| 1. Homer, Odyssey, 12.212 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108 |
| 2. Cicero, Philippicae, 2.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153 |
3. Cicero, On Divination, 1.17-1.22 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Found in books: Walters (2020) 80| 1.17. Sed quo potius utar aut auctore aut teste quam te? cuius edidici etiam versus, et lubenter quidem, quos in secundo de consulatu Urania Musa pronuntiat: Principio aetherio flammatus Iuppiter igni Vertitur et totum conlustrat lumine mundum Menteque divina caelum terrasque petessit, Quae penitus sensus hominum vitasque retentat Aetheris aeterni saepta atque inclusa cavernis. Et, si stellarum motus cursusque vagantis Nosse velis, quae sint signorum in sede locatae, Quae verbo et falsis Graiorum vocibus erant, Re vera certo lapsu spatioque feruntur, Omnia iam cernes divina mente notata. 1.18. Nam primum astrorum volucris te consule motus Concursusque gravis stellarum ardore micantis Tu quoque, cum tumulos Albano in monte nivalis Lustrasti et laeto mactasti lacte Latinas, Vidisti et claro tremulos ardore cometas, Multaque misceri nocturna strage putasti, Quod ferme dirum in tempus cecidere Latinae, Cum claram speciem concreto lumine luna Abdidit et subito stellanti nocte perempta est. Quid vero Phoebi fax, tristis nuntia belli, Quae magnum ad columen flammato ardore volabat, Praecipitis caeli partis obitusque petessens? Aut cum terribili perculsus fulmine civis Luce sereti vitalia lumina liquit? Aut cum se gravido tremefecit corpore tellus? Iam vero variae nocturno tempore visae Terribiles formae bellum motusque monebant, Multaque per terras vates oracla furenti Pectore fundebant tristis minitantia casus, 1.19. Atque ea, quae lapsu tandem cecidere vetusto, Haec fore perpetuis signis clarisque frequentans Ipse deum genitor caelo terrisque canebat. Nunc ea, Torquato quae quondam et consule Cotta Lydius ediderat Tyrrhenae gentis haruspex, Omnia fixa tuus glomerans determinat annus. Nam pater altitos stellanti nixus Olympo Ipse suos quondam tumulos ac templa petivit Et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignis. Tum species ex aere vetus venerataque Nattae Concidit, elapsaeque vetusto numine leges, Et divom simulacra peremit fulminis ardor. 1.20. Hic silvestris erat Romani nominis altrix, Martia, quae parvos Mavortis semine natos Uberibus gravidis vitali rore rigabat; Quae tum cum pueris flammato fulminis ictu Concidit atque avolsa pedum vestigia liquit. Tum quis non artis scripta ac monumenta volutans Voces tristificas chartis promebat Etruscis? Omnes civilem generosa a stirpe profectam Vitare ingentem cladem pestemque monebant Vel legum exitium constanti voce ferebant Templa deumque adeo flammis urbemque iubebant Eripere et stragem horribilem caedemque vereri; Atque haec fixa gravi fato ac fundata teneri, Ni prius excelsum ad columen formata decore Sancta Iovis species claros spectaret in ortus. Tum fore ut occultos populus sanctusque senatus Cernere conatus posset, si solis ad ortum Conversa inde patrum sedes populique videret. 1.21. Haec tardata diu species multumque morata Consule te tandem celsa est in sede locata, Atque una fixi ac signati temporis hora Iuppiter excelsa clarabat sceptra columna, Et clades patriae flamma ferroque parata Vocibus Allobrogum patribus populoque patebat. Rite igitur veteres, quorum monumenta tenetis, Qui populos urbisque modo ac virtute regebant, Rite etiam vestri, quorum pietasque fidesque Praestitit et longe vicit sapientia cunctos, Praecipue coluere vigenti numine divos. Haec adeo penitus cura videre sagaci, Otia qui studiis laeti tenuere decoris, 1.22. Inque Academia umbrifera nitidoque Lyceo Fuderunt claras fecundi pectoris artis. E quibus ereptum primo iam a flore iuventae Te patria in media virtutum mole locavit. Tu tamen anxiferas curas requiete relaxans, Quod patriae vacat, id studiis nobisque sacrasti. Tu igitur animum poteris inducere contra ea, quae a me disputantur de divinatione, dicere, qui et gesseris ea, quae gessisti, et ea, quae pronuntiavi, accuratissume scripseris? | 1.17. But what authority or what witness can I better employ than yourself? I have even learned by heart and with great pleasure the following lines uttered by the Muse, Urania, in the second book of your poem entitled, My Consulship:First of all, Jupiter, glowing with fire from regions celestial,Turns, and the whole of creation is filled with the light of his glory;And, though the vaults of aether eternal begird and confine him,Yet he, with spirit divine, ever searching the earth and the heavens,Sounds to their innermost depths the thoughts and the actions of mortals.When one has learned the motions and variant paths of the planets,Stars that abide in the seat of the signs, in the Zodiacs girdle,(Spoken of falsely as vagrants or rovers in Greek nomenclature,Whereas in truth their distance is fixed and their speed is determined,)Then will he know that all are controlled by an Infinite Wisdom. 