| 1. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
| 2. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
| 3. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 117.13, 121.12-121.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
| 4. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1052 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
| 5. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.161-7.163, 7.228-7.231, 7.372, 8.11, 8.70, 8.275, 8.400, 8.409-8.410 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 25, 226 |
| 6. Hierocles Stoicus, , 4.38-4.53 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
| 7. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.70 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
8. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.50-7.51, 7.57, 7.63 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 | 7.50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take impression in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object. 7.51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man. 7.57. Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible – which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse. 7.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries. |
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| 9. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 15.20.2 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
10. Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.3 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 | 3.1.3. But since a rational animal not only has within itself these natural movements, but has moreover, to a greater extent than other animals, the power of reason, by which it can judge and determine regarding natural movements, and disapprove and reject some, while approving and adopting others, so by the judgment of this reason may the movements of men be governed and directed towards a commendable life. And from this it follows that, since the nature of this reason which is in man has within itself the power of distinguishing between good and evil, and while distinguishing possesses the faculty of selecting what it has approved, it may justly be deemed worthy of praise in choosing what is good, and deserving of censure in following that which is base or wicked. This indeed must by no means escape our notice, that in some dumb animals there is found a more regular movement than in others, as in hunting-dogs or war-horses, so that they may appear to some to be moved by a kind of rational sense. But we must believe this to be the result not so much of reason as of some natural instinct, largely bestowed for purposes of that kind. Now, as we had begun to remark, seeing that such is the nature of a rational animal, some things may happen to us human beings from without; and these, coming in contact with our sense of sight, or hearing, or any other of our senses, may incite and arouse us to good movements, or the contrary; and seeing they come to us from an external source, it is not within our own power to prevent their coming. But to determine and approve what use we ought to make of those things which thus happen, is the duty of no other than of that reason within us, i.e., of our own judgment; by the decision of which reason we use the incitement, which comes to us from without for that purpose, which reason approves, our natural movements being determined by its authority either to good actions or the reverse. 3.1.3. The rational animal, however, has, in addition to its phantasial nature, also reason, which judges the phantasies, and disapproves of some and accepts others, in order that the animal may be led according to them. Therefore, since there are in the nature of reason aids towards the contemplation of virtue and vice, by following which, after beholding good and evil, we select the one and avoid the other, we are deserving of praise when we give ourselves to the practice of virtue, and censurable when we do the reverse. We must not, however, be ignorant that the greater part of the nature assigned to all things is a varying quantity among animals, both in a greater and a less degree; so that the instinct in hunting-dogs and in war-horses approaches somehow, so to speak, to the faculty of reason. Now, to fall under some one of those external causes which stir up within us this phantasy or that, is confessedly not one of those things that are dependent upon ourselves; but to determine that we shall use the occurrence in this way or differently, is the prerogative of nothing else than of the reason within us, which, as occasion offers, arouses us towards efforts inciting to what is virtuous and becoming, or turns us aside to what is the reverse. |
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| 14. Galen, On Hippocrates Epidemics, 6.270 Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
| 16. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 15.212 Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
| 17. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 1.49.33 Tagged with subjects: •cleanthes, on impressions Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226 |
