| 1. Homer, Odyssey, 11.24-11.43 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 149 |
2. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 107| 25e. ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν, ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω ὥστε καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν συνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῂς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλʼ ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, | 25e. to those nearest them, and the good some good; whereas I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this, that if I make anyone of my associates bad I am in danger of getting some harm from him, so that I do this great evil voluntarily, as you say? I don’t believe this, Meletus, nor do I think anyone else in the world does! |
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| 3. Plato, Crito, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 173 |
4. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 140 | 280b. in the end that the truth in general was this: when wisdom is present, he with whom it is present has no need of good fortune as well; and as we had agreed on this I began to inquire of him over again what we should think, in this case, of our previous agreements. For we agreed, said I, that if many goods were present to us we should be happy and prosper. |
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5. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 107| 468b. μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ΣΩ. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τινʼ ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. ἕνεκʼ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες. ΠΩΛ. φημί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, | 468b. Soc. Thus it is in pursuit of the good that we walk, when we walk, conceiving it to be better; or on the contrary, stand, when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, the good: is it not so? Pol. Yes. Soc. And so we put a man to death, if we do put him to death, or expel him or deprive him of his property, because we think it better for us to do this than not? Pol. Certainly. Soc. So it is for the sake of the good that the doers of all these things do them? Pol. I agree. Soc. And we have admitted that when we do things for an object, we do not wish those things, but the object for which we do them? |
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| 6. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 118 |
| 7. Plato, Menexenus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 173 |
| 8. Plato, Meno, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 107 |
| 9. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 140 |
| 10. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 184 |
| 11. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 97 |
| 12. Plato, Lysis, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 78 |
| 13. Aristotle, Heavens, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 89 |
| 14. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 129 |
| 15. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 136 |
| 16. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 99, 193 |
| 17. Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 168 |
| 18. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 55 |
| 19. Dicaearchus Messenius, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 145 |
| 20. Dicaearchus Messenius, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 145 |
| 21. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 147 |
| 22. Aristotle, Physics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 90 |
| 23. Theophrastus, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 194 |
| 24. Theophrastus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 145 |
| 25. Theophrastus, Plant Explanations, 2.16.2-2.16.3 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 193, 194, 195 |
| 26. Plautus, Poenulus, 522-523, 527-528 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 147 |
| 27. Cicero, On Old Age, 78 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, somnium scipionis Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 40 |
28. Cicero, Republic, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 40| 6.10. Post autem apparatu regio accepti sermonem in multam noctem produximus, cum senex nihil nisi de Africano loqueretur omniaque eius non facta solum, sed etiam dicta meminisset. Deinde, ut cubitum discessimus, me et de via fessum, et qui ad multam noctem vigilassem, artior quam solebat somnus complexus est. Hic mihi (credo equidem ex hoc, quod eramus locuti; fit enim fere, ut cogitationes sermonesque nostri pariant aliquid in somno tale, quale de Homero scribit Ennius, de quo videlicet saepissime vigilans solebat cogitare et loqui) Africanus se ostendit ea forma, quae mihi ex imagine eius quam ex ipso erat notior; quem ubi agnovi, equidem cohorrui, sed ille: Ades, inquit, animo et omitte timorem, Scipio, et, quae dicam, trade memoriae. | |
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29. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.155 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on emulating greek orators Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 41| 1.155. Postea mihi placuit, eoque sum usus adulescens, ut summorum oratorum Graecas orationes explicarem, quibus lectis hoc adsequebar, ut, cum ea, quae legeram Graece, Latine redderem, non solum optimis verbis uterer et tamen usitatis, sed etiam exprimerem quaedam verba imitando, quae nova nostris essent, dum modo essent idonea. | |
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30. Cicero, On Duties, 1.1-1.3, 1.51-1.52, 1.54, 1.131, 2.60 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, on appropriate actions •cicero, marcus tullius, on duties •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Fertik (2019) 22; Jenkyns (2013) 45, 147; Tsouni (2019) 25, 162| 1.1. Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum, idque Athenis, abundare oportet praeceptis institutisque philosophiae propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scientia augere potest, altera exemplis, tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper cum Graecis Latina coniunxi neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci, idem tibi censeo faciendum, ut par sis in utriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem ad rem nos, ut videmur, magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Graecarum litterarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et ad dicendum et ad iudicandum. 1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 1.3. Quam ob rem magnopere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut non solum orationes meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se aequarunt, studiose legas; vis enim maior in illis dicendi, sed hoc quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus. Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere elaboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium, utrumque certe secuti sumus. 1.51. Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium autem communia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in permultas potest: Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam, Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit. Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet, cum illi accénderit. Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; 1.52. ex quo sunt illa communia: non prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit, consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem: Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales. 1.54. Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos tamquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur conubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui; quae propagatio et suboles origo est rerum publicarum. Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines et caritate; 1.131. Cavendum autem est, ne aut tarditatibus utamur in ingressu mollioribus, ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur, aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates, quae cum fiunt, anhelitus moventur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur; ex quibus magna significatio fit non adesse constantiam. Sed multo etiam magis elaborandum est, ne animi motus a natura recedant; quod assequemur, si cavebimus, ne in perturbationes atque exanimationes incidamus, et si attentos animos ad decoris conservationem tenebimus. 2.60. Atque etiam illae impensae meliores, muri, navalia, portus, aquarum ductus omniaque, quae ad usum rei publicae pertinent. Quamquam, quod praesens tamquam in manum datur, iucundius est; tamen haec in posterum gratiora. Theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprehendo propter Pompeium, sed doctissimi non probant, ut et hic ipse Panaetius, quem nultum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus, et Phalereus Demetrius, qui Periclem, principem Graeciae, vituperat, quod tantam pecuniam in praeclara illa propylaea coniecerit. Sed de hoc genere toto in iis libris, quos de re publica scripsi, diligenter est disputatum. Tota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, temporibus necessaria, et tum ipsum et ad facultates accommodanda et mediocritate moderanda est. | 1.51. This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common." Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and, though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally: "Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his: No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit." In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. 1.52. On this principle we have the following maxims:"Deny no one the water that flows by;" "Let anyone who will take fire from our fire;" "Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;" for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss. We should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing something to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are limited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of universal liberality must be regulated according to that test of Ennius â "No less shines his" â in order that we may continue to have the means for being generous to our friends. 1.54. For since the reproductive instinct is by Nature's gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And this is the foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it were, of the state. Then follow the bonds between brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then of second cousins; and when they can no longer be sheltered under one roof, they go out into other homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these in turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and from these again a new stock of relations; and from this propagation and after-growth states have their beginnings. The bonds of common blood hold men fast through good-will and affection; 1.131. We must be careful, too, not to fall into a habit of listless sauntering in our gait, so as to look like carriers in festal processions, or of hurrying too fast, when time presses. If we do this, it puts us out of breath, our looks are changed, our features distorted; and all this is clear evidence of a lack of poise. But it is much more important that we succeed in keeping our mental operations in harmony with Nature's laws. And we shall not fall in this if we guard against violent excitement or depression, and if we keep our minds intent on the observance of propriety. 2.60. Again, the expenditure of money is better justified when it is made for walls, docks, harbours, aqueducts, and all those works which are of service to the community. There is, to be sure, more of present satisfaction in what is handed out, like cash down; nevertheless public improvements win us greater gratitude with posterity. Out of respect for Pompey's memory I am rather diffident about expressing any criticism of theatres, colonnades, and new temples; and yet the greatest philosophers do not approve of them â our Panaetius himself, for example, whom I am following, not slavishly translating, in these books; so, too, Demetrius of Phalerum, who denounces Pericles, the foremost man of Greece, for throwing away so much money on the magnificent, far-famed Propylaea. But this whole theme is discussed at length in my books on "The Republic." To conclude, the whole system of public bounties in such extravagant amount is intrinsically wrong; but it may under certain circumstances be necessary to make them; even then they must be proportioned to our ability and regulated by the golden mean. |
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| 31. Cicero, Letters, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 109 |
| 32. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 2.12.2, 5.12, 7.1.5, 10.31.6, 15.5.2, 15.6.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, consulship •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 5, 146, 150, 151; Oksanish (2019) 109 |
| 33. Cicero, In Verrem, 2.4.82, 2.4.106-2.4.109, 2.5.187 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 45, 252, 253 |
34. Polybius, Histories, 6.53 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 51 | 6.53. 1. Whenever any illustrious man dies, he is carried at his funeral into the forum to the soâcalled rostra, sometimes conspicuous in an upright posture and more rarely reclined.,2. Here with all the people standing round, a grown-up son, if he has left one who happens to be present, or if not some other relative mounts the rostra and discourses on the virtues and successful achievements of the dead.,3. As a consequence the multitude and not only those who had a part in these achievements, but those also who had none, when the facts are recalled to their minds and brought before their eyes, are moved to such sympathy that the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the whole people.,4. Next after the interment and the performance of the usual ceremonies, they place the image of the departed in the most conspicuous position in the house, enclosed in a wooden shrine.,5. This image is a mask reproducing with remarkable fidelity both the features and complexion of the deceased.,6. On the occasion of public sacrifices they display these images, and decorate them with much care, and when any distinguished member of the family dies they take them to the funeral, putting them on men who seem to them to bear the closest resemblance to the original in stature and carriage.,7. These representatives wear togas, with a purple border if the deceased was a consul or praetor, whole purple if he was a censor, and embroidered with gold if he had celebrated a triumph or achieved anything similar.,8. They all ride in chariots preceded by the fasces, axes, and other insignia by which the different magistrates are wont to be accompanied according to the respective dignity of the offices of state held by each during his life;,9. and when they arrive at the rostra they all seat themselves in a row on ivory chairs. There could not easily be a more ennobling spectacle for a young man who aspires to fame and virtue.,10. For who would not be inspired by the sight of the images of men renowned for their excellence, all together and as if alive and breathing? What spectacle could be more glorious than this? |
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| 35. Cicero, Pro Sestio, 19 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 147 |
| 36. Cicero, Letters To Quintus, 3.3.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 109 |
37. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 1.16, 1.18-1.24, 1.53, 1.82, 2.6, 2.35, 2.62, 2.78, 2.133, 2.154, 2.158, 2.160, 3.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on the nature of the gods •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, and timaeus translation •cicero, marcus tullius, and creation of cosmos •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 88, 89, 90, 96; Jenkyns (2013) 252, 253, 254; Tsouni (2019) 34, 35, 70, 161, 185, 195 | 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.16. "Well, I too," I replied, "think I have come at the right moment, as you say. For here are you, three leaders of three schools of philosophy, met in congress. In fact we only want Marcus Piso to have every considerable school represented." "Oh," rejoined Cotta, "if what is said in the book which our master Antiochus lately dedicated to our good Balbus here is true, you have no need to regret the absence of your friend Piso. Antiochus holds the view that the doctrines of the Stoics, though differing in form of expression, agree in substance with those of the Peripatetics. I should like to know your opinion of the book, Balbus." "My opinion?" said Balbus, "Why, I am surprised that a man of first-rate intellect like Antiochus should have failed to see what a gulf divides the Stoics, who distinguish expediency and right not in name only but in essential nature, from the Peripatetics, who class the right and the expedient together, and only recognize differences of quantity or degree, not of kind, between them. This is not a slight verbal discrepancy but a fundamental difference of doctrine. 1.18. Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render 'Providence') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. 1.19. What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; 1.20. but the prize example is that the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution? What thing is there that has a beginning but not an end? While as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato's creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried though? If on the contrary it is something different, I ask why it made the world mortal, and not everlasting as did Plato's divine creator? 1.21. Moreover I would put to both of you the question, why did these deities suddenly awake into activity as world-builders after countless ages of slumber? for though the world did not exist, it does not follow that ages did not exist — meaning by ages, not periods made up of a number of days and nights in annual courses, for ages in this sense I admit could not have been produced without the circular motion of the firmament; but from the infinite past there has existed an eternity not measured by limited divisions of time, but of a nature intelligible in terms of extension; since it is inconceivable that there was ever a time when time did not exist. 1.22. Well then, Balbus, what I ask is, why did your Providence remain idle all through that extent of time of which you speak? Was it in order to avoid fatigue? But god cannot know fatigue; and also there was no fatigue in question, since all the elements, sky, fire, earth and sea, were obedient to the divine will. Also, why should god take a fancy to decorate the firmament with figures and illuminations, like an aedile? If it was to embellish his own abode, then it seems that he had previously between dwelling for an infinite time in a dark and gloomy hovel! And are we to suppose that thenceforward the varied beauties which we see adorning earth and sky have afforded him pleasure? How can a god take pleasure in things of this sort? And if he did, he could not have dispensed with it so long. 1.23. Or were these beauties designed for the sake of men, as your school usually maintains? For the sake of wise men? If so, all this vast effort of construction took place on account of a handful of people. For the sake of fools then? But in the first place there was no reason for god to do a service to the wicked and secondly, what good did he do? inasmuch as all fools are beyond question extremely miserable, precisely because they are fools (for what can be mentioned more miserable than folly?), and in the second place because there are so many troubles in life that, though wise men can assuage them by balancing against them life's advantages, fools can neither avoid their approach nor endure their presence. Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom, failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess. I will touch on this a little later; 1.24. for the present I will confine myself to expressing my surprise at their stupidity in holding that a being who is immortal and also blessed is of a spherical shape, merely on the ground that Plato pronounces a sphere to be the most beautiful of all figures. For my own part, on the score of appearance I prefer either a cylinder or a cube or a cone or a pyramid. Then, what mode of existence is assigned to their spherical deity? Why, he is in a state of rotation, spinning round with a velocity that surpasses all powers of conception. But what room there can be in such an existence for steadfastness of mind and for happiness, I cannot see. Also, why should a condition that is painful in the human body, if even the smallest part of it is affected, be supposed to be painless in the deity? Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively. 1.53. We for our part deem happiness to consist in tranquillity of mind and entire exemption from all duties. For he who taught us all the rest has also taught us that the world was made by nature, without needing an artificer to construct it, and that the act of creation, which according to you cannot be performed without divine skill, is so easy, that nature will create, is creating and has created worlds without number. You on the contrary cannot see how nature can achieve all this without the aid of some intelligence, and so, like the tragic poets, being unable to bring the plot of your drama to a dénouement, you have recourse to a god; 1.82. For we have often seen temples robbed and images of gods carried off from the holiest shrines by our fellow-countrymen, but no one ever even heard of an Egyptian laying profane hands on a crocodile or ibis or cat. What therefore do you infer? that the Egyptians do not believe their sacred bull Apis to be a god? Precisely as much as you believe the Saviour Juno of your native place to be a goddess. You never see her even in your dreams unless equipped with goat-skin, spear, buckler and slippers turned up at the toe. Yet that is not the aspect of the Argive Juno, nor of the Roman. It follows that Juno has one form for the Argives, another for the people of Lanuvium, and another for us. And indeed our Jupiter of the Capitol is not the same as the Africans' Juppiter Ammon. 2.6. Nor is this unaccountable or accidental; it is the result, firstly, of the fact that the gods often manifest their power in bodily presence. For instance in the Latin War, at the critical battle of Lake Regillus between the dictator Aulus Postumius and Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, Castor and Pollux were seen fighting on horseback in our ranks. And in more modern history likewise these sons of Tyndareus brought the news of the defeat of Perses. What happened was that Publius Vatinius, the grandfather of our young contemporary, was returning to Rome by night from Reate, of which he was governor, when he was informed by two young warriors on white horses that King Perses had that very day been taken prisoner. When Vatinius carried the news to the Senate, at first he was flung into gaol on the charge of spreading an unfounded report on a matter of national concern; but afterwards a dispatch arrived from Paulus, and the date was found to tally, so the Senate bestowed upon Vatinius both a grant of land and exemption from military service. It is also recorded in history that when the Locrians won their great victory over the people of Crotona at the important battle of the River Sagra, news of the engagement was reported at the Olympic Games on the very same day. often has the sound of the voices of the Fauns, often has the apparition of a divine form compelled anyone that is not either feeble-minded or impious to admit the real presence of the gods. 2.35. Again, it is undeniable that every organic whole must have an ultimate ideal of perfection. As in vines or cattle we see that, unless obstructed by some force, nature progresses on a certain path of her own to her goal of full development, and as in painting, architecture and the other arts and crafts there is an ideal of perfect workmanship, even so and far more in the world of nature as a whole there must be a process towards completeness and perfection. The various limited modes of being may encounter many external obstacles to hinder their perfect realization, but there can be nothing that can frustrate nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains within herself all modes of being. Hence it follows that there must exist this fourth and highest grade, unassailable by any external force. 2.62. Those gods therefore who were the authors of various benefits owned their deification to the value of the benefits which they bestowed, and indeed the names that I just now enumerated express the various powers of the gods that bear them. "Human experience moreover and general custom have made it a practice to confer the deification of renown and gratitude upon of distinguished benefactors. This is the origin of Hercules, of Castor and Pollux, of Aesculapius, and also of Liber (I mean Liber the son of Semele, not the Liber whom our ancestors solemnly and devoutly consecrated with Ceres and Libera, the import of which joint consecration may be gathered from the mysteries; but Liber and Libera were so named as Ceres' offspring, that being the meaning of our Latin word liberi — a use which has survived in the case of Libera but not of Liber) — and this is also the origin of Romulus, who is believed to be the same as Quirinus. And these benefactors were duly deemed divine, as being both supremely good and immortal, because their souls survived and enjoyed eternal life. 2.78. And yet from the fact of the gods' existence (assuming that they exist, as they certainly do) it necessarily follows that they are animate beings, and not only animate but possessed of reason and united together in a sort of social community or fellowship, ruling the one world as a united commonwealth or state. 2.133. "Here somebody will ask, for whose sake was all this vast system contrived? For the sake of the trees and plants, for these, though without sensation, have their sustece from nature? But this at any rate is absurd. Then for the sake of the animals? It is no more likely that the gods took all this trouble for the sake of dumb, irrational creatures/ For whose sake then shall one pronounce the world to have been created? Doubtless for the sake of those living beings which have the use of reason; these are the gods and mankind, who assuredly surpass all other things in excellence, since the most excellent of all things is reason. Thus we are led to believe that the world and all the things that it contains were made for the sake of gods and men. "And that man has been cared for by divine providence will be more readily understood if we survey the whole structure of man and all the conformation and perfection of human nature. 2.154. "It remains for me to show, in coming finally to a conclusion, that all the things in this world which men employ have been created and provided for the sake of men. "In the first place the world itself was created for the sake of gods and men, and the things that it contains were provided and contrived for the enjoyment of men. For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place of gods and men, or the city that belongs to both; for they alone have the use of reason and live by justice and by law. As therefore Athens and Sparta must be deemed to have been founded for the sake of the Athenians and the Spartans, and all the things contained in those cities are rightly said to belong to those peoples, so whatever things are contained in all the world must be deemed to belong to the gods and to men. 2.158. It must therefore be admitted that all this abundance was provided for the sake of men, unless perchance the bounteous plenty and variety of our orchard fruit and the delightfulness not only of its flavour but also of its scent and appearance lead us to doubt whether nature intended this gift for man alone! So far is it from being true that the furs of the earth were provided for the sake of animals as well as men, that the animals themselves, as we may see, were created for the benefit of men. What other use have sheep save that their fleeces are dressed and woven into clothing for men? and in fact they could not have been reared nor sustained nor have produced anything of value without man's care and tendance. Then think of the dog, with its trusty watchfulness, its fawning affection for its master and hatred of strangers, its incredible keenness of scent in following a trail and its eagerness in hunting — what do these qualities imply except that they were created to serve the conveniences of men? 2.160. As for the pig, it can only furnish food; indeed Chrysippus actually says that its soul was given it to serve as salt and keep it from putrefaction; and because this animal was fitted for the food of man, nature made it the most prolific of all her offspring. Why should I speak of the teeming swarms of delicious fish? or of birds, which afford us so much pleasure that our Stoic Providence appears to have been at times a disciple of Epicurus? and they could not even be caught save by man's intelligence and cunning; — although some birds, birds of flight and birds of utterance as our augurs call them, we believe to have been created for the purpose of giving omens. 3.10. Give permission therefore for my reason to join issue with yours. "You adduce all these arguments to prove that the gods exist, and by arguing you render doubtful a matter which in my opinion admits no doubt at all. For I have committed to memory not only the number but also the order of your arguments. The first was that when we look up at the sky, we at once perceive that some power exists whereby the heavenly bodies are governed. And from this you went on to quote: Behold this dazzling vault of heaven, which all mankind as Jove invoke; |
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| 38. Cicero, Philippicae, 2.63, 2.75, 2.84-2.87 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 168 |
39. Cicero, Partitiones Oratoriae, 34, 40 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 66| 40. veri similia autem partim singula movent e suo pondere, partim, etiam si videntur esse exigua per se, multum tamen cum sunt coacervata proficiunt. Atque in his veri similibus insunt non numquam etiam certae rerum et propriae notae. Maximam autem fidem facit ad similitudinem veri primum exemplum, deinde introducta rei similitudo; fabula etiam non numquam, etsi sit incredibilis, tamen homines commovet. | |
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| 40. Cicero, Orator, 3.80 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 55 |
| 41. Cicero, In Pisonem, 60, 24 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 147 |
| 42. Cicero, Lucullus, 10, 12, 131, 18, 31, 38, 8, 73 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 145 |
43. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.1, 1.7-1.8, 1.26, 1.32, 1.53-1.55, 1.62-1.63, 1.70, 2.9, 2.13, 3.7, 4.43, 4.70, 5.34, 5.37 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations •cicero, marcus tullius, on the nature of the gods •cicero, marcus tullius, and creation of cosmos •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, somnium scipionis •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 283; Hoenig (2018) 84, 86, 92; Oksanish (2019) 40, 168; Tsouni (2019) 25, 29, 33, 34, 143, 173, 193, 201| 1.1. Cum 1 et 5 extr. imit. Paschasius Radb. Expos. in ps. 44 l. I praef. in. defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus aut omnino aut magna ex parte essem aliquando liberatus, rettuli rettuli s retuli X Pasch. cf. p. 344, 24 me, Brute, te hortante maxime ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa revocavi, et cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis cf. Lact. inst. 3,14, 13 litteris litteris at libris V 2 inlustrandum putavi, non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset, sed meum semper hoc supra semper add. V 2 iudicium fuit omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae quidem digna statuissent, in quibus elaborarent. 1.7. Sed ut Aristoteles, vir summo ingenio, scientia, scientia scientiae X -a pro -ae in r. V 2 copia, cum motus cum motus H commotus GKRV sed cũ supra com V 2 esset Isocratis isocratis V 2 s socratis X rhetoris gloria, dicere docere etiam coepit adulescentes docere s om. X post adulescentes add. decere V 2 et prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere, sic nobis placet nec pristinum dicendi studium deponere et in hac maiore et uberiore arte versari. hanc haen c R 1 enim perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere; in quam exercitationem ita nos studiose operam dedimus, del. Mur. operam inpendimus Dav. ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus. audeamus V (a in r. c ) ut nuper tuum post discessum in Tusculano cum essent complures cumplures G 1 R 1 (corr. ipsi) mecum familiares, temptavi, quid in eo genere possem. possem V 2 g possim X ( cf. auderemus v. 20 ) ut enim antea declamitabam causas, quod nemo me diutius fecit, sic haec mihi nunc senilis est declamatio. ponere iubebam, de quo quis audire vellet; ad id aut at id X (at id sed. ex aut id aut sed. K c ) sedens aut ambulans disputabam. 1.8. itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. fiebat autem ita ut, cum is his G 1 V 1 H qui audire audiri X ( corr. V 2 l e ss. K 2 ) vellet dixisset, quid quod K 1 V 2 sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et et om. V 1 add. 2 Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Philosophia ... 221, 7 narretur H (27 fieri 220, 5 litteris et 220,13 adulescentes 220, 18 dicere bis ) ergo ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c ita nascetur exordium: Malum ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c mihi videtur esse mors. 1.26. Expone igitur, nisi molestum est, primum, si potes, potest G 1 animos remanere post mortem, tum, si minus id obtinebis obtenebis GR 1 V —est enim arduum—, docebis carere omni malo mortem. ego enim istuc ipsum vereor ne ne me G malum sit non dico carere sensu, sed carendum esse. Auctoribus quidem ad istam sententiam, quam vis obtineri, uti optimis optineri V possumus, quod in omnibus causis et debet et solet valere plurimum, et primum quidem omni antiquitate, quae quo propius propius opius in r. V c aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae erant vera vera ss. K c veru ( aaper- tum! ) in vera corr. R cernebant. cercebant G 1 (corr. ipse) R cernebant K cerneba t V (-bat s ) Itaque unum illud erat insitum priscis illis, quos cascos cassos R cassus K 1 ann. 24 appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum neque excessu vitae sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret; 1.32. illud illũ K 1 num dubitas, quin specimen naturae capi deceat ex optima quaque natura? quae est melior igitur in hominum genere natura quam eorum, qui se natos ad homines iuvandos tutandos conservandos arbitrantur? abiit ad deos Hercules: numquam abisset, nisi, cum inter homines esset, eam sibi viam viam s. v. add. K 2 munivisset. vetera iam ista et religione omnium consecrata: quid in hac re p. tot tantosque viros ob rem p. ob rem p. b r in r. V 1 ob re p. K ob rē p. ( er. ublică) G interfectos cogitasse arbitramur? isdemne ut finibus nomen suum quibus vita terminaretur? nemo umquam sine magna spe inmortalitatis se pro patria offerret ad mortem. 1.53. Sed si, qualis sit animus, ipse animus nesciet, nesci aet K dic quaeso, ne esse ne esse ex non esse K c quidem se sciet, ne moveri quidem se? ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis, quae a Socrate est in Phaedro Phaedr. 245 c, cf. Cic. rep. 6, 27. Ciceronem sequitur Lact. inst. 7, 8, 4 et Serv. Aen. 6, 727 phedro KRV explicata, a me autem posita est in sexto libro de re p.: “Quod semper movetur, aeternum et aet. X ( sed et exp. V vet K c ) aet. Somn. Macr. est; quod autem motum adfert alicui quodque ipsum agitatur aliunde, aliunde ( u(p' a)/llou ) H e corr. s Somn. pars Macr. alicunde X quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. solum igitur, quod se ipsum movet, quia numquam deseritur a se, quia a se s. u. add. V 2 numquam ne moveri quidem desinit; quin etiam ceteris quae moventur hic fons, hoc hoc o in r. R c principium est movendi. 1.54. principii autem nulla est origo; nam e principio oriuntur omnia, ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest; nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliunde. quod si numquam oritur, ne ne G nec s Somn. Macr. occidit quidem umquam; nam principium extinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur nec ex ex V 2 s Somn. Macr. om. X ( ou)/te a)/llo e)c e)kei/nhs genh/setai ) se aliud creabit, siquidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. ita fit, ut motus principium ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur; id autem nec nasci potest nec mori, vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura et et Somn. Macr. (consistat et P ) om. W ( ta=sa/n te ge/nesin sumpesou=san sh=nai kai\ mh/poe au/)qis e)/xein o(/qen kinhqe/na genh/setai ) consistat necesse est nec vim ullam ciscatur, qua a a V 2 s Somn. Macr. om. X imp. GR primo inpulsa moveatur. cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse, quod se ipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? iimum est enim omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur cietur s Somn. Macr. citetur X Macr. P 1 interiore et suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis. quae si est una ex omnibus quae se ipsa semper 1.55. moveat, quae se ipsa moveat ( to\ au)to\ e(auto\ kinou=n ) Macr. quae se ipsam semper m. X sed semper del. V vet quae sese m. Somn. neque nata certe est et aeterna est.” semper enim movetur...245, 3 aeterna est ( sine 19 vel... 23 neget) H licet concurrant omnes plebei philosophi—sic enim i, qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia dissident, appellandi videntur—, non modo nihil umquam tam eleganter eliganter K el eg. R 1 explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter supt. hic GR conclusum sit intellegent. sentit igitur animus se moveri; quod cum sentit, illud ilium X, corr. K c V 2 s una sentit, se vi sua, non aliena moveri, nec accidere posse ut ipse umquam a se deseratur. ad R 1 ex quo efficitur aeternitas, nisi quid habes ad haec. dicere post haec add. V 2 Ego vero facile sim sim def. Plasb. ad ac. 2,147 cl. Ter. Andr. 203 sum s passus ne in mentem quidem mihi aliquid contra venire; ita isti faveo sententiae. Quid? 1.62. illa vis quae tandem est quae investigat occulta, quae inventio atque excogitatio dicitur? ex hacne tibi terrena mortalique natura et caduca concreta ea concreta ea concretus esse Bentl. videtur? aut qui primus, quod summae sapientiae Pythagorae visum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina? aut qui dissipatos homines congregavit et ad societatem vitae convocavit, vocum V 2 aut qui sonos vocis, qui infiniti videbantur, paucis litterarum notis terminavit, aut qui errantium stellarum cursus praegressiones insti tu tiones institiones Man. notavit? omnes magni; etiam superiores, qui fruges, qui vestitum, qui tecta, qui cultum vitae, qui praesidia contra feras invenerunt, a quibus mansuefacti et exculti a necessariis artificiis ad elegantiora eligantiora K ele g. R 1 defluximus. nam et auribus oblectatio magna parta est inventa parata ss. K 2 que post inventa add. V 2 et temperata varietate et natura sonorum, et astra suspeximus cum cum V, sed c in r. scr, V c tum X ea quae sunt infixa certis locis, tum illa non re sed vocabulo errantia, quorum conversiones omnisque motus qui animo animo Man. s animus vidit, is docuit similem animum suum eius esse, qui ea fabricatus esset in caelo. 1.63. nam cum Archimedes lunae solis quinque errantium motus in sphaeram spher. GRV sper. K inligavit, effecit efficit K 1 idem quod ille, qui in Timaeo timeo X Tim. p.39 mundum aedificavit, Platonis deus, ut tarditate et celeritate dissimillimos motus una regeret conversio. quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera spher. GRV sper. K quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine sine V divino ingenio ne V potuisset imitari. 1.70. minis utilitati agros omnis et maria parentia—: haec igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare quin is is H his GKRV praesit aliquis vel effector, si haec nata sunt, sînt K 1 ut Platoni videtur, vel, si semper fuerunt, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris? numeris K 1 sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non videas ut deum add. G 1 in mg. non vides, tamen, ut deum adgnoscis adgn. G (3 agd n.) KR a gn. V agn. H ex operibus eius, sic ex memoria rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omnique omniaque GK 1 (omni atque c )R omni que V pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis adgnoscito. adgn. G (3 agd n.) KR In quo igitur loco est? credo equidem in capite et cur credam adferre possum. sed alias, ubi nunc ante ubi add. V rec sit animus; certe quidem in te est. quidem interest K 1 quae est eius ei' (= eius) in r. V c et X ei s V rec natura? propria, puto, et sua. sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem: spiritabilem V nihil ad id de quo agimus. illud modo videto, ut deum noris, etsi eius ignores et locum et faciem ... 13 locum et om. H s faciem, faciem aciem in r. V 1 sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiamsi ignores et locum et formam. 2.9. Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partis partes K 1 R 1?ecorr. disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset, quid in quaque re re add. in mg. K 2 veri simile esset, inveniri, invenire GK 1 (~i 2 aut c ) RV 1 (i V rec ) sed etiam quod esset ea maxuma dicendi exercitatio. qua qua G princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. nostra autem memoria Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum: ad quam nos consuetudinem a familiaribus nostris adducti in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumpsimus. itaque cum ante meridiem dictioni operam dedissemus, sicut pridie feceramus, post meridiem meridie X (-di V me- ridi ach. G) meridiẽ K 2 R c? cf. de orat.2, 367 et Usener, Jahrb f. Phil. 117 p. 79 in Academiam descendimus. in qua disputationem habitam non quasi narrantes exponimus, exponemus V 2 sed eisdem ex eisdem K (exp. 2 aut 1) fere verbis, ut actum disputatumque est. Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum mundum V 1 sermo ille nobis institutus et a tali et ali V 1 et tali V c quodam ductus ductus Crat. inductus cf. Brut. 21 exordio: 2.13. Nullum vero id quidem argumentum est. nam ut agri non omnes frugiferi sunt qui coluntur, falsumque illud Acci: Accius Atr. 234 Accii Probae Mur. acimprobe RK (acĭ pbe) acinprobe GV Probae falsumque ... probae om. H e/tsi in segetem su/nt deteriore/m datae Fruge/s, tamen ipsae ipse KR sua/pte natura natura alt. a in r. G 1 nature nitent K 1 e/nitent, sic animi non omnes culti fructum cultum fructi R 1 ferunt. atque, ut ut add. G 1 in eodem simili verser, ut ager quamvis fertilis sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus; ita est utraque res sine altera debilis. cultura autem animi philosophia est; haec extrahit vitia radicitus et praeparat properat K 1 animos ad satus accipiendos eaque mandat mandat s mundat X is et, ut ita dicam, serit, quae adulta fructus uberrimos ferant. nam... 16 ferant H Agamus igitur, ut coepimus. dic, si vis, de quo disputari velis. 3.7. ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, aliquid quid adherant G 1 causam disserendi. tum res acta sic est: Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo. Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines libidines add. G 2 iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, eiusmodi V ( ss. c ) quae Graeci pa/qh pathe X appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, relique ... 29 usitate ( libere ) H uisit. G 1 ( sic etiam 322, 10; 325,16 ) nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. Mihi vero isto modo. 4.43. quorum est talis oratio: primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant, cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt, multoque et imit. Lact. inst. 6, 14 in hostem et in inprobum et in probum V (im ss. 2 ) et inprobum GK (imp.) R (imp.) civem vehementioris vehementiores V (e ex i 2 ) iratorum impetus esse, levis autem ratiunculas eorum, qui ita cogitarent: proelium rectum est hoc fieri, convenit dimicare demicare K 1 pro legibus, pro libertate, pro patria; haec nullam habent habent Peripateticorum argumentatio- nem recta oratione C. referre pergit ut mox v. 13 vim, nisi ira excanduit fortitudo. noctu eqs. ( cf. p. 447, 26 fin. 3, 62. 64 al. ) nec vero de bellatoribus solum disputant: imperia severiora nulla esse putant sine aliqua acerbitate iracundiae; oratorem denique non modo accusantem, sed ne defendentem quidem probant sine aculeis iracundiae, quae etiamsi non adsit, tamen verbis atque motu simulandam arbitrantur, ut auditoris iram oratoris incendat actio. virum denique videri negant qui irasci nesciet, nesciet W (nesciat edd. plur. ) o(/stis ou)de/pote o0rgisqh/setai, tou=ton ou)d ' a)/ndra dokei=n ei/(nai/ fasin Cf. o( sofo\s o)rgisqh/setai, amaturum esse p. 398, 5 vincetur 427, 28 al. Hor. ars 35 eamque, quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lentitudinis vitiosolitudinis K nomine nomine in mg. G 1 appellant. eamque ... 13 appellant Non. 134, 4 4.70. Sed poëtas ludere sinamus, quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari ipsum videmus Iovem: ad at G 1 magistros virtutis philosophos veniamus, qui amorem quimorem quā orem K 1 -i amorem in r. G 2 negant stupri esse St. fr. 3, 653 Epic. 483 et in eo litigant cum Epicuro non multum, ut opinio mea fert, mentiente. quis est enim iste ista K 1 amor amicitiae? cur neque deformem adulescentem quisquam amat neque formosum senem? mihi quidem haec in Graecorum gymnasiis nata consuetudo videtur, in quibus isti liberi et concessi sunt amores. bene ergo Ennius: Ennius sc. 395 Fla/giti flagitii X cives G(?)R rec princi/pium est nudare i/nter civis co/rpora. qui ut sint, quod fieri posse video, pudici, solliciti tamen et anxii sunt, eoque magis, quod se ipsi continent et coërcent. 5.34. quare demus hoc sane Bruto, ut sit beatus semper sapiens—quam sibi conveniat, ipse ipsa X corr. V 2 viderit; gloria quidem huius sententiae quis est illo viro dignior?—, nos tamen teneamus, ut sit idem beatissimus. Et si Zeno Citieus, ticieus R cici eus K 1 advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex, insinuasse se se om. Non. in antiquam philosophiam videtur, advena... 3 videtur Non. 457, 25 huius sententiae gravitas a Platonis auctoritate repetatur, apud quem saepe haec oratio usurpata est, ut nihil praeter virtutem diceretur bonum. velut velud KR in Gorgia Gorg. 470 d Socrates, cum esset ex eo quaesitum, Archelaum arcelaum hic X (arcael.G) Perdiccae filium, qui tum fortunatissimus haberetur, nonne beatum putaret, haud scio inquit; 5.37. quae, quicquid genuit, non modo animal, sed etiam quod ita ortum esset e terra, ut stirpibus suis niteretur, in suo quidque genere perfectum esse voluit. itaque et arbores et vites et ea, quae sunt humiliora neque se tollere a terra altius possunt, alia semper virent, alia hieme nudata verno tempore tepefacta frondescunt, neque est ullum quod non ita vigeat vigeant X interiore quodam motu et suis in quoque seminibus inclusis, ut aut flores aut fruges fundat aut bacas, ut... bacas Non.312,41 (fundant) omniaque in omnibus, quantum in ipsis sit, nulla vi vi K vim GRV impediente perfecta sint. | |
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| 44. Cicero, On Laws, 2.2-2.4, 2.35-2.36, 3.36 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero marcus tullius (son) •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 251, 253, 254; Maso (2022) 7 |
45. Cicero, Topica, 58-59, 6, 60-66, 8, 90, 25 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 77| 25. his igitur locis qui sunt expositi ad omne argumentum reperiendum reperiendum om. codd. O tamquam elementis quibusdam significatio et demonstratio ad reperiendum ad reperiendum om. O datur. Vtrum igitur hactenus satis est? Tibi quidem tam acuto et tam occupato puto. sed quoniam avidum hominem ad has discendi epulas recepi, sic accipiam, ut reliquiarum sit potius aliquid quam te hinc patiar non satiatum discedere. | |
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46. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.1-1.10, 1.17, 2.34, 2.110, 3.7-3.10, 3.16-3.17, 3.20-3.21, 3.23, 3.31, 3.33, 3.41, 3.50, 3.62-3.64, 4.3, 4.6, 4.14, 4.18, 4.21, 4.45, 4.51, 4.61, 5.1-5.2, 5.4, 5.6-5.14, 5.16, 5.18, 5.22-5.33, 5.37-5.40, 5.42-5.43, 5.45, 5.47-5.51, 5.53-5.55, 5.60-5.61, 5.64, 5.66-5.68, 5.71, 5.73-5.75, 5.78, 5.84, 5.86-5.87, 5.89, 5.91-5.92, 5.94-5.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 3, 4, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 41, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78, 87, 88, 89, 99, 105, 107, 111, 112, 118, 128, 133, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 161, 164, 173, 175, 177, 181, 184, 186, 188, 189, 191, 193, 194, 195, 198, 201| 1.1. Non eram nescius, Brute, cum, quae summis ingeniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sermone tractavissent, ea Latinis litteris mandaremus, fore ut hic noster labor in varias reprehensiones incurreret. nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt, si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. erunt etiam, et ii quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. 1.2. contra quos omnis dicendum breviter existimo. Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis responsum est eo libro, quo a nobis philosophia philosophia a nobis BE defensa et collaudata est, cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi veritus ne movere hominum studia viderer, retinere non posse. Qui autem, si maxime hoc placeat, placet BEV moderatius tamen id volunt fieri, difficilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo, quod semel admissum admissum dett iam missum coe+rceri reprimique non potest, ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis, qui omnino avocent a philosophia, quam his, qui rebus infinitis modum constituant in reque eo meliore, quo maior sit, mediocritatem desiderent. 1.3. sive enim ad sapientiam perveniri potest, non paranda nobis solum ea, sed fruenda etiam sapientia om. cod. Eliens. Davisii, P. Man. est; sive hoc difficile est, tamen nec modus est ullus ullus est BE investigandi veri, nisi inveneris, et quaerendi defatigatio defetigatio A 2 turpis est, cum id, quod quaeritur, sit pulcherrimum. etenim si delectamur, cum scribimus, quis est tam invidus, qui ab eo nos abducat? sin laboramus, quis est, qui alienae modum statuat industriae? nam ut Terentianus Chremes non inhumanus, qui novum vicinum non vult 'fodere au/t arare aut a/liquid ferre de/nique'— non enim illum ab industria, sed ab inliberali labore deterret—, sic isti curiosi, quos offendit noster minime nobis iniucundus labor. 1.4. Iis iis Man. sec. Bai. ; his igitur est difficilius satis facere, qui se Latina latina A 1 B E latinia R latine A 2 NV scripta dicunt contemnere. in quibus hoc primum est in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non delectet eos sermo patrius, cum idem fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini nomini pene BE Romano est, qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii spernat aut reiciat, quod se isdem Euripidis fabulis delectari dicat, Latinas litteras oderit? Synephebos ego, inquit, potius Caecilii aut Andriam Terentii quam utramque Medri legam? A quibus tantum dissentio, ut, cum Sophocles vel optime scripserit Electram, tamen male conversam Atilii atrilii ( ut videtur )R acilii BE mihi legendam putem, de quo Lucilius: Lucilius Se. lucinius A 1 ; licinius (altera parte prioris u erasa) A 2 ; licinius BER, N (litin.), V; Licinus C.F.W. Mue. 1.5. 'ferreum scriptorem', verum, opinor, scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit. rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poe+tis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidii delicatissimi. mihi quidem nulli satis eruditi videntur, quibus nostra ignota sunt. an Utina/m an Utinam Mur (ad Phil. 14, 5), at utinam ABERN aut umnam V ne in nemore nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? 1.6. Quid? quod BEN 2 si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque eisque eisdem N his (hys) BE nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca antepot iis, quae et splendide dicta sint dicta sint dett. dicta sunt neque sint conversa de Graecis? nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos ipsos NV ipso quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant, quam legendi sunt. quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. quid? Theophrastus Theophrastus A. Man. theophrastum RNV theophastrum A theoprastum BE mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? quid? Epicurei epicuri BE num num BE non RV non ( superscr. ab alt. m. uel num) A non ( superscr. ab alt. m. nun) N desistunt de isdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis isdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est, cur nostri a nostris non legantur? 1.7. Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poe+tae fabulas, male, male AR 2 N 2 mali BEN 1 mole R 1 magis V credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Medro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius, Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia; alia Urs. alias sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris. 1.8. ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire, usui uenire superscr. ab alt. m. illud e; ut sit illud euenire, A; uenire usu R ut abhorreant a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. quibus ego assentior, dum modo de isdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. res vero bonas verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas dictas V dictatas quis non legat? nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a Scaevola est praetore praetore P. Man. praetor salutatus Athenis Albucius. 1.9. quem quidem locum comit comit Se. c o N cum ABERV cf. ad p. 5,10; 23,1; 26,12; 44,8; 46,15; 160,31 multa venustate et omni sale idem Lucilius, apud quem praeclare Scaevola: Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum, municipem Ponti, Ponti edd. pontii (pontu BE) Tritani, Tritani Bai. tritanii A 2 RV tiranii A 1 tritanu BE centurionum, praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque, maluisti dici. Graece ergo praetor Athenis, id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto: 'chaere,' chaere care BE inquam, Tite! lictores, turma omnis chorusque: chorusque cohorsque 'primus quantum video Man.' Mdv. 'chaere, Tite!' hinc hic A 1 BERV mi BEV; om. in ras. A; m R; mi in fine versus N 1, add. itii ( ut sit mutii) N 2 hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus. Sed iure Mucius. 1.10. ego autem mirari satis mirari satis Mdv. satis mirari A. Man.; non mirari Böck. mirari (R in mg. ad aū in fine versus pos. adscriptum habet a man. rec. nō) non queo unde hoc sit tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium. non est omnino hic hic omnino BE docendi locus; sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, modo non inopem N 2 modo inopem ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. quando enim nobis, vel dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poe+tis, postea quidem quam fuit quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit? Ego vero, quoniam quoniam Otto con (conforensibus superscr. ab alt. man. u sup. o priore ) N c vel ī (superscr.) R cum forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor videor N 2 V videri praesidium, in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, sum dett. sim debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, possum BE possim in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, nec cum istis tantopere tanto opere N pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, malunt BER modo legant illa ipsa, ne simulent, et iis servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magnopere desiderent. 1.17. Quid igitur est? inquit; audire enim cupio, quid non probes. Principio, inquam, in physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus. Democritea dicit democrite adicit A 1 RBE democrito adicit A 2, V (adijcit); adicit de- mocrite (e corr in o) N perpauca mutans, sed ita, ut ea, quae corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur. ille atomos athom. (et sic semper) quas appellat, id est corpora individua propter soliditatem, censet in infinito ii, in quo nihil nec summum nec infimum nec medium nec ultimum ultimum intimum Jonas (dissert. Berol. 1870 thes. 5) nec extremum sit, ita ferri, ferri A 2 ERN fieri BV ita ferri ut om A 1 ut concursionibus inter se cohaerescant, ex quo efficiantur ea, quae sint quaeque certur, omnia, eumque motum atomorum nullo a principio, sed ex aeterno tempore intellegi convenire. 2.34. in his primis naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valitudinem corporis, non valitudinem corporis om. E non valetudinem ( om. cor- poris) edd. summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam et iam NV etiam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt, quae paulo ante paulo ante § 33 omne enim animal ... asperneturque contraria dixi. ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis. Callipho ad virtutem nihil adiunxit nisi voluptatem, Diodorus vacuitatem doloris. * * Mdv. : ' nonnulla exciderunt, quibus Cicero simili forma atque supra (Polemoni et Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt cet. ) dixerit, quae alii prima posuissent; tum rectissime (quemadmodum ante: ergo nata est cet.) subiciebatur de finibus : his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes (consentanei iis, quae posita sunt prima) sunt fines bonorum. Et fortasse etiam Carneadem et Hieronymum no- minarat, sed hic exempli causa solos Aristippum et Stoicos ponit. ' his omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes fines sunt fines sunt etiam A bonorum, Aristippo simplex voluptas, Stoicis Stoicis N 2 stoici consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste, vivere, quod ita interpretantur: vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum, quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea, quae essent secundum naturam, reicientemque reficientemque A 1 BERN contraria. 2.110. videmus in quodam volucrium volucrium Charis. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil I p. 146); volucrum ARNV voluerunt BE genere non nulla indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, in multis etiam desideria videmus. ergo in bestiis erunt secreta e voluptate humanarum quaedam simulacra virtutum, in ipsis hominibus virtus nisi voluptatis causa nulla erit? et homini, qui ceteris animantibus plurimum praestat, praecipue praecipui P. Man. sec. Mdv. a natura nihil datum esse dicemus? esse dicemus datum BE 3.7. nam in Tusculano cum essem vellemque e bibliotheca pueri Luculli quibusdam libris uti, veni in eius villam, ut eos ipse, ut solebam, depromerem. quo cum venissem, M. Catonem, quem ibi esse nescieram, vidi in bibliotheca sedentem multis circumfusum Stoicorum libris. erat enim, ut scis, in eo aviditas legendi, nec satiari poterat, quippe qui ne reprehensionem ne re pn sionē R ne pren- sionem ABE rep hensionem N nec reprensionem V quidem vulgi iem reformidans iem non ut credo reformidans (punct. ab alt. m. pos.) N in ipsa curia soleret legere saepe, dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operae rei publicae detrahens. quo magis tum in summo otio maximaque copia quasi helluari libris, si hoc verbo in tam clara re utendum est, videbatur. 3.8. quod cum accidisset ut alter alterum necopinato videremus, surrexit statim. deinde prima illa, quae in congressu solemus: Quid tu, inquit, huc? a villa enim, credo, et: Si ibi te esse scissem, ad te ipse venissem. Heri, inquam, ludis commissis ex urbe profectus veni ad vesperum. vespm BE vesperam R causa autem fuit huc veniendi ut quosdam hinc hinc BE hīc (īc ex corr. m. alt. ) N hic A huc RV libros promerem. et quidem, Cato, hanc totam copiam iam Lucullo nostro notam esse oportebit; nam his libris eum malo quam reliquo ornatu villae delectari. est enim mihi magnae curae—quamquam hoc quidem proprium tuum munus est—, ut ita erudiatur, ut et patri et Caepioni scipioni BER c epioni V nostro et tibi tam propinquo respondeat. laboro autem non sine causa; nam et avi avi avunculi Schuetz. 'cui sic assentior ut ipsum Ciceronem perturbatione quadam memoriae avi scripsisse putem' Mdv. (cf. index nom. et rer. s. v. Q. Servilius Caepio). eius memoria moveor—nec enim ignoras, quanti fecerim Caepionem, scepionem R c epionem V qui, ut opinio mea fert, fert R refert in principibus iam esset, si viveret—, et Lucullus et L. Lucullus Halm. mihi versatur ante oculos, vir cum vir cum (tum E) om. V virtutibus virtutibus om. ABERN omnibus excellens, tum mecum et amicitia et omni voluntate sententiaque coniunctus. 3.9. Praeclare, inquit, facis, cum cum quod Wes. apud Mdv. et eorum memoriam tenes, quorum uterque tibi testamento liberos suos testamento libros suos tibi BE commendavit, et puerum diligis. quod autem meum munus dicis non equidem recuso, sed te adiungo socium. addo etiam illud, multa iam mihi dare signa puerum et pudoris et ingenii, sed aetatem vides. Video equidem, inquam, sed tamen iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, conbiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior. veniet paratior sit et quidem A venerit (in E incert.) paratior sit et quidem BE veniet paratior sit. Equidem R cu ul si venerit paratior sit Et quidem N 1 veniet paratior sit quidem N 2 veniet paratior sic equidem V Sic, et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos agemusque communiter. sed residamus, inquit, si placet. Itaque fecimus. 3.10. Tum ille: Tu autem cum ipse tantum librorum habeas, quos quos om. BE hic hic hic ul hic N his AR hys BE om. V tandem requiris? Commentarios quosdam, inquam, Aristotelios, aristotelios A aristotilis BE aristoteles R aristotili hos N 1 aristotelicos N 2 aristotilicos V quos hic sciebam esse, veni ut auferrem, quos legerem, dum essem otiosus; quod quidem nobis non saepe contingit. Quam vellem, inquit, te ad Stoicos inclinavisses! erat enim, si cuiusquam, certe tuum nihil praeter virtutem in bonis ducere. Vide, ne magis, inquam, tuum fuerit, cum re idem tibi, quod mihi, videretur, non nova te te om. NV rebus nomina inponere. ratio enim nostra consentit, pugnat oratio. Minime vero, inquit ille, consentit. quicquid quidquid BV quitquid E Quid quod R enim praeter id, quod honestum sit, expetendum esse dixeris in bonisque numeraveris, et honestum ipsum quasi virtutis lumen extinxeris et virtutem penitus everteris. Dicuntur ista, Cato, magnifice, inquam, sed videsne verborum gloriam tibi cum Pyrrhone et cum Aristone, qui omnia exaequant, esse exequant esse V, N (post t ras., es ab alt. m.); exequantes se ABE ex sequentes se R communem? 3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. 3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.23. Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab isdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. sed quem ad modum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus alicui pluris eum faciat cui commendatus sit om. BEN 1 sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus sit, quam illum, a quo, sic sic sit BR minime mirum est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam ipsam autem BE sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae o(rmh/ Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. 3.31. sed sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii, ii V hi (hij) qui cum scientia vivere ultimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam esse dixerunt, atque ita sapientem beatum fore, nihil aliud alii momento ullo anteponentem, et qui, add.O.Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 252; Mdv. ut ut aut BE quidam Academici constituisse dicuntur, extremum bonorum et summum munus esse sapientis obsistere visis adsensusque suos firme sustinere. his singulis copiose responderi solet, sed quae perspicua sunt longa esse non debent. quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, fore ut add. Lamb. tollatur omnis ea, quae quaeratur laudeturque, prudentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis, quas posui, et iis, si quae similes earum sunt, relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint sint Mdv. sunt reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere. 3.33. Bonum autem, quod in hoc sermone totiens usurpatum est, id etiam definitione explicatur. sed eorum definitiones paulum oppido inter se differunt et tamen eodem spectant. ego adsentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id, quod esset natura esset natura dett. esset enatura A esset e natura RNV esse a natura BE absolutum. id autem sequens illud etiam, quod prodesset— w)fe/lhma enim sic appellemus—, motum aut statum esse dixit e natura absoluto. absoluto Brem. absoluta cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni boni Lamb. in curis secundis ; bonum notitia notitia nocio BE facta est. cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit. 3.41. Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam qua tractata Guyet. a Peripateticis mollius—est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem ignorantiam R dialecticae—Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio aio aĩo V animo R oio ( prior o ab alt. m. in ras. ) N discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod non ex omni quod Dav. non quod ex omni ARV noro quod ex omni BE numquam ex omni N aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent. 3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.64. mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum. 4.3. Existimo igitur, inquam, Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, auditores Platonis BE Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum, Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitutam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni, cum Polemonem audisset, cur et ab eo ipso et a superioribus dissideret. quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim quid mutandum putes nec expectes, dum ad omnia dicam, quae a te a te ed. princ. Rom. ante dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra confligendum puto. 4.6. deinde ea, quae requirebant orationem ornatam et gravem, quam magnifice sunt dicta ab illis, quam splendide! de iustitia, de temperantia, de fortitudine, de amicitia, de aetate add. Mdv. degenda, de philosophia, de capessenda re publica, de del. Mdv. temperantia de fortitudine hominum non non Mdv. de spinas spinis RNV vellentium, ut Stoici, nec ossa nudantium, sed eorum, qui grandia ornate vellent, enucleate minora dicere. itaque quae sunt eorum consolationes, quae cohortationes, quae etiam monita et consilia scripta ad summos viros! erat enim apud eos, ut est rerum ipsarum natura, sic dicendi exercitatio duplex. nam, quicquid quaeritur, id habet aut generis ipsius sine personis temporibusque aut his adiunctis facti aut iuris aut nominis controversiam. ergo in utroque exercebantur, eaque disciplina effecit effecit edd. efficit tantam illorum utroque in genere dicendi copiam. 4.14. Sed haec hactenus. nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit, quam ob rem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret. hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum, finis hic bonorum qui continet del. Bentl., Ern. philosophiam et quis quis ARV quid (d ab alt. m. in ras. ) N qui BE a Stoicis et quem ad modum diceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus, si potuerimus, quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, dixissent edd. dixisset his verbis tria significari significari BE significare Stoici dicunt, unum eius modi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent. hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere. 4.18. Principiis autem a natura datis amplitudines quaedam bonorum excitabantur partim profectae a contemplatione rerum occultiorum, occultorum R quod erat insitus menti cognitionis amor, e quo etiam rationis explicandae disserendique cupiditas consequebatur; quodque hoc solum animal natum est pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque coniunctionum coniunctionum RNV coniunctium (coniunct iu pro coniunct iu m = coniunctionum) BE hominum ad ad R et B ac ENV societatem societatem R societatum BENV cf. III 66 inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus et p. 128, 15 sq., ubi de cognitione rerum respicit ad p. 127,23 (erat insitus menti cognitionis amor) et de coniunctione generis humani ad p. 127, 26 sq. (coniunctionum hominum ad societatem) animadvertensque in omnibus rebus, quas ageret aut aut RN 2 ut BEN 1 V diceret, ut ne quid ab eo fieret nisi honeste ac ac BER et NV decore, his initiis, ut ante dixi, et et V om. BERN ( ad initiis, ut ante dixi, et seminibus cf. p. 127, 14 et 9 ) seminibus a natura datis temperantia, modestia, iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absoluta est. 4.21. O magnam vim ingenii causamque iustam, cur nova existeret disciplina! Perge porro. sequuntur enim ea, quae tu scientissime complexus es, complexus es p. 107, 17-30 omnium insipientiam, iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, omniaque peccata esse paria, eosque, qui natura doctrinaque longe ad virtutem processissent, nisi eam plane consecuti essent, summe esse miseros, neque inter eorum vitam et improbissimorum quicquam omnino interesse, ut Plato, tantus ille vir, si sapiens non fuerit, nihilo melius quam quivis improbissimus nec beatius beatius dett. beatus vixerit. haec videlicet est correctio correctio V correptio philosophiae veteris et emendatio, quae omnino aditum habere nullum nullum habere BE potest in urbem, in forum, in curiam. quis enim ferre posset ita loquentem eum, qui se auctorem vitae graviter et sapienter agendae profiteretur, nomina rerum commutantem, cumque idem sentiret quod omnes, quibus rebus eandem vim tribueret, alia nomina inponentem, verba modo mutantem, de opinionibus nihil detrahentem? 4.45. sed primum illud vide, gravissimam illam vestram sententiam, quae familiam ducit, honestum quod sit, id esse bonum solum bonum solum BERNV honesteque vivere bonorum finem, communem fore vobis cum omnibus, qui in una virtute constituunt finem bonorum, quodque dicitis, informari non posse virtutem, si quicquam, nisi quod honestum sit, numeretur, idem dicetur ab illis, modo quos modo quos BERNV nominavi. mihi autem aequius videbatur Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat, acceperat V accederat R ac- cederet BE concederat N a communibus initiis progredientem videre ubi primum insisteret et unde causa controversiae nasceretur, non stantem cum iis, qui ne dicerent quidem sua summa bona esse a a N 2 V om. BERN 1 natura profecta, uti isdem argumentis, quibus illi uterentur, isdemque sententiis. 4.51. dabit hoc Zenoni Polemo, etiam magister eius et tota illa gens et reliqui, qui virtutem omnibus rebus multo anteponentes adiungunt ei tamen aliquid summo in bono finiendo. si enim virtus digna est gloriatione, ut est, tantumque praestat reliquis rebus, ut dici vix possit, et beatus esse poterit (25 poterit, sc. non Polemo, sed qui virtute una praeditus est, caret ceteris) virtute una praeditus carens ceteris, nec tamen illud tibi concedetur, concedetur Se. concedet praeter virtutem nihil in bonis esse ducendum. illi autem, quibus summum bonum sine virtute est, non dabunt fortasse vitam beatam habere, in quo iure possit possit iure BE gloriari, etsi illi quidem etiam voluptates faciunt interdum gloriosas. 4.61. quid, si reviviscant Platonis illi et deinceps qui eorum auditores fuerunt, et tecum ita loquantur? Nos cum te, M. Cato, studiosissimum philosophiae, iustissimum virum, optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem, audiremus, admirati sumus, quid esset cur nobis Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sentirent ea, quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, nominibus uterentur iis, quae prima specie admirationem, re explicata risum moverent. tu autem, si tibi illa probabantur, cur non propriis verbis ea ea NV eas R illa BE tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne omnibus et Platoni ipsi nescio quem illum anteponebas? praesertim cum in re publica princeps esse velles ad eamque tuendam cum summa tua dignitate maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. a nobis enim ista quaesita, a nobis descripta, notata, add. Lamb. praecepta sunt, omniumque rerum publicarum rectionis rectionis Mdv. rectiones BERN rectores V genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et leges etiam et ERN leges et etiam B et etiam leges et V instituta ac mores civitatum perscripsimus. eloquentiae vero, quae et principibus maximo ornamento maximo ornamento RV maximo e ornamento B maximo cornamento E maxime (e ex corr. m. alt. ) ornamento N est, et qua te audimus audivimus RV valere plurimum, et qua te ... plurimum om. N quantum tibi ex monumentis monimentis RV nostris addidisses! Ea cum dixissent, quid tandem talibus viris responderes? 5.1. Cum audissem audivissem ER Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, solebam Vict. solebat cum M. Pisone in eo gymnasio, quod Ptolomaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognatione patruelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut ambulationem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. inde sermone vario sex illa a Dipylo stadia confecimus. cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea, quam volueramus. 5.2. tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc, inquit, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod aliquid R legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui propinqui hortuli BE non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo, cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram—Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse esse mihi B videtur, posteaquam est maior—solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina. 5.4. Hic ego: Pomponius quidem, inquam, noster iocari videtur, et fortasse suo iure. ita enim se Athenis collocavit, ut sit paene unus ex Atticis, ut id etiam cognomen videatur habiturus. Ego autem tibi, Piso, assentior usu hoc venire, ut acrius aliquanto et attentius de claris viris locorum admonitu admonitum Non. cogitemus. ut acrius...cogitemus Non. p. 190, 191 scis enim me quodam tempore Metapontum venisse tecum neque ad hospitem ante devertisse, devertisse Lambini vetus cod. in marg. ed. rep. ; divertisse quam Pythagorae ipsum illum locum, ubi vitam ediderat, sedemque viderim. hoc autem tempore, etsi multa in omni parte Athenarum sunt in ipsis locis indicia summorum virorum, tamen ego illa moveor exhedra. modo enim fuit Carneadis, Carneadis Mdv. carneades quem videre videor—est enim nota imago—, a sedeque ipsa tanta tanti RN ingenii magnitudine orbata desiderari illam vocem puto. 5.6. Tum Piso: Atqui, Cicero, inquit, ista studia, si ad imitandos summos viros spectant, ingeniosorum sunt; sin tantum modo ad indicia veteris memoriae cognoscenda, curiosorum. te autem hortamur omnes, currentem quidem, ut spero, ut eos, quos novisse vis, imitari etiam velis. Hic ego: Etsi facit hic quidem, inquam, Piso, ut vides, ea, quae praecipis, tamen mihi grata hortatio tua est. Tum ille amicissime, ut solebat: Nos vero, inquit, omnes omnia ad huius adolescentiam conferamus, in primisque ut aliquid suorum studiorum philosophiae quoque impertiat, vel ut te imitetur, quem amat, vel ut illud ipsum, quod studet, facere possit ornatius. sed utrum hortandus es nobis, Luci, inquit, an etiam tua sponte propensus es? mihi quidem Antiochum, quem audis, satis belle videris attendere. Tum ille timide vel potius verecunde: Facio, inquit, equidem, sed audistine modo de Carneade? rapior illuc, revocat autem Antiochus, nec est praeterea, quem audiamus. 5.7. Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V 5.8. Scis me, inquam, istud idem sentire, Piso, sed a te oportune facta mentio est. studet enim meus audire Cicero quaenam sit istius veteris, quam commemoras, Academiae de finibus bonorum Peripateticorumque sententia. sed a te ... Peripat. sententia Non. p. 91 est sed et enim Non. censemus autem facillime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam Staseam dett. stans eam Neapolitanum multos annos habueris apud te et complures iam menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex Antiocho videamus exquirere. Et ille ridens: Age, age, inquit,—satis enim scite me videtur legenduim : in me nostri sermonis principium esse voluisti—exponamus adolescenti, si quae forte possumus. dat enim id nobis solitudo, quod si qui deus diceret, numquam putarem me in Academia tamquam philosophum disputaturum. sed ne, dum huic obsequor, vobis molestus sim. Mihi, inquam, qui te id ipsum rogavi? Tum, Quintus et Pomponius cum idem se velle dixissent, Piso exorsus est. cuius oratio attende, quaeso, Brute, satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi, qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris, maxime probatam existimo. 5.9. Sic est igitur locutus: Quantus ornatus in Peripateticorum disciplina sit satis est a me, ut brevissime potuit, paulo ante dictum. sed est forma eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex: una pars est naturae, naturae edd. natura ( etiam B) disserendi altera, vivendi tertia. Natura sic ab iis investigata est, ut nulla pars caelo, mari, terra, ut poe+tice loquar, praetermissa sit; quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo locuti essent, ut multa non modo probabili argumentatione, sed etiam necessaria mathematicorum ratione concluderent, maximam materiam ex rebus per se investigatis ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attulerunt. 5.10. persecutus est est N 2 om. BERN 1 V Non. p. 232 Aristoteles animantium omnium ortus, victus, figuras, Theophrastus autem stirpium naturas omniumque fere rerum, quae e terra gignerentur, causas atque rationes; qua ex cognitione facilior facta est investigatio rerum occultissimarum. Disserendique ab isdem non dialectice solum, sed etiam oratorie praecepta sunt tradita, ab Aristoteleque principe de singulis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia semper, sicut Arcesilas, diceret, et tamen ut in omnibus rebus, quicquid ex utraque parte dici posset, expromeret. exprimeret R 5.11. Cum autem tertia pars bene vivendi praecepta quaereret, ea quoque est ab isdem non solum ad privatae vitae rationem, sed etiam ad rerum publicarum rectionem relata. omnium fere civitatum non Graeciae solum, sed etiam barbariae ab Aristotele mores, instituta, disciplinas, a Theophrasto leges etiam cognovimus. cumque uterque eorum docuisset qualem in re publica principem esse conveniret, add. Ascens. 1511 pluribus praeterea conscripsisset cum scripsisset NV qui esset optimus rei publicae status, hoc amplius Theophrastus: quae essent in re publica status ... in re publica om. BER rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum, quibus esset moderandum, utcumque res postularet. vitae autem degendae elegendae E eligendae B ratio maxime quidem illis illis quidem BE placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae vite erat BE simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima. atque his de rebus et splendida est eorum et illustris oratio. 5.12. De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod e)cwteriko/n appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. sed cum beata vita quaeratur idque sit unum, quod philosophia philosophia dett. philosophiam spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut labefactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo non numquam variari inter eos inter eos variari R et dubitari videtur. quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam praestare vitam vitam praestare BE sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, delicatior videtur NV ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis et roboris. Simus igitur contenti his. 5.13. namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, lyco V lico R lisias et N 2 ( versu ultra marg. continuato; ex priore script. lic cognosci posse videtur ); om. BE spatio vacuo rel. oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ipsi rebus R ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet. 5.14. praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen ne is is his R quidem in patriis institutis add. Brem. manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic hic his R quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli aristotilis R, N ( fort. corr. ex aristotili), V fuisse et Polemonis docet. 5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. 5.18. ab iis iis Lamb. 2, Mdv. ; his alii, quae prima secundum naturam nomit, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valitudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima prima om. R in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid aliquid Wes. aliquod sit, quo primum primum dett. prima BE primo RNV natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad ad ( prius ) om. BERN repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid aliquod BE referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. 5.22. nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadeam illam sententiam. quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id id ( post vult) om. RNV efficit turpe. ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquitis. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. hos contra singulos dici est melius. sed nunc, quod quod quid BE quid (= quidem) R agimus; 5.23. de illis, cum volemus. Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tamquam tamquam (tanquā R) tranquillitas RN tranquillitas tamquam BE tranquillitas ( om. tamquam) V tranquillitas, quam appellant eu)qumi/an, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea ipsa secl. Se. est est ipsa BE beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sit ( utroque loco ) dett. sint sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus diximus p. 163, 16 sqq. naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil quod non aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse del. Lamb. ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quicquam quicquam quitquid BE omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. ergo ergo igitur BE instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium. 5.24. Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul et ortum est, id agit, se ut ut se BE conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantum modo se tueatur, qualecumque sit, sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quicquid se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere quam ob ob N 2 ad causam habeat habeat Lamb. habet eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae nature V natura ( etiam B) est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque que ER et NV om. B accommodatissime. 5.25. Quoniam Quoniam Q uo R autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint sunt RNV et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. desiderat RNV 5.26. quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente. 5.27. haec igitur nobis explicanda sunt, sed si enodatius, vos ignoscetis. huius enim aetati haec igitur ... aetati Non. p. 15 ignoscetis cuius aetatis Non. et huic nunc haec primum haec primum R primum hoc ( ante primum ras., in qua cognosc. h) N 2 hic primum BE hoc primum V fortasse secl. Mdv. audientis audientis Mdv. audienti (audiendi E) servire debemus. Ita prorsus, inquam; etsi ea quidem, quae adhuc dixisti, quamvis ad aetatem recte isto modo dicerentur. Exposita igitur, inquit, inquit om. BE terminatione rerum expetendarum cur ista se res ita habeat, ut dixi, deinceps demonstrandum est. quam ob rem ordiamur ab eo, quod primum posui, quod idem reapse reapse re ab se primum est, ut intellegamus omne animal se ipsum diligere. diligere N 2 V diligi BERN 1 quod quamquam dubitationem non habet—est enim infixum in ipsa natura comprehenditur que suis add. Crat. natura ac comprehenditur suis Alanus cuiusque sensibus sic, ut, contra si quis dicere velit, non audiatur—, tamen, ne quid praetermittamus, rationes quoque, cur hoc ita sit, afferendas puto. 5.28. etsi qui qui edd. quid potest intellegi aut cogitari esse aliquod animal, quod se oderit? res enim concurrent occurrent R contrariae. nam cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad se trahere coeperit consulto, quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod fieri non potest. necesseque est, necesseque est BE necesse ēq; (= estque) R necesse est eque N 1 V necesse est quidem N 2 si quis sibi ipsi ipsi sibi BE inimicus est, eum quae bona sunt mala putare, bona contra quae mala, et quae appetenda fugere, fugere et que BEV quae fugienda appetere, appetere dett. petere quae sine dubio vitae est est Mdv. sunt eversio. neque enim, si non nulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos aut alia exitia quaerant aut ut aut ut Mdv. ille apud Terentium, Terentium Heautontim. I 1, 95 ( 147 ): Decrevi tantisper me minus iniuriae, Chremes, meo gnato facere, dum fiam miser. qui 'decrevit tantisper tantisper dett. tantum per (tantum s per N 2 ) se minus est usus BE iniuriae suo nato facere', ut ait ipse, 'dum fiat miser', inimicus ipse sibi putandus est. 5.29. sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in mala scientes inruunt, tum se optime sibi consulere arbitrantur. itaque dicunt nec dubitant: 'mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac'. et qui Et qui RV Equi BE et qui (et ab alt. m. in ras. add. ) N ipsi sibi bellum indixissent, cruciari dies, noctes torqueri vellent, nec vero sese ipsi accusarent ob eam causam, quod se male suis rebus consuluisse dicerent. eorum enim est haec querela, qui sibi cari sunt seseque diligunt. quare, quotienscumque dicetur male quis de se mereri sibique esse inimicus inimicus esse BE atque hostis, vitam denique fugere, intellegatur aliquam subesse eius modi causam, ut ex eo ipso intellegi possit sibi quemque esse carum. 5.30. Nec vero id satis est, est om. BE neminem esse, qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intellegendum est, neminem esse, qui, quo modo se habeat, nihil sua censeat interesse. tolletur enim appetitus animi, si, ut in iis rebus, inter quas nihil interest, neutram in partem propensiores sumus, sumus Lamb. simus item in nobismet ipsis quem ad modum affecti simus simus B sumus nihil nostra arbitrabimur arbitramur RNV interesse. Atque etiam illud si qui qui Bai. quid BERN 1 quis N 2 V dicere velit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque, ut ea vis diligendi ad aliam rem quampiam referatur, non ad eum ipsum, ipsum V ipse qui sese diligat. hoc cum in amicitiis, cum in officiis, cum in virtutibus dicitur, quomodocumque quoquomodocumque BE dicitur, intellegi tamen quid dicatur potest, in nobismet autem ipsis ipsis autem BE ipsis autem ipsis R ne ne et ut add. A. Man. (intelligi ne quidem ut N 2 ) intellegi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratia propter voluptatem, nos amemus; propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmet ipsos diligimus. 5.31. Quamquam quid est, quod magis perspicuum sit, quam non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam add. cod. Glogav., P. Man. vehementer carum esse? quis est enim aut quotus quisque, cui, quisque est cui Non. mors cum adpropinquet, adpr. Non. appr. non 'refugiat fugiat Non. ti/mido sanguen timido sanguen Non. timidos anguis BERN 1 timido sanguis N 2 V a/tque exalbesca/t metu'? quis est ... metu Non. p. 224 etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae tam valde perhorrescere—quod item est reprehendendum in dolore—, sed quia fere sic afficiuntur omnes, satis argumenti est ab interitu naturam abhorrere; idque quo magis quidam ita faciunt, ut iure etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisse, nisi quaedam essent modica natura. modica natura essent BE nec vero dico eorum metum mortis, qui, quia privari se vitae bonis arbitrentur, aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines extimescant, aut si metuant, ne cum dolore moriantur, idcirco mortem fugiant; in parvis enim saepe, qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes minamur praecipitaturos alicunde, alicunde edd. aliunde extimescunt. quin etiam 'ferae', inquit Pacuvius, 'qui/bus abest ad prae/cavendum inte/llegendi astu/tia', astutia N 2 V astutias iniecto terrore mortis 'horrescunt'. quis autem de ipso sapiente aliter existimat, quin, etiam cum decreverit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur? 5.32. maxime autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur, ut vivant, et angantur adpropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute et ea perferant, quae Philoctetam videmus in fabulis. qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis doloribus, propagabat tamen vitam aucupio, 'sagittarum sagittarum om. BE ictu ictu add. Se. configebat tardus celeres, stans volantis', ut apud Accium accium R actium est, pennarumque contextu corpori tegumenta faciebat. 5.33. De hominum genere aut omnino de animalium loquor, cum arborum et stirpium eadem paene natura sit? sive enim, ut doctissimis viris visum est, maior aliqua causa atque divinior hanc vim ingenuit, sive hoc ita fit fortuito, fortuitu BER videmus N 2 videamus videmus ea, quae terra gignit, corticibus et radicibus valida servari, quod contingit animalibus sensuum distributione et quadam compactione membrorum. Qua quidem de re quamquam assentior iis, qui haec omnia regi natura putant, quae si natura neglegat, ipsa esse non possit, tamen concedo, ut, qui de hoc dissentiunt, existiment, quod velint, ac vel hoc intellegant, si quando quando dett. quid BE quā R q ua NV naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt. nam prius a se poterit quisque discedere quam appetitum earum rerum, quae sibi conducant, amittere. iure igitur gravissimi philosophi initium summi boni a natura petiverunt et illum appetitum rerum ad naturam accommodatarum ingeneratum putaverunt omnibus, quia quia Dav. qui continentur ea commendatione naturae, qua se ipsi diligunt. 5.37. ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore et in animo et in corpore NV et animo et corpore (in bis om. ) BE in animo et corpore ( priore et et poster. in om. ) R perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate sua caritate V sua e caritate R sua ecaritate BEN colantur et per se ipsae appetantur. 5.38. Quibus expositis facilis est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent habent habeant Ern. dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis, quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius. etenim omnium rerum, quas et creat natura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt sunt Ern. sint aut sine animo sunt aut om. R non non add. A. Man. multo secus, earum earum edd. eorum summum bonum in corpore est, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. non inscite ... putisceret Non. p. 161 putisceret Non. putresceret sunt autem bestiae quaedam, in quibus inest aliquid aliquod BER simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, in equis, leonibus ut in canibus in equis BEN 1 leonibus in canibus in equis RV leonibus ut in canibus ut in equis N 2 in quibus non corporum solum, ut in suibus, sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. in homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant. 5.39. Earum etiam rerum, quas terra gignit, educatio quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium. itaque et vivere vitem et mori dicimus arboremque et novellam et vetulam vetulam dicimus BE et vigere et 'senescere'. ex quo non est alienum, ut animantibus, animalibus BE sic illis et apta quaedam ad naturam putare et putare et BE aptare et R amputare et NV aliena earumque augendarum et alendarum quandam cultricem esse, quae sit scientia atque ars agricolarum, quae circumcidat, circumcidat dett. circumcidet R circumdat BEN 1 circumdet N 2 V amputet, erigat, extollat, adminiculet, ut, quo natura ferat, eo possint possint Dav. possit ire, ut ipsae vites, si loqui possint, possint A. Man. possent ita se tractandas tuendasque esse fateantur. et nunc quidem quod eam tuetur, ut de vite potissimum loquar, est id id om. BE extrinsecus; in ipsa enim parum magna vis inest, ut quam optime se habere possit, si nulla cultura adhibeatur. 5.40. at vero si ad vitem sensus accesserit, ut appetitum quendam habeat et per se ipsa ipsa Crat. ipsam moveatur, quid facturam putas? an ea, quae per vinitorem antea ante BE consequebatur, per se ipsa ipsa Crat. ipsam curabit? sed videsne accessuram ei curam, ut sensus quoque suos eorumque omnem appetitum et si qua sint adiuncta ei membra tueatur? sic ad illa, quae semper habuit, iunget ea, quae postea accesserint, nec eundem finem habebit, quem cultor eius habebat, sed volet secundum eam naturam, quae postea ei adiuncta erit, erit ( priore loco ) C.F. W. Mue. sit vivere. ita similis erit ei ei Bentl., Gz. ; et finis boni, atque antea fuerat, neque idem tamen; non enim iam stirpis bonum quaeret, sed animalis. quid, si quod si R (Quod), NV non sensus modo ei modo sensus non ei BE non sensus ei modo R sit datus, datus sit BE verum etiam animus hominis? eciam animus hominis N 2 V etiam animus (animus R) est animus hominis RN 1 animus est etiam animus hominis BE etiam animus, et animus hominis Vict. non necesse est et illa pristina manere, ut Inter RN 1 ad tuendas inter BE ut tuenda Inter N 2 V tuenda sint, et ut tuenda sint, et Or. ut tuendas. haec multo esse cariora, quae accesserint, animique optimam quamque partem carissimam, in eaque expletione expletione explanatione R naturae summi boni finem consistere, cum longe multumque praestet mens atque ratio? sic, quod est sic, quod est Se. sitque BERN 1 V sicque N 2 Sic extitit Mdv. Librarius archetypi pro ē legit que extremum omnium appetendorum atque ductum ductum (uc ab alt. m. in ras. ) N doctum commendatione Lamb. commutatione BE commutate V comunitate R c oi tate N a prima commendatione naturae, multis gradibus adscendit, ut ad summum perveniret, quod cumulatur ex integritate corporis et ex mentis ratione perfecta. 5.42. quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo, in quo loco natae sunt, ex eo se non commovent, deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur. movetur moventur NV serpere anguiculos, nare nare natare Non. anaticulas, anaticulas V aneticulas BERN anaticulos Non. volare Non. evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, videamus boves Non. boves videmus BE nepas nepas RN 1 Non. nespas vel vespas V vespas BEN 2 aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. serpere ... ducem Non. p. 145 quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet. parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint. cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit, et animo utuntur et sensibus conitunturque, ut sese sese ut BE utuntur ed. Iuntina utantur erigant, et manibus utuntur et eos agnoscunt, a quibus educantur. deinde aequalibus delectantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur deque eo, quod ipsis superat, aliis gratificari volunt animadvertuntque ea, quae domi fiunt, curiosius incipiuntque commentari aliquid et discere et discere facere R et eorum, quos vident, volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant, si vicerunt, vicerunt Mdv.. vicerint BENV dicerint R efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque que om. BEN demittunt. quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est. 5.43. est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima elementa naturae, quibus auctis auctis actis R virtutis quasi germen germen I. F. Gronov. carmen efficitur. nam cum ita nati factique simus, ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contineremus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam quasi deum ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. nam, ut saepe iam dixi, in infirma aetate inbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem ille quidem Mdv. quid ille BE quidem ille RNV naturae vim, sed ita, ut progredi possit longius, per se sit tantum tantum Mdv. tamen inchoata. 5.45. In enumerandis autem corporis commodis si quis praetermissam a nobis voluptatem putabit, in aliud tempus ea quaestio differatur. utrum enim sit voluptas in iis rebus, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, necne sit ad id, quod agimus, nihil interest. si enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, non explet bona naturae voluptas, iure praetermissa est; sin autem autem om. RNV est in ea, quod quidam quidem BER volunt, nihil impedit hanc nostram comprehensionem summi boni. quae enim constituta sunt prima naturae, ad ea si voluptas accesserit, unum aliquod accesserit commodum corporis neque eam constitutionem summi boni, quae est proposita, mutaverit. 5.47. Quid? in quid in RNV quod in BE motu et et etiam BE in statu corporis nihil inest, quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? quem ad modum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui ductus oris, qui vultus in quoque sit? nihilne est in his rebus, quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? nonne odio multos dignos putamus, qui quodam motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum contempsisse? et quoniam haec deducuntur ducuntur NV de corpore, quid est cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur? nam si pravitatem inminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam fugienda BER putamus, cur non etiam, ac etiam ac N 2 iam et hanc BE etiam (eciam V) hac RV etiam hanc N 1 fortasse magis, propter se formae dignitatem sequamur? et si turpitudinem fugimus fugimus P. Man. fugiamus in statu et motu corporis, quid est cur pulchritudinem non sequamur? atque etiam valitudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter utilitatem solum, sed etiam ipsas propter se expetemus. quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit, qui est maxime e natura, quae tota perturbatur, si aut aegrum corpus corpus V opus est aut dolet aut caret viribus. 