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65 results for "causality"
1. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 20.21 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 158
20.21. "מִזְבַּח אֲדָמָה תַּעֲשֶׂה־לִּי וְזָבַחְתָּ עָלָיו אֶת־עֹלֹתֶיךָ וְאֶת־שְׁלָמֶיךָ אֶת־צֹאנְךָ וְאֶת־בְּקָרֶךָ בְּכָל־הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר אַזְכִּיר אֶת־שְׁמִי אָבוֹא אֵלֶיךָ וּבֵרַכְתִּיךָ׃", 20.21. "An altar of earth thou shalt make unto Me, and shalt sacrifice thereon thy burnt-offerings, and thy peace-offerings, thy sheep, and thine oxen; in every place where I cause My name to be mentioned I will come unto thee and bless thee.",
2. Homer, Odyssey, 1.177, 9.366 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •cause/causality Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 48
3. Parmenides, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 67
4. Plato, Greater Hippias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 176
297c. ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ ὑὸς πατήρ; ΙΠ. καλῶς μέντοι. ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε τὸ αἴτιον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον αὖ αἴτιον. ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐδὲ ἄρα τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων; ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔ μοι φαίνεται. ΣΩ. ἀρέσκει οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐθέλοιμεν ἂν λέγειν ὡς τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν; ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ πάνυ μοι ἀρέσκει. ΣΩ. ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Ἱππία· ἐμοὶ δέ γε πάντων 297c. Hipp. To be sure it is well said. Soc. And neither is the cause that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause. Hipp. True. Soc. By Zeus, my good friend, then neither is the beautiful good, nor the good beautiful; or does it seem to you possible, after what has been said? Hipp. No, by Zeus, it does not appear so to me. Soc. Does it please us, and should we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, and the good not beautiful? Hipp. No, by Zeus, it does not please me at all. Soc. Right, by Zeus, Hippias!
5. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 175
6. Plato, Alcibiades I, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 121
7. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 175
27a. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὖ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νυνδή, διαφέρον εὑρήσομεν. ἢ πῶς; ΠΡΩ. οὕτως. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ γιγνόμενον ἐκείνῳ; ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. ἄλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αἰτία τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη; ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα. 27a. Soc. And, again, we shall find that, on the same principle, that which is made or created differs in name only from that which comes into being, shall we not? Pro. We shall. Soc. And the creative agent always naturally leads, and that which is created follows after it as it comes into being? Pro. Certainly. Soc. Then the cause and that which is the servant of the cause for the purpose of generation are not the same. Pro. of course not. Soc. Did not the things which come into being and the things out of which they come into being furnish us all the three classes? Pro. Certainly.
8. Philolaus of Croton, Fragments, 7 (5th cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •active/causal/productive (gennetikê, γεννητική‎; paraktikê, παρακτική‎) potency/power (dunamis, δύναμις‎) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 136
9. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 67
10. Plato, Sophist, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 96
245b. ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὂν οὐ συμφωνήσει τῷ ὅλῳ λόγῳ. ΘΕΑΙ. μανθάνω. ΞΕ. πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχον τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς οὕτως ἕν τε ἔσται καὶ ὅλον, ἢ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν ὅλον εἶναι τὸ ὄν; ΘΕΑΙ. χαλεπὴν προβέβληκας αἵρεσιν. ΞΕ. ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθός τε γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναί πως οὐ ταὐτὸν ὂν τῷ ἑνὶ φανεῖται, καὶ πλέονα δὴ τὰ πάντα ἑνὸς ἔσται. ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. 245b. Str. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason. Theaet. I understand. Str. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all? Theaet. It is a hard choice that you offer me. Str. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one. Theaet. Yes. Str. And further, if being is not a whole through
11. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 156
257b. ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν δʼ εἴ τι λόγῳ σοι ἀπηχὲς εἴπομεν Φαῖδρός τε καὶ ἐγώ, Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα αἰτιώμενος παῦε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ὥσπερ ἁδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψον, ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἐραστὴς ὅδε αὐτοῦ μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς πρὸς ἔρωτα μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῆται. ΦΑΙ. συνεύχομαί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ ἄμεινον ταῦθʼ 257b. And if in our former discourse Phaedrus and I said anything harsh against thee, blame Lysias, the father of that discourse, make him to cease from such speeches, and turn him, as his brother Polemarchus is turned, toward philosophy, that his lover Phaedrus may no longer hesitate, as he does now, between two ways, but may direct his life with all singleness of purpose toward love and philosophical discourses. Phaedrus. I join in your prayer, Socrates,
12. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 168
90a. διὸ φυλακτέον ὅπως ἂν ἔχωσιν τὰς κινήσεις πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμέτρους. τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρʼ ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἴδους διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ τῇδε, ὡς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμονα θεὸς ἑκάστῳ δέδωκεν, τοῦτο ὃ δή φαμεν οἰκεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν ἐπʼ ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον, ὀρθότατα λέγοντες· ἐκεῖθεν γάρ, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἔφυ, τὸ θεῖον τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ῥίζαν ἡμῶν 90a. wherefore care must be taken that they have their motions relatively to one another in due proportion. And as regards the most lordly kind of our soul, we must conceive of it in this wise: we declare that God has given to each of us, as his daemon, that kind of soul which is housed in the top of our body and which raises us—seeing that we are not an earthly but a heavenly plant up from earth towards our kindred in the heaven. And herein we speak most truly; for it is by suspending our head and root from that region whence the substance of our soul first came that the Divine Power
13. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 156
177d. συνδοκεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν, γένοιτʼ ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν λόγοις ἱκανὴ διατριβή· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἔρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ὡς ἂν δύνηται κάλλιστον, ἄρχειν δὲ Φαῖδρον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρῶτος κατάκειται καὶ ἔστιν ἅμα πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου. 177d. So if you on your part approve, we might pass the time well enough in discourses; for my opinion is that we ought each of us to make a speech in turn, from left to right, praising Love as beautifully as he can. Phaedrus shall open first; for he has the topmost place at table, and besides is father of our debate.
14. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 175
15. Aristotle, Physics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 136; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 175
16. Aristotle, Categories, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 151
17. Aristotle, Interpretation, 9 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 84
18. Cicero, In Pisonem, 37, 59, 20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 99
19. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 3.9.1, 5.2.10, 6.4.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 123
20. Cicero, Topica, 58-66, 8, 90, 6 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 44
6. Cum omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat partis partis vulg. : artis Aa2 , unam inveniendi alteram iudicandi, utriusque princeps, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles fuit. Stoici autem in altera elaboraverunt; iudicandi enim vias diligenter persecuti sunt ea scientia quam dialektikh\n appellant, inveniendi artem quae topikh\ dicitur, quae et quaeque et A ad usum potior erat et ordine naturae certe prior, totam reliquerunt.
21. Cicero, On Duties, 3.15, 3.51-3.52 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 118
3.15. Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant, id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus quid absit a perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum; quod idem in poematis, in picturis usu venit in aliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in iis aliquid probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem, quid in una quaque re vitii sit, nequeant iudicare; itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt facile sententia. Haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia. 3.51. In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo. Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid om-nino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam vendat, velle quam optime vendere. Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quain ceteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria? 3.52. Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu cum horninibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nune te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. 3.15.  On the other hand, when some act is performed in which we see "mean" duties manifested, that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of real perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, they think there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the estimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art: ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The reason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of excellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have not the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular piece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts, they readily abandon their former opinion. The performance of the duties, then, which I am discussing in these books, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness, not the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all mankind. 3.51.  In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater, a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage, provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation. "I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my competitors — perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is wronged?" 3.52.  "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?" "It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told."
22. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.15, 3.51-3.52 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 118
3.15. Experiamur igitur, inquit, etsi habet haec Stoicorum ratio difficilius quiddam et obscurius. nam cum in Graeco sermone haec ipsa quondam rerum rerum om. BE nomina novarum * * non videbantur, novarum non videbantur ARV, N (syll. rum ab alt. m. in ras. compendio ser.); vocarunt non videbantur BE; excidisse aliquid vidit Mdv., qui suspicatur fuisse aut cum ... quondam rerum nomina novarum nova erant, ferenda non videbantur aut cum ... quondam nomina nova erant, ferenda non videbantur aut cum ... quondam nomina nova erant, ridebantur quae nunc consuetudo diuturna trivit; quid censes in Latino fore? Facillimum id quidem est, inquam. si enim Zenoni licuit, cum rem aliquam invenisset inusitatam, inauditum quoque ei rei nomen inponere, cur non liceat Catoni? nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum, quod idem declaret, magis idem declaret magis magis idem declarat R usitatum. equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere. et tamen puto concedi nobis oportere ut Graeco verbo utamur, si quando minus minus NV munus occurret Latinum, ne hoc ephippiis et acratophoris potius quam proe+gmenis et apoproe+gmenis concedatur; quamquam haec quidem praeposita proposita R posita V recte et reiecta dicere licebit. 3.51. quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valitudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum ' ipsius Ciceronis in scribendo lapsus' Mdv. similium rerum in usu O. Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 246 alia alii AR autem non esse eius modi, itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno prohgme/non, contraque quod a)poprohgme/non nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi verbi ( post huius) om. A faciendi Zenonis exponere. 3.52. Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim id est enim Mdv. idem enim est ( in N enim ab alt. m. superscr. ; V om. enim) prohgme/non ), sed eos, qui in aliquo honore sunt, sunt R sint quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primo loco primo loco O. Heinius ibid. p. 245 pri- morie A p'mori e loco BE primove R primorie (o corr. in a) N primore V sunt, sed ea, quae ' In primorie latet primo ordine, quam vocem adscripsit qui haec ad antecedentia quorum ordo proxime accedit ut secundus sit accommodare studeret' H. A. Koch p. 37. Cf. etiam p. 110, 5 sq. secundum locum optinent, prohgme/na, id est producta, nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus—id erit verbum e verbo—vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta. re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus. 3.15.  "Then let us make the attempt," said he, "albeit there is a considerable element of difficulty and obscurity in this Stoic system. For at one time even the terms employed in Greek for its novel conceptions seemed unendurable, when they were novel, though now daily use has made them familiar; what then to you think will be the case in Latin?" "Do not feel the least difficulty on that score," said I. "If when Zeno invented some novel idea he was permitted to denote it by an equally unheard‑of word, why should not Cato be permitted to do so too? Though all the same it need not be a hard and fast rule that every word shall be represented by its exact counterpart, when there is a more familiar word conveying the same meaning. That is the way of a clumsy translator. Indeed my own practice is to use several words to give what is expressed in Greek by one, if I cannot convey the sense ')" onMouseOut="nd();" otherwise. At the same time I hold that we may fairly claim the licence to employ a Greek word when no Latin word is readily forthcoming. Why should this licence be granted to ephippia (saddles) and acratophora (jars for neat wine) more than to proēgmena and apoproēgmena? These latter however it is true may be correctly translated 'preferred' and 'rejected.' " 3.51.  Again among things valuable — e.g. health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like — they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proēgmena and the opposite, apoproēgmena — for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. 3.52.  "In a royal court, Zeno remarks, no one speaks of the king himself as 'promoted' to honour (for that is the meaning of proēgmenon), but the term is applied to those holding some office of state whose rank most nearly approaches, though it is second to, the royal pre‑eminence; similarly in the conduct of life the title proēgmenon, that is, 'promoted,' is to be given not to those things which are in the first rank, but to those which hold the second place; for these we may use either the term suggested (for that will be a literal translation) or 'advanced' and 'degraded,' or the term we have been using all along, 'preferred' or 'superior,' and for the opposite 'rejected.' If the meaning is intelligible we need not be punctilious about the use of words.
23. Cicero, On Fate, 18-26, 31, 39-48 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 84
24. Cicero, On Divination, 1.9, 1.11, 1.34, 1.63, 1.72, 1.86, 1.109-1.110, 1.125-1.127, 1.132, 2.2-2.4, 2.13, 2.16-2.27, 2.100 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 39, 81, 83, 126
1.9. Eius rationi non sane desidero quid respondeam; satis enim defensa religio est in secundo libro a Lucilio, cuius disputatio tibi ipsi, ut in extremo tertio scribis, ad veritatem est visa propensior. Sed, quod praetermissum est in illis libris (credo, quia commodius arbitratus es separatim id quaeri deque eo disseri), id est de divinatione, quae est earum rerum, quae fortuitae putantur, praedictio atque praesensio, id, si placet, videamus quam habeat vim et quale sit. Ego enim sic existimo, si sint ea genera dividi vera, de quibus accepimus quaeque colimus, esse deos, vicissimque, si di sint, esse qui divinent. 1.11. Ego vero, inquam, philosophiae, Quinte, semper vaco; hoc autem tempore, cum sit nihil aliud, quod lubenter agere possim, multo magis aveo audire, de divinatione quid sentias. Nihil, inquit, equidem novi, nec quod praeter ceteros ipse sentiam; nam cum antiquissimam sententiam, tum omnium populorum et gentium consensu conprobatam sequor. Duo sunt enim dividi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae. 1.34. Iis igitur adsentior, qui duo genera divinationum esse dixerunt, unum, quod particeps esset artis, alterum, quod arte careret. Est enim ars in iis, qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt. Carent autem arte ii, qui non ratione aut coniectura observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quadam animi aut soluto liberoque motu futura praesentiunt, quod et somniantibus saepe contingit et non numquam vaticitibus per furorem, ut Bacis Boeotius, ut Epimenides Cres, ut Sibylla Erythraea. Cuius generis oracla etiam habenda sunt, non ea, quae aequatis sortibus ducuntur, sed illa, quae instinctu divino adflatuque funduntur; etsi ipsa sors contemnenda non est, si et auctoritatem habet vetustatis, ut eae sunt sortes, quas e terra editas accepimus; quae tamen ductae ut in rem apte cadant, fieri credo posse divinitus. Quorum omnium interpretes, ut grammatici poe+tarum, proxime ad eorum, quos interpretantur, divinationem videntur accedere. 1.63. Cum ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura providet; iacet enim corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus. Quod multo magis faciet post mortem, cum omnino corpore excesserit. Itaque adpropinquante morte multo est divinior. Nam et id ipsum vident, qui sunt morbo gravi et mortifero adfecti, instare mortem; itaque iis occurrunt plerumque imagines mortuorum, tumque vel maxume laudi student, eosque, qui secus, quam decuit, vixerunt, peccatorum suorum tum maxume paenitet. 1.72. in quo haruspices, augures coniectoresque numerantur. Haec inprobantur a Peripateticis, a Stoicis defenduntur. Quorum alia sunt posita in monumentis et disciplina, quod Etruscorum declarant et haruspicini et fulgurales et rituales libri, vestri etiam augurales, alia autem subito ex tempore coniectura explicantur, ut apud Homerum Calchas, qui ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratus est, et ut in Sullae scriptum historia videmus, quod te inspectante factum est, ut, cum ille in agro Nolano inmolaret ante praetorium, ab infima ara subito anguis emergeret, cum quidem C. Postumius haruspex oraret illum, ut in expeditionem exercitum educeret; id cum Sulla fecisset, tum ante oppidum Nolam florentissuma Samnitium castra cepit. 1.86. Cur fiat quidque, quaeris. Recte omnino; sed non nunc id agitur; fiat necne fiat, id quaeritur. Ut, si magnetem lapidem esse dicam, qui ferrum ad se adliciat et attrahat, rationem, cur id fiat, adferre nequeam, fieri omnino neges. Quod idem facis in divinatione, quam et cernimus ipsi et audimus et legimus et a patribus accepimus. Neque ante philosophiam patefactam, quae nuper inventa est, hac de re communis vita dubitavit, et, posteaquam philosophia processit, nemo aliter philosophus sensit, in quo modo esset auctoritas. 1.109. Sed ut, unde huc digressa est, eodem redeat oratio: si nihil queam disputare, quam ob rem quidque fiat, et tantum modo fieri ea, quae commemoravi, doceam, parumne Epicuro Carneadive respondeam? Quid, si etiam ratio exstat artificiosae praesensionis facilis, divinae autem paulo obscurior? Quae enim extis, quae fulgoribus, quae portentis, quae astris praesentiuntur, haec notata sunt observatione diuturna. Adfert autem vetustas omnibus in rebus longinqua observatione incredibilem scientiam; quae potest esse etiam sine motu atque inpulsu deorum, cum, quid ex quoque eveniat, et quid quamque rem significet, crebra animadversione perspectum est. 1.110. Altera divinatio est naturalis, ut ante dixi; quae physica disputandi subtilitate referenda est ad naturam deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus; cumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est cognatione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri. Sed vigilantes animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt diiunguntque se a societate divina vinclis corporis inpediti. 1.125. Quin etiam hoc non dubitans dixerim, si unum aliquid ita sit praedictum praesensumque, ut, cum evenerit, ita cadat, ut praedictum sit, neque in eo quicquam casu et fortuito factum esse appareat, esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum. Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis dividi ratioque repetenda. Fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci ei(marme/nhn, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. 