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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

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Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.



All subjects (including unvalidated):
subject book bibliographic info
acquisition/cognition, body, human, and knowledge Nuno et al (2021) 1, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 54, 55, 57, 66, 67
beliefs, cognitions, accurate benefit Graver (2007) 49, 180, 181, 183, 185
cognition Beck (2006) 2, 4, 24, 62, 82, 108, 109, 129, 134, 135, 136, 149, 151, 153, 154, 186, 237, 259
Inwood and Warren (2020) 174, 175, 177, 188, 189, 192
Jedan (2009) 66, 67, 68, 69, 188
King (2006) 33, 131
Nuno et al (2021) 12, 39, 54, 114, 115, 119
Singer and van Eijk (2018) 9, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 29, 98
van der EIjk (2005) 25, 119
cognition, about action Mackey (2022) 113, 114, 115, 269, 342, 360, 378
cognition, about practice Mackey (2022) 338, 360, 363
cognition, about speech acts Mackey (2022) 366
cognition, action, and Mackey (2022) 113, 114, 115, 139, 269, 342, 378
cognition, affective-behavioral episode of Mackey (2022) 108
cognition, agents, and Mackey (2022) 342
cognition, and agency Mackey (2022) 286, 288, 342
cognition, and autonomy Mackey (2022) 138, 289, 290
cognition, and belief Mackey (2022) 114
cognition, and common ground Mackey (2022) 281
cognition, and conformity Mackey (2022) 41, 130, 138
cognition, and cult Mackey (2022) 213
cognition, and intentionality Mackey (2022) 56, 100, 104, 143
cognition, and norms Mackey (2022) 129, 271
cognition, and representations Mackey (2022) 188, 338
cognition, and ritual Mackey (2022) 338, 342
cognition, and the body/senses Nuno et al (2021) 7, 8, 44, 66, 67
cognition, aristotle, on parmenides and others on perception and Tor (2017) 183, 184, 190, 191, 192, 193, 240, 330, 331
cognition, as element of emotion Kaster(2005) 10, 67, 68, 77, 104, 105, 188, 189
cognition, attunement of Mackey (2022) 269
cognition, belief, and Mackey (2022) 114
cognition, child Mackey (2022) 286
cognition, christian Mackey (2022) 40
cognition, cognitio, Tuori (2016) 5, 40, 64, 156, 185, 186, 187, 219, 251, 253, 271, 295
cognition, constitutive Mackey (2022) 189
cognition, cultural Mackey (2022) 250, 251, 252, 254, 264, 265, 281, 290
cognition, deontic Mackey (2022) 127
cognition, development of Mackey (2022) 89
cognition, developmentally natural Mackey (2022) 11
cognition, embodied Kirichenko (2022) 11
cognition, emotions, and Champion (2022) 148, 149, 150, 151, 152
cognition, excellence, aretē, as Brouwer (2013) 40
cognition, features of Mackey (2022) 229
cognition, freedom, and Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 76, 82, 87, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138
cognition, human Mackey (2022) 338
cognition, hypothesis of Mackey (2022) 359
cognition, in emotions, role of Kaster(2005) 188, 189
cognition, in epictetus and paul, gift of Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138
cognition, in practice Mackey (2022) 338, 365
cognition, intentionality, and Mackey (2022) 56, 100, 143
cognition, its doxographic context, parmenides, his theory of human Tor (2017) 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 240, 241, 242
cognition, katalepsis, accurate Graver (2007) 114, 115
cognition, knowledge, epistēmē, as Brouwer (2013) 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36
cognition, latent zone of Mackey (2022) 279
cognition, meta Mackey (2022) 40, 48, 88
cognition, modern theories Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 294, 296, 297, 301
cognition, natural Mackey (2022) 220, 342, 359, 360
cognition, normativity of Mackey (2022) 73, 118
cognition, of cult Mackey (2022) 137, 213
cognition, of the gods Nuno et al (2021) 134
cognition, ontogeny, of social Mackey (2022) 89, 249, 250, 251, 253
cognition, origen, tripartite classification of Dilley (2019) 101
cognition, parmenides, his theory of human Tor (2017) 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 195, 196, 216, 217, 239, 240
cognition, plotinian Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 310, 311, 322, 324, 455, 490, 491, 492, 493
cognition, practical Mackey (2022) 337
cognition, processes of Mackey (2022) 48, 282, 322
cognition, religious Mackey (2022) 82, 86, 92, 93
cognition, responses to its paradoxical implications, parmenides, his theory of human Tor (2017) 222, 223, 224, 225
cognition, ritual, and Mackey (2022) 338, 342
cognition, roman Mackey (2022) 89, 90, 92, 93
cognition, roman religion, and Mackey (2022) 89, 90, 92, 93
cognition, shared Mackey (2022) 254
cognition, skills of Mackey (2022) 139
cognition, social Despotis and Lohr (2022) 49
Mackey (2022) 281, 290
cognition, speech act, and Mackey (2022) 192, 366
cognition, speech acts as Mackey (2022) 192
cognition, stoicism Malherbe et al (2014) 234, 292, 293, 814
cognition, stoicism, and freedom through Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138
cognition, stoicism, stoic materialism and Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 78, 79
cognition, subjective Mackey (2022) 189
cognition, system Mackey (2022) 1, 2, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 104, 117
cognition, theological Mackey (2022) 218
cognition, theory of Mackey (2022) 358
cognition, thumos, and thumoeides, as a seat of Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012) 118
cognition, γνῶσις Joosse (2021) 84, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 108, 109, 129, 137, 201
cognition/perception, unity, of Joosse (2021) 85, 86, 91, 92, 93
cognitions, accurate, katalepsis Graver (2007) 114, 115
cognitions, expertise, technē, as system of Brouwer (2013) 45, 46
cognitions, knowledge, accurate Graver (2007) 114, 115
cognitive Eidinow and Driediger-Murphy (2019) 60, 227, 230, 244
Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 8, 130
cognitive, activity Dilley (2019) 4, 12, 13
cognitive, agency Mackey (2022) 288
cognitive, alteration Carter (2019) 91, 128
cognitive, and personal, world in paul, physical Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 84
cognitive, and practical command centres, alexander of aphrodisias, aristotelian, distinguished Sorabji (2000) 262, 263
cognitive, anthropology Dilley (2019) 11, 12
cognitive, approach Kingsley Monti and Rood (2022) 217, 222
cognitive, approach to, greek, religion Versnel (2011) 542, 557, 558
cognitive, approaches Williamson (2021) 61
cognitive, approaches to, religion, greek Tor (2017) 41
cognitive, aspect Despotis and Lohr (2022) 5, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 168, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 191, 197, 324, 336, 356, 361, 363, 412, 434
cognitive, communities, cognitive, anthropology Dilley (2019) 12
cognitive, conception in stoicism, god Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 232
cognitive, discipline, prayer, as Dilley (2019) 15
cognitive, disciplines Dilley (2019) 8, 9, 15, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 146, 147
cognitive, dissonance Graver (2007) 52
cognitive, dissonance and, apocalyptic literature and thought, Boustan Janssen and Roetzel (2010) 47
cognitive, dissonance, δυσφωνία Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022) 134
cognitive, faculties, procession, prohodos, πρόοδος‎, of d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 194, 195
cognitive, function, phantasia Manolaraki (2012) 293, 302, 303, 305, 306, 307
cognitive, function, pneuma, spirit, in paul, as having a Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 62, 63, 64, 65, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 156, 157, 227
cognitive, functions of soul, kinetic, ontological Inwood and Warren (2020) 173, 193, 198
cognitive, geography Pinheiro et al (2012a) 59, 74
cognitive, historiography Dilley (2019) 12
cognitive, impression Jedan (2009) 68, 69, 188
cognitive, intuition Struck (2016) 26, 32, 54
cognitive, likeness, axiom, of refined Carter (2019) 163, 164, 165, 166, 178, 180, 181, 188
cognitive, likeness, principle, arche, of Carter (2019) 106, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 166
cognitive, limitations of humans Hoenig (2018) 16
cognitive, linguistics Feder (2022) 50, 51
Kirichenko (2022) 10, 11
Nuno et al (2021) 67
Peels (2016) 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154
cognitive, literary theory Harkins and Maier (2022) 131
cognitive, manifestations Dilley (2019) 98, 99, 100
cognitive, maps Williamson (2021) 57, 300, 324
cognitive, ones, physical terms, and Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 64, 65, 75, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180
cognitive, optimum Mackey (2022) 322, 323
cognitive, science Dilley (2019) 10
cognitive, science of religion Eidinow and Driediger-Murphy (2019) 91, 92
Mackey (2022) 12, 82
Petrovic and Petrovic (2016) 7
cognitive, science of religion, csr Dilley (2019) 10, 11, 150
Geljon and Vos (2020) 201, 210
Mackey (2022) 12, 82, 229
cognitive, science, cognition Laemmle (2021) 27, 86
cognitive, structure of disgust Mermelstein (2021) 162, 167, 251, 252
cognitive, structure, fear Mermelstein (2021) 186
cognitive, structure, pity Mermelstein (2021) 76, 77, 140, 141
cognitive, structure, shame Mermelstein (2021) 160, 161, 162, 250, 251
cognitive, terms, and physical ones Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 64, 65, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180
cognitive, terms, two sides of same coin Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 178, 179, 180
cognitive, theory Dilley (2019) 12
Linjamaa (2019) 15, 17, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 203, 204, 205, 206, 220, 223, 227, 246, 252
cognitive, theory / science of religion Nissinen and Uro (2008) 5, 475, 483
cognitive, theory of virtues d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 267, 268
cognitive, therapy, democritus, presocratic Sorabji (2000) 18
cognitive, therapy, therapy Sorabji (2000) 153
cognitive, typologies Dilley (2019) 101, 102, 103, 104, 105
cognitive, typologies, pachomius Dilley (2019) 5, 91, 104, 190
cognitive, typologies, shenoute Dilley (2019) 102
cognitive, vocabulary Clark (2007) 21, 35, 280
cognitive, with varying interconnection, emotions, two brain tracks, one physical, one Sorabji (2000) 146, 153
cognitive/intellectual, capacities Beck (2006) 4, 44, 47, 108, 109, 129, 151, 153, 154
memory/cognition, tablets, as metaphor for Arthur-Montagne DiGiulio and Kuin (2022) 67, 72, 239, 240

