחייב אלא דמטיא ברוח שאינה מצויה,ורב אשי אמר טמון אתמר משום דשויה טמון באש:,אמר מר השוכר עדי שקר ה"ד אילימא לנפשיה ממונא בעי שלומי ובדיני אדם נמי ניחייב אלא לחבריה,והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו במאי עסקינן אילימא בבי תרי פשיטא דאורייתא הוא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו,אלא בחד,ותו ליכא והאיכא (סימן העושה בסם ושליח חבירו נשבר) העושה מלאכה במי חטאת ובפרת חטאת פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא הנותן סם המות בפני בהמת חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא השולח את הבערה ביד חרש שוטה וקטן פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא המבעית את חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא נשברה כדו ברה"ר ולא סלקה נפלה גמלו ולא העמידה ר"מ מחייב בהזיקן וחכ"א פטור בדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,אין מיהא איכא טובא והני אצטריכא ליה מהו דתימא בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,הפורץ גדר בפני בהמת חבירו מהו דתימא כיון דלמסתריה קאי מה עביד בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,הכופף קמתו של חבירו נמי מהו דתימא לימא מי הוה ידענא דאתיא רוח שאינה מצויה ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,ולרב אשי דאמר נמי טמון איתמר מהו דתימא אנא כסויי כסיתיה ניהלך ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,והשוכר עדי שקר נמי מהו דתימא לימא דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו נמי מהו דתימא מי יימר דכי הוה (אתינא) מסהדינא ליה הוה מודה דלמא הוה משתבע לשקרא ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל:,נפרצה בלילה או שפרצוה לסטים כו': אמר רבה והוא שחתרה,אבל לא חתרה מאי חייב היכי דמי אילימא בכותל בריא כי לא חתרה אמאי חייב מאי ה"ל למעבד אלא בכותל רעוע כי חתרה אמאי פטור תחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס הוא,הניחא למ"ד תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור אלא למ"ד תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב מאי איכא למימר,אלא מתני' בכותל בריא ואפילו לא חתרה וכי איתמר דרבה אסיפא איתמר הניחה בחמה או שמסרה לחרש שוטה וקטן ויצתה והזיקה חייב אמר רבה ואפי' חתרה,לא מבעיא היכא דלא חתרה דכולה בפשיעה הוא אלא אפי' חתרה נמי מהו דתימא הויא לה תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס קמ"ל דכולה פשיעה היא,מ"ט דאמר ליה מידע ידעת דכיון דשבקתה בחמה כל טצדקא דאית לה למיעבד עבדא ונפקא:,הוציאוה לסטים לסטים חייבין: | 56a. the i baraita /i is speaking b of an unstable wall /b that was about to fall and break in any event, and so his action did not actually cause any loss to the owner., b The Master says: /b With regard to the case mentioned in the i baraita /i of b one who bends another’s standing /b grain b before a fire, what are the circumstances? If we say /b that the i baraita /i is referring to a case b where /b the fire would b reach /b the bent grain b in a typical wind, let him /b also b be liable /b for the damage according to b human laws. Rather, /b it must be a case b where /b the fire could b reach /b the bent grain only b in an atypical wind. /b Therefore, he is exempt according to human laws, and, since the grain was destroyed due to his action, he is liable according to the laws of Heaven., b And Rav Ashi /b offered an alternative explanation and b said: /b The i baraita /i b was stated /b in the case of b a concealed /b item; in other words, this person did not bend the grain toward the fire but bent it over another item in order to conceal it. One is not liable to pay restitution for concealed items damaged by fire. Therefore, when this person bent the grain over an item, he caused indirect damage to the owner of that item b because he made it into a concealed /b item that was subsequently damaged by b fire, /b and the owner cannot reclaim his loss., b The Master says: /b With regard to the case mentioned in the i baraita /i of b one who hires false witnesses, what are the circumstances? If we say /b that he hired them b for his own /b benefit, in order to extract payment from another, b he is required to reimburse /b that person with b money, and he is liable according to human laws /b for receiving money under false circumstances. b Rather, /b the case is one where he hired false witnesses b for /b the benefit of b another. /b In such a case the injured party cannot sue the other litigant, since the latter did not hire the witnesses, nor can he sue the person who hired them, since that person received no personal benefit.,The i baraita /i teaches: b And one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf /b is exempt from liability according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. b With what /b circumstances b are we dealing? If we say /b that the case b involves two /b people who could testify, and their evidence would render the other party liable to pay, it b is obvious /b that each of them is liable according to the laws of Heaven; he has committed a transgression b by Torah law: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” /b (Leviticus 5:1). Therefore, it is unnecessary for the i baraita /i to mention this case., b Rather, /b the case of the i baraita /i b concerns a single /b witness, whose testimony is not sufficient to render another liable, and to which the transgression of Torah law consequently does not apply. Nevertheless, a litigant can be forced to take an oath based on the testimony of a single witness, and refusal to take this oath would obligate the litigant to pay. Therefore, the witness has caused an indirect loss and