1. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.4.8 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium,
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 211; Inwood and Warren (2020) 127
1.4.8. σὺ δὲ σαυτῷ δοκεῖς τι φρόνιμον ἔχειν; ἐρώτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἴει φρόνιμον εἶναι; καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι· νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα διʼ ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὡς οἴει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν;''. None | 1.4.8. Do you think you have any wisdom yourself? Oh! Ask me a question and judge from my answer. And do you suppose that wisdom is nowhere else to be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose, just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due, forsooth, to a sort of absurdity? ''. None |
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2. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 34; Sorabji (2000) 322
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3. None, None, nan (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium, biography • Zeno of Citium, epistemology of
Found in books: Long (2006) 223; Wardy and Warren (2018) 245
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4. Cicero, De Finibus, 4.51, 4.61, 5.14, 5.16, 5.23-5.24 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, and Arcesilaus
Found in books: Frede and Laks (2001) 47; Long (2006) 107; Sorabji (2000) 207; Tsouni (2019) 50, 71; Wardy and Warren (2018) 269, 271
| 4.51. \xa0The minor premise Polemo will concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the whole of their clan, as well as all the other philosophers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief Good; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it is, and excels everything else to a degree hardly to be expressed in words, Polemo will be able to be happy if endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all besides, and yet he will not grant you that nothing except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with virtue will perhaps decline to grant that happiness contains any just ground for pride; although they, it is true, sometimes represent even pleasures as things to be proud of. <
4.61. \xa0What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? \'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâ\x80\x91eminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.\' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" <
5.14. \xa0"I\xa0pass over a\xa0number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I\xa0know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. <
5.16. \xa0and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. <
5.23. \xa0"The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. < 5.24. \xa0"Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. <''. None |
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5. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.21, 3.41, 3.48, 3.50-3.53, 3.60, 4.3, 4.51, 4.61, 5.14, 5.16, 5.23-5.24, 5.74 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, and Arcesilaus • Zeno of Citium, on moral end
Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 99, 104; Frede and Laks (2001) 47; Graver (2007) 230; Long (2006) 107; Maso (2022) 117, 118, 132; Sorabji (2000) 170, 172, 207; Tsouni (2019) 50, 71, 73; Wardy and Warren (2018) 269, 271; Wynne (2019) 123
3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum.
3.41. Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam qua tractata Guyet. a Peripateticis mollius—est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem ignorantiam R dialecticae—Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio aio aĩo V animo R oio ( prior o ab alt. m. in ras. ) N discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod non ex omni quod Dav. non quod ex omni ARV noro quod ex omni BE numquam ex omni N aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent.
3.48. itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse—isdem placere esse alium alio et et ABERV ( sequitur itemque; cf. p.188, 15 sq. et eos ... nosque), et (= etiam, ab alt. m., ut vid. ) N sapientiorem itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat adpropinquat (appr.) edd. ut propinquat ABER apropin- quat N 2 propinquat N 1 V ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum habitum dett. aditum (additum R) nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit. Haec mirabilia videri intellego, sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum de eorum R quidem est veritate dubitandum. sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen tamen N 2 et tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. Divitias autem Diogenes censet eam eam non eam dett. modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam;
3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE' "3.51. quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valitudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum ' ipsius Ciceronis in scribendo lapsus' Mdv. similium rerum in usu O. Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 246 alia alii AR autem non esse eius modi, itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno prohgme/non, contraque quod a)poprohgme/non nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi verbi ( post huius) om. A faciendi Zenonis exponere." "3.52. Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim id est enim Mdv. idem enim est ( in N enim ab alt. m. superscr. ; V om. enim) prohgme/non ), sed eos, qui in aliquo honore sunt, sunt R sint quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primo loco primo loco O. Heinius ibid. p. 245 pri- morie A p'mori e loco BE primove R primorie (o corr. in a) N primore V sunt, sed ea, quae ' In primorie latet primo ordine, quam vocem adscripsit qui haec ad antecedentia quorum ordo proxime accedit ut secundus sit accommodare studeret' H. A. Koch p. 37. Cf. etiam p. 110, 5 sq. secundum locum optinent, prohgme/na, id est producta, nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus—id erit verbum e verbo—vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta. re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus." '3.53. quoniam autem omne, quod est bonum, primum locum tenere dicimus, necesse est nec bonum esse nec malum hoc, quod praepositum praepositum edd. propositum vel praecipuum nominamus. idque ita definimus; quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione mediocri; quod enim illi a)dia/foron dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit, ut indifferens dicerem. neque enim illud fieri poterat ullo modo, ut nihil relinqueretur in mediis, quod aut secundum naturam esset aut contra, nec, cum id relinqueretur, nihil in his poni, quod satis satis om. A aestimabile esset, nec hoc posito non aliqua esse esse P. Man. esset praeposita. recte igitur haec facta distinctio est, atque etiam ab iis, quo facilius res perspici possit, hoc simile ponitur:
3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser.
4.3. Existimo igitur, inquam, Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, auditores Platonis BE Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum, Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitutam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni, cum Polemonem audisset, cur et ab eo ipso et a superioribus dissideret. quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim quid mutandum putes nec expectes, dum ad omnia dicam, quae a te a te ed. princ. Rom. ante dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra confligendum puto.
4.51. dabit hoc Zenoni Polemo, etiam magister eius et tota illa gens et reliqui, qui virtutem omnibus rebus multo anteponentes adiungunt ei tamen aliquid summo in bono finiendo. si enim virtus digna est gloriatione, ut est, tantumque praestat reliquis rebus, ut dici vix possit, et beatus esse poterit (25 poterit, sc. non Polemo, sed qui virtute una praeditus est, caret ceteris) virtute una praeditus carens ceteris, nec tamen illud tibi concedetur, concedetur Se. concedet praeter virtutem nihil in bonis esse ducendum. illi autem, quibus summum bonum sine virtute est, non dabunt fortasse vitam beatam habere, in quo iure possit possit iure BE gloriari, etsi illi quidem etiam voluptates faciunt interdum gloriosas.
4.61. quid, si reviviscant Platonis illi et deinceps qui eorum auditores fuerunt, et tecum ita loquantur? Nos cum te, M. Cato, studiosissimum philosophiae, iustissimum virum, optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem, audiremus, admirati sumus, quid esset cur nobis Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sentirent ea, quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, nominibus uterentur iis, quae prima specie admirationem, re explicata risum moverent. tu autem, si tibi illa probabantur, cur non propriis verbis ea ea NV eas R illa BE tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne omnibus et Platoni ipsi nescio quem illum anteponebas? praesertim cum in re publica princeps esse velles ad eamque tuendam cum summa tua dignitate maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. a nobis enim ista quaesita, a nobis descripta, notata, add. Lamb. praecepta sunt, omniumque rerum publicarum rectionis rectionis Mdv. rectiones BERN rectores V genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et leges etiam et ERN leges et etiam B et etiam leges et V instituta ac mores civitatum perscripsimus. eloquentiae vero, quae et principibus maximo ornamento maximo ornamento RV maximo e ornamento B maximo cornamento E maxime (e ex corr. m. alt. ) ornamento N est, et qua te audimus audivimus RV valere plurimum, et qua te ... plurimum om. N quantum tibi ex monumentis monimentis RV nostris addidisses! Ea cum dixissent, quid tandem talibus viris responderes?
5.14. praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet.
5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam.