List of validated texts:
27 validated results for "cognitive"
1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 1.26 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • cognitive-affectivity, and meta-cognition

 Found in books: Champion (2022) 116; Linjamaa (2019) 54

1.26. וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ וְיִרְדּוּ בִדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל־הָאָרֶץ וּבְכָל־הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃''. None
1.26. And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’''. None
2. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 6.10 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • cognitive • cognitive aspect

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 324; Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 130

6.10. Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they, seeing with their eyes, and hearing with their ears, and understanding with their heart, return, and be healed.’''. None
3. Homer, Iliad, 1.42, 1.63, 2.527-2.546, 3.277 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive linguistics • Parmenides, his theory of human cognition • Parmenides, his theory of human cognition, its doxographic context • cognition, cognitive science • cognitive • cognitive linguistics • embodied cognition • tablets, as metaphor for memory/cognition

 Found in books: Arthur-Montagne DiGiulio and Kuin (2022) 67; Kirichenko (2022) 10, 11; Laemmle (2021) 27; Peels (2016) 51, 52; Roskovec and Hušek (2021) 8; Tor (2017) 175

1.42. τίσειαν Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν.
1.63. ἢ καὶ ὀνειροπόλον, καὶ γάρ τʼ ὄναρ ἐκ Διός ἐστιν,
2.527. Λοκρῶν δʼ ἡγεμόνευεν Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας 2.528. μείων, οὔ τι τόσος γε ὅσος Τελαμώνιος Αἴας 2.529. ἀλλὰ πολὺ μείων· ὀλίγος μὲν ἔην λινοθώρηξ, 2.530. ἐγχείῃ δʼ ἐκέκαστο Πανέλληνας καὶ Ἀχαιούς· 2.531. οἳ Κῦνόν τʼ ἐνέμοντʼ Ὀπόεντά τε Καλλίαρόν τε 2.532. Βῆσσάν τε Σκάρφην τε καὶ Αὐγειὰς ἐρατεινὰς 2.533. Τάρφην τε Θρόνιον τε Βοαγρίου ἀμφὶ ῥέεθρα· 2.534. τῷ δʼ ἅμα τεσσαράκοντα μέλαιναι νῆες ἕποντο 2.535. Λοκρῶν, οἳ ναίουσι πέρην ἱερῆς Εὐβοίης. 2.536. οἳ δʼ Εὔβοιαν ἔχον μένεα πνείοντες Ἄβαντες 2.537. Χαλκίδα τʼ Εἰρέτριάν τε πολυστάφυλόν θʼ Ἱστίαιαν 2.538. Κήρινθόν τʼ ἔφαλον Δίου τʼ αἰπὺ πτολίεθρον, 2.539. οἵ τε Κάρυστον ἔχον ἠδʼ οἳ Στύρα ναιετάασκον, 2.540. τῶν αὖθʼ ἡγεμόνευʼ Ἐλεφήνωρ ὄζος Ἄρηος 2.541. Χαλκωδοντιάδης μεγαθύμων ἀρχὸς Ἀβάντων. 2.542. τῷ δʼ ἅμʼ Ἄβαντες ἕποντο θοοὶ ὄπιθεν κομόωντες 2.543. αἰχμηταὶ μεμαῶτες ὀρεκτῇσιν μελίῃσι 2.544. θώρηκας ῥήξειν δηΐων ἀμφὶ στήθεσσι· 2.545. τῷ δʼ ἅμα τεσσαράκοντα μέλαιναι νῆες ἕποντο. 2.546. οἳ δʼ ἄρʼ Ἀθήνας εἶχον ἐϋκτίμενον πτολίεθρον
3.277. Ἠέλιός θʼ, ὃς πάντʼ ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντʼ ἐπακούεις,''. None
1.42. fulfill this prayer for me: let the Danaans pay for my tears by your arrows So he spoke in prayer, and Phoebus Apollo heard him. Down from the peaks of Olympus he strode, angered at heart, bearing on his shoulders his bow and covered quiver.
1.63. if war and pestilence alike are to ravage the Achaeans. But come, let us ask some seer or priest, or some reader of dreams—for a dream too is from Zeus—who might say why Phoebus Apollo is so angry, whether he finds fault with a vow or a hecatomb;
2.527. And their leaders busily marshalled the ranks of the Phocians, and made ready for battle hard by the Boeotians on the left.And the Loerians had as leader the swift son of Oïleus, Aias the less, in no wise as great as Telamonian Aias, but far less. Small of stature was he, with corselet of linen, 2.530. /but with the spear he far excelled the whole host of Hellenes and Achaeans. These were they that dwelt in Cynus and Opus and Calliarus and Bessa and Scarphe and lovely Augeiae and Tarphe and Thronium about the streams of Boagrius. With Aias followed forty black ships of 2.535. the Locrians that dwell over against sacred Euboea.And the Abantes, breathing fury, that held Euboea and Chalcis and Eretria and Histiaea, rich in vines, and Cerinthus, hard by the sea, and the steep citadel of Dios; and that held Carystus and dwelt in Styra,— 2.540. all these again had as leader Elephenor, scion of Ares, him that was son of Chalcodon and captain of the great-souled Abantes. And with him followed the swift Abantes, with hair long at the back, spearmen eager with outstretched ashen spears to rend the corselets about the breasts of the foemen. 2.545. /And with him there followed forty black ships.
3.277. Then in their midst Agamemnon lifted up his hands and prayed aloud:Father Zeus, that rulest from Ida, most glorious, most great, and thou Sun, that beholdest all things and hearest all things, and ye rivers and thou earth, and ye that in the world below take vengeance on men that are done with life, whosoever hath sworn a false oath; ''. None
4. None, None, nan (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on Parmenides and others on perception and cognition • Parmenides, his theory of human cognition • Parmenides, his theory of human cognition, its doxographic context • Parmenides, his theory of human cognition, responses to its paradoxical implications • cognition

