| 1. Homer, Odyssey, 4.242-4.246, 9.29-9.33 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 111 |
| 2. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 145 |
| 3. Cato, Marcus Porcius, Origines, None (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 51, 56 |
| 4. Plautus, Poenulus, 132-134 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 80 |
| 5. Ennius, Annales, None (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 234 |
6. Cicero, Republic, 1.1, 1.10, 2.1-2.3, 4.5, 5.1-5.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder •cato, marcus porcius uticensis Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 43, 143, 145, 228, 229| 1.1. im petu liberavissent, nec C. Duelius, A. Atilius, L. Metellus terrore Karthaginis, non duo Scipiones oriens incendium belli Punici secundi sanguine suo restinxissent, nec id excitatum maioribus copiis aut Q. Maximus enervavisset aut M. Marcellus contudisset aut a portis huius urbis avolsum P. Africanus compulisset intra hostium moenia. M. vero Catoni, homini ignoto et novo, quo omnes, qui isdem rebus studemus, quasi exemplari ad industriam virtutemque ducimur, certe licuit Tusculi se in otio delectare salubri et propinquo loco. Sed homo demens, ut isti putant, cum cogeret eum necessitas nulla, in his undis et tempestatibus ad summam senectutem maluit iactari quam in illa tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere. Omitto innumerabilis viros, quorum singuli saluti huic civitati fuerunt, et quia sunt haud procul ab aetatis huius memoria, commemorare eos desino, ne quis se aut suorum aliquem praetermissum queratur. Unum hoc definio, tantam esse necessitatem virtutis generi hominum a natura tantumque amorem ad communem salutem defendendam datum, ut ea vis omnia blandimenta voluptatis otiique vicerit. 1.1. Plin. Nat. praef. 7 nec docti/ssimis. †Manium Persium haec le/gere nolo, Iu/nium Congu/m volo. 1.10. Illa autem exceptio cui probari tandem potest, quod negant sapientem suscepturum ullam rei publicae partem, extra quam si eum tempus et necessitas coegerit? quasi vero maior cuiquam necessitas accidere possit, quam accidit nobis; in qua quid facere potuissem, nisi tum consul fuissem? Consul autem esse qui potui, nisi eum vitae cursum tenuissem a pueritia, per quem equestri loco natus pervenirem ad honorem amplissimum? Non igitur potestas est ex tempore, aut cum velis, opitulandi rei publicae, quamvis ea prematur periculis, nisi eo loco sis, ut tibi id facere liceat. 2.1. Cum omnes flagrarent cupi ditate audiendi, ingressus est sic loqui Scipio: Catonis hoc senis est, quem, ut scitis, unice dilexi maximeque sum admiratus cuique vel patris utriusque iudicio vel etiam meo studio me totum ab adulescentia dedidi; cuius me numquam satiare potuit oratio; tantus erat in homine usus rei publicae, quam et domi et militiae cum optime, tum etiam diutissime gesserat, et modus in dicendo et gravitate mixtus lepos et summum vel discendi studium vel docendi et orationi vita admodum congruens. 2.2. Is dicere solebat ob hanc causam praestare nostrae civitatis statum ceteris civitatibus, quod in illis singuli fuissent fere, qui suam quisque rem publicam constituissent legibus atque institutis suis, ut Cretum Minos, Lacedaemoniorum Lycurgus, Atheniensium, quae persaepe commutata esset, tum Theseus, tum Draco, tum Solo, tum Clisthenes, tum multi alii, postremo exsanguem iam et iacentem doctus vir Phalereus sustentasset Demetrius, nostra autem res publica non unius esset ingenio, sed multorum, nec una hominis vita, sed aliquot constituta saeculis et aetatibus. Nam neque ullum ingenium tantum extitisse dicebat, ut, quem res nulla fugeret, quisquam aliquando fuisset, neque cuncta ingenia conlata in unum tantum posse uno tempore providere, ut omnia complecterentur sine rerum usu ac vetustate. 2.3. Quam ob rem, ut ille solebat, ita nunc mea repetet oratio populi originem; libenter enim etiam verbo utor Catonis. Facilius autem, quod est propositum, consequar, si nostram rem publicam vobis et nascentem et crescentem et adultam et iam firmam atque robustam ostendero, quam si mihi aliquam, ut apud Platonem Socrates, ipse finxero. 4.5. Non. 362M et noster Plato magis etiam quam Lycurgus, omnia qui prorsus iubet esse communia, ne quis civis propriam aut suam rem ullam queat dicere. Non. 308M Ego vero eodem, quo ille Homerum redimitum coronis et delibutum unguentis emittit ex ea urbe, quam sibi ipse fingit. 5.1. August. C.D. 2.21,Non. 417M Ennius Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque, quem quidem ille versum vel brevitate vel veritate tamquam ex oraculo mihi quodam esse effatus videtur. Nam neque viri, nisi ita morata civitas fuisset, neque mores, nisi hi viri praefuissent, aut fundare aut tam diu tenere potuissent tantam et tam fuse lateque imperantem rem publicam. Itaque ante nostram memoriam et mos ipse patrius praestantes viros adhibebat, et veterem morem ac maiorum instituta retinebant excellentes viri. Nostra vero aetas cum rem publicam sicut picturam accepisset egregiam, sed iam evanescentem vetustate, non modo eam coloribus eisdem, quibus fuerat, renovare neglexit, sed August. C.D. 2.21, Non. 417M ne id quidem curavit, ut formam saltem eius et extrema tamquam liniamenta servaret. Quid enim manet ex antiquis moribus, quibus ille dixit rem stare Romanam? quos ita oblivione obsoletos videmus, ut non modo non colantur, sed iam ignorentur. Nam de viris quid dicam? Mores enim ipsi interierunt virorum penuria, cuius tanti mali non modo reddenda ratio nobis, sed etiam tamquam reis capitis quodam modo dicenda causa est. Nostris enim vitiis, non casu aliquo, rem publicam verbo retinemus, re ipsa vero iam pridem amisimus. | |
|
7. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.2-1.5, 1.16, 1.195, 1.197, 1.200, 1.254-1.255, 3.56, 3.60-3.61 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder •cato, marcus porcius uticensis Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 43, 45, 230| 1.2. Quam spem cogitationum et consiliorum meorum cum graves communium temporum tum varii nostri casus fefellerunt; nam qui locus quietis et tranquillitatis plenissimus fore videbatur, in eo maximae moles molestiarum et turbulentissimae tempestates exstiterunt; neque vero nobis cupientibus atque exoptantibus fructus oti datus est ad eas artis, quibus a pueris dediti fuimus, celebrandas inter nosque recolendas. 1.3. Nam prima aetate incidimus in ipsam perturbationem disciplinae veteris, et consulatu devenimus in medium rerum omnium certamen atque discrimen, et hoc tempus omne post consulatum obiecimus eis fluctibus, qui per nos a communi peste depulsi in nosmet ipsos redundarent. Sed tamen in his vel asperitatibus rerum vel angustiis temporis obsequar studiis nostris et quantum mihi vel fraus inimicorum vel causae amicorum vel res publica tribuet oti, ad scribendum potissimum conferam; tibi vero, frater, neque hortanti deero neque roganti, nam neque auctoritate quisquam apud me plus valere te potest neque voluntate. 1.4. Ac mihi repetenda est veteris cuiusdam memoriae non sane satis explicata recordatio, sed, ut arbitror, apta ad id, quod requiris, ut cognoscas quae viri omnium eloquentissimi clarissimique senserint de omni ratione dicendi. 