1.126. Ex quo intellegitur, ut fatum sit non id, quod superstitiose, sed id, quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea, quae praeterierunt, facta sint et, quae instant, fiant et, quae sequuntur, futura sint. Ita fit, ut et observatione notari possit, quae res quamque causam plerumque consequatur, etiamsi non semper (nam id quidem adfirmare difficile est), easdemque causas veri simile est rerum futurarum cerni ab iis, qui aut per furorem eas aut in quiete videant. 1.127. Praeterea cum fato omnia fiant, id quod alio loco ostendetur, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui conligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. Qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat, quae futura sint. Quod cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini, ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentiat. Non enim illa, quae futura sunt, subito exsistunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis. Quod et ii vident, quibus naturalis divinatio data est, et ii, quibus cursus rerum observando notatus est. Qui etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt; ad quas adhibita memoria et diligentia et monumentis superiorum efficitur ea divinatio, quae artificiosa dicitur, extorum, fulgorum, ostentorum signorumque caelestium. 1.132. Nunc illa testabor, non me sortilegos neque eos, qui quaestus causa hariolentur, ne psychomantia quidem, quibus Appius, amicus tuus, uti solebat, agnoscere; non habeo denique nauci Marsum augurem, non vicanos haruspices, non de circo astrologos, non Isiacos coniectores, non interpretes somniorum; non enim sunt ii aut scientia aut arte divini, Séd superstitiósi vates ínpudentesque hárioli Aút inertes aút insani aut quíbus egestas ímperat, Quí sibi semitám non sapiunt, álteri monstránt viam; Quíbus divitias póllicentur, áb iis drachumam ipsí petunt. De hís divitiis síbi deducant dráchumam, reddant cétera. Atque haec quidem Ennius, qui paucis ante versibus esse deos censet, sed eos non curare opinatur, quid agat humanum genus. Ego autem, qui et curare arbitror et monere etiam ac multa praedicere, levitate, vanitate, malitia exclusa divinationem probo. Quae cum dixisset Quintus, Praeclare tu quidem, inquam, paratus 2.2. Cumque fundamentum esset philosophiae positum in finibus bonorum et malorum, perpurgatus est is locus a nobis quinque libris, ut, quid a quoque, et quid contra quemque philosophum diceretur, intellegi posset. Totidem subsecuti libri Tusculanarum disputationum res ad beate vivendum maxime necessarias aperuerunt. Primus enim est de contemnenda morte, secundus de tolerando dolore, de aegritudine lenienda tertius, quartus de reliquis animi perturbationibus, quintus eum locum conplexus est, qui totam philosophiam maxime inlustrat; docet enim ad beate vivendum virtutem se ipsa esse contentam. 2.3. Quibus rebus editis tres libri perfecti sunt de natura deorum, in quibus omnis eius loci quaestio continetur. Quae ut plane esset cumulateque perfecta, de divinatione ingressi sumus his libris scribere; quibus, ut est in animo, de fato si adiunxerimus, erit abunde satis factum toti huic quaestioni. Atque his libris adnumerandi sunt sex de re publica, quos tum scripsimus, cum gubernacula rei publicae tenebamus. Magnus locus philosophiaeque proprius a Platone, Aristotele, Theophrasto totaque Peripateticorum familia tractatus uberrime. Nam quid ego de Consolatione dicam? quae mihi quidem ipsi sane aliquantum medetur, ceteris item multum illam profuturam puto. Interiectus est etiam nuper liber is, quem ad nostrum Atticum de senectute misimus; in primisque, quoniam philosophia vir bonus efficitur et fortis, Cato noster in horum librorum numero ponendus est. 2.4. Cumque Aristoteles itemque Theophrastus, excellentes viri cum subtilitate, tum copia, cum philosophia dicendi etiam praecepta coniunxerint, nostri quoque oratorii libri in eundem librorum numerum referendi videntur. Ita tres erunt de oratore, quartus Brutus, quintus orator. Adhuc haec erant; ad reliqua alacri tendebamus animo sic parati, ut, nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset, nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris inlustratus pateret. Quod enim munus rei publicae adferre maius meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem? his praesertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium opibus refreda atque coe+rcenda sit. 2.13. Sed animadverti, Quinte, te caute et ab iis coniecturis, quae haberent artem atque prudentiam, et ab iis rebus, quae sensibus aut artificiis perciperentur, abducere divinationem eamque ita definire: divinationem esse earum rerum praedictionem et praesensionem, quae essent fortuitae. Primum eodem revolveris. Nam et medici et gubernatoris et imperatoris praesensio est rerum fortuitarum. Num igitur aut haruspex aut augur aut vates quis aut somnians melius coniecerit aut e morbo evasurum aegrotum aut e periculo navem aut ex insidiis exercitum quam medicus, quam gubernator, quam imperator? 2.16. Medicus morbum ingravescentem ratione providet, insidias imperator, tempestates gubernator; et tamen ii ipsi saepe falluntur, qui nihil sine certa ratione opitur; ut agricola, cum florem oleae videt, bacam quoque se visurum putat, non sine ratione ille quidem; sed non numquam tamen fallitur. Quodsi falluntur ii, qui nihil sine aliqua probabili coniectura ac ratione dicunt, quid existimandum est de coniectura eorum, qui extis aut avibus aut ostentis aut oraclis aut somniis futura praesentiunt? Nondum dico, quam haec signa nulla sint, fissum iecoris, corvi cantus, volatus aquilae, stellae traiectio, voces furentium, sortes, somnia; de quibus singulis dicam suo loco; nunc de universis. 2.17. Qui potest provideri quicquam futurum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam neque notam, cur futurum sit? Solis defectiones itemque lunae praedicuntur in multos annos ab iis, qui siderum motus numeris persequuntur; ea praedicunt enim, quae naturae necessitas perfectura est. Vident ex constantissimo motu lunae, quando illa e regione solis facta incurrat in umbram terrae, quae est meta noctis, ut eam obscurari necesse sit, quandoque eadem luna subiecta atque opposita soli nostris oculis eius lumen obscuret, quo in signo quaeque errantium stellarum quoque tempore futura sit, qui exortus quoque die signi alicuius aut qui occasus futurus sit. Haec qui ante dicunt, quam rationem sequantur, vides. 2.18. Qui thesaurum inventum iri aut hereditatem venturam dicunt, quid sequuntur? aut in qua rerum natura inest id futurum? Quodsi haec eaque, quae sunt eiusdem generis, habent aliquam talem necessitatem, quid est tandem, quod casu fieri aut forte fortuna putemus? Nihil enim est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae quam fortuna, ut mihi ne in deum quidem cadere videatur, ut sciat, quid casu et fortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet; sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est; est autem fortuna; rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla praesensio est. 2.19. Aut si negas esse fortunam et omnia, quae fiunt quaeque futura sunt, ex omni aeternitate definita dicis esse fataliter, muta definitionem divinationis, quam dicebas praesensionem esse rerum fortuitarum. Si enim nihil fieri potest, nihil accidere, nihil evenire, nisi quod ab omni aeternitate certum fuerit esse futurum rato tempore, quae potest esse fortuna? qua sublata qui locus est divinationi? quae a te fortuitarum rerum est dicta praesensio. Quamquam dicebas omnia, quae fierent futurave essent, fato contineri. Anile sane et plenum superstitionis fati nomen ipsum; sed tamen apud Stoicos de isto fato multa dicuntur; de quo alias; nunc quod necesse est. 2.20. Si omnia fato, quid mihi divinatio prodest? Quod enim is, qui divinat, praedicit, id vero futurum est, ut ne illud quidem sciam quale sit, quod Deiotarum, necessarium nostrum, ex itinere aquila revocavit; qui nisi revertisset, in eo conclavi ei cubandum fuisset, quod proxuma nocte corruit; ruina igitur oppressus esset. At id neque, si fatum fuerat, effugisset nec, si non fuerat, in eum casum incidisset. Quid ergo adiuvat divinatio? aut quid est, quod me moneant aut sortes aut exta aut ulla praedictio? Si enim fatum fuit classes populi Romani bello Punico primo, alteram naufragio, alteram a Poenis depressam, interire, etiamsi tripudium solistumum pulli fecissent L. Iunio et P. Claudio consulibus, classes tamen interissent. Sin, cum auspiciis obtemperatum esset, interiturae classes non fuerunt, non interierunt fato; vultis autem omnia fato; 2.21. nulla igitur est divinatio. Quodsi fatum fuit bello Punico secundo exercitum populi Romani ad lacum Trasumennum interire, num id vitari potuit, si Flaminius consul iis signis iisque auspiciis, quibus pugnare prohibebatur, paruisset? Certe potuit. Aut igitur non fato interiit exercitus, aut, si fato (quod certe vobis ita dicendum est), etiamsi obtemperasset auspiciis, idem eventurum fuisset; mutari enim fata non possunt. Ubi est igitur ista divinatio Stoicorum? quae, si fato omnia fiunt, nihil nos admonere potest, ut cautiores simus; quoquo enim modo nos gesserimus, fiet tamen illud, quod futurum est; sin autem id potest flecti, nullum est fatum; ita ne divinatio quidem, quoniam ea rerum futurarum est. Nihil autem est pro certo futurum, quod potest aliqua procuratione accidere ne fiat. 2.22. Atque ego ne utilem quidem arbitror esse nobis futurarum rerum scientiam. Quae enim vita fuisset Priamo, si ab adulescentia scisset, quos eventus senectutis esset habiturus? Abeamus a fabulis, propiora videamus. Clarissimorum hominum nostrae civitatis gravissimos exitus in Consolatione collegimus. Quid igitur? ut omittamus superiores, Marcone Crasso putas utile fuisse tum, cum maxumis opibus fortunisque florebat, scire sibi interfecto Publio filio exercituque deleto trans Euphratem cum ignominia et dedecore esse pereundum? An Cn. Pompeium censes tribus suis consulatibus, tribus triumphis, maximarum rerum gloria laetaturum fuisse, si sciret se in solitudine Aegyptiorum trucidatum iri amisso exercitu, post mortem vero ea consecutura, quae sine lacrimis non possumus dicere? 2.23. Quid vero Caesarem putamus, si divinasset fore ut in eo senatu, quem maiore ex parte ipse cooptasset, in curia Pompeia ante ipsius Pompeii simulacrum tot centurionibus suis inspectantibus a nobilissumis civibus, partim etiam a se omnibus rebus ornatis, trucidatus ita iaceret, ut ad eius corpus non modo amicorum, sed ne servorum quidem quisquam accederet, quo cruciatu animi vitam acturum fuisse? Certe igitur ignoratio futurorum malorum utilior est quam scientia. 