1.18. You, being consul, at once did observe the swift constellations,Noting the glare of luminous stars in direful conjunction:Then you beheld the tremulous sheen of the Northern aurora,When, on ascending the mountainous heights of snowy Albanus,You offered joyful libations of milk at the Feast of the Latins;Ominous surely the time wherein fell that Feast of the Latins;Many a warning was given, it seemed, of slaughter nocturnal;Then, of a sudden, the moon at her full was blotted from heaven —Hidden her features resplendent, though night was bejewelled with planets;Then did that dolorous herald of War, the torch of Apollo,Mount all aflame to the dome of the sky, where the sun has its setting;Then did a Roman depart from these radiant abodes of the living,Stricken by terrible lightning from heavens serene and unclouded.Then through the fruit-laden body of earth ran the shock of an earthquake;Spectres at night were observed, appalling and changeful of figure,Giving their warning that war was at hand, and internal commotion;Over all lands there outpoured, from the frenzied bosoms of prophets,Dreadful predictions, gloomy forecasts of impending disaster. 1.19. And the misfortunes which happened at last and were long in their passing —These were foretold by the Father of Gods, in earth and in heaven,Through unmistakable signs that he gave and often repeated.[12] Now, of those prophecies made when Torquatus and Cotta were consuls, —Made by a Lydian diviner, by one of Etruscan extraction —All, in the round of your crowded twelve months, were brought to fulfilment.For high-thundering Jove, as he stood on starry Olympus,Hurled forth his blows at the temples and monuments raised in his honour,And on the Capitols site he unloosed the bolts of his lightning.Then fell the brazen image of Natta, ancient and honoured:Vanished the tablets of laws long ago divinely enacted;Wholly destroyed were the statues of gods by the heat of the lightning. 1.20. Here was the Martian beast, the nurse of Roman dominion,Suckling with life-giving dew, that issued from udders distended,Children divinely begotten, who sprang from the loins of the War God;Stricken by lightning she toppled to earth, bearing with her the children;Torn from her station, she left the prints of her feet in descending.Then what diviner, in turning the records and tomes of the augurs,Failed to relate the mournful forecasts the Etruscans had written?Seers all advised to beware the monstrous destruction and slaughter,Plotted by Romans who traced their descent from a noble ancestry;Or they proclaimed the laws overthrow with voices insistent,Bidding rescue the city from flames, and the deities temples;Fearful they bade us become of horrible chaos and carnage;These, by a rigorous Fate, would be certainly fixed and determined,Were not a sacred statue of Jove, one comely of figure,High on a column erected beforehand, with eyes to the eastward;Then would the people and venerable senate be able to fathomHidden designs, when that statue — its face to the sun at its rising —Should behold from its station the seats of the people and Senate. 1.21. Long was the statue delayed and much was it hindered in making.Finally, you being consul, it stood in its lofty position.Just at the moment of time, which the gods had set and predicted,When on column exalted the sceptre of Jove was illumined,Did Allobrogian voices proclaim to Senate and peopleWhat destruction by dagger and torch was prepared for our country.[13] Rightly, therefore, the ancients whose monuments you have in keeping,Romans whose rule over peoples and cities was just and courageous,Rightly your kindred, foremost in honour and pious devotion,Far surpassing the rest of their fellows in shrewdness and wisdom,Held it a duty supreme to honour the Infinite Godhead.Such were the truths they beheld who painfully searching for wisdomGladly devoted their leisure to study of all that was noble, 1.22. Who, in Academys shade and Lyceums dazzling effulgence,Uttered the brilliant reflections of minds abounding in culture.Torn from these studies, in youths early dawn, your country recalled you,Giving you place in the thick of the struggle for public preferment;Yet, in seeking surcease from the worries and cares that oppress you,Time, that the State leaves free, you devote to us and to learning.In view, therefore, of your acts, and in view too of your own verses which I have quoted and which were composed with the utmost care, could you be persuaded to controvert the position which I maintain in regard to divination? |
