1. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.41, 4.21, 5.16, 5.22, 5.89 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •carneades, polemical strategies Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 70 | 3.41. "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâcalled 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 4.21. "What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy! But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, that all men's folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in public life, in the lawâcourts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everyone else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched? 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.22. Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. 5.89. What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, â if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, â let them coin new words at their pleasure. |
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2. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.41, 4.21, 5.16, 5.22, 5.89 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •carneades, polemical strategies Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 70| 3.41. Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam qua tractata Guyet. a Peripateticis mollius—est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem ignorantiam R dialecticae—Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio aio aĩo V animo R oio ( prior o ab alt. m. in ras. ) N discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod non ex omni quod Dav. non quod ex omni ARV noro quod ex omni BE numquam ex omni N aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent. 4.21. O magnam vim ingenii causamque iustam, cur nova existeret disciplina! Perge porro. sequuntur enim ea, quae tu scientissime complexus es, complexus es p. 107, 17-30 omnium insipientiam, iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, omniaque peccata esse paria, eosque, qui natura doctrinaque longe ad virtutem processissent, nisi eam plane consecuti essent, summe esse miseros, neque inter eorum vitam et improbissimorum quicquam omnino interesse, ut Plato, tantus ille vir, si sapiens non fuerit, nihilo melius quam quivis improbissimus nec beatius beatius dett. beatus vixerit. haec videlicet est correctio correctio V correptio philosophiae veteris et emendatio, quae omnino aditum habere nullum nullum habere BE potest in urbem, in forum, in curiam. quis enim ferre posset ita loquentem eum, qui se auctorem vitae graviter et sapienter agendae profiteretur, nomina rerum commutantem, cumque idem sentiret quod omnes, quibus rebus eandem vim tribueret, alia nomina inponentem, verba modo mutantem, de opinionibus nihil detrahentem? 5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. 5.22. nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadeam illam sententiam. quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id id ( post vult) om. RNV efficit turpe. ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquitis. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. hos contra singulos dici est melius. sed nunc, quod quod quid BE quid (= quidem) R agimus; 5.89. quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? idem dicant V iā dicant R ilia appellant BE ita, quem ad modum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. bonum appello quicquid secundum naturam est, quod quod V contra malum, nec ego quam BER solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola scola BERV desinis. quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? quanti quidque sit aliter docti et indocti, sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit—si homines essent, essent V si B se E et R ( in quo s non satis cognosci potest ) usitate loquerentur—, dum res maneant, maneant dett. maneat verba fingant arbitratu suo. | 3.41. "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâcalled 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 4.21. "What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy! But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, that all men's folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in public life, in the lawâcourts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everyone else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched? 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.22. Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. 5.89. What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, â if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, â let them coin new words at their pleasure. |
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