is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,The Gemara asks: b And is there nothing else, /b i.e., is there no other case in which one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven? b But there is /b such a case. And before citing several cases that are not written in the i baraita /i the Gemara presents b a mnemonic /b device: b One who performs; with poison; and an agent; another; is broken. /b The Gemara returns to the first case: One b who performs labor with water of purification, /b which was meant to be used to purify one rendered ritually impure by a corpse, thereby rendering the water unfit for use, b or /b who performs labor b with the /b red b heifer of purification, /b invalidating the animal for use as an element of the purification ritual, is b exempt according to human laws, /b since the damage he caused is not evident, b but liable according to the laws of Heaven, /b as he caused a ficial loss.,The Gemara adds: b But there is /b the following i halakha /i : With regard to b one who places poison before another’s animal, /b and the animal eats it and dies, he is b exempt according to human laws, /b since the animal caused its own death, b but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b ,The Gemara adds: b But there is /b the case of b one who sends /b an exposed b flame in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, /b and the fire spreads, causing damage; he is b exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b ,The Gemara adds: b But there is /b the case of b one who frightens another /b without touching him, but causes him injury; he is b exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b ,The Gemara adds: b But there is /b the case of one b whose jug broke in the public domain and he did not remove /b the broken pieces, or one b whose camel fell and he did not stand it up /b again. b Rabbi Meir deems /b the owner of jug or of the camel b liable /b for the damage thereby caused to others, b and the Rabbis say that /b he is b exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b Since there are so many other cases, why did Rabbi Yehoshua claim in the i baraita /i that there are only four cases when one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven?,The Gemara answers: b Yes, there are, in any event, many /b other cases, b but /b Rabbi Yehoshua held that it b was necessary for him /b to state the i halakha /i of b these /b four cases. The reason he stated them is b lest you say /b that in these cases b one should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in these cases one is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,The Gemara explains why one might have thought that there is no liability at all for each case in the i baraita /i : Rabbi Yehoshua taught that b one who breaches a fence /b that stood b before another’s animal, /b thereby allowing the animal to escape, is liable according to the laws of Heaven, b lest you say: Since /b the fence b is about to collapse /b even without this person’s intervention, b what did /b he really b do? /b Based on that logic, one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,Rabbi Yehoshua taught that b one who bends another’s standing /b grain is liable according to the laws of Heaven, b lest you say: Let /b the one who bent the grain b say /b to the owner: b Did I know that an atypical wind would come /b and cause the fire to spread? Based on that logic, one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven., b And according to Rav Ashi, who said /b that Rabbi Yehoshua’s ruling b was stated /b with regard to the case of b a concealed /b item, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned liability according to the laws of Heaven b lest you say /b that the one who concealed the item could say: b I covered it for you /b in order to protect it from the fire. Based on that logic, one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven., b And /b Rabbi Yehoshua taught that there is liability b also /b in the case of b one who hires false witnesses, lest you say: Let /b the one who hired them b say: /b If the witnesses hear b the statement of the teacher, /b i.e., God, Who prohibited giving false testimony, b and the statement of the student, /b i.e., the one who hired them, b to whose statement /b should they b listen? /b Although the one who hired them encouraged these witnesses to sin, ultimately it was they who transgressed by not adhering to the instructions of God. b And /b based on this logic one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,Finally, Rabbi Yehoshua taught that b one who knows testimony /b in support b of another but does not testify on his behalf /b is liable according to the laws of Heaven, b lest you say /b that the witness could claim: b Who says that had I come forward /b and b testified on behalf of /b one litigant, the other litigant b would admit /b liability? b Perhaps he would have /b chosen to b take a false oath /b and absolve himself. Based on that logic one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,§ The mishna teaches: If the pen b was breached at night, or bandits breached it, /b and sheep subsequently went out and caused damage, the owner of the sheep is exempt. b Rabba says: And this /b first instance of a pen that was breached is referring specifically to a case b where /b the animal b tunneled /b under the wall of the pen and by doing so