1.5. Vis enim, ut mihi saepe dixisti, quoniam, quae pueris aut adulescentulis nobis ex commentariolis nostris incohata ac rudia exciderunt, vix sunt hac aetate digna et hoc usu, quem ex causis, quas diximus, tot tantisque consecuti sumus, aliquid eisdem de rebus politius a nobis perfectiusque proferri; solesque non numquam hac de re a me in disputationibus nostris dissentire, quod ego eruditissimorum hominum artibus eloquentiam contineri statuam, tu autem illam ab elegantia doctrinae segregandam putes et in quodam ingeni atque exercitationis genere ponendam. Ac mihi quidem saepe numero in summos homines ac summis ingeniis praeditos intuenti quaerendum esse visum est quid esset cur plures in omnibus rebus quam in dicendo admirabiles exstitissent; nam quocumque te animo et cogitatione converteris, permultos excellentis in quoque genere videbis non mediocrium artium, sed prope maximarum. 1.16. Quibus de causis quis non iure miretur ex omni memoria aetatum, temporum, civitatum tam exiguum oratorum numerum inveniri? Sed enim maius est hoc quiddam quam homines opitur, et pluribus ex artibus studiisque conlectum. Quid enim quis aliud in maxima discentium multitudine, summa magistrorum copia, praestantissimis hominum ingeniis, infinita causarum varietate, amplissimis eloquentiae propositis praemiis esse causae putet, nisi rei quandam incredibilem magnitudinem ac difficultatem? 1.195. Fremant omnes licet, dicam quod sentio: bibliothecas me hercule omnium philosophorum unus mihi videtur xii tabularum libellus, si quis legum fontis et capita viderit, et auctoritatis pondere et utilitatis ubertate superare. 1.197. Percipietis etiam illam ex cognitione iuris laetitiam et voluptatem, quod, quantum praestiterint nostri maiores prudentia ceteris gentibus, tum facillime intellegetis, si cum illorum Lycurgo et Dracone et Solone nostras leges conferre volueritis; incredibile est enim, quam sit omne ius civile praeter hoc nostrum inconditum ac paene ridiculum; de quo multa soleo in sermonibus cotidianis dicere, cum hominum nostrorum prudentiam ceteris omnibus et maxime Graecis antepono. His ego de causis dixeram, Scaevola, eis, qui perfecti oratores esse vellent, iuris civilis esse cognitionem necessariam. 1.200. est enim sine dubio domus iuris consulti totius oraculum civitatis; testis est huiusce Q. Muci ianua et vestibulum, quod in eius infirmissima valetudine adfectaque iam aetate maxima cotidie frequentia civium ac summorum hominum splendore celebratur. 1.254. Nam quod dicis senectutem a solitudine vindicari iuris civilis scientia, fortasse etiam pecuniae magnitudine; sed nos non quid nobis utile, verum quid oratori necessarium sit, quaerimus. Quamquam, quoniam multa ad oratoris similitudinem ab uno artifice sumimus, solet idem Roscius dicere se, quo plus sibi aetatis accederet, eo tardiores tibicinis modos et cantus remissiores esse facturum. Quod si ille astrictus certa quadam numerorum moderatione et pedum tamen aliquid ad requiem senectutis excogitat, quanto facilius nos non laxare modos, sed totos mutare possumus? 1.255. Neque enim hoc te, Crasse, fallit, quam multa sint et quam varia genera dicendi, id quod haud sciam an tu primus ostenderis, qui iam diu multo dicis remissius et lenius quam solebas; neque minus haec tamen tua gravissimi sermonis lenitas, quam illa summa vis et contentio probatur: multique oratores fuerunt, ut illum Scipionem audimus et Laelium, qui omnia sermone conficerent paulo intentiore, numquam, ut Ser. Galba, lateribus aut clamore contenderent. Quod si iam hoc facere non poteris aut noles, vereris ne tua domus talis et viri et civis, si a litigiosis hominibus non colatur, a ceteris deseratur? Equidem tantum absum ab ista sententia, ut non modo non arbitrer subsidium senectutis in eorum, qui consultum veniant, multitudine esse ponendum, sed tamquam portum aliquem exspectem istam quam tu times, solitudinem. Subsidium enim bellissimum existimo esse senectuti otium. 3.56. Hanc, inquam, cogitandi pronuntiandique rationem vimque dicendi veteres Graeci sapientiam nominabant; hinc illi Lycurgi, hinc Pittaci, hinc Solones atque ab hac similitudine Coruncanii nostri, Fabricii, Catones, Scipiones fuerunt, non tam fortasse docti, sed impetu mentis simili et voluntate. Eadem autem alii prudentia, sed consilio ad vitae studia dispari quietem atque otium secuti, ut Pythagoras, Democritus, Anaxagoras, a regendis civitatibus totos se ad cognitionem rerum transtulerunt; quae vita propter tranquillitatem et propter ipsius scientiae suavitatem, qua nihil est hominibus iucundius, pluris, quam utile fuit rebus publicis, delectavit. 3.60. quorum princeps Socrates fuit, is qui omnium eruditorum testimonio totiusque iudicio Graeciae cum prudentia et acumine et venustate et subtilitate tum vero eloquentia, varietate, copia, quam se cumque in partem dedisset omnium fuit facile princeps, eis que, qui haec, quae nunc nos quaerimus, tractarent, agerent, docerent, cum nomine appellarentur uno, quod omnis rerum optimarum cognitio atque in eis exercitatio philosophia nominaretur, hoc commune nomen eripuit sapienterque sentiendi et ornate dicendi scientiam re cohaerentis disputationibus suis separavit; cuius ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato tradidit, cum ipse litteram Socrates nullam reliquisset. 3.61. Hinc discidium illud exstitit quasi linguae atque cordis, absurdum sane et inutile et reprehendendum, ut alii nos sapere, alii dicere docerent. Nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, proseminatae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum disiunctae et dispares, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur. | |
|
8. Cicero, On Duties, 1.1-1.3, 1.28 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 145; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 25| 1.1. Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum, idque Athenis, abundare oportet praeceptis institutisque philosophiae propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scientia augere potest, altera exemplis, tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper cum Graecis Latina coniunxi neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci, idem tibi censeo faciendum, ut par sis in utriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem ad rem nos, ut videmur, magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Graecarum litterarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et ad dicendum et ad iudicandum. 1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 1.3. Quam ob rem magnopere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut non solum orationes meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se aequarunt, studiose legas; vis enim maior in illis dicendi, sed hoc quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus. Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere elaboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium, utrumque certe secuti sumus. 1.28. Praetermittendae autem defensionis deserendique officii plures solent esse causae; nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt aut etiam neglegentia, pigritia, inertia aut suis studiis quibusdam occupationibusve sic impediuntur, ut eos, quos tutari debeant, desertos esse patiantur. Itaque videndum est, ne non satis sit id, quod apud Platonem est in philosophos dictum, quod in veri investigatione versentur quodque ea, quae plerique vehementer expetant, de quibus inter se digladiari soleant, contemt et pro nihilo putent, propterea iustos esse. Nam alterum iustitiae genus assequuntur, ut inferenda ne cui noceant iniuria, in alterum incidunt; discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt. Itaque eos ne ad rem publicam quidem accessuros putat nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri; namhoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium. | 1.28. The motives for failure to prevent injury and so for slighting duty are likely to be various: people either are reluctant to incur enmity or trouble or expense; or through indifference, indolence, or incompetence, or through some preoccupation or self-interest they are so absorbed that they suffer those to be neglected whom it is their duty to protect. And so there is reason to fear that what Plato declares of the philosophers may be inadequate, when he says that they are just because they are busied with the pursuit of truth and because they despise and count as naught that which most men eagerly seek and for which they are prone to do battle against each other to the death. For they secure one sort of justice, to be sure, in that they do no positive wrong to anyone, but they fall into the opposite injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning they leave to their fate those whom they ought to defend. And so, Plato thinks, they will not even assume their civic duties except under compulsion. But in fact it were better that they should assume them of their own accord; for an action intrinsically right is just only on condition that it is voluntary. |