2.24. Nam illud quidem dici, praesertim a Stoicis, nullo modo potest: Non isset ad arma Pompeius, non transisset Crassus Euphratem, non suscepisset bellum civile Caesar. Non igitur fatalis exitus habuerunt; vultis autem evenire omnia fato; nihil ergo illis profuisset divinare; atque etiam omnem fructum vitae superioris perdidissent; quid enim posset iis esse laetum exitus suos cogitantibus? Ita, quoquo sese verterint Stoici, iaceat necesse est omnis eorum sollertia. Si enim id, quod eventurum est, vel hoc vel illo modo potest evenire, fortuna valet plurimum; quae autem fortuita sunt, certa esse non possunt. Sin autem certum est, quid quaque de re quoque tempore futurum sit, quid est, quod me adiuvent haruspices? qui cum res tristissimas portendi dixerunt, addunt ad extremum omnia levius casura rebus divinis procuratis; 2.25. si enim nihil fit extra fatum, nihil levari re divina potest. Hoc sentit Homerus, cum querentem Iovem inducit, quod Sarpedonem filium a morte contra fatum eripere non posset. Hoc idem significat Graecus ille in eam sententiam versus: Quod fóre paratum est, íd summum exsuperát Iovem. Totum omnino fatum etiam Atellanio versu iure mihi esse inrisum videtur; sed in rebus tam severis non est iocandi locus. Concludatur igitur ratio: Si enim provideri nihil potest futurum esse eorum, quae casu fiunt, quia esse certa non possunt, divinatio nulla est; sin autem idcirco possunt provideri, quia certa sunt et fatalia, rursus divinatio nulla est; eam enim tu fortuitarum rerum esse dicebas. 2.26. Sed haec fuerit nobis tamquam levis armaturae prima orationis excursio; nunc comminus agamus experiamurque, si possimus cornua commovere disputationis tuae. Duo enim genera dividi esse dicebas, unum artificiosum, alterum naturale; artificiosum constare partim ex coniectura, partim ex observatione diuturna; naturale, quod animus arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus ex divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Artificiosa divinationis illa fere genera ponebas: extispicum eorumque, qui ex fulgoribus ostentisque praedicerent, tum augurum eorumque, qui signis aut ominibus uterentur, omneque genus coniecturale in hoc fere genere ponebas. 2.27. Illud autem naturale aut concitatione mentis edi et quasi fundi videbatur aut animo per somnum sensibus et curis vacuo provideri. Duxisti autem divinationem omnem a tribus rebus, a deo, a fato, a natura. Sed tamen cum explicare nihil posses, pugnasti commenticiorum exemplorum mirifica copia. De quo primum hoc libet dicere: Hoc ego philosophi non esse arbitror, testibus uti, qui aut casu veri aut malitia falsi fictique esse possunt; argumentis et rationibus oportet, quare quidque ita sit, docere, non eventis, iis praesertim, quibus mihi liceat non credere. 2.100. Restant duo dividi genera, quae habere dicimur a natura, non ab arte, vaticidi et somniandi; de quibus, Quinte, inquam, si placet, disseramus. Mihi vero, inquit, placet; his enim, quae adhuc disputasti, prorsus adsentior, et, vere ut loquar, quamquam tua me oratio confirmavit, tamen etiam mea sponte nimis superstitiosam de divinatione Stoicorum sententiam iudicabam; haec me Peripateticorum ratio magis movebat et veteris Dicaearchi et eius, qui nunc floret, Cratippi, qui censent esse in mentibus hominum tamquam oraclum aliquod, ex quo futura praesentiant, si aut furore divino incitatus animus aut somno relaxatus solute moveatur ac libere. His de generibus quid sentias et quibus ea rationibus infirmes, audire sane velim. 1.9. However, I am really at no loss for a reply to his reasoning; for in the second book Lucilius has made an adequate defence of religion and his argument, as you yourself state at the end of the third book, seemed to you nearer to the truth than Cottas. But there is a question which you passed over in those books because, no doubt, you thought it more expedient to inquire into it in a separate discussion: I refer to divination, which is the foreseeing and foretelling of events considered as happening by chance. Now let us see, if you will, what efficacy it has and what its nature is. My own opinion is that, if the kinds of divination which we have inherited from our forefathers and now practise are trustworthy, then there are gods and, conversely, if there are gods then there are men who have the power of divination. [6] 1.11. Really, my dear Quintus, said I, I always have time for philosophy. Moreover, since there is nothing else at this time that I can do with pleasure, I am all the more eager to hear what you think about divination.There is, I assure you, said he, nothing new or original in my views; for those which I adopt are not only very old, but they are endorsed by the consent of all peoples and nations. There are two kinds of divination: the first is dependent on art, the other on nature. 1.34. I agree, therefore, with those who have said that there are two kinds of divination: one, which is allied with art; the other, which is devoid of art. Those diviners employ art, who, having learned the known by observation, seek the unknown by deduction. On the other hand those do without art who, unaided by reason or deduction or by signs which have been observed and recorded, forecast the future while under the influence of mental excitement, or of some free and unrestrained emotion. This condition often occurs to men while dreaming and sometimes to persons who prophesy while in a frenzy — like Bacis of Boeotia, Epimenides of Crete and the Sibyl of Erythraea. In this latter class must be placed oracles — not oracles given by means of equalized lots — but those uttered under the impulse of divine inspiration; although divination by lot is not in itself to be despised, if it has the sanction of antiquity, as in the case of those lots which, according to tradition, sprang out of the earth; for in spite of everything, I am inclined to think that they may, under the power of God, be so drawn as to give an appropriate response. Men capable of correctly interpreting all these signs of the future seem to approach very near to the divine spirit of the gods whose wills they interpret, just as scholars do when they interpret the poets. 1.63. When, therefore, the soul has been withdrawn by sleep from contact with sensual ties, then does it recall the past, comprehend the present, and foresee the future. For though the sleeping body then lies as if it were dead, yet the soul is alive and strong, and will be much more so after death when it is wholly free of the body. Hence its power to divine is much enhanced by the approach of death. For example, those in the grasp of a serious and fatal sickness realize the fact that death impends; and so, visions of dead men generally appear to them and then their desire for fame is strongest; while those who have lived otherwise than as they should, feel, at such a time, the keenest sorrow for their sins. 1.72. But those methods of divination which are dependent on conjecture, or on deductions from events previously observed and recorded, are, as I have said before, not natural, but artificial, and include the inspection of entrails, augury, and the interpretation of dreams. These are disapproved of by the Peripatetics and defended by the Stoics. Some are based upon records and usage, as is evident from the Etruscan books on divination by means of inspection of entrails and by means of thunder and lightning, and as is also evident from the books of your augural college; while others are dependent on conjecture made suddenly and on the spur of the moment. An instance of the latter kind is that of Calchas in Homer, prophesying the number of years of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows. We find another illustration of conjectural divination in the history of Sulla in an occurrence which you witnessed. While he was offering sacrifices in front of his head-quarters in the Nolan district a snake suddenly came out from beneath the altar. The soothsayer, Gaius Postumius, begged Sulla to proceed with his march at once. Sulla did so and captured the strongly fortified camp of the Samnites which lay in front of the town of Nola. 1.86. You ask why everything happens. You have a perfect right to ask, but that is not the point at issue now. The question is, Does it happen, or does it not? For example, if I were to say that the magnet attracted iron and drew it to itself, and I could not tell you why, then I suppose you would utterly deny that the magnet had any such power. At least that is the course you pursue in regard to the existence of the power of divination, although it is established by our reading and by the traditions of our forefathers. Why, even before the dawn of philosophy, which is a recent discovery, the average man had no doubt about divination, and, since its development, no philosopher of any sort of reputation has had any different view. 1.109. But let us bring the discussion back to the point from which it wandered. Assume that I can give no reason for any of the instances of divination which I have mentioned and that I can do no more than show that they did occur, is that not a sufficient answer to Epicurus and to Carneades? And what does it matter if, as between artificial and natural divination, the explanation of the former is easy and of the latter is somewhat hard? For the results of those artificial means of divination, by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and astrology, have been the subject of observation for a long period of time. But in every field of inquiry great length of time employed in continued observation begets an extraordinary fund of knowledge, which may be acquired even without the intervention or inspiration of the gods, since repeated observation makes it clear what effect follows any given cause, and what sign precedes any given event. 1.110. The second division of divination, as I said before, is the natural; and it, according to exact teaching of physics, must be ascribed to divine Nature, from which, as the wisest philosophers maintain, our souls have been drawn and poured forth. And since the universe is wholly filled with the Eternal Intelligence and the Divine Mind, it must be that human souls are influenced by their contact with divine souls. But when men are awake their souls, as a rule, are subject to the demands of everyday life and are withdrawn from divine association because they are hampered by the chains of the flesh. 1.125. Nay, if even one such instance is found and the agreement between the prediction and the thing predicted is so close as to exclude every semblance of chance or of accident, I should not hesitate to say in such a case, that divination undoubtedly exists and that everybody should admit its existence.Wherefore, it seems to me that we must do as Posidonius does and trace the vital principle of divination in its entirety to three sources: first, to God, whose connexion with the subject has been sufficiently discussed; secondly to Fate; and lastly, to Nature. Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening. 