 Found in books: King (2006) 33; Tor (2017) 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 196, 216, 217, 222, 223, 224, 239, 240, 241

5. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognition, Plotinian • Cognitive theory

 Found in books: Corrigan and Rasimus (2013) 311; Linjamaa (2019) 49

6. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotelian, distinguished cognitive and practical command centres • Body (human), And knowledge acquisition/cognition • Cognitive theory • axiom, of refined cognitive likeness • cognition, and emotion • principle (arche), of cognitive likeness

 Found in books: Carter (2019) 154, 158, 163, 166, 178, 181; Hockey (2019) 63, 66; Linjamaa (2019) 75; Nuno et al (2021) 6; Sorabji (2000) 263

7. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • cognition, and emotion

 Found in books: Hockey (2019) 58; Linjamaa (2019) 74

8. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.20, 3.22, 3.58-3.61, 3.70, 5.54 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, and cognition • beliefs,cognitions, accurate benefit • cognition, about action • cognitive aspect

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 177, 191; Graver (2007) 181; Mackey (2022) 113

3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici." '
3.22. cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec ad ea hec R referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est est enim BE et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, etenim ( cf. p. 106,4 etenim si; contra p. 107, 5 ut si; p. 110, 17 ut enim) Se. ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo hastam aliquo N astam aliquo A aliquo hastam BE hastam aliquā V hastam ( om. aliquo) R aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet secl. Mdv. huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint sint sunt R facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit sit Ern. sed (Sed RNV) hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum.
3.58. Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam quiddam Mdv. quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis iis edd. his rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, actum est Mdv. actum sit ABEN fit V id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in ratione ... ponatur nec in om. R contrariis. 3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. 3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. 3.61. nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia materie BE sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis iis edd. in V his rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in add. Se. vita, nec iis, qui qui que BER sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et et Urs. ut saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic naturae sic B naturae vivere sic ( etiam E) enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, earum rerum BE quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei magis ei ei (et E) magis BE vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum.
3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V
5.54. princeps huius civitatis Phalereus phalereus R phalerius BEN phalerus V Demetrius cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, ad Ptolomaeum se regem Alexandream alexandriam RNV contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa ipsa om. BE philosophia, ad quam te hortamur, excelleret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit scripsit ed. Veneta 1494 ; scribit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. equidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis capto, saepe audiebam, cum se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret. somnum denique nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quandam laboris afferret, contra naturam putaremus datum; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit omnem. itaque si aut requietem natura non quaereret aut eam posset alia quadam ratione consequi, facile pateremur, qui qui N 2 quin etiam nunc agendi aliquid discendique causa prope contra naturam vigilias suscipere soleamus. soleamus valeamus R'". None
3.20. \xa0"To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â\x80\x94 axia as the Stoics call it â\x80\x94 this they pronounce to be \'valuable\' (for so I\xa0suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term \'valueless.\' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are \'things to be taken\' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly \'things to be rejected,\' the first \'appropriate act\' (for so I\xa0render the Greek kathÄ\x93kon) is to preserve oneself in one\'s natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by \'appropriate action\'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. <' "
3.22. \xa0But since those actions which I\xa0have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I\xa0have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' <" '
3.58. \xa0"But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. < 3.59. \xa0"It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification \'on principle\' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. <' "3.60. \xa0But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. <" '3.61. \xa0For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life. <
3.70. \xa0"They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among \'things beneficial.\' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends\' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man\'s own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another\'s loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I\xa0am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. <
5.54. \xa0Demetrius of Phalerum, a ruler of this city, when unjustly banished from his country, repaired to the court of King Ptolemy at Alexandria. Being eminent in the very system of philosophy which we are recommending to you, and a pupil of Theophrastus, he employed the leisure afforded by his disaster in composing a\xa0number of excellent treatises, not for any practical use of his own, for he was debarred from affairs; but he found a sort of food for his higher nature in thus cultivating his mind. I\xa0myself frequently heard the blind exâ\x80\x91praetor and scholar Gnaeus Aufidius declare that he felt the actual loss of light more than the inconvenience of blindness. Take lastly the gift of sleep: did it not bring us repose for our bodies and an antidote for labour, we should think it a violation of nature, for it robs us of sensation and entirely suspends our activity; so that if our nature did not require repose or could obtain it in some other manner, we should be quite content, inasmuch as even as it is we frequently deny ourselves slumber, almost to the point of doing violence to nature, in the interests of business or of study. <''. None
9. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • cognition, as element of emotion • pity, cognitive structure

 Found in books: Kaster(2005) 10; Linjamaa (2019) 91; Mermelstein (2021) 76

10. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Body (human), And knowledge acquisition/cognition • Cognition, And the body/senses • cognition, theological

 Found in books: Mackey (2022) 218; Nuno et al (2021) 66

11. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • cognition • cognitive aspect • cognitive impression

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 177; Jedan (2009) 188

12. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.22.93 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Stoicism, cognition • cognitive aspect

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 191; Malherbe et al (2014) 292

