| 1. Sappho, Fragments, 47 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 |
| 2. Sappho, Fragments, 47 (7th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 |
| 3. Plato, Menexenus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Barbato (2020), The Ideology of Democratic Athens: Institutions, Orators and the Mythical Past, 99 |
4. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 2.37.1-2.37.3, 3.82.8, 8.53.3, 8.64.5, 8.75.2, 8.93.3 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •autochthony, and concord (homonoia) •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Barbato (2020), The Ideology of Democratic Athens: Institutions, Orators and the Mythical Past, 99, 101; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 165| 2.37.1. ‘χρώμεθα γὰρ πολιτείᾳ οὐ ζηλούσῃ τοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους, παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους. καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ’ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται: μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλέον ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἢ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται, οὐδ’ αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων γέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ κεκώλυται. 2.37.2. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι’ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ’ ἡδονήν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μέν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι. 2.37.3. ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ’ ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν. 3.82.8. πάντων δ’ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν: ἐκ δ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα ἐπεξῇσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκατέροις που αἰεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὁρίζοντες, καὶ ἢ μετὰ ψήφου ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐκπιμπλάναι. ὥστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκουον. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο. 8.53.3. ὁπότε δὲ μὴ φαῖεν ἐρωτώμενοι, ἐνταῦθα δὴ σαφῶς ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι ‘τοῦτο τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ πολιτεύσομεν τε σωφρονέστερον καὶ ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσομεν, ἵνα πιστεύῃ ἡμῖν βασιλεύς, καὶ μὴ περὶ πολιτείας τὸ πλέον βουλεύσομεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἢ περὶ σωτηρίας ʽὕστερον γὰρ ἐξέσται ἡμῖν καὶ μεταθέσθαι, ἢν μή τι ἀρέσκᾐ, Ἀλκιβιάδην τε κατάξομεν, ὃς μόνος τῶν νῦν οἷός τε τοῦτο κατεργάσασθαι.’ 8.64.5. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν Θάσον τἀναντία τοῖς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστᾶσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο, δοκεῖν δέ μοι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν ὑπηκόων: σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες. 8.75.2. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο λαμπρῶς ἤδη ἐς δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι μεταστῆσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ὅ τε Θρασύβουλος ὁ τοῦ Λύκου καὶ Θράσυλος (οὗτοι γὰρ μάλιστα προειστήκεσαν τῆς μεταβολῆς) ὥρκωσαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἦ μὴν δημοκρατήσεσθαί τε καὶ ὁμονοήσειν καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμον προθύμως διοίσειν καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμιοί τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπικηρυκεύσεσθαι. 8.93.3. τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων ἠπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ: ξυνεχώρησάν τε ὥστε ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας. | 2.37.1. Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighboring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favors the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if to social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. 2.37.2. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbor for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. 2.37.3. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace. 3.82.8. The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy, engaged in the direct excesses; in their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion was in honor with neither party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation. Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape. 8.53.3. Upon their replying that they had not, he then plainly said to them: ‘This we cannot have unless we have a more moderate form of government, and put the offices into fewer hands, and so gain the king's confidence, and forthwith restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living that can bring this about. The safety of the state, not the form of its government, is for the moment the most pressing question, as we can always change afterwards whatever we do not like.' 8.64.5. Things at Thasos thus turned out just the contrary to what the oligarchical conspirators at Athens expected; and the same in my opinion was the case in many of the other dependencies; as the cities no sooner got a moderate government and liberty of action, than they went on to absolute freedom without being at all seduced by the show of reform offered by the Athenians. 