caused the wall to collapse. In that case, the owner is completely blameless and therefore exempt from liability for any damage that ensues.,The Gemara asks: b But /b if the animal b did not tunnel /b under the wall, b what /b is the i halakha /i ? Would the owner be b liable? What are the circumstances? If we say /b that the pen had b a stable wall, /b then even b if /b the animal b did not tunnel, why /b is the owner b liable? What should he have done? /b Clearly, he cannot be held liable for the damage. b Rather, /b the pen had b an unstable wall. /b The Gemara asks: Even b if /b the animal b tunneled /b under the wall and knocked it down, b why /b is he b exempt? /b The damage in this case is b initially through negligence and ultimately by accident. /b , b This works out well according to the one who said /b that in any case of damage that is b initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, /b he is b exempt /b from liability, since the ultimate cause of the damage was not his fault. b But according to the one who says /b that in any case of damage that is b initially through negligence and ultimately by accident /b he is b liable, /b as even without the accident his negligence could have caused damage, b what is there to say? /b , b Rather, /b the case of b the mishna concerns a stable wall, and even /b if the animal b did not tunnel /b under the wall the owner is exempt. b And when /b the statement b of Rabba was stated, it was stated with regard to the latter clause /b of the mishna that says: If the owner b left /b the animal b in the sun or conveyed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and /b the animal b went out and caused damage, /b the owner is b liable. /b Concerning this b Rabba stated: And /b the owner is liable b even if /b the animal b tunneled /b its way out under the wall of the pen.,The Gemara explains: b It is not necessary /b for the mishna to mention the case b where the animal did not tunnel /b its way out. In that case the owner is clearly liable, since b the entire /b incident occurred due to his b negligence /b of leaving the animal in the sun, thereby causing it distress and leading it to attempt escape by any possible means. b But even if /b the animal b tunneled /b its way out, the owner is liable, and this is the novelty in this ruling: b Lest you say /b that b this is /b a case of damage that is b initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, /b because animals do not typically tunnel their way out of a pen, the mishna b teaches us that /b it is considered as though b the entire /b damage resulted from the owner’s b negligence. /b , b What is the reason /b that the owner is liable? It is b that /b the one who suffered the damage b can say to /b the owner of the sheep: b You should have known that since you left it in the sun, it would utilize any means [ i tatzdeka /i ] available for it to use and /b it would b escape, /b so you are ultimately responsible for the damage.,§ The mishna teaches: If the b bandits /b themselves b took /b the sheep b out, the bandits are liable. /b |
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10. Babylonian Talmud, Makkot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 79| 6b. big strongמתני׳ /strong /big היו שנים רואין אותו מחלון זה ושנים רואין אותו מחלון זה ואחד מתרה בו באמצע בזמן שמקצתן רואין אלו את אלו הרי אלו עדות אחת ואם לאו הרי אלו שתי עדיות לפיכך אם נמצאת אחת מהן זוממת הוא והן נהרגין והשניה פטורה,רבי יוסי אומר לעולם אין נהרגין עד שיהו שני עדיו מתרין בו שנאמר (דברים יז, ו) על פי שנים עדים דבר אחר על פי שנים עדים שלא תהא סנהדרין שומעת מפי התורגמן:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big אמר רב זוטרא בר טוביא אמר רב מנין לעדות מיוחדת שהיא פסולה שנאמר (דברים יז, ו) לא יומת על פי עד אחד מאי אחד אילימא עד אחד ממש מרישא שמעינן לה על פי שנים עדים אלא מאי אחד אחד אחד,תניא נמי הכי לא יומת על פי עד אחד להביא שנים שרואים אותו אחד מחלון זה ואחד מחלון זה ואין רואין זה את זה שאין מצטרפין ולא עוד אלא אפילו בזה אחר זה בחלון אחד אין מצטרפין,אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי השתא ומה אחד מחלון זה ואחד מחלון זה דהאי קא חזי כולו מעשה והאי קא חזי כולו מעשה אמרת לא מצטרפי בזה אחר זה דהאי חזי פלגא דמעשה והאי חזי פלגא דמעשה מיבעיא א"ל לא נצרכא אלא לבועל את הערוה,אמר רבא אם היו רואין את המתרה או המתרה רואה אותן מצטרפין אמר רבא מתרה שאמרו אפילו מפי עצמו ואפילו מפי השד,אמר רב נחמן עדות מיוחדת כשירה בדיני ממונות דכתיב לא יומת על פי עד אחד בדיני נפשות הוא דאין כשירה אבל בדיני ממונות כשירה,מתקיף לה רב זוטרא אלא מעתה בדיני נפשות תציל אלמה תנן הוא והן נהרגין קשיא:,רבי יוסי אומר וכו': א"ל רב פפא לאביי ומי אית ליה לרבי יוסי האי סברא והתנן רבי יוסי אומר השונא נהרג מפני שהוא כמועד ומותרה,א"ל ההוא רבי יוסי בר יהודה היא דתניא רבי יוסי בר יהודה אומר חבר אין צריך התראה לפי שלא ניתנה התראה אלא להבחין בין שוגג למזיד:,דבר אחר ע"פ שנים עדים שלא תהא סנהדרין שומעת מפי התורגמן: הנהו לעוזי דאתו לקמיה דרבא אוקי רבא תורגמן בינייהו והיכי עביד הכי והתנן שלא תהא סנהדרין שומעת מפי התורגמן רבא מידע הוה ידע מה דהוו אמרי ואהדורי הוא דלא הוה ידע | 6b. strong MISHNA: /strong In a case where there b were two /b witnesses b observing /b an individual violating a capital transgression b from this window /b in a house, b and two observing him from that window /b in a house, b and one /b person was b forewarning /b the transgressor b in the middle /b between the two sets of witnesses, the i halakha /i depends on the circumstances. In a situation