5.23. de illis, cum volemus. Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tamquam tamquam (tanquā R) tranquillitas RN tranquillitas tamquam BE tranquillitas ( om. tamquam) V tranquillitas, quam appellant eu)qumi/an, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea ipsa secl. Se. est est ipsa BE beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sit ( utroque loco ) dett. sint sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus diximus p. 163, 16 sqq. naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil quod non aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse del. Lamb. ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quicquam quicquam quitquid BE omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. ergo ergo igitur BE instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium. 5.24. Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul et ortum est, id agit, se ut ut se BE conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, qualecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quicquid se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob ob N 2 ad causam habeat habeat Lamb. habet eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae nature V natura ( etiam B) est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque que ER et NV om. B accommodatissime.' "
5.74. quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula diverticula BENV quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos dies voluptatemque primo dumtaxat primo dumtaxat NV prima dum taxat R dumtaxat primo BE expeti dicunt, quaerunt ... habent ... dicunt Lamb. quaerant ... habeant (habent V) ... dicant (' sententiae satisfaceret : quidni, quum etiam ... quaerant ... habeant ... dicant? ut minus hoc in Calliphonte et Diodoro mirum esse significaretur ' Mdv. ) deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici, qua inpulsi multa faciant faciant Bentl., Ernest. ; faciunt nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram rem a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam add. Bentl., Davis. transtulerunt; atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus. Quae cum dixisset paulumque parumque BE institisset, Quid est?"'. None | 3.21. \xa0Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â\x80\x94 in Stoic phraseology ennoia â\x80\x94 and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â\x80\x94 inasmuch I\xa0say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. <" '
3.41. \xa0"Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâ\x80\x91called \'problem of good and evil,\' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I\xa0maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. <
3.48. \xa0So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open for us to say, who do not think that the end of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all."I\xa0am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. <
3.50. \xa0But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. <' "3.51. \xa0Again among things valuable â\x80\x94 e.g.\xa0health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like â\x80\x94 they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proÄ\x93gmena and the opposite, apoproÄ\x93gmena â\x80\x94 for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. <" '3.52. \xa0"In a royal court, Zeno remarks, no one speaks of the king himself as \'promoted\' to honour (for that is the meaning of proÄ\x93gmenon), but the term is applied to those holding some office of state whose rank most nearly approaches, though it is second to, the royal preâ\x80\x91eminence; similarly in the conduct of life the title proÄ\x93gmenon, that is, \'promoted,\' is to be given not to those things which are in the first rank, but to those which hold the second place; for these we may use either the term suggested (for that will be a literal translation) or \'advanced\' and \'degraded,\' or the term we have been using all along, \'preferred\' or \'superior,\' and for the opposite \'rejected.\' If the meaning is intelligible we need not be punctilious about the use of words. <' "3.53. \xa0But since we declare that everything that is good occupies the first rank, it follows that this which we entitle preferred or superior is neither good nor evil; and accordingly we define it as being indifferent but possessed of a moderate value â\x80\x94 since it has occurred to me that I\xa0may use the word 'indifferent' to represent their term adiaphoron. For in fact, it was inevitable that the class of intermediate things should contain some things that were either in accordance with nature, or the reverse, and this being so, that this class should include some things which possessed moderate value, and, granting this, that some things of this class should be 'preferred.' <" "
3.60. \xa0But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. <" '
4.3. \xa0"My view, then, Cato," I\xa0proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master\'s predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows â\x80\x94 but I\xa0should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting while I\xa0deal with the whole of your discourse; for I\xa0think I\xa0shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. <
4.51. \xa0The minor premise Polemo will concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the whole of their clan, as well as all the other philosophers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief Good; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it is, and excels everything else to a degree hardly to be expressed in words, Polemo will be able to be happy if endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all besides, and yet he will not grant you that nothing except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with virtue will perhaps decline to grant that happiness contains any just ground for pride; although they, it is true, sometimes represent even pleasures as things to be proud of. <
4.61. \xa0What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? \'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâ\x80\x91eminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.\' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" <
5.14. \xa0"I\xa0pass over a\xa0number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I\xa0know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. <
5.16. \xa0and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. <
5.23. \xa0"The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. < 5.24. \xa0"Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. <
5.74. \xa0Even the votaries of pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things. Our system therefore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the student of the liberal arts, of the learned and the eminent, of statesmen and princes." <'". None |
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6. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.3, 1.36-1.39, 2.13-2.16, 2.19-2.22, 2.57-2.58, 2.64, 2.87-2.88, 2.160-2.161 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, • Zeno of Citium, on mental conflict • Zeno, of Citium
Found in books: Agri (2022) 17; Bar Kochba (1997) 98; Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 608, 611; Del Lucchese (2019) 176, 210, 211, 246; Frede and Laks (2001) 97, 102, 112; Graver (2007) 233; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 133, 135, 141; Long (2006) 119, 130; Long (2019) 82; Maso (2022) 138; Vazques and Ross (2022) 212; Williams and Vol (2022) 210; Wynne (2019) 123, 156, 282
| 1.3. For there are and have been philosophers who hold that the gods exercise no control over human affairs whatever. But if their opinion is the true one, how can piety, reverence or religion exist? For all these are tributes which it is our duty to render in purity and holiness to the divine powers solely on the assumption that they take notice of them, and that some service has been rendered by the immortal gods to the race of men. But if on the contrary the gods have neither the power nor the will to aid us, if they pay no heed to us at all and take no notice of our actions, if they can exercise no possible influence upon the life of men, what ground have we for rendering any sort of worship, honour or prayer to the immortal gods? Piety however, like the rest of the virtues, cannot exist in mere outward show and pretence; and, with piety, reverence and religion must likewise disappear. And when these are gone, life soon becomes a welter of disorder and confusion;
1.36. "Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno\'s view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a \'reason\' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod\'s Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. ' "
1.37. Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views. He thinks that the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all. Cleanthes, who attended Zeno's lectures at the same time as the last-named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and at another decides that the most unquestionable deity is that remote all‑surrounding fiery atmosphere called the aether, which encircles and embraces the universe on its outer side at an exceedingly lofty altitude; while in the books that he wrote to combat hedonism he babbles like one demented, now imagining gods of some definite shape and form, now assigning full divinity to the stars, now pronouncing that nothing is more divine than reason. The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. " '
1.38. Persaeus, another pupil of Zeno, says that men have deified those persons who have made some discovery of special utility for civilization, and that useful and health-giving things have themselves been called by divine names; he did not even say that they were discoveries of the gods, but speaks of them as actually divine. But what could be more ridiculous than to award divine honours to things mean and ugly, or to give the rank of gods to men now dead and gone, whose worship could only take the form of lamentation?