8.75.2. After this Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders in the revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to change the government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any, to accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively the war with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four Hundred, and to hold no communication with them. 8.93.3. After a great many had spoken and had been spoken to, the whole body of heavy infantry became calmer than before, absorbed by their fears for the country at large, and now agreed to hold upon an appointed day an assembly in the theatre of Dionysus for the restoration of concord. |
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5. Xenophon, Memoirs, 4.4.16 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 159| 4.4.16. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστόν τε ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι καὶ πλειστάκις ἐν αὐταῖς αἵ τε γερουσίαι καὶ οἱ ἄριστοι ἄνδρες παρακελεύονται τοῖς πολίταις ὁμονοεῖν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι νόμος κεῖται τοὺς πολίτας ὀμνύναι ὁμονοήσειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ὀμνύουσι τὸν ὅρκον τοῦτον· οἶμαι δʼ ἐγὼ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς χοροὺς κρίνωσιν οἱ πολῖται, οὐδʼ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς αὐλητὰς ἐπαινῶσιν, οὐδʼ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιητὰς αἱρῶνται, οὐδʼ ἵνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδωνται, ἀλλʼ ἵνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται. τούτοις γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμμενόντων, αἱ πόλεις ἰσχυρόταταί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέσταται γίγνονται· ἄνευ δὲ ὁμονοίας οὔτʼ ἂν πόλις εὖ πολιτευθείη οὔτʼ οἶκος καλῶς οἰκηθείη. | 4.4.16. And again, agreement is deemed the greatest blessing for cities: their senates and their best men constantly exhort the citizens to agree, and everywhere in Greece there is a law that the citizens shall promise under oath to agree, and everywhere they take this oath. The object of this, in my opinion, is not that the citizens may vote for the same choirs, not that they may praise the same flute-players, not that they may select the same poets, not that they may like the same things, but that they may obey the laws. For those cities whose citizens abide by them prove strongest and enjoy most happiness; but without agreement no city can be made a good city, no house can be made a prosperous house. |
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6. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 165| 519a. διʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι | 519a. For with no regard for temperance and justice they have stuffed the city with harbors and arsenals and walls and tribute and suchlike trash; and so whenever that access of debility comes they will lay the blame on the advisers who are with them at the time, and belaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who caused all the trouble; and belike they will lay hold of you, if you are not on your guard, and my good friend Alcibiades, when they are losing what they had originally |
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| 7. Isocrates, Orations, 12.178 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •autochthony, and concord (homonoia) Found in books: Barbato (2020), The Ideology of Democratic Athens: Institutions, Orators and the Mythical Past, 101 |
| 8. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 |
| 9. Plautus, Mercator, 867 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Clark (2007), Divine Qualities: Cult and Community in Republican Rome, 31 |
| 10. Cicero, In Verrem, 92 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Clark (2007), Divine Qualities: Cult and Community in Republican Rome, 34 |
11. Cicero, On Duties, 3.90 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251| 3.90. Quid? si una tabula sit, duo naufragi, eique sapientes, sibine uter que rapiat, an alter cedat alteri? Cedat vero, sed ei, cuius magis intersit vel sua vel rei publicae causa vivere. Quid, si haec paria in utroque? Nullum erit certamen, sed quasi sorte aut micando victus alteri cedet alter. Quid? si pater fana expilet, cuniculos agat ad aerarium, indicetne id magistratibus filius? Nefas id quidem est, quin etiam defendat patrem, si arguatur. Non igitur patria praestat omnibus officiis? Immo vero, sed ipsi patriae conducit pios habere cives in parentes. Quid? si tyrannidem occupare, si patriam prodere conabitur pater, silebitne filius? Immo vero obsecrabit patrem, ne id faciat. Si nihil proficiet, accusabit, minabitur etiam, ad extremum, si ad perniciem patriae res spectabit, patriae salutem anteponet saluti patris. | 3.90. "Again; suppose there were two to be saved from the sinking ship â both of them wise men â and only one small plank, should both seize it to save themselves? Or should one give place to