b where some of /b the witnesses observing from the two windows b see each other, /b the testimony of all b these /b witnesses constitutes b one testimony, but if /b they do b not /b see each other, the testimony of b these /b witnesses constitutes b two /b independent b testimonies. Therefore, /b as two independent sets of witnesses, b if one of /b the sets b was found /b to be a set of b conspiring /b witnesses, while the testimony of the other set remained valid, both b he, /b the one accused of violating the capital transgression, b and they, /b the conspiring witnesses, b are executed, and the second /b set, whose testimony remained valid, b is exempt. /b , b Rabbi Yosei says: /b Transgressors b are never executed unless his two witnesses are /b the ones b forewarning him, as it is stated: “At the mouth of two witnesses… /b he who is to be put to death shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:6), from which it is derived that it is from the mouths of the two witnesses that the accused must be forewarned, and forewarning issued by someone else is insufficient. b Alternatively, /b from the phrase b “at the mouth of two witnesses” /b one derives b that /b the judges must hear the testimony directly from the witnesses, and the b Sanhedrin will not hear /b testimony b from the mouth of an interpreter. /b , strong GEMARA: /strong b Rav Zutra bar Tuvya says /b that b Rav says: From where /b is it derived with regard b to disjointed testimony, /b in which each of the witnesses saw the incident independent of the other, b that it is not valid? /b It is derived from a verse, b as it is stated: “He shall not die at the mouth of one witness” /b (Deuteronomy 17:6). The exposition is as follows: b What /b is the meaning of b “one /b witness”? b If we say /b that it means b one witness literally, we learn it from the first /b portion of the verse: b “At the mouth of two witnesses,” /b indicating that the testimony of fewer than two witnesses is not valid. b Rather, what /b is the meaning of b “one /b witness”? It means that the accused is not executed based on the testimony of people who witnessed an incident with b one /b witness here and b one /b witness elsewhere.,The Gemara notes: b This is also taught /b in a i baraita /i : It is written: b “He shall not die at the mouth of one witness,” /b from which it is derived b to include /b the i halakha /i that in the case of b two /b witnesses b who observe /b an individual violating a capital transgression, b one from this window and one from that window, and they do not see each other, that they do not join /b to constitute a set of witnesses. b Moreover, even /b if they witnessed the same transgression from the same perspective, watching the incident not at the same time but b one after the other in one window, they do not join /b to constitute a set of witnesses., b Rav Pappa said to Abaye: /b Why is it necessary to mention both cases? b Now if /b in the case where b one /b witness views the incident b from this window and one /b witness views the incident b from that window, where this /b witness b sees the entire incident and that /b witness b sees the entire incident, you say /b that b they do not join /b to testify together as two witnesses, if they see the incident b one after the other, where this /b witness b sees half /b the b incident and that /b witness b sees half /b the b incident, /b is it b necessary /b to say that the witnesses do not join together? Abaye b said to him: /b It b is necessary /b to state this i halakha /i b only /b with regard b to /b a case where they witnessed one who b engages in intercourse with a forbidden relative, /b which is a continuing act, and each of the witnesses saw sufficient behavior to render the transgressor liable. The i tanna /i of the i baraita /i teaches that even in that case, they do not join to constitute a set of witnesses.,Apropos witnesses joining to constitute a set of witnesses, b Rava says: /b Even if the witness in either window is unable to see the witness in the other window, b if /b the witness in each window b sees the one who is forewarning /b the accused, b or /b if b the one who is forewarning /b the accused b could see /b the two disjointed witnesses, b they join /b to constitute a set of witnesses. b Rava says: /b The one b forewarning /b the accused of b whom /b the Sages b spoke /b need not be a third witness, but b even /b if the victim forewarns the murderer b from his own mouth, and even /b if the forewarning emerged b from the mouth of a demon, /b meaning the source of the forewarning is unknown, the forewarning is legitimate., b Rav Naḥman says: Disjointed testimony /b of two witnesses, each of whom observed an incident independent of the other, b is valid in /b cases of b monetary law, as it is written: “He shall not die at the mouth of one witness” /b (Deuteronomy 17:6). This indicates that b it is /b only b with regard to /b cases of b capital law that /b disjointed testimony b is not valid, but with regard to /b cases of b monetary law /b that testimony b is valid. /b , b Rav Zutra objects to this: But if that is so, /b and disjointed testimony is effective in certain cases, b in /b cases of b capital law /b disjointed testimony b should spare /b the accused from execution. Since one must exploit every avenue possible to prevent executions, in a case where some of the disjointed witnesses were rendered