1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. ' "
2.13. As to their nature there are various opinions, but their existence nobody denies. Indeed our master Cleanthes gave four reasons to account for the formation in men's minds of their ideas of the gods. He put first the argument of which I spoke just now, the one arising from our foreknowledge of future events; second, the one drawn from the magnitude of the benefits which we derive from our temperate climate, from the earth's fertility, and from a vast abundance of other blessings; " "2.14. third, the awe inspired by lightning, storms, rain, snow, hail, floods, pestilences, earthquakes and occasionally subterranean rumblings, showers of stones and raindrops the colour of blood, also landslips and chasms suddenly opening in the ground, also unnatural monstrosities human and animal, and also the appearance of meteoric lights and what are called by the Greeks 'comets,' and in our language 'long-haired stars,' such as recently during the Octavian War appeared as harbingers of dire disasters, and the doubling of the sun, which my father told me had happened in the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius, the year in which the light was quenched of Publius Africanus, that second sun of Rome: all of which alarming portents have suggested to mankind the idea of the existence of some celestial and divine power. " '2.15. And the fourth and most potent cause of the belief he said was the uniform motion and revolution of the heavens, and the varied groupings and ordered beauty of the sun, moon and stars, the very sight of which was in itself enough to prove that these things are not the mere effect of chance. When a man goes into a house, a wrestling-school or a public assembly and observes in all that goes on arrangement, regularity and system, he cannot possibly suppose that these things come about without a cause: he realizes that there is someone who presides and controls. Far more therefore with the vast movements and phases of the heavenly bodies, and these ordered processes of a multitude of enormous masses of matter, which throughout the countless ages of the infinite past have never in the smallest degree played false, is he compelled to infer that these mighty world-motions are regulated by some Mind. 2.16. "Extremely acute of intellect as is Chrysippus, nevertheless his utterance here might well appear to have been learnt from the very lips of Nature, and not discovered by himself. \'If (he says) there be something in the world that man\'s mind and human reason, strength and power are incapable of producing, that which produces it must necessarily be superior to man; now the heavenly bodies and all those things that display a never-ending regularity cannot be created by man; therefore that which creates them is superior to man; yet what better name is there for this than "god"? Indeed, if gods do not exist, what can there be in the universe superior to man? for he alone possesses reason, which is the most excellent thing that can exist; but for any human being in existence to think that there is nothing in the whole world superior to himself would be an insane piece of arrogance; therefore there is something superior to man; therefore God does exist.\ '
2.19. Again, consider the sympathetic agreement, interconnexion and affinity of things: whom will this not compel to approve the truth of what I say? Would it be possible for the earth at one definite time to be gay with flowers and then in turn all bare and stark, or for the spontaneous transformation of so many things about us to signal the approach and the retirement of the sun at the summer and the winter solstices, or for the tides to flow and ebb in the seas and straits with the rising and setting of the moon, or for the different courses of the stars to be maintained by the one revolution of the entire sky? These processes and this musical harmony of all the parts of the world assuredly would not go on were they not maintained in unison by a single divine and all‑pervading spirit. 2.20. "When one expounds these doctrines in a fuller and more flowing style, as I propose to do, it is easier for them to evade the captious objections of the Academy; but when they are reduced to brief syllogistic form, as was the practice of Zeno, they lie more open to criticism. A running river can almost or quite entirely escape pollution, whereas an enclosed pool is easily sullied; similarly a flowing stream of eloquence sweeps aside the censures of the critic, but a closely reasoned argument defends itself with difficult. The thoughts that we expound at length Zeno used to compress into this form: ' "2.21. 'That which has the faculty of reason is superior to that which has not the faculty of reason; but nothing is superior to the world; therefore the world has the faculty of reason.' A similar argument can be used to prove that the world is wise, and happy, and eternal; for things possessed of each of these attributes are superior to things devoid of them, and nothing is superior to the world. From this it will follow that the world is god. Zeno also argued thus: " "2.22. 'Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself that is sentient; but the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation.' He also proceeds to press the argument more closely: 'Nothing,' he says, 'that is iimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.' Furthermore he proved his argument by means of one of his favourite comparisons, as follows: 'If flutes playing musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some knowledge of the art of flute-playing; or if plane-trees bore well-tuned lutes, doubtless you would likewise infer that the plane-trees possessed the art of music; why then should we not judge the world to be animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring? " '
2.57. "I therefore believe that I shall not be wrong if in discussing this subject I take my first principle from the prince of seekers after truth, Zeno himself. Now Zeno gives this definition of nature: \'nature (he says) is a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to the work of generation.\' For he holds that the special function of an art or craft is to create and generate, and that what in the processes of our arts is done by the hand is done with far more skilful craftsmanship by nature, that is, as I said, by that \'craftsmanlike\' fire which is the teacher of the other arts. And on this theory, while each department of nature is \'craftsmanlike,\' in the sense of having a method or path marked out for it to follow, ' "2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. " "
2.64. now these immoral fables enshrined a decidedly clever scientific theory. Their meaning was that the highest element of celestial ether or fire, which by itself generates all things, is devoid of that bodily part which requires union with another for the work of procreation. By Saturn again they denoted that being who maintains the course and revolution of seasons and periods of time, et deity actually so designated in Greek, for Saturn's Greek name is Kronos, which is the same as chronos, a space of time. The Latin designation 'Saturn' on the other hand is due to the fact that he is 'saturated' or 'satiated with years' (anni); the fable is that he was in the habit of devouring his sons — meaning that Time devours the ages and gorges himself insatiably with the years that are past. Saturn was bound by Jove in order that Time's courses might not be unlimited, and that Jove might fetter him by the bonds of the stars. But Jupiter himself — the name means 'the helping father,' whom with a change of inflexion we style Jove, from iuvare 'to help'; the poets call him 'father of gods and men,' and our ancestors entitled him 'best and greatest,' putting the title 'best,' that is most beneficent, before that of 'greatest,' because universal beneficence is greater, or at least more lovable, than the possession of great wealth — " '
2.87. Let someone therefore prove that it could have been better. But no one will ever prove this, and anyone who essays to improve some detail will either make it worse or will be demanding an improvement impossible in the nature of things. "But if the structure of the world in all its parts is such that it could not have been better whether in point of utility or beauty, let us consider js is the result of chance, or whether on the contrary the parts of the world are in such a condition that they could not possibly have cohered together if they were not controlled by intelligence and by divine providence. If then that produces of nature are better than those of art, and if art produces nothing without reason, nature too cannot be deemed to be without reason. When you see a statue or a painting, you recognize the exercise of art; when you observe from a distance the course of a ship, you do not hesitate to assume that its motion is guided by reason and by art; when you look at a sun‑dial or a water-clock, you infer that it tells the time by art and not by chance; how then can it be consistent to suppose that the world, which includes both the works of art in question, the craftsmen who made them, and everything else besides, can be devoid of purpose and of reason? 2.88. Suppose a traveller to carry into Scythia or Britain the orrery recently constructed by our friend Posidonius, which at each revolution reproduces the same motions of the sun, the moon and the five planets that take place in the heavens every twenty-four hundred, would any single native doubt that this orrery was the work of a rational being? This thinkers however raise doubts about the world itself from which all things arise and have their being, and debate whether it is the produce of chance or necessity of some sort, or of divine reason and intelligence; they think more highly of the achievement of Archimedes in making a model of the revolutions of the firmament than of that of nature in creating them, although the perfection of the original shows a craftsmanship many times as great as does the counterfeit. ' "
2.160. As for the pig, it can only furnish food; indeed Chrysippus actually says that its soul was given it to serve as salt and keep it from putrefaction; and because this animal was fitted for the food of man, nature made it the most prolific of all her offspring. Why should I speak of the teeming swarms of delicious fish? or of birds, which afford us so much pleasure that our Stoic Providence appears to have been at times a disciple of Epicurus? and they could not even be caught save by man's intelligence and cunning; — although some birds, birds of flight and birds of utterance as our augurs call them, we believe to have been created for the purpose of giving omens. " "2.161. The great beasts of the forest again we take by hunting, both for food and in order to exercise ourselves in the mimic warfare of the chase, and also, as in the case of elephants, to train and discipline them for our employment, and to procure from their busy a variety of medicines for diseases and wounds, as also we do from certain roots and herbs whose values we have learnt by long-continued use and trial. Let the mind's eye survey the whole earth and all the seas, and you will behold now fruitful plains of measureless extent and mountains thickly clad with forests and pastures filled with flocks, now vessels sailing with marvellous swiftness across the sea. "'. None |
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7. Cicero, On Duties, 1.107-1.115, 1.153 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, ethics of
Found in books: Long (2006) 15; Maso (2022) 138; Sorabji (2000) 249, 412; Wynne (2019) 123
1.107. Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus. 1.115. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores, divitiae, opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubertur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius mavult excellere.