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4. Cicero, De Domo Sua, 102-103, 111-112, 114, 146 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020) 108| 146. facis iniuriam, Chrysogone, si maiorem spem emptionis tuae in huius exitio ponis quam in eis iis π : his cett. rebus quas L. L ucius Sulla gessit. quod si tibi causa nulla est cur hunc miserum tanta calamitate adfici velis, si tibi omnia sua praeter praeter σχψ : propter cett. animam tradidit nec sibi quicquam paternum ne monumenti quidem causa reservavit causa reservavit ψ2 : causa clare servavit cett. : causa clam reservavit pauci dett. , per deos immortalis! quae ista tanta crudelitas est, quae tam fera immanisque natura? quis umquam praedo fuit tam nefarius, quis pirata tam barbarus ut, cum integram praedam sine sanguine habere posset, cruenta spolia detrahere mallet? | |
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5. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.6, 1.10, 1.25-1.124 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •brutus m. junius Found in books: Maso (2022) 19, 35, 114 | 1.6. I observe however that a great deal of talk has been current about the large number of books that I have produced within a short space of time, and that such comment has not been all of one kind; some people have been curious as to the cause of this sudden outburst of philosophical interest on my part, while others have been eager to learn what positive opinions I hold on the various questions. Many also, as I have noticed, are surprised at my choosing to espouse a philosophy that in their view robs the world of daylight and floods it with a darkness as of night; and they wonder at my coming forward so unexpectedly as the champion of a derelict system and one that has long been given up. As a matter of fact however I am no new convert to the study of philosophy. From my earliest youth I have devoted no small amount of time and energy to it, and I pursued it most keenly at the very periods when I least appeared to be doing so, witness the philosophical maxims of which my speeches are full, and my intimacy with the learned men who have always graced my household, as well as those eminent professors, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius, who were my instructors. 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 1.25. "So much, Lucilius, for the doctrines of your school. To show what the older systems are like, I will trace their history from the remotest of your predecessors. Thales of Miletus, who was the first person to investigate these matters, said that water was the first principle of things, but that god was the mind that moulded all things out of water — supposing that gods can exist without sensation; and why did he make mind an adjunct of water, if mind can exist by itself, devoid of body? The view of Anaximander is that the gods are not everlasting but are born and perish at long intervals of time, and that they are worlds, countless in number. But how we conceive of god save as living for ever? 1.26. Next, Anaximenes held that air is god, and that it has a beginning in time, and is immeasurable and infinite in extent, and is always in motion; just as if formless air could be god, especially seeing that it is proper to god to possess not merely some shape but the most beautiful shape; or as if anything that has had a beginning must not necessarily be mortal. Then there is Anaxagoras, the successor of Anaximenes; he was the first thinker to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by the rational power of an infinite mind. But in saying this he failed to see that there can be no such thing as sentient and continuous activity in that which is infinite, and that sensation in general can only occur when the subject itself becomes sentient by the impact of a sensation. Further, if he intended his infinite mind to be a definite living creature, it must have some inner principle of life to justify the name. But mind is itself the innermost principle. Mind therefore will have an outer integument of body. 1.27. But this Anaxagoras will not allow; yet mind naked and simple, without any material adjunct to serve as an organ of sensation, seems to elude the capacity of our understanding. Alcmaeon of Croton, who attributed divinity to the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, and also to the soul, did not perceive that he was bestowing immortality on things that are mortal. As for Pythagoras, who believed that the entire substance of the universe is penetrated and pervaded by a soul of which our souls are fragments, he failed to notice that this severance of the souls of men from the world-soul means the dismemberment and rending asunder of god; and that when their souls are unhappy, as happens to most men, then a portion of god is unhappy; which is impossible. 