the other?""Why, of course, one should give place to the other, but that other must be the one whose life is more valuable either for his own sake or for that of his country.""But what if these considerations are of equal weight in both?""Then there will be no contest, but one will give place to the other, as if the point were decided by lot or at a game of odd and even.""Again, suppose a father were robbing temples or making underground passages to the treasury, should a son inform the officers of it?""Nay; that were a crime; rather should he defend his father, in case he were indicted.""Well, then, are not the claims of country paramount to all other duties""Aye, verily; but it is to our country's interest to have citizens who are loyal to their parents.""But once more â if the father attempts to make himself king, or to betray his country, shall the son hold his peace?""Nay, verily; he will plead with his father not to do so. If that accomplishes nothing, he will take him to task; he will even threaten; and in the end, if things point to the destruction of the state, he will sacrifice his father to the safety of his country." |
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12. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.121 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 | 1.121. for who could form a mental picture of such images? who could adore them and deem them worthy of worship or reverence? "Epicurus however, in abolishing divine beneficence and divine benevolence, uprooted and exterminated all religion from the human heart. For while asserting the supreme goodness and excellence of the divine nature, he yet denies to god the attribute of benevolence — that is to say, he does away with that which is the most essential element of supreme goodness and excellence. For what can be better or more excellent than kindness and beneficence? Make out god to be devoid of either, and you make him devoid of all love, affection or esteem for any other being, human or divine. It follows not merely that the gods do not care for mankind, but that they have no care for one another. How much more truth there is in the Stoics, whom you censure! They hold that all wise men are friends, even when strangers to each other, since nothing is more lovable than virtue, and he that attains to it will have our esteem in whatever country he dwells. |
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| 13. Cicero, On Laws, 1.49 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 |
14. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251| 4.72. Stoici vero et sapientem amaturum esse St. fr. 3, 652 dicunt et amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt. qui si qui si quin V quis est in rerum natura sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine cura, sine suspirio, sit sane; vacat enim omni libidine; haec autem de libidine oratio est. sin autem est aliquis amor, ut est certe, qui nihil absit aut non multum ab insania, qualis in Leucadia est: si quidem sit quisquam Turpil. 115 deus, cui cuii Ribb. ad V ego sim curae — | |
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15. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.55, 3.68, 3.70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 181, 251| 3.55. Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello, quae telika/ dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere, quod uno uno dett., om. ABERNV non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci poihtika/, alia utrumque. de pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam sapientiam deft. sapientem volunt esse. nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo est in illo Dav. est illo ABERN 1 est cum illo N 2 cum illo V pertinenti genere, quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones adfert et efficit, id efficiens dici potest. secl. Mdv. 3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. 3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V | 3.55. "Next comes the division of goods into three classes, first those which are 'constituents' of the final end (for so I represent the term telika, this being a case of an idea which we may decide, as we agreed, to express in several words as we cannot do so in one, in order to make the meaning clear), secondly those which are 'productive' of the End, the Greek poiÄtika; and thirdly those which are both. The only instances of goods of the 'constituent' class are moral action; the only instance of a 'productive' good is a friend. Wisdom, according to the Stoics, is both constituent and productive; for as being itself an appropriate activity it comes under what I called the constituent class; as causing and producing moral actions, it can be called productive. 3.68. Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. 3.70. "They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among 'things beneficial.' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another's loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. |
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| 16. Julius Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 3.2.16 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Clark (2007), Divine Qualities: Cult and Community in Republican Rome, 34 |
