1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.16-3.21, 3.48, 3.50, 3.59 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • eupatheiai, called consistencies (constantiae) • inconsistency,in Stoicism
Found in books: Graver (2007) 230; Wilson (2022) 27, 52, 54
3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo." '3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.18. artis etiam ipsas propter se adsumendas putamus, cum cum ABE tum N (t corr. ut vid., ex c), RV quia sit in iis iis Mdv. his aliquid dignum adsumptione, tum quod constent ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via. a falsa autem adsensione magis nos alienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus, quae sint sunt R contra naturam, arbitrantur. iam membrorum, id est partium corporis, alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata, ut manus, crura, pedes, ut ea, ut ea et ea BE quae sunt intus in corpore, quorum utilitas quanta sit a medicis etiam etiam a medicis R disputatur, alia autem nullam ob utilitatem quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque barba. 3.19. Haec dicuntur fortasse ieiunius; sunt enim quasi prima elementa naturae, quibus ubertas orationis adhiberi vix potest, nec equidem eam cogito consectari. verum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dicas, ipsae res verba rapiunt; ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam splendidior oratio. Est, ut dicis, inquam. sed tamen omne, quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praeclare dici videtur. istius modi autem res dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri.' "3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici." '3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum.
3.48. itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse—isdem placere esse alium alio et et ABERV ( sequitur itemque; cf. p.188, 15 sq. et eos ... nosque), et (= etiam, ab alt. m., ut vid. ) N sapientiorem itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat adpropinquat (appr.) edd. ut propinquat ABER apropin- quat N 2 propinquat N 1 V ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum habitum dett. aditum (additum R) nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit. Haec mirabilia videri intellego, sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum de eorum R quidem est veritate dubitandum. sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen tamen N 2 et tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. Divitias autem Diogenes censet eam eam non eam dett. modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam;
3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE
3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus.'". None | 3.16. \xa0"Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I\xa0certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I\'ll do my best," I\xa0replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I\xa0adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 3.17. \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. < 3.18. \xa0The sciences also, we consider, are things to be chosen for their own sake, partly because there is in them something worthy of choice, partly because they consist of acts of cognition and contain an element of fact established by methodical reasoning. The mental assent to what is false, as the Stoics believe, is more repugt to us than all the other things that are contrary to nature. "(Again, of the members or parts of the body, some appear to have been bestowed on us by nature for the sake of their use, for example the hands, legs, feet, and internal organs, as to the degree of whose utility even physicians are not agreed; while others serve no useful purpose, but appear to be intended for ornament: for instance the peacock\'s tail, the plumage of the dove with its shifting colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human being.) < 3.19. \xa0All this is perhaps somewhat baldly expressed; for it deals with what may be called the primary elements of nature, to which any embellishment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am\xa0I for my part concerned to attempt it. On the other hand, when one is treating of more majestic topics the style instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance of the language increases with the dignity of the theme." "True," I\xa0rejoined; "but to my mind, any clear statement of an important topic possesses excellence of style. It would be childish to desire an ornate style in subjects of the kind with which you are dealing. A\xa0man of sense and education will be content to be able to express his meaning plainly and clearly." < 3.20. \xa0"To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â\x80\x94 axia as the Stoics call it â\x80\x94 this they pronounce to be \'valuable\' (for so I\xa0suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term \'valueless.\' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are \'things to be taken\' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly \'things to be rejected,\' the first \'appropriate act\' (for so I\xa0render the Greek kathÄ\x93kon) is to preserve oneself in one\'s natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by \'appropriate action\'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. <' "3.21. \xa0Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â\x80\x94 in Stoic phraseology ennoia â\x80\x94 and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â\x80\x94 inasmuch I\xa0say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. <" '
3.48. \xa0So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open for us to say, who do not think that the end of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all."I\xa0am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. <
3.50. \xa0But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. <
3.59. \xa0"It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification \'on principle\' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. <''. None |
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2. Cicero, On Duties, 1.113-1.114 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • behaviour, inconsistency of • consistency
Found in books: Bexley (2022) 92; Long (2006) 15
1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus.''. None | 1.113. \xa0How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a\xa0thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. <" '1.114. \xa0Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I\xa0remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. <'". None |
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4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.87, 7.101-7.103 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • De Abrahamo, inconsistencies in • consistency • eupatheiai, called consistencies (constantiae) • inconsistency,in Stoicism
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 153; Graver (2007) 230; Long (2006) 18; Wilson (2022) 27, 54
| 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.