1.153. Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento confirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum affluentibus copiis quamvis omnia, quae cognitione digna sint, summo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam sofi/an Graeci vocant—prudentiam enim, quam Graeci fro/nhsin dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur ad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognition anteponenda est.''. None | 1.107. \xa0We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. <' "1.108. \xa0Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴÏ\x81Ï\x89ν in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. <" '1.109. \xa0Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus â\x80\x94 both father and son â\x80\x94 and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I\xa0have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand â\x80\x94 the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings â\x80\x94 had no such gracious manner in social intercourse .\xa0.\xa0., and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. < 1.110. \xa0Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one\'s nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is â\x80\x94 that is, if it is in direct opposition to one\'s natural genius. <' "1.111. \xa0If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. <" '1.112. \xa0Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another under the same circumstances a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. <' "1.113. \xa0How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a\xa0thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. <" '1.114. \xa0Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I\xa0remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. < 1.115. \xa0To the two above-mentioned characters is added a\xa0third, which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a\xa0fourth also, which we assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers and military commands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and influence, and their opposites depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled by circumstances. But what rôle we ourselves may choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. And so some turn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to oratory, while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to excel in one, another in another. <
1.153. \xa0My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to Nature which depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon knowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: (1)\xa0suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that, with an abundance of everything pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace study and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the solitude were so complete that he could never see a human being, he would die. And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom â\x80\x94 what the Greeks call Ï\x83οÏ\x86ία; for by prudence, which they call Ï\x86Ï\x81Ï\x8cνηÏ\x83ιÏ\x82, we understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and of things to be avoided. (2)\xa0Again, that wisdom which I\xa0have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty which is connected with the social obligation is the most important duty. And (3)\xa0service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best seen in the safeguarding of human interests. It is essential, then, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above speculative knowledge. <''. None |
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8. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium, • Zeno of Citium, and Platos Theaetetus • Zeno of Citium, biography • Zeno of Citium, epistemology of • Zeno of Citium, founder of Stoicism • Zeno of Citium, writings
Found in books: Del Lucchese (2019) 180; Long (2006) 225, 231; Wardy and Warren (2018) 244
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9. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium, Republic • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, And oscillation or fluttering • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Appetite and fear as reaching and leaning away • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Distress and pleasure as contraction and expansion of soul • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion as movement of the soul • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion is not false judgement, but disobedience to one's better judgement • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Four generic emotions distress, pleasure, appetite, fear • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Judgement insufficient for distress and pleasure when not fresh • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Not recognize first movements • Zeno of Citium, definition of emotion • Zeno of Citium, on erotic love • Zeno of Citium, on mental conflict • Zeno of Citium, on moral end • Zeno of Citium, reproductive theory • Zeno, of Citium
Found in books: Agri (2022) 15; Graver (2007) 79, 230, 233, 249, 252; Sorabji (2000) 34, 55, 70, 111, 112, 136, 162, 165, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 191, 196, 208, 236, 237, 238, 241, 267, 329
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10. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, on pneuma • Zeno of Citium, treatise On the Universe
Found in books: Graver (2007) 225; Inwood and Warren (2020) 148
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11. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.17.21-1.17.24 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)
Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 169; Sorabji (2000) 332
| 1.17.21. SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be ualysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end. Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely, and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, Distinguish, I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, It is more urgent. This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs? I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion ( ἔκκλισιν ) except another desire and aversion? But, you object: If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me. No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets. 1.17.24. SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be ualysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end. Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely, and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, Distinguish, I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, It is more urgent. This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs? I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion ( ἔκκλισιν ) except another desire and aversion? But, you object: If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me. No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.''. None |
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12. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 71.15, 104.21, 113.18, 113.23 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno, of Citium
Found in books: Agri (2022) 29; Maso (2022) 129, 131; Sorabji (2000) 119, 172, 211, 223, 242; Wardy and Warren (2018) 318
| 71.15. Therefore the wise man will say just what a Marcus Cato would say, after reviewing his past life: "The whole race of man, both that which is and that which is to be, is condemned to die. of all the cities that at any time have held sway over the world, and of all that have been the splendid ornaments of empires not their own, men shall some day ask where they were, and they shall be swept away by destructions of various kinds; some shall be ruined by wars, others shall be wasted away by inactivity and by the kind of peace which ends in sloth, or by that vice which is fraught with destruction even for mighty dynasties, – luxury. All these fertile plains shall be buried out of sight by a sudden overflowing of the sea, or a slipping of the soil, as it settles to lower levels, shall draw them suddenly into a yawning chasm. Why then should I be angry or feel sorrow, if I precede the general destruction by a tiny interval of time?"
104.21. If you would be stripped of your faults leave far behind you the patterns of the faults. The miser, the swindler, the bully, the cheat, who will do you much harm merely by being near you, are within you. Change therefore to better associations: live with the Catos, with Laelius, with Tubero. Or, if you enjoy living with Greeks also, spend your time with Socrates and with Zeno: the former will show you how to die if it be necessary; the latter how to die before it is necessary.
113.18. Every living thing possessed of reason is inactive if it is not first stirred by some external impression; then the impulse comes, and finally assent confirms the impulse.8 Now what assent is, I shall explain. Suppose that I ought to take a walk: I do walk, but only after uttering the command to myself and approving this opinion of mine. Or suppose that I ought to seat myself; I do seat myself, but only after the same process. This assent is not a part of virtue.