| 17. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, 1068 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 |
| 18. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 9.4-9.5, 9.8, 9.12-9.14, 109.3-109.6, 109.14-109.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 |
19. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 34.16, 34.48, 38.37, 48.1 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 426, 479 | 34.16. 'Yes, by Zeus,' some one may retort, 'but at least the business of the city itself and our dealings with one another are proceeding as they should.' Is it not true that but a day or two ago the Assembly took one course and the Council another and that the Elders still maintain a position of independence, each body clearly consulting its own self-interest? It was just as if, when a ship is putting in for shore, the sailors should seek their own advantage, the pilot his, and the owner his. For even if this comparison is made repeatedly, still it is your duty not on that account to disregard it. For it is not that which is told for the first time nor that which one has never heard before which one should eagerly accept as true, but rather that which is germane to the situation and may be put to some practical use. 34.48. On the other hand, goodwill and a reputation for superiority in virtue and kindliness â those are your true blessings, those are the objects worthy of emulation and serious regard. And you would pay heed to them, since your present behaviour is ridiculous. And whether it is a question of Aegaeans quarrelling with you, or Apameans with men of Antioch, or, to go farther afield, Smyrnaeans with Ephesians, it is an ass's shadow, as the saying goes, over which they squabble; for the right to lead and to wield authority belongs to others. 38.37. Yet by their public acts they have branded you as a pack of fools, yes, they treat you just like children, for we often offer children the most trivial things in place of things of greatest worth; moreover, those children, in their ignorance of what is truly valuable and in their pleasure over what is of least account, delight in what is a mere nothing. So also in your case, in place of justice, in place of the freedom of the cities from spoliation or from the seizure of the private possessions of their inhabitants, in place of their refraining from insulting you, in place of their refraining from drunken violence, your governors hand you titles, and call you "first" either by word of mouth or in writing; that done, they may thenceforth with impunity treat you as being the very last! 48.1. In the first place, my friends, we ought to feel grateful to the most noble Varenus, not only for the general goodwill he has displayed toward our city, but also because, when we wished to hold an assembly once more, he gave his permission, not only readily but even gladly. For this was the act of one who trusts you and knows you will not use the privilege for any disagreeable purpose. For just as no one, I assume, collects green logs to build a fire, knowing in advance that there is bound to be much disagreeable smoke, so no proconsul of good judgement convenes a meeting of a community which is in a state of turmoil, unless some major emergency overtakes him. |
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| 20. Cassius Dio, Roman History, 72.12.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 479 |
| 21. Gellius, Attic Nights, 8.111 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Clark (2007), Divine Qualities: Cult and Community in Republican Rome, 34 |
| 22. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 |
| 23. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 5.14 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 |
24. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.23, 7.33, 7.36, 7.96, 7.113, 7.124, 7.130, 7.175, 7.178 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •concord (homonoia) Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 178, 251 | 7.23. Again he would say that if we want to master the sciences there is nothing so fatal as conceit, and again there is nothing we stand so much in need of as time. To the question Who is a friend? his answer was, A second self (alter ego). We are told that he was once chastising a slave for stealing, and when the latter pleaded that it was his fate to steal, Yes, and to be beaten too, said Zeno. Beauty he called the flower of chastity, while according to others it was chastity which he called the flower of beauty. Once when he saw the slave of one of his acquaintance marked with weals, I see, said he, the imprints of your anger. To one who had been drenched with unguent, Who is this, quoth he, who smells of woman? When Dionysius the Renegade asked, Why am I the only pupil you do not correct? the reply was, Because I mistrust you. To a stripling who was talking nonsense his words were, The reason why we have two ears and only one mouth is that we may listen the more and talk the less. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.36. of the many disciples of Zeno the following are the most famous: Persaeus, son of Demetrius, of Citium, whom some call a pupil and others one of the household, one of those sent him by Antigonus to act as secretary; he had been tutor to Antigonus's son Halcyoneus. And Antigonus once, wishing to make trial of him, caused some false news to be brought to him that his estate had been ravaged by the enemy, and as his countece fell, Do you see, said he, that wealth is not a matter of indifference?The following works are by Persaeus:of Kingship.The Spartan Constitution.of Marriage.of Impiety.Thyestes.of Love.Exhortations.Interludes.Four books of Anecdotes.Memorabilia.A Reply to Plato's Laws in seven books. 7.96. Similarly of things evil some are mental evils, namely, vices and vicious actions; others are outward evils, as to have a foolish country or a foolish friend and the unhappiness of such; other evils again are neither mental nor outward, e.g. to be yourself bad and unhappy.Again, goods are either of the nature of ends or they are the means to these ends, or they are at the same time end and means. A friend and the advantages derived from him are means to good, whereas confidence, high-spirit, liberty, delight, gladness, freedom from pain, and every virtuous act are of the nature of ends. 7.113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty. 7.124. He will, however, submit to training to augment his powers of bodily endurance.And the wise man, they say, will offer prayers, and ask for good things from the gods: so Posidonius in the first book of his treatise On Duties, and Hecato in his third book On Paradoxes. Friendship, they declare, exists only between the wise and good, by reason of their likeness to one another. And by friendship they mean a common use of all that has to do with life, wherein we treat our friends as we should ourselves. They argue that a friend is worth having for his own sake and that it is a good thing to have many friends. But among the bad there is, they hold, no such thing as friendship, and thus no bad man has a friend. Another of their tenets is that the unwise are all mad, inasmuch as they are not wise but do what they do from that madness which is the equivalent of their folly. 7.130. Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise of Love, and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease. 7.175. Antiquities.of the Gods.of Giants.of Marriage.On Homer.of Duty, three books.of Good Counsel.of Gratitude.An Exhortation.of the Virtues.of Natural Ability.of Gorgippus.of Envy.of Love.of Freedom.The Art of Love.of Honour.of Fame.The Statesman.of Deliberation.of Laws.of Litigation.of Education.of Logic, three books.of the End.of Beauty.of Conduct.of Knowledge.of Kingship.of Friendship.On the Banquet.On the Thesis that Virtue is the same in Man and in Woman.On the Wise Man turning Sophist.of Usages.Lectures, two books.of Pleasure.On Properties.On Insoluble Problems.of Dialectic.of Moods or Tropes.of Predicates.This, then, is the list of his works. 7.178. The books that he wrote were as follows:of the Cosmos, two books.of Elements.of Seed.of Fortune.of Minimal Parts.Against Atoms and Images.of Organs of Sense.A Course of Five Lectures on Heraclitus.On the Right Arrangement of Ethical Doctrine.of Duty.of Impulse.of the Passions, two books.of Kingship.of the Spartan Constitution.of Lycurgus and Socrates, three books.of Law.On Divination.Dialogues on Love.of the School of Eretria.of Similars.of Terms.of Habit.of Contradictions, three books.of Discourse.of Wealth.of Fame.of Death.Handbook of Dialectic, two books.of Predicates.of Ambiguous Terms.Letters. |
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| 25. Isidore of Seville, Etymologies, 15.249 (6th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Clark (2007), Divine Qualities: Cult and Community in Republican Rome, 34 |
| 26. Andocides, Orations, 1.73, 1.76 Tagged with subjects: •autochthony, and concord (homonoia) Found in books: Barbato (2020), The Ideology of Democratic Athens: Institutions, Orators and the Mythical Past, 101 |
| 28. Iamblichus, Apud Stob., 2.3.15 Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 159 |
| 29. Epigraphy, Ogis, 479 Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 426 |
| 32. Lysias, Orations, 2.20, 2.24, 2.43, 2.63, 2.65, 18.17-18.19, 25.20, 25.27 Tagged with subjects: •autochthony, and concord (homonoia) Found in books: Barbato (2020), The Ideology of Democratic Athens: Institutions, Orators and the Mythical Past, 101, 102 |
| 33. Augustus, Tam, 2.1.301 Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 426 |
| 34. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 251 |
| 35. Andocides, Orations, 1.73, 1.76 Tagged with subjects: •autochthony, and concord (homonoia) Found in books: Barbato (2020), The Ideology of Democratic Athens: Institutions, Orators and the Mythical Past, 101 |
| 36. Epigraphy, Smyrna, 713 Tagged with subjects: •homonoia (concord) Found in books: Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 426 |
| 37. Demosthenes, Orations, 20.110, 22.77, 24.185 Tagged with subjects: •autochthony, and concord (homonoia) Found in books: Barbato (2020), The Ideology of Democratic Athens: Institutions, Orators and the Mythical Past, 101 |