7.101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term good has equal force with the term beautiful, which comes to the same thing. Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good. They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent). 7.102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics, and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision things preferred. 7.103. For as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods. On the other hand, Posidonius maintains that these things too are among goods. Hecato in the ninth book of his treatise On Goods, and Chrysippus in his work On Pleasure, deny that pleasure is a good either; for some pleasures are disgraceful, and nothing disgraceful is good.''. None |
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5. Vergil, Aeneis, 6.14-6.41, 8.671-8.731, 10.495-10.505
Tagged with subjects: • ethical qualities, consistency • inconsistency
Found in books: Farrell (2021) 288; Pandey (2018) 70, 148, 150, 156, 199, 200
6.14. Daedalus, ut fama est, fugiens Minoïa regna, 6.15. praepetibus pennis ausus se credere caelo, 6.16. insuetum per iter gelidas enavit ad Arctos, 6.17. Chalcidicaque levis tandem super adstitit arce. 6.18. Redditus his primum terris, tibi, Phoebe, sacravit 6.20. In foribus letum Androgeo: tum pendere poenas 6.21. Cecropidae iussi—miserum!—septena quotannis 6.22. corpora natorum; stat ductis sortibus urna. 6.23. Contra elata mari respondet Gnosia tellus: 6.24. hic crudelis amor tauri, suppostaque furto 6.25. Pasiphaë, mixtumque genus prolesque biformis 6.26. Minotaurus inest, Veneris monumenta nefandae; 6.27. hic labor ille domus et inextricabilis error; 6.28. magnum reginae sed enim miseratus amorem 6.29. Daedalus ipse dolos tecti ambagesque resolvit, 6.30. caeca regens filo vestigia. Tu quoque magnam 6.31. partem opere in tanto, sineret dolor, Icare, haberes. 6.32. Bis conatus erat casus effingere in auro; 6.33. bis patriae cecidere manus. Quin protinus omnia 6.34. perlegerent oculis, ni iam praemissus Achates 6.35. adforet, atque una Phoebi Triviaeque sacerdos, 6.36. Deiphobe Glauci, fatur quae talia regi: 6.37. Non hoc ista sibi tempus spectacula poscit; 6.38. nunc grege de intacto septem mactare iuvencos' '6.40. Talibus adfata Aenean (nec sacra morantur 6.41. iussa viri), Teucros vocat alta in templa sacerdos.
8.671. Haec inter tumidi late maris ibat imago 8.672. aurea, sed fluctu spumabant caerula cano; 8.673. et circum argento clari delphines in orbem 8.674. aequora verrebant caudis aestumque secabant. 8.675. In medio classis aeratas, Actia bella, 8.676. cernere erat, totumque instructo Marte videres 8.677. fervere Leucaten auroque effulgere fluctus. 8.678. Hinc Augustus agens Italos in proelia Caesar 8.679. cum patribus populoque, penatibus et magnis dis, 8.680. stans celsa in puppi; geminas cui tempora flammas 8.681. laeta vomunt patriumque aperitur vertice sidus. 8.682. Parte alia ventis et dis Agrippa secundis 8.683. arduus agmen agens; cui, belli insigne superbum, 8.684. tempora navali fulgent rostrata corona. 8.685. Hinc ope barbarica variisque Antonius armis, 8.686. victor ab Aurorae populis et litore rubro, 8.687. Aegyptum viresque Orientis et ultima secum 8.688. Bactra vehit, sequiturque (nefas) Aegyptia coniunx. 8.689. Una omnes ruere, ac totum spumare reductis 8.690. convolsum remis rostrisque tridentibus aequor. 8.691. alta petunt: pelago credas innare revolsas 8.692. Cycladas aut montis concurrere montibus altos, 8.693. tanta mole viri turritis puppibus instant. 8.694. stuppea flamma manu telisque volatile ferrum 8.695. spargitur, arva nova Neptunia caede rubescunt. 