3.22.93. WHEN one of his pupils inquired of Epictetus, and he was a person who appeared to be inclined to Cynism, what kind of person a Cynic ought to be and what was the notion ( πρόληψις ) of the thing, we will inquire, said Epictetus, at leisure: but I have so much to say to you that he who without God attempts so great a matter, is hateful to God, and has no other purpose than to act indecently in public. For in any well-managed house no man comes forward, and says to himself, I ought to be manager of the house. If he does so, the master turns round, and seeing him insolently giving orders, drags him forth and flogs him. So it is also in this great city (the world); for here also there is a master of the house who orders every thing. (He says) You are the sun; you can by going round make the year and seasons, and make the fruits grow and nourish them, and stir the winds and make them remit, and warm the bodies of men properly: go, travel round, and so administer things from the greatest to the least. You are a calf; when a lion shall appear, do your proper business ( i. e. run away): if you do not, you will suffer. You are a bull: advance and fight, for this is your business, and becomes you, and you can do it. You can lead the army against Ilium; be Agamemnon. You can fight in single combat against Hector: be Achilles. But if Thersites came forward and claimed the command, he would either not have obtained it; or if he did obtain it, he would have disgraced himself before many witnesses. Do you also think about the matter carefully: it is not what it seems to you. (You say) I wear a cloak now and I shall wear it then: I sleep hard now, and I shall sleep hard then: I will take in addition a little bag now and a staff, and I will go about and begin to beg and to abuse those whom I meet; and if I see any man plucking the hair out of his body, I will rebuke him, or if he has dressed his hair, or if he walks about in purple—If you imagine the thing to be such as this, keep far away from it: do not approach it: it is not at all for you. But if you imagine it to be what it is, and do not think yourself to be unfit for it, consider what a great thing you undertake. In the first place in the things which relate to yourself, you must not be in any respect like what you do now: you must not blame God or man: you must take away desire altogether, you must transfer avoidance ( ἔκκλισις ) only to the things which are within the power of the will: you must not feel anger nor resentment nor envy nor pity; a girl must not appear handsome to you, nor must you love a little reputation, nor be pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought to know that the rest of men throw walls around them and houses and darkness when they do any such things, and they have many means of concealment. A man shuts the door, he sets somebody before the chamber: if a person comes, say that he is out, he is not at leisure. But the Cynic instead of all these things must use modesty as his protection: if he does not, he will be indecent in his nakedness and under the open sky. This is his house, his door: this is the slave before his bedchamber: this is his darkness. For he ought not to wish to hide any thing that he does: and if he does, he is gone, he has lost the character of a Cynic, of a man who lives under the open sky, of a free man: he has begun to fear some external thing, he has begun to have need of concealment, nor can he get concealment when he chooses. For where shall he hide himself and how? And if by chance this public instructor shall be detected, this paedagogue, what kind of things will he be compelled to suffer? when then a man fears these things, is it possible for him to be bold with his whole soul to superintend men? It cannot be: it is impossible. In the first place then you must make your ruling faculty pure, and this mode of life also. Now (you should say), to me the matter to work on is my understanding, as wood is to the carpenter, as hides to the shoemaker; and my business is the right use of appearances. But the body is nothing to me: the parts of it are nothing to me. Death? Let it come when it chooses, either death of the whole or of a part. Fly, you say. And whither; can any man eject me out of the world? He cannot. But wherever I go, there is the sun, there is the moon, there are the stars, dreams, omens, and the conversation ( ὁμιλία ) with Gods. Then, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic cannot be satisfied with this; but he must know that he is sent a messenger from Zeus to men about good and bad things, to show them that they have wandered and are seeking the substance of good and evil where it is not, but where it is, they never think; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes was carried off to Philip after the battle of Chaeroneia as a spy. For in fact a Cynic is a spy of the things which are good for men and which are evil, and it is his duty to examine carefully and to come and report truly, and not to be struck with terror so as to point out as enemies those who are not enemies, nor in any other way to be perturbed by appearances nor confounded. It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say like Socrates: Men, whither are you hurrying, what are you doing, wretches? like blind people you are wandering up and down: you are going by another road, and have left the true road: you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are not, and if another shows you where they are, you do not believe him. Why do you seek it without? In the body? It is not there. If you doubt, look at Myro, look at Ophellius. In possessions? It is not there. But if you do not believe me, look at Croesus: look at those who are now rich, with what lamentations their life is filled. In power? It is not there. If it is, those must be happy who have been twice and thrice consuls; but they are not. Whom shall we believe in these matters? You who from without see their affairs and are dazzled by an appearance, or the men themselves? What do they say? Hear them when they groan, when they grieve, when on account of these very consulships and glory and splendour they think that they are more wretched and in greater danger. Is it in royal power? It is not: if it were, Nero would have been happy, and Sardanapalus. But neither was Agamemnon happy, though he was a better man than Sardanapalus and Nero; but while others are snoring, what is he doing? Much from his head he tore his rooted hair: Iliad, x. 15. and what does he say himself? I am perplexed, he says, and Disturb’d I am, and my heart out of my bosom Is leaping. Iliad x. 91. Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your possessions? No. Your body? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matter with you? That part of you, whatever it is, has been neglected by you and is corrupted, the part with which we desire, with which we avoid, with which we move towards and move from things. How neglected? He knows not the nature of good for which he is made by nature and the nature of evil; and what is his own, and what belongs to another; and when any thing that belongs to others goes badly, he says, Wo to me, for the Hellenes are in danger. Wretched is his ruling faculty, and alone neglected and uncared for. The Hellenes are going to die destroyed by the Trojans. And if the Trojans do not kill them, will they not die? Yes; but not all at once. What difference then does it make? For if death is an evil, whether men die altogether, or if they die singly, it is equally an evil. Is any thing else then going to happen than the separation of the soul and the body? Nothing. And if the Hellenes perish, is the door closed, and is it not in your power to die? It is. Why then do you lament (and say) Oh, you who are a king and have the sceptre of Zeus? An unhappy king does not exist more than an unhappy god. What then art thou? In truth a shepherd: for you weep as shepherds do, when a wolf has carried off one of their sheep: and these who are governed by you are sheep. And why did you come hither? Was your desire in any danger? was your aversion ( ἔκκλισις )? was your movement (pursuits)? was your avoidance of things? He replies, No; but the wife of my brother was carried off. Was it not then a great gain to be deprived of an adulterous wife?—Shall we be despised then by the Trojans?—What kind of people are the Trojans, wise or foolish? If they are wise, why do you fight with them? If they are fools, why do you care about them? In what then is the good, since it is not in these things? Tell us, you who are lord, messenger and spy. Where you do not think that it is, nor choose to seek it: for if you chose to seek it, you would have found it to be in yourselves; nor would you be wandering out of the way, nor seeking what belongs to others as if it were your own. Turn your thoughts into yourselves: observe the preconceptions which you have. What kind of a thing do you imagine the good to be? That which flows easily, that which is happy, that which is not impeded. Come, and do you not naturally imagine it to be great, do you not imagine it to be valuable? do you not imagine it to be free from harm? In what material then ought you to seek for that which flows easily, for that which is not impeded? in that which serves or in that which is free? In that which is free. Do you possess the body then free or is it in servile condition? We do not know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, of gout, ophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of every thing which is stronger? Yes, it is a slave. How then is it possible that any thing which belongs to the body can be free from hindrance? and how is a thing great or valuable which is naturally dead, or earth, or mud? Well then, do you possess nothing which is free? Perhaps nothing. And who is able to compel you to assent to that which appears false? No man. And who can compel you not to assent to that which appears true? No man. By this then you see that there is something in you naturally free. But to desire or to be averse from, or to move towards an object or to move from it, or to prepare yourself, or to propose to do any thing, which of you can do this, unless he has received an impression of the appearance of that which is profitable or a duty? No man. You have then in these things also something which is not hindered and is free. Wretched men, work out this, take care of this, seek for good here. And how is it possible that a man who has nothing, who is naked, houseless, without a hearth, squalid, without a slave, without a city, can pass a life that flows easily? See, God has sent you a man to show you that it is possible. Look at me, who am without a city, without a house, without possessions, without a slave; I sleep on the ground; I have no wife, no children, no praetorium, but only the earth and heavens, and one poor cloak. And what do I want? Am I not without sorrow? am I not without fear? Am I not free? When did any of you see me failing in the object of my desire? or ever falling into that which I would avoid? did I ever blame God or man? did I ever accuse any man? did any of you ever see me with sorrowful countece? And how do I meet with those whom you are afraid of and admire? Do not I treat them like slaves? Who, when he sees me, does not think that he sees his king and master? This is the language of the Cynics, this their character, this is their purpose. You say No: but their characteristic is the little wallet, and staff, and great jaws: the devouring of all that you give them, or storing it up, or the abusing unseasonably all whom they meet, or displaying their shoulder as a fine thing.—Do you see how you are going to undertake so great a business? First take a mirror: look at your shoulders; observe your loins, your thighs. You are going, my man, to be enrolled as a combatant in the Olympic games, no frigid and miserable contest. In the Olympic games a man is not permitted to be conquered only and to take his departure; but first he must be disgraced in the sight of all the world, not in the sight of Athenians only, or of Lacedaemonians or of Nicopolitans; next he must be whipped also if he has entered into the contests rashly: and before being whipped, he must suffer thirst and heat, and swallow much dust. Reflect more carefully, know thyself, consult the divinity, without God attempt nothing; for if he shall advise you (to do this or anything), be assured that he intends you to become great or to receive many blows. For this very amusing quality is conjoined to a Cynic: he must be flogged like an ass, and when he is flogged, he must love those who flog him, as if he were the father of all, and the brother of all.—You say No; but if a man flogs you, stand in the public place and call out, Caesar, what do I suffer in this state of peace under thy protection. Let us bring the offender before the proconsul.