1.28. Again, if the soul of man is divine, why is it not omniscient? Moreover, if the Pythagorean god is pure soul, how is he implanted in, or diffused throughout, the world? Next, Xenophanes endowed the universe with mind, and held that, as being infinite, it was god. His view of mind is as open to objection as that of the rest; but on the subject of infinity he incurs still severer criticism, for the infinite can have no sensation and no contact with anything outside. As for Parmenides, he invents a purely fanciful something resembling a crown — stephanè is his name for it —, an unbroken ring of glowing lights, encircling the sky, which he entitles god; but no one can imagine this to possess divine form, or sensation. He also has many other portentous notions; he deifies war, strife, lust and the like, things which can be destroyed by disease or sleep or forgetfulness or lapse of time; and he also deifies the stars, but this has been criticized in another philosopher and need not be dealt with now in the case of Parmenides. 1.29. Empedocles again among many other blunders comes to grief most disgracefully in his theology. He assigns divinity to the four substances which in his system are the constituent elements of the universe, although manifestly these substances both come into and pass out of existence, and are entirely devoid of sensation. Protagoras also, who declares he has no clear views whatever about the gods, whether they exist or do not exist, or what they are like, seems to have no notion at all of the divine nature. Then in what a maze of error is Democritus involved, who at one moment ranks as gods his roving 'images,' at another the substance that emits and radiates these images, and at another again the scientific intelligence of man! At the same time his denial of immutability and therefore of eternity, to everything whatsoever surely involves a repudiation of deity so absolute as to leave no conception of a divine be remaining! Diogenes of Apollonia makes air a god; but how can air have sensation, or divinity in any shape? 1.30. The inconsistencies of Plato are a long story. In the Timaeus he says that it is impossible to name the father of this universe; and in the Laws he deprecates all inquiry into the nature of the deity. Again, he holds that god is entirely incorporeal (in Greek, asomatos); but divine incorporeity is inconceivable, for an incorporeal deity would necessarily be incapable of sensation, and also of practical wisdom, and of pleasure, all of which are attributes essential to our conception of deity. Yet both in the Timaeus and the Laws he says that the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls are gods, in addition to those in whom we have been taught to believe; but it is obvious that these propositions are both inherently false and mutually destructive. 1.31. Xenophon also commits almost the same errors, though in fewer words; for in his memoir of the sayings of Socrates he represents Socrates as arguing that it is wrong to inquire about the form of god, but also as saying that both the sun and the soul are god, and as speaking at one moment of a single god and at another of several: utterances that involve almost the same mistakes as do those which we quoted from Plato. 1.32. Antisthenes also, in his book entitled The Natural Philosopher, says that while there are many gods of popular belief, there is one god in nature, so depriving divinity of all meaning or substance. Very similarly Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, and speaking of a certain force that governs all things and is endowed with life, does his best to root out the notion of deity from our minds altogether. 1.33. And Aristotle in the Third Book of his Philosophy has a great many confused notions, not disagreeing with the doctrines of his master Plato; at one moment he assigns divinity exclusively to the intellect, at another he says that the world is itself a god, then again he puts some other being over the world, and assigns to this being the rôle of regulating and sustaining the world-motion by means of a sort of inverse rotation; then he says that the celestial heat is god — not realizing that the heavens are a part of that world which elsewhere he himself has entitled god. But how could the divine consciousness which he assigns to the heavens persist in a state of such rapid motion? Where moreover are all the gods of accepted belief, if we count the heavens also as a god? Again, in maintaining that god is incorporeal, he robs him entirely of sensation, and also of wisdom. Moreover, how is motion possible for an incorporeal being, and how, if he is always in motion, can he enjoy tranquillity and bliss? 