113.23. Now do not imagine that I am the first one of our school who does not speak from rules but has his own opinion: Cleanthes and his pupil Chrysippus could not agree in defining the act of walking. Cleanthes held that it was spirit transmitted to the feet from the primal essence, while Chrysippus maintained that it was the primal essence in itself.11 Why, then, following the example of Chrysippus himself, should not every man claim his own freedom, and laugh down all these "living things," – so numerous that the universe itself cannot contain them? ' '. None |
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13. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, on mental conflict
Found in books: Graver (2007) 233; Sorabji (2000) 63, 349
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14. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, ethics of • Zeno of Citium, reproductive theory
Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 72; Graver (2007) 249; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 137; Long (2006) 10, 268
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15. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, and Platos Theaetetus • Zeno of Citium, epistemology of
Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020) 135, 137, 139, 140, 141; Long (2006) 226, 235; Maso (2022) 130; Vazques and Ross (2022) 10, 212
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16. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, on impressions
Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 75, 76, 79; Graver (2007) 25
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17. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Republic • Zeno of Citium, Stoic • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, And involves akrasia • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, And oscillation or fluttering • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, But since the occasioning judgement, unlike appearance, involves assent, emotion is voluntary • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion as impulse • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion is not false judgement, but disobedience to one's better judgement • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion is not judgement but occurs on the occasion of judgement • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Four generic emotions distress, pleasure, appetite, fear • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, In this sense, it is without judgement or reason • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Indifference • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Judgement insufficient for distress and pleasure when not fresh • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Not accept Plato's irrational part of the soul • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Reservation • Zeno of Citium, on designing fire • Zeno of Citium, on erotic love • Zeno of Citium, on mental conflict • Zeno of Citium, theology • Zeno, of Citium
Found in books: Agri (2022) 15; Graver (2007) 19, 233, 252; Inwood and Warren (2020) 160, 162; Sorabji (2000) 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 101, 106, 112, 115, 118, 119, 125, 128, 130, 163, 175, 257, 258, 259, 325, 331, 393
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18. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, on impressions
Found in books: Graver (2007) 24; Sorabji (2000) 251
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19. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, epistemology of
Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 68; Long (2006) 223
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20. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.115, 3.66-3.67, 4.17, 4.22, 4.29, 6.11, 6.72, 6.103-6.104, 7.2-7.10, 7.12, 7.14-7.15, 7.25-7.29, 7.31-7.33, 7.46, 7.86, 7.88, 7.101-7.106, 7.110-7.111, 7.119, 7.127, 7.131, 7.134, 7.136, 7.139, 7.142-7.143, 7.156-7.157, 7.160, 7.162-7.163, 7.174, 7.177, 10.119 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Republic • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, And oscillation or fluttering • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Appetite and fear as reaching and leaning away • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Different view of emotion from Chrysippus • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Distress and pleasure as contraction and expansion of soul • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Emotion as movement of the soul • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Four generic emotions distress, pleasure, appetite, fear • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Judgement insufficient for distress and pleasure when not fresh • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Not accept Plato's irrational part of the soul • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Random sex advocated and communal female partners • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Suicide • Zeno of Citium, and Arcesilaus • Zeno of Citium, and Platos Theaetetus • Zeno of Citium, biography • Zeno of Citium, conversion to philosophy • Zeno of Citium, epistemology of • Zeno of Citium, ethics of • Zeno of Citium, founder of Stoicism • Zeno of Citium, influence from Cynicism • Zeno of Citium, interest in Socrates • Zeno of Citium, on mental conflict • Zeno of Citium, on moral end • Zeno of Citium, on pneuma • Zeno of Citium, politics of • Zeno of Citium, treatise On the Universe • Zeno of Citium, writings • Zeno, of Citium
Found in books: Agri (2022) 23, 73; Beneker et al. (2022) 233; Bett (2019) 69; Bianchetti et al (2015) 134; Bowen and Rochberg (2020) 611; Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 32, 33, 34; Erler et al (2021) 68, 71, 72, 82; Graver (2007) 225, 230, 233; Inwood and Warren (2020) 114, 127, 136, 137, 189, 192; Long (2006) 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 81, 92, 103, 105, 106, 226, 228, 229, 260, 268, 346; Long (2019) 82, 191, 202; Malherbe et al (2014) 619; Maso (2022) 118, 130; Sorabji (2000) 34, 35, 64, 107, 136, 170, 172, 184, 196, 201, 214, 274, 275, 281, 283, 389; Tsouni (2019) 73, 85, 162; Vazques and Ross (2022) 212; Wardy and Warren (2018) 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259; Wynne (2019) 164; Yona (2018) 33, 87, 119
| 2.115. Ptolemy Soter, they say, made much of him, and when he had got possession of Megara, offered him a sum of money and invited him to return with him to Egypt. But Stilpo would only accept a very moderate sum, and he declined the proposed journey, and removed to Aegina until Ptolemy set sail. Again, when Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, had taken Megara, he took measures that Stilpo's house should be preserved and all his plundered property restored to him. But when he requested that a schedule of the lost property should be drawn up, Stilpo denied that he had lost anything which really belonged to him, for no one had taken away his learning, while he still had his eloquence and knowledge." "
3.66. the dotted cross (⨰) denotes select passages and beauties of style; the dotted diple (⋗) editors' corrections of the text; the dotted obelus (÷) passages suspected without reason; the dotted antisigma (Ꜿ) repetitions and proposals for transpositions; the ceraunium the philosophical school; the asterisk (∗) an agreement of doctrine; the obelus (−) a spurious passage. So much for the critical marks and his writings in general. As Antigonus of Carystus says in his Life of Zeno, when the writings were first edited with critical marks, their possessors charged a certain fee to anyone who wished to consult them." '3.67. The doctrines he approved are these. He held that the soul is immortal, that by transmigration it puts on many bodies, and that it has a numerical first principle, whereas the first principle of the body is geometrical; and he defined soul as the idea of vital breath diffused in all directions. He held that it is self-moved and tripartite, the rational part of it having its seat in the head, the passionate part about the heart, while the appetitive is placed in the region of the navel and the liver.
4.17. Antigonus of Carystus in his Biographies says that his father was foremost among the citizens and kept horses to compete in the chariot-race; that Polemo himself had been defendant in an action brought by his wife, who charged him with cruelty owing to the irregularities of his life; but that, from the time when he began to study philosophy, he acquired such strength of character as always to maintain the same unruffled calm of demeanour. Nay more, he never lost control of his voice. This in fact accounts for the fascination which he exercised over Crantor. Certain it is that, when a mad dog bit him in the back of his thigh, he did not even turn pale, but remained undisturbed by all the clamour which arose in the city at the news of what had happened. In the theatre too he was singularly unmoved.
4.22. Hence Arcesilaus, who had quitted Theophrastus and gone over to their school, said of them that they were gods or a remt of the Golden Age. They did not side with the popular party, but were such as Dionysodorus the flute-player is said to have claimed to be, when he boasted that no one ever heard his melodies, as those of Ismenias were heard, either on shipboard or at the fountain. According to Antigonus, their common table was in the house of Crantor; and these two and Arcesilaus lived in harmony together. Arcesilaus and Crantor shared the same house, while Polemo and Crates lived with Lysicles, one of the citizens. Crates, as already stated, was the favourite of Polemo and Arcesilaus of Crantor.
4.29. At first, before he left Pitane for Athens, he was a pupil of the mathematician Autolycus, his fellow-countryman, and with him he also travelled to Sardis. Next he studied under Xanthus, the musician, of Athens; then he was a pupil of Theophrastus. Lastly, he crossed over to the Academy and joined Crantor. For while his brother Moereas, who has already been mentioned, wanted to make him a rhetorician, he was himself devoted to philosophy, and Crantor, being enamoured of him, cited the line from the Andromeda of Euripides:O maiden, if I save thee, wilt thou be grateful to me?and was answered with the next line:Take me, stranger, whether for maidservant or for wife.
6.11. And he held virtue to be sufficient in itself to ensure happiness, since it needed nothing else except the strength of a Socrates. And he maintained that virtue is an affair of deeds and does not need a store of words or learning; that the wise man is self-sufficing, for all the goods of others are his; that ill repute is a good thing and much the same as pain; that the wise man will be guided in his public acts not by the established laws but by the law of virtue; that he will also marry in order to have children from union with the handsomest women; furthermore that he will not disdain to love, for only the wise man knows who are worthy to be loved.