1.126. Consequently, we know that Fate is that which is called, not ignorantly, but scientifically, the eternal cause of things, the wherefore of things past, of things present, and of things to come. Hence it is that it may be known by observation what effect will in most instances follow any cause, even if it is not known in all; for it would be too much to say that it is known in every case. And it is probable that these causes of coming events are perceived by those who see them during frenzy or in sleep. [56] 1.127. Moreover, since, as will be shown elsewhere, all things happen by Fate, if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause with every other cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction he might make. For he who knows the causes of future events necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledge is possible only to a god, it is left to man to presage the future by means of certain signs which indicate what will follow them. Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order. This connexion between cause and effect is obvious to two classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs. They may not discern the causes themselves, yet they do discern the signs and tokens of those causes. The careful study and recollection of those signs, aided by the records of former times, has evolved that sort of divination, known as artificial, which is divination by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and celestial phenomena. 1.132. I will assert, however, in conclusion, that I do not recognize fortune-tellers, or those who prophesy for money, or necromancers, or mediums, whom your friend Appius makes it a practice to consult.In fine, I say, I do not care a figFor Marsian augurs, village mountebanks,Astrologers who haunt the circus grounds,Or Isis-seers, or dream interpreters:— for they are not diviners either by knowledge or skill, —But superstitious bards, soothsaying quacks,Averse to work, or mad, or ruled by want,Directing others how to go, and yetWhat road to take they do not know themselves;From those to whom they promise wealth they begA coin. From what they promised let them takeTheir coin as toll and pass the balance on.Such are the words of Ennius who only a few lines further back expresses the view that there are gods and yet says that the gods do not care what human beings do. But for my part, believing as I do that the gods do care for man, and that they advise and often forewarn him, I approve of divination which is not trivial and is free from falsehood and trickery.When Quintus had finished I remarked, My dear Quintus, you have come admirably well prepared. 2.2. And, since the foundation of philosophy rests on the distinction between good and evil, I exhaustively treated that subject in five volumes and in such a way that the conflicting views of the different philosophers might be known. Next, and in the same number of volumes, came the Tusculan Disputations, which made plain the means most essential to a happy life. For the first volume treats of indifference to death, the second of enduring pain, the third of the alleviation of sorrow, the fourth of other spiritual disturbances; and the fifth embraces a topic which sheds the brightest light on the entire field of philosophy since it teaches that virtue is sufficient of itself for the attainment of happiness. 2.3. After publishing the works mentioned I finished three volumes On the Nature of the Gods, which contain a discussion of every question under that head. With a view of simplifying and extending the latter treatise I started to write the present volume On Divination, to which I plan to add a work on Fate; when that is done every phase of this particular branch of philosophy will be sufficiently discussed. To this list of works must be added the six volumes which I wrote while holding the helm of state, entitled On the Republic — a weighty subject, appropriate for philosophic discussion, and one which has been most elaborately treated by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the entire peripatetic school. What need is there to say anything of my treatise On Consolation? For it is the source of very great comfort to me and will, I think, be of much help to others. I have also recently thrown in that book On Old Age, which I sent my friend Atticus; and, since it is by philosophy that a man is made virtuous and strong, my Cato is especially worthy of a place among the foregoing books. 2.4. Inasmuch as Aristotle and Theophrastus, too, both of whom were celebrated for their keenness of intellect and particularly for their copiousness of speech, have joined rhetoric with philosophy, it seems proper also to put my rhetorical books in the same category; hence we shall include the three volumes On Oratory, the fourth entitled Brutus, and the fifth called The Orator.[2] I have named the philosophic works so far written: to the completion of the remaining books of this series I was hastening with so much ardour that if some most grievous cause had not intervened there would not now be any phase of philosophy which I had failed to elucidate and make easily accessible in the Latin tongue. For what greater or better service can I render to the commonwealth than to instruct and train the youth — especially in view of the fact that our young men have gone so far astray because of the present moral laxity that the utmost effort will be needed to hold them in check and direct them in the right way? 2.13. But I observed, Quintus, that you prudently withdrew divination from conjectures based upon skill and experience in public affairs, from those drawn from the use of the senses and from those made by persons in their own callings. I observed, also, that you defined divination to be the foreknowledge and foretelling of things which happen by chance. In the first place, that is a contradiction of what you have admitted. For the foreknowledge possessed by a physician, a pilot, and a general is of things which happen by chance. Then can any soothsayer, augur, prophet, or dreamer conjecture better than a physician, a pilot, or a general that an invalid will come safely out of his sickness, or that a ship will escape from danger, or that an army will avoid an ambuscade? 2.16. By the use of reason the physician foresees the progress of a disease, the general anticipates the enemys plans and the pilot forecasts the approach of bad weather. And yet even those who base their conclusions on accurate reasoning are often mistaken: for example, when the farmer sees his olive-tree in bloom he expects also, and not unreasonably, to see it bear fruit, but occasionally he is disappointed. If then mistakes are made by those who make no forecasts not based upon some reasonable and probable conjecture, what must we think of the conjectures of men who foretell the future by means of entrails, birds, portents, oracles, or dreams? I am not ready yet to take up one by one the various kinds of divination and show that the cleft in the liver, the croak of a raven, the flight of an eagle, the fall of a star, the utterances of persons in a frenzy, lots, and dreams have no prophetic value whatever; I shall discuss each of them in its turn — now I am discussing the subject as a whole. 2.17. How can anything be foreseen that has no cause and no distinguishing mark of its coming? Eclipses of the sun and also of the moon are predicted for many years in advance by men who employ mathematics in studying the courses and movements of the heavenly bodies; and the unvarying laws of nature will bring their predictions to pass. Because of the perfectly regular movements of the moon the astronomers calculate when it will be opposite the sun and in the earths shadow — which is the cone of night — and when, necessarily, it will become invisible. For the same reason they know when the moon will be directly between the earth and the sun and thus will hide the light of the sun from our eyes. They know in what sign each planet will be at any given time and at what time each day any constellation will rise and set. You see the course of reasoning followed in arriving at these predictions. [7] 2.18. But what course of reasoning is followed by men who predict the finding of a treasure or the inheritance of an estate? On what law of nature do such prophecies depend? But, on the other hand, if the prophecies just mentioned and others of the same class are controlled by some natural and immutable law such as regulates the movements of the stars, pray, can we conceive of anything happening by accident, or chance? Surely nothing is so at variance with reason and stability as chance? Hence it seems to me that it is not in the power even of God himself to know what event is going to happen accidentally and by chance. For if He knows, then the event is certain to happen; but if it is certain to happen, chance does not exist. And yet chance does exist, therefore there is no foreknowledge of things that happen by chance. 2.19. But if you deny the existence of chance and assert that the course of everything present or future has been inevitably determined from all eternity, then you must change your definition of divination, which you said was the foreknowledge of things that happen by chance. For if nothing can happen, nothing befall, nothing come to pass, except what has been determined from all eternity as bound to happen at a fixed time, how can there be such a thing as chance? And if there is no such thing as chance, what room is there for that divination, which you termed a foreknowledge of things that happen by chance? And you were inconsistent enough, too, to say that everything that is or will be is controlled by Fate! Why, the very word Fate is full of superstition and old womens credulity, and yet the Stoics have much to say of this Fate of yours. A discussion on Fate is reserved for another occasion; at present I shall speak of it only in so far as it is necessary. [8] 2.20. of what advantage to me is divination if everything is ruled by Fate? On that hypothesis what the diviner predicts is bound to happen. Hence I do not know what to make of the fact that an eagle recalled our intimate friend Deiotarus from his journey; for if he had not turned back he must have been sleeping in the room when it was destroyed the following night, and, therefore, have been crushed in the ruins. And yet, if Fate had willed it, he would not have escaped that calamity; and vice versa. Hence, I repeat, what is the good of divination? Or what is it that lots, entrails, or any other means of prophecy warn me to avoid? For, if it was the will of Fate that the Roman fleets in the First Punic War should perish — the one by shipwreck and the other at the hands of the Carthaginians — they would have perished just the same even if the sacred chickens had made a tripudium solistimum in the consulship of Lucius Junius and Publius Claudius! On the other hand, if obedience to the auspices would have prevented the destruction of the fleets, then they did not perish in accordance with Fate. But you insist that all things happen by Fate; therefore there is no such thing as divination. 