5.48. Videamus animi partes, quarum est conspectus illustrior; quae quo sunt excelsiores, eo dant clariora indicia naturae. inditia nature N iudicia natura BE iudicia nature RV tantus est igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae, ut nemo dubitare possit quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. videmusne ut pueri ne verberibus quidem a contemplandis rebus perquirendisque deterreantur? ut pulsi ut pulsi P. Man. aut pulsi ( etiam B) recurrant? ut aliquid recurrant ut aliquid cod. Morel. recurrentur aliquid R recurrant aliquid BEV recurrerentur aliquid ( ut vid. ) N 1 recurrerent et aliquid N 2 scire se scire se etiam R gaudeant? ut id aliis narrare gestiant? ut pompa, ludis atque eius modi spectaculis teneantur ob eamque rem vel famem et sitim perferant? quid vero? qui ingenuis ingeniis BER studiis atque artibus delectantur, nonne videmus eos nec valitudinis nec rei familiaris habere rationem omniaque perpeti ipsa cognitione et scientia captos et cum maximis curis et laboribus compensare eam, quam ex discendo capiant, voluptatem? 5.49. ut add. Se. mihi quidem Homerus huius modi quiddam vidisse videatur videatur BER videtur N om. V in iis, quae de Sirenum cantibus finxerit. finxerit RN 1 V finxerint BE finxerat N 2 neque enim vocum suavitate videntur aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitae, qui praetervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate adhaerescerent. ita enim invitant Ulixem—nam verti, ut quaedam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum—: O decus Argolicum, quin quin N 2 qui puppim flectis, Ulixes, Auribus ut nostros possis agnoscere cantus! Nam nemo haec umquam est transvectus caerula cursu, Quin prius adstiterit vocum dulcedine captus, Post variis avido satiatus pectore musis Doctior ad patrias lapsus pervenerit oras. Nos grave certamen belli clademque tenemus, Graecia quam Troiae divino numine vexit, Omniaque e latis rerum rerum Marsus regum vestigia terris. Vidit Homerus probari fabulam non posse, si cantiunculis tantus irretitus vir teneretur; scientiam pollicentur, quam non erat mirum sapientiae cupido patria esse patria esse (pat a ee, 1 et in ras. a ee ab alt. m. ) N patrie V patria BER cariorem. Atque omnia quidem scire, cuiuscumque modi sint, cupere curiosorum, duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum. 5.50. quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit attentius, ne patriam quidem captam esse add. ed. princ. Roman. ( sec. Mdv. sil. ) senserit? quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis? quo studio Aristophanem putamus aetatem in litteris duxisse? quid de Pythagora? quid de Platone aut de Democrito aut democrito (de mocrito V) RNV loquar? a quibus propter discendi cupiditatem videmus ultimas terras esse peragratas. quae qui non vident, nihil umquam magnum magnum ac Brem. magna ac cognitione dignum amaverunt. Atque hoc loco, qui propter animi voluptates coli dicunt ea studia, quae dixi, non intellegunt idcirco esse ea propter se expetenda, quod nulla utilitate obiecta delectentur animi atque ipsa scientia, etiamsi incommodatura sit, gaudeant. 5.51. Sed quid attinet de rebus tam apertis plura requirere? ipsi enim quaeramus a a e RNV nobis stellarum motus contemplationesque rerum caelestium eorumque omnium, quae naturae obscuritate occultantur, cognitiones quem ad modum cognitiones quem ad modum N 2 cogni- tionesque admodum nos moveant, et quid historia delectet, quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum, cum praetermissa repetimus, add. Se. inchoata persequimur. nec vero sum nescius esse utilitatem in historia, non modo voluptatem. 5.53. Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura futura Clericus ( ad Aeschinis Axioch. 17 ); natura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum aut apparatum Lamb. requirentis, nihil aliud esse esse om. BE acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo in qendo E in querendo RV inquerendo N ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus, sed etiam levamentum miseriarum. itaque multi, cum in in om. BER potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. levarunt BE 5.54. princeps huius civitatis Phalereus phalereus R phalerius BEN phalerus V Demetrius cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, ad Ptolomaeum se regem Alexandream alexandriam RNV contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa ipsa om. BE philosophia, ad quam te hortamur, excelleret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit scripsit ed. Veneta 1494 ; scribit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. equidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis capto, saepe audiebam, cum se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret. somnum denique nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quandam laboris afferret, contra naturam putaremus datum; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit omnem. itaque si aut requietem natura non quaereret aut eam posset alia quadam ratione consequi, facile pateremur, qui qui N 2 quin etiam nunc agendi aliquid discendique causa prope contra naturam vigilias suscipere soleamus. soleamus valeamus R 5.55. Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane perspicua minimeque dubitanda indicia inditia N iudicia naturae, maxime scilicet in homine, sed in omni animali, ut appetat animus aliquid agere semper agere semper aliquod BE neque ulla condicione quietem sempiternam possit pati. facile est hoc cernere in primis puerorum aetatulis. quamquam enim vereor, ne nimius in hoc genere videar, tamen omnes veteres philosophi, maxime nostri, ad incunabula accedunt, quod quod RNV qui BE in pueritia facillime se arbitrantur arbitrantur RNV arbitrentur BE naturae voluntatem voluntatem Lamb. voluptatem posse cognoscere. videmus igitur ut conquiescere ne infantes quidem possint. cum vero paulum processerunt, processerunt Non. processerint lusionibus vel laboriosis laboriosius Non. delectantur, cum ... delectantur Non. p. 211 cum hi vero Non. ut ne verberibus quidem deterreri possint, eaque cupiditas agendi aliquid adolescit una cum aetatibus. itaque, ne si ne si edd. nisi iucundissimis quidem nos somniis usuros putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velimus dari, idque si accidat, mortis instar putemus. 5.60. itaque amplius itaque BE itaque amplius RNV nostrum est—quod nostrum dico, artis est—ad ea principia, quae accepimus, consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id, quod volumus, effectum. quod quidem pluris est est Thurot. ( Revue critique 1870,1. semestrep.21 ); sunt R sit NV om. BE haud paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam aut sensus aut corporis ea, quae diximus, quibus tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones, quae virtuti sunt consentaneae, consentanee sunt BE refertur, eaque omnia, quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita geruntur, uno nomine honesta dicuntur. quorum omnium quae quae Matthiae ( Vermischte Schriften 1833 p. 31 sq. ); queque sint notitiae, quae quidem quae quidem Se. quaeque (queque) BENV que R significentur significent BE rerum vocabulis, quaeque cuiusque vis cuiusque vis NV cuiusvis BE cuius vis R et natura sit mox mox p. 189, 20 sqq. videbimus. 5.61. Hoc autem loco tantum explicemus haec honesta, quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. indicant iudicant BER pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. quanta studia decertantium sunt! sunt R sint quanta ipsa certamina! ut illi efferuntur laetitia, cum vicerunt! vicerunt Mdv. vicerint ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores non perferunt, ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! atque ea in optima quaque indole indole quaque BE maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta, quae intellegimus, a natura tamquam adumbrantur. 5.64. Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae, verum verum sed Non. etiam historiae refertae talibus exp. ... refertae Non. p. 309 sunt, et quidem maxime nostrae. nos enim ad sacra Idaea accipienda optimum virum delegimus, nos tutores misimus regibus, regibus misimus BE (misimus regem municissimum menibus, rell. om., R) nostri imperatores pro salute patriae sua capita voverunt, nostri consules regem inimicissimum moenibus iam adpropinquantem monuerunt, a veneno ut caveret, nostra in re publica Lucretia et quae per del. Vict. vim oblatum stuprum voluntaria morte lueret inventa est et qui interficeret filiam, filiam interficeret BE ne stupraretur. quae quidem omnia et innumerabilia praeterea quis est quin quin NV qui BER intellegat et eos qui fecerint dignitatis splendore ductos inmemores fuisse utilitatum suarum nosque, cum ea laudemus, nulla alia re nisi honestate duci? Quibus rebus expositis breviter breviter expositis BE —nec enim sum copiam, quam potui, quia dubitatio in re nulla erat, persecutus—sed his rebus concluditur profecto et virtutes omnes et honestum illud, quod ex iis oritur ex hijs virtutibus oritur N et in iis iis Mdv. his R hijs NV illis BE haeret, per se esse expetendum. 5.66. nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam quoddam BE ingenitum ingenitum B E innatum RN in natum V quasi civile atque populare, quod Graeci politiko/n vocant, quicquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea, quam quam que RN exposui, caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa se fundet fundet se BE in in N post fundet ab alt. m. superscr. est (= scilicet) usu ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet. servari enim iustitia nisi a forti forte RNV viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. qualis est igitur omnis haec, quam dico, conspiratio consensusque virtutum, tale est illud ipsum honestum, quandoquidem honestum aut ipsa virtus est aut res gesta virtute; quibus rebus in rebus R et (ī ab alt. m. superscr. ) N 2 vita consentiens virtutibusque respondens recta et honesta et constans et naturae congruens existimari potest. 5.67. atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. nam cum ita copulatae conexaeque sint, sint ( ante ut) BE sunt ut omnes omnium participes sint nec alia ab alia possit separari, tamen proprium suum cuiusque munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur, temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in dilectu bonorum et malorum, iustitia in suo cuique tribuendo. quando igitur inest in omni virtute cura quaedam quasi foras spectans aliosque appetens atque complectens, existit illud, ut amici, ut fratres, ut propinqui, ut affines, ut cives, ut omnes denique—quoniam unam societatem hominum esse volumus—propter se expetendi sint. atqui eorum nihil est eius generis, ut sit in fine atque extremo bonorum. 5.68. ita fit, ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum, quod est in iis, in quibus completur illud extremum, quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; haec autem, quae sunt extrinsecus, id est quae neque in animo nec in animo BE insunt neque in corpore, ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere, quo illa, non sunt. nec vero umquam umquam N unquam V inquam BER summum bonum assequi quisquam posset, si omnia illa, ilia om. BE quae sunt extra, quamquam expetenda, summo bono continerentur. 5.71. iam non dubitabis, quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque viventes semper sint beati, qui omnis motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum levis et inbecillos fore intellegant, si in virtutis certamen venerint. illa enim, quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata, complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita, ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. consistere R ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum, ut, quem ad modum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne certur quidem. Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla esse dicere; 5.73. saepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia; hoc uno captus Erillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. multa sunt dicta dicta sunt BE ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despiciendis rebus humanis; hoc unum Aristo tenuit: praeter vitia atque virtutes negavit rem esse ullam aut fugiendam aut expetendam. expetendam dett. petendam positum est a nostris in iis esse rebus, quae secundum naturam essent, non dolere; hoc Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit. at vero Callipho et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamavisset, adamasset BE alter vacuitatem doloris, neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata maxime. 5.74. quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula diverticula BENV quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos dies voluptatemque primo dumtaxat primo dumtaxat NV prima dum taxat R dumtaxat primo BE expeti dicunt, quaerunt ... habent ... dicunt Lamb. quaerant ... habeant (habent V) ... dicant (' sententiae satisfaceret : quidni, quum etiam ... quaerant ... habeant ... dicant? ut minus hoc in Calliphonte et Diodoro mirum esse significaretur ' Mdv. ) deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici, qua inpulsi multa faciant faciant Bentl., Ernest. ; faciunt nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram rem a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam add. Bentl., Davis. transtulerunt; atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus. Quae cum dixisset paulumque parumque BE institisset, Quid est? 5.75. inquit; satisne vobis videor pro meo iure in vestris auribus commentatus? comentatus R commentatus ( prior t in ras. paulo capaciore ) N commendatus (conm. E) BE comendatus V Et ego: Tu vero, inquam, Piso, ut saepe alias, alias N 2 alia sic hodie ita nosse ista visus es, ut, si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non multum Graecis supplicandum putarem. quod quidem eo probavi magis, quia memini Staseam Neapolitanum, doctorem illum tuum, nobilem sane Peripateticum, aliquanto aliquando BE ista secus dicere solitum, assentientem iis, qui multum in fortuna secunda aut adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis ponerent. Est, ut dicis, inquit; sed haec ab Antiocho, familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius, quam a Stasea dicebantur. quamquam ego non quaero, quid tibi a me probatum sit, sed huic Ciceroni nostro, quem discipulum cupio a te abducere. 5.78. Atqui, inquit, si Stoicis concedis ut virtus sola, si adsit, vitam efficiat beatam, concedis etiam Peripateticis. quae enim mala illi non audent appellare, aspera autem et incommoda et reicienda et aliena naturae esse concedunt, ea nos mala dicimus, sed exigua et paene pene BENV porro R minima. quare si potest esse beatus is, qui est in asperis reiciendisque rebus, potest is quoque esse, qui est in parvis malis. Et ego: Piso, inquam, si est quisquam, qui acute in causis videre soleat quae res agatur, is es profecto tu. quare attende, quaeso. nam adhuc, meo fortasse vitio, quid ego quaeram non perspicis. Istic sum, inquit, expectoque quid ad id, quod quaerebam, quaerebam ( p. 194, 14-18 ) Mdv. et Wes. ( apud Mdv. ); queram respondeas. 5.84. dato dato edd. date hoc dandum erit erit est BE illud. Quod vestri non item. 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi proclivis V currit oratio. venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra. cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, potes cod. Glogav., Dav. ; potest nisi retexueris illa. paupertas si malum est, mendicus beatus esse esse beatus BE nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. at Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. dolere malum est: in crucem qui agitur, in crucem qui agitur cod. Mor., marg. Crat. ; in crucem quia igitur BE in cruce. Quia igitur RV beatus esse non potest. bonum liberi: misera orbitas. bonum patria: miserum exilium. bonum valitudo: miser miser Mdv. miserum RV om. BE morbus. bonum integritas corporis: misera debilitas. bonum incolumis acies: misera caecitas. quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quo modo sustinebit? sustinebis BE substinebis V sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: eculeo dett. aculeo quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam tam dett., om. BERV docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. 5.86. Id quaeris, Id quaeris P. Man. id queres BE Idque res R Id que res V inquam, in quo, utrum respondero, utrum respondero Lamb. utrum respondebo R tibi utrum respondebo V respondebo utrum BE verses te huc atque illuc necesse est. Quo tandem modo? inquit. Quia, si mala sunt, is, qui erit in iis, beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum. Et ille ridens: Video, inquit, quid agas; ne discipulum abducam, times. Tu vero, inquam, ducas licet, si sequetur; sequatur RV erit enim mecum, si tecum erit. Audi igitur, inquit, Luci; tecum enim mihi enim mihi Lamb. enim (est V) ut ait theophrastus mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, ut ait Theophrastus Lamb. om. BERV Non. consistit constitit ( LBA Lindsay ) Non. in beata vita comparanda; omnis auct.... comparanda Non. p. 256 beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus. hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit. vivendi ... convenit Non. p. 271 5.87. quare hoc hoc atque hoc Non. videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio philosophorum dare. pollicetur certe. nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem, Locros, ut, cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustravit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit? cur haec eadem Democritus? qui —vere falsone, quaerere mittimus quaerere mittimus Se. quereremus BER queremus V quae- rere nolumus C.F.W. Mue. —dicitur oculis se se oculis BE privasse; privavisse R certe, ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? beatam vitam R quam si etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex illa investigatione naturae consequi volebat, bono ut esset animo. id enim ille id enim ille R ideo enim ille BE id ille V id est enim illi summum bonum; eu)qumi/an cet. coni. Mdv. summum bonum eu)qumi/an et saepe a)qambi/an appellat, id est animum terrore liberum. 5.89. quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? idem dicant V iā dicant R ilia appellant BE ita, quem ad modum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. bonum appello quicquid secundum naturam est, quod quod V contra malum, nec ego quam BER solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola scola BERV desinis. quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? quanti quidque sit aliter docti et indocti, sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit—si homines essent, essent V si B se E et R ( in quo s non satis cognosci potest ) usitate loquerentur—, dum res maneant, maneant dett. maneat verba fingant arbitratu suo. 5.91. At enim, qua in vita est aliquid mali, ea beata esse non potest. ne seges quidem igitur spicis uberibus et crebris, si avenam uspiam videris, nec mercatura quaestuosa, si in maximis lucris paulum paulum Brem. parum aliquid damni contraxerit. an hoc usque quaque, aliter in vita? et non ex maxima parte de tota iudicabis? an dubium est, quin virtus ita maximam partem optineat in rebus humanis, ut reliquas obruat? Audebo audeo R igitur cetera, quae secundum naturam sint, sunt V bona appellare nec fraudare fraudari BR suo vetere vetere Wes. ad or. p. Sest. p. 7 (sec. Mdv) veteri nomine neque iam neque iam Se. quam aliquod aliquod Lamb. aliquid RV ali- quam BE potius novum exquirere, acquirere E virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in altera librae lance ponere. 5.92. terram, mihi crede, ea lanx et maria deprimet. semper enim ex eo, quod maximas partes continet latissimeque funditur, tota res appellatur. dicimus aliquem hilare vivere; ergo, si semel tristior effectus est, hilara vita amissa est? at at Ascens. an hoc in eo M. Crasso, quem semel ait in vita ait in vita om. Sacerd. risisse quem ... risisse Sacerd. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil VI 442) Lucilius, non contigit, ut ea re minus a)ge/lastos, ut ait idem, vocaretur. Polycratem Samium felicem appellabant. nihil acciderat acciderat V accideret ei, quod nollet, nisi quod anulum, quo delectabatur, in mari abiecerat. ergo infelix una molestia, felix rursus, cum is ipse anulus in praecordiis piscis inventus est? ille vero, si insipiens—quod certe, quoniam tyrannus—, numquam beatus; si sapiens, ne tum quidem miser, cum ab Oroete, Oroete Vict. oronte BE oriente R orente V praetore Darei, in crucem actus est. At At V ad R et BE multis malis affectus. Quis negat? sed ea mala virtutis magnitudine obruebantur. 5.94. nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter oculorum oculorum g-|enu R (num legendum sit renum sec. Tusc. II 60 incertum est) dolorem. quasi quasi Lamb. quis vero hoc hoc vero R didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, cum doleret! illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse, quia turpe non esset, et esse et esse P. Man. et esset ferendum viro. viro dett. vero hic si Peripateticus fuisset, permansisset, credo, in sententia, qui qui BE qm (= quoniam) RV dolorem malum dicunt esse, de asperitate autem eius fortiter ferenda praecipiunt eadem, quae Stoici. Et quidem Arcesilas tuus, etsi fuit in disserendo pertinacior, tamen noster fuit; erat enim Polemonis. is cum arderet podagrae doloribus visitassetque hominem Charmides charmides BE carimdes R carneades V Epicureus Epicureus Mdv. epicurus perfamiliaris et tristis exiret, Mane, quaeso, inquit, Charmide carmide B carnide E carimde R carneades V noster; nihil illinc huc pervenit. ostendit pedes et pectus. ac tamen hic mallet non dolere. 5.95. Haec igitur est nostra ratio, quae tibi videtur inconstans, cum propter virtutis caelestem quandam et divinam tantamque praestantiam, ut, ubi virtus sit resque magnae et add. Gz. (e cod. Spirensi ?) summe laudabiles laudabilesque RV virtute gestae, ibi esse miseria et aerumna non possit, tamen labor possit, possit molestia, labor possit possit molestia BE labor possit molestia R labor possit et molestia V non dubitem dicere omnes sapientes esse semper semper esse BE beatos, sed tamen fieri posse, ut sit alius alio beatior. atqui iste locus est, Piso, tibi etiam atque etiam confirmandus, inquam; quem si tenueris, non modo meum Ciceronem, sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit. | 2.34. Whether the list of these primary natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a much debated question; but to hold that it includes nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the senses, nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. And this is the fountain-head from which one's whole theory of Goods and Evils must necessarily flow. Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue pleasure alone; Diodorus freedom from pain. . . . In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their End of Goods logically follows: with Aristippus it is pleasure pure and simple; with the Stoics, harmony with Nature, which they interpret as meaning virtuous or morally good life, and further explain this as meaning to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. 2.110. in a certain class of birds we see some traces of affection, and also recognition and recollection; and in many we even notice regret for a lost friend. If animals therefore possess some semblance of the human virtues unconnected with pleasure, are men themselves to display no virtue except as a means to pleasure? And shall we say that man, who so far surpasses all other living creatures, has been gifted by nature with no exceptional endowment? 3.7. I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus; so I went to his country-house, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appetite for reading, and could never have enough of it; indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate-house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble, â he did not steal any attention from public business. So it may well be believed that when I found him taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of books at his command, he had the air of indulging in a literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so honourable an occupation. 3.8. Upon this chance encounter, each of us being equally surprised to see the other, he at once rose, and we began to exchange the usual greetings. "What brings you here?" cried he; "You are from your country-seat, I suppose. Had I known you were there," he continued, "I should have anticipated you with a visit." "Yes," I answered, "the games began yesterday, so I came out of town, and arrived late in the afternoon. My reason for coming on here was to get some books from the library. By the way, Cato, it will soon be time for our friend Lucullus to make acquaintance with this fine collection; for I hope he will take more pleasure in his library than in all the other appointments of his country-house. I am extremely anxious (though of course the responsibility belongs especially to you) that he should have the kind of education that will turn him out after the same pattern as his father and our dear Caepio, and also yourself, to whom he is so closely related. I cherish the memory of his grandfather (and you are aware how highly I esteemed Caepio, who in my belief would toâday be in the front rank, were he still alive). And also Lucullus is always present to my mind; he was a man of general eminence, and united to me in sentiment and opinion as well as by friendship." 3.9. "I commend you," rejoined Cato, "for your loyalty to the memory of men who both bequeathed their children to your care, as well as for your affectionate interest in the lad. My own responsibility, as you call it, I by no means disown, but I enlist you to share it with me. Moreover I may say that the youth already seems to me to show many signs both of modesty and talent; but you know how young he is." "I do," said I, "but all the same it is time for him to receive a tincture of studies which, if allowed to soak in at this impressionable age, will render him better equipped when he comes to the business of life." "True, and we will discuss this matter again several times more fully and take common action. But let us sit down," he said, "shall we?" So we sat down. 3.10. Cato then resumed: "But what pray are the books that you must come here for, when you have so large a library of your own?" "I have come to fetch some Note-books of Aristotle," I replied, "which I knew were here. I wanted to read them during my holiday; I do not often get any leisure." "How I wish," said he, "that you had thrown in your lot with the Stoics! You of all men might have been expected to reckon virtue as the only good." "Perhaps you might rather have been expected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a new terminology, when in substance you think as I do. Our principles agree; it is our language that is at variance." "Indeed," he rejoined, "they do not agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be desirable, once reckon anything as a good, other than Moral Worth, and you have extinguished the very light of virtue, Moral Worth itself, and overthrown virtue entirely." 3.16. "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.20. "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â axia as the Stoics call it â this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathÄkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.23. "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormÄ, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. 3.31. But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said, as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consot with and things contrary to nature, the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence is abolished altogether? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature. 3.33. "Again, the term 'Good,' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. He was led by this also to pronounce the 'beneficial' (for so let us render the Greek ÅphelÄma) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. 3.41. "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâcalled 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 3.50. But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.64. "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâabiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 4.3. "My view, then, Cato," I proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master's predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows â but I should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting while I deal with the whole of your discourse; for I think I shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. 4.6. Then, in themes demanding ornate and dignified treatment, however imposing, how brilliant is their diction! On Justice, Temperance, Courage, Friendship, on the conduct of life, the pursuit of wisdom, the career of the statesman, â no hair-splitting like that of the Stoics, no niggling minutiae, but the loftier passages studiously ornate, and the minor topics studiously plain and clear. As a result, think of their consolations, their exhortations, even their warnings and counsels, addressed to men of the highest eminence! In fact, their rhetorical exercises were twofold, like the nature of the subjects themselves. For every question for debate can be argued either on the general issue, ignoring the persons or circumstances involved, or, these also being taken into consideration, on a point of fact or of law or of nomenclature. They therefore practised themselves in both kinds; and this training produced their remarkable fluency in each class of discussion. 4.14. "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.' 4.18. Again, from the elements given by nature arose certain lofty excellences, springing partly from the contemplation of the secrets of nature, since the mind possessed an innate love of knowledge, whence also resulted the passion for argument and for discussion; and also, since man is the only animal endowed with a sense of modesty and shame, with a desire for intercourse and society with his fellows, and with a scrupulous care in all his words and actions to avoid any conduct that is not honourable and seemly, from these beginnings or germs, as I called them before, of nature's bestowal, were developed Temperance, Self-control, Justice and moral virtue generally in full flower and perfection. 4.21. "What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy! But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, that all men's folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in public life, in the lawâcourts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everyone else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched? 4.45. But first I would have you observe that the most important of all your doctrines, the head of the array, namely that Moral Worth alone is good and that the moral life is the End of Goods, will be shared with you by all those who make the End of Goods consist of virtue alone; and your view that it is impossible to frame a conception of Virtue if anything beside Moral Worth be counted in it, will also be maintained by the philosophers whom I just now mentioned. To my mind it would have been fairer for Zeno in his dispute with Polemo, whose teaching as to the primary impulses of nature he had adopted, to have started from the fundamental tenets which they held in common, and to have marked the point where he first called a halt and where occasion for divergence arose; not to take his stand with thinkers who did not even profess to hold that the Chief Good, as they severally conceived it, was based on natural instinct, and employ the same arguments and the same doctrines as they did. 4.51. The minor premise Polemo will concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the whole of their clan, as well as all the other philosophers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief Good; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it is, and excels everything else to a degree hardly to be expressed in words, Polemo will be able to be happy if endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all besides, and yet he will not grant you that nothing except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with virtue will perhaps decline to grant that happiness contains any just ground for pride; although they, it is true, sometimes represent even pleasures as things to be proud of. 4.61. What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâeminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 5.1. My dear Brutus, â Once I had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I was in the habit of doing, with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out beguiled with conversation on various subjects the three-quarters of a mile from the Dipylon Gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so deservedly famous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. 