1. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 4.3, 4.23, 4.30, 4.35, 4.39, 4.47 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 32| 4.3. "מִבֶּן שְׁלֹשִׁים שָׁנָה וָמַעְלָה וְעַד בֶּן־חֲמִשִּׁים שָׁנָה תִּפְקְדֵם כָּל־הַבָּא לַצָּבָא לַעֲבֹד אֶת־עֲבֹדַת אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד׃", 4.3. "מִבֶּן שְׁלֹשִׁים שָׁנָה וָמַעְלָה וְעַד בֶּן־חֲמִשִּׁים שָׁנָה כָּל־בָּא לַצָּבָא לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד׃", 4.23. "מִבֶּן שְׁלֹשִׁים שָׁנָה וָמַעְלָה עַד בֶּן־חֲמִשִּׁים שָׁנָה תִּפְקֹד אוֹתָם כָּל־הַבָּא לִצְבֹא צָבָא לַעֲבֹד עֲבֹדָה בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד׃", 4.35. "מִבֶּן שְׁלֹשִׁים שָׁנָה וָמַעְלָה וְעַד בֶּן־חֲמִשִּׁים שָׁנָה כָּל־הַבָּא לַצָּבָא לַעֲבֹדָה בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד׃", 4.39. "מִבֶּן שְׁלֹשִׁים שָׁנָה וָמַעְלָה וְעַד בֶּן־חֲמִשִּׁים שָׁנָה כָּל־הַבָּא לַצָּבָא לַעֲבֹדָה בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד׃", 4.47. "מִבֶּן שְׁלֹשִׁים שָׁנָה וָמַעְלָה וְעַד בֶּן־חֲמִשִּׁים שָׁנָה כָּל־הַבָּא לַעֲבֹד עֲבֹדַת עֲבֹדָה וַעֲבֹדַת מַשָּׂא בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד׃", | 4.3. "from thirty years old and upward even until fifty years old, all that enter upon the service, to do work in the tent of meeting.", 4.23. "from thirty years old and upward until fifty years old shalt thou number them: all that enter in to wait upon the service, to do service in the tent of meeting.", 4.30. "from thirty years old and upward even unto fifty years old shalt thou number them, every one that entereth upon the service, to do the work of the tent of meeting.", 4.35. "from thirty years old and upward even unto fifty years old, every one that entered upon the service, for service in the tent of meeting.", 4.39. "from thirty years old and upward even unto fifty years old, every one that entered upon the service, for service in the tent of meeting,", 4.47. "from thirty years old and upward even unto fifty years old, every one that entered in to do the work of service, and the work of bearing burdens in the tent of meeting,", |
|
2. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 16.18, 17.15 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 28, 42| 16.18. "שֹׁפְטִים וְשֹׁטְרִים תִּתֶּן־לְךָ בְּכָל־שְׁעָרֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת־הָעָם מִשְׁפַּט־צֶדֶק׃", 17.15. "שׂוֹם תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ מִקֶּרֶב אַחֶיךָ תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ לֹא תוּכַל לָתֵת עָלֶיךָ אִישׁ נָכְרִי אֲשֶׁר לֹא־אָחִיךָ הוּא׃", | 16.18. "Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the LORD thy God giveth thee, tribe by tribe; and they shall judge the people with righteous judgment.", 17.15. "thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the LORD thy God shall choose; one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee; thou mayest not put a foreigner over thee, who is not thy brother.", |
|
3. Hebrew Bible, Ruth, 4.2 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 24, 25| 4.2. "וַיִּקַּח עֲשָׂרָה אֲנָשִׁים מִזִּקְנֵי הָעִיר וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁבוּ־פֹה וַיֵּשֵׁבוּ׃", 4.2. "וְעַמִּינָדָב הוֹלִיד אֶת־נַחְשׁוֹן וְנַחְשׁוֹן הוֹלִיד אֶת־שַׂלְמָה׃", | 4.2. "And he took ten men of the elders of the city, and said: ‘Sit ye down here.’ And they sat down.", |
|
4. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 1.13, 27.3 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •stipulation of the court (tenai beit din) •court, of ten Found in books: Balberg (2017) 41; Schiffman (1983) 40| 1.13. "וְהַקֶּרֶב וְהַכְּרָעַיִם יִרְחַץ בַּמָּיִם וְהִקְרִיב הַכֹּהֵן אֶת־הַכֹּל וְהִקְטִיר הַמִּזְבֵּחָה עֹלָה הוּא אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ לַיהוָה׃", 27.3. "וְהָיָה עֶרְכְּךָ הַזָּכָר מִבֶּן עֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה וְעַד בֶּן־שִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה וְהָיָה עֶרְכְּךָ חֲמִשִּׁים שֶׁקֶל כֶּסֶף בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ׃", 27.3. "וְכָל־מַעְשַׂר הָאָרֶץ מִזֶּרַע הָאָרֶץ מִפְּרִי הָעֵץ לַיהוָה הוּא קֹדֶשׁ לַיהוָה׃", | 1.13. "But the inwards and the legs shall he wash with water; and the priest shall offer the whole, and make it smoke upon the altar; it is a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of a sweet savour unto the LORD.", 27.3. "then thy valuation shall be for the male from twenty years old even unto sixty years old, even thy valuation shall be fifty shekels of silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary.", |
|
5. Hebrew Bible, Proverbs, 8.26 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 42| 8.26. "עַד־לֹא עָשָׂה אֶרֶץ וְחוּצוֹת וְרֹאשׁ עָפְרוֹת תֵּבֵל׃", | 8.26. "While as yet He had not made the earth, nor the fields, Nor the beginning of the dust of the world.", |
|
6. Hebrew Bible, 2 Chronicles, 19.11 (5th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 42| 19.11. "וְהִנֵּה אֲמַרְיָהוּ כֹהֵן הָרֹאשׁ עֲלֵיכֶם לְכֹל דְּבַר־יְהוָה וּזְבַדְיָהוּ בֶן־יִשְׁמָעֵאל הַנָּגִיד לְבֵית־יְהוּדָה לְכֹל דְּבַר־הַמֶּלֶךְ וְשֹׁטְרִים הַלְוִיִּם לִפְנֵיכֶם חִזְקוּ וַעֲשׂוּ וִיהִי יְהוָה עִם־הַטּוֹב׃", | 19.11. "And, behold, Amariah the chief priest is over you in all matters of the LORD; and Zebadiah the son of Ishmael, the ruler of the house of Judah, in all the king’s matters; also the officers of the Levites before you. Deal courageously, and the LORD be with the good.’", |
|
7. Hebrew Bible, Ecclesiastes, 7.19 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 24| 7.19. "הַחָכְמָה תָּעֹז לֶחָכָם מֵעֲשָׂרָה שַׁלִּיטִים אֲשֶׁר הָיוּ בָּעִיר׃", | 7.19. "Wisdom is a stronghold to the wise man more than ten rulers that are in a city.", |
|
| 8. Septuagint, Ecclesiasticus (Siracides), 6.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 28, 29 |
| 9. Dead Sea Scrolls, (Cairo Damascus Covenant) Cd-A, 10.1, 10.4-10.10, 12.19-12.22, 14.12-14.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 29, 43, 196 |
| 10. Dead Sea Scrolls, of Discipline, 8.2-8.10, 9.13-9.14, 9.18-9.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 25, 29 |
| 11. Dead Sea Scrolls, Temple Scroll, 57.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 40 |
| 12. Dead Sea Scrolls, Damascus Covenant, 10.1, 10.4-10.10, 12.19-12.22, 14.12-14.16 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 29, 43, 196 |
13. Mishnah, Berachot, 7.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 196| 7.3. "כֵּיצַד מְזַמְּנִין, בִּשְׁלשָׁה אוֹמֵר נְבָרֵךְ. בִּשְׁלשָׁה וְהוּא, אוֹמֵר בָּרְכוּ. בַּעֲשָׂרָה, אוֹמֵר נְבָרֵךְ לֵאלֹהֵינוּ. בַּעֲשָׂרָה וָהוּא, אוֹמֵר בָּרְכוּ. אֶחָד עֲשָׂרָה וְאֶחָד עֲשָׂרָה רִבּוֹא. בְּמֵאָה אוֹמֵר, נְבָרֵךְ לַייָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ. בְּמֵאָה וְהוּא, אוֹמֵר בָּרְכוּ. בְּאֶלֶף, אוֹמֵר נְבָרֵךְ לַייָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. בְּאֶלֶף וְהוּא, אוֹמֵר בָּרְכוּ. בְּרִבּוֹא, אוֹמֵר, נְבָרֵךְ לַייָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֱלֹהֵי הַצְּבָאוֹת יוֹשֵׁב הַכְּרוּבִים עַל הַמָּזוֹן שֶׁאָכָלְנוּ. בְּרִבּוֹא וְהוּא, אוֹמֵר בָּרְכוּ. כְּעִנְיָן שֶׁהוּא מְבָרֵךְ, כָּךְ עוֹנִין אַחֲרָיו, בָּרוּךְ יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֱלֹהֵי הַצְּבָאוֹת יוֹשֵׁב הַכְּרוּבִים עַל הַמָּזוֹן שֶׁאָכָלְנוּ. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר, לְפִי רֹב הַקָּהָל הֵן מְבָרְכִין, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בְּמַקְהֵלוֹת בָּרְכוּ אֱלֹהִים, יְיָ מִמְּקוֹר יִשְׂרָאֵל (תהלים סח). אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, מַה מָּצִינוּ בְּבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת, אֶחָד מְרֻבִּין וְאֶחָד מֻעָטִין אוֹמֵר, בָּרְכוּ אֶת יְיָ. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, בָּרְכוּ אֶת יְיָ הַמְבֹרָךְ: \n", | 7.3. "How do they invite [one another to recite the Birkat Hamazon]?If there are three, he [the one saying Birkat Hamazon] says, “Let us bless [Him of whose food we have eaten].” If there are three and him he says, “Bless [Him of whose food we have eaten]” If there are ten, he says, “Let us bless our God [of whose food we have eaten].” If there are ten and he says, “Bless.” It is the same whether there are ten or ten myriads (ten ten thousands). If there are a hundred he says, “Let us bless the Lord our God [of whose food we have eaten]. If there are a hundred and him he says, “Bless.” If there are a thousand he says “Let us bless the Lord our God, the God of Israel [of whose food we have eaten].” If there are a thousand and him he says “Bless.” If there are ten thousand he says, “Let us bless the Lord our God, the God of Israel, the God of hosts, who dwells among the cherubim, for the food which we have eaten.” If there are ten thousand and him he says, “Bless.” Corresponding to his blessing the others answer after him, “Blessed be the Lord our God the God of Israel, the God of hosts, who dwells among the cherubim, for the food which we have eaten.” Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: According to the number of the congregation, they bless, as it says, “In assemblies bless God, the Lord, O you who are from the fountain of Israel.” Rabbi Akiba said: What do we find in the synagogue? Whether there are many or few the he says, “Bless the Lord your God.” Rabbi Ishmael says: “Bless the Lord your God who is blessed.”", |
|
14. Mishnah, Avot, 5.21 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 32| 5.21. "הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר, בֶּן חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים לַמִּקְרָא, בֶּן עֶשֶׂר לַמִּשְׁנָה, בֶּן שְׁלשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה לַמִּצְוֹת, בֶּן חֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה לַתַּלְמוּד, בֶּן שְׁמֹנֶה עֶשְׂרֵה לַחֻפָּה, בֶּן עֶשְׂרִים לִרְדֹּף, בֶּן שְׁלשִׁים לַכֹּחַ, בֶּן אַרְבָּעִים לַבִּינָה, בֶּן חֲמִשִּׁים לָעֵצָה, בֶּן שִׁשִּׁים לַזִּקְנָה, בֶּן שִׁבְעִים לַשֵּׂיבָה, בֶּן שְׁמֹנִים לַגְּבוּרָה, בֶּן תִּשְׁעִים לָשׁוּחַ, בֶּן מֵאָה כְּאִלּוּ מֵת וְעָבַר וּבָטֵל מִן הָעוֹלָם: \n", | 5.21. "He used to say: At five years of age the study of Scripture; At ten the study of Mishnah; At thirteen subject to the commandments; At fifteen the study of Talmud; At eighteen the bridal canopy; At twenty for pursuit [of livelihood]; At thirty the peak of strength; At forty wisdom; At fifty able to give counsel; At sixty old age; At seventy fullness of years; At eighty the age of “strength”; At ninety a bent body; At one hundred, as good as dead and gone completely out of the world.", |
|
15. Mishnah, Megillah, 4.4 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 42| 4.4. "הַקּוֹרֵא בַּתּוֹרָה לֹא יִפְחֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה פְסוּקִים. לֹא יִקְרָא לַמְּתֻרְגְּמָן יוֹתֵר מִפָּסוּק אֶחָד, וּבַנָּבִיא שְׁלֹשָׁה. הָיוּ שְׁלָשְׁתָּן שָׁלֹשׁ פָּרָשִׁיּוֹת, קוֹרִין אֶחָד אֶחָד. מְדַלְּגִין בַּנָּבִיא וְאֵין מְדַלְּגִין בַּתּוֹרָה. וְעַד כַּמָּה הוּא מְדַלֵּג, עַד כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִפְסֹק הַמְּתֻרְגְּמָן:", | 4.4. "One who reads the Torah [in public] may not read les than three verses. And he should not read to the translator more than one verse [at a time], but [if reading from the book of a] prophet [he may read to him] three at a time. If the three verses constitute three separate paragraphs, he must read them [to the translator] one by one. They may skip [from place to place] in a prophet but not in the Torah. How far may he skip [in the prophet]? [Only] so far that the translator will not have stopped [before he finds his place].", |