conspiring witnesses, the entire testimony should be voided on their account. b Why, /b then, b did we learn /b in the mishna that if one set witnessed the capital transgression from one window and one set from the other window, and one set was found to be a set of conspiring witnesses, b he, /b the accused, b and they, /b the conspiring witnesses, b are executed? /b The Gemara comments: Indeed, that is b difficult /b according to Rav Naḥman.,§ The mishna teaches that b Rabbi Yosei says: /b Perpetrators are never executed unless his two witnesses are the ones forewarning him. b Rav Pappa said to Abaye: And is Rabbi Yosei of /b the opinion that b this /b line of b reasoning /b is correct, and forewarning by the witnesses is indispensable? b But didn’t we learn /b in a mishna (9b): b Rabbi Yosei says: An enemy /b who commits murder cannot claim that he killed the victim unwittingly. Rather, b he is executed /b even if there was no forewarning, b due to /b the fact b that his /b halakhic status is b like /b that of one who is b cautioned and forewarned. /b Apparently, Rabbi Yosei does not always require that there be forewarning.,Abaye b said to him: That /b statement in the mishna you cited that is attributed to Rabbi Yosei b is /b actually the opinion of b Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: A i ḥaver /i does not require forewarning, as forewarning was instituted only to distinguish between /b one who commits a transgression b unwittingly and /b one who does so b intentionally. /b A i ḥaver /i , who is a Torah scholar, does not require forewarning to distinguish between them. Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥalafta, whose opinion is cited in the mishna here, is of the opinion that forewarning is a necessary prerequisite to executing someone who is judged liable, and that forewarning must be issued by the witnesses.,§ The mishna teaches: b Alternatively, /b from the phrase in the verse b “at the mouth of two witnesses” /b one derives b that /b the b Sanhedrin will not hear /b testimony b from the mouth of an interpreter. /b The Gemara relates: There were b certain /b people who spoke b a foreign /b language b who came before Rava /b for judgment. b Rava installed an interpreter between them /b and heard the testimony through the interpreter. The Gemara asks: b And how did he do so? But didn’t we learn /b in the mishna b that /b the b Sanhedrin will not hear /b testimony b from the mouth of an interpreter? /b The Gemara answers: b Rava knew what they were saying, /b as he understood their language, b but he did not know /b how to b respond /b to them in their language. He posed questions through the interpreter but understood the answers on his own, as required by the mishna. |
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11. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of twenty-three (small sanhedrin) Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 79| 30a. וכל לישני דבי דינא ולא הוה כתב בה במותב תלתא הוינא וחד ליתוהי,סבר רבינא למימר היינו דריש לקיש א"ל רב נתן בר אמי הכי אמרינן משמיה דרבא כל כי האי גוונא חיישינן לב"ד טועין,אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אי כתב בה בי דינא תו לא צריך,ודילמא בית דין חצוף הוא דאמר שמואל שנים שדנו דיניהן דין אלא שנקראו ב"ד חצוף דכתב ביה בי דינא דרבנא אשי,ודילמא רבנן דבי רב אשי כשמואל סבירא להו דכתיב בו (ואמרנא ליה לרבנא אשי) ואמר לן רבנא אשי,ת"ר אמר להן אחד אני ראיתי אביכם שהטמין מעות בשידה תיבה ומגדל ואמר של פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן בבית לא אמר כלום בשדה דבריו קיימין,כללו של דבר כל שבידו ליטלן דבריו קיימין אין בידו ליטלן לא אמר כלום,הרי שראו את אביהן שהטמין מעות בשידה תיבה ומגדל ואמר של פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן אם כמוסר דבריו קיימין אם כמערים לא אמר כלום,הרי שהיה מצטער על מעות שהניח לו אביו ובא בעל החלום ואמר לו כך וכך הן במקום פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן זה היה מעשה ואמרו דברי חלומות לא מעלין ולא מורידין:,שנים אומרים זכאי כו': מיכתב היכי כתבי,ר' יוחנן אמר זכאי ריש לקיש אמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין (ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין) רבי (אליעזר) אמר מדבריהן נזדכה פלוני,מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו לשלומי איהו מנתא בהדייהו דלמאן דאמר זכאי משלם ולמאן דאמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין לא משלם,ולמ"ד זכאי משלם לימא להו אי לדידי צייתיתון אתון נמי לא שלמיתון,אלא איכא בינייהו לשלומי אינהו מנתא דידיה למ"ד זכאי משלמי למ"ד פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין לא משלמי,ולמאן דאמר זכאי משלמי ולימרו ליה אי לאו את בהדן לא הוה סליק דינא מידי,אלא איכא בינייהו משום (ויקרא יט, טז) לא תלך רכיל בעמך רבי יוחנן אמר זכאי משום לא תלך רכיל,ריש לקיש אמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני פלוני מחייבין משום דמיחזי כשיקרא,ור' אלעזר אית ליה דמר ואית ליה דמר הלכך כתבי הכי מדבריהם נזדכה פלוני:,גמרו את הדבר היו מכניסין כו': למאן אילימא לבעלי דינין התם קיימי אלא לעדים,כמאן דלא כרבי נתן דתניא לעולם אין עדותן מצטרפת עד שיראו שניהן כאחד רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר אפילו בזה אחר זה,ואין עדותן מתקיימת בבית דין עד שיעידו שניהן כאחד רבי נתן אומר שומעין דבריו של זה היום וכשיבא חבירו למחר שומעין את דבריו,לא לעולם לבעלי דינין ורבי נחמיה היא דתניא רבי נחמיה אומר כך היה מנהגן של נקיי הדעת שבירושלים מכניסין לבעלי דינין ושומעין דבריהן ומכניסין את העדים ושומעין דבריהם ומוציאין אותן לחוץ ונושאין ונותנין בדבר (גמרו את הדבר