5.2. Thereupon Piso remarked: "Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I can't say; but one's emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which looks to my eyes smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality." 5.4. "As for our friend Pomponius," I interposed, "I believe he is joking; and no doubt he is a licensed wit, for he has so taken root in Athens that he is almost an Athenian; in fact I expect he will get the surname of Atticus! But I, Piso, agree with you; it is a common experience that places do strongly stimulate the imagination and vivify our ideas of famous men. You remember how I once came with you to Metapontum, and would not go to the house where we were to stay until I had seen the very place where Pythagoras breathed his last and the seat he sat in. All over Athens, I know, there are many reminders of eminent men in the actual place where they lived; but at the present moment it is that alcove over there which appeals to me, for not long ago it belonged to Carneades. I fancy I see him now (for his portrait is familiar), and I can imagine that the very place where he used to sit misses the sound of his voice, and mourns the loss of that mighty intellect." 5.6. "Well, Cicero," said Piso, "these enthusiasms befit a young man of parts, if they lead him to copy the example of the great. If they only stimulate antiquarian curiosity, they are mere dilettantism. But we all of us exhort you â though I hope it is a case of spurring a willing steed â to resolve to imitate your heroes as well as to know about them." "He is practising your precepts already, Piso," said I, "as you are aware; but all the same thank you for encouraging him." "Well," said Piso, with his usual amiability, "let us all join forces to promote the lad's improvement; and especially let us try to make him spare some of his interest for philosophy, either so as to follow the example of yourself for whom he has such an affection, or in order to be better equipped for the very study to which he is devoted. But, Lucius," he asked, "do you need our urging, or have you a natural leaning of your own towards philosophy? You are keeping Antiochus's lectures, and seem to me to be a pretty attentive pupil." "I try to be," replied Lucius with a timid or rather a modest air; "but have you heard any lectures on Carneades lately? He attracts me immensely; but Antiochus calls me in the other direction; and there is no other lecturer to go to." 5.7. "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." 5.8. "You know that I agree with you about that, Piso," I replied; "but you have raised the point most opportunely; for my cousin Cicero is eager to hear the doctrine of the Old Academy of which you speak, and of the Peripatetics, on the subject of the Ends of Goods. We feel sure you can expound it with the greatest ease, for you have had Staseas from Naples in your household for many years, and also we know you have been studying this very subject under Antiochus for several months at Athens." "Here goes, then," replied Piso, smiling, "(for you have rather craftily arranged for our discussion to start with me), let me see what I can do to give the lad a lecture. If an oracle had foretold that I should find myself discoursing in the Academy like a philosopher, I should not have believed it, but here I am, thanks to our having the place to ourselves. Only don't let me bore the rest of you while I am obliging our young friend." "What, bore me?" said I. "Why, it is I who asked you to speak." Thereupon Quintus and Pomponius having declared that they wished it too, Piso began. And I will ask you, Brutus, kindly to consider whether you think his discourse a satisfactory summary of the doctrine of Antiochus, which I believe to be the system which you most approve, as you have often attended the lectures of his brother Aristus. 5.9. Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. 5.10. Aristotle gave a complete account of the birth, nutrition and structure of all living creatures, Theophrastus of the natural history of plants and the causes and constitution of vegetable organisms in general; and the knowledge thus attained facilitated the investigation of the most obscure questions. In Logic their teachings include the rules of rhetoric as well as of dialectic; and Aristotle their founder started the practice of arguing both pro and contra upon every topic, not like Arcesilas, always controverting every proposition, but setting out all the possible arguments on either side in every subject. 5.11. The third division of philosophy investigates the rules of human well-being; this too was treated by the Peripatetics, so as to comprise not only the principles of individual conduct but also of the government of states. From Aristotle we learn the manners, customs and institutions, and from Theophrastus the laws also, of nearly all the states not only of Greece but of the barbarians as well. Both described the proper qualifications of a statesman, both moreover wrote lengthy treatises on the best form of constitution; Theophrastus treated the subject more fully, discussing the forces and occasions of political change, and their control as circumstances demand. Among the alternative ideals of conduct they gave the highest place to the life of retirement, devoted to contemplation and to study. This was pronounced to be most worthy of the Wise Man, as most nearly resembling the life of the gods. And these topics they handle in a style as brilliant as it is illuminating. 5.12. "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.13. Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.22. Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. 5.23. "The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. 5.24. "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. 5.25. At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 5.26. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.27. This, then, is the theory that we have to expound; but if it requires a good deal of explanation, you will receive it with forbearance. For this is perhaps the first time that Lucius has heard the subject debated, and we must make allowance for his youth." "Very true," said I; "albeit the style of your discourse so far has been suited to hearers of any age.""Well then," he resumed, "having explained what the principle is which determines what things are desirable, I have next to show why the matter is as I have stated. Let us therefore begin from the position which I laid down first and which is also first in the order of reality: let us understand that every living creature loves itself. The fact that this is so admits of no doubt, for indeed it is a fundamental fact of nature, and one that everybody can grasp for himself by the evidence of his senses, so much so that did anyone choose to deny it, he would not get a hearing; nevertheless, so that no step may be omitted, I suppose I ought also to give reasons why it is so. 5.28. Yet how can you form any intelligible conception of an animal that should hate itself? The thing is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke of will deliberately set about drawing to itself something harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this for its own sake; therefore the animal will both hate and love itself at the same time, which is impossible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows that he will think good evil and evil good; that he will avoid things that are desirable and seek things that ought to be avoided; but this undeniably would mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A few people may be found who attempt to end their lives with a halter or by other means; but these, or the character of Terence who (in his own words) 'resolved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made less the wrong he did his son,' are not to be put down as haters of themselves. 5.29. The motive with some is grief, with others passion; many are rendered insane by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, fancying all the time that what they do is for their own best interests. Hence they say, and say in all sincerity: 'It is my way; do you do as it suits you.' Men who had really declared war against themselves would desire to have days of torment and nights of anguish, and they would not reproach themselves and say that they had been misguided and imprudent: such lamentations show that they love and care for themselves. It follows that whenever it is said of a man that he has ruined himself and is his own worst enemy, and that he is tired of life, you may be sure that there is really an explanation which would justify the inference, even from such a case as this, that every man loves himself. 5.30. Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists who hates himself; we must also realize that nobody exists who thinks it makes no difference to him what his own condition is. For it will be destructive of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality which is our attitude towards the things that are really indifferent."It would also be utterly absurd if anyone desired to maintain that, though the fact of self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really directed toward some other object and not towards the person himself who feels it. When this is said of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning; but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love ourselves for the sake of something else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves. 5.31. Yet what fact is more self-evident than that every man not merely loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed? For who is there, what percentage of mankind, whose 'Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale with fear,' at the approach of death? No doubt it is a fault to recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being (and the same timidity in regard to pain is blameworthy); but the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more some people act thus â as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree â the more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural. I am not referring to the fear of death felt by those who shun death because they believe it means the loss of the good things of life, or because they are afraid of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest death may be painful: for very often young children, who do not think of any of these things, are terribly frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall from a height. Even 'wild creatures,' says Pacuvius, 'Lacking discourse of reason To look before,' when seized with fear of death, 'bristle with horror.' 5.32. Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be ')" onMouseOut="nd();" affected by parting from his friends and merely by leaving the light of day? The strength of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg their bread in order that they may live, and men broken with age suffer anguish at the approach of death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes in the play; who though racked with intolerable pains, nevertheless prolonged life by fowling; 'Slow he pierced the swift with arrows, standing shot them on the wing,' as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to make himself garments. 5.33. But do I speak of the human race or of animals generally, when the nature of trees and plants is almost the same? For whether it be, as very learned men have thought, that this capacity has been engendered in them by some higher and diviner power, or whether it is the result of chance, we see that the vegetable species secure by means of their bark and roots that support and protection which animals derive from the distribution of the sensory organs and from the well-knit framework of the limbs. On this matter I agree, it is true, with those who hold that all these things are regulated by nature, because if nature were to neglect them her own existence would be impossible; yet I allow those who think otherwise on this point to hold whatever view they please: whenever I mention 'the nature of man,' let them, if they like, understand me to mean 'man,' as it makes no difference. For the individual can no more lose the instinct to seek the things that are good for him than he can divest himself of his own personality. The wisest authorities have therefore been right in finding the basis of the Chief Good in nature, and in holding that this instinctive desire for things suited to our nature is innate in all men, because it is founded on that natural attraction which makes them love themselves. 5.37. "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.39. "Plants also have a development and progress to maturity that is not unlike that of animals; hence we speak of a vine living and dying, or of a tree as young or old, in the prime of life or decrepit; consequently it is appropriate to suppose that with them as with animals certain things are suited and certain other things foreign to their nature; and that their growth and nurture is tended by a foster-mother, the science and art of husbandry, which trims and prunes, straightens, raises and props, enabling them to advance to the goal that nature prescribes, till the vines themselves, could they speak, would acknowledge this to be their proper mode of treatment and of tendance. In reality, of course, the power that tends the vine, to take that particular instance, is something outside of it; for the vine does not possess force enough in itself to be able to attain its highest possible development without the aid of cultivation. 5.40. But suppose the vine to receive the gift of sensation, bestowing on it some degree of appetition and power of movement; then what do you think it will do? Will it not endeavour to provide for itself the benefits which it previously obtained by the aid of the vine-dresser? But do you mark how it will further be concerned to protect its sensory faculties also and all their appetitive instincts, and any additional organs it may have developed? Thus with the properties that it always possessed it will combine those subsequently added to it, and it will not have the same end as the husbandman who tended it had, but will desire to live in accordance with that nature which it has subsequently acquired. And so its End or Good will be similar to, but not the same as, what it was before; it will no longer seek the Good of a plant, but that of an animal. Suppose again that it have bestowed upon it not merely sensation but also a human mind. Will it not result that while its former properties remain objects of its care, these added properties will be far more dear to it, and that the best parts of the mind will be the dearest of all? Will it not find its End or Chief Good in this crowning development of its nature, inasmuch as intellect and reason are far and away the highest of all faculties? Thus there has emerged the final term of the series of objects of desire; thus starting from the primary attraction of nature, by gradual stages of ascent we have arrived at the summit, the consummation of perfect bodily integrity combined with the full development of the mental faculty of reason. 5.42. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. 5.43. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 5.45. "If however anyone thinks that our enumeration of bodily advantages is incomplete owing to the omission of pleasure, let us postpone this question to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not one of the objects we have called the primary things in accordance with nature makes no difference for our present inquiry. If, as I hold, pleasure adds nothing to the sumâtotal of nature's goods, it has rightly been omitted. If on the contrary pleasure does possess the property that some assign to it, this fact does not impair the general outline we have just given of the Chief Good; since if to the primary objects of nature as we have explained them, pleasure be added, this only adds one more to the list of bodily advantages, and does not alter the interpretation of the Chief Good which has been propounded. 5.47. Again, is there nothing in the movements and postures of the body which Nature herself judges to be of importance? A man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular cast of features and expression â is there nothing in these things that we consider worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not often think people deserving of dislike, who by some movement or posture appear to have violated a law or principle of nature? And since people try to get rid of these defects of bearing, why should not even beauty have a good claim to be considered as desirable for its own sake? For we think imperfection or mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps still greater reason pursue distinction of form for its own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily movement and posture, why should we not pursue beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility but also for their own sakes. For since our nature aims at the full development of all its parts, she desires for its own sake that state of body which is most in accordance with himself; because she is thrown into utter disorder if the body is diseased or in pain or weak. 5.48. "Let us consider the parts of the mind, which are of nobler aspect. The loftier these are, the more unmistakable indications of nature do they afford. So great is our innate love of learning and of knowledge, that no one can doubt that man's nature is strongly attracted to these things even without the lure of any profit. Do we notice how children cannot be deterred even by punishment from studying and inquiry into the world around them? Drive them away, and back they come. They delight in knowing things; they are eager to impart their knowledge to others; pageants, games and shows of that sort hold them spell-bound, and they will even endure hunger and thirst so as to be able to see them. Again, take persons who delight in the liberal arts and studies; do we not see them careless of health or business, patiently enduring any inconvenience when under the spell of learning and of science, and repaid for endless toil and trouble by the pleasure they derive from acquiring knowledge? 5.49. For my part I believe Homer had something of this sort in view in his imaginary account of the songs of the Sirens. Apparently it was not the sweetness of their voices or the novelty and diversity of their songs, but their professions of knowledge that used to attract the passing voyageurs; it was the passion for learning that kept men rooted to the Sirens' rocky shores. This is their invitation to Ulysses (for I have translated this among other passages of Homer): Ulysses, pride of Argos, turn thy bark And listen to our music. Never yet Did voyager sail these waters blue, but stayed His course, enchanted by our voices sweet, And having filled his soul with harmony, Went on his homeward way a wiser man. We know the direful strife and clash of war That Greece by Heaven's mandate bore to Troy, And whatsoe'er on the wide earth befalls. Homer was aware that his story would not sound plausible if the magic that held his hero immeshed was merely an idle song! It is knowledge that the Sirens offer, and it was no marvel if a lover of wisdom held this dearer than his home. A passion for miscellaneous omniscience no doubt stamps a man as a mere dilettante; but it must be deemed the mark of a superior mind to be led on by the contemplation of high matters to a passionate love of knowledge. 5.50. "What an ardour for study, think you, possessed Archimedes, who was so absorbed in a diagram he was drawing in the dust that he was unaware even of the capture of his native city! What genius do we see expended by Aristoxenus on the theory of music! Imagine the zeal of a lifetime that Aristophanes devoted to literature! Why should I speak of Pythagoras, or of Plato, or Democritus? For they, we are told, in their passion for learning travelled through the remotest parts of the earth! Those who are blind to these facts have never been enamoured of some high and worthy study. And those who in this connexion allege that the studies I have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be desirable for their own sake by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them when no bait of advantage is held out, and finds enjoyment in the mere possession of knowledge even though it is likely to be a positive disadvantage to its possessor. 5.51. But what is the point of inquiring further into matters so obvious? Let us ask ourselves the question, how it is we are interested in the motions of the stars and in contemplating the heavenly bodies and studying all the obscure and secret realms of nature; why we derive pleasure from history, which we are so fond of following up, to the remotest detail, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun. Not that I am unaware that history is useful as well as entertaining. But what of our reading fiction, from which no utility can be extracted? 5.53. The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and think that being released from all anxiety and needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, they will do nothing but spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature. We on the other hand see in such studies not only the amusement of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of misfortune; hence the numbers of men who when they had fallen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning. 5.54. Demetrius of Phalerum, a ruler of this city, when unjustly banished from his country, repaired to the court of King Ptolemy at Alexandria. Being eminent in the very system of philosophy which we are recommending to you, and a pupil of Theophrastus, he employed the leisure afforded by his disaster in composing a number of excellent treatises, not for any practical use of his own, for he was debarred from affairs; but he found a sort of food for his higher nature in thus cultivating his mind. I myself frequently heard the blind exâpraetor and scholar Gnaeus Aufidius declare that he felt the actual loss of light more than the inconvenience of blindness. Take lastly the gift of sleep: did it not bring us repose for our bodies and an antidote for labour, we should think it a violation of nature, for it robs us of sensation and entirely suspends our activity; so that if our nature did not require repose or could obtain it in some other manner, we should be quite content, inasmuch as even as it is we frequently deny ourselves slumber, almost to the point of doing violence to nature, in the interests of business or of study. 5.55. "Even more striking, and in fact absolutely obvious and convincing natural indications are not wanting, more particularly no doubt in man, but also in every living creature, of the presence of a positive craving for constant activity. Perpetual repose is unendurable on any terms. This is a fact that may be readily detected in children of the tenderest age, if I may risk being thought to lay undue stress on a field of observation sanctioned by the older thinkers, all of whom, and my own school more than others, go to the nursery, because they believe that Nature reveals her plan to them most clearly in childhood. Even infants, we notice, are incapable of keeping still. Children of a somewhat more advanced age delight in games involving considerable exertion, from which not even fear of punishment can restrain them. And this passion for activity grows as they grow older. The prospect of the most delightful dreams would not reconcile us to feeling asleep for ever: Endymion's fate we should consider no better than death. 5.60. Therefore it rests with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our science), in addition to the elementary principles bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical developments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable than either the senses or the endowments of the body above alluded to; since those are surpassed in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed toward virtue and towards the actions in harmony with virtue, and all such properties and processes of the mind are entitled by the single name of Moral Worth. "The connotation of all these conceptions and the signification of the terms that denote them, and their several values and natures we shall study later; 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. 5.64. These high examples crowd the pages not only of romance but also of history, and especially the history of our own country. It was we who chose our most virtuous citizen to receive the sacred emblems from Ida; we who sent guardians to royal princes; our generals sacrificed their lives to save their country; our consuls warned the king who was their bitterest enemy, when close to the walls of Rome, to be on his guard against poison; in our commonwealth was found the lady who expiated her outraged honour by a self-sought death, and the father who killed his daughter to save her from shame. Who is there who cannot see that all these deeds and countless others besides were done by men who were inspired by the splendour of moral greatness to forget all thought of interest, and are praised by us from no other consideration but that of Moral Worth?"The considerations thus briefly set out (for I have not aimed at such a full account as I might have given, since the matter admitted of no uncertainty), these considerations then lead to the undoubted conclusion that all the virtues, and the Moral Worth which springs from them and inheres in them, are intrinsically desirable. 5.66. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature. 5.67. "At the same time this complex of interfused virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its separate parts by philosophers. For although the virtues are so closely united that each participates in every other and none can be separated from any other, yet on the other hand each has its own special function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and dangers, Temperance in forgoing pleasures, Prudence in the choice of goods and evils, Justice in giving each his due. As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is such as to form part of the end and Ultimate Good. 5.68. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. 5.71. Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.73. Aristotle and Theophrastus often and admirably praised knowledge for its own sake; Erillus, captivated by this single tenet, maintained that knowledge was the Chief Good and that nothing else was desirable as an end in itself. The ancients enlarged on the duty of rising proudly superior to human fortunes; Aristo singled out this one point, and declared that nothing but vice or virtue was either to be avoided or desired. Our school included freedom from pain among the things in accordance with nature; Hieronymus made it out to be the Supreme Good. On the other hand Callipho and later Diodorus, the one having fallen in love with pleasure, and the other with freedom from pain, could neither of them dispense with Moral Worth, which by our school was extolled above all else. 5.74. Even the votaries of pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things. Our system therefore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the student of the liberal arts, of the learned and the eminent, of statesmen and princes." 5.75. After these words he paused, and then added: "How now? Do you think I have made good use of my privilege of having you hear me say over my lesson?" "Why, Piso," I replied, "you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils." "That is true," said he; "but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you." 5.78. "Yet," said he, "if you concede to the Stoics that the presence of virtue alone can produce happiness, you concede this also to the Peripatetics. What the Stoics have not the courage to call evils, but admit to be irksome, detrimental, 'to be rejected,' and not in accordance with nature, we say are evils, though small and almost negligible evils. Hence if a man can be happy when surrounded by circumstances that are irksome and to be rejected, he can also be happy when surrounded by trifling evils." "Piso," I rejoined, "you, if anyone, are a sharp enough lawyer to see at a glance the real point at issue in a dispute. Therefore I beg your close attention. For so far, though perhaps I am to blame, you do not grasp the point of my question." "I am all attention," he replied," and await your reply to my inquiry." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.86. "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.87. On this your cousin and I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the systems of the philosophers give us happiness? They certainly profess to do so. Whether it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. 5.89. What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, â if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, â let them coin new words at their pleasure. 5.91. But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat among it; a business is not profitable if among enormous profits it incurs a trifling loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? And will you not judge the whole of life by its largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue plays so far the largest part in human affairs that it obliterates everything else? Well, then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. 5.92. Believe me, that scale will weigh down earth and sea combined. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predomit and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if for once he falls into low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that did not prevent his having the name of agelastos, as Lucilius says he had. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward accident had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he apparently was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not unhappy even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue. 5.94. We think it was scandalous of Dionysius of Heraclea to secede from the Stoics because of a malady of the eyes. As though Zeno had ever taught him that to feel pain was not painful! What he had heard, though he had not learnt the lesson, was that pain was not an evil, because not morally bad, and that it was manly to endure it. Had Dionysius been a Peripatetic, I believe he should never have changed his opinions; the Peripatetics say that pain is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoyance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the same as that of the Stoics. And indeed your friend Arcesilas, though he was rather too dogmatic in debate, was still one of us, for he was a pupil of Polemo. When he was racked with the torments of gout he was visited by an intimate friend, the Epicurean Charmides. The latter was departing in distress. 'Stay, I beg of you, friend Charmides,' cried Arcesilas; 'no pain from there has got to here' (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet he would have preferred to have no pain at all. 5.95. "This then is our system which you think inconsistent. I on the other hand, seeing the celestial and divine existence of virtue, excellence so great that where virtue and the mighty and most glorious deeds that she inspires are found, there misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and annoyance can, do not hesitate to declare that every Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible for one to be happier than another." "Well, Piso," said I, "that is a position which you will find needs a great deal of defending; and if you can hold to it, you are welcome to convert not only my cousin Cicero, but also myself." |