|
16. Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 1.2-1.3, 1.5-1.6, 3.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 40, 42, 43| 1.2. "מַכּוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָמְרוּ, בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. עִבּוּר הַחֹדֶשׁ, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. עִבּוּר הַשָּׁנָה, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה מַתְחִילִין, וּבַחֲמִשָּׁה נוֹשְׂאִין וְנוֹתְנִין, וְגוֹמְרִין בְּשִׁבְעָה. וְאִם גָּמְרוּ בִשְׁלֹשָׁה, מְעֻבֶּרֶת: \n", 1.3. "סְמִיכַת זְקֵנִים וַעֲרִיפַת עֶגְלָה, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, בַּחֲמִשָּׁה. הַחֲלִיצָה וְהַמֵּאוּנִין, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. נֶטַע רְבָעִי וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי שֶׁאֵין דָּמָיו יְדוּעִין, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. הַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. הָעֲרָכִין הַמִּטַּלְטְלִין, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אֶחָד מֵהֶן כֹּהֵן. וְהַקַּרְקָעוֹת, תִּשְׁעָה וְכֹהֵן. וְאָדָם, כַּיּוֹצֵא בָהֶן: \n", 1.5. "אֵין דָּנִין לֹא אֶת הַשֵּׁבֶט וְלֹא אֶת נְבִיא הַשֶּׁקֶר וְלֹא אֶת כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין לְמִלְחֶמֶת הָרְשׁוּת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין מוֹסִיפִין עַל הָעִיר וְעַל הָעֲזָרוֹת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין סַנְהֶדְרִיּוֹת לַשְּׁבָטִים, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת בַּסְּפָר, וְלֹא שְׁלֹשָׁה, אֲבָל עוֹשִׂין אַחַת אוֹ שְׁתָּיִם: \n", 1.6. "סַנְהֶדְרִי גְדוֹלָה הָיְתָה שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד, וּקְטַנָּה שֶׁל עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. וּמִנַּיִן לַגְּדוֹלָה שֶׁהִיא שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר יא) אֶסְפָה לִּי שִׁבְעִים אִישׁ מִזִּקְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וּמֹשֶׁה עַל גַּבֵּיהֶן, הֲרֵי שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, שִׁבְעִים. וּמִנַּיִן לַקְּטַנָּה שֶׁהִיא שֶׁל עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם לה) וְשָׁפְטוּ הָעֵדָה וְגוֹ' וְהִצִּילוּ הָעֵדָה, עֵדָה שׁוֹפֶטֶת וְעֵדָה מַצֶּלֶת, הֲרֵי כָאן עֶשְׂרִים. וּמִנַּיִן לָעֵדָה שֶׁהִיא עֲשָׂרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם יד) עַד מָתַי לָעֵדָה הָרָעָה הַזֹּאת, יָצְאוּ יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְכָלֵב. וּמִנַּיִן לְהָבִיא עוֹד שְׁלֹשָׁה, מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כג) לֹא תִהְיֶה אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְרָעֹת, שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁאֶהְיֶה עִמָּהֶם לְטוֹבָה, אִם כֵּן לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר (שם) אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְהַטֹּת, לֹא כְהַטָּיָתְךָ לְטוֹבָה הַטָּיָתְךָ לְרָעָה. הַטָּיָתְךָ לְטוֹבָה עַל פִּי אֶחָד, הַטָּיָתְךָ לְרָעָה עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם, וְאֵין בֵּית דִּין שָׁקוּל, מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶם עוֹד אֶחָד, הֲרֵי כָאן עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. וְכַמָּה יְהֵא בְעִיר וּתְהֵא רְאוּיָה לְסַנְהֶדְרִין, מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים. רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר, מָאתַיִם וּשְׁלשִׁים, כְּנֶגֶד שָׂרֵי עֲשָׂרוֹת: \n", 3.1. "דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, שְׁנֵי דַיָּנִין בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד. זֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּנוֹ שֶׁל זֶה וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּנוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא עֲלֵיהֶן רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְסוּלִין, אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְשֵׁרִים אוֹ מֻמְחִין, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפָסְלָן. זֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא עֲלֵיהֶם רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִים אוֹ פְסוּלִים. אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְשֵׁרִים, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפָסְלָן: \n", | 1.2. "[Cases concerning offenses punishable by] beating [are decided] by three. In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said twenty-three. The intercalation of the month and intercalation of the year [are decided] by three, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “The matter is begun by three, discussed by five, and decided upon by seven. But if they decided upon it with three, the intercalation is valid.”", 1.3. "The laying on of the elders’ hands and the breaking of the heifer’s neck [are decided upon] by three, according to Rabbi Shimon. But Rabbi Judah says: “By five.” The rites of halitzah and “refusal” [are performed] before three. The fruit of fourth year plantings and Second Tithes whose value is not known [are redeemed] before three. Things dedicated to the Temple [are redeemed] before three. Vows of evaluation to be redeemed with movable property, [are evaluated] before three. Rabbi Judah says: “One must be a priest.” [Vows of evaluation], [to be redeemed] with land [are evaluated] before nine and a priest. And similarly [for the evaluation] of a man.", 1.5. "A tribe, a false prophet, or the high priest may not be tried save by the court of seventy-one; They may not send forth the people to wage a battle of free choice save by the decision of the court of one and seventy; They may not add to the City [of Jerusalem], or the Courts of the Temple save by the decision of the court of seventy-one; They may not set up sanhedrins for the several tribes save by the decision of the court of one and seventy. And they may not proclaim [any city to be] an Apostate City (ir ha-niddahat) (Deut. 13:13–19] save by the decision of one and seventy. No city on the frontier may be proclaimed an Apostate City, nor three together, but only one or two.", 1.6. "The greater Sanhedrin was made up of seventy one and the little Sanhedrin of twenty three.From where do we learn that the greater Sanhedrin should be made up of seventy one? As it says, “Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Num. 11:16), and when Moses is added to them there is seventy one. Rabbi Judah says: “Seventy.” From where do we learn that the little Sanhedrin should be made up of twenty three? As it says, “The assembly shall judge”, “The assembly shall deliver” (Num. 35:24-25), an assembly that judges and an assembly that delivers, thus we have twenty. And from where do we know that an assembly has ten? As it says, “How long shall I bear this evil congregation?” (Num. 14:27) [which refers to the twelve spies] but Joshua and Caleb were not included. And from where do we learn that we should bring three others [to the twenty]? By inference from what it says, “You shall not follow after the many to do evil” (Ex. 23:2), I conclude that I must be with them to do well. Then why does it say, “[To follow] after the many to change judgment” (Ex. 23:2). [It means that] your verdict of condemnation should not be like your verdict of acquittal, for your verdict of acquittal is reached by the decision of a majority of one, but your verdict of condemnation must be reached by the decision of a majority of two. The court must not be divisible equally, therefore they add to them one more; thus they are twenty three. And how many should there be in a city that it may be fit to have a Sanhedrin? A hundred and twenty. Rabbi Nehemiah says: “Two hundred and thirty, so that [the Sanhedrin of twenty three] should correspond with them that are chiefs of [at least] groups of ten.", 3.1. "Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges].This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.", |
|
17. Mishnah, Zevahim, 4.6, 12.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stipulation of the court (tenai beit din) Found in books: Balberg (2017) 41, 43| 4.6. "לְשֵׁם שִׁשָּׁה דְבָרִים הַזֶּבַח נִזְבָּח, לְשֵׁם זֶבַח, לְשֵׁם זוֹבֵחַ, לְשֵׁם הַשֵּׁם, לְשֵׁם אִשִּׁים, לְשֵׁם רֵיחַ, לְשֵׁם נִיחוֹחַ. וְהַחַטָּאת וְהָאָשָׁם, לְשֵׁם חֵטְא. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אַף מִי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְלִבּוֹ לְשֵׁם אַחַד מִכָּל אֵלּוּ, כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין, שֶׁאֵין הַמַּחֲשָׁבָה הוֹלֶכֶת אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד: \n", 12.1. "טְבוּל יוֹם וּמְחֻסַּר כִּפּוּרִים, אֵינָן חוֹלְקִים בַּקֳּדָשִׁים לֶאֱכֹל לָעָרֶב. אוֹנֵן, נוֹגֵעַ וְאֵינוֹ מַקְרִיב, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק לֶאֱכֹל לָעָרֶב. בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין, בֵּין בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין קְבוּעִין, בֵּין בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין עוֹבְרִין, חוֹלְקִין וְאוֹכְלִין, אֲבָל לֹא מַקְרִיבִין. וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה, אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק בַּבָּשָׂר. וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בַּבָּשָׂר, אֵין לוֹ בָעוֹרוֹת. אֲפִלּוּ טָמֵא בִשְׁעַת זְרִיקַת דָּמִים וְטָהוֹר בִּשְׁעַת הֶקְטֵר חֲלָבִים, אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק בַּבָּשָׂר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ז), הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים וְאֶת הַחֵלֶב מִבְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן לוֹ תִהְיֶה שׁוֹק הַיָּמִין לְמָנָה: \n", | 4.6. "The sacrifice is slaughtered for the sake of six things:For the sake of the sacrifice, For the sake of the sacrificer, For the sake of the [Divine] Name, For the sake of fire-offerings, For the sake of fragrance, For the sake of pleasing; And a hatat and an asham for the sake of sin. Rabbi Yose said: even if one did not have any of these purposes in his heart, it is valid, because it is a regulation of the court. Since the intention is determined only by the worshipper.", 12.1. "A tebul yom and one who lacks atonement do not share in sacrifices for consumption in the evening. An onen may handle [sacrifices], but he may not offer them, and he does not receive a share for consumption in the evening. Priests with blemishes, whether permanent or passing, receive a share and may eat [of the sacrifices] but they may not offer them. Whoever is not eligible for service does not share in the flesh. And he who does not share in the flesh does not share in the hides. Even if one was unclean when the blood was sprinkled but clean when the fats were burned [on the altar], he does not share in the flesh, for it is said: “he among the sons of Aaron, that offers the blood of the shelamim, and the fat, shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33).", |
|
18. Mishnah, Hulin, 2.7 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stipulation of the court (tenai beit din) Found in books: Balberg (2017) 43| 2.7. "הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְנָכְרִי, שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְשֵׁרָה. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אֲפִלּוּ שְׁחָטָהּ שֶׁיֹּאכַל הַנָּכְרִי מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלָּהּ, פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁסְּתָם מַחֲשֶׁבֶת נָכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, קַל וָחֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמַה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת, בְּמֻקְדָּשִׁין, אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחֲשָׁבָה פוֹסֶלֶת, בְּחֻלִּין, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט: \n", | 2.7. "If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!", |