מכניסין אותן כו'),והתניא גמרו את הדבר מכניסין את העדים ההיא דלא כרבי נתן,גופא לעולם אין עדותן מצטרפת עד שיראו שניהם כאחד רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר אפילו בזה אחר זה במאי קמיפלגי איבעית אימא קרא ואיבעית אימא סברא,איבעית אימא סברא אמנה דקא מסהיד האי לא קא מסהיד האי ומנה דקא מסהיד האי לא קמסהיד האי ואידך אמנה בעלמא תרוייהו קמסהדי,ואיבעית אימא קרא דכתיב (ויקרא ה, א) והוא עד או ראה או ידע,ותניא ממשמע שנאמר (דברים יט, טו) לא יקום עד איני יודע שהוא אחד מה תלמוד לומר אחד,זה בנה אב כל מקום שנאמר עד הרי כאן שנים עד שיפרט לך הכתוב אחד,ואפקיה רחמנא בלשון חד למימר עד דחזו תרווייהו כחד ואידך והוא עד או ראה או ידע מ"מ:,ואין עדותן מתקיימת בב"ד עד שיעידו שניהן כאחד ר' נתן אומר שומעין דבריו של זה היום וכשיבא חבירו למחר שומעין דבריו במאי קמיפלגי איבעית אימא סברא איבעית אימא קרא,אב"א סברא מר סבר עד אחד כי אתי לשבועה אתי לממונא לא אתי,ואידך אטו כי אתו בהדי הדדי בחד פומא קא מסהדי אלא מצרפינן להו הכא נמי ליצרפינהו,ואיבעית אימא קרא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו | 30a. b and all of the formulations /b of an enactment b of the court /b were written in it. But only two were signed on it, b and /b the following statement b was not written in it: We were /b convened b in a session of three /b judges, b and one /b of the judges b is no /b longer here, as he died or left for another reason. There was therefore room for concern that perhaps there were only two witnesses, and they wrote the document of admission improperly., b Ravina thought to say /b that b this is /b a case in which the principle b of Reish Lakish, /b that witnesses do not sign a document unless the action was performed appropriately, applies. b Rav Natan bar Ami said to him: This /b is what b we say in the name of Rava: /b In b any cases like this, we are concerned for /b the possibility of b an erroneous court /b that thinks that two constitute a court., b Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: If it was written in /b the document: We, the members of b the court, /b convened, it is b unnecessary /b for the deed to b further /b state that one of the judges is no longer there, as a standard court consists of three judges.,The Gemara asks: b But perhaps it was an impudent court, as Shmuel says: /b With regard to b two /b judges b who /b convened a tribunal and b judged, their verdict is /b a binding b verdict; but /b because they contravened the rabbinic ordice mandating that a court must be composed of three judges, b they are called an impudent court. /b The Gemara answers: It was a document b in which it was written: /b We, the members of b the court of Rabbana Ashi, /b convened. Rav Ashi’s court presumably conformed to rabbinic protocol.,The Gemara asks: b But perhaps the Sages of the court of Rav Ashi hold like Shmuel, /b that the verdict of two judges is binding, and they convened an impudent court. The Gemara answers: It is a document b in which it is written: And we said to Rabbana Ashi, and Rabbana Ashi said to us. /b Rav Ashi himself certainly would not have participated in the discussions of an impudent court.,§ The Gemara continues its discussion of when an admission is deemed credible. b The Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : In a case where b one said to /b the children of another: b I saw that your father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, saying: /b This money b belongs to so-and-so, /b or: This money b is second tithe, /b and the money was found where he said, the i halakha /i depends on the circumstances. If the chest, box, or cabinet was b in the house, /b the witness has b said nothing. /b His testimony about the status of the money is not accepted, as he is only one witness, and he could not have taken the money for himself had he wanted to. But if it was b in the field, his statement stands, /b i.e., is accepted., b The principle of the matter /b is as follows: In b any /b case b where it is in /b the b power of /b the witness b to take /b the money, b his statement stands; /b if b it is not in his power to take /b the money, b he has said nothing. /b ,In a case b where /b the children themselves b saw that their father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, and /b the father b said: /b This money b belongs to so-and-so, /b or: This money b is second tithe, if /b he said so b as one who relays /b information to his own children, b his statement stands. /b But b if /b he said so b as one who employs artifice, /b i.e., he appears to have told them that the money was not his only so that they would not take it, b he has said nothing, /b and they may spend the money.,In a case b where /b one b was distressed about money that his father left him /b as an inheritance, because he could not find it, b and the master of the dream, /b i.e., someone in his dream, b came and said to him: It is such and such /b an amount of money and b it is in such and such a place, /b but the money b is second tithe, /b and he found this amount in the place of which he dreamed; and b this was /b an actual b incident /b that was brought before the Sages, b and they said /b that he can spend the money, as b matters /b appearing in b dreams do not make a difference /b in determining the practical i halakha /i .,§ The mishna teaches that if b two /b judges b say /b the defendant is b exempt /b and one says he is liable, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: When there is a dispute