|
9. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.78 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 161 | 2.78. And yet from the fact of the gods' existence (assuming that they exist, as they certainly do) it necessarily follows that they are animate beings, and not only animate but possessed of reason and united together in a sort of social community or fellowship, ruling the one world as a united commonwealth or state. |
|
| 10. Cicero, On Laws, 1.10-1.11, 1.58-1.62 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), as ciceros stoic spokesperson Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 35; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230 |
11. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.1-1.10, 3.7-3.10, 3.20-3.21, 3.31, 3.33, 3.62-3.64, 3.73, 4.61, 5.52 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), as ciceros stoic spokesperson •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 29, 35; Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 22, 25, 33, 87, 161| 1.1. Non eram nescius, Brute, cum, quae summis ingeniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sermone tractavissent, ea Latinis litteris mandaremus, fore ut hic noster labor in varias reprehensiones incurreret. nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt, si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. erunt etiam, et ii quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. 1.2. contra quos omnis dicendum breviter existimo. Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis responsum est eo libro, quo a nobis philosophia philosophia a nobis BE defensa et collaudata est, cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi veritus ne movere hominum studia viderer, retinere non posse. Qui autem, si maxime hoc placeat, placet BEV moderatius tamen id volunt fieri, difficilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo, quod semel admissum admissum dett iam missum coe+rceri reprimique non potest, ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis, qui omnino avocent a philosophia, quam his, qui rebus infinitis modum constituant in reque eo meliore, quo maior sit, mediocritatem desiderent. 1.3. sive enim ad sapientiam perveniri potest, non paranda nobis solum ea, sed fruenda etiam sapientia om. cod. Eliens. Davisii, P. Man. est; sive hoc difficile est, tamen nec modus est ullus ullus est BE investigandi veri, nisi inveneris, et quaerendi defatigatio defetigatio A 2 turpis est, cum id, quod quaeritur, sit pulcherrimum. etenim si delectamur, cum scribimus, quis est tam invidus, qui ab eo nos abducat? sin laboramus, quis est, qui alienae modum statuat industriae? nam ut Terentianus Chremes non inhumanus, qui novum vicinum non vult 'fodere au/t arare aut a/liquid ferre de/nique'— non enim illum ab industria, sed ab inliberali labore deterret—, sic isti curiosi, quos offendit noster minime nobis iniucundus labor. 1.4. Iis iis Man. sec. Bai. ; his igitur est difficilius satis facere, qui se Latina latina A 1 B E latinia R latine A 2 NV scripta dicunt contemnere. in quibus hoc primum est in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non delectet eos sermo patrius, cum idem fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini nomini pene BE Romano est, qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii spernat aut reiciat, quod se isdem Euripidis fabulis delectari dicat, Latinas litteras oderit? Synephebos ego, inquit, potius Caecilii aut Andriam Terentii quam utramque Medri legam? A quibus tantum dissentio, ut, cum Sophocles vel optime scripserit Electram, tamen male conversam Atilii atrilii ( ut videtur )R acilii BE mihi legendam putem, de quo Lucilius: Lucilius Se. lucinius A 1 ; licinius (altera parte prioris u erasa) A 2 ; licinius BER, N (litin.), V; Licinus C.F.W. Mue. 1.5. 'ferreum scriptorem', verum, opinor, scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit. rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poe+tis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidii delicatissimi. mihi quidem nulli satis eruditi videntur, quibus nostra ignota sunt. an Utina/m an Utinam Mur (ad Phil. 14, 5), at utinam ABERN aut umnam V ne in nemore nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? 1.6. Quid? quod BEN 2 si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque eisque eisdem N his (hys) BE nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca antepot iis, quae et splendide dicta sint dicta sint dett. dicta sunt neque sint conversa de Graecis? nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos ipsos NV ipso quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant, quam legendi sunt. quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. quid? Theophrastus Theophrastus A. Man. theophrastum RNV theophastrum A theoprastum BE mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? quid? Epicurei epicuri BE num num BE non RV non ( superscr. ab alt. m. uel num) A non ( superscr. ab alt. m. nun) N desistunt de isdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis isdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est, cur nostri a nostris non legantur? 1.7. Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poe+tae fabulas, male, male AR 2 N 2 mali BEN 1 mole R 1 magis V credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Medro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius, Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia; alia Urs. alias sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris. 1.8. ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire, usui uenire superscr. ab alt. m. illud e; ut sit illud euenire, A; uenire usu R ut abhorreant a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. quibus ego assentior, dum modo de isdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. res vero bonas verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas dictas V dictatas quis non legat? nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a Scaevola est praetore praetore P. Man. praetor salutatus Athenis Albucius. 1.9. quem quidem locum comit comit Se. c o N cum ABERV cf. ad p. 5,10; 23,1; 26,12; 44,8; 46,15; 160,31 multa venustate et omni sale idem Lucilius, apud quem praeclare Scaevola: Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum, municipem Ponti, Ponti edd. pontii (pontu BE) Tritani, Tritani Bai. tritanii A 2 RV tiranii A 1 tritanu BE centurionum, praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque, maluisti dici. Graece ergo praetor Athenis, id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto: 'chaere,' chaere care BE inquam, Tite! lictores, turma omnis chorusque: chorusque cohorsque 'primus quantum video Man.' Mdv. 