|
19. Tosefta, Berachot, 5.23 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 196| 5.23. "היה מקריב זבחים בירושלים אומר ברוך שהגיענו לזמן הזה כשהוא מקריבם אומר בא\"י אקב\"ו להקריב זבחים כשהוא אוכלם אומר בא\"י אקב\"ו לאכול זבחים.", | |
|
20. Tosefta, Sanhedrin, 2.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 43| 2.1. "קידוש עבור שנה בג' דברי ר\"מ וחכמים אומרים עבור שנה בשלשה מתחילין בחמשה נושאין ונותנין וגומרים בשבעה כיצד אחד אומר לישב עמם ושנים אומרים שלא לישב בטל היחיד במיעוטו שנים אומרים לישב ואחד אומר שלא לישב מוסיפין שנים ונושאין ונותנין בחמשה שנים אומרים צריכה וג' אומרים אינה צריכה בטלו שנים במיעוטם ג' אומרים צריכה ושנים אומרים אינה צריכה מוסיפים שנים וגומרים בשבעה שאין מנין פחות מז' האב אומר לעבר ובנו אומר שלא לעבר שניהן נמנין שנים האב ובנו אומרים לעבר האב ובנו אומרים שלא לעבר שניהן נמנין אחד אמר ר' יוסי פעם אחת הלכתי אני ואלעזר לעבר שנה נמתי לו לאלעזר בני אני ואתה נמנין אחד.", | |
|
21. Anon., Leviticus Rabba, 29.4 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 43| 29.4. רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה פָּתַח (תהלים פט, טז): אַשְׁרֵי הָעָם יֹדְעֵי תְרוּעָה ה' בְּאוֹר פָּנֶיךָ יְהַלֵּכוּן, רַבִּי אַבָּהוּ פָּתַר קְרָא בַּחֲמִשָּׁה זְקֵנִים שֶׁהֵם נִכְנָסִים לְעַבֵּר אֶת הַשָּׁנָה, מָה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עוֹשֶׂה מַנִּיחַ סַנְקְלִיטִין שֶׁלּוֹ מִלְּמַעְלָן וְיוֹרֵד וּמְצַמְצֵם שְׁכִינָתוֹ בֵּינֵיהֶם מִלְּמַטָּן, מַלְאֲכֵי הַשָּׁרֵת אוֹמְרִים הָא תַּקִּיף הָא תַּקִּיף, הָא אֱלָהָא הָא אֱלָהָא, מִי שֶׁכָּתוּב בּוֹ (תהלים פט, ח): אֵל נַעֲרָץ בְּסוֹד קְדשִׁים רַבָּה, מֵנִיחַ סַנְקְלִיטִין שֶׁלּוֹ וּמְצַמְצֵם שְׁכִינָתוֹ בֵּינֵיהֶם לְמַטָּה, כָּל כָּךְ לָמָּה, שֶׁאִם טָעוּ בִּדְבַר הֲלָכָה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מֵאִיר פְּנֵיהֶם, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב: בְּאוֹר פָּנֶיךָ יְהַלֵּכוּן. אָמַר רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, כְּתִיב: אַשְׁרֵי הָעָם יֹדְעֵי תְרוּעָה, וְכִי אֵין אֻמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם יוֹדְעִים לְהָרִיעַ, כַּמָּה קְרָנוֹת יֵשׁ לָהֶן, כַּמָּה בּוּקִינוּס יֵשׁ לָהֶם, כַּמָּה סַלְפִּירְגָסִי יֵשׁ לָהֶם, וְאָמַרְתָּ: אַשְׁרֵי הָעָם יֹדְעֵי תְרוּעָה, אֶלָּא שֶׁהֵן מַכִּירִין לְפַתּוֹת אֶת בּוֹרְאָן בִּתְרוּעָה, וְהוּא עוֹמֵד מִכִּסֵּא הַדִּין לְכִסֵּא רַחֲמִים וּמִתְמַלֵּא עֲלֵיהֶם רַחֲמִים וְהוֹפֵךְ לָהֶם מִדַּת הַדִּין לְמִדַּת רַחֲמִים, אֵימָתַי בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי. | |
|
| 22. Anon., Sifra, None (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •stipulation of the court (tenai beit din) Found in books: Balberg (2017) 41 |
| 23. Anon., Sifre Deuteronomy, 144 (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 42 |
| 24. Anon., Sifre Numbers, 92 (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 40 |
| 25. Palestinian Talmud, Kiddushin, None (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 40 |
| 26. Palestinian Talmud, Qiddushin, None (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 40 |
| 27. Palestinian Talmud, Sanhedrin, None (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 43 |
28. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 43| 10b. למחייה עשרים וחדא וכי מיית בהך חדא לימות דהא כי מחית אגבא דחייא קא מחית אמר ליה אמר קרא (דברים כה, ג) ונקלה אחיך לעיניך אחר שלקה אחיך בעינא וליכא:,עיבור החדש בשלשה: חישוב לא קתני קידוש לא קתני אלא עיבור לא ליקדשא וממילא לעבר,אמר אביי תני קידוש החדש תניא נמי הכי קידוש החדש ועיבור השנה בשלשה דברי רבי מאיר אמר רבא והא עיבור קתני אלא אמר רבא קידוש ביום עיבור בשלשה אחר עיבור ליכא קידוש,ומני רבי אלעזר (בן) צדוק היא דתניא רבי אלעזר (בן) צדוק אומר אם לא נראה בזמנו אין מקדשין אותו שכבר קידשוהו בשמים,רב נחמן אמר קידוש אחר עיבור בשלשה ביום עיבור ליכא קידוש ומני פלימו היא דתניא פלימו אומר בזמנו אין מקדשין אותו שלא בזמנו מקדשין אותו,רב אשי אמר לעולם חישוב קתני ומאי עיבור חישוב דעיבור ואיידי דקבעי למיתני עיבור שנה תנא נמי עיבור חודש,חישוב חודש אין קידוש חודש לא מני ר' אליעזר היא דתניא ר' אליעזר אומר בין בזמנו בין שלא בזמנו אין מקדשין אותו שנאמר (ויקרא כה, י) וקדשתם את שנת החמשים שנה שנים אתה מקדש ואי אתה מקדש חדשים:,רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר בשלשה כו': תניא כיצד אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל בשלשה מתחילין ובחמשה נושאין ונותנין וגומרין בשבעה אחד אומר לישב ושנים אומרים שלא לישב בטל יחיד במיעוטו,שנים אומרים לישב ואחד אומר שלא לישב מוסיפין עליהם עוד שנים ונושאין ונותנין בדבר שנים אומרים צריכה ושלשה אומרים אינה צריכה בטלו שנים במיעוטן שלשה אומרים צריכה ושנים אומרים אינה צריכה מוסיפין עליהם עוד שנים שאין המנין פחות משבעה,הני שלשה חמשה ושבעה כנגד מי פליגי בה רבי יצחק בר נחמני וחד דעימיה ומנו רבי שמעון בן פזי ואמרי לה רבי שמעון בן פזי וחד דעימיה ומנו ר' יצחק בר נחמני חד אמר כנגד ברכת כהנים וחד אמר שלשה כנגד שומרי הסף חמשה מרואי פני המלך שבעה רואי פני המלך,תני רב יוסף הני שלשה וחמשה ושבעה שלשה כנגד שומרי הסף חמשה מרואי פני המלך שבעה רואי פני המלך א"ל אביי לרב יוסף עד האידנא מאי טעמא לא פריש לן מר הכי אמר להו לא הוה ידענא דצריכיתו מי בעיתו מנאי מילתא ולא אמרי לכו:,זמן נשיא צריך גדי סימן: ת"ר אין מעברין את השנה אלא | 10b. b Let /b the court b strike him /b with b twenty-one /b lashes, b and if he dies with this /b last b one, let him die. /b According to the medical evaluation, he will still be alive after the twentieth lash. There would be no concern of flogging a dead man, b as when /b the court b strikes /b him with the twenty-first lash, it is b upon the back of a living man /b that the court b is striking. /b If so, why should he not receive the last blow? Rav Ashi b said to him: The verse states: “Then your brother will be dishonored before your eyes.” /b The verse means: Even b after he is hit, I need /b him to remain b your brother; and /b if he dies, he b is no /b longer your brother.,§ The mishna teaches: The b intercalation of the month /b is performed b by /b a panel of b three /b judges. The Gemara extrapolates: The i tanna /i b does not teach: /b The b calculation /b to determine if the month must be extended is performed by three judges, and he b does not teach: /b The b sanctification /b of the new month is performed by three judges; b rather, /b he teaches: The b intercalation /b of the month, referring to the decision to extend the month by an extra day and begin the following month on the thirty-first day instead of the thirtieth, is performed by a panel of three judges. The Gemara asks: Why are judges necessary to extend the month? Simply b do not sanctify /b the new month, b and /b let the previous month b be intercalated by itself. /b When the thirtieth day of any month is not declared the first day of the new month, the earlier month is extended by default. Why, then, does the mishna specify: Intercalation?, b Abaye said: /b Emend the text of the mishna and b teach: The sanctification of the /b new b month /b is performed by three judges. b This is also taught /b in a i baraita /i ( i Tosefta /i 2:1): b The sanctification of the /b new b month and the intercalation of the year /b is performed b by three /b judges; this is b the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rava said /b in objection to Abaye’s explanation: b But /b the mishna b teaches: Intercalation, /b not sanctification. b Rather, Rava said: /b Explain the mishna this way: If there will be b sanctification /b of the new month b on the /b thirtieth day of the first month, which is the b day /b that would otherwise be the b intercalation, /b this is done b by three /b judges. But b after /b the day of the b intercalation, /b i.e., if the month is sanctified on the thirty-first day, b there is no /b active b sanctification /b necessary., b And /b in accordance with b whose /b opinion is this? b It is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok, as it is taught /b in a mishna ( i Rosh HaShana /i 24a): b Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok says: If /b the new moon b was not seen at its /b anticipated b time, /b the court b does not /b formally b sanctify /b the New Moon on the following day, b as /b the celestial court b in Heaven has already sanctified it, /b precluding the need for the additional sanctification by the earthly court.,Taking the opposite opinion, b Rav Naḥman says: /b In the instance of b sanctification /b of the new moon b after /b the b intercalation /b of the month through the addition of a thirtieth day to the previous month, the sanctification is performed b by three /b judges. But if the New Moon is declared b on the day of the intercalation, /b so that the previous month is left with only twenty-nine days, b there is no /b active b sanctification. /b This is the standard time for the New Moon, and no intervention is necessary. b And /b in accordance with b whose /b opinion is this? b It is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Peleimu, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Peleimu says: /b If the new moon was reported b at its /b anticipated b time, /b the court b does not sanctify /b the New Moon. But if the new moon was reported b not at its /b anticipated b time, /b the court b sanctifies /b the New Moon., b Rav Ashi said: Actually, /b the mishna b teaches /b that three judges are necessary for the b calculation /b to determine when the New Moon should be declared. b And what /b is the term: b Intercalation, /b that is mentioned in the mishna? It is b the calculation of the intercalation. And /b although the wording of the mishna is imprecise, it is written this way for a reason: b Since /b the mishna b needed to teach /b the number of judges necessary for b the intercalation of the year, /b the mishna b also taught: The intercalation of the month, /b so as to describe the similar processes of adding to the year and adding to the month with the same verb.,The Gemara notes: With regard to b the calculation of the month, yes, /b this requires three judges. But with regard to the b sanctification of month, /b this does b not /b require three judges. In accordance with b whose /b opinion is this? b It is /b in accordance with the opinion of b Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Rabbi Eliezer says: Whether /b it was reported b in its /b anticipated b time /b or b whether /b it was reported b not in its /b anticipated b time, we do not sanctify /b the New Moon formally, b as it is stated: “And you shall sanctify the fiftieth year” /b (Leviticus 25:10), which teaches: b You /b must formally b sanctify years, but you do not /b formally b sanctify months, /b as they are sanctified automatically. In any case, calculation, when necessary, is performed by three judges.,§ The mishna teaches: b Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says /b that intercalation is performed in stages: The deliberations begin b with three /b judges, they debate the matter with five judges, and they conclude the matter with seven judges. The Gemara elaborates: b It is taught /b in a i baraita /i ( i Tosefta /i 2:1): b How does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel say /b the intercalation is to be conducted? The court b begins /b the deliberation b with three /b judges, b and /b they b debate /b the matter b with five, and /b they b conclude with seven. /b At first, three judges convene for a preliminary discussion with regard to the necessity of adding a month to the