1.34. Nor was his fellow-pupil Xenocrates any wiser on this subject. His volumes On the Nature of the Gods give no intelligible account of the divine form; for he states that there are eight gods: five inhabiting the planets, and in a state of motion; one consisting of all the fixed stars, which are to be regarded as separate members constituting a single deity; seventh he adds the sun, and eighth the moon. But what sensation of bliss these things can enjoy it is impossible to conceive. Another member of the school of Plato, Heracleides of Pontus, filled volume after volume with childish fictions; at one moment he deems the world divine, at another the intellect; he also assigns divinity to the planets, and holds that the deity is devoid of sensation and mutable of form; and again in the same volume he reckons earth and sky as gods. 1.35. Theophrastus also is intolerably inconsistent; at one moment he assigns divine pre‑eminence to mind, at another to the heavens, and then again to the constellations and stars in the heavens. Nor is his pupil, Strato, surnamed the Natural Philosopher, worthy of attention; in his view the sole repository of divine power is nature, which contains in itself the causes of birth, growth and decay, but is entirely devoid of sensation and of form. 1.36. "Lastly, Balbus, I come to your Stoic school. Zeno's view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage however Zeno declares that the aether is god — if there is any meaning in a god without sensation, a form of deity that never presents itself to us when we offer up our prayers and supplications and make our vows. And in other books again he holds the view that a 'reason' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. He likewise attributes the same powers to the stars, or at another time to the years, the months and the seasons. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony (or Origin of the Gods) he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. 1.37. Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views. He thinks that the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all. Cleanthes, who attended Zeno's lectures at the same time as the last-named, at one moment says that the world itself is god, at another gives this name to the mind and soul of the universe, and at another decides that the most unquestionable deity is that remote all‑surrounding fiery atmosphere called the aether, which encircles and embraces the universe on its outer side at an exceedingly lofty altitude; while in the books that he wrote to combat hedonism he babbles like one demented, now imagining gods of some definite shape and form, now assigning full divinity to the stars, now pronouncing that nothing is more divine than reason. The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. 1.38. Persaeus, another pupil of Zeno, says that men have deified those persons who have made some discovery of special utility for civilization, and that useful and health-giving things have themselves been called by divine names; he did not even say that they were discoveries of the gods, but speaks of them as actually divine. But what could be more ridiculous than to award divine honours to things mean and ugly, or to give the rank of gods to men now dead and gone, whose worship could only take the form of lamentation? 1.39. Chrysippus, who is deemed to be the most skilful interpreter of the Stoic dreams, musters an enormous mob of unknown gods — so utterly unknown that even imagination cannot guess at their form and nature, although our mind appears capable of visualizing anything; for he says that divine power resides in reason, and in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all‑pervading world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and reason, and the common and all‑embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs future events; and also all fluid and soluble substances, such as water, earth, air, the sun, moon and stars, and the all‑embracing unity of things; and even those human beings who have attained immortality. 1.40. He also argues that the god whom men call Jupiter is the aether, and that Neptune is the air which permeates the sea, and the goddess called Ceres the earth; and he deals in the same way with the whole series of the names of the other gods. He also identifies Jupiter with the mighty Law, everlasting and eternal, which is our guide of life and instructress in duty, and which he entitles Necessity or Fate, and the Everlasting Truth of future events; none of which conceptions is of such a nature as to be deemed to possess divinity. 1.41. This is what is contained in his Nature of the Gods, Book I. In Book II he aims at reconciling the myths of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer with his own theology as enunciated in Book I, and so makes out that even the earliest poets of antiquity, who had no notion of these doctrines, were really Stoics. In this he is followed by Diogenes of Babylon, who in his book entitled Minerva rationalizes the myth of the birth of the virgin goddess from Jove by explaining it as an allegory of the processes of nature. 1.42. "I have given a rough account of what are more like the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers. For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarrels, their births and deaths, their complaints and lamentations, the utter and unbridled licence of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immortal parent. 