—But what is Caesar to a Cynic, or what is a proconsul or what is any other except him who sent the Cynic down hither, and whom he serves, namely Zeus? Does he call upon any other than Zeus? Is he not convinced that whatever he suffers, it is Zeus who is exercising him? Hercules when he was exercised by Eurystheus did not think that he was wretched, but without hesitation he attempted to execute all that he had in hand. And is he who is trained to the contest and exercised by Zeus going to call out and to be vexed, he who is worthy to bear the sceptre of Diogenes? Hear what Diogenes says to the passers by when he is in a fever, Miserable wretches, will you not stay? but are you going so long a journey to Olympia to see the destruction or the fight of athletes; and will you not choose to see the combat between a fever and a man? Would such a man accuse God who sent him down as if God were treating him unworthily, a man who gloried in his circumstances, and claimed to be an example to those who were passing by? For what shall he accuse him of? because he maintains a decency of behaviour, because he displays his virtue more conspicuously? Well, and what does he say of poverty, about death, about pain? How did he compare his own happiness with that of the great king (the king of Persia)? or rather he thought that there was no comparison between them. For where there are perturbations, and griefs, and fears, and desires not satisfied, and aversions of things which you cannot avoid, and envies and jealousies, how is there a road to happiness there? But where there are corrupt principles, there these things must of necessity be. When the young man asked, if when a Cynic has fallen sick, and a friend asks him to come to his house and to be take care of in his sickness, shall the Cynic accept the invitation, he replied, And where shall you find, I ask, a Cynic’s friend? For the man who invites ought to be such another as the Cynic that he may be worthy of being reckoned the Cynic’s friend. He ought to be a partner in the Cynic’s sceptre and his royalty, and a worthy minister, if he intends to be considered worthy of a Cynic’s friendship, as Diogenes was a friend of Antisthenes, as Crates was a friend of Diogenes. Do you think that if a man comes to a Cynic and salutes him, that he is the Cynic’s friend, and that the Cynic will think him worthy of receiving a Cynio into his house? So that if you please, reflect on this also: rather look round for some convenient dunghill on which you shall bear your fever and which will shelter you from the north wind that you may not be chilled. But you seem to me to wish to go into some man’s house and to be well fed there for a time. Why then do you think of attempting so great a thing (as the life of a Cynic)? But, said the young man, shall marriage and the procreation of children as a chief duty be undertaken by the Cynic? If you grant me a community of wise men, Epictetus replies, perhaps no man will readily apply himself to the Cynic practice. For on whose account should he undertake this manner of life? However if we suppose that he does, nothing will prevent him from marrying and begetting children; for his wife will be another like himself, and his father in law another like himself, and his children will be brought up like himself. But in the present state of things which is like that of an army placed in battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should without any distraction be employed only on the ministration of God, It is remarkable that Epictetus here uses the same word ( ἀπερισπάστως ) with St. Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 35, and urges the same consideration, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from marriage. His observation too that the state of things was then ( ὡς ἐν παρατάξει ) like that of an army prepared for battle, nearly resembles the Apostle’s ( ἐνεστῶσα ἀνάγκη ) present necessity. St. Paul says 2 Tim. ii. 4 ( οὐδεὶς στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται etc.) no man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of life. So Epictetus says here that a Cynic must not be ( ἐμπεπλεγμένον ) in relations etc. From these and many other passages of Epictetus one would be inclined to think that he was not unacquainted with St. Paul’s Epistles or that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine. Mrs. Carter. I do not find any evidence of Epictetus being acquainted with the Epistles of Paul. It is possible that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine, but I have not observed any evidence of the fact. Epictetus and Paul have not the same opinion about marriage, for Paul says that if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn. Accordingly his doctrine is to avoid fornication let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband. He does not directly say what a man should do when he is not able to maintain a wife; but the inference is plain what he will do (I Cor. vii. 2). Paul’s view of marriage differs from that of Epictetus, who recommends marriage. Paul does not: he writes, I say therefore to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they abide even as I. He does not acknowledge marriage and the begetting of children as a duty; which Epictetus did. In the present condition of the world Epictetus says that the minister of God should not marry, because the cares of a family would distract him and make him unable to discharge his duties. There is sound sense in this. A minister of God should not be distracted by the cares of a family, especially if he is poor. able to go about among men, not tied down to the common duties of mankind, nor entangled in the ordinary relations of life, which if he neglects, he will not maintain the character of an honourable and good man? and if he observes them he will lose the character of the messenger, and spy and herald of God. For consider that it is his duty to do something towards his father in law, something to the other kinsfolks of his wife, something to his wife also (if he has one). He is also excluded by being a Cynic from looking after the sickness of his own family, and from providing for their support. And to say nothing of the rest, he must have a vessel for heating water for the child that he may wash it in the bath; wool for his wife when she is delivered of a child, oil, a bed, a cup: so the furniture of the house is increased. I say nothing of his other occupations, and of his distraction. Where then now is that king, he who devotes himself to the public interests, The people’s guardian and so full of cares. Homer, Iliad ii. 25 whose duty it is to look after others, the married and those who have children; to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly; who quarrels; what family is well administered, what is not; going about as a physician does and feels pulses? He says to one, you have a fever, to another you have a head-ache, or the gout: he says to one, abstain from food; to another he says, eat; or do not use the bath; to another, you require the knife, or the cautery. How can he have time for this who is tied to the duties of common life? is it not his duty to supply clothing to his children, and to send them to the school-master with writing tablets, and styles (for writing). Besides must he not supply them with beds? for they cannot be genuine Cynics as soon as they are born. If he does not do this, it would be better to expose the children as soon as they are born than to kill them in this way. Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down to, how we are taking his royalty from him.—Yes, but Crates took a wife.—You are speaking of a circumstance which arose from love and of a woman who was another Crates. But we are inquiring about ordinary marriages and those which are free from distractions, and making this inquiry we do not find the affair of marriage in this state of the world a thing which is especially suited to the Cynic. How then shall a man maintain the existence of society? In the name of God, are those men greater benefactors to society who introduce into the world to occupy their own places two or three grunting children, or those who superintend as far as they can all mankind, and see what they do, how they live, what they attend to, what they neglect contrary to their duty? Did they who left little children to the Thebans do them more good than Epaminondas who died childless? And did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons or Danaus or Aeolus contribute more to the community than Homer? then shall the duty of a general or the business of a writer exclude a man from marriage or the begetting of children, and such a man shall not be judged to have accepted the condition of childlessness for nothing; and shall not the royalty of a Cynic be considered an equivalent for the want of children? Do we not perceive his grandeur and do we not justly contemplate the character of Diogenes; and do we instead of this turn our eyes to the present Cynics who are dogs that wait at tables, and in no respect imitate the Cynics of old except perchance in breaking wind, but in nothing else? For such matters would not have moved us at all nor should we have wondered if a Cynic should not marry or beget children. Man, the Cynic is the father of all men; the men are his sons, the women are his daughters: he so carefully visits all, so well does he care for all. Do you think that it is from idle impertinence that he rebukes those whom he meets? He does it as a father, as a brother, and as the minister of the father of all, the minister of Zeus. If you please, ask me also if a Cynic shall engage in the administration of the state. Fool, do you seek a greater form of administration than that in which he is engaged? Do you ask if he shall appear among the Athenians and say something about the revenues and the supplies, he who must talk with all men, alike with Athenians, alike with Corinthians, alike with Romans, not about supplies, nor yet about revenues, nor about peace or war, but about happiness and unhappiness, about good fortune and bad fortune, about slavery and freedom? When a man has undertaken the administration of such a state, do you ask me if he shall engage in the administration of a state? ask me also if he shall govern (hold a magisterial office): again I will say to you, Fool, what greater government shall he exercise than that which he exercises now? It is necessary also for such a man (the Cynic) to have a certain habit of body: for if he appears to be consumptive, thin and pale, his testimony has not then the same weight. For he must not only by showing the qualities of the soul prove to the vulgar that it is in his power independent of the things which they admire to be a good man, but he must also show by his body that his simple and frugal way of living in the open air does not injure even the body. See, he says, I am a proof of this, and my own body also is. So Diogenes used to do, for he used to go about fresh looking, and he attracted the notice of the many by his personal appearance. But if a Cynic is an object of compassion, he seems to be a beggar: all persons turn away from him, all are offended with him; for neither ought he to appear dirty so that he shall not also in this respect drive away men; but his very roughness ought to be clean and attractive. There ought also to belong to the Cynic much natural grace and sharpness; and if this is not so, he is a stupid fellow, and nothing else; and he must have these qualities that he may be able readily and fitly to be a match for all circumstances that may happen. So Diogenes replied to one who said, Are you the Diogenes who does not believe that there are gods? And, how, replied Diogenes, can this be when I think that you are odious to the gods? On another occasion in reply to Alexander, who stood by him when he was sleeping, and quoted Homer’s line (Iliad, ii. 24) A man a councillor should not sleep all night, he answered, when he was half asleep, The people’s guardian and so full of cares. But before all the Cynic’s ruling faculty must be purer than the sun; and if it is not, he must necessarily be a cunning knave and a fellow of no principle, since while he himself is entangled in some vice he will reprove others. For see how the matter stands: to these kings and tyrants their guards and arms give the power of reproving some persons, and of being able even to punish those who do wrong though they are themselves bad; but to a Cynic instead of arms and guards it is conscience ( τὸ συνειδός ) which gives this power. When he knows that he has watched and laboured for mankind, and has slept pure, and sleep has left him still purer, and that he thought whatever he has thought as a friend of the gods, as a minister, as a participator of the power of Zeus, and that on all occasions he is ready to say Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O Destiny; and also, If so it pleases the gods, so let it be; why should he not have confidence to speak freely to his own brothers, to his children, in a word to his kinsmen? For this reason he is neither over curious nor a busybody when he is in this state of mind; for he is not a meddler with the affairs of others when he is superintending human affairs, but he is looking after his own affairs. If that is not so, you may also say that the general is a busybody, when he inspects his soldiers, and examines them and watches them and punishes the disorderly. But if while you have a cake under your arm, you rebuke others, I will say to you, Will you not rather go away into a corner and eat that which you have stolen; what have you to do with the affairs of others? For who are you? are you the bull of the herd, or the queen of the bees? Show me the tokens of your supremacy, such as they have from nature. But if you are a drone claiming the sovereignty over the bees, do you not suppose that your fellow citizens will put you down as the bees do the drones? The Cynic also ought to have such power of endurance as to seem insensible to the common sort and a stone: no man reviles him, no man strikes him, no man insults him, but he gives his body that any man who chooses may do with it what he likes. For he bears in mind that the inferior must be overpowered by the superior in that in which it is inferior; and the body is inferior to the many, the weaker to the stronger. He never then descends into such a contest in which he can be overpowered; but he immediately withdraws from things which belong to others, he claims not the things which are servile. But where there is will and the use of appearances, there you will see how many eyes he has so that you may say, Argus was blind compared with him. Is his assent ever hasty, his movement (towards an object) rash, does his desire ever fail in its object, does that which he would avoid befal him, is his purpose unaccomplished, does he ever find fault, is he ever humiliated, is he ever envious? To these he directs all his attention and energy; but as to every thing else he snores supine. All is peace; there is no robber who takes away his will, no tyrant. But what say you as to his body? I say there is. And his possessions? I say there is. And as to magistracies and honours?— What does he care for them?—When then any person would frighten him through them, he says to him, Begone, look for children: masks are formidable to them; but I know that they are made of shell, and they have nothing inside. About such a matter as this you are deliberating. Therefore, if you please, I urge you in God’s name, defer the matter, and first consider your preparation for it. For see what Hector says to Andromache, Retire rather, he says, into the house and weave: War is the work of men of all indeed, but specially ’tis mine. II. vi. 490. So he was conscious of his own qualification, and knew her weakness.''. None
13. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 13.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • Stoicism, Stoic materialism and cognition • Stoicism, and freedom through cognition • cognitive terms, and physical ones • cognitive terms, two sides of same coin • freedom, and cognition • gift of cognition, in Epictetus and Paul • physical terms, and cognitive ones • pneuma (spirit) in Paul, as having a cognitive function