year. If b one says /b it is necessary b to sit /b and deliberate the question of intercalation b and two say that /b there is b not /b a need b to sit /b and continue, b the single /b opinion in favor of intercalation b is negated in its minority, /b i.e., it is the minority opinion, and the process ends.,The i baraita /i continues: If b two say to sit and one says not to sit, /b the majority decision causes the process to move to the next stage, and the court then b adds another two /b judges b to them and /b all five b debate the matter. /b If b two say: /b The year b needs /b the extra month, b and three say: /b It b does not need /b it, the opinions of b the two are negated in their minority. /b If b three say: /b The year b needs /b it, b and two say: /b It b does not need /b it, the court b adds to them another two /b judges, b as the quorum /b for declaring an intercalation may b not /b be b fewer than seven. /b ,The Gemara asks: b Corresponding to what /b was it determined that the intercalation procedure should incorporate b these /b numbers of b three, five, and seven /b judges? b Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani and one /b other Sage b who was with him disagree about this. And who is /b that other scholar? b Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi. And some say /b that this was a matter of dispute between b Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi and one /b other scholar b who was with him. And who is /b that other scholar? b Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani. One said: /b These numbers b correspond to /b the number of Hebrew words in each of the three verses of b the priestly benediction /b (see Numbers 6:24–26). b And one said: Three corresponds to the /b three b guards of the door /b (see II Kings 25:18), five corresponds to b five of /b the officers who b saw the king’s face /b (see II Kings 25:19), and seven corresponds to b seven /b officers who b saw the king’s face /b (see Jeremiah 52:25). Since these numbers represent appointments of distinction, the Rabbis saw fit to employ them in the composition of the court as well.,Similarly, b Rav Yosef taught /b a i baraita /i : b These /b numbers: b Three, five, and seven /b members of the court for intercalation, are adopted from different numbers of the king’s servants. b Three corresponds to: Guards of the door; five /b corresponds to: b of /b those officers b who saw the king’s face, /b mentioned in the book of II Kings; and b seven /b corresponds to: officers b who saw the king’s face, /b mentioned in the book of Jeremiah. When Rav Yosef taught this, b Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reason /b that b until now the Master did not explain /b the matter b to us this way, /b although you have taught this material before? Rav Yosef b said to /b Abaye and the others with him: b I did not know that you needed /b this information, as I thought that you were already familiar with the i baraita /i . b Have you /b ever b asked me something and I did not tell you? /b ,§ The Gemara presents b a mnemonic /b device for several other sources cited with regard to the intercalation of the year: b i Zeman /i , i Nasi /i , i tzarikh /i , i gedi /i . The Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : b The year /b may be b intercalated only /b |
|
29. Babylonian Talmud, Megillah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 42| 26a. יקחו ספרים ספרים לוקחין תורה,אבל אם מכרו תורה לא יקחו ספרים ספרים לא יקחו מטפחות מטפחות לא יקחו תיבה תיבה לא יקחו בית הכנסת בית הכנסת לא יקחו את הרחוב,וכן במותריהן:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big בני העיר שמכרו רחובה של עיר אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן זו דברי ר' מנחם בר יוסי סתומתאה אבל חכ"א הרחוב אין בו משום קדושה,ור' מנחם בר יוסי מאי טעמיה הואיל והעם מתפללין בו בתעניות ובמעמדות ורבנן ההוא אקראי בעלמא:,בית הכנסת לוקחין תיבה: אמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני א"ר יונתן לא שנו אלא בית הכנסת של כפרים אבל בית הכנסת של כרכין כיון דמעלמא אתו ליה לא מצו מזבני ליה דהוה ליה דרבים,אמר רב אשי האי בי כנישתא דמתא מחסיא אף על גב דמעלמא אתו לה כיון דאדעתא דידי קאתו אי בעינא מזבנינא לה,מיתיבי א"ר יהודה מעשה בבית הכנסת של טורסיים שהיה בירושלים שמכרוה לרבי אליעזר ועשה בה כל צרכיו והא התם דכרכים הוה ההיא בי כנישתא זוטי הוה ואינהו עבדוה,מיתיבי (ויקרא יד, לד) בבית ארץ אחוזתכם אחוזתכם מיטמא בנגעים ואין ירושלים מיטמא בנגעים אמר רבי יהודה אני לא שמעתי אלא מקום מקדש בלבד,הא בתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות מיטמאין אמאי הא דכרכין הוו אימא א"ר יהודה אני לא שמעתי אלא מקום מקודש בלבד,במאי קמיפלגי ת"ק סבר לא נתחלקה ירושלים לשבטים ורבי יהודה סבר נתחלקה ירושלים לשבטים,ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי,דתניא מה היה בחלקו של יהודה הר הבית הלשכות והעזרות ומה היה בחלקו של בנימין אולם והיכל ובית קדשי הקדשים,ורצועה היתה יוצאת מחלקו של יהודה ונכנסת בחלקו של בנימין ובה מזבח בנוי והיה בנימין הצדיק מצטער עליה בכל יום לבולעה שנאמר (דברים לג, יב) חופף עליו כל היום לפיכך זכה בנימין ונעשה אושפיזכן לשכינה,והאי תנא סבר לא נתחלקה ירושלים לשבטים דתניא אין משכירים בתים בירושלים מפני שאינן שלהן ר"א (בר צדוק) אומר אף לא מטות לפיכך עורות קדשים בעלי אושפיזין נוטלין אותן בזרוע,אמר אביי ש"מ אורח ארעא למישבק אינש גולפא ומשכא באושפיזיה,אמר רבא לא שנו אלא שלא מכרו שבעה טובי העיר במעמד אנשי העיר אבל מכרו שבעה טובי העיר במעמד אנשי העיר אפילו | 26a. b they may purchase scrolls /b of the Prophets and the Writings. If they sold b scrolls /b of the Prophets and Writings, b they may purchase a Torah /b scroll., b However, /b the proceeds of a sale of a sacred item may not be used to purchase an item of a lesser degree of sanctity. Therefore, b if they sold a Torah /b scroll, b they may not /b use the proceeds to b purchase scrolls /b of the Prophets and the Writings. If they sold b scrolls /b of the Prophets and Writings, b they may not purchase wrapping cloths. /b If they sold b wrapping cloths, they may not purchase an ark. /b If they sold b an ark, they may not purchase a synagogue. /b If they sold b a synagogue, they may not purchase a town square. /b , b And similarly, /b the same limitation applies b to /b any b surplus funds /b from the sale of sacred items, i.e., if after selling an item and purchasing something of a greater degree of sanctity there remain additional, unused funds, the leftover funds are subject to the same principle and may be used to purchase only something of a degree of sanctity greater than that of the original item., strong GEMARA: /strong The mishna states: b Residents of a town who sold the town square /b may purchase a synagogue with the proceeds. Concerning this mishna, b Rabba bar bar Ḥana said /b that b Rabbi Yoḥa said: This is the statement of Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei, cited unattributed. However, the Rabbis say: The town square does not have any sanctity. /b Therefore, if it is sold, the residents may use the money from the sale for any purpose., b And Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei, what is his reason /b for claiming that the town square has sanctity? b Since the people pray in /b the town square b on /b communal b fast days and on /b non-priestly b watches, /b it is defined as a place of prayer and as such has sanctity. b And the Rabbis, /b why do they disagree? They maintain b that /b use of the town square b is merely an irregular occurrence. /b Consequently, the town square is not to be defined as a place of prayer, and so it has no sanctity.,§ The mishna states: If they sold b a synagogue, they may purchase an ark. /b The Gemara cites a qualification to this i halakha /i : b Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said /b that b Rabbi Yonatan said: They taught /b this b only /b with regard to b a synagogue of a village, /b which is considered the property of the residents of that village. b However, /b with regard to b a synagogue of a city, since /b people b come to it from the /b outside b world, /b the residents of the city b are not able to sell it, because it is /b considered to be the property b of the public /b at large and does not belong exclusively to the residents of the city., b Rav Ashi said: This synagogue of Mata Meḥasya, although /b people b from the /b outside b world come to it, since they come at my discretion, /b as I established it, and everything is done there in accordance with my directives, b if I wish, I can sell it. /b ,The Gemara b raises an objection /b to Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani’s statement, from a i baraita /i : b Rabbi Yehuda said: /b There was b an incident involving a synagogue of bronze workers [ i tursiyyim /i ] that was in Jerusalem, which they sold to Rabbi Eliezer, and he used it for all his /b own b needs. /b The Gemara asks: b But wasn’t /b the synagogue b there /b one b of cities, /b as Jerusalem is certainly classified as a city; why were they permitted to sell it? The Gemara explains: b That /b one b was a small synagogue, and /b it was the bronze workers b themselves /b who b built it. /b Therefore, it was considered exclusively theirs, and they were permitted to sell it.,The Gemara b raises an objection /b from another i baraita /i : The verse states with regard to leprosy of houses: “And I put the plague of leprosy b in a house of the land of your possession” /b (Leviticus 14:34), from which it may be inferred: b “Your possession,” /b i.e., a privately owned house, b can become ritually impure with leprosy, but /b a house in b Jerusalem cannot become ritually impure with leprosy, /b as property there belongs collectively to the Jewish people and is not privately owned. b Rabbi Yehuda said: I heard /b this distinction stated b only /b with regard to b the site of the Temple alone, /b but not with regard to the entire city of Jerusalem.,The Gemara explains: From Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, it is apparent that only the site of the Temple cannot become ritually impure, b but synagogues and study halls /b in Jerusalem b can become ritually impure. Why /b should this be true given b that they are /b owned by the b city? /b The Gemara answers: Emend the i baraita /i and b say /b as follows: b Rabbi Yehuda said: I heard /b this distinction stated b only /b with regard to b a sacred site, /b which includes the Temple, synagogues, and study halls., b With regard to what /b principle do the first i tanna /i and Rabbi Yehuda b disagree? The first i tanna /i holds /b that b Jerusalem was not apportioned to the tribes, /b i.e., it was never assigned to any particular tribe, but rather it belongs collectively to the entire nation. b And Rabbi Yehuda holds: Jerusalem was apportioned to the tribes, /b and it is only the site of the Temple itself that belongs collectively to the entire nation.,The Gemara notes: They each follow a different opinion b in the dispute /b between b these i tanna’im /i : /b ,One i tanna /i holds that Jerusalem was apportioned to the tribes, b as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b What /b part of the Temple b was in the /b tribal b portion of Judah? The Temple mount, the /b Temple b chambers, and the /b Temple b courtyards. And what was in the /b tribal b portion of Benjamin? The Entrance Hall, the Sanctuary, and the Holy of Holies. /b , b And a strip /b of land b issued forth from the portion of Judah and entered into the portion of Benjamin, and upon /b that strip b the altar was built, and /b the tribe of b Benjamin, the righteous, would