'chaere, Tite!' hinc hic A 1 BERV mi BEV; om. in ras. A; m R; mi in fine versus N 1, add. itii ( ut sit mutii) N 2 hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus. Sed iure Mucius. 1.10. ego autem mirari satis mirari satis Mdv. satis mirari A. Man.; non mirari Böck. mirari (R in mg. ad aū in fine versus pos. adscriptum habet a man. rec. nō) non queo unde hoc sit tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium. non est omnino hic hic omnino BE docendi locus; sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, modo non inopem N 2 modo inopem ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. quando enim nobis, vel dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poe+tis, postea quidem quam fuit quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit? Ego vero, quoniam quoniam Otto con (conforensibus superscr. ab alt. man. u sup. o priore ) N c vel ī (superscr.) R cum forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor videor N 2 V videri praesidium, in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, sum dett. sim debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, possum BE possim in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, nec cum istis tantopere tanto opere N pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, malunt BER modo legant illa ipsa, ne simulent, et iis servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magnopere desiderent. 3.7. nam in Tusculano cum essem vellemque e bibliotheca pueri Luculli quibusdam libris uti, veni in eius villam, ut eos ipse, ut solebam, depromerem. quo cum venissem, M. Catonem, quem ibi esse nescieram, vidi in bibliotheca sedentem multis circumfusum Stoicorum libris. erat enim, ut scis, in eo aviditas legendi, nec satiari poterat, quippe qui ne reprehensionem ne re pn sionē R ne pren- sionem ABE rep hensionem N nec reprensionem V quidem vulgi iem reformidans iem non ut credo reformidans (punct. ab alt. m. pos.) N in ipsa curia soleret legere saepe, dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operae rei publicae detrahens. quo magis tum in summo otio maximaque copia quasi helluari libris, si hoc verbo in tam clara re utendum est, videbatur. 3.8. quod cum accidisset ut alter alterum necopinato videremus, surrexit statim. deinde prima illa, quae in congressu solemus: Quid tu, inquit, huc? a villa enim, credo, et: Si ibi te esse scissem, ad te ipse venissem. Heri, inquam, ludis commissis ex urbe profectus veni ad vesperum. vespm BE vesperam R causa autem fuit huc veniendi ut quosdam hinc hinc BE hīc (īc ex corr. m. alt. ) N hic A huc RV libros promerem. et quidem, Cato, hanc totam copiam iam Lucullo nostro notam esse oportebit; nam his libris eum malo quam reliquo ornatu villae delectari. est enim mihi magnae curae—quamquam hoc quidem proprium tuum munus est—, ut ita erudiatur, ut et patri et Caepioni scipioni BER c epioni V nostro et tibi tam propinquo respondeat. laboro autem non sine causa; nam et avi avi avunculi Schuetz. 'cui sic assentior ut ipsum Ciceronem perturbatione quadam memoriae avi scripsisse putem' Mdv. (cf. index nom. et rer. s. v. Q. Servilius Caepio). eius memoria moveor—nec enim ignoras, quanti fecerim Caepionem, scepionem R c epionem V qui, ut opinio mea fert, fert R refert in principibus iam esset, si viveret—, et Lucullus et L. Lucullus Halm. mihi versatur ante oculos, vir cum vir cum (tum E) om. V virtutibus virtutibus om. ABERN omnibus excellens, tum mecum et amicitia et omni voluntate sententiaque coniunctus. 3.9. Praeclare, inquit, facis, cum cum quod Wes. apud Mdv. et eorum memoriam tenes, quorum uterque tibi testamento liberos suos testamento libros suos tibi BE commendavit, et puerum diligis. quod autem meum munus dicis non equidem recuso, sed te adiungo socium. addo etiam illud, multa iam mihi dare signa puerum et pudoris et ingenii, sed aetatem vides. Video equidem, inquam, sed tamen iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, conbiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior. veniet paratior sit et quidem A venerit (in E incert.) paratior sit et quidem BE veniet paratior sit. Equidem R cu ul si venerit paratior sit Et quidem N 1 veniet paratior sit quidem N 2 veniet paratior sic equidem V Sic, et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos agemusque communiter. sed residamus, inquit, si placet. Itaque fecimus. 3.10. Tum ille: Tu autem cum ipse tantum librorum habeas, quos quos om. BE hic hic hic ul hic N his AR hys BE om. V tandem requiris? Commentarios quosdam, inquam, Aristotelios, aristotelios A aristotilis BE aristoteles R aristotili hos N 1 aristotelicos N 2 aristotilicos V quos hic sciebam esse, veni ut auferrem, quos legerem, dum essem otiosus; quod quidem nobis non saepe contingit. Quam vellem, inquit, te ad Stoicos inclinavisses! erat enim, si cuiusquam, certe tuum nihil praeter virtutem in bonis ducere. Vide, ne magis, inquam, tuum fuerit, cum re idem tibi, quod mihi, videretur, non nova te te om. NV rebus nomina inponere. ratio enim nostra consentit, pugnat oratio. Minime vero, inquit ille, consentit. quicquid quidquid BV quitquid E Quid quod R enim praeter id, quod honestum sit, expetendum esse dixeris in bonisque numeraveris, et honestum ipsum quasi virtutis lumen extinxeris et virtutem penitus everteris. Dicuntur ista, Cato, magnifice, inquam, sed videsne verborum gloriam tibi cum Pyrrhone et cum Aristone, qui omnia exaequant, esse exequant esse V, N (post t ras., es ab alt. m.); exequantes se ABE ex sequentes se R communem? 3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.31. sed sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii, ii V hi (hij) qui cum scientia vivere ultimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam esse dixerunt, atque ita sapientem beatum fore, nihil aliud alii momento ullo anteponentem, et qui, add.O.Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 252; Mdv. ut ut aut BE quidam Academici constituisse dicuntur, extremum bonorum et summum munus esse sapientis obsistere visis adsensusque suos firme sustinere. his singulis copiose responderi solet, sed quae perspicua sunt longa esse non debent. quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, fore ut add. Lamb. tollatur omnis ea, quae quaeratur laudeturque, prudentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis, quas posui, et iis, si quae similes earum sunt, relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint sint Mdv. sunt reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere. 3.33. Bonum autem, quod in hoc sermone totiens usurpatum est, id etiam definitione explicatur. sed eorum definitiones paulum oppido inter se differunt et tamen eodem spectant. ego adsentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id, quod esset natura esset natura dett. esset enatura A esset e natura RNV esse a natura BE absolutum. id autem sequens illud etiam, quod prodesset— w)fe/lhma enim sic appellemus—, motum aut statum esse dixit e natura absoluto. absoluto Brem. absoluta cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni boni Lamb. in curis secundis ; bonum notitia notitia nocio BE facta est. cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit. 