1.43. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some 'preconception' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgement. 1.44. You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the uimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) 1.45. We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that 'that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favour, since all such things belong only to the weak.' "If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshipping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man's pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favour alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence. 1.46. "For the divine form we have the hints of nature supplemented by the teachings of reason. From nature all men of all races derive the notion of gods as having human shape and none other; for in what other shape do they ever appear to anyone, awake or asleep? But not to make primary concepts the sole test of all things, reason itself delivers the same pronouncement. 1.47. For it seems appropriate that the being who is the most exalted, whether by reason of his happiness or his eternity, should also be the most beautiful; but what disposition of the limbs, what cast of features, what shape or outline can be more beautiful than the human form? You Stoics at least, Lucilius, (for my friend Cotta says one thing at one time and another at another) are wont to portray the skill of the divine creator by enlarging on the beauty as well as the utility of design displayed in all parts of the human figure. 1.48. But if the human figure surpasses the form of all other living beings, and god is a living being, god must possess the shape which is the most beautiful of all; and since it is agreed that the gods are supremely happy, and no one can be happy without virtue, and virtue cannot exist without reason, and reason is only found in the human shape, it follows that the gods possess the form of man. 1.49. Yet their form is not corporeal, but only resembles bodily substance; it does not contain blood, but the semblance of blood. "These discoveries of Epicurus are so acute in themselves and so subtly expressed that not everyone would be capable of appreciating them. Still I may rely on your intelligence, and make my exposition briefer than the subject demands. Epicurus then, as he not merely discerns abstruse and recondite things with his mind's eye, but handles them as tangible realities, teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind, and not materially or individually, like the solid objects which Epicurus in virtue of their substantiality entitles steremnia; but by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods, our minds with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of the nature of a being both blessed and eternal. 1.50. Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study; we must understand that it has the following property, that in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals, and if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite. "You Stoics are also fond of asking us, Balbus, what is the mode of life of the gods and how they pass their days. 1.51. The answer is, their life is the happiest conceivable, and the one most bountifully furnished with all good things. God is entirely inactive and free from all ties of occupation; he toils not neither does he labour, but he takes delight in his own wisdom and virtue, and knows with absolute certainty that he will always enjoy pleasures at once consummate and everlasting. 1.52. This is the god whom we should call happy in the proper sense of the term; your Stoic god seems to us to be grievously overworked. If the world itself is god, what can be less restful than to revolve at incredible speed round the axis of the heavens without a single moment of respite? but repose is an essential condition of happiness. If on the other hand some god resides within the world as its governor and pilot, maintaining the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons and all the ordered process of creation, and keeping a watch on land and sea to guard the interests and lives of men, why, what a bondage of irksome and laborious business is his! 1.53. We for our part deem happiness to consist in tranquillity of mind and entire exemption from all duties. For he who taught us all the rest has also taught us that the world was made by nature, without needing an artificer to construct it, and that the act of creation, which according to you cannot be performed without divine skill, is so easy, that nature will create, is creating and has created worlds without number. You on the contrary cannot see how nature can achieve all this without the aid of some intelligence, and so, like the tragic poets, being unable to bring the plot of your drama to a dénouement, you have