agonize over it every day /b desiring b to absorb it /b into its portion, due to its unique sanctity, b as it is stated /b in Moses’ blessing to Benjamin: b “He covers it throughout the day, /b and he dwells between his shoulders” (Deuteronomy 33:12). The phrase “covers it” is understood to mean that Benjamin is continually focused upon that site. b Therefore, Benjamin was privileged by becoming the host [ i ushpizekhan /i ] of the /b Divine Presence, as the Holy of Holies was built in his portion., b And this /b other b i tanna /i holds /b that b Jerusalem was not apportioned to the tribes, as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b One may not rent out houses in Jerusalem, due to /b the fact b that /b the houses b do not belong to /b those occupying them. Rather, as is true for the entire city, they are owned collectively by the nation. b Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says: Even beds may not /b be hired out. b Therefore, /b in the case of the b hides of /b the renter’s b offerings /b that the innkeepers take in lieu of payment, the b innkeepers /b are considered to be b taking them by force, /b as they did not have a right to demand payment.,Apropos the topic of inns, the Gemara reports: b Abaye said: Learn from /b this i baraita /i that b it is proper etiquette /b for b a person to leave /b his wine b flask and /b the b hide /b of the animal that he slaughtered b at his inn, /b i.e., the inn where he stayed, as a gift for the service he received.,§ The Gemara returns its discussion of the mishna: b Rava said: They taught /b that there is a limitation on what may be purchased with the proceeds of the sale of a synagogue b only when the seven representatives of the town /b who were appointed to administer the town’s affairs b had not sold /b the synagogue b in an assembly of the residents of the town. However, /b if b the seven representatives of the town had sold /b it b in an assembly of the residents of the town, /b then b even /b |
|
30. Babylonian Talmud, Horayot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 42| 3b. או דלמא [ידיעה] דההוא ב"ד דהורו בעינן תיקו,אמר רבי יונתן מאה שישבו להורות אין חייבין עד שיורו כולן שנאמר (ויקרא ד, יג) ואם כל עדת ישראל ישגו עד שישגו כולן [עד שתפשוט הוראה בכל עדת ישראל] אמר רב הונא בריה דרב הושעיא הכי נמי מסתברא דבכל התורה כולה קיי"ל רובו ככולו והכא כתי' כל העדה הואיל וכך אפילו הן מאה,[תנן] הורו ב"ד וידע אחד מהן שטעו או תלמיד וראוי להוראה והלך ועשה על פיהם בין שעשו ועשה עמהן ובין שעשו ועשה אחריהן ובין שלא עשו ועשה ה"ז חייב מפני שלא תלה בב"ד,האי הוא דחייב הא אחר פטור ואמאי הא לא נגמרה הוראה הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהרכין ההוא אחד מהן בראשו,ת"ש הורו ב"ד וידע אחד מהן שטעו ואמר להן טועין אתם הרי אלו פטורים טעמא דאמר להן טועין אתם דפטורים הא שתיק מישתק חייבין וגמר לה הוראה ואמאי והא לא הורו כולן אמרי ה"נ כגון שהרכין בראשו,מתיב רב משרשיא סמכו רבותינו על דברי רשב"ג ועל דברי ר"א בר' צדוק שהיו אומרים אין גוזרין גזירה על הצבור אלא א"כ רוב הצבור יכולין לעמוד בה,ואמר רב אדא בר אבא מאי קרא (מלאכי ג, ט) במארה אתם נארים ואותי אתם קובעים הגוי כולו והא הכא דכתי' הגוי כולו ורובא ככולא דמי תיובתא דר' (יוחנן) [יונתן] תיובתא,ואלא מאי כל עדת דקאמר רחמנא ה"ק אי איכא כולם הויא הוראה ואי לא לא הויא הוראה,אמר רבי יהושע י' שיושבין בדין קולר תלוי בצואר כולן פשיטא הא קמ"ל דאפילו תלמיד בפני רבו,רב הונא כי הוה נפיק לבי דינא מייתי עשרה תנאי דבי רב לקמיה כי היכי דנימטיין שיבא מכשורא רב אשי כי הוו מייתי טרפתא לקמיה מייתי עשרה טבחי ממתא מחסיא ומותיב קמיה אמר כי היכא דנימטיין שיבא מכשורא:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big הורו ב"ד וידעו שטעו וחזרו בהן בין שהביאו כפרתן ובין שלא הביאו כפרתן והלך ועשה על פיהן ר' שמעון פוטר ור' אלעזר אומר ספק איזהו ספק ישב לו בתוך ביתו חייב הלך לו למדינת הים פטור,אמר רבי עקיבא מודה אני בזה שהוא קרוב לפטור מן החובה אמר לו בן עזאי מאי שנא זה מן היושב בביתו שהיושב בביתו אפשר היה לו שישמע וזה לא היה לו אפשר שישמע,הורו ב"ד לעקור את כל הגוף אמרו אין נדה בתורה אין שבת בתורה אין עבודת כוכבים בתורה הרי אלו פטורין הורו לבטל מקצת ולקיים מקצת הרי אלו חייבין,כיצד אמרו יש נדה בתורה אבל הבא על שומרת יום כנגד יום פטור,יש שבת בתורה אבל המוציא מרה"י לרה"ר פטור,יש עבודת כוכבי' בתור' אבל המשתחוה פטור הרי אלו חייבין שנא' (ויקרא ד, יג) ונעלם דבר דבר ולא כל הגוף:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מ"ט דר"ש הואיל וברשות ב"ד הוא עושה איכא דאמרי אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אומר היה ר"ש כל הוראה שיצאה ברוב צבור יחיד העושה אותה פטור לפי שלא ניתנה הוראה אלא להבחין בין שוגג למזיד,מיתיבי פר העלם דבר של צבור ושעירי עבודת כוכבים בתחלה גובין עליהן דברי ר"ש ר' יהודה אומר מתרומת הלשכה הן באין אמאי כיון דגבי להו הוי ליה הודע,איבעית אימא כגון שגבו סתם,ואב"א כגון דלא הוה ליה במתא,ואיבעית אימא רב כאידך תנא סבר דתניא איפכא בתחילה גובין להן דברי רבי יהודה ר"ש אומר מתרומת הלשכה הן באין,תני ר"מ מחייב ור"ש פוטר ר"א אומר ספק משום סומכוס אמרו תלוי אמר ר' יוחנן אשם תלוי איכא בינייהו,א"ר זירא משל דר"א למה הדבר דומה לאדם שאכל ספק חלב ספק שומן ונודע לו שמביא אשם | 3b. b Or perhaps, /b for liability b we require /b the b awareness of the same court that issued the ruling, /b and that court no longer exists. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma b shall stand /b unresolved.,§ b Rabbi Yonatan says: /b Even in the case of b one hundred /b judges b who convened to issue a ruling /b and erred, b they are not liable /b to bring an offering b unless they all issue /b that b ruling, as it is stated /b with regard to liability to bring the offering: b “And if the entire assembly of Israel shall act unwittingly” /b (Leviticus 4:13). From the term “entire” it is derived that the judges are not liable b until they all act unwittingly, and the ruling /b must b disseminate /b and be adopted b throughout the entire assembly of Israel, /b i.e., the Sanhedrin. b Rav Huna, son of Rav Hoshaya, said: So too it is reasonable /b to conclude this, b as throughout the entire Torah we maintain /b the principle: The legal status of b the majority of /b an entity is considered b like all of /b that entity, b and here: “The entire assembly,” is written. Since it is so, /b a majority does not suffice. b Even /b if b they are one hundred /b judges, they are liable only if the erroneous ruling was uimous., b We learned /b in the mishna: If the b court issued /b that b ruling, and one of /b the judges b knew that they erred, /b despite the fact that the majority ruled against his opinion, b or /b if he was b a student and /b was b qualified to issue /b halakhic b rulings, and /b that judge or student b proceeded and performed /b that transgression b on the basis of /b the court’s ruling, then b whether /b the judges b performed /b the transgression b and he performed /b it b with them, or whether /b the judges b performed /b the transgression b and he performed /b it b after them, or whether /b the judges b did not perform /b the transgression b and he performed /b it alone, in all these cases the judge or the student b is liable /b to bring an offering. This is b due to /b the fact b that he did not associate /b his action b with /b the ruling of the b court. /b ,The Gemara notes that one may infer: b It is this /b judge or student b who /b is b liable, but another /b who acts on the basis of the ruling of the court is b exempt. But why /b would he be exempt? b The ruling is not completed /b if it is not uimous. The Gemara answers: b What are we dealing with here? /b We are dealing with a case b where the one /b dissenting judge b among them bowed his head /b and indicated his agreement with the remaining judges.,The Gemara suggests: b Come /b and b hear /b proof from a mishna (4b): If the b court issued a ruling, and one of /b the judges b knew that they erred and he said to them: You are mistaken, they are exempt. /b One may infer: b The reason that /b they are b exempt /b is b that /b the judge b said to them: You are mistaken. But /b if b he was silent, /b they are b liable, and the ruling is complete. And why, /b according to Rabbi Yonatan, would they be liable? b But isn’t /b it so that b not all of them issued /b the same b ruling? /b The Sages b say /b in response: b So too /b here, it is a case b where /b the dissenting judge b bowed his head. /b , b Rav Mesharshiyya raises an objection /b to the statement of Rabbi Yonatan from a i baraita /i : b Our Sages relied on the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and on the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, who would say: One does not issue a decree upon the congregation unless the majority of the congregation is able to withstand it. /b , b And Rav Adda bar Abba said: What is the verse /b from which this principle is derived? It is derived from the verse: b “With the curse you are cursed, yet you rob Me, the entire nation” /b (Malachi 3:9). The verse is referring to the oath taken by the entire people to observe the i halakhot /i of tithes, and they violated those i halakhot /i . b But here it is written: “The entire nation,” and /b yet, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, relied on this verse to derive that the legal status of b the majority of /b an entity is b like /b that of b the entire /b entity, and therefore if a majority of the congregation can withstand the decree the court may issue it. The Gemara concludes: b The refutation of /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yonatan /b is indeed b a conclusive refutation. /b ,The Gemara asks: b Rather, /b now that Rabbi Yonatan’s opinion has been refuted, b what /b is derived from the phrase b “the entire assembly” that the Merciful One states? This /b is what it b is saying: If there are all /b the judges present and they issue that ruling based on the majority, b it is a ruling, and if not, it is not a ruling. /b ,With regard to a court session b Rabbi Yehoshua says: /b When there are b ten /b judges b who sit in judgment, the chain [ i kolar /i ] /b placed around the neck of the person taken to his punishment b is suspended around the neck of all of them, /b i.e., they are all responsible for the decision. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this b obvious? /b The Gemara answers: b This teaches us that even a student before his teacher /b may not be silent in deference to his teacher, as he bears responsibility for an erroneous ruling.,The Gemara relates: b Rav Huna, when he would go out to the court /b to sit in judgment, would b bring ten i tanna’im /i , /b i.e., people b who /b recited i mishnayot /i and i baraitot /i in the b study hall, /b to sit b before him /b and serve as partners in judgment with him. He said: I do this b so that we will /b each b receive a splinter from the beam, /b i.e., each of us will bear only a small part of the responsibility. The Gemara relates on a similar note: b Rav Ashi, when they would bring /b a slaughtered animal b before him /b to determine whether or not it was b a i tereifa /i , would bring ten slaughterers from Mata Meḥasya and sit /b them b before him /b while rendering his decision. b He said: /b I do this b so that we will /b each b receive a splinter from the beam. /b , strong MISHNA: /strong In a case where the judges of the b court issued /b an erroneous b ruling and they discovered that they erred and reversed their /b decision, b whether they brought their atonement /b offering for their erroneous ruling b or whether they did not bring their atonement /b offering, b and /b an individual who was unaware of the new ruling b proceeded and performed /b a transgression b on the basis of their /b first ruling, b Rabbi Shimon deems /b him b exempt /b from bringing an offering, b and Rabbi Elazar says: /b There is b uncertainty /b with regard to his status and he is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering. b Which is /b the case of b uncertainty /b for which one is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering? If one b sat inside his house /b and performed the transgression he is b liable /b to bring a provisional guilt-offering, as he could have learned of the change in the court’s ruling. If he b went to a country overseas /b and is relying on the initial ruling, he is b exempt. /b , b Rabbi Akiva said: I concede in that /b case of one who went overseas b that he is closer to exemption than /b he is to b liability. Ben Azzai said to him: /b In b what /b way b is this /b person who went overseas b different from one who sits in his house? /b Rabbi Akiva said to him: The difference is b that /b with regard to b one who sits in his house it would have been possible for him to hear /b of the court’s reversal, b but /b with regard to b that /b person who went overseas, b it would not have been possible for him to hear /b of the court’s reversal.,The mishna explains for which type of unwitting transgression based on the ruling of the court there is liability to bring an offering. In a case where the judges of the b court issued /b an erroneous b ruling to abolish the entire essence /b of a mitzva, not only a detail thereof, e.g., b they said: There is no /b prohibition against engaging in intercourse with b a menstruating woman /b written b in the Torah, /b or b there is no /b prohibition against performing prohibited labor on b Shabbat /b written b in the Torah, /b or b there is no /b prohibition against engaging in b idol worship /b written b in the Torah, these /b judges b are exempt, /b as this is an error based on ignorance, not an erroneous ruling. If the judges b issued a ruling to nullify part /b of a mitzva b and to sustain part /b of that mitzva, b these /b judges b are liable. /b , b How /b so? An example of this is if the judges b said: There is /b a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with b a menstruating woman /b written b in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with /b a woman b who observes /b a clean b day for a day /b she experiences a discharge is b exempt. /b When the woman sees a discharge of blood for one or two days during the eleven days between the end of one menstrual period and the expected start of another, the blood is assumed to not be menstrual blood. If after the second day, the next day passes without any discharge of blood, she may immerse immediately and she is ritually pure. The judges ruled erroneously that it is permitted to engage in intercourse with her on the day that she is observing a clean day, even without the day having passed and her having immersed.,Another example is if they said: b There is /b a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on b Shabbat /b written b in the Torah, but one who carries out /b objects b from the private domain to the public domain /b is b exempt. /b ,Another example is if they said: b There is /b a prohibition against engaging in b idol worship /b written b in the Torah, but one who bows /b to the idol but does not sacrifice an offering is b exempt. /b In all of these cases, b these /b judges b are liable, as it is stated: “And the matter is hidden” /b (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that there is liability only if b a matter, /b a single detail, is hidden, b but not /b if b the entire essence /b of a mitzva is hidden., strong GEMARA: /strong The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who performed a transgression on the basis of the initial ruling of the court even though the court reversed its ruling. b Rav Yehuda said /b that b Rav said: What is the reason /b for the statement b of Rabbi Shimon? /b The reason is b since /b it is b with the permission of the court /b that b he performs /b the transgression, he is exempt. b Some say /b there is a different version of the statement cited by Rav Yehuda: b Rav Yehuda said /b that b Rav said: Rabbi Shimon would say: /b Concerning b any ruling that disseminated to the majority of /b the b congregation, /b even if the court later reversed that decision, b an individual who performs /b a transgression based on the first ruling is b exempt, because a ruling is given only to distinguish between unwitting and intentional /b acts. One who performs an action on the basis of that ruling is unwitting, as he associated his action with the court, and he is unaware that the court reversed its decision.,The Gemara b raises an objection /b from a i baraita /i : For b a bull /b brought for b an unwitting communal sin, and /b for b goats /b brought for the unwitting violation of the prohibition b of idol worship, /b the Temple treasury b collects /b money from the congregation to pay b for /b the offerings b from the outset, /b i.e., a collection undertaken specifically for that offering; this is b the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says: /b The money for purchasing these offerings b comes from /b the funds of b the collection of the /b Temple treasury b chamber, /b just like the money for purchasing all other communal offerings. According to Rabbi Shimon, b why /b is this person exempt? b Since they collect /b money specifically for each of these communal sin-offerings, the transgression b is for him /b one that b became known, /b as he presumably heard about the collection, and he should be liable because he is aware of the reversal in the court’s ruling.,The Gemara answers: b If you wish, say /b that the reference in the mishna is to a case b where they collected /b the money b without specification. /b Therefore, he was unaware of the reversal of the court’s ruling., b And if you wish, say /b instead that the reference in the mishna is to a case b where /b the person b was not in the city. /b Therefore, he was unaware of the collection of the funds and unaware of the reversal of the ruling of the court., b And if you wish, say /b instead that b Rav holds in accordance with /b the opinion of b the other i tanna /i /b who cited the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, b as it is taught /b in a i baraita /i with the attribution of the opinions b reversed: /b The Temple treasury b collects /b money from the congregation to pay b for /b the offerings b from the outset; /b this is b the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: /b The money for purchasing these offerings b comes from /b the funds of b the collection of the /b Temple treasury b chamber. /b According to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion in this i baraita /i , it is possible that the transgressor remained unaware that the court reversed its decision.,Apropos this topic, b it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : If an individual performed a transgression on the basis of the original ruling of the court after the court reversed its ruling, b Rabbi Meir deems /b him b liable /b to bring a sin-offering b and Rabbi Shimon deems /b him b exempt. Rabbi Elazar says: /b There is b uncertainty /b with regard to his status. b In the name of Sumakhos, /b the Sages b said: /b His status is b suspended /b and remains uncertain. b Rabbi Yoḥa said: /b It is with regard to b a provisional guilt-offering /b that b there is /b a practical difference b between /b the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and the opinion of Sumakhos. According to Rabbi Elazar, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering, whereas according to Sumakhos the question of his liability is suspended, and he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering., b Rabbi Zeira says: /b There is b an analogy /b to illustrate the opinion b of Rabbi Elazar. To what is this matter comparable? /b It is comparable b to a person who ate /b a piece of fat with regard to which there is b uncertainty /b whether it is forbidden b fat /b and b uncertainty /b whether it is permitted b fat, /b and he thought that he was eating permitted fat. b And /b he later b became aware /b that there is uncertainty whether he unwittingly ate fat for which one is liable to receive i karet /i if he ate it intentionally, b as /b in this case he is liable to b bring /b a provisional b guilt-offering. /b In the case in the i baraita /i too, when he later discovered that the court reversed its ruling, it is like one who is uncertain whether he associated his action with the court or associated his action with himself. |
|
31. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Qamma, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 28| 56a. בכותל רעוע,אמר מר הכופף קמתו של חבירו בפני הדליקה היכי דמי אילימא דמטיא ליה ברוח מצויה בדיני אדם נמי נחייב אלא דמטיא ברוח שאינה מצויה,ורב אשי אמר טמון אתמר משום דשויה טמון באש:,אמר מר השוכר עדי שקר ה"ד אילימא לנפשיה ממונא בעי שלומי ובדיני אדם נמי ניחייב אלא לחבריה,והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו במאי עסקינן אילימא בבי תרי פשיטא דאורייתא הוא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו,אלא בחד,ותו ליכא והאיכא (סימן העושה בסם ושליח חבירו נשבר) העושה מלאכה במי חטאת ובפרת חטאת פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא הנותן סם המות בפני בהמת חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא השולח את הבערה ביד חרש שוטה וקטן פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא המבעית את חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא נשברה כדו ברה"ר ולא סלקה נפלה גמלו ולא העמידה ר"מ מחייב בהזיקן וחכ"א פטור בדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,אין מיהא איכא טובא והני אצטריכא ליה מהו דתימא בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,הפורץ גדר בפני בהמת חבירו מהו דתימא כיון דלמסתריה קאי מה עביד בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,הכופף קמתו של חבירו נמי מהו דתימא לימא מי הוה ידענא דאתיא רוח שאינה מצויה ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,ולרב אשי דאמר נמי טמון איתמר מהו דתימא אנא כסויי כסיתיה ניהלך ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,והשוכר עדי שקר נמי מהו דתימא לימא דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו נמי מהו דתימא מי יימר דכי הוה (אתינא) מסהדינא ליה הוה מודה דלמא הוה משתבע לשקרא ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל:,נפרצה בלילה או שפרצוה לסטים כו': אמר רבה והוא שחתרה,אבל לא חתרה מאי חייב היכי דמי אילימא בכותל בריא כי לא חתרה אמאי חייב מאי ה"ל למעבד אלא בכותל רעוע כי חתרה אמאי פטור תחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס הוא,הניחא למ"ד תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור אלא למ"ד תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב מאי איכא למימר,אלא מתני' בכותל בריא ואפילו לא חתרה וכי איתמר דרבה אסיפא איתמר הניחה בחמה או שמסרה לחרש שוטה וקטן ויצתה והזיקה חייב אמר רבה ואפי' חתרה,לא מבעיא היכא דלא חתרה דכולה בפשיעה הוא אלא אפי' חתרה נמי מהו דתימא הויא לה תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס קמ"ל דכולה פשיעה היא,מ"ט דאמר ליה מידע ידעת דכיון דשבקתה בחמה כל טצדקא דאית לה למיעבד עבדא ונפקא:,הוציאוה לסטים לסטים חייבין: | 56a. the i baraita /i is speaking b of an unstable wall /b that was about to fall and break in any event, and so his action did not actually cause any loss to the owner., b The Master says: /b With regard to the case mentioned in the i baraita /i of b one who bends another’s standing /b