 Found in books: Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 62, 75, 78, 87, 124, 128, 180, 227; Linjamaa (2019) 59, 86

13.12. βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι διʼ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.' '. None
13.12. For now we see in a mirror, dimly, butthen face to face. Now I know in part, but then I will know fully, evenas I was also fully known.' '. None
14. New Testament, Colossians, 3.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • cognitive-affectivity, and sayings literature

 Found in books: Champion (2022) 193, 194; Linjamaa (2019) 76

3.5. Νεκρώσατε οὖν τὰ μέλη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, πορνείαν, ἀκαθαρσίαν, πάθος, ἐπιθυμίαν κακήν, καὶ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἥτις ἐστὶν εἰδωλολατρία,''. None
3.5. Put to death therefore your members which are on the earth: sexual immorality, uncleanness, depraved passion, evil desire, and covetousness, which is idolatry; ''. None
15. New Testament, Galatians, 1.15-1.16, 3.1, 3.28, 4.8-4.9, 5.24, 6.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • Stoicism, and freedom through cognition • cognitive, • cognitive-affectivity, and meta-cognition • freedom, and cognition • gift of cognition, in Epictetus and Paul

 Found in books: Champion (2022) 116; Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 129; Linjamaa (2019) 76, 86, 109; Robbins et al (2017) 40, 199

1.15. Ὅτε δὲ εὐδόκησεν ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἀφορίσας μεἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μουκαὶκαλέσαςδιὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ 1.16. ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἵνα εὐαγγελίζωμαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, εὐθέως οὐ προσανεθέμην σαρκὶ καὶ αἵματι,
3.1. Ὦ ἀνόητοι Γαλάται, τίς ὑμᾶς ἐβάσκανεν, οἷς κατʼ ὀφθαλμοὺς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς προεγράφη ἐσταυρωμένος;
3.28. οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστὲ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.
4.8. Ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν οὐκ εἰδότες θεὸν ἐδουλεύσατε τοῖς φύσει μὴ οὖσι θεοῖς· 4.9. νῦν δὲ γνόντες θεόν, μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ θεοῦ, πῶς ἐπιστρέφετε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα, οἷς πάλιν ἄνωθεν δουλεῦσαι θέλετε;
5.24. οἱ δὲ τοῦ χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τὴν σάρκα ἐσταύρωσαν σὺν τοῖς παθήμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις.
6.14. ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ γένοιτο καυχᾶσθαι εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, διʼ οὗ ἐμοὶ κόσμος ἐσταύρωται κἀγὼ κόσμῳ.''. None
1.15. Butwhen it was the good pleasure of God, who separated me from my mother'swomb, and called me through his grace, " "1.16. to reveal his Son in me,that I might preach him among the Gentiles, I didn't immediately conferwith flesh and blood, " '
3.1. Foolish Galatians, who has bewitched you not to obey thetruth, before whose eyes Jesus Christ was openly set forth among you as crucified?
3.28. There is neither Jewnor Greek, there is neither slave nor free man, there is neither malenor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.
4.8. However at that time, not knowing God, youwere in bondage to those who by nature are not gods. 4.9. But now thatyou have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, why do youturn back again to the weak and miserable elements, to which you desireto be in bondage all over again?
5.24. Those who belong to Christhave crucified the flesh with its passions and lusts.
6.14. But far be it from me to boast, except inthe cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world has beencrucified to me, and I to the world. '". None
16. New Testament, Philippians, 2.13, 3.9, 3.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • Stoicism, and freedom through cognition • cognitive aspect • freedom, and cognition • gift of cognition, in Epictetus and Paul • pneuma (spirit) in Paul, as having a cognitive function