6.72. He maintained that all things are the property of the wise, and employed such arguments as those cited above. All things belong to the gods. The gods are friends to the wise, and friends share all property in common; therefore all things are the property of the wise. Again as to law: that it is impossible for society to exist without law; for without a city no benefit can be derived from that which is civilized. But the city is civilized, and there is no advantage in law without a city; therefore law is something civilized. He would ridicule good birth and fame and all such distinctions, calling them showy ornaments of vice. The only true commonwealth was, he said, that which is as wide as the universe. He advocated community of wives, recognizing no other marriage than a union of the man who persuades with the woman who consents. And for this reason he thought sons too should be held in common.' "
6.103. Such are the lives of the several Cynics. But we will go on to append the doctrines which they held in common – if, that is, we decide that Cynicism is really a philosophy, and not, as some maintain, just a way of life. They are content then, like Ariston of Chios, to do away with the subjects of Logic and Physics and to devote their whole attention to Ethics. And what some assert of Socrates, Diocles records of Diogenes, representing him as saying: We must inquire intoWhate'er of good or ill within our halls is wrought.They also dispense with the ordinary subjects of instruction. At least Antisthenes used to say that those who had attained discretion had better not study literature, lest they should be perverted by alien influences." "6.104. So they get rid of geometry and music and all such studies. Anyhow, when somebody showed Diogenes a clock, he pronounced it a serviceable instrument to save one from being late for dinner. Again, to a man who gave a musical recital before him he said:By men's minds states are ordered well, and households,Not by the lyre's twanged strings or flute's trilled notes.They hold further that Life according to Virtue is the End to be sought, as Antisthenes says in his Heracles: exactly like the Stoics. For indeed there is a certain close relationship between the two schools. Hence it has been said that Cynicism is a short cut to virtue; and after the same pattern did Zeno of Citium live his life." "
7.2. He was a pupil of Crates, as stated above. Next they say he attended the lectures of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years – so Timocrates says in his Dion – and Polemo as well. It is stated by Hecato and by Apollonius of Tyre in his first book on Zeno that he consulted the oracle to know what he should do to attain the best life, and that the god's response was that he should take on the complexion of the dead. Whereupon, perceiving what this meant, he studied ancient authors. Now the way he came across Crates was this. He was shipwrecked on a voyage from Phoenicia to Peiraeus with a cargo of purple. He went up into Athens and sat down in a bookseller's shop, being then a man of thirty." "7.3. As he went on reading the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, he was so pleased that he inquired where men like Socrates were to be found. Crates passed by in the nick of time, so the bookseller pointed to him and said, Follow yonder man. From that day he became Crates's pupil, showing in other respects a strong bent for philosophy, though with too much native modesty to assimilate Cynic shamelessness. Hence Crates, desirous of curing this defect in him, gave him a potful of lentil-soup to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed and tried to keep it out of sight, with a blow of his staff he broke the pot. As Zeno took to flight with the lentil-soup flowing down his legs, Why run away, my little Phoenician? quoth Crates, nothing terrible has befallen you." "7.4. For a certain space, then, he was instructed by Crates, and when at this time he had written his Republic, some said in jest that he had written it on Cynosura, i.e. on the dog's tail. Besides the Republic he wrote the following works:of Life according to Nature.of Impulse, or Human Nature.of Emotions.of Duty.of Law.of Greek Education.of Vision.of the Whole World.of Signs.Pythagorean Questions.Universals.of Varieties of Style.Homeric Problems, in five books.of the Reading of Poetry.There are also by him:A Handbook of Rhetoric.Solutions.Two books of Refutations.Recollections of Crates.Ethics.This is a list of his writings. But at last he left Crates, and the men above mentioned were his masters for twenty years. Hence he is reported to have said, I made a prosperous voyage when I suffered shipwreck. But others attribute this saying of his to the time when he was under Crates." '7.5. A different version of the story is that he was staying at Athens when he heard his ship was wrecked and said, It is well done of thee, Fortune, thus to drive me to philosophy. But some say that he disposed of his cargo in Athens, before he turned his attention to philosophy.He used then to discourse, pacing up and down in the Stoa Poikile, which is also called the stoa or Portico of Pisianax, but which received its name from the painting of Polygnotus; his object being to keep the spot clear of a concourse of idlers. It was the spot where in the time of the Thirty 1400 Athenian citizens had been put to death. Hither, then, people came henceforth to hear Zeno, and this is why they were known as men of the Stoa, or Stoics; and the same name was given to his followers, who had formerly been known as Zenonians. So it is stated by Epicurus in his letters. According to Eratosthenes in his eighth book On the Old Comedy, the name of Stoic had formerly been applied to the poets who passed their time there, and they had made the name of Stoic still more famous. 7.6. The people of Athens held Zeno in high honour, as is proved by their depositing with him the keys of the city walls, and their honouring him with a golden crown and a bronze statue. This last mark of respect was also shown to him by citizens of his native town, who deemed his statue an ornament to their city, and the men of Citium living in Sidon were also proud to claim him for their own. Antigonus (Gonatas) also favoured him, and whenever he came to Athens would hear him lecture and often invited him to come to his court. This offer he declined but dispatched thither one of his friends, Persaeus, the son of Demetrius and a native of Citium, who flourished in the 130th Olympiad, at which time Zeno was already an old man. According to Apollonius of Tyre in his work upon Zeno, the letter of Antigonus was couched in the following terms:' "7.7. King Antigonus to Zeno the philosopher, greeting.While in fortune and fame I deem myself your superior, in reason and education I own myself inferior, as well as in the perfect happiness which you have attained. Wherefore I have decided to ask you to pay me a visit, being persuaded that you will not refuse the request. By all means, then, do your best to hold conference with me, understanding clearly that you will not be the instructor of myself alone but of all the Macedonians taken together. For it is obvious that whoever instructs the ruler of Macedonia and guides him in the paths of virtue will also be training his subjects to be good men. As is the ruler, such for the most part it may be expected that his subjects will become.And Zeno's reply is as follows:" '7.8. Zeno to King Antigonus, greeting.I welcome your love of learning in so far as you cleave to that true education which tends to advantage and not to that popular counterfeit of it which serves only to corrupt morals. But if anyone has yearned for philosophy, turning away from much-vaunted pleasure which renders effeminate the souls of some of the young, it is evident that not by nature only, but also by the bent of his will he is inclined to nobility of character. But if a noble nature be aided by moderate exercise and further receive ungrudging instruction, it easily comes to acquire virtue in perfection. 7.9. But I am constrained by bodily weakness, due to old age, for I am eighty years old; and for that reason I am unable to join you. But I send you certain companions of my studies whose mental powers are not inferior to mine, while their bodily strength is far greater, and if you associate with these you will in no way fall short of the conditions necessary to perfect happiness.So he sent Persaeus and Philonides the Theban; and Epicurus in his letter to his brother Aristobulus mentions them both as living with Antigonus. I have thought it well to append the decree also which the Athenians passed concerning him. It reads as follows: 7.10. In the archonship of Arrhenides, in the fifth prytany of the tribe Acamantis on the twenty-first day of Maemacterion, at the twenty-third plenary assembly of the prytany, one of the presidents, Hippo, the son of Cratistoteles, of the deme Xypetaeon, and his co-presidents put the question to the vote; Thraso, the son of Thraso of the deme Anacaea, moved:Whereas Zeno of Citium, son of Mnaseas, has for many years been devoted to philosophy in the city and has continued to be a man of worth in all other respects, exhorting to virtue and temperance those of the youth who come to him to be taught, directing them to what is best, affording to all in his own conduct a pattern for imitation in perfect consistency with his teaching, it has seemed good to the people –
7.12. Thraso of the deme Anacaea, Philocles of Peiraeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystus, Medon of Acharnae, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Paeania have been elected commissioners for the making of the crown and the building.These are the terms of the decree.Antigonus of Carystus tells us that he never denied that he was a citizen of Citium. For when he was one of those who contributed to the restoration of the baths and his name was inscribed upon the pillar as Zeno the philosopher, he requested that the words of Citium should be added. He made a hollow lid for a flask and used to carry about money in it, in order that there might be provision at hand for the necessities of his master Crates.