8.696. Regina in mediis patrio vocat agmina sistro 8.697. necdum etiam geminos a tergo respicit anguis. 8.698. omnigenumque deum monstra et latrator Anubis 8.699. contra Neptunum et Venerem contraque Minervam 8.700. tela tenent. Saevit medio in certamine Mavors 8.701. caelatus ferro tristesque ex aethere Dirae, 8.702. et scissa gaudens vadit Discordia palla, 8.703. quam cum sanguineo sequitur Bellona flagello. 8.704. Actius haec cernens arcum tendebat Apollo 8.705. desuper: omnis eo terrore Aegyptus et Indi, 8.706. omnis Arabs, omnes vertebant terga Sabaei. 8.707. Ipsa videbatur ventis regina vocatis 8.708. vela dare et laxos iam iamque inmittere funis. 8.709. Illam inter caedes pallentem morte futura 8.710. fecerat Ignipotens undis et Iapyge ferri, 8.711. contra autem magno maerentem corpore Nilum 8.712. pandentemque sinus et tota veste vocantem 8.713. caeruleum in gremium latebrosaque flumina victos. 8.714. At Caesar, triplici invectus Romana triumpho 8.715. moenia, dis Italis votum inmortale sacrabat, 8.716. maxuma tercentum totam delubra per urbem. 8.717. Laetitia ludisque viae plausuque fremebant; 8.718. omnibus in templis matrum chorus, omnibus arae; 8.719. ante aras terram caesi stravere iuvenci. 8.720. Ipse, sedens niveo candentis limine Phoebi, 8.721. dona recognoscit populorum aptatque superbis 8.722. postibus; incedunt victae longo ordine gentes, 8.723. quam variae linguis, habitu tam vestis et armis. 8.725. hic Lelegas Carasque sagittiferosque Gelonos 8.726. finxerat; Euphrates ibat iam mollior undis, 8.727. extremique hominum Morini, Rhenusque bicornis, 8.728. indomitique Dahae, et pontem indignatus Araxes. 8.729. Talia per clipeum Volcani, dona parentis, 8.730. miratur rerumque ignarus imagine gaudet, 8.731. attollens umero famamque et fata nepotum.10.495. hospitia. Et laevo pressit pede talia fatus 10.496. exanimem, rapiens immania pondera baltei 10.497. impressumque nefas, una sub nocte iugali 10.498. caesa manus iuvenum foede thalamique cruenti, 10.499. quae Clonus Eurytides multo caelaverat auro; 10.500. quo nunc Turnus ovat spolio gaudetque potitus. 10.501. Nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futurae 10.502. et servare modum, rebus sublata secundis! 10.503. Turno tempus erit, magno cum optaverit emptum 10.504. intactum Pallanta et cum spolia ista diemque 10.505. oderit. At socii multo gemitu lacrimisque''. None | 6.14. The templed hill where lofty Phoebus reigns, 6.15. And that far-off, inviolable shrine 6.16. of dread Sibylla, in stupendous cave, ' "6.17. O'er whose deep soul the god of Delos breathes " '6.18. Prophetic gifts, unfolding things to come. 6.20. Here Daedalus, the ancient story tells, ' "6.21. Escaping Minos' power, and having made " '6.22. Hazard of heaven on far-mounting wings, 6.23. Floated to northward, a cold, trackless way, ' "6.24. And lightly poised, at last, o'er Cumae 's towers. " '6.25. Here first to earth come down, he gave to thee 6.26. His gear of wings, Apollo! and ordained 6.27. Vast temples to thy name and altars fair. ' "6.28. On huge bronze doors Androgeos' death was done; " "6.29. And Cecrops' children paid their debt of woe, " '6.30. Where, seven and seven,—0 pitiable sight!— 6.31. The youths and maidens wait the annual doom, 6.32. Drawn out by lot from yonder marble urn. 6.33. Beyond, above a sea, lay carven Crete :— 6.34. The bull was there; the passion, the strange guile; ' "6.35. And Queen Pasiphae's brute-human son, " '6.36. The Minotaur—of monstrous loves the sign. 6.37. Here was the toilsome, labyrinthine maze, ' "6.38. Where, pitying love-lorn Ariadne's tears, " '6.39. The crafty Daedalus himself betrayed 6.40. The secret of his work; and gave the clue 6.41. To guide the path of Theseus through the gloom.