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 324; Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 125, 127, 156; Linjamaa (2019) 123

2.13. θεὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐδοκίας·
3.9. μὴ ἔχων ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ νόμου ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει,
3.11. εἴ πως καταντήσω εἰς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν. οὐχ ὅτι ἤδη ἔλαβον ἢ ἤδη τετελείωμαι,''. None
2.13. For it is God who works in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure.
3.9. and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own, that which is of the law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is from God by faith;
3.11. if by any means I may attain to the resurrection from the dead. ''. None
17. New Testament, Romans, 1.24, 1.26-1.27, 6.13, 8.6, 8.38-8.39, 9.18-9.21, 13.13-13.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • God, cognitive conception in Stoicism • Stoicism, Stoic materialism and cognition • Stoicism, and freedom through cognition • cognitive aspect • cognitive terms, and physical ones • cognitive terms, two sides of same coin • freedom, and cognition • gift of cognition, in Epictetus and Paul • physical terms, and cognitive ones • pneuma (spirit) in Paul, as having a cognitive function

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 168, 363; Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 65, 76, 77, 78, 79, 126, 177, 179, 227, 232; Linjamaa (2019) 76, 86, 119, 149, 150

1.24. Διὸ παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς,
1.26. Διὰ τοῦτο παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας· αἵ τε γὰρ θήλειαι αὐτῶν μετήλλαξαν τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν, 1.27. ὁμοίως τε καὶ οἱ ἄρσενες ἀφέντες τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν τῆς θηλείας ἐξεκαύθησαν ἐν τῇ ὀρέξει αὐτῶν εἰς ἀλλήλους ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσιν, τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην κατεργαζόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν ἣν ἔδει τῆς πλάνης αὐτῶν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀπολαμβάνοντες.
6.13. μηδὲ παριστάνετε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν ὅπλα ἀδικίας τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἀλλὰ παραστήσατε ἑαυτοὺς τῷ θεῷ ὡσεὶ ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῶντας καὶ τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν ὅπλα δικαιοσύνης τῷ θεῷ·
8.6. τὸ γὰρ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος, τὸ δὲ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη·
8.38. πέπεισμαι γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε ζωὴ οὔτε ἄγγελοι οὔτε ἀρχαὶ οὔτε ἐνεστῶτα οὔτε μέλλοντα οὔτε δυνάμεις 8.39. οὔτε ὕψωμα οὔτε βάθος οὔτε τις κτίσις ἑτέρα δυνήσεται ἡμᾶς χωρίσαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.
9.18. ἄρα οὖν ὃν θέλει ἐλεεῖ, ὃν δὲ θέλεισκληρύνει. 9.19. Ἐρεῖς μοι οὖν Τί ἔτι μέμφεται; 9.20. τῷ γὰρ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ τίς ἀνθέστηκεν; ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μενοῦνγε σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ ἀνταποκρινόμενος τῷ θεῷ;μὴ ἐρεῖ τὸ πλάσμα τῷ πλάσαντιΤί με ἐποίησας οὕτως; 9.21. ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίανὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος ποιῆσαι ὃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκεῦος, ὃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν;
13.13. ὡς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ εὐσχημόνως περιπατήσωμεν, μὴ κώμοις καὶ μέθαις, μὴ κοίταις καὶ ἀσελγείαις, μὴ ἔριδι καὶ ζήλῳ. 13.14. ἀλλὰ ἐνδύσασθε τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πρόνοιαν μὴ ποιεῖσθε εἰς ἐπιθυμίας.' '. None
1.24. Therefore God also gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to uncleanness, that their bodies should be dishonored among themselves,
1.26. For this reason, God gave them up to vile passions. For their women changed the natural function into that which is against nature. 1.27. Likewise also the men, leaving the natural function of the woman, burned in their lust toward one another, men doing what is inappropriate with men, and receiving in themselves the due penalty of their error.
6.13. Neither present your members to sin as instruments of unrighteousness, but present yourselves to God, as alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness to God.
8.6. For the mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the Spirit is life and peace;
8.38. For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, 8.39. nor height, nor depth, nor any other created thing, will be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.
9.18. So then, he has mercy on whom he desires, and he hardens whom he desires. 9.19. You will say then to me, "Why does he still find fault? For who withstands his will?" 9.20. But indeed, O man, who are you to reply against God? Will the thing formed ask him who formed it, "Why did you make me like this?"' "9.21. Or hasn't the potter a right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel for honor, and another for dishonor? " '
13.13. Let us walk properly, as in the day; not in reveling and drunkenness, not in sexual promiscuity and lustful acts, and not in strife and jealousy. 13.14. But put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, for its lusts. ' '. None
18. New Testament, Luke, 6.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • apocalyptic literature and thought, cognitive dissonance and • cognitive-affectivity, and meta-cognition

 Found in books: Boustan Janssen and Roetzel (2010) 47; Champion (2022) 116

6.36. Γίνεσθε οἰκτίρμονες καθὼς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν·''. None
6.36. Therefore be merciful, Even as your Father is also merciful. ''. None
19. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • cognitive aspect • excellence (aretē), as cognition

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 40; Despotis and Lohr (2022) 175

441c. and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.''. None
20. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 59.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • cognition, and emotion

 Found in books: Hockey (2019) 76; Linjamaa (2019) 97

59.2. I am aware that if we test words by our formula,1 even pleasure is a thing of ill repute, and joy can be attained only by the wise. For "joy" is an elation of spirit, – of a spirit which trusts in the goodness and truth of its own possessions. The common usage, however, is that we derive great "joy" from a friend\'s position as consul, or from his marriage, or from the birth of his child; but these events, so far from being matters of joy, are more often the beginnings of sorrow to come. No, it is a characteristic of real joy that it never ceases, and never changes into its opposite.2 ''. None
21. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • cognition, • cognitive,

 Found in books: Linjamaa (2019) 52; Robbins et al (2017) 114, 117, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 156, 178, 179

22. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • cognition • cognition, and emotion • cognitive aspect • cognitive impression

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022) 172; Hockey (2019) 71; Jedan (2009) 68, 69, 188

23. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.47, 7.52, 7.85-7.87, 7.89, 7.111, 7.114, 7.116, 7.120, 7.127, 7.156 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognition • Cognitive theory • Stoicism/Stoics, cognition as origin of wisdom ,xvi • cognition • cognition, and emotion • cognitions, accurate (katalepsis) • cognitive aspect • excellence (aretē), as cognition • expertise (technē), as system of cognitions • katalepsis (accurate cognition) • knowledge (epistēmē), as cognition • knowledge, accurate cognitions

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 30, 40, 46; Despotis and Lohr (2022) 172, 174, 175, 176; Graver (2007) 115; Hockey (2019) 69, 76; Inwood and Warren (2020) 189; Jedan (2009) 67; Linjamaa (2019) 91, 95, 96, 137, 177; Volk and Williams (2006) 84