7.14. He disliked, they say, to be brought too near to people, so that he would take the end seat of a couch, thus saving himself at any rate from one half of such inconvenience. Nor indeed would he walk about with more than two or three. He would occasionally ask the bystanders for coppers, in order that, for fear of being asked to give, people might desist from mobbing him, as Cleanthes says in his work On Bronze. When several persons stood about him in the Colonnade he pointed to the wooden railing at the top round the altar and said, This was once open to all, but because it was found to be a hindrance it was railed off. If you then will take yourselves off out of the way you will be the less annoyance to us.When Demochares, the son of Laches, greeted him and told him he had only to speak or write for anything he wanted to Antigonus, who would be sure to grant all his requests, Zeno after hearing this would have nothing more to do with him.' "7.15. After Zeno's death Antigonus is reported to have said, What an audience I have lost. Hence too he employed Thraso as his agent to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus. And when asked why he admired him, Because, said he, the many ample gifts I offered him never made him conceited nor yet appear poor-spirited.His bent was towards inquiry, and he was an exact reasoner on all subjects. Hence the words of Timon in his Silli:A Phoenician too I saw, a pampered old woman ensconced in gloomy pride, longing for all things; but the meshes of her subtle web have perished, and she had no more intelligence than a banjo." "
7.25. According to Hippobotus he forgathered with Diodorus, with whom he worked hard at dialectic. And when he was already making progress, he would enter Polemo's school: so far from all self-conceit was he. In consequence Polemo is said to have addressed him thus: You slip in, Zeno, by the garden door – I'm quite aware of it – you filch my doctrines and give them a Phoenician make-up. A dialectician once showed him seven logical forms concerned with the sophism known as The Reaper, and Zeno asked him how much he wanted for them. Being told a hundred drachmas, he promptly paid two hundred: to such lengths would he go in his love of learning. They say too that he first introduced the word Duty and wrote a treatise on the subject. It is said, moreover, that he corrected Hesiod's lines thus:He is best of all men who follows good advice: good too is he who finds out all things for himself." '
7.26. The reason he gave for this was that the man capable of giving a proper hearing to what is said and profiting by it was superior to him who discovers everything himself. For the one had merely a right apprehension, the other in obeying good counsel superadded conduct.When he was asked why he, though so austere, relaxed at a drinking-party, he said, Lupins too are bitter, but when they are soaked become sweet. Hecato too in the second book of his Anecdotes says that he indulged freely at such gatherings. And he would say, Better to trip with the feet than with the tongue. Well-being is attained by little and little, and nevertheless it is no little thing itself. Others attribute this to Socrates.' "
7.27. He showed the utmost endurance, and the greatest frugality; the food he used required no fire to dress, and the cloak he wore was thin. Hence it was said of him:The cold of winter and the ceaseless rainCome powerless against him: weak the dartof the fierce summer sun or racking painTo bend that iron frame. He stands apartUnspoiled by public feast and jollity:Patient, unwearied night and day doth heCling to his studies of philosophy.Nay more: the comic poets by their very jests at his expense praised him without intending it. Thus Philemon says in a play, Philosophers:This man adopts a new philosophy.He teaches to go hungry: yet he getsDisciples. One sole loaf of bread his food;His best dessert dried figs; water his drink.Others attribute these lines to Poseidippus.By this time he had almost become a proverb. At all events, More temperate than Zeno the philosopher was a current saying about him. Poseidippus also writes in his Men Transported:So that for ten whole daysMore temperate than Zeno's self he seemed." '
7.28. And in very truth in this species of virtue and in dignity he surpassed all mankind, ay, and in happiness; for he was ninety-eight when he died and had enjoyed good health without an ailment to the last. Persaeus, however, in his ethical lectures makes him die at the age of seventy-two, having come to Athens at the age of twenty-two. But Apollonius says that he presided over the school for fifty-eight years. The manner of his death was as follows. As he was leaving the school he tripped and fell, breaking a toe. Striking the ground with his fist, he quoted the line from the Niobe:I come, I come, why dost thou call for me?and died on the spot through holding his breath.
7.29. The Athenians buried him in the Ceramicus and honoured him in the decrees already cited above, adding their testimony of his goodness. Here is the epitaph composed for him by Antipater of Sidon:Here lies great Zeno, dear to Citium, who scaled high Olympus, though he piled not Pelion on Ossa, nor toiled at the labours of Heracles, but this was the path he found out to the stars – the way of temperance alone.' "
7.31. We have ourselves mentioned the manner of Zeno's death in the Pammetros (a collection of poems in various metres):The story goes that Zeno of Citium after enduring many hardships by reason of old age was set free, some say by ceasing to take food; others say that once when he had tripped he beat with his hand upon the earth and cried, I come of my own accord; why then call me?For there are some who hold this to have been the manner of his death.So much then concerning his death.Demetrius the Magnesian, in his work on Men of the Same Name, says of him: his father, Mnaseas, being a merchant often went to Athens and brought away many books about Socrates for Zeno while still a boy." '7.32. Hence he had been well trained even before he left his native place. And thus it came about that on his arrival at Athens he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that, when the rest were at a loss how to express their views, Zeno framed a definition of the end. They say that he was in the habit of swearing by capers just as Socrates used to swear by the dog. Some there are, and among them Cassius the Sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. Their first count is that in the beginning of his Republic he pronounced the ordinary education useless: the next is that he applies to all men who are not virtuous the opprobrious epithets of foemen, enemies, slaves, and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers, friends to friends. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered.' "
7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions." "
7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically." '
7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions.
7.101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term good has equal force with the term beautiful, which comes to the same thing. Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good. They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent). 7.102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine, book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics, and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision things preferred. 7.103. For as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods. On the other hand, Posidonius maintains that these things too are among goods. Hecato in the ninth book of his treatise On Goods, and Chrysippus in his work On Pleasure, deny that pleasure is a good either; for some pleasures are disgraceful, and nothing disgraceful is good.' "7.104. To benefit is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with virtue; whereas to harm is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with vice.The term indifferent has two meanings: in the first it denotes the things which do not contribute either to happiness or to misery, as wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy without having these, although, if they are used in a certain way, such use of them tends to happiness or misery. In quite another sense those things are said to be indifferent which are without the power of stirring inclination or aversion; e.g. the fact that the number of hairs on one's head is odd or even or whether you hold out your finger straight or bent. But it was not in this sense that the things mentioned above were termed indifferent," '7.105. they being quite capable of exciting inclination or aversion. Hence of these latter some are taken by preference, others are rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense affords no ground for either choosing or avoiding.of things indifferent, as they express it, some are preferred, others rejected. Such as have value, they say, are preferred, while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are rejected. Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the life according to nature: which is as much as to say any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts – as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in. 7.106. Thus things of the preferred class are those which have positive value, e.g. amongst mental qualities, natural ability, skill, moral improvement, and the like; among bodily qualities, life, health, strength, good condition, soundness of organs, beauty, and so forth; and in the sphere of external things, wealth, fame, noble birth, and the like. To the class of things rejected belong, of mental qualities, lack of ability, want of skill, and the like; among bodily qualities, death, disease, weakness, being out of condition, mutilation, ugliness, and the like; in the sphere of external things, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and so forth. But again there are things belonging to neither class; such are not preferred, neither are they rejected.
7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.' "7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself." '
7.119. They are also, it is declared, godlike; for they have a something divine within them; whereas the bad man is godless. And yet of this word – godless or ungodly – there are two senses, one in which it is the opposite of the term godly, the other denoting the man who ignores the divine altogether: in this latter sense, as they note, the term does not apply to every bad man. The good, it is added, are also worshippers of God; for they have acquaintance with the rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep themselves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offences against the gods, and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in what concerns the gods. The wise too are the only priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also establishing holy places, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods.
7.127. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues, and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods:
7.131. It is also their doctrine that amongst the wise there should be a community of wives with free choice of partners, as Zeno says in his Republic and Chrysippus in his treatise On Government and not only they, but also Diogenes the Cynic and Plato. Under such circumstances we shall feel paternal affection for all the children alike, and there will be an end of the jealousies arising from adultery. The best form of government they hold to be a mixture of democracy, kingship, and aristocracy (or the rule of the best).Such, then, are the statements they make in their ethical doctrines, with much more besides, together with their proper proofs: let this, however, suffice for a statement of them in a summary and elementary form.