grain b before a fire, what are the circumstances? If we say /b that the i baraita /i is referring to a case b where /b the fire would b reach /b the bent grain b in a typical wind, let him /b also b be liable /b for the damage according to b human laws. Rather, /b it must be a case b where /b the fire could b reach /b the bent grain only b in an atypical wind. /b Therefore, he is exempt according to human laws, and, since the grain was destroyed due to his action, he is liable according to the laws of Heaven., b And Rav Ashi /b offered an alternative explanation and b said: /b The i baraita /i b was stated /b in the case of b a concealed /b item; in other words, this person did not bend the grain toward the fire but bent it over another item in order to conceal it. One is not liable to pay restitution for concealed items damaged by fire. Therefore, when this person bent the grain over an item, he caused indirect damage to the owner of that item b because he made it into a concealed /b item that was subsequently damaged by b fire, /b and the owner cannot reclaim his loss., b The Master says: /b With regard to the case mentioned in the i baraita /i of b one who hires false witnesses, what are the circumstances? If we say /b that he hired them b for his own /b benefit, in order to extract payment from another, b he is required to reimburse /b that person with b money, and he is liable according to human laws /b for receiving money under false circumstances. b Rather, /b the case is one where he hired false witnesses b for /b the benefit of b another. /b In such a case the injured party cannot sue the other litigant, since the latter did not hire the witnesses, nor can he sue the person who hired them, since that person received no personal benefit.,The i baraita /i teaches: b And one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf /b is exempt from liability according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. b With what /b circumstances b are we dealing? If we say /b that the case b involves two /b people who could testify, and their evidence would render the other party liable to pay, it b is obvious /b that each of them is liable according to the laws of Heaven; he has committed a transgression b by Torah law: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” /b (Leviticus 5:1). Therefore, it is unnecessary for the i baraita /i to mention this case., b Rather, /b the case of the i baraita /i b concerns a single /b witness, whose testimony is not sufficient to render another liable, and to which the transgression of Torah law consequently does not apply. Nevertheless, a litigant can be forced to take an oath based on the testimony of a single witness, and refusal to take this oath would obligate the litigant to pay. Therefore, the witness has caused an indirect loss and is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,The Gemara asks: b And is there nothing else, /b i.e., is there no other case in which one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven? b But there is /b such a case. And before citing several cases that are not written in the i baraita /i the Gemara presents b a mnemonic /b device: b One who performs; with poison; and an agent; another; is broken. /b The Gemara returns to the first case: One b who performs labor with water of purification, /b which was meant to be used to purify one rendered ritually impure by a corpse, thereby rendering the water unfit for use, b or /b who performs labor b with the /b red b heifer of purification, /b invalidating the animal for use as an element of the purification ritual, is b exempt according to human laws, /b since the damage he caused is not evident, b but liable according to the laws of Heaven, /b as he caused a ficial loss.,The Gemara adds: b But there is /b the following i halakha /i : With regard to b one who places poison before another’s animal, /b and the animal eats it and dies, he is b exempt according to human laws, /b since the animal caused its own death, b but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b ,The Gemara adds: b But there is /b the case of b one who sends /b an exposed b flame in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, /b and the fire spreads, causing damage; he is b exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b ,The Gemara adds: b But there is /b the case of b one who frightens another /b without touching him, but causes him injury; he is b exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b ,The Gemara adds: b But there is /b the case of one b whose jug broke in the public domain and he did not remove /b the broken pieces, or one b whose camel fell and he did not stand it up /b again. b Rabbi Meir deems /b the owner of jug or of the camel b liable /b for the damage thereby caused to others, b and the Rabbis say that /b he is b exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b Since there are so many other cases, why did Rabbi Yehoshua claim in the i baraita /i that there are only four cases when one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven?,The Gemara answers: b Yes, there are, in any event, many /b other cases, b but /b Rabbi Yehoshua held that it b was necessary for him /b to state the i halakha /i of b these /b four cases. The reason he stated them is b lest you say /b that in these cases b one should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in these cases one is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,The Gemara explains why one might have thought that there is no liability at all for each case in the i baraita /i : Rabbi Yehoshua taught that b one who breaches a fence /b that stood b before another’s animal, /b thereby allowing the animal to escape, is liable according to the laws of Heaven, b lest you say: Since /b the fence b is about to collapse /b even without this person’s intervention, b what did /b he really b do? /b Based on that logic, one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,Rabbi Yehoshua taught that b one who bends another’s standing /b grain is liable according to the laws of Heaven, b lest you say: Let /b the one who bent the grain b say /b to the owner: b Did I know that an atypical wind would come /b and cause the fire to spread? Based on that logic, one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven., b And according to Rav Ashi, who said /b that Rabbi Yehoshua’s ruling b was stated /b with regard to the case of b a concealed /b item, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned liability according to the laws of Heaven b lest you say /b that the one who concealed the item could say: b I covered it for you /b in order to protect it from the fire. Based on that logic, one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven., b And /b Rabbi Yehoshua taught that there is liability b also /b in the case of b one who hires false witnesses, lest you say: Let /b the one who hired them b say: /b If the witnesses hear b the statement of the teacher, /b i.e., God, Who prohibited giving false testimony, b and the statement of the student, /b i.e., the one who hired them, b to whose statement /b should they b listen? /b Although the one who hired them encouraged these witnesses to sin, ultimately it was they who transgressed by not adhering to the instructions of God. b And /b based on this logic one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,Finally, Rabbi Yehoshua taught that b one who knows testimony /b in support b of another but does not testify on his behalf /b is liable according to the laws of Heaven, b lest you say /b that the witness could claim: b Who says that had I come forward /b and b testified on behalf of /b one litigant, the other litigant b would admit /b liability? b Perhaps he would have /b chosen to b take a false oath /b and absolve himself. Based on that logic one might have thought that b he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. /b Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua b teaches us /b that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,§ The mishna teaches: If the pen b was breached at night, or bandits breached it, /b and sheep subsequently went out and caused damage, the owner of the sheep is exempt. b Rabba says: And this /b first instance of a pen that was breached is referring specifically to a case b where /b the animal b tunneled /b under the wall of the pen and by doing so caused the wall to collapse. In that case, the owner is completely blameless and therefore exempt from liability for any damage that ensues.,The Gemara asks: b But /b if the animal b did not tunnel /b under the wall, b what /b is the i halakha /i ? Would the owner be b liable? What are the circumstances? If we say /b that the pen had b a stable wall, /b then even b if /b the animal b did not tunnel, why /b is the owner b liable? What should he have done? /b Clearly, he cannot be held liable for the damage. b Rather, /b the pen had b an unstable wall. /b The Gemara asks: Even b if /b the animal b tunneled /b under the wall and knocked it down, b why /b is he b exempt? /b The damage in this case is b initially through negligence and ultimately by accident. /b , b This works out well according to the one who said /b that in any case of damage that is b initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, /b he is b exempt /b from liability, since the ultimate cause of the damage was not his fault. b But according to the one who says /b that in any case of damage that is b initially through negligence and ultimately by accident /b he is b liable, /b as even without the accident his negligence could have caused damage, b what is there to say? /b , b Rather, /b the case of b the mishna concerns a stable wall, and even /b if the animal b did not tunnel /b under the wall the owner is exempt. b And when /b the statement b of Rabba was stated, it was stated with regard to the latter clause /b of the mishna that says: If the owner b left /b the animal b in the sun or conveyed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and /b the animal b went out and caused damage, /b the owner is b liable. /b Concerning this b Rabba stated: And /b the owner is liable b even if /b the animal b tunneled /b its way out under the wall of the pen.,The Gemara explains: b It is not necessary /b for the mishna to mention the case b where the animal did not tunnel /b its way out. In that case the owner is clearly liable, since b the entire /b incident occurred due to his b negligence /b of leaving the animal in the sun, thereby causing it distress and leading it to attempt escape by any possible means. b But even if /b the animal b tunneled /b its way out, the owner is liable, and this is the novelty in this ruling: b Lest you say /b that b this is /b a case of damage that is b initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, /b because animals do not typically tunnel their way out of a pen, the mishna b teaches us that /b it is considered as though b the entire /b damage resulted from the owner’s b negligence. /b , b What is the reason /b that the owner is liable? It is b that /b the one who suffered the damage b can say to /b the owner of the sheep: b You should have known that since you left it in the sun, it would utilize any means [ i tatzdeka /i ] available for it to use and /b it would b escape, /b so you are ultimately responsible for the damage.,§ The mishna teaches: If the b bandits /b themselves b took /b the sheep b out, the bandits are liable. /b |