8.671. Seek ye a king from far!’ So in the field ' "8.672. inert and fearful lies Etruria's force, " '8.673. disarmed by oracles. Their Tarchon sent 8.674. envoys who bore a sceptre and a crown 8.675. even to me, and prayed I should assume ' "8.676. the sacred emblems of Etruria's king, " '8.677. and lead their host to war. But unto me 8.678. cold, sluggish age, now barren and outworn, 8.679. denies new kingdoms, and my slow-paced powers 8.680. run to brave deeds no more. Nor could I urge ' "8.681. my son, who by his Sabine mother's line " '8.682. is half Italian-born. Thyself art he, 8.683. whose birth illustrious and manly prime 8.684. fate favors and celestial powers approve. 8.685. Therefore go forth, O bravest chief and King 8.686. of Troy and Italy ! To thee I give 8.687. the hope and consolation of our throne, 8.688. pallas, my son, and bid him find in thee 8.689. a master and example, while he learns ' "8.690. the soldier's arduous toil. With thy brave deeds " '8.691. let him familiar grow, and reverence thee 8.692. with youthful love and honor. In his train 8.693. two hundred horsemen of Arcadia, 8.694. our choicest men-at-arms, shall ride; and he 8.695. in his own name an equal band shall bring 8.696. to follow only thee.” Such the discourse. 8.697. With meditative brows and downcast eyes 8.698. Aeneas and Achates, sad at heart, 8.699. mused on unnumbered perils yet to come. ' "8.700. But out of cloudless sky Cythera's Queen " "8.701. gave sudden signal: from th' ethereal dome " '8.702. a thunder-peal and flash of quivering fire 8.703. tumultuous broke, as if the world would fall, 8.704. and bellowing Tuscan trumpets shook the air. 8.705. All eyes look up. Again and yet again 8.706. crashed the terrible din, and where the sky 8.707. looked clearest hung a visionary cloud, 8.708. whence through the brightness blazed resounding arms. ' "8.709. All hearts stood still. But Troy 's heroic son " '8.710. knew that his mother in the skies redeemed 8.711. her pledge in sound of thunder: so he cried, 8.712. “Seek not, my friend, seek not thyself to read ' "8.713. the meaning of the omen. 'T is to me " '8.714. Olympus calls. My goddess-mother gave 8.715. long since her promise of a heavenly sign 8.716. if war should burst; and that her power would bring 8.717. a panoply from Vulcan through the air, 8.718. to help us at our need. Alas, what deaths ' "8.719. over Laurentum's ill-starred host impend! " '8.720. O Turnus, what a reckoning thou shalt pay 8.721. to me in arms! O Tiber, in thy wave 8.722. what helms and shields and mighty soldiers slain 8.723. hall in confusion roll! Yea, let them lead 8.725. He said: and from the lofty throne uprose. 8.726. Straightway he roused anew the slumbering fire 8.727. acred to Hercules, and glad at heart 8.728. adored, as yesterday, the household gods 8.729. revered by good Evander, at whose side 8.730. the Trojan company made sacrifice 8.731. of chosen lambs, with fitting rites and true.
10.495. who also for the roughness of the ground 10.496. were all unmounted: he (the last resource 10.497. of men in straits) to wild entreaty turned 10.498. and taunts, enkindling their faint hearts anew: 10.499. “Whither, my men! O, by your own brave deeds, ' "10.500. O, by our lord Evander's happy wars, " '10.501. the proud hopes I had to make my name 10.502. a rival glory,—think not ye can fly! 10.503. Your swords alone can carve ye the safe way 10.504. traight through your foes. Where yonder warrior-throng 10.505. is fiercest, thickest, there and only there ' '. None |
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