7.134. They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter. This doctrine is laid down by Zeno of Citium in his treatise On Existence, Cleanthes in his work On Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics towards the end, Archedemus in his treatise On Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Exposition. There is a difference, according to them, between principles and elements; the former being without generation or destruction, whereas the elements are destroyed when all things are resolved into fire. Moreover, the principles are incorporeal and destitute of form, while the elements have been endowed with form.
7.136. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and by Archedemus in a work On Elements. An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved.
7.139. For through some parts it passes as a hold or containing force, as is the case with our bones and sinews; while through others it passes as intelligence, as in the ruling part of the soul. Thus, then, the whole world is a living being, endowed with soul and reason, and having aether for its ruling principle: so says Antipater of Tyre in the eighth book of his treatise On the Cosmos. Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Providence and Posidonius in his book On the Gods say that the heaven, but Cleanthes that the sun, is the ruling power of the world. Chrysippus, however, in the course of the same work gives a somewhat different account, namely, that it is the purer part of the aether; the same which they declare to be preeminently God and always to have, as it were in sensible fashion, pervaded all that is in the air, all animals and plants, and also the earth itself, as a principle of cohesion.
7.142. The world, they hold, comes into being when its substance has first been converted from fire through air into moisture and then the coarser part of the moisture has condensed as earth, while that whose particles are fine has been turned into air, and this process of rarefaction goes on increasing till it generates fire. Thereupon out of these elements animals and plants and all other natural kinds are formed by their mixture. The generation and the destruction of the world are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, by Posidonius in the first book of his work On the Cosmos, by Cleanthes, and by Antipater in his tenth book On the Cosmos. Panaetius, however, maintained that the world is indestructible.The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius.
7.143. It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. Boethus, however, denies that the world is a living thing. The unity of the world is maintained by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius in the first book of his Physical Discourse. By the totality of things, the All, is meant, according to Apollodorus, (1) the world, and in another sense (2) the system composed of the world and the void outside it. The world then is finite, the void infinite.
7.156. And there are five terrestrial zones: first, the northern zone which is beyond the arctic circle, uninhabitable because of the cold; second, a temperate zone; a third, uninhabitable because of great heats, called the torrid zone; fourth, a counter-temperate zone; fifth, the southern zone, uninhabitable because of its cold.Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create; which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath. And the soul is a nature capable of perception. And they regard it as the breath of life, congenital with us; from which they infer first that it is a body and secondly that it survives death. Yet it is perishable, though the soul of the universe, of which the individual souls of animals are parts, is indestructible. 7.157. Zeno of Citium and Antipater, in their treatises De anima, and Posidonius define the soul as a warm breath; for by this we become animate and this enables us to move. Cleanthes indeed holds that all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration; but Chrysippus says that only the souls of the wise do so.They count eight parts of the soul: the five senses, the generative power in us, our power of speech, and that of reasoning. They hold that we see when the light between the visual organ and the object stretches in the form of a cone: so Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics and Apollodorus. The apex of the cone in the air is at the eye, the base at the object seen. Thus the thing seen is reported to us by the medium of the air stretching out towards it, as if by a stick.
7.160. 2. ARISTONAriston the Bald, of Chios, who was also called the Siren, declared the end of action to be a life of perfect indifference to everything which is neither virtue nor vice; recognizing no distinction whatever in things indifferent, but treating them all alike. The wise man he compared to a good actor, who, if called upon to take the part of a Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate them both becomingly. He wished to discard both Logic and Physics, saying that Physics was beyond our reach and Logic did not concern us: all that did concern us was Ethics.' "
7.162. After meeting Polemo, says Diocles of Magnesia, while Zeno was suffering from a protracted illness, he recanted his views. The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses." "7.163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you? and when the other answered No, he rejoined,Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?The books attributed to him are as follows:Exhortations, two books.of Zeno's Doctrines.Dialogues.Lectures, six books.Dissertations on Philosophy, seven books.Dissertations on Love.Commonplaces on Vainglory.Notebooks, twenty-five volumes.Memorabilia, three books.Anecdotes, eleven books.Against the Rhetoricians.An Answer to the Counter-pleas of Alexinus.Against the Dialecticians, three books.Letters to Cleanthes, four books.Panaetius and Sosicrates consider the Letters to be alone genuine; all the other works named they attribute to Ariston the Peripatetic." "
7.174. To the solitary man who talked to himself he remarked, You are not talking to a bad man. When some one twitted him on his old age, his reply was, I too am ready to depart; but when again I consider that I am in all points in good health and that I can still write and read, I am content to wait. We are told that he wrote down Zeno's lectures on oyster-shells and the blade-bones of oxen through lack of money to buy paper. Such was he; and yet, although Zeno had many other eminent disciples, he was able to succeed him in the headship of the school.He has left some very fine writings, which are as follows:of Time.of Zeno's Natural Philosophy, two books.Interpretations of Heraclitus, four books.De Sensu.of Art.A Reply to Democritus.A Reply to Aristarchus.A Reply to Herillus.of Impulse, two books." '
7.177. 6. SPHAERUSAmongst those who after the death of Zeno became pupils of Cleanthes was Sphaerus of Bosporus, as already mentioned. After making considerable progress in his studies, he went to Alexandria to the court of King Ptolemy Philopator. One day when a discussion had arisen on the question whether the wise man could stoop to hold opinion, and Sphaerus had maintained that this was impossible, the king, wishing to refute him, ordered some waxen pomegranates to be put on the table. Sphaerus was taken in and the king cried out, You have given your assent to a presentation which is false. But Sphaerus was ready with a neat answer. I assented not to the proposition that they are pomegranates, but to another, that there are good grounds for thinking them to be pomegranates. Certainty of presentation and reasonable probability are two totally different things. Mnesistratus having accused him of denying that Ptolemy was a king, his reply was, Being of such quality as he is, Ptolemy is indeed a king.
10.119. Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose. Nor will he drivel, when drunken: so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant; nor will he turn Cynic (so the second book On Life tells us); nor will he be a mendicant. But even when he has lost his sight, he will not withdraw himself from life: this is stated in the same book. The wise man will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta.'". None |
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21. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, on pneuma • Zeno of Citium, treatise On the Universe
Found in books: Erler et al (2021) 71, 72, 74, 76; Graver (2007) 225; Inwood and Warren (2020) 136, 148; Long (2006) 272; Long (2019) 82; Sorabji (2000) 242
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22. Augustine, The City of God, 14.8 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium, Republic • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, on erotic love
Found in books: Graver (2007) 252; Sorabji (2000) 380, 404
| 14.8. Those emotions which the Greeks call &'. None |
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23. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, and Arcesilaus • Zeno of Citium, and Platos Theaetetus • Zeno of Citium, biography • Zeno of Citium, epistemology of
Found in books: Brouwer and Vimercati (2020) 34; Long (2006) 102, 224; Long (2019) 82; Wardy and Warren (2018) 245
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24. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium, and Arcesilaus • Zeno of Citium, biography
Found in books: Long (2006) 107; Wardy and Warren (2018) 246
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25. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, • Zeno of Citium, and Platos Theaetetus • Zeno of Citium, biography • Zeno of Citium, epistemology of • Zeno of Citium, founder of Stoicism • Zeno of Citium, writings • Zeno, of Citium
Found in books: Agri (2022) 101; Del Lucchese (2019) 172, 180, 206, 211; Erler et al (2021) 72, 75, 76; Long (2006) 227; Maso (2022) 129, 130, 132; Pinheiro et al (2015) 25; Vazques and Ross (2022) 214; Wardy and Warren (2018) 242, 243
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26. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Zeno of Citium • Zeno of Citium, Stoic, Hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) • Zeno of Citium, ethics of
Found in books: Long (2006) 10; Sorabji (2000) 217
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