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.64. mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum. 3.73. physicae quoque quoque quidem BE non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei ei V et ABER ei et N proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere parere pariete R et sequi sequi et deum et se BE deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus adversus advorsum Non. deos nec quanta iis iis Mdv. his expiatione ( explatione L 1 ut vid. Lindsay ) Non. gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. nec vero ... potest Non. p. 232 s. v. advorsum 4.61. quid, si reviviscant Platonis illi et deinceps qui eorum auditores fuerunt, et tecum ita loquantur? Nos cum te, M. Cato, studiosissimum philosophiae, iustissimum virum, optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem, audiremus, admirati sumus, quid esset cur nobis Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sentirent ea, quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, nominibus uterentur iis, quae prima specie admirationem, re explicata risum moverent. tu autem, si tibi illa probabantur, cur non propriis verbis ea ea NV eas R illa BE tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne omnibus et Platoni ipsi nescio quem illum anteponebas? praesertim cum in re publica princeps esse velles ad eamque tuendam cum summa tua dignitate maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. a nobis enim ista quaesita, a nobis descripta, notata, add. Lamb. praecepta sunt, omniumque rerum publicarum rectionis rectionis Mdv. rectiones BERN rectores V genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et leges etiam et ERN leges et etiam B et etiam leges et V instituta ac mores civitatum perscripsimus. eloquentiae vero, quae et principibus maximo ornamento maximo ornamento RV maximo e ornamento B maximo cornamento E maxime (e ex corr. m. alt. ) ornamento N est, et qua te audimus audivimus RV valere plurimum, et qua te ... plurimum om. N quantum tibi ex monumentis monimentis RV nostris addidisses! Ea cum dixissent, quid tandem talibus viris responderes? 5.52. quid, cum fictas fabulas, e quibus utilitas nulla elici elici dett. dici BERN duci V potest, cum voluptate legimus? quid, cum volumus nomina eorum, qui quid gesserint, gesserunt R nota nobis esse, parentes, patriam, multa praeterea minime necessaria? quid, quod homines infima infirma BE fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur delectentur RNV historia? maximeque que om. R eos videre possumus res gestas audire et legere velle, qui a spe gerendi absunt confecti senectute. quocirca intellegi necesse est in ipsis rebus, quae discuntur et cognoscuntur, invitamenta invita—menta ( lineola et ta poste- rius ab alt. m. scr., ta in ras. ) N invita mente BE invita|et mente R in vita mentem V inesse, quibus ad discendum cognoscendumque moveamur. | 3.7. I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus; so I went to his country-house, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appetite for reading, and could never have enough of it; indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate-house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble, â he did not steal any attention from public business. So it may well be believed that when I found him taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of books at his command, he had the air of indulging in a literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so honourable an occupation. 3.8. Upon this chance encounter, each of us being equally surprised to see the other, he at once rose, and we began to exchange the usual greetings. "What brings you here?" cried he; "You are from your country-seat, I suppose. Had I known you were there," he continued, "I should have anticipated you with a visit." "Yes," I answered, "the games began yesterday, so I came out of town, and arrived late in the afternoon. My reason for coming on here was to get some books from the library. By the way, Cato, it will soon be time for our friend Lucullus to make acquaintance with this fine collection; for I hope he will take more pleasure in his library than in all the other appointments of his country-house. I am extremely anxious (though of course the responsibility belongs especially to you) that he should have the kind of education that will turn him out after the same pattern as his father and our dear Caepio, and also yourself, to whom he is so closely related. I cherish the memory of his grandfather (and you are aware how highly I esteemed Caepio, who in my belief would toâday be in the front rank, were he still alive). And also Lucullus is always present to my mind; he was a man of general eminence, and united to me in sentiment and opinion as well as by friendship." 3.9. "I commend you," rejoined Cato, "for your loyalty to the memory of men who both bequeathed their children to your care, as well as for your affectionate interest in the lad. My own responsibility, as you call it, I by no means disown, but I enlist you to share it with me. Moreover I may say that the youth already seems to me to show many signs both of modesty and talent; but you know how young he is." "I do," said I, "but all the same it is time for him to receive a tincture of studies which, if allowed to soak in at this impressionable age, will render him better equipped when he comes to the business of life." "True, and we will discuss this matter again several times more fully and take common action. But let us sit down," he said, "shall we?" So we sat down. 3.10. Cato then resumed: "But what pray are the books that you must come here for, when you have so large a library of your own?" "I have come to fetch some Note-books of Aristotle," I replied, "which I knew were here. I wanted to read them during my holiday; I do not often get any leisure." "How I wish," said he, "that you had thrown in your lot with the Stoics! You of all men might have been expected to reckon virtue as the only good." "Perhaps you might rather have been expected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a new terminology, when in substance you think as I do. Our principles agree; it is our language that is at variance." "Indeed," he rejoined, "they do not agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be desirable, once reckon anything as a good, other than Moral Worth, and you have extinguished the very light of virtue, Moral Worth itself, and overthrown virtue entirely." 3.20. "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â axia as the Stoics call it â this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathÄkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.31. But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said, as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consot with and things contrary to nature, the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence is abolished altogether? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature. 3.33. "Again, the term 'Good,' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. He was led by this also to pronounce the 'beneficial' (for so let us render the Greek ÅphelÄma) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.64. "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâabiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 3.73. "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to 'obey occasion,' 'follow God,' 'know thyself,' and 'moderation in all things.' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature's secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. 4.61. What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâeminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 5.52. What of our eagerness to learn the names of people who have done something notable, their parentage, birthplace, and many quite unimportant details beside? What of the delight that is taken in history by men of the humblest station, who have no expectation of participating in public life, even mere artisans? Also we may notice that the persons most eager to hear and read of public affairs are those who are debarred by the infirmities of age from any prospect of taking part in them. Hence we are forced to infer that the objects of study and knowledge contain in themselves the allurements that entice us to study and to learning. |