7.47. By wariness they mean a strong presumption against what at the moment seems probable, so as not to be taken in by it. Irrefutability is strength in argument so as not to be brought over by it to the opposite side. Earnestness (or absence of frivolity) is a habit of referring presentations to right reason. Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot methodically put questions and give answers.
7.52. The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation (αἴσθησις) to three things: (1) the current passing from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, (3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation. According to them it is by sense that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we apprehend the conclusions of demonstration, for instance the existence of gods and their providence. General notions, indeed, are gained in the following ways: some by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by contrariety.' "
7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it." "7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically." '7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.
7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse.' "
7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself." "
7.114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines:Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.Resentment is anger in an early stage.Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another's ills. Delight is the mind's propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue." '
7.116. Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness.
7.120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct.
7.127. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues, and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods:
7.156. And there are five terrestrial zones: first, the northern zone which is beyond the arctic circle, uninhabitable because of the cold; second, a temperate zone; a third, uninhabitable because of great heats, called the torrid zone; fourth, a counter-temperate zone; fifth, the southern zone, uninhabitable because of its cold.Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create; which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath. And the soul is a nature capable of perception. And they regard it as the breath of life, congenital with us; from which they infer first that it is a body and secondly that it survives death. Yet it is perishable, though the soul of the universe, of which the individual souls of animals are parts, is indestructible.''. None
24. Augustine, The City of God, 6.10 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognition • cognition, System

 Found in books: Mackey (2022) 91; Nuno et al (2021) 114

6.10. That liberty, in truth, which this man wanted, so that he did not dare to censure that theology of the city, which is very similar to the theatrical, so openly as he did the theatrical itself, was, though not fully, yet in part possessed by Ann us Seneca, whom we have some evidence to show to have flourished in the times of our apostles. It was in part possessed by him, I say, for he possessed it in writing, but not in living. For in that book which he wrote against superstition, he more copiously and vehemently censured that civil and urban theology than Varro the theatrical and fabulous. For, when speaking concerning images, he says, They dedicate images of the sacred and inviolable immortals in most worthless and motionless matter. They give them the appearance of man, beasts, and fishes, and some make them of mixed sex, and heterogeneous bodies. They call them deities, when they are such that if they should get breath and should suddenly meet them, they would be held to be monsters. Then, a while afterwards, when extolling the natural theology, he had expounded the sentiments of certain philosophers, he opposes to himself a question, and says, Here some one says, Shall I believe that the heavens and the earth are gods, and that some are above the moon and some below it? Shall I bring forward either Plato or the peripatetic Strato, one of whom made God to be without a body, the other without a mind? In answer to which he says, And, really, what truer do the dreams of Titus Tatius, or Romulus, or Tullus Hostilius appear to you? Tatius declared the divinity of the goddess Cloacina; Romulus that of Picus and Tiberinus; Tullus Hostilius that of Pavor and Pallor, the most disagreeable affections of men, the one of which is the agitation of the mind under fright, the other that of the body, not a disease, indeed, but a change of color. Will you rather believe that these are deities, and receive them into heaven? But with what freedom he has written concerning the rites themselves, cruel and shameful! One, he says, castrates himself, another cuts his arms. Where will they find room for the fear of these gods when angry, who use such means of gaining their favor when propitious? But gods who wish to be worshipped in this fashion should be worshipped in none. So great is the frenzy of the mind when perturbed and driven from its seat, that the gods are propitiated by men in a manner in which not even men of the greatest ferocity and fable-renowned cruelty vent their rage. Tyrants have lacerated the limbs of some; they never ordered any one to lacerate his own. For the gratification of royal lust, some have been castrated; but no one ever, by the command of his lord, laid violent hands on himself to emasculate himself. They kill themselves in the temples. They supplicate with their wounds and with their blood. If any one has time to see the things they do and the things they suffer, he will find so many things unseemly for men of respectability, so unworthy of freemen, so unlike the doings of sane men, that no one would doubt that they are mad, had they been mad with the minority; but now the multitude of the insane is the defense of their sanity. He next relates those things which are wont to be done in the Capitol, and with the utmost intrepidity insists that they are such things as one could only believe to be done by men making sport, or by madmen. For having spoken with derision of this, that in the Egyptian sacred rites Osiris, being lost, is lamented for, but straightway, when found, is the occasion of great joy by his reappearance, because both the losing and the finding of him are feigned; and yet that grief and that joy which are elicited thereby from those who have lost nothing and found nothing are real - having I say, so spoken of this, he says, Still there is a fixed time for this frenzy. It is tolerable to go mad once in the year. Go into the Capitol. One is suggesting divine commands to a god; another is telling the hours to Jupiter; one is a lictor; another is an anointer, who with the mere movement of his arms imitates one anointing. There are women who arrange the hair of Juno and Minerva, standing far away not only from her image, but even from her temple. These move their fingers in the manner of hairdressers. There are some women who hold a mirror. There are some who are calling the gods to assist them in court. There are some who are holding up documents to them, and are explaining to them their cases. A learned and distinguished comedian, now old and decrepit, was daily playing the mimic in the Capitol, as though the gods would gladly be spectators of that which men had ceased to care about. Every kind of artificers working for the immortal gods is dwelling there in idleness. And a little after he says, Nevertheless these, though they give themselves up to the gods for purposes superflous enough, do not do so for any abominable or infamous purpose. There sit certain women in the Capitol who think they are beloved by Jupiter; nor are they frightened even by the look of the, if you will believe the poets, most wrathful Juno. This liberty Varro did not enjoy. It was only the poetical theology he seemed to censure. The civil, which this man cuts to pieces, he was not bold enough to impugn. But if we attend to the truth, the temples where these things are performed are far worse than the theatres where they are represented. Whence, with respect to these sacred rites of the civil theology, Seneca preferred, as the best course to be followed by a wise man, to feign respect for them in act, but to have no real regard for them at heart. All which things, he says, a wise man will observe as being commanded by the laws, but not as being pleasing to the gods. And a little after he says, And what of this, that we unite the gods in marriage, and that not even naturally, for we join brothers and sisters? We marry Bellona to Mars, Venus to Vulcan, Salacia to Neptune. Some of them we leave unmarried, as though there were no match for them, which is surely needless, especially when there are certain unmarried goddesses, as Populonia, or Fulgora, or the goddess Rumina, for whom I am not astonished that suitors have been awanting. All this ignoble crowd of gods, which the superstition of ages has amassed, we ought, he says, to adore in such a way as to remember all the while that its worship belongs rather to custom than to reality. Wherefore, neither those laws nor customs instituted in the civil theology that which was pleasing to the gods, or which pertained to reality. But this man, whom philosophy had made, as it were, free, nevertheless, because he was an illustrious senator of the Roman people, worshipped what he censured, did what he condemned, adored what he reproached, because, forsooth, philosophy had taught him something great - namely, not to be superstitious in the world, but, on account of the laws of cities and the customs of men, to be an actor, not on the stage, but in the temples, - conduct the more to be condemned, that those things which he was deceitfully acting he so acted that the people thought he was acting sincerely. But a stage-actor would rather delight people by acting plays than take them in by false pretences. ''. None
25. Vergil, Eclogues, 4.60
 Tagged with subjects: • cognition, as element of emotion • emotions,role of cognition in • ontogeny, of social cognition

 Found in books: Kaster(2005) 189; Mackey (2022) 249

4.60. by Destiny's unalterable decree."". None
26. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • cognitive theory of virtues • excellence (aretē), as cognition

 Found in books: Brouwer (2013) 40; d, Hoine and Martijn (2017) 267

27. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Cognitive theory • cognition, and emotion

 Found in books: Hockey (2019) 74; Linjamaa (2019) 75

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