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47. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.1-1.10, 1.17, 2.34, 2.110, 3.7-3.10, 3.16-3.17, 3.20-3.21, 3.23, 3.31, 3.33, 3.41, 3.50, 3.62-3.64, 4.3, 4.6, 4.14, 4.18, 4.21, 4.45, 4.51, 4.61, 5.1-5.2, 5.4, 5.6-5.14, 5.16, 5.18, 5.22-5.33, 5.37-5.40, 5.42-5.43, 5.45, 5.47-5.51, 5.53-5.55, 5.60-5.61, 5.64, 5.66-5.68, 5.71, 5.73-5.75, 5.78, 5.84, 5.86-5.87, 5.89, 5.91-5.92, 5.94-5.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 3, 4, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 41, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78, 87, 88, 89, 99, 105, 107, 111, 112, 118, 128, 133, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 161, 164, 173, 175, 177, 181, 184, 186, 188, 189, 191, 193, 194, 195, 198, 201 | 2.34. Whether the list of these primary natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a much debated question; but to hold that it includes nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the senses, nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. And this is the fountain-head from which one's whole theory of Goods and Evils must necessarily flow. Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue pleasure alone; Diodorus freedom from pain. . . . In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their End of Goods logically follows: with Aristippus it is pleasure pure and simple; with the Stoics, harmony with Nature, which they interpret as meaning virtuous or morally good life, and further explain this as meaning to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. 2.110. in a certain class of birds we see some traces of affection, and also recognition and recollection; and in many we even notice regret for a lost friend. If animals therefore possess some semblance of the human virtues unconnected with pleasure, are men themselves to display no virtue except as a means to pleasure? And shall we say that man, who so far surpasses all other living creatures, has been gifted by nature with no exceptional endowment? 3.7. I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus; so I went to his country-house, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appetite for reading, and could never have enough of it; indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate-house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble, â he did not steal any attention from public business. So it may well be believed that when I found him taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of books at his command, he had the air of indulging in a literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so honourable an occupation. 3.8. Upon this chance encounter, each of us being equally surprised to see the other, he at once rose, and we began to exchange the usual greetings. "What brings you here?" cried he; "You are from your country-seat, I suppose. Had I known you were there," he continued, "I should have anticipated you with a visit." "Yes," I answered, "the games began yesterday, so I came out of town, and arrived late in the afternoon. My reason for coming on here was to get some books from the library. By the way, Cato, it will soon be time for our friend Lucullus to make acquaintance with this fine collection; for I hope he will take more pleasure in his library than in all the other appointments of his country-house. I am extremely anxious (though of course the responsibility belongs especially to you) that he should have the kind of education that will turn him out after the same pattern as his father and our dear Caepio, and also yourself, to whom he is so closely related. I cherish the memory of his grandfather (and you are aware how highly I esteemed Caepio, who in my belief would toâday be in the front rank, were he still alive). And also Lucullus is always present to my mind; he was a man of general eminence, and united to me in sentiment and opinion as well as by friendship." 3.9. "I commend you," rejoined Cato, "for your loyalty to the memory of men who both bequeathed their children to your care, as well as for your affectionate interest in the lad. My own responsibility, as you call it, I by no means disown, but I enlist you to share it with me. Moreover I may say that the youth already seems to me to show many signs both of modesty and talent; but you know how young he is." "I do," said I, "but all the same it is time for him to receive a tincture of studies which, if allowed to soak in at this impressionable age, will render him better equipped when he comes to the business of life." "True, and we will discuss this matter again several times more fully and take common action. But let us sit down," he said, "shall we?" So we sat down. 3.10. Cato then resumed: "But what pray are the books that you must come here for, when you have so large a library of your own?" "I have come to fetch some Note-books of Aristotle," I replied, "which I knew were here. I wanted to read them during my holiday; I do not often get any leisure." "How I wish," said he, "that you had thrown in your lot with the Stoics! You of all men might have been expected to reckon virtue as the only good." "Perhaps you might rather have been expected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a new terminology, when in substance you think as I do. Our principles agree; it is our language that is at variance." "Indeed," he rejoined, "they do not agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be desirable, once reckon anything as a good, other than Moral Worth, and you have extinguished the very light of virtue, Moral Worth itself, and overthrown virtue entirely." 3.16. "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. 3.17. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄpseis), â these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. 3.20. "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â axia as the Stoics call it â this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathÄkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.23. "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormÄ, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. 3.31. But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said, as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consot with and things contrary to nature, the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence is abolished altogether? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature. 3.33. "Again, the term 'Good,' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. He was led by this also to pronounce the 'beneficial' (for so let us render the Greek ÅphelÄma) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. 3.41. "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâcalled 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 3.50. But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.64. "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâabiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 4.3. "My view, then, Cato," I proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master's predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows â but I should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting while I deal with the whole of your discourse; for I think I shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. 4.6. Then, in themes demanding ornate and dignified treatment, however imposing, how brilliant is their diction! On Justice, Temperance, Courage, Friendship, on the conduct of life, the pursuit of wisdom, the career of the statesman, â no hair-splitting like that of the Stoics, no niggling minutiae, but the loftier passages studiously ornate, and the minor topics studiously plain and clear. As a result, think of their consolations, their exhortations, even their warnings and counsels, addressed to men of the highest eminence! In fact, their rhetorical exercises were twofold, like the nature of the subjects themselves. For every question for debate can be argued either on the general issue, ignoring the persons or circumstances involved, or, these also being taken into consideration, on a point of fact or of law or of nomenclature. They therefore practised themselves in both kinds; and this training produced their remarkable fluency in each class of discussion. 4.14. "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.' 4.18. Again, from the elements given by nature arose certain lofty excellences, springing partly from the contemplation of the secrets of nature, since the mind possessed an innate love of knowledge, whence also resulted the passion for argument and for discussion; and also, since man is the only animal endowed with a sense of modesty and shame, with a desire for intercourse and society with his fellows, and with a scrupulous care in all his words and actions to avoid any conduct that is not honourable and seemly, from these beginnings or germs, as I called them before, of nature's bestowal, were developed Temperance, Self-control, Justice and moral virtue generally in full flower and perfection. 4.21. "What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy! But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, that all men's folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in public life, in the lawâcourts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everyone else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched? 4.45. But first I would have you observe that the most important of all your doctrines, the head of the array, namely that Moral Worth alone is good and that the moral life is the End of Goods, will be shared with you by all those who make the End of Goods consist of virtue alone; and your view that it is impossible to frame a conception of Virtue if anything beside Moral Worth be counted in it, will also be maintained by the philosophers whom I just now mentioned. To my mind it would have been fairer for Zeno in his dispute with Polemo, whose teaching as to the primary impulses of nature he had adopted, to have started from the fundamental tenets which they held in common, and to have marked the point where he first called a halt and where occasion for divergence arose; not to take his stand with thinkers who did not even profess to hold that the Chief Good, as they severally conceived it, was based on natural instinct, and employ the same arguments and the same doctrines as they did. 4.51. The minor premise Polemo will concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the whole of their clan, as well as all the other philosophers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief Good; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it is, and excels everything else to a degree hardly to be expressed in words, Polemo will be able to be happy if endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all besides, and yet he will not grant you that nothing except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with virtue will perhaps decline to grant that happiness contains any just ground for pride; although they, it is true, sometimes represent even pleasures as things to be proud of. 4.61. What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâeminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 5.1. My dear Brutus, â Once I had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I was in the habit of doing, with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out beguiled with conversation on various subjects the three-quarters of a mile from the Dipylon Gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so deservedly famous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. 5.2. Thereupon Piso remarked: "Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I can't say; but one's emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which looks to my eyes smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality." 5.4. "As for our friend Pomponius," I interposed, "I believe he is joking; and no doubt he is a licensed wit, for he has so taken root in Athens that he is almost an Athenian; in fact I expect he will get the surname of Atticus! But I, Piso, agree with you; it is a common experience that places do strongly stimulate the imagination and vivify our ideas of famous men. You remember how I once came with you to Metapontum, and would not go to the house where we were to stay until I had seen the very place where Pythagoras breathed his last and the seat he sat in. All over Athens, I know, there are many reminders of eminent men in the actual place where they lived; but at the present moment it is that alcove over there which appeals to me, for not long ago it belonged to Carneades. I fancy I see him now (for his portrait is familiar), and I can imagine that the very place where he used to sit misses the sound of his voice, and mourns the loss of that mighty intellect." 5.6. "Well, Cicero," said Piso, "these enthusiasms befit a young man of parts, if they lead him to copy the example of the great. If they only stimulate antiquarian curiosity, they are mere dilettantism. But we all of us exhort you â though I hope it is a case of spurring a willing steed â to resolve to imitate your heroes as well as to know about them." "He is practising your precepts already, Piso," said I, "as you are aware; but all the same thank you for encouraging him." "Well," said Piso, with his usual amiability, "let us all join forces to promote the lad's improvement; and especially let us try to make him spare some of his interest for philosophy, either so as to follow the example of yourself for whom he has such an affection, or in order to be better equipped for the very study to which he is devoted. But, Lucius," he asked, "do you need our urging, or have you a natural leaning of your own towards philosophy? You are keeping Antiochus's lectures, and seem to me to be a pretty attentive pupil." "I try to be," replied Lucius with a timid or rather a modest air; "but have you heard any lectures on Carneades lately? He attracts me immensely; but Antiochus calls me in the other direction; and there is no other lecturer to go to." 5.7. "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." 5.8. "You know that I agree with you about that, Piso," I replied; "but you have raised the point most opportunely; for my cousin Cicero is eager to hear the doctrine of the Old Academy of which you speak, and of the Peripatetics, on the subject of the Ends of Goods. We feel sure you can expound it with the greatest ease, for you have had Staseas from Naples in your household for many years, and also we know you have been studying this very subject under Antiochus for several months at Athens." "Here goes, then," replied Piso, smiling, "(for you have rather craftily arranged for our discussion to start with me), let me see what I can do to give the lad a lecture. If an oracle had foretold that I should find myself discoursing in the Academy like a philosopher, I should not have believed it, but here I am, thanks to our having the place to ourselves. Only don't let me bore the rest of you while I am obliging our young friend." "What, bore me?" said I. "Why, it is I who asked you to speak." Thereupon Quintus and Pomponius having declared that they wished it too, Piso began. And I will ask you, Brutus, kindly to consider whether you think his discourse a satisfactory summary of the doctrine of Antiochus, which I believe to be the system which you most approve, as you have often attended the lectures of his brother Aristus. 5.9. Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. 5.10. Aristotle gave a complete account of the birth, nutrition and structure of all living creatures, Theophrastus of the natural history of plants and the causes and constitution of vegetable organisms in general; and the knowledge thus attained facilitated the investigation of the most obscure questions. In Logic their teachings include the rules of rhetoric as well as of dialectic; and Aristotle their founder started the practice of arguing both pro and contra upon every topic, not like Arcesilas, always controverting every proposition, but setting out all the possible arguments on either side in every subject. 5.11. The third division of philosophy investigates the rules of human well-being; this too was treated by the Peripatetics, so as to comprise not only the principles of individual conduct but also of the government of states. From Aristotle we learn the manners, customs and institutions, and from Theophrastus the laws also, of nearly all the states not only of Greece but of the barbarians as well. Both described the proper qualifications of a statesman, both moreover wrote lengthy treatises on the best form of constitution; Theophrastus treated the subject more fully, discussing the forces and occasions of political change, and their control as circumstances demand. Among the alternative ideals of conduct they gave the highest place to the life of retirement, devoted to contemplation and to study. This was pronounced to be most worthy of the Wise Man, as most nearly resembling the life of the gods. And these topics they handle in a style as brilliant as it is illuminating. 5.12. "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.13. Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. 5.14. "I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philosophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, and has a flowing style; all the same, even he is not true to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo. 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.18. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.22. Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. 5.23. "The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. 5.24. "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintece of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to understand the degree in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness dawns, and the creature begins to comprehend the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises The End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. 5.25. At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. 5.26. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. 5.27. This, then, is the theory that we have to expound; but if it requires a good deal of explanation, you will receive it with forbearance. For this is perhaps the first time that Lucius has heard the subject debated, and we must make allowance for his youth." "Very true," said I; "albeit the style of your discourse so far has been suited to hearers of any age.""Well then," he resumed, "having explained what the principle is which determines what things are desirable, I have next to show why the matter is as I have stated. Let us therefore begin from the position which I laid down first and which is also first in the order of reality: let us understand that every living creature loves itself. The fact that this is so admits of no doubt, for indeed it is a fundamental fact of nature, and one that everybody can grasp for himself by the evidence of his senses, so much so that did anyone choose to deny it, he would not get a hearing; nevertheless, so that no step may be omitted, I suppose I ought also to give reasons why it is so. 5.28. Yet how can you form any intelligible conception of an animal that should hate itself? The thing is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke of will deliberately set about drawing to itself something harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this for its own sake; therefore the animal will both hate and love itself at the same time, which is impossible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows that he will think good evil and evil good; that he will avoid things that are desirable and seek things that ought to be avoided; but this undeniably would mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A few people may be found who attempt to end their lives with a halter or by other means; but these, or the character of Terence who (in his own words) 'resolved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made less the wrong he did his son,' are not to be put down as haters of themselves. 5.29. The motive with some is grief, with others passion; many are rendered insane by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, fancying all the time that what they do is for their own best interests. Hence they say, and say in all sincerity: 'It is my way; do you do as it suits you.' Men who had really declared war against themselves would desire to have days of torment and nights of anguish, and they would not reproach themselves and say that they had been misguided and imprudent: such lamentations show that they love and care for themselves. It follows that whenever it is said of a man that he has ruined himself and is his own worst enemy, and that he is tired of life, you may be sure that there is really an explanation which would justify the inference, even from such a case as this, that every man loves himself. 5.30. Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists who hates himself; we must also realize that nobody exists who thinks it makes no difference to him what his own condition is. For it will be destructive of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality which is our attitude towards the things that are really indifferent."It would also be utterly absurd if anyone desired to maintain that, though the fact of self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really directed toward some other object and not towards the person himself who feels it. When this is said of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning; but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love ourselves for the sake of something else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves. 5.31. Yet what fact is more self-evident than that every man not merely loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed? For who is there, what percentage of mankind, whose 'Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale with fear,' at the approach of death? No doubt it is a fault to recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being (and the same timidity in regard to pain is blameworthy); but the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more some people act thus â as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree â the more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural. I am not referring to the fear of death felt by those who shun death because they believe it means the loss of the good things of life, or because they are afraid of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest death may be painful: for very often young children, who do not think of any of these things, are terribly frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall from a height. Even 'wild creatures,' says Pacuvius, 'Lacking discourse of reason To look before,' when seized with fear of death, 'bristle with horror.' 5.32. Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be ')" onMouseOut="nd();" affected by parting from his friends and merely by leaving the light of day? The strength of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg their bread in order that they may live, and men broken with age suffer anguish at the approach of death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes in the play; who though racked with intolerable pains, nevertheless prolonged life by fowling; 'Slow he pierced the swift with arrows, standing shot them on the wing,' as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to make himself garments. 5.33. But do I speak of the human race or of animals generally, when the nature of trees and plants is almost the same? For whether it be, as very learned men have thought, that this capacity has been engendered in them by some higher and diviner power, or whether it is the result of chance, we see that the vegetable species secure by means of their bark and roots that support and protection which animals derive from the distribution of the sensory organs and from the well-knit framework of the limbs. On this matter I agree, it is true, with those who hold that all these things are regulated by nature, because if nature were to neglect them her own existence would be impossible; yet I allow those who think otherwise on this point to hold whatever view they please: whenever I mention 'the nature of man,' let them, if they like, understand me to mean 'man,' as it makes no difference. For the individual can no more lose the instinct to seek the things that are good for him than he can divest himself of his own personality. The wisest authorities have therefore been right in finding the basis of the Chief Good in nature, and in holding that this instinctive desire for things suited to our nature is innate in all men, because it is founded on that natural attraction which makes them love themselves. 5.37. "Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. 5.38. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our faculties are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the nonâvolitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the iimate or nearly iimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often. 5.39. "Plants also have a development and progress to maturity that is not unlike that of animals; hence we speak of a vine living and dying, or of a tree as young or old, in the prime of life or decrepit; consequently it is appropriate to suppose that with them as with animals certain things are suited and certain other things foreign to their nature; and that their growth and nurture is tended by a foster-mother, the science and art of husbandry, which trims and prunes, straightens, raises and props, enabling them to advance to the goal that nature prescribes, till the vines themselves, could they speak, would acknowledge this to be their proper mode of treatment and of tendance. In reality, of course, the power that tends the vine, to take that particular instance, is something outside of it; for the vine does not possess force enough in itself to be able to attain its highest possible development without the aid of cultivation. 5.40. But suppose the vine to receive the gift of sensation, bestowing on it some degree of appetition and power of movement; then what do you think it will do? Will it not endeavour to provide for itself the benefits which it previously obtained by the aid of the vine-dresser? But do you mark how it will further be concerned to protect its sensory faculties also and all their appetitive instincts, and any additional organs it may have developed? Thus with the properties that it always possessed it will combine those subsequently added to it, and it will not have the same end as the husbandman who tended it had, but will desire to live in accordance with that nature which it has subsequently acquired. And so its End or Good will be similar to, but not the same as, what it was before; it will no longer seek the Good of a plant, but that of an animal. Suppose again that it have bestowed upon it not merely sensation but also a human mind. Will it not result that while its former properties remain objects of its care, these added properties will be far more dear to it, and that the best parts of the mind will be the dearest of all? Will it not find its End or Chief Good in this crowning development of its nature, inasmuch as intellect and reason are far and away the highest of all faculties? Thus there has emerged the final term of the series of objects of desire; thus starting from the primary attraction of nature, by gradual stages of ascent we have arrived at the summit, the consummation of perfect bodily integrity combined with the full development of the mental faculty of reason. 5.42. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. 5.43. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition. 5.45. "If however anyone thinks that our enumeration of bodily advantages is incomplete owing to the omission of pleasure, let us postpone this question to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not one of the objects we have called the primary things in accordance with nature makes no difference for our present inquiry. If, as I hold, pleasure adds nothing to the sumâtotal of nature's goods, it has rightly been omitted. If on the contrary pleasure does possess the property that some assign to it, this fact does not impair the general outline we have just given of the Chief Good; since if to the primary objects of nature as we have explained them, pleasure be added, this only adds one more to the list of bodily advantages, and does not alter the interpretation of the Chief Good which has been propounded. 5.47. Again, is there nothing in the movements and postures of the body which Nature herself judges to be of importance? A man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular cast of features and expression â is there nothing in these things that we consider worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not often think people deserving of dislike, who by some movement or posture appear to have violated a law or principle of nature? And since people try to get rid of these defects of bearing, why should not even beauty have a good claim to be considered as desirable for its own sake? For we think imperfection or mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps still greater reason pursue distinction of form for its own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily movement and posture, why should we not pursue beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility but also for their own sakes. For since our nature aims at the full development of all its parts, she desires for its own sake that state of body which is most in accordance with himself; because she is thrown into utter disorder if the body is diseased or in pain or weak. 5.48. "Let us consider the parts of the mind, which are of nobler aspect. The loftier these are, the more unmistakable indications of nature do they afford. So great is our innate love of learning and of knowledge, that no one can doubt that man's nature is strongly attracted to these things even without the lure of any profit. Do we notice how children cannot be deterred even by punishment from studying and inquiry into the world around them? Drive them away, and back they come. They delight in knowing things; they are eager to impart their knowledge to others; pageants, games and shows of that sort hold them spell-bound, and they will even endure hunger and thirst so as to be able to see them. Again, take persons who delight in the liberal arts and studies; do we not see them careless of health or business, patiently enduring any inconvenience when under the spell of learning and of science, and repaid for endless toil and trouble by the pleasure they derive from acquiring knowledge? 5.49. For my part I believe Homer had something of this sort in view in his imaginary account of the songs of the Sirens. Apparently it was not the sweetness of their voices or the novelty and diversity of their songs, but their professions of knowledge that used to attract the passing voyageurs; it was the passion for learning that kept men rooted to the Sirens' rocky shores. This is their invitation to Ulysses (for I have translated this among other passages of Homer): Ulysses, pride of Argos, turn thy bark And listen to our music. Never yet Did voyager sail these waters blue, but stayed His course, enchanted by our voices sweet, And having filled his soul with harmony, Went on his homeward way a wiser man. We know the direful strife and clash of war That Greece by Heaven's mandate bore to Troy, And whatsoe'er on the wide earth befalls. Homer was aware that his story would not sound plausible if the magic that held his hero immeshed was merely an idle song! It is knowledge that the Sirens offer, and it was no marvel if a lover of wisdom held this dearer than his home. A passion for miscellaneous omniscience no doubt stamps a man as a mere dilettante; but it must be deemed the mark of a superior mind to be led on by the contemplation of high matters to a passionate love of knowledge. 5.50. "What an ardour for study, think you, possessed Archimedes, who was so absorbed in a diagram he was drawing in the dust that he was unaware even of the capture of his native city! What genius do we see expended by Aristoxenus on the theory of music! Imagine the zeal of a lifetime that Aristophanes devoted to literature! Why should I speak of Pythagoras, or of Plato, or Democritus? For they, we are told, in their passion for learning travelled through the remotest parts of the earth! Those who are blind to these facts have never been enamoured of some high and worthy study. And those who in this connexion allege that the studies I have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be desirable for their own sake by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them when no bait of advantage is held out, and finds enjoyment in the mere possession of knowledge even though it is likely to be a positive disadvantage to its possessor. 5.51. But what is the point of inquiring further into matters so obvious? Let us ask ourselves the question, how it is we are interested in the motions of the stars and in contemplating the heavenly bodies and studying all the obscure and secret realms of nature; why we derive pleasure from history, which we are so fond of following up, to the remotest detail, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun. Not that I am unaware that history is useful as well as entertaining. But what of our reading fiction, from which no utility can be extracted? 5.53. The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and think that being released from all anxiety and needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, they will do nothing but spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature. We on the other hand see in such studies not only the amusement of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of misfortune; hence the numbers of men who when they had fallen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning. 5.54. Demetrius of Phalerum, a ruler of this city, when unjustly banished from his country, repaired to the court of King Ptolemy at Alexandria. Being eminent in the very system of philosophy which we are recommending to you, and a pupil of Theophrastus, he employed the leisure afforded by his disaster in composing a number of excellent treatises, not for any practical use of his own, for he was debarred from affairs; but he found a sort of food for his higher nature in thus cultivating his mind. I myself frequently heard the blind exâpraetor and scholar Gnaeus Aufidius declare that he felt the actual loss of light more than the inconvenience of blindness. Take lastly the gift of sleep: did it not bring us repose for our bodies and an antidote for labour, we should think it a violation of nature, for it robs us of sensation and entirely suspends our activity; so that if our nature did not require repose or could obtain it in some other manner, we should be quite content, inasmuch as even as it is we frequently deny ourselves slumber, almost to the point of doing violence to nature, in the interests of business or of study. 5.55. "Even more striking, and in fact absolutely obvious and convincing natural indications are not wanting, more particularly no doubt in man, but also in every living creature, of the presence of a positive craving for constant activity. Perpetual repose is unendurable on any terms. This is a fact that may be readily detected in children of the tenderest age, if I may risk being thought to lay undue stress on a field of observation sanctioned by the older thinkers, all of whom, and my own school more than others, go to the nursery, because they believe that Nature reveals her plan to them most clearly in childhood. Even infants, we notice, are incapable of keeping still. Children of a somewhat more advanced age delight in games involving considerable exertion, from which not even fear of punishment can restrain them. And this passion for activity grows as they grow older. The prospect of the most delightful dreams would not reconcile us to feeling asleep for ever: Endymion's fate we should consider no better than death. 5.60. Therefore it rests with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our science), in addition to the elementary principles bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical developments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable than either the senses or the endowments of the body above alluded to; since those are surpassed in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed toward virtue and towards the actions in harmony with virtue, and all such properties and processes of the mind are entitled by the single name of Moral Worth. "The connotation of all these conceptions and the signification of the terms that denote them, and their several values and natures we shall study later; 5.61. for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. 5.64. These high examples crowd the pages not only of romance but also of history, and especially the history of our own country. It was we who chose our most virtuous citizen to receive the sacred emblems from Ida; we who sent guardians to royal princes; our generals sacrificed their lives to save their country; our consuls warned the king who was their bitterest enemy, when close to the walls of Rome, to be on his guard against poison; in our commonwealth was found the lady who expiated her outraged honour by a self-sought death, and the father who killed his daughter to save her from shame. Who is there who cannot see that all these deeds and countless others besides were done by men who were inspired by the splendour of moral greatness to forget all thought of interest, and are praised by us from no other consideration but that of Moral Worth?"The considerations thus briefly set out (for I have not aimed at such a full account as I might have given, since the matter admitted of no uncertainty), these considerations then lead to the undoubted conclusion that all the virtues, and the Moral Worth which springs from them and inheres in them, are intrinsically desirable. 5.66. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature. 5.67. "At the same time this complex of interfused virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its separate parts by philosophers. For although the virtues are so closely united that each participates in every other and none can be separated from any other, yet on the other hand each has its own special function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and dangers, Temperance in forgoing pleasures, Prudence in the choice of goods and evils, Justice in giving each his due. As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is such as to form part of the end and Ultimate Good. 5.68. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. 5.71. Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. 5.73. Aristotle and Theophrastus often and admirably praised knowledge for its own sake; Erillus, captivated by this single tenet, maintained that knowledge was the Chief Good and that nothing else was desirable as an end in itself. The ancients enlarged on the duty of rising proudly superior to human fortunes; Aristo singled out this one point, and declared that nothing but vice or virtue was either to be avoided or desired. Our school included freedom from pain among the things in accordance with nature; Hieronymus made it out to be the Supreme Good. On the other hand Callipho and later Diodorus, the one having fallen in love with pleasure, and the other with freedom from pain, could neither of them dispense with Moral Worth, which by our school was extolled above all else. 5.74. Even the votaries of pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things. Our system therefore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the student of the liberal arts, of the learned and the eminent, of statesmen and princes." 5.75. After these words he paused, and then added: "How now? Do you think I have made good use of my privilege of having you hear me say over my lesson?" "Why, Piso," I replied, "you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils." "That is true," said he; "but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you." 5.78. "Yet," said he, "if you concede to the Stoics that the presence of virtue alone can produce happiness, you concede this also to the Peripatetics. What the Stoics have not the courage to call evils, but admit to be irksome, detrimental, 'to be rejected,' and not in accordance with nature, we say are evils, though small and almost negligible evils. Hence if a man can be happy when surrounded by circumstances that are irksome and to be rejected, he can also be happy when surrounded by trifling evils." "Piso," I rejoined, "you, if anyone, are a sharp enough lawyer to see at a glance the real point at issue in a dispute. Therefore I beg your close attention. For so far, though perhaps I am to blame, you do not grasp the point of my question." "I am all attention," he replied," and await your reply to my inquiry." 5.84. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. But when it comes to its conclusion, it finds itself in trouble; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man undergoing crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then sickness is miserable; soundness of body is a good; then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all together? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply, 'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' 5.86. "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you are bound to be in difficulties." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down topples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine.""Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for happiness possesses us all. 5.87. On this your cousin and I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the systems of the philosophers give us happiness? They certainly profess to do so. Whether it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. 5.89. What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, â if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, â let them coin new words at their pleasure. 5.91. But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat among it; a business is not profitable if among enormous profits it incurs a trifling loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? And will you not judge the whole of life by its largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue plays so far the largest part in human affairs that it obliterates everything else? Well, then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. 5.92. Believe me, that scale will weigh down earth and sea combined. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predomit and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if for once he falls into low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that did not prevent his having the name of agelastos, as Lucilius says he had. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward accident had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he apparently was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not unhappy even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue. 5.94. We think it was scandalous of Dionysius of Heraclea to secede from the Stoics because of a malady of the eyes. As though Zeno had ever taught him that to feel pain was not painful! What he had heard, though he had not learnt the lesson, was that pain was not an evil, because not morally bad, and that it was manly to endure it. Had Dionysius been a Peripatetic, I believe he should never have changed his opinions; the Peripatetics say that pain is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoyance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the same as that of the Stoics. And indeed your friend Arcesilas, though he was rather too dogmatic in debate, was still one of us, for he was a pupil of Polemo. When he was racked with the torments of gout he was visited by an intimate friend, the Epicurean Charmides. The latter was departing in distress. 'Stay, I beg of you, friend Charmides,' cried Arcesilas; 'no pain from there has got to here' (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet he would have preferred to have no pain at all. 5.95. "This then is our system which you think inconsistent. I on the other hand, seeing the celestial and divine existence of virtue, excellence so great that where virtue and the mighty and most glorious deeds that she inspires are found, there misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and annoyance can, do not hesitate to declare that every Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible for one to be happier than another." "Well, Piso," said I, "that is a position which you will find needs a great deal of defending; and if you can hold to it, you are welcome to convert not only my cousin Cicero, but also myself." |
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| 48. Cicero, On Fate, 4.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 149 |
49. Cicero, On Divination, 2.150 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, on the orator Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 31, 38| 2.150. Perfugium videtur omnium laborum et sollicitudinum esse somnus. At ex eo ipso plurumae curae metusque nascuntur; qui quidem ipsi per se minus valerent et magis contemnerentur, nisi somniorum patrocinium philosophi suscepissent, nec ii quidem contemptissimi, sed in primis acuti et consequentia et repugtia videntes, qui prope iam absoluti et perfecti putantur. Quorum licentiae nisi Carneades restitisset, haud scio an soli iam philosophi iudicarentur. Cum quibus omnis fere nobis disceptatio contentioque est, non quod eos maxume contemnamus, sed quod videntur acutissime sententias suas prudentissimeque defendere. Cum autem proprium sit Academiae iudicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare, quae simillima veri videantur, conferre causas et, quid in quamque sententiam dici possit, expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate iudicium audientium relinquere integrum ac liberum, tenebimus hanc consuetudinem a Socrate traditam eaque inter nos, si tibi, Quinte frater, placebit, quam saepissime utemur. Mihi vero, inquit ille, nihil potest esse iucundius. Quae cum essent dicta, surreximus. | 2.150. Sleep is regarded as a refuge from every toil and care; but it is actually made the fruitful source of worry and fear. In fact dreams would be less regarded on their own account and would be viewed with greater indifference had they not been taken under the guardianship of philosophers — not philosophers of the meaner sort, but those of the keenest wit, competent to see what follows logically and what does not — men who are considered well-nigh perfect and infallible. Indeed, if their arrogance had not been resisted by Carneades, it is probable that by this time they would have adjudged the only philosophers. While most of my war of words has been with these men, it is not because I hold them in especial contempt, but on the contrary, it is because they seem to me to defend their own views with the greatest acuteness and skill. Moreover, it is characteristic of the Academy to put forward no conclusions of its own, but to approve those which seem to approach nearest to the truth; to compare arguments; to draw forth all that may be said in behalf of any opinion; and, without asserting any authority of its own, to leave the judgement of the inquirer wholly free. That same method, which by the way we inherited from Socrates, I shall, if agreeable to you, my dear Quintus, follow as often as possible in our future discussions.Nothing could please me better, Quintus replied.When this was said, we arose. |
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50. Cicero, Academica, 1.21, 1.46, 1.121, 2.32, 2.66, 2.104-2.105, 2.118-2.120 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, and creation of cosmos •cicero, marcus tullius, plato and platonism of •cicero, marcus tullius, partitiones oratoriae •cicero, marcus tullius, and fusion of rhetorical and philosophical methods •cicero, marcus tullius, concurrence of •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 39, 40, 61, 64, 65, 87, 90, 91, 92, 96| 1.21. ergo haec animorum; vitae autem (id enim erat tertium) adiuncta esse dicebant quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Iam nam Goer. virtus in in 1 et 2 om. *d animi bonis et in corporis cernitur et et om. *d in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. hominem enim enim om. *d autem Mue. esse censebant quasi partem quandam esse post quandam smn civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana hum. communi IFGronovius observ. 3, 6 quadam societate. ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt; cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut ad tenendum, aut ad agendum *dn om. s tuendum s ut divitias ut opes ut gloriam ut gratiam. Ita tripertita ab his inducitur ratio bonorum, 1.46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur—sed tamen illa quam exposuisti exposuisti Dur. exposui *g*d ; an a Cicerone neglegenter scriptum ? vetus, haec nova nominetur. quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, producta mn (per in ras. p ) qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex is qui illum audierant maximeque ex Epicureo Epicureo ms -ZZZo *g*d Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate et to fuit īo facultate et do m 1, īo del. et do ctrina m 2 ; et to om. *dn et co pia dicendi Chr. ” quid autem stomachatur stomachetur Sig. Mnesarchus, quid Antipater digladiatur Non. p. 65 (digladiari) digladiatur F 1 -etur cett. cum Carneade tot voluminibus? * | |
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| 51. Cicero, On Invention, 144-149 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 61 |
| 52. Horace, Letters, 1.4.53-1.4.62, 1.7.46-1.7.48, 1.11.27 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, consulship •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 146, 151; Oksanish (2019) 109 |
53. Livy, History, 7.6, 8.13.9, 9.43.22, 24.39.8, 28.9.15-28.9.16, 29.8.9-29.8.11, 29.18.4-29.18.5, 29.18.18, 44.29.2 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 5, 44, 251, 253, 254| 44.29.2. sanctitas templi insulaeque inviolatos praestabat omnes. itaque permixti Romanique et Macedones et Eumenis navales socii et in templo indutias religione loci praebente versabantur. | |
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54. Dionysius of Halycarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 6.13.1-6.13.2 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 254 | 6.13.1. It is said that in this battle two men on horseback, far excelling in both beauty and stature those our human stock produces, and just growing their first beard, appeared to Postumius, the dictator, and to those arrayed about him, and charged at the head of the Roman horse, striking with their spears all the Latins they encountered and driving them headlong before them. And after the flight of the Latins and the capture of their camp, the battle having come to an end in the late afternoon, two youths are said to have appeared in the same manner in the Roman Forum attired in military garb, very tall and beautiful and of the same age, themselves retaining on their counteces as having come from a battle, the look of combatants, and the horses they led being all in a sweat. 6.13.2. And when they had each of them watered their horses and washed them at the fountain which rises near the temple of Vesta and forms a small but deep pool, and many people stood about them and inquired if they brought any news from the camp, they related how the battle had gone and that the Romans were the victors. And it is said that after they left the Forum they were not seen again by anyone, though great search was made for them by the man who had been left in command of the city. |
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55. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 2.618-2.620, 2.625, 3.28-3.29, 3.74-3.77, 3.1057-3.1067 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 148, 151, 251| 2.618. tympana tenta tot palmis et cymbala circum 2.619. concava, raucisonoque mitur cornua cantu, 2.620. et Phrygio stimulat numero cava tibia mentis, 2.625. munificat tacita mortalis muta salute, 3.28. his ibi me rebus quaedam divina voluptas 3.29. percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua vi 3.74. consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore 3.75. macerat invidia ante oculos illum esse potentem, 3.76. illum aspectari, claro qui incedit honore, 3.77. ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur. 3.1057. haut ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus 3.1058. quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper, 3.1059. commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit. 3.1060. exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille, 3.1061. esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque revertit , 3.1062. quippe foris nihilo melius qui sentiat esse. 3.1063. currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter 3.1064. auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans; 3.1065. oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae, 3.1066. aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit, 3.1067. aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit. | |
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56. Anon., Rhetorica Ad Herennium, 2.19 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on duties Found in books: Fertik (2019) 22 | 2.19. We shall be dealing with an Absolute Juridical Issue when, without any recourse to a defence extraneous to the cause, we contend that the act itself which we confess having committed was lawful. Herein it is proper to examine whether the act was in accord with the Law. We can discuss this question, once a cause is given, when we know the departments of which the Law is constituted. The constituent departments, then, are the following: Nature, Statute, Custom, Previous Judgements, Equity, and Agreement. To the Law of Nature belong the duties observed because of kinship or family loyalty. In accordance with this kind of Law parents are cherished by their children, and children by their parents. Statute Law is that kind of Law which is sanctioned by the will of the people; for example, you are to appear before the court when summoned to do so. Legal Custom is that which, in the absence of any statute, is by usage endowed with the force of statute law; for example, the money you have deposited with a banker you may rightly seek from his partner. It is a Previous Judgement what on the same question a sentence has been passed or a decree interposed. These are often contradictory, according as one judge, praetor, consul, or tribune of the plebs has determined differently from another; and it often happens that on the very same matter one has decree or decided differently from another. For example, Marcus Drusus, city praetor, granted an action on breach of contract against an heir, whereas Sextus Julius refused to do so. Again, Gaius Caelius, sitting in judgement, acquitted of the charge of injury the man who had by name attacked the poet Lucilius on the stage, while Publius Mucius condemned the man who had specifically named the poet Lucius Accius. |
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| 57. Catullus, Poems, 10 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 147 |
| 58. Ovid, Epistulae Ex Ponto, 1.8.36 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 146 |
| 59. Horace, Odes, 1.9 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 150 |
| 60. Vitruvius Pollio, On Architecture, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 40 |
| 61. Tibullus, Elegies, 2.3.51-2.3.52 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 148 |
62. Plutarch, Cato The Elder, 19.3-19.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 44| 19.3. φαίνεται δὲ θαυμαστῶς ἀποδεξάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τιμητείαν ὁ δῆμος, ἀνδριάντα γοῦν ἀναθεὶς ἐν τῷ ναῷ τῆς Ὑγιείας ἐπέγραψεν οὐ τὰς στρατηγίας οὐδὲ τὸν θρίαμβον τὸν Κάτωνος, ἀλλʼ, ὡς ἄν τις μεταφράσειε τὴν ἐπιγραφήν, ὅτι τὴν Ῥωμαίων πολιτείαν ἐγκεκλιμένην καὶ ῥέπουσαν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τιμητὴς γενόμενος χρησταῖς ἀγωγαῖς καὶ σώφροσιν ἐθισμοῖς καὶ διδασκαλίαις εἰς ὀρθὸν αὖθις ἀποκατέστησε 19.4. καίτοι πρότερον αὐτὸς κατεγέλα τῶν ἀγαπώντων τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ λανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἔλεγεν ἐπὶ χαλκέων καὶ ζωγράφων ἔργοις μέγα φρονοῦντας, αὐτοῦ δὲ καλλίστας εἰκόνας ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς περιφέρειν τοὺς πολίτας πρὸς δὲ τοὺς θαυμάζοντας, ὅτι πολλῶν ἀδόξων ἀνδριάντας ἐχόντων ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἔχει μᾶλλον γὰρ, ἔφη, βούλομαι ζητεῖσθαι, διὰ τί μου ἀνδριὰς οὐ κεῖται ἢ διὰ τί κεῖται | 19.3. 19.4. |
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| 63. Juvenal, Satires, 8.142-8.144, 10.133-10.146, 10.278-10.282 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 5, 44, 51 |
| 64. Lucan, Pharsalia, 1.119-1.120, 5.278-5.282, 6.303-6.306, 9.227-9.236 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on duties Found in books: Fertik (2019) 22 |
65. Plutarch, Mark Antony, 4.1-4.3, 36.7, 60.3, 60.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 51; Oksanish (2019) 167, 168| 4.1. προσῆν δὲ καὶ μορφῆς ἐλευθέριον ἀξίωμα, καὶ πώγων τις οὐκ ἀγεννὴς καὶ πλάτος μετώπου καὶ γρυπότης μυκτῆρος ἐδόκει τοῖς γραφομένοις καὶ πλαττομένοις Ἡρακλέους προσώποις ἐμφερὲς ἔχειν τὸ ἀρρενωπόν. ἦν δὲ καὶ λόγος παλαιὸς Ἡρακλείδας εἶναι τοὺς Ἀντωνίους, ἀπʼ Ἄντωνος, παιδὸς Ἡρακλέους, γεγονότας. 4.2. καὶ τοῦτον ᾤετο τὸν λόγον τῇ τε μορφῇ τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τῇ στολῇ βεβαιοῦν. ἀεὶ γάρ, ὅτε μέλλοι πλείοσιν ὁρᾶσθαι, χιτῶνα εἰς μηρὸν ἔζωστο, καὶ μάχαιρα μεγάλη παρήρτητο, καὶ σάγος περιέκειτο τῶν στερεῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις φορτικὰ δοκοῦντα, μεγαλαυχία καὶ σκῶμμα καὶ κώθων ἐμφανὴς καὶ καθίσαι παρὰ τὸν ἐσθίοντα καὶ φαγεῖν ἐπιστάντα τραπέζῃ στρατιωτικῇ, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον εὐνοίας καὶ πόθου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐνεποίει τοῖς στρατιώταις. 4.3. ἦν δέ που καὶ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν οὐκ ἀναφρόδιτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτῳ πολλοὺς ἐδημαγώγει, συμπράττων τε τοῖς ἐρῶσι καὶ σκωπτόμενος οὐκ ἀηδῶς εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους ἔρωτας. ἡ δʼ ἐλευθεριότης καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ὀλίγῃ χειρὶ μηδὲ φειδομένῃ χαρίζεσθαι στρατιώταις καὶ φίλοις ἀρχήν τε λαμπρὰν ἐπὶ τὸ ἰσχύειν αὐτῷ παρέσχε, καὶ μεγάλου γενομένου τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐπῆρεν, ἐκ μυρίων ἄλλων ἁμαρτημάτων ἀνατρεπομένην. ἓν δέ τι τοῦ μεγαλοδώρου παράδειγμα διηγήσομαι. 60.3. προσῳκείου δὲ ἑαυτὸν Ἀντώνιος Ἡρακλεῖ κατὰ γένος καὶ Διονύσῳ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ βίου ζῆλον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, Διόνυσος νέος προσαγορευόμενος. ἡ δὲ αὐτὴ θύελλα καὶ τοὺς Εὐμενοῦς καὶ Ἀττάλου κολοσσοὺς ἐπιγεγραμμένους Ἀντωνείους Ἀθήνησιν ἐμπεσοῦσα μόνους ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνέτρεψε. ἡ δὲ Κλεοπάτρας ναυαρχὶς ἐκαλεῖτο μὲν Ἀντωνιάς, σημεῖον δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν δεινὸν ἐφάνη· χελιδόνες γὰρ ὑπὸ τὴν πρύμναν ἐνεόττευσαν· ἕτεραι δὲ ἐπελθοῦσαι καὶ ταύτας ἐξήλασαν καὶ τὰ νεόττια διέφθειραν. | 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 60.3. |
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| 66. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 5.1.6-5.1.7, 6.198, 7.121 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius, on duties Found in books: Fertik (2019) 22; Jenkyns (2013) 251 |
| 67. Martial, Epigrams, 5.22.5, 5.22.7-5.22.9, 10.2.9-10.2.12, 10.20.4-10.20.5, 10.56.1-10.56.2, 10.56.10, 12.18.1-12.18.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 51, 146 |
| 68. Martial, Epigrams, 5.22.5, 5.22.7-5.22.9, 10.2.9-10.2.12, 10.20.4-10.20.5, 10.56.1-10.56.2, 10.56.10, 12.18.1-12.18.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 51, 146 |
69. Plutarch, Coriolanus, 3.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 254| 3.4. ἦν δὲ καὶ σιτίον ἀπʼ αὐτῆς ἡ βάλανος καὶ ποτὸν τὸ μελίτειον, ὄψον δὲ παρεῖχε τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν νεμομένων τε καὶ πτηνῶν, θήρας ὄργανον φέρουσα τὸν ἰξόν. ἐν ἐκείνῃ δὲ τῇ μάχῃ καὶ τοὺς Διοσκούρους ἐπιφανῆναι λέγουσι, καὶ μετὰ τὴν μάχην εὐθὺς ὀφθῆναι ῥεομένοις ἱδρῶτι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐν ἀγορᾷ τὴν νίκην ἀπαγγέλλοντας, οὗ νῦν παρὰ τὴν κρήνην νεώς ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἱδρυμένος, ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐπινίκιον οὖσαν, ἐν τῷ Ἰουλίῳ μηνὶ τὰς εἰδούς, Διοσκούροις ἀνιερώκασι. | 3.4. In the battle of which I was speaking, it is said that Castor and Pollux appeared, and that immediately after the battle they were seen, their horses all a-drip with sweat, in the forum, announcing the victory, by the fountain where their temple now stands. Therefore the day on which this victory was won, the Ides of July, was consecrated to the Dioscuri. |
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70. Plutarch, Lucullus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 22| 42.3. καίπερ ἀνθούσης τότε τοῖς Καρνεάδου λόγοις διὰ Φίλωνος, ἀλλὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς, πιθανὸν ἄνδρα καὶ δεινὸν εἰπεῖν τότε προστάτην ἐχούσης τὸν Ἀσκαλωνίτην Ἀντίοχον, ὃν πάσῃ σπουδῇ ποιησάμενος φίλον ὁ Λούκουλλος καὶ συμβιωτὴν ἀντέταττε τοῖς Φίλωνος ἀκροαταῖς, ὧν καὶ Κικέρων ἦν. | 42.3. |
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| 71. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 25 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 254 |
72. Plutarch, Advice To Bride And Groom, 2, 39, 3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 137 | 3. In the beginning, especially, married people ought to be on their guard against disagreements and clashes, for they see that such household vessels as are made of sections joined together are at the outset easily pulled apart by any fortuitous cause, but after a time, when their joints have become set, they can hardly be separated by fire and steel. |
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| 73. Plutarch, Sulla, 26 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 23, 53 |
| 74. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, on the nature of the gods Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 185, 186 |
75. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 5.13.39, 11.3.66 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 147 | 5.13.39. The method of reply to our opponent's counsel should be on different lines. Sometimes however we are justified in attacking, not merely their manner of speaking, but also their character, their appearance, their gait or bearing. Indeed, in his attack on Quintius, Cicero does not confine himself to these topics, but even attacks his purple-bordered toga that goes trailing to his heels: for Quintius had caused Cluentius grave embarrassment by his turbulent harangues. |
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| 76. Seneca The Younger, De Brevitate Vitae (Dialogorum Liber X ), 15.4, 20.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 45 |
| 77. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 16.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 45 |
| 78. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Polybium (Ad Polybium De Consolatione) (Dialogorum Liber Xi), 1.1, 18.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 45 |
| 79. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.20.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on gender roles and anger Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 136 |
| 80. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 23.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 146 |
| 81. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 121.6, 121.8, 121.17, 121.20, 121.24 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 88, 89, 112, 191 |
| 82. Statius, Siluae, 1.1.84-1.1.90 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 44 |
83. Tacitus, Annals, 4.38 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 44| 4.38. Ego me, patres conscripti, mortalem esse et hominum officia fungi satisque habere si locum principem impleam et vos testor et meminisse posteros volo; qui satis superque memoriae meae tribuent, ut maioribus meis dignum, rerum vestrarum providum, constantem in periculis, offensionum pro utilitate publica non pavidum credant. haec mihi in animis vestris templa, hae pulcherrimae effigies et mansurae. nam quae saxo struuntur, si iudicium posterorum in odium vertit, pro sepulchris spernuntur. proinde socios civis et deos ipsos precor, hos ut mihi ad finem usque vitae quietam et intellegentem humani divinique iuris mentem duint, illos ut, quandoque concessero, cum laude et bonis recordationibus facta atque famam nominis mei prosequantur.' perstititque posthac secretis etiam sermonibus aspernari talem sui cultum. quod alii modestiam, multi, quia diffideret, quidam ut degeneris animi interpretabantur. optumos quippe mortalium altissima cupere: sic Herculem et Liberum apud Graecos, Quirinum apud nos deum numero additos: melius Augustum, qui speraverit. cetera principibus statim adesse: unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam; nam contemptu famae contemni virtutes. | 4.38. "As for myself, Conscript Fathers, that I am mortal, that my functions are the functions of men, and that I hold it enough if I fill the foremost place among them â this I call upon you to witness, and I desire those who shall follow us to bear it in mind. For they will do justice, and more, to my memory, if they pronounce me worthy of my ancestry, provident of your interests, firm in dangers, not fearful of offences in the cause of the national welfare. These are my temples in your breasts, these my fairest and abiding effigies: for those that are reared of stone, should the judgement of the future turn to hatred, are scorned as sepulchres! And so my prayer to allies and citizens and to Heaven itself is this: to Heaven, that to the end of my life it may endow me with a quiet mind, gifted with understanding of law human and divine; and to my fellow-men, that, whenever I shall depart, their praise and kindly thoughts may still attend my deeds and the memories attached to my name." And, in fact, from now onward, even in his private conversations, he persisted in a contemptuous rejection of these divine honours to himself: an attitude by some interpreted as modesty, by many as self-distrust, by a few as degeneracy of soul:â "The best of men," they argued, "desired the greatest heights: so Hercules and Liber among the Greeks, and among ourselves Quirinus, had been added to the number of the gods. The better way had been that of Augustus â who hoped! To princes all other gratifications came instantly: for one they must toil and never know satiety â the favourable opinion of the future. For in the scorn of fame was implied the scorn of virtue!" |
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| 84. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 31 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 51 |
| 85. Suetonius, Tiberius, 70.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, somnium scipionis Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 40 |
| 86. Tacitus, Agricola, 46 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, somnium scipionis Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 40 |
87. Pliny The Younger, Letters, 1.17, 9.36.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 51, 151 | 1.17. To Cornelius Titianus. Faith and loyalty are not yet extinct among men 0 |
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| 88. Chariton, Chaereas And Callirhoe, 6.5.8 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on gender roles and anger Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 136 |
| 89. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 7.6.33 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 50, 51, 184 |
| 90. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), 151.7-151.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 57 |
| 91. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 1.42, 11.200 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 140, 143 |
| 92. Anon., Mekhilta Derabbi Shimeon Ben Yohai, 3.3 (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 151 |
93. Cassius Dio, Roman History, 54.7.6, 54.9.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, son of the orator Found in books: Marek (2019) 317 | 54.7.6. He reduced the people of Cyzicus to slavery because during a factious quarrel they had flogged and put to death some Romans. And when he reached Syria, he took the same action in the case of the people of Tyre and Sidon on account of their factious quarrelling. 54.9.2. Therefore he undertook no war, at any rate for the time being, but actually gave away certain principalities â to Iamblichus, the son of Iamblichus, his ancestral dominion over the Arabians, and to Tarcondimotus, the son of Tarcondimotus, the kingdom of Cilicia, which his father had held, except for a few places on the coast. These latter together with Lesser Armenia he granted to Archelaus, because the Mede, who previously had ruled them, was dead. |
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| 94. Pliny The Younger, Panegyric, 24.2, 83.7 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 147 |
| 95. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 21 |
| 96. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 147 |
97. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 4.20, 4.62, 5.22-5.27, 5.30, 5.45, 5.49, 5.81, 7.3, 7.33, 7.87-7.88, 7.125, 7.129, 9.36 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, on appropriate actions •cicero, marcus tullius, on the nature of the gods Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 51, 53, 56, 64, 86, 87, 140, 142, 145, 162, 181, 185 | 4.20. He loved Sophocles, particularly in those passages where it seemed as if, in the phrase of the comic poet,A stout Molossian mastiff lent him aid,and where the poet was, in the words of Phrynichus,Nor must, nor blended vintage, but true Pramnian.Thus he would call Homer the Sophocles of epic, and Sophocles the Homer of tragedyHe died at an advanced age of gradual decay, leaving behind him a considerable number of works. I have composed the following epigram upon him:Dost thou not hear? We have buried Polemo, laid here by that fatal scourge of wasted strength. Yet not Polemo, but merely his body, which on his way to the stars he left to moulder in the ground. 4.62. 9. CARNEADESCarneades, the son of Epicomus or (according to Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers) of Philocomus, was a native of Cyrene. He studied carefully the writings of the Stoics and particularly those of Chrysippus, and by combating these successfully he became so famous that he would often say:Without Chrysippus where should I have been?The man's industry was unparalleled, although in physics he was not so strong as in ethics. Hence he would let his hair and nails grow long from intense devotion to study. Such was his predomice in philosophy that even the rhetoricians would dismiss their classes and repair to him to hear him lecture. 5.22. of Justice, four books.On Poets, three books.On Philosophy, three books.of the Statesman, two books.On Rhetoric, or Grylus, one book.Nerinthus, one book.The Sophist, one book.Menexenus, one book.Concerning Love, one book.Symposium, one book.of Wealth, one book.Exhortation to Philosophy, one book.of the Soul, one book.of Prayer, one book.On Noble Birth, one book.On Pleasure, one book.Alexander, or a Plea for Colonies, one book.On Kingship, one book.On Education, one book.of the Good, three books.Extracts from Plato's Laws, three books.Extracts from the Republic, two books.of Household Management, one book.of Friendship, one book.On being or having been affected, one book.of Sciences, one book.On Controversial Questions, two books.Solutions of Controversial Questions, four books.Sophistical Divisions, four books.On Contraries, one book.On Genera and Species, one book.On Essential Attributes, one book. 5.23. Three note-books on Arguments for Purposes of Refutation.Propositions concerning Virtue, two books.Objections, one book.On the Various Meanings of Terms or Expressions where a Determit is added, one book.of Passions or of Anger, one book.Five books of Ethics.On Elements, three books.of Science, one book.of Logical Principle, one book.Logical Divisions, seventeen books.Concerning Division, one book.On Dialectical Questioning and Answering, two books.of Motion, one book.Propositions, one book.Controversial Propositions, one book.Syllogisms, one book.Eight books of Prior Analytics.Two books of Greater Posterior Analytics.of Problems, one book.Eight books of Methodics.of the Greater Good, one book.On the Idea, one book.Definitions prefixed to the Topics, seven books.Two books of Syllogisms. 5.24. Concerning Syllogism with Definitions, one book.of the Desirable and the Contingent, one book.Preface to Commonplaces, one book.Two books of Topics criticizing the Definitions.Affections or Qualities, one book.Concerning Logical Division, one book.Concerning Mathematics, one book.Definitions, thirteen books.Two books of Refutations.of Pleasure, one book.Propositions, one book.On the Voluntary, one book.On the Beautiful, one book.Theses for Refutation, twenty-five books.Theses concerning Love, four books.Theses concerning Friendship, two books.Theses concerning the Soul, one book.Politics, two books.Eight books of a course of lectures on Politics like that of Theophrastus.of Just Actions, two books.A Collection of Arts [that is, Handbooks], two books.Two books of the Art of Rhetoric.Art, a Handbook, one book.Another Collection of Handbooks, two books.Concerning Method, one book.Compendium of the Art of Theodectes, one book.A Treatise on the Art of Poetry, two books.Rhetorical Enthymemes, one book.of Degree, one book.Divisions of Enthymemes, one book.On Diction, two books.of Taking Counsel, one book. 5.25. A Collection or Compendium, two books.On Nature, three books.Concerning Nature, one book.On the Philosophy of Archytas, three books.On the Philosophy of Speusippus and Xenocrates, one book.Extracts from the Timaeus and from the Works of Archytas, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Melissus, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Alcmaeon, one book.A Reply to the Pythagoreans, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Gorgias, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Xenophanes, one book.A Reply to the Writings of Zeno, one book.On the Pythagoreans, one book.On Animals, nine books.Eight books of Dissections.A selection of Dissections, one book.On Composite Animals, one book.On the Animals of Fable, one book.On Sterility, one book.On Plants, two books.Concerning Physiognomy, one book.Two books concerning Medicine.On the Unit, one book. 5.26. Prognostics of Storms, one book.Concerning Astronomy, one book.Concerning Optics, one book.On Motion, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Memory, one book.Six books of Homeric Problems.Poetics, one book.Thirty-eight books of Physics according to the lettering.Two books of Problems which have been examined.Two books of Routine Instruction.Mechanics, one book.Problems taken from the works of Democritus, two books.On the Magnet, one book.Analogies, one book.Miscellaneous Notes, twelve books.Descriptions of Genera, fourteen books.Claims advanced, one book.Victors at Olympia, one book.Victors at the Pythian Games, one book.On Music, one book.Concerning Delphi, one book.Criticism of the List of Pythian Victors, one book.Dramatic Victories at the Dionysia, one book.of Tragedies, one book.Dramatic Records, one book.Proverbs, one book.Laws of the Mess-table, one book.Four books of Laws.Categories, one book.De Interpretatione, one book. 5.27. Constitutions of 158 Cities, in general and in particular, democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, tyrannical.Letters to Philip.Letters of Selymbrians.Letters to Alexander, four books.Letters to Antipater, nine books.To Mentor, one book.To Ariston, one book.To Olympias, one book.To Hephaestion, one book.To Themistagoras, one book.To Philoxenus, one book.In reply to Democritus, one book.Verses beginning Ἁγνὲ θεῶν πρέσβισθ᾽ ἑκατηβόλε (Holy One and Chiefest of Gods, far-darting).Elegiac verses beginning Καλλιτέκνου μητρὸς θύγατερ (Daughter of a Mother blessed with fair offspring).In all 445,270 lines. 5.30. The one ethical end he held to be the exercise of virtue in a completed life. And happiness he maintained to be made up of goods of three sorts: goods of the soul, which indeed he designates as of the highest value; in the second place bodily goods, health and strength, beauty and the like; and thirdly external goods, such as wealth, good birth, reputation and the like. And he regarded virtue as not of itself sufficient to ensure happiness; bodily goods and external goods were also necessary, for the wise man would be miserable if he lived in the midst of pains, poverty, and similar circumstances. Vice, however, is sufficient in itself to secure misery, even if it be ever so abundantly furnished with corporeal and external goods. 5.45. Remarks upon Definitions, one book.On Smells, one book.On Wine and Oil.Introduction to Propositions, eighteen books.of Legislators, three books.of Politics, six books.A Political Treatise dealing with important Crises, four books.of Social Customs, four books.of the Best Constitution, one book.A Collection of Problems, five books.On Proverbs, one book.On Coagulation and Liquefaction, one book.On Fire, two books.On Winds, one book.of Paralysis, one book.of Suffocation, one book.of Mental Derangement, one book.On the Passions, one book.On Symptoms, one book.Two books of Sophisms.On the solution of Syllogisms, one book.Two books of Topics.of Punishment, two books.On Hair, one book.of Tyranny, one book.On Water, three books.On Sleep and Dreams, one book.of Friendship, three books.of Ambition, two books. 5.49. Epitomes of Aristotle's work on Animals, six books.Two books of Refutative Arguments.Theses, three books.of Kingship, two books.of Causes, one book.On Democritus, one book.[of Calumny, one book.]of Becoming, one book.of the Intelligence and Character of Animals, one book.On Motion, two books.On Vision, four books.Relating to Definitions, two books.On Data, one book.On Greater and Less, one book.On the Musicians, one book.of the Happiness of the Gods, one book.A Reply to the Academics, one book.Exhortation to Philosophy, one book.How States can best be governed, one book.Lecture-Notes, one book.On the Eruption in Sicily, one book.On Things generally admitted, one book.[On Problems in Physics, one book.]What are the methods of attaining Knowledge, one book.On the Fallacy known as the Liar, three books. 5.81. On the Iliad, two books.On the Odyssey, four books.And the following works, each in one book:Ptolemy.Concerning Love.Phaedondas.Maedon.Cleon.Socrates.Artaxerxes.Concerning Homer.Aristides.Aristomachus.An Exhortation to Philosophy.of the Constitution.On the ten years of his own Supremacy.of the Ionians.Concerning Embassies.of Belief.of Favour.of Fortune.of Magimity.of Marriage.of the Beam in the Sky.of Peace.On Laws.On Customs.of Opportunity.Dionysius.Concerning Chalcis.A Denunciation of the Athenians.On Antiphanes.Historical Introduction.Letters.A Sworn Assembly.of Old Age.Rights.Aesop's Fables.Anecdotes. 7.3. As he went on reading the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, he was so pleased that he inquired where men like Socrates were to be found. Crates passed by in the nick of time, so the bookseller pointed to him and said, Follow yonder man. From that day he became Crates's pupil, showing in other respects a strong bent for philosophy, though with too much native modesty to assimilate Cynic shamelessness. Hence Crates, desirous of curing this defect in him, gave him a potful of lentil-soup to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed and tried to keep it out of sight, with a blow of his staff he broke the pot. As Zeno took to flight with the lentil-soup flowing down his legs, Why run away, my little Phoenician? quoth Crates, nothing terrible has befallen you. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. 7.125. Furthermore, the wise man does all things well, just as we say that Ismenias plays all airs on the flute well. Also everything belongs to the wise. For the law, they say, has conferred upon them a perfect right to all things. It is true that certain things are said to belong to the bad, just as what has been dishonestly acquired may be said, in one sense, to belong to the state, in another sense to those who are enjoying it.They hold that the virtues involve one another, and that the possessor of one is the possessor of all, inasmuch as they have common principles, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Virtues, Apollodorus in his Physics according to the Early School, and Hecato in the third book of his treatise On Virtues. 7.129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics. 9.36. Demetrius estimates his share at over 100 talents, the whole of which he spent. His industry, says the same author, was so great that he cut off a little room in the garden round the house and shut himself up there. One day his father brought an ox to sacrifice and tied it there, and he was not aware of it for a considerable time, until his father roused him to attend the sacrifice and told him about the ox. Demetrius goes on: It would seem that he also went to Athens and was not anxious to be recognized, because he despised fame, and that while he knew of Socrates, he was not known to Socrates, his words being, 'I came to Athens and no one knew me.' |
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| 98. Porphyry, On Abstinence, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 188 |
| 99. Augustine, On The Holy Trinity, 14.12 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 148 |
| 100. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 2.302 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, de divinatione •cicero, marcus tullius, partitiones oratoriae •cicero, marcus tullius, philonean outlook of •cicero, marcus tullius, plato and platonism of •cicero, marcus tullius, somnium scipionis •cicero, marcus tullius, tusculan disputations •cicero, marcus tullius, and timaeus translation •cicero, marcus tullius, and creation of cosmos •cicero, marcus tullius, and fusion of rhetorical and philosophical methods •cicero, marcus tullius, concurrence of •cicero, marcus tullius, historical reach of translations •cicero, marcus tullius, on romans surpassing greeks (in tusculans) •cicero, marcus tullius, on emulating greek orators Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 77, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 167 |
| 101. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 171 |
| 102. Arch., Att., 1.18.1, 2.3.4, 2.15.3, 2.23.1, 4.10.1, 6.1.26, 13.52.1, 14.13.1, 115.17 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 51, 150, 151, 253 |
| 104. Calcidius, Translation of Plato, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig (2018) 19 |
| 105. Cicero, Academic Books, 10-11, 13-14, 16-17, 19-20, 26, 33-35, 38-39, 9, 37 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 72 |
| 107. Dicaearchus, Frs., None Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 145 |
| 108. Stobaeus, Selections (From Didymus Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics), None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 171 |
| 109. Critolaus, Frs., None Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 63 |
| 112. Florus Lucius Annaeus, Epitome Bellorum Omnium Annorum Dcc, 2.13.91 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 45 |
| 113. Anon., Anonymi Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum, 5.22-5.36, 6.17-6.20 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 164 |
| 114. Dion of Prusa, Or., 31.66 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, son of the orator Found in books: Marek (2019) 317 |
| 115. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, 5.4-5.7 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on duties Found in books: Fertik (2019) 22 |
| 116. Velleius Paterculus, Roman History, 2.39, 2.61 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 44, 51 |
117. Vergil, Aeneis, 1.405, 2.725, 2.730-2.731, 2.736-2.740, 2.752-2.757, 2.760, 2.768-2.771, 6.9-6.12, 6.42-6.51, 6.77-6.82, 6.98-6.100, 6.126, 6.128-6.129, 6.268, 6.384, 6.477, 6.539, 6.642-6.644, 6.673, 6.676, 6.688, 6.703, 7.563-7.571, 8.307, 8.349-8.354 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 148, 149, 254; Oksanish (2019) 168 | 1.405. These words he gave, and summoned Maia's son, 2.725. when Priam was his foe. With flush of shame 2.730. the aged warrior hurled with nerveless arm 2.731. his ineffectual spear, which hoarsely rang 2.736. tell him my naughty deeds! Be sure and say 2.737. how Neoptolemus hath shamed his sires. 2.738. Now die!” With this, he trailed before the shrines 2.739. the trembling King, whose feet slipped in the stream 2.740. of his son's blood. Then Pyrrhus' left hand clutched 2.752. and dazed me utterly. A vision rose 2.753. of my own cherished father, as I saw 2.754. the King, his aged peer, sore wounded Iying 2.755. in mortal agony; a vision too 2.756. of lost Creusa at my ravaged hearth, 2.757. and young Iulus' peril. Then my eyes 2.760. from battlement or tower; some in despair 2.768. for Troy o'erthrown, and of some Greek revenge, 2.769. or her wronged husband's Iong indigt ire. 2.770. So hid she at that shrine her hateful brow, 2.771. being of Greece and Troy , full well she knew, 6.9. To find the seed-spark hidden in its veins; 6.10. One breaks the thick-branched trees, and steals away 6.11. The shelter where the woodland creatures bide; 6.12. One leads his mates where living waters flow. 6.42. 0 Icarus, in such well-graven scene 6.43. How proud thy place should be! but grief forbade: 6.44. Twice in pure gold a father's fingers strove 6.45. To shape thy fall, and twice they strove in vain. 6.46. Aeneas long the various work would scan; 6.47. But now Achates comes, and by his side 6.48. Deiphobe, the Sibyl, Glaucus' child. 6.49. Thus to the prince she spoke : 6.50. “Is this thine hour 6.51. To stand and wonder? Rather go obtain 6.77. On great Achilles! Thou hast guided me 6.78. Through many an unknown water, where the seas 6.79. Break upon kingdoms vast, and to the tribes 6.80. of the remote Massyli, whose wild land 6.81. To Syrtes spreads. But now; because at last 6.82. I touch Hesperia's ever-fleeting bound, 6.98. I there will keep, to be my people's law; 6.99. And thee, benigt Sibyl for all time 6.100. A company of chosen priests shall serve. 6.126. Through Italy ; the cause of so much ill 6.128. A marriage-chamber for an alien bride. 6.129. Oh! yield not to thy woe, but front it ever, 6.268. In silent flight, and find a wished-for rest 6.384. These were but shapes and shadows sweeping by, 6.477. For thou hast power! Or if some path there be, 6.539. Came safe across the river, and were moored 6.642. of ears and nostrils infamously shorn. 6.643. Scarce could Aeneas know the shuddering shade 6.644. That strove to hide its face and shameful scar; 6.673. In that same hour on my sad couch I lay, 6.676. But my illustrious bride from all the house 6.688. But, friend, what fortunes have thy life befallen? 6.703. To Tartarus th' accurst.” Deiphobus Deïphobus 7.563. which, while in night and slumber thou wert laid, 7.564. Saturnia 's godhead, visibly revealed, 7.565. bade me declare. Up, therefore, and array 7.566. thy warriors in arms! Swift sallying forth 7.567. from thy strong city-gates, on to the fray 7.568. exultant go! Assail the Phrygian chiefs 7.569. who tent them by thy beauteous river's marge, 7.570. and burn their painted galleys! 't is the will 7.571. of gods above that speaks. Yea, even the King 8.307. gnashing his teeth. Three times his ire surveyed 8.349. burst wide the doorway of the sooty den, 8.350. and unto Heaven and all the people showed 8.351. the stolen cattle and the robber's crimes, 8.352. and dragged forth by the feet the shapeless corpse 8.353. of the foul monster slain. The people gazed 8.354. insatiate on the grewsome eyes, the breast |
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118. Vergil, Georgics, 1.388-1.389, 2.173-2.174, 2.473-2.474 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, on religions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 150, 254| 1.388. Tum cornix plena pluviam vocat inproba voce 1.389. et sola in sicca secum spatiatur harena. 2.173. Salve, magna parens frugum, Saturnia tellus, 2.174. magna virum; tibi res antiquae laudis et artem 2.473. sacra deum sanctique patres; extrema per illos 2.474. iustitia excedens terris vestigia fecit. | |
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| 119. Theodorus of Hierapolis, Peri Agonon, None Tagged with subjects: •ciceromarcus tullius cicero, and antony Found in books: Oksanish (2019) 168 |
120. Strabo, Geography, 3.4.16, 13.1.54, 14.5.6, 14.5.10, 14.5.14 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, on walking •cicero, marcus tullius, on ends •cicero, marcus tullius, son of the orator Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 149; Marek (2019) 317; Tsouni (2019) 23, 53, 59 | 3.4.16. Iberia produces a large quantity of roots used in dyeing. In olives, vines, figs, and every kind of similar fruit trees, the Iberian coast next the Mediterranean abounds, they are likewise plentiful beyond. of the coasts next the ocean, that towards the north is destitute of them, on account of the cold, and the remaining portion generally on account of the apathy of the men, and because they do not lead a civilized life, but pass their days in poverty, only acting on the animal impulse, and living most corruptly. They do not attend to ease or luxury, unless any one considers it can add to the happiness of their lives to wash themselves and their wives in stale urine kept in tanks, and to rinse their teeth with it, which they say is the custom both with the Cantabrians and their neighbours. This practice, as well as that of sleeping on the ground, is common both among the Iberians and Kelts. Some say that the Gallicians are atheists, but that the Keltiberians, and their neighbours to the north, [sacrifice] to a nameless god, every full moon, at night, before their doors, the whole family passing the night in dancing and festival. The Vettones, the first time they came to a Roman camp, and saw certain of the officers walking up and down the roads for the mere pleasure of walking, supposed that they were mad, and offered to show them the way to their tents. For they thought, when not fighting, one should remain quietly seated at ease. 13.1.54. From Scepsis came the Socratic philosophers Erastus and Coriscus and Neleus the son of Coriscus, this last a man who not only was a pupil of Aristotle and Theophrastus, but also inherited the library of Theophrastus, which included that of Aristotle. At any rate, Aristotle bequeathed his own library to Theophrastus, to whom he also left his school; and he is the first man, so far as I know, to have collected books and to have taught the kings in Egypt how to arrange a library. Theophrastus bequeathed it to Neleus; and Neleus took it to Scepsis and bequeathed it to his heirs, ordinary people, who kept the books locked up and not even carefully stored. But when they heard bow zealously the Attalic kings to whom the city was subject were searching for books to build up the library in Pergamum, they hid their books underground in a kind of trench. But much later, when the books had been damaged by moisture and moths, their descendants sold them to Apellicon of Teos for a large sum of money, both the books of Aristotle and those of Theophrastus. But Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher; and therefore, seeking a restoration of the parts that had been eaten through, he made new copies of the text, filling up the gaps incorrectly, and published the books full of errors. The result was that the earlier school of Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus had no books at all, with the exception of only a few, mostly exoteric works, and were therefore able to philosophize about nothing in a practical way, but only to talk bombast about commonplace propositions, whereas the later school, from the time the books in question appeared, though better able to philosophise and Aristotelise, were forced to call most of their statements probabilities, because of the large number of errors. Rome also contributed much to this; for, immediately after the death of Apellicon, Sulla, who had captured Athens, carried off Apellicon's library to Rome, where Tyrannion the grammarian, who was fond of Aristotle, got it in his hands by paying court to the librarian, as did also certain booksellers who used bad copyists and would not collate the texts — a thing that also takes place in the case of the other books that are copied for selling, both here and at Alexandria. However, this is enough about these men. 14.5.6. Then, after Corycus, one comes to Elaeussa, an island lying close to the mainland, which Archelaus settled, making it a royal residence, after he had received the whole of Cilicia Tracheia except Seleuceia — the same way in which it was obtained formerly by Amyntas and still earlier by Cleopatra; for since the region was naturally well adapted to the business of piracy both by land and by sea — by land, because of the height of the mountains and the large tribes that live beyond them, tribes which have plains and farm-lands that are large and easily overrun, and by sea, because of the good supply, not only of shipbuilding timber, but also of harbors and fortresses and secret recesses — with all this in view, I say, the Romans thought that it was better for the region to be ruled by kings than to be under the Roman prefects sent to administer justice, who were not likely always to be present or to have armed forces with them. Thus Archelaus received, in addition to Cappadocia, Cilicia Tracheia; and the boundary of the latter, the river Lamus and the village of the same name, lies between Soli and Elaeussa. 14.5.10. Above Anchiale lies Cyinda, a fortress, which at one time was used as a treasury by the Macedonians. But the treasures were taken away by Eumenes, when he revolted from Antigonus. And still above this and Soli is a mountainous country, in which is a city Olbe, with a sanctuary of Zeus, founded by Ajax the son of Teucer. The priest of this sanctuary became dynast of Cilicia Tracheia; and then the country was beset by numerous tyrants, and the gangs of pirates were organized. And after the overthrow of these they called this country the domain of Teucer, and called the same also the priesthood of Teucer; and most of the priests were named Teucer or Ajax. But Aba, the daughter of Xenophanes, one of the tyrants, came into this family by marriage and herself took possession of the empire, her father having previously received it in the guise of guardian. But later both Antony and Cleopatra conferred it upon her as a favor, being moved by her courteous entreaties. And then she was overthrown, but the empire remained with her descendants. After Anchiale one comes to the outlets of the Cydnus, near the Rhegma, as it is called. It is a place that forms into a lake, having also ancient arsenals; and into it empties the Cydnus River, which flows through the middle of Tarsus and has its sources in the city Taurus, which lies above Tarsus. The lake is also the naval station of Tarsus. 14.5.14. The following men were natives of Tarsus: among the Stoics, Antipater and Archedemus and Nestor; and also the two Athenodoruses, one of whom, called Cordylion, lived with Marcus Cato and died at his house; and the other, the son of Sandon, called Caites after some village, was Caesar's teacher and was greatly honored by him; and when he returned to his native land, now an old man, he broke up the government there established, which was being badly conducted by Boethus, among others, who was a bad poet and a bad citizen, having prevailed there by currying the favour of the people. He had been raised to prominence by Antony, who at the outset received favorably the poem which he had written upon the victory at Philippi, but still more by that facility prevalent among the Tarsians whereby he could instantly speak offhand and unceasingly on any given subject. Furthermore, Antony promised the Tarsians an office of gymnasiarch, but appointed Boethus instead of a gymnasiarch, and entrusted to him the expenditures. But Boethus was caught secreting, among other things, the olive-oil; and when he was being proven guilty by his accusers in the presence of Antony he deprecated Antony's wrath, saying, among other things, that Just as Homer had hymned the praises of Achilles and Agamemnon and Odysseus, so I have hymned thine. It is not right, therefore, that I should be brought before you on such slanderous charges. When, however, the accuser caught the statement, he said, Yes, but Homer did not steal Agamemnon's oil, nor yet that of Achilles, but you did; and therefore you shall be punished. However, he broke the wrath of Antony by courteous attentions, and no less than before kept on plundering the city until the overthrow of Antony. Finding the city in this plight, Athenodorus for a time tried to induce both Boethus and his partisans to change their course; but since they would abstain from no act of insolence, he used the authority given him by Caesar, condemned them to exile, and expelled them. These at first indicted him with the following inscription on the walls: Work for young men, counsels for the middle-aged, and flatulence for old men; and when he, taking the inscription as a joke, ordered the following words to be inscribed beside it, thunder for old men, someone, contemptuous of all decency and afflicted with looseness of the bowels, profusely bespattered the door and wall of Athenodorus' house as he was passing by it at night. Athenodorus, while bringing accusations in the assembly against the faction, said: One may see the sickly plight and the disaffection of the city in many ways, and in particular from its excrements. These men were Stoics; but the Nestor of my time, the teacher of Marcellus, son of Octavia the sister of Caesar, was an Academician. He too was at the head of the government of Tarsus, having succeeded Athenodorus; and he continued to be held in honor both by the prefects and in the city. |
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| 121. Arch., Cat., 3.26 Tagged with subjects: •cicero, marcus tullius, triumphal ambitions Found in books: Jenkyns (2013) 44 |