|
12. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.1-1.10, 3.7-3.10, 3.20-3.21, 3.31, 3.33, 3.62-3.64, 4.61, 5.52 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 22, 25, 33, 87, 161 | 3.7. I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus; so I went to his country-house, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appetite for reading, and could never have enough of it; indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate-house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble, â he did not steal any attention from public business. So it may well be believed that when I found him taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of books at his command, he had the air of indulging in a literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so honourable an occupation. 3.8. Upon this chance encounter, each of us being equally surprised to see the other, he at once rose, and we began to exchange the usual greetings. "What brings you here?" cried he; "You are from your country-seat, I suppose. Had I known you were there," he continued, "I should have anticipated you with a visit." "Yes," I answered, "the games began yesterday, so I came out of town, and arrived late in the afternoon. My reason for coming on here was to get some books from the library. By the way, Cato, it will soon be time for our friend Lucullus to make acquaintance with this fine collection; for I hope he will take more pleasure in his library than in all the other appointments of his country-house. I am extremely anxious (though of course the responsibility belongs especially to you) that he should have the kind of education that will turn him out after the same pattern as his father and our dear Caepio, and also yourself, to whom he is so closely related. I cherish the memory of his grandfather (and you are aware how highly I esteemed Caepio, who in my belief would toâday be in the front rank, were he still alive). And also Lucullus is always present to my mind; he was a man of general eminence, and united to me in sentiment and opinion as well as by friendship." 3.9. "I commend you," rejoined Cato, "for your loyalty to the memory of men who both bequeathed their children to your care, as well as for your affectionate interest in the lad. My own responsibility, as you call it, I by no means disown, but I enlist you to share it with me. Moreover I may say that the youth already seems to me to show many signs both of modesty and talent; but you know how young he is." "I do," said I, "but all the same it is time for him to receive a tincture of studies which, if allowed to soak in at this impressionable age, will render him better equipped when he comes to the business of life." "True, and we will discuss this matter again several times more fully and take common action. But let us sit down," he said, "shall we?" So we sat down. 3.10. Cato then resumed: "But what pray are the books that you must come here for, when you have so large a library of your own?" "I have come to fetch some Note-books of Aristotle," I replied, "which I knew were here. I wanted to read them during my holiday; I do not often get any leisure." "How I wish," said he, "that you had thrown in your lot with the Stoics! You of all men might have been expected to reckon virtue as the only good." "Perhaps you might rather have been expected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a new terminology, when in substance you think as I do. Our principles agree; it is our language that is at variance." "Indeed," he rejoined, "they do not agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be desirable, once reckon anything as a good, other than Moral Worth, and you have extinguished the very light of virtue, Moral Worth itself, and overthrown virtue entirely." 3.20. "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â axia as the Stoics call it â this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathÄkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.31. But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said, as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consot with and things contrary to nature, the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence is abolished altogether? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature. 3.33. "Again, the term 'Good,' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. He was led by this also to pronounce the 'beneficial' (for so let us render the Greek ÅphelÄma) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.64. "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâabiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 4.61. What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are preâeminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 5.52. What of our eagerness to learn the names of people who have done something notable, their parentage, birthplace, and many quite unimportant details beside? What of the delight that is taken in history by men of the humblest station, who have no expectation of participating in public life, even mere artisans? Also we may notice that the persons most eager to hear and read of public affairs are those who are debarred by the infirmities of age from any prospect of taking part in them. Hence we are forced to infer that the objects of study and knowledge contain in themselves the allurements that entice us to study and to learning. |
|
| 13. Cicero, On Friendship, 18, 4, 6, 5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 227 |
14. Cicero, Brutus, 8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230| 8. ita nobismet ipsis ipsis om. BHM accidit ut, quamquam essent multo magis alia lugenda, tamen hoc doleremus quod, quo tempore aetas nostra perfuncta rebus amplissimis tamquam in portum confugere deberet non inertiae neque desidiae, sed oti moderati atque honesti, cumque ipsa oratio iam nostra canesceret haberetque suam quandam maturitatem et quasi senectutem, tum arma sunt ea sumpta, quibus illi ipsi, qui didicerant eis uti gloriose, quem ad modum salutariter uterentur, non reperiebant. | |
|
15. Cicero, Brutus, 8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230| 8. ita nobismet ipsis ipsis om. BHM accidit ut, quamquam essent multo magis alia lugenda, tamen hoc doleremus quod, quo tempore aetas nostra perfuncta rebus amplissimis tamquam in portum confugere deberet non inertiae neque desidiae, sed oti moderati atque honesti, cumque ipsa oratio iam nostra canesceret haberetque suam quandam maturitatem et quasi senectutem, tum arma sunt ea sumpta, quibus illi ipsi, qui didicerant eis uti gloriose, quem ad modum salutariter uterentur, non reperiebant. | |
|
| 16. Cicero, Letters To Quintus, 3.5.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230 |
| 17. Cicero, On Old Age, 18-20, 67, 3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 58, 227 |
| 18. Cicero, Letters, 3.5.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230 |