|
| 32. Anon., Exodus Rabbah, 15.20 (4th cent. CE - 9th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 25 |
| 33. Anon., Lexicon Artis Grammaticae (E Cod. Coislin. 345), 29.4 Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 43 |
34. Babylonian Talmud, Zevahim, None Tagged with subjects: •stipulation of the court (tenai beit din) Found in books: Balberg (2017) 41| 2b. נדר הוא אלא אם כמה שנדרת עשית יהא נדר ואם לא נדבה יהא,ונדבה מי שרי לשנויי בה,אמר ליה רבינא לרב פפא לא הוית גבן באורתא בתחומא בי חרמך דרמי רבא מילי מעלייתא אהדדי ושני להו,מאי מילי מעלייתא תנן כל הזבחים שנזבחו שלא לשמן כו' טעמא דשלא לשמן הא סתמא עלו נמי לבעלים לשם חובה אלמא סתמא נמי כלשמן דמי,ורמינהי כל הגט שנכתב שלא לשם אשה פסול וסתמא נמי פסול,ושני זבחים בסתם לשמן עומדין אשה בסתמא לאו לגירושין עומדת,וזבחים בסתמא כשירין מנלן אילימא מהא דתנן כל הזבחים שנזבחו שלא לשמן כו' ולא קתני שלא נזבחו לשמן גבי גט נמי הקתני כל הגט שנכתב שלא לשם אשה פסול ולא קתני שלא נכתב לשם אשה פסול,אלא מהא דתנן כיצד לשמן ושלא לשמן לשם פסח ולשם שלמים טעמא דאמר לשם פסח ולשם שלמים הא לשם פסח וסתמא כשר אלמא סתמן כלשמן דמי,דילמא שאני התם דאמר כל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה,אלא מסיפא שלא לשמן ולשמן לשם שלמים ולשם פסח טעמא דאמר לשם שלמים ולשם פסח הא סתמא ולשם פסח כשר,דילמא שאני התם דאמר יוכיח סופו על תחילתו,אי נמי איידי דתנא לשמן ושלא לשמן תנא נמי שלא לשמן ולשמן,אלא מהא לשם ששה דברים הזבח נזבח לשם זבח לשם זובח לשם שם לשם אשים לשם ריח לשם ניחוח והחטאת ואשם לשם חטא,א"ר יוסי אף מי שלא היה בלבו לשם אחת מכל אלו כשר שתנאי בית דין הוא אתנו בית דין דלא לימא לשמו דילמא אתי למימר שלא לשמו,אי סלקא דעתך סתמא פסול קיימי בית דין ומתני מילתא דמיפסיל ביה,וגבי גט דסתמא פסול מנלן,אילימא מהא דתנן היה עובר בשוק ושמע סופרים מקרין איש פלוני גירש פלונית ממקום פלוני ואמר זה שמי וזה שם אשתי פסול לגרש בו,דילמא כדרב פפא דאמר רב פפא הכא בסופרים העשויין להתלמד עסקינן ולא איכתוב לשום כריתות כלל,אלא מהא | 2b. b It is /b already referred to as b a vow /b offering b [ i neder /i ]. Rather, /b the verse indicates that b if you did what you vowed /b to do, i.e., you sacrificed your vow offering properly, b it shall be /b a satisfactory b vow /b offering; b and if /b you did b not /b sacrifice it properly, b it shall be /b rendered a voluntary b gift /b offering unrelated to the vow, and shall not satisfy the obligation of your vow.,The Gemara concludes: b And is it permitted to deviate /b from protocol b in /b the sacrifice of b a gift /b offering i ab initio /i ? Clearly it is not. Evidently, even if one of the sacrificial rites was performed for the sake of sacrificing a different offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of the other sacrificial rites in the incorrect manner.,§ b Ravina said to Rav Pappa: /b Since b you were not with us last night within the /b Shabbat b limit of Bei Ḥarmakh, /b you did not hear b that Rava raises a contradiction between /b two b superior /b mishnaic b statements and teaches their /b resolution., b What /b are these b superior statements? We learned /b in the mishna: b All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake /b are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rava infers: b The reason /b they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner is specifically b that /b they were slaughtered b not for their sake. But /b if offerings were slaughtered b without specification /b of intent, b they, as well, satisfied the obligation of the owner. Apparently, /b if one performs any action b without specification /b of intent, it is b also considered as /b if he performed it expressly b for its sake. /b , b And /b Rava b raises a contradiction /b from another mishna ( i Gittin /i 24a): b Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of /b the b woman /b in question is b not valid. And /b it is derived from the continuation of that mishna that if a bill of divorce was written b without specification /b as to which woman it is referring, it is b also not valid. /b , b And /b Rava b resolves /b the contradiction: b Ordinary slaughtered offerings stand /b designated b for their /b own b sake. /b From the time that the offering is consecrated, its presumed end is that it will be slaughtered for the type of offering for which is was consecrated. Therefore, even if the one slaughtering it has no particular intention, it is in effect considered slaughtered for its own sake. By contrast, b an ordinary wife does not stand /b designated b for divorce. /b Therefore, a bill of divorce is never presumed to be referring to a given woman unless it is specified explicitly.,§ The Gemara asks: b And from where do we /b derive that b slaughtered offerings are fit /b and even satisfy the obligation of the owner if slaughtered b without specification? If we say /b it is b from that which we learned /b in the mishna: b All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake /b are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, b and /b it b does not teach /b this using the language: All slaughtered offerings b that were not slaughtered for their sake /b are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, this cannot be. One cannot infer from this language that slaughter without specification is valid, since the Mishna b also teaches with regard to a bill of divorce: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it does not teach: That was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid, /b and it is a given that a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid., b Rather, /b perhaps it is derived b from that which we learned /b in a mishna (13a): b How /b are offerings slaughtered b for their sake and /b then b not for their sake? /b For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering b for the sake of a Paschal offering and /b then b for the sake of a peace offering. /b The Gemara infers: b The reason /b such an offering is unfit is b that he says /b that he is slaughtering it b for the sake of a Paschal offering and /b then he says that he is slaughtering it b for the sake of a peace offering. But /b if he says that he is slaughtering it b for the sake of a Paschal offering, and /b then slaughters it b without specification, /b it is b fit. Apparently, /b slaughtering an offering b without specification is considered as /b if one slaughtered it b for its sake. /b ,The Gemara responds: b Perhaps there it is different, as /b the mishna b is saying /b that b anyone who performs /b an action b performs /b it b with /b his b original intent /b in mind. Therefore, since he specified initially that he was slaughtering the offering for the sake of a Paschal offering, there are no grounds to assume that he then changed his mind. Here, by contrast, he pronounced no initial statement of proper intent., b Rather, /b perhaps this i halakha /i is derived b from the latter clause /b of that mishna: How are offerings slaughtered b not for their sake and /b then b for their sake? /b For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering b for the sake of a peace offering and /b then b for the sake of a Paschal offering. /b The Gemara infers: b The reason /b it is unfit b is that he says /b he is slaughtering it b for the sake of a peace offering and /b then he says he is slaughtering it b for the sake of a Paschal offering. But /b if he started slaughtering it b without specification and /b then slaughtered it b for the sake of a Paschal offering, /b it is b fit. /b Apparently, if one slaughters an offering without specification it still satisfies the obligation of the owner.,The Gemara responds: b Perhaps there it is different, as /b the mishna b is saying /b that b his ultimate /b intent b proves /b the nature b of his original /b intent. Since his ultimate intent was to sacrifice a Paschal offering, that was presumably his original intent as well. Here, by contrast, there is no ultimate expression of proper intent., b Alternatively, /b it can be explained that even if one’s ultimate intent is not considered proof of his original intent, the mishna still uses the same term in both clauses to preserve symmetry. b Since /b in the former clause the i tanna /i b taught /b using the language: b For their sake and /b then b not for their sake, /b teaching that original intent is considered proof of ultimate intent, the i tanna /i b also taught /b the second clause using the language: b Not for their sake and /b then b for their sake. /b In any event, there is no proof from that mishna that an offering slaughtered without specification satisfies its owner’s obligation., b Rather, /b perhaps this i halakha /i is derived b from that /b mishna (46b), which states: b The offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of /b the particular b offering; for the sake of the one sacrificing /b the offering, i.e., the owner; b for the sake of God; for the sake of /b consumption by the b fires /b of the altar; b for the sake of /b sacrificing it in a manner that gives b an aroma; /b and b for the sake of pleasing /b God. b And the sin offering and a guilt offering /b are slaughtered b for the sake of /b atonement for the b sin. /b ,The mishna on 46b continues: b Rabbi Yosei said: Even /b in the case of b one who did not have in mind /b to slaughter the offering b for the sake of /b any b one of these, /b the offering is b fit, since /b this b is a stipulation of the court. /b The Gemara explains Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: The b court stipulated that /b one b should not say /b that he is slaughtering the offering b for its sake, lest he come to say /b that he is slaughtering it b not for its sake. /b Therefore one should not specify his intent at all.,The Gemara infers: b And if it enters your mind /b that if one slaughters an offering b without specification /b it is b unfit, would the court arise and stipulate a matter that disqualifies /b the offering? Clearly, an offering slaughtered without specification is fit and satisfies the obligation of the owner.,§ The Gemara asks: b And with regard to a bill of divorce, from where do we /b derive b that /b if it is written b without specification /b as to which woman it is referring, it is b not valid? /b , b If we say /b it is inferred b from that which we learned /b in a mishna ( i Gittin /i 24a): In the case of a man who b was passing through the marketplace, and /b he b heard scribes /b who write bills of divorce b dictating /b to their students: The b man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from /b the b place /b of b such and such, and /b the man b said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, /b and he desires to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is b unfit to divorce /b his wife b with it, /b that is not a proof.,It can be explained: b Perhaps /b the mishna is b in accordance with /b the explanation b of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa says: Here we are dealing with scribes who are wont to practice /b writing bills of divorce; b and /b this bill of divorce is a draft and b was not written for the sake of severance, /b i.e., divorce, b at all. /b But if a bill of divorce is written to be used for divorce, perhaps it is fit even if written without specifying the woman in question., b Rather, /b derive this i halakha /i b from /b the subsequent clause in b that /b mishna: |
|
| 35. Anon., Midrash Tannaim To Deut, 17.15 Tagged with subjects: •court, of ten Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 40 |