between the judges, b how do they write /b the verdict?, b Rabbi Yoḥa says: /b They write that he is b exempt, /b without mentioning the dispute. b Reish Lakish says /b that they specify: b So-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b liable; /b they must mention that there was a dispute. b Rabbi Eliezer says /b that they do not specify the names of the judges, but rather they add the phrase: b From the statement of /b the judges b so-and-so was deemed exempt, /b to the wording of the verdict. This indicates that not all the judges agreed that he is exempt, but does not specify which judges came to which conclusion.,The Gemara asks: b What /b is the difference b between /b these opinions, besides the wording of the verdict? The Gemara answers: The practical difference b between them /b is b with regard to /b whether or not, in a case where it is discovered that the verdict was erroneous, the judge who was in the minority must b pay /b his b portion /b of restitution b along with /b the judges of the majority. b As according to the one who says /b that they write that he is b exempt, /b the minority judge b pays /b as well, b and according to the one who says /b that they specify: b So-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b liable, he does not pay. /b ,The Gemara asks: b But according to the one who says /b that they write that he is b exempt, /b why b does he pay? Let him say to /b the other judges: b If you would have listened to me you would not have paid either. /b Why should I have to pay for your mistake?, b Rather, /b he does not pay, and the practical difference b between /b the opinions is b with regard to /b whether or not b those /b other judges must b pay his portion /b of the restitution. b According to the one who says /b that they write that he is b exempt, they pay /b the full sum, as they did not mention that there was a dispute over the matter. But b according to the one who says /b that they specify: b So-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b liable, they do not pay /b the portion of the overruled judge, and he does not pay it either.,The Gemara asks: b But according to the one who says /b that they write that he is b exempt, /b why b do they pay /b his portion? b Let them say to him: If you had not been with us the judgment would have had no verdict at all, /b as two judges cannot issue a verdict. Therefore, you share the responsibility with us and should participate in the payment., b Rather, /b the difference b between /b the opinions is only with regard to the wording of the verdict, and is b due to /b the prohibition of: b “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” /b (Leviticus 19:16). b Rabbi Yoḥa says /b that they write that he is b exempt due to /b the prohibition of gossip, as derived from the verse: b “You shall not go as a talebearer.” /b , b Reish Lakish says /b they specify: b So-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem /b him b liable, because /b otherwise the document would b have the appearance of falsehood, /b as not all the judges deemed him exempt., b And Rabbi Elazar accepts /b the opinion b of /b this b Sage, /b Rabbi Yoḥa, b and accepts /b the opinion b of /b that b Sage, /b Reish Lakish. b Therefore, this /b is what b they write: From the statement of /b the judges, b so-and-so was deemed exempt. /b This wording indicates that the ruling was not based on a consensus among the judges, so that it will not have the appearance of falsehood, but it also does not specify what each judge said, to avoid gossip.,§ The mishna teaches that after the judges b finished the matter /b and reached a decision, b they would bring /b them b in. /b The Gemara asks: b Whom /b would they bring in? b If we say /b they would bring in b the litigants, /b this cannot be, as b they were there /b the whole time; they never left the room. b Rather, /b they would bring in b the witnesses. /b ,If so, b in accordance with whose /b opinion is the mishna? It is b not in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Natan; as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b The testimonies of /b individual witnesses b are never combined /b into a testimony of two witnesses b unless the two of them saw /b the incident transpire together b as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: /b Their testimonies are combined b even in /b a case where they saw the incident b one after the other. /b ,The i baraita /i continues: b And /b furthermore, b their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify /b together b as one. Rabbi Natan says: /b They need not testify together. Rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges b hear the statement of this /b witness b today, and when the other /b witness b comes tomorrow /b the judges b hear his statement. /b The mishna, by contrast, indicates that the verdict must be given with the two witnesses present together.,The Gemara reverses its interpretation of the mishna: b No, actually /b it can be explained that the judges would bring in b the litigants; and it is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Neḥemya. As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i that b Rabbi Neḥemya says: This was the custom of the scrupulous people of Jerusalem: /b When they would judge, b they /b would b bring in the litigants and hear their statements, and /b then b they /b would b bring in the witnesses and hear their statements /b in the presence of the litigants, b and /b then b they /b would b take them /b all b outside /b of the courtroom b and discuss the matter /b in their absence. Once b they finished the matter they /b would b bring them, /b i.e., the litigants, b in, /b to hear their verdict.,The Gemara asks: b But isn’t it taught /b in a i baraita /i explicitly: When b they finished the matter they /b would b bring in the witnesses? /b The Gemara answers: b That /b i baraita /i is certainly b not in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Natan. /b ,§ The Gemara discusses b the /b matter b itself: The testimonies of /b individual witnesses b are never combined /b into a testimony of two witnesses b unless the two of them saw /b the incident transpire together b as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: /b Their testimonies are combined b even in /b a case where they saw the incident b one after the other. /b The Gemara asks: b With regard to what do they disagree? /b The Gemara answers: b If you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of b a verse, and if you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to b logical reasoning. /b ,The Gemara elaborates: b If you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to b logical reasoning: /b The first i tanna /i holds that the witnesses must see the incident transpire together, as otherwise, b about the one hundred dinars /b of debt b that this /b one b is testifying, that /b one b is not testifying, and /b about b the one hundred dinars that that /b one b is testifying, this one is not testifying. /b There is only one witness of each incident, which is not sufficient. b And the other /b i tanna /i , Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, holds that since b both /b witnesses b are testifying about one hundred dinars in general, /b the defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff one hundred dinars., b And if you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of b a verse, as it is written: /b “And if anyone sins, hearing the voice of adjuration, b and he is a witness, whether he has seen or known, /b if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1).,The Gemara explains: b And it is taught /b in a i baraita /i with regard to the verse: “One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sins; at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); b by inference, from that /b which b is stated /b in the verse: b A witness shall not rise up /b against a man, even without the word “one,” b do I not know that it is /b referring to b one /b witness? After all, the verse is written in the singular. Therefore, b what /b is the meaning when b the verse states /b explicitly: b “One /b witness”?, b This established a paradigm, /b a basis for the principle that in b every place /b in the Torah b where /b the word b “witness” is stated, /b it means that b there are two /b witnesses, b unless the verse specifies for you /b that it is referring to only b one /b witness., b And /b according to the first i tanna /i , b the Merciful One expresses it in the singular form, /b i.e., “witness” and not “witnesses,” b to say /b that they are not combined into a testimony of two witnesses b unless the two of them saw /b the incident transpire together b as one. And the other /b i tanna /i , Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, derives from the phrase: b “And he is a witness, whether he has seen or known,” /b that b in any case /b where one testifies about what he sees and knows, his testimony is valid.,The i baraita /i cited above teaches: b And /b furthermore, b their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify /b together b as one. Rabbi Natan says: /b They need not testify together; rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges b hear the statement of this /b witness b today, and when the other /b witness b comes tomorrow /b the judges b hear his statement. /b The Gemara asks: b With regard to what do they disagree? /b The Gemara answers: b If you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to b logical reasoning, /b and b if you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of b a verse. /b ,The Gemara elaborates: b If you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to b logical reasoning, /b as one b Sage, /b the first i tanna /i , b holds /b that b when one witness comes /b to testify, b he comes to /b render the defendant liable to take b an oath. /b This is the i halakha /i when there is one witness against the defendant in a case of monetary law. b He does not come to /b render the defendant liable to pay b money, /b because for this two witnesses are necessary., b And the other /b i tanna /i , Rabbi Natan, responds: b Is that to say /b that b when they come together, /b they render the defendant ficially liable because b they testify with one mouth? /b Obviously they testify one after the other. b Rather, /b clearly it is the judges who b combine /b their two testimonies into one. b Here too, /b when the witnesses come to court at different times, b let /b the judges b combine /b their testimonies., b And if you wish, say /b that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of b a verse: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” /b (Leviticus 5:1), |
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