| 19. Cicero, Lucullus, 145 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), suicide of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 105 |
| 20. Cicero, Philippicae, 1.11, 2.118, 8.31 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230 |
| 21. Cicero, Pro Caelio, 3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230 |
| 22. Cicero, Pro Marcello, 27 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius uticensis Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 215 |
| 23. Cicero, Pro Sestio, 112 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230 |
24. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.1, 1.55, 2.9, 3.7, 5.70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), as ciceros stoic spokesperson Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 35; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 25, 33| 1.1. Cum 1 et 5 extr. imit. Paschasius Radb. Expos. in ps. 44 l. I praef. in. defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus aut omnino aut magna ex parte essem aliquando liberatus, rettuli rettuli s retuli X Pasch. cf. p. 344, 24 me, Brute, te hortante maxime ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa revocavi, et cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis cf. Lact. inst. 3,14, 13 litteris litteris at libris V 2 inlustrandum putavi, non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset, sed meum semper hoc supra semper add. V 2 iudicium fuit omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae quidem digna statuissent, in quibus elaborarent. 1.55. moveat, quae se ipsa moveat ( to\ au)to\ e(auto\ kinou=n ) Macr. quae se ipsam semper m. X sed semper del. V vet quae sese m. Somn. neque nata certe est et aeterna est.” semper enim movetur...245, 3 aeterna est ( sine 19 vel... 23 neget) H licet concurrant omnes plebei philosophi—sic enim i, qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia dissident, appellandi videntur—, non modo nihil umquam tam eleganter eliganter K el eg. R 1 explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter supt. hic GR conclusum sit intellegent. sentit igitur animus se moveri; quod cum sentit, illud ilium X, corr. K c V 2 s una sentit, se vi sua, non aliena moveri, nec accidere posse ut ipse umquam a se deseratur. ad R 1 ex quo efficitur aeternitas, nisi quid habes ad haec. dicere post haec add. V 2 Ego vero facile sim sim def. Plasb. ad ac. 2,147 cl. Ter. Andr. 203 sum s passus ne in mentem quidem mihi aliquid contra venire; ita isti faveo sententiae. Quid? 2.9. Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partis partes K 1 R 1?ecorr. disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset, quid in quaque re re add. in mg. K 2 veri simile esset, inveniri, invenire GK 1 (~i 2 aut c ) RV 1 (i V rec ) sed etiam quod esset ea maxuma dicendi exercitatio. qua qua G princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. nostra autem memoria Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum: ad quam nos consuetudinem a familiaribus nostris adducti in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumpsimus. itaque cum ante meridiem dictioni operam dedissemus, sicut pridie feceramus, post meridiem meridie X (-di V me- ridi ach. G) meridiẽ K 2 R c? cf. de orat.2, 367 et Usener, Jahrb f. Phil. 117 p. 79 in Academiam descendimus. in qua disputationem habitam non quasi narrantes exponimus, exponemus V 2 sed eisdem ex eisdem K (exp. 2 aut 1) fere verbis, ut actum disputatumque est. Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum mundum V 1 sermo ille nobis institutus et a tali et ali V 1 et tali V c quodam ductus ductus Crat. inductus cf. Brut. 21 exordio: 3.7. ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, aliquid quid adherant G 1 causam disserendi. tum res acta sic est: Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo. Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines libidines add. G 2 iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, eiusmodi V ( ss. c ) quae Graeci pa/qh pathe X appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, relique ... 29 usitate ( libere ) H uisit. G 1 ( sic etiam 322, 10; 325,16 ) nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. Mihi vero isto modo. 5.70. haec tractanti tractanti s V 3 tractandi X (-i ex -o K 1 ) animo et noctes et dies cogitanti cogitandi KV 1 cogitanti G existit illa a a s om. X deo deo H Delphis praecepta cognitio, ut ipsa se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio compleatur. completur Bentl. ipsa enim cogitatio de vi et natura deorum studium incendit incedit GRV 1 illius aeternitatem aeternitatem Sey. aeternitatis (aeterni status Mdv. ad fin.1, 60 ) imitandi, neque se in brevitate vitae conlocatam conlocata GRV 1 collocatam H ( bis ) conlocatum s We. putat, cum rerum causas alias ex aliis aptas et necessitate nexas videt, quibus ab aeterno tempore fluentibus in aeternum ratio tamen mensque moderatur. | |
|
25. Cicero, Academica, 1.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius the elder Found in books: Gilbert, Graver and McConnell (2023), Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy. 230| 1.11. Ego autem Varro a. V. Pl. autem *d uarro *g (dicam enim ut res est), dum me ambitio dum honores dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura sed quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat, animo animo om. *d haec inclusa habebam et ne obsolescerent renovabam cum licebat legendo; nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus perculsus x Lb. vulnere et et om. *g administratione rei publicae liberatus doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime aptum est, aut his rebus si quas dignas laude gessimus hoc in primis consentaneum, aut etiam ad nostros cives erudiendos nihil utilius, aut si haec ita non sunt nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. | |
|
| 26. Cicero, Letters, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 22 |
| 27. Livy, History, 21.1-21.22, 30.44 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 52, 176, 234 |
| 28. Sallust, Catiline, 10.1-10.2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 6 |
| 29. Sallust, Historiae, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 6 |
| 30. Sallust, Iugurtha, 41.2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 6 |
31. Plutarch, Lucullus, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 22| 42.3. καίπερ ἀνθούσης τότε τοῖς Καρνεάδου λόγοις διὰ Φίλωνος, ἀλλὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς, πιθανὸν ἄνδρα καὶ δεινὸν εἰπεῖν τότε προστάτην ἐχούσης τὸν Ἀσκαλωνίτην Ἀντίοχον, ὃν πάσῃ σπουδῇ ποιησάμενος φίλον ὁ Λούκουλλος καὶ συμβιωτὴν ἀντέταττε τοῖς Φίλωνος ἀκροαταῖς, ὧν καὶ Κικέρων ἦν. | 42.3. |
|
| 32. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), as ciceros stoic spokesperson Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 29 |
| 33. Plutarch, Cato The Younger, 66-67, 69-71, 68 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 105 |