recourse to a god; 1.54. whose intervention you assuredly would not require if you would but contemplate the measureless and boundless extent of space that stretches in every direction, into which when the mind projects and propels itself, it journeys onward far and wide without ever sighting any margin or ultimate point where it can stop. Well then, in this immensity of length and breadth and height there flits an infinite quantity of atoms innumerable, which though separated by void yet cohere together, and taking hold each of another form unions wherefrom are created those shapes and forms of things which you think cannot be created without the aid of bellows and anvils, and so have saddled us with an eternal master, whom day and night we are to fear; for who would not fear a prying busybody of a god, who foresees and thinks of and notices all things, and deems that everything is his concern? 1.55. An outcome of this theology was first of all your doctrine of Necessity or Fate, heimarmenē, as you termed it, the theory that every event is the result of an eternal truth and an unbroken sequence of causation. But what value can be assigned to a philosophy which thinks that everything happens by fate? it is a belief for old women, and ignorant old women at that. And next follows your doctrine of mantikē, or Divination, which would so steep us in superstition, if we consented to listen to you, that we should be the devotees of soothsayers, augurs, oracle-mongers, seers and interpreters of dreams. 1.56. But Epicurus has set us free from superstitious terrors and delivered us out of captivity, so that we have no fear of beings who, we know, create no trouble for themselves and seek to cause none to others, while we worship with pious reverence the transcendent majesty of nature. "But I fear that enthusiasm for my subject has made me prolix. It was difficult however to leave so vast and splendid a theme unfinished, although really it was not my business to be a speaker so much as a listener." 1.57. Then Cotta took up the discussion. "Well, Velleius," he rejoined, with his usual suavity, "unless you had stated a case, you certainly would have had no chance of hearing anything from me. I always find it much easier to think of arguments to prove a thing false than to prove it true. This often happens to me, and did so just now while I was listening to you. Ask me what I think that the divine nature is like, and very probably I shall make no reply; but inquire whether I believe that it resembles the description of it which you have just given, and I shall say that nothing seems to me less likely. But before proceeding to examine your arguments, I will give my opinion of yourself. 1.58. I fancy I have often heard that friend of yours [Lucius Crassus] declare that of all the Roman adherents of Epicureanism he placed you unquestionably first, and that few of those from Greece could be ranked beside you; but knowing his extraordinary esteem for you, I imagined that he was speaking with the partiality of a friend. I myself however, though reluctant to praise you to your face, must nevertheless pronounce that your exposition of an obscure and difficult theme has been most illuminating, and not only exhaustive in its treatment of the subject, but also graced with a charm of style not uncommon in your school. 1.59. When at Athens, I frequently attended the discourses of Zeno, whom our friend Philo used to call the leader of the Epicurean choir; in fact it was Philo who suggested that I should go to him — no doubt in order that I might be better able to judge how completely the Epicurean doctrine may be refuted when I had heard an exposition of it from the head of the school. Now Zeno, unlike most Epicureans, had a style as clear, cogent and elegant as your own. But what often occurred to me in his case happened just now while I was listening to you: I felt annoyed that talents so considerable should have chanced to select (if you will forgive my saying it) so trivial, not to say so stupid, a set of doctrines. 1.60. Not that I propose at the moment to contribute something better of my own. As I said just now, in almost all subjects, but especially in natural philosophy, I am more ready to say what is not true than what is. Inquire of me as to the being and nature of god, and I shall follow the example of Simonides, who having the same question put to him by the great Hiero, requested a day's grace for consideration; next day, when Hiero repeated the question, he asked for two days, and so went on several times multiplying the number of days by two; and when Hiero in surprise asked why he did so, he replied, 'Because the longer I deliberate the more obscure the matter seems to me.' But Simonides is recorded to have been not only a charming poet but also a man of learning and wisdom in other fields, and I suppose that so many acute and subtle ideas came into his mind that he could not decide which of them was truest, and therefore despaired of truth altogether. 