2.21. Again, if it was the will of Fate that the Roman army should perish at Lake Trasimenus in the Second Punic War, could that result have been avoided if the consul Flaminius had obeyed the signs and the auspices which forbade his joining battle? Assuredly not. Therefore, either the army did not perish by the will of Fate, or, if it did (and you are certainly bound as a Stoic to say that it did), the same result would have happened even if the auspices had been obeyed; for the decrees of Fate are unchangeable. Then what becomes of that vaunted divination of you Stoics? For if all things happen by Fate, it does us no good to be warned to be on our guard, since that which is to happen, will happen regardless of what we do. But if that which is to be can be turned aside, there is no such thing as Fate; so, too, there is no such thing as divination — since divination deals with things that are going to happen. But nothing is certain to happen which there is some means of dealing with so as to prevent its happening. [9] 2.22. And further, for my part, I think that a knowledge of the future would be a disadvantage. Consider, for example, what Priams life would have been if he had known from youth what dire events his old age held in store for him! But let us leave the era of myths and come to events nearer home. In my work On Consolation I have collected instances of very grievous deaths that befell some of the most illustrious men of our commonwealth. Passing by men of earlier day, let us take Marcus Crassus. What advantage, pray, do you think it would have been to him, when he was at the very summit of power and wealth, to know that he was destined to perish beyond the Euphrates in shame and dishonour, after his son had been killed and his own army had been destroyed? Or do you think that Gnaeus Pompey would have found joy in his three consulships, in his three triumphs, and in the fame of his transcendent deeds, if he had known that he would be slain in an Egyptian desert, after he had lost his army, and that following his death those grave events would occur of which I cannot speak without tears? 2.23. Or what do we think of Caesar? Had he foreseen that in the Senate, chosen in most part by himself, in Pompeys hall, aye, before Pompeys very statue, and in the presence of many of his own centurions, he would be put to death by most noble citizens, some of whom owed all that they had to him, and that he would fall to so low an estate that no friend — no, not even a slave — would approach his dead body, in what agony of soul would he have spent his life!of a surety, then, ignorance of future ills is more profitable than the knowledge of them. 2.24. For, assuming that men knew the future it cannot in any wise be said — certainly not by the Stoics — that Pompey would not have taken up arms, that Crassus would not have crossed the Euphrates, or that Caesar would not have embarked upon the civil war. If so, then, the deaths that befell these men were not determined by Fate. But you will have it that everything happens by Fate; consequently, knowledge of the future would have done these men no good. In reality it would have entirely deprived the earlier portion of their lives of enjoyment; for how could they have been happy in reflecting what their ends would be? And so, however the Stoics turn and twist, all their shrewdness must come to naught. For, if a thing that is going to happen, may happen in one way or another, indifferently, chance is predomit; but things that happen by chance cannot be certain. But if it is certain what is going to befall me in reference to any matter and on every occasion, how do the soothsayers help me by saying that the greatest misfortunes await me? [10] 2.25. To the last point the Stoics make the rejoinder that every evil which is going to befall us is made lighter by means of religious rites. But if nothing happens except in accordance with Fate, no evil can be made lighter by means of religious rites. Homer shows his appreciation of this fact when he represents Jupiter as complaining because he could not snatch his son Sarpedon from death when Fate forbade. The same thought is expressed in the following verses translated from a Greek poet:That which has been decreed by Fate to beAlmighty Jove himself cannot prevent.The whole idea of Fate in every detail is justly, as I think, the subject of derision even in Atellan farces, but in a discussion as serious as ours joking is out of place. So then let us sum up our argument: If it is impossible to foresee things that happen by chance because they are uncertain, there is no such thing as divination; if, on the contrary, they can be foreseen because they are preordained by Fate, still there is no such thing as divination, which, by your definition, deals with things that happen by chance. 2.26. But this introductory part of my discussion has been mere skirmishing with light infantry; now let me come to close quarters and see if I cannot drive in both wings of your argument.[11] You divided divination into two kinds, one artificial and the other natural. The artificial, you said, consists in part of conjecture and in part of long-continued observation; while the natural is that which the soul has seized, or, rather, has obtained, from a source outside itself — that is, from God, whence all human souls have been drawn off, received, or poured out. Under the head of artificial divination you placed predictions made from the inspection of entrails, those made from lightnings and portents, those made by augurs, and by persons who depend entirely upon premonitory signs. Under the same head you included practically every method of prophecy in which conjecture was employed. 2.27. Natural divination, on the other hand, according to your view, is the result — the effusion, as it were — of mental excitement, or it is the prophetic power which the soul has during sleep while free from bodily sensation and worldly cares. Moreover, you derived every form of divination from three sources — God, Fate, and Nature. And although you could not give a reason for any kind of divination, still you carried on the war by marshalling an astonishing array of examples from fiction. of such a course I wish to say emphatically that it is not becoming in a philosopher to introduce testimony which may be either true by accident, or false and fabricated through malice. You ought to have employed arguments and reason to show that all your propositions were true and you ought not to have resorted to so‑called occurrences — certainly not to such occurrences as are unworthy of belief. [12] 2.100. There remain the two kinds of divination which we are said to derive from nature and not from art — vaticination and dreams, — these, my dear Quintus, if agreeable to you, let us now discuss.Delighted, I assure you, said he, for I am in entire accord with the views which you have so far expressed. To be quite frank, your argument has merely strengthened the opinion which I already had, for my own reasoning had convinced me that the Stoic view of divination smacked too much of superstition. I was more impressed by the reasoning of the Peripatetics, of Dicaearchus, of ancient times, and of Cratippus, who still flourishes. According to their opinion there is within the human soul some sort of power — oracular, I might call it — by which the future is foreseen when the soul is inspired by a divine frenzy, or when it is released by sleep and is free to move at will. I should like very much to learn your views of these two classes of divination and by what arguments you disprove them. [49]
25. Cicero, Letters, 16.13.6, 16.14.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 44
26. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 1.40, 3.5, 3.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 68, 81, 118, 123, 126, 127
1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.40. He also argues that the god whom men call Jupiter is the aether, and that Neptune is the air which permeates the sea, and the goddess called Ceres the earth; and he deals in the same way with the whole series of the names of the other gods. He also identifies Jupiter with the mighty Law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guide of life and instructress in duty, and which he entitles Necessity or Fate, and the Everlasting Truth of future events; none of which conceptions is of such a nature as to be deemed to possess divinity. 3.5. "Very well," rejoined Cotta, "let us then proceed as the argument itself may lead us. But before we come to the subject, let me say a few words about myself. I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that you put forward at the conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontife. This no doubt meant that I ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion. For my part I always shall uphold them and always have done so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall ever dislodge me from the belief as to the worship of the immortal gods which I have inherited from our forefathers. But on any question of el I am guided by the high pontifes, Titus Coruncanius, Publius Scipio and Publius Scaevola, not by Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, who was both an augur and a philosopher, to whose discourse upon religion, in his famous oration, I would rather listen than to any leader of the Stoics. The religion of the Roman people comprises ritual, auspices, and the third additional division consisting of all such prophetic warnings as the interpreters of the Sybil or the soothsayers have derived from portents and prodigies. While, I have always thought that none of these departments of religion was to be despised, and I have held the conviction that Romulus by his auspices and Numa by his establishment of our ritual laid the foundations of our state, which assuredly could never have been as great as it is had not the fullest measure of divine favour been obtained for it. 3.95. "I on my side," replied Cotta, "only desire to be refuted. My purpose was rather to discuss the doctrines I have expounded than to pronounce judgement upon them, and I am confident that you can easily defeat me." "Oh, no doubt," interposed Velleius; "why, he thinks that even our dreams are sent to us by Jupiter — though dreams themselves are not so unsubstantial as a Stoic disquisition on the nature of the gods." Here the conversation ended, and we parted, Velleius thinking Cotta's discourse to be the truer, while I felt that that of Balbus approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth.
27. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 1.75 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 131
1.75. And God said, "At first say unto them, I am that I am, that when they have learnt that there is a difference between him that is and him that is not, they may be further taught that there is no name whatever that can properly be assigned to me, who am the only being to whom existence belongs.
28. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.6-1.8 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 131
1.6. Thirdly, there is the resemblance of the part that is circumcised to the heart; for both parts are prepared for the sake of generation; for the breath contained within the heart is generative of thoughts, and the generative organ itself is productive of living beings. Therefore, the men of old thought it right to make the evident and visible organ, by which the objects of the outward senses are generated, resemble that invisible and superior part, by means of which ideas are formed. 1.7. The fourth, and most important, is that which relates to the provision thus made for prolificness; for it is said that the seminal fluid proceeds in its path easily, neither being at all scattered, nor flowing on its passage into what may be called the bags of the prepuce. On which account those nations which practise circumcision are the most prolific and the most populous.II. 1.8. These considerations have come to our ears, having been discussed of old among men of divine spirit and wisdom, who have interpreted the writings of Moses in no superficial or careless manner. But, besides what has been already said, I also look upon circumcision to be a symbol of two things of the most indispensable importance.
29. New Testament, John, 1.1, 3.3, 3.7, 3.31, 17.24-17.26, 19.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 153, 154, 155, 156
1.1. ΕΝ ΑΡΧΗ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. 3.3. ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν, οὐ δύναται ἰδεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ. 3.7. μὴ θαυμάσῃς ὅτι εἶπόν σοι Δεῖ ὑμᾶς γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν. 3.31. Ὁ ἄνωθεν ἐρχόμενος ἐπάνω πάντων ἐστίν. ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐστὶν καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς λαλεῖ· ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐρχόμενος ἐπάνω πάντων ἐστίν· 17.24. Πατήρ, ὃ δέδωκάς μοι, θέλω ἵνα ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγὼ κἀκεῖνοι ὦσιν μετʼ ἐμοῦ, ἵνα θεωρῶσιν τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἐμὴν ἣν δέδωκάς μοι, ὅτι ἠγάπησάς με πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου. 17.25. Πατὴρ δίκαιε, καὶ ὁ κόσμος σε οὐκ ἔγνω, ἐγὼ δέ σε ἔγνων, καὶ οὗτοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι σύ με ἀπέστειλας, 17.26. καὶ ἐγνώρισα αὐτοῖς τὸ ὄνομά σου καὶ γνωρίσω, ἵνα ἡ ἀγάπη ἣν ἠγάπησάς με ἐν αὐτοῖς ᾖ κἀγὼ ἐν αὐτοῖς. 19.11. ἀπεκρίθη αὐτῷ Ἰησοῦς Οὐκ εἶχες ἐξουσίαν κατʼ ἐμοῦ οὐδεμίαν εἰ μὴ ἦν δεδομένον σοι ἄνωθεν· διὰ τοῦτο ὁ παραδούς μέ σοι μείζονα ἁμαρτίαν ἔχει. 1.1. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 3.3. Jesus answered him, "Most assuredly, I tell you, unless one is born anew, he can't see the Kingdom of God." 3.7. Don't marvel that I said to you, 'You must be born anew.' 3.31. He who comes from above is above all. He who is from the Earth belongs to the Earth, and speaks of the Earth. He who comes from heaven is above all. 17.24. Father, I desire that they also whom you have given me be with me where I am, that they may see my glory, which you have given me, for you loved me before the foundation of the world. 17.25. Righteous Father, the world hasn't known you, but I knew you; and these knew that you sent me. 17.26. I made known to them your name, and will make it known; that the love with which you loved me may be in them, and I in them." 19.11. Jesus answered, "You would have no power at all against me, unless it were given to you from above. Therefore he who delivered me to you has greater sin."
30. New Testament, 2 Corinthians, 12.2-12.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 158
12.2. οἶδα ἄνθρωπον ἐν Χριστῷ πρὸ ἐτῶν δεκατεσσάρων, —εἴτε ἐν σώματι οὐκ οἶδα, εἴτε ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν, —ἁρπαγέντα τὸν τοιοῦτον ἕως τρίτου οὐρανοῦ. 12.3. καὶ οἶδα τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον,—εἴτε ἐν σώματι εἴτε χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος [οὐκ οἶδα,] ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν, 12.4. —ὅτι ἡρπάγη εἰς τὸν παράδεισον καὶ ἤκουσεν ἄρρητα ῥήματα ἃ οὐκ ἐξὸν ἀνθρώπῳ λαλῆσαι.
31. New Testament, Acts, 17.22-17.23 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 159
17.22. σταθεὶς δὲ Παῦλος ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ Ἀρείου Πάγου ἔφη Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατὰ πάντα ὡς δεισιδαιμονεστέρους ὑμᾶς θεωρῶ· 17.23. διερχόμενος γὰρ καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν εὗρον καὶ βωμὸν ἐν ᾧ ἐπεγέγραπτο ΑΓΝΩΣΤΩ ΘΕΩ. ὃ οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτο ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν. 17.22. Paul stood in the midst of the Areopagus, and said, "You men of Athens, I perceive that you are very religious in all things. 17.23. For as I passed along, and observed the objects of your worship, I found also an altar with this inscription: 'TO AN UNKNOWN GOD.' What therefore you worship in ignorance, this I announce to you.
32. New Testament, Colossians, 1.21 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 158
1.21. καὶ ὑμᾶς ποτὲ ὄντας ἀπηλλοτριωμένους καὶ ἐχθροὺς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς πονηροῖς, — 1.21. You, being in past times alienated and enemies in your mind in your evil works,
33. New Testament, Ephesians, 2.4, 4.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 158
2.4. ὁ δὲ θεὸς πλούσιος ὢν ἐν ἐλέει, διὰ τὴν πολλὴν ἀγάπην αὐτοῦ ἣν ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς, 4.18. ἐσκοτωμένοι τῇ διανοίᾳ ὄντες, ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ θεοῦ, διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὴν πώρωσιν τῆς καρδίας αὐτῶν, 2.4. But God, being rich in mercy, for his great love with which he loved us, 4.18. being darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God, because of the ignorance that is in them, because of the hardening of their hearts;
34. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 151, 153, 154, 155
35. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.2.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 126
36. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 175
37. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies,,, 2.16.73, 2.16.74,,,, 4.14.95,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 8.4.9, 8.4.10, 8.4.13, 8.4.12, 8.4.11, 8.5.15\-16, 8.6.19, 8.6.18, 8.6.17, 8.6.20, 8.6.21,,,,, 8.8.24, 8.8.23,,,,,,,,,,,,, 8.9.25, 8.9.26, 8.9.27, 8.9.28, 8.9.29, 8.9.30, 8.9.31, 8.9.32, 8.9.33,, 8.9 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 176, 177
38. Aristides of Athens, Apology, 2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 131
39. Tertullian, Against Marcion, 2.18 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causal reciprocity/causal relations Found in books: Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 178
2.18. But what parts of the law can I defend as good with a greater confidence than those which heresy has shown such a longing for?- as the statute of retaliation, requiring eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and stripe for stripe. Exodus 21:24 Now there is not here any smack of a permission to mutual injury; but rather, on the whole, a provision for restraining violence. To a people which was very obdurate, and wanting in faith towards God, it might seem tedious, and even incredible, to expect from God that vengeance which was subsequently to be declared by the prophet: Vengeance is mine; I will repay, says the Lord. Therefore, in the meanwhile, the commission of wrong was to be checked by the fear of a retribution immediately to happen; and so the permission of this retribution was to be the prohibition of provocation, that a stop might thus be put to all hot-blooded injury, while by the permission of the second the first is prevented by fear, and by this deterring of the first the second fails to be committed. By the same law another result is also obtained, even the more ready kindling of the fear of retaliation by reason of the very savour of passion which is in it. There is no more bitter thing, than to endure the very suffering which you have inflicted upon others. When, again, the law took somewhat away from men's food, by pronouncing unclean certain animals which were once blessed, you should understand this to be a measure for encouraging continence, and recognise in it a bridle imposed on that appetite which, while eating angels' food, craved after the cucumbers and melons of the Egyptians. Recognise also therein a precaution against those companions of the appetite, even lust and luxury, which are usually chilled by the chastening of the appetite. For the people sat down to eat and to drink, and rose up to play. Exodus 32:6 Furthermore, that an eager wish for money might be restrained, so far as it is caused by the need of food, the desire for costly meat and drink was taken out of their power. Lastly, in order that man might be more readily educated by God for fasting, he was accustomed to such articles of food as were neither plentiful nor sumptuous, and not likely to pamper the appetite of the luxurious. of course the Creator deserved all the greater blame, because it was from His own people that He took away food, rather than from the more ungrateful Marcionites. As for the burdensome sacrifices also, and the troublesome scrupulousness of their ceremonies and oblations, no one should blame them, as if God specially required them for Himself: for He plainly asks, To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? and, Who has required them at your hand? Isaiah 1:11-12 But he should see herein a careful provision on God's part, which showed His wish to bind to His own religion a people who were prone to idolatry and transgression by that kind of services wherein consisted the superstition of that period; that He might call them away therefrom, while requesting it to be performed to Himself, as if He desired that no sin should be committed in making idols.
40. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.106 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 118
7.106. Thus things of the preferred class are those which have positive value, e.g. amongst mental qualities, natural ability, skill, moral improvement, and the like; among bodily qualities, life, health, strength, good condition, soundness of organs, beauty, and so forth; and in the sphere of external things, wealth, fame, noble birth, and the like. To the class of things rejected belong, of mental qualities, lack of ability, want of skill, and the like; among bodily qualities, death, disease, weakness, being out of condition, mutilation, ugliness, and the like; in the sphere of external things, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and so forth. But again there are things belonging to neither class; such are not preferred, neither are they rejected.
41. Plotinus, Enneads, a b c d\n0 3.5[50]9.36 3.5[50]9.36 3 5[50]9 \n1 3.5[50]9.37 3.5[50]9.37 3 5[50]9 \n2 3.5[50]9.33 3.5[50]9.33 3 5[50]9 \n3 6.4[22]15.3 6.4[22]15.3 6 4[22]15\n4 3.5[50]9.34 3.5[50]9.34 3 5[50]9 \n5 6.4[22]15.1 6.4[22]15.1 6 4[22]15\n6 6.4[22]15.2 6.4[22]15.2 6 4[22]15\n7 3.5[50]9.35 3.5[50]9.35 3 5[50]9 \n8 1 1 1 None \n9 - None \n10 3.5[50]9.32 3.5[50]9.32 3 5[50]9 \n11 [ [ [ None \n12 . . \n13 3.5[50]9.31 3.5[50]9.31 3 5[50]9 \n14 5.2[11] 5.2[11] 5 2[11] \n15 6 6 6 None \n16 2.3[52]17 2.3[52]17 2 3[52]17\n17 3.5[50]9.30 3.5[50]9.30 3 5[50]9 \n18 9 9 9 None \n19 2 2 2 None \n20 ] ] ] None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 109
42. Hermeias of Alexandria, In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia,, 224.1-224.3 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •cause/causality Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 107
43. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, None (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 126
44. Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem, 83.20-84.11, 122.9, 122.10, 122.11 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 96
45. Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem Commentarii, 2.738.21, 2.738.22, 2.738.17, 2.738.16, 2.738.19, 2.738.18, 2.738.15, 2.738.20, 2.738.14, 2.738.23, 2.738.24, 2.745.28-746.5, 3.795.25-796.9, 4.842.29-843.18, 6.1063.17, 6.1063.16, 6.1119.5-1123.14, 6.1124.4, 6.1124.1, 6.1124.5, 6.1124.6, 6.1124.7, 6.1124.2, 6.1124.3, 7.1167.14, 7.1167.13, 7.1167.12, 7.1167.15, 7.1167.16, 7.1167.17, 696.34-697.14, 698.6, 703.23, 703.24, 707.8, 707.9, 707.10, 707.11, 707.12, 707.13, 707.14, 707.15, 707.16, 707.17, 707.18, 710.8, 710.9 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 53
46. Proclus, Theologia Platonica ( ), 1.10, 1.11, 2.10, 3.2, 3.6, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.12, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.18, 3.19, 5.18,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 25.11-26.11, 31.12-32.5, 31.14-32.7, 31.18-23, 32.15-16, 32.23-5, 33.1-2, 33.3-34, 34.1-11, 36.2-3, 39.11-24, 40.10-41.15, 44.23-45.6, 45.3-4, 45.3-6, 47.7-8, 51.6-7, 54.14-16, 57.3-4, 58.22-3, 63.14-1696, 64.2-979-80, 69.20-1 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 168
47. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 1.11.22-1.11.23, 1.176.11-1.176.12, 2.3.6-2.3.8, 2.13.15, 2.28.2-2.28.3, 2.80.19-2.80.31, 3.3.1, 3.110.12-3.110.30, 3.209.18-3.209.26, 3.230.16-3.230.18, 3.317.24-3.317.28, 3.318.1-3.318.4, 3.335.17-3.335.23 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 151
48. Proclus, Institutio Theologica, None (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 50, 56
49. Damaskios, In Phaedonem (Versio 1), 1.2.14-1.2.16, 1.4.15, 4.2.4, 5.1.2-5.1.4, 7.4.4-7.4.10 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •cause/causality Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 92, 96, 132
50. Olympiodorus The Younger of Alexandria, In Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria, None (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 175
51. Olympiodorus The Younger of Alexandria, In Categorias Commentarium, 77.12 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •cause/causality Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 92
52. Olympiodorus The Younger of Alexandria, In Platonis Alcibiadem Commentarii, 2.15, 2.16, 4.8-9.20, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 9.9, 9.10, 9.11, 9.12, 11.9, 20.4, 20.5, 20.6, 20.7, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, 20.11, 20.12, 20.13, 23.2, 34.20, 34.21, 34.22, 34.23, 34.24, 34.25, 40.16, 41.1, 42.10, 42.11, 42.12, 42.13, 42.14, 42.15, 42.16, 42.17, 42.18, 42.19, 42.20, 52.21-53.7, 59.24-60.12, 88.5, 88.6, 88.7, 88.8, 88.9, 88.10, 92.3, 92.4, 96.4, 98.5, 103.19, 103.20, 103.21, 103.22, 103.23, 103.24, 103.25, 103.26, 124.4, 124.5, 124.6, 124.7, 124.8, 124.9, 124.10, 124.11, 124.12, 125.9, 125.10, 125.11, 125.12, 125.13, 129.7, 135.1, 140.12, 151.16-152.20, 153.8, 156.6, 156.7, 156.8, 157.15, 171.8, 172.5, 172.6, 172.7, 172.8, 172.9, 172.10, 172.11, 172.12, 175.3, 175.4, 175.5, 175.7, 175.8, 175.9, 175.10, 175.20, 175.21, 204.1, 204.2, 204.3, 204.4, 204.5, 204.6, 204.7, 209.24-210.16, 210.14, 225.1, 230.10 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 239
53. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, 302.29-302.36 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •active/causal/productive (gennetikê, γεννητική‎; paraktikê, παρακτική‎) potency/power (dunamis, δύναμις‎) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 96
54. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria, 612.29-612.34 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •active/causal/productive (gennetikê, γεννητική‎; paraktikê, παρακτική‎) potency/power (dunamis, δύναμις‎) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 136
55. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.346, 2.351, 2.1000, 3.131  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 86, 118, 126
56. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 118
57. Anon, Anonymous Prolegomena To Plato'S Philosophy, 22.8-22.12, 22.39-22.58  Tagged with subjects: •cause/causality, efficient •cause/causality, final •cause/causality, formal •cause/causality, instrumental •cause/causality, material •cause/causality, paradigmatic Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 168
58. Aristotle, 1, 3  Tagged with subjects: •active/causal/productive (gennetikê, γεννητική‎; paraktikê, παρακτική‎) potency/power (dunamis, δύναμις‎) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 136
60. Damaskios, Prolegomena Logica, 16.25-16.26  Tagged with subjects: •cause/causality Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 48
61. Cicero, Luc., 97  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 99
62. Alex. Aphr., Fat., 22.192.17-22.192.19  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 99
63. Epigraphy, L&S, None  Tagged with subjects: •causality / causa / αἰτία Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 126
64. Various, Collection Des Anciens Alchimistes Grecs, 79.11-85.5;  Tagged with subjects: •cause/causality Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 20