34. Plutarch, Cato The Elder, 13.1, 27.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 56, 176| 13.1. ἐπεὶ δʼ Ἀντίοχος ἐμφράξας τὰ περὶ Θερμοπύλας στενὰ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοφυέσι τῶν τόπων ἐρύμασι προσβαλὼν χαρακώματα καὶ διατειχίσματα, καθῆστο τὸν πόλεμον ἐκκεκλεικέναι νομίζων, τὸ μὲν κατὰ στόμα βιάζεσθαι παντάπασιν ἀπεγίνωσκον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, τὴν δὲ Περσικὴν ἐκείνην περιήλυσιν καὶ κύκλωσιν ὁ Κάτων εἰς νοῦν βαλόμενος ἐξώδευσε νύκτωρ, ἀναλαβὼν μέρος τι τῆς στρατιᾶς. 27.1. πρὸς τούτοις φασὶ τὸν Κάτωνά καὶ σῦκα τῶν Λιβυκῶν ἐπίτηδες ἐκβαλεῖν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ, τὴν τήβεννον ἀναβαλόμενον· εἶτα θαυμασάντων τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἡ ταῦτα φέρουσα χώρα τριῶν ἡμερῶν πλοῦν ἀπέχει τῆς Ῥώμης. ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἤδη καὶ βιαιότερον, τὸ περὶ παντὸς οὗ δήποτε πράγματος γνώμην ἀποφαινόμενον προσεπιφωνεῖν οὕτως δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Καρχηδόνα μὴ εἶναι. τοὐναντίον δὲ Πόπλιος Σκηπίων ὁ Νασικᾶς ἐπικαλούμενος ἀεὶ διετέλει λέγων καὶ ἀποφαινόμενος· δοκεῖ μοι Καρχηδόνα εἶναι. | 13.1. 27.1. |
|
| 35. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 42.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 164 |
| 36. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.12.3, 3.24.13, 3.24.18-3.24.20, 3.26.33-3.26.34 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 111 |
| 37. Epictetus, Fragments, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 111 |
| 38. Seneca The Younger, De Constantia Sapientis, 2.1, 7.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), suicide of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 105, 111 |
| 39. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 7.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), suicide of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 105 |
| 40. Tatian, Oration To The Greeks, 3.2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 164 |
| 41. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.91 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 164 |
42. Pliny The Younger, Letters, 8.24.3, 10.49 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •porcius cato, marcus Found in books: Dignas (2002), Economy of the Sacred in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor, 112 | 10.49. To Trajan. Before my arrival, Sir, the people of Nicomedia had commenced to make certain additions to their old forum, in one corner of which stands a very ancient shrine of the Great Mother, * which should either be restored or removed to another site, principally for this reason, that it is much less lofty than the new buildings, which are being run up to a good height. When I inquired whether the temple was protected by any legal enactments, I discovered that the form of dedication is different here from what it is with us in Rome. Consider therefore. Sir, whether you think that a temple can be removed without desecration when there has been no legal consecration of the site, for, if there are no religious objections, the removal would be a great convenience. |
|
| 43. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 199.16-199.18 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 164 |
| 44. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 6.8.14 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 164 |
45. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.88 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 87 | 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. |
|
46. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 3.19 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 161 | 3.19. 19.But with respect to him who thinks that we should not use an ox for food, nor destroying and corrupting spirit and life, place things on the table which are only the allurements and elegances of satiety, of what does he deprive our life, which is either necessary to our safety, or subservient to virtue? To compare plants, however, with animals, is doing violence to the order of things. For the latter are naturally sensitive, and adapted to feel pain, to be terrified and hurt; on which account also they may be injured. But the former are entirely destitute of sensation, and in consequence of this, nothing foreign, or evil, or hurtful, or injurious, can befall them. For sensation is the principle of all alliance, and of every thing of a foreign nature. But Zeno and his followers assert, that alliance is the principle of justice. And is it not absurd, since we see that many of our own species live from sense alone, but do not possess intellect and reason, and since we also see, that many of them surpass the most terrible of wild beasts in cruelty, anger, and rapine, being murderous of their children and their parents, and also being tyrants, and the tools of kings [is it not, I say, absurd,] to fancy that we ought to act justly towards these, but that no justice is due from us to the ox that ploughs, the dog that is fed with us, and the animals that nourish us with their milk, and adorn our bodies with their wool? Is it not such an opinion most irrational and absurd? |97 SPAN |
|
| 47. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 2.43, 7.432-7.435 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), suicide of Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 105, 111, 164 |
| 48. Heraclitus, Allegoriae, 33.1 Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 111 |
| 49. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), as ciceros stoic spokesperson Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 29 |
| 50. Cicero, Academic Books, 9 Tagged with subjects: •cato, marcus porcius Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 25 |
| 51. Ps.-Plutarch, On Homer, 2.136 Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 111 |
| 53. Cicero, On Proper Functions, 3.14-3.16 Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), sagehood of •related fabulously about, of cato (marcus porcius cato the younger) Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 111 |
54. Vergil, Aeneis, 1.19-1.20, 1.36, 1.39-1.41, 1.661, 4.622-4.629, 6.841, 6.844-6.846, 6.855-6.859 Tagged with subjects: •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato, in the aeneid •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 6, 52, 80, 201, 234 | 1.19. made front on Italy and on the mouths 1.20. of Tiber 's stream; its wealth and revenues 1.36. for her loved Greeks at Troy . Nor did she fail 1.39. its griefs and wrongs: the choice by Paris made; 1.40. her scorned and slighted beauty; a whole race 1.41. rebellious to her godhead; and Jove's smile 1.661. on Trojan corn or Xanthus ' cooling stream. 4.622. mite with alternate wrath: Ioud is the roar, 4.623. and from its rocking top the broken boughs 4.624. are strewn along the ground; but to the crag 4.625. teadfast it ever clings; far as toward heaven 4.626. its giant crest uprears, so deep below 4.627. its roots reach down to Tartarus:—not less 4.628. the hero by unceasing wail and cry 4.629. is smitten sore, and in his mighty heart 6.841. Their arms and shadowy chariots he views, 6.844. For if in life their darling passion ran 6.845. To chariots, arms, or glossy-coated steeds, 6.846. The self-same joy, though in their graves, they feel. 6.855. And poets, of whom the true-inspired song 6.856. Deserved Apollo's name; and all who found 6.857. New arts, to make man's life more blest or fair; 6.858. Yea! here dwell all those dead whose deeds bequeath 6.859. Deserved and grateful memory to their kind. |
|
| 55. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.68, 3.282, 3.326 Tagged with subjects: •cato (marcus porcius cato the younger), as ciceros stoic spokesperson Found in books: Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 29, 35 |
| 56. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 161 |
| 57. Florus Lucius Annaeus, Epitome Bellorum Omnium Annorum Dcc, 1.24.2 Tagged with subjects: •cato the elder, marcus porcius cato Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 56 |