1.61. But as for your master Epicurus (for I prefer to join issue with him rather than with yourself), which of his utterances is, I do not say worthy of philosophy, but compatible with ordinary common sense? "In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the gods exist or do they not? 'It is difficult to deny their existence.' No doubt it would be if the question were to be asked in a public assembly, but in private conversation and in a company like the present it is perfectly easy. This being so, I, who am a high priest, and who hold it to be a duty most solemnly to maintain the rights and doctrines of the established religion, should be glad to be convinced of this fundamental tenet of the divine existence, not as an article of faith merely but as an ascertained fact. For many disturbing reflections occur to my mind, which sometimes make me think that there are no gods at all. 1.62. But mark how generously I deal with you. I will not attack those tenets which are shared by your school with all other philosophers — for example the one in question, since almost all men, and I myself no less than any other, believe that the gods exist, and this accordingly I do not challenge. At the same time I doubt the adequacy of the argument which you adduce to prove it. You said that a sufficient reason for our admitting that the gods exist was the fact that all the nations and races of mankind believe it. But argument is both inconclusive and untrue. In the first place, how do you know what foreign races believe? For my part I think that there are many nations so uncivilized and barbarous as to have no notion of any gods at all. 1.63. Again, did not Diagoras, called the Atheist, and later Theodorus openly deny the divine existence? Since as for Protagoras of Abdera, the greatest sophist of that age, to whom you just now alluded, for beginning a book with the words 'About the gods I am unable to affirm either how they exist or how they do not exist,' he was sentenced by a decree of the Athenian assembly to be banished from the city and from the country, and to have his books burnt in the market-place: an example that I can well believe has discouraged many people since from professing atheism, since the mere expression of doubt did not succeed in escaping punishment. What are we to say about the men guilty of sacrilege or impiety or perjury? Suppose that ever Lucius Tubulus, Lupus or Carbo, or some son of Neptune, as Lucilius has it, had believed in the gods, would he have been such a perjurer and scoundrel? 1.64. We find then that your argument is not so well-established a proof of the view which you uphold as you imagine it to be. Still, as it is a line of reasoning that is followed by other philosophers as well, I will pass it over for the present, and turn rather to doctrines peculiar to your school. 1.65. "I grant the existence of the gods: do you then teach me their origin, their dwelling-place, their bodily and spiritual nature, their mode of life; for these are the things which I want to know. In regard to all of them you make great play with the lawless domination of the atoms; from these you construct and create everything that comes upon the ground, as he says. Now in the first place, there are no such things as atoms. For there is nothing . . . incorporeal, but all space is filled with material bodies; hence there can be no such thing as void, and no such thing as an indivisible body. 1.66. In all of this I speak for the time being only as the mouthpiece of our oracles of natural philosophy; whether their utterances are true or false I do not know, but at all events they are more probable than those of your school. As for the outrageous doctrines of Democritus, or perhaps of his predecessor Leucippus, that there are certain minute particles, some smooth, others rough, some round, some angular, some curved or hook-shaped, and that heaven and earth were created from these, not by compulsion of any natural law but by a sort of accidental colliding — this is the belief to which you, Gaius Velleius, have clung all your life long, and it would be easier to make you alter all your principles of conduct than abandon the teachings of your master; for you made up your mind that the Epicureanism claimed your allegiance before you learned these doctrines: so that you were faced with the alternative of either accepting these outrageous notions or surrendering the title of the school of your adoption. 1.67. For what would you take to cease to be an Epicurean? 'For no consideration,' you reply, 'would I forsake the principles of happiness and the truth.' Then is Epicureanism the truth? For as to happiness I don't join issue, since in your view even divine happiness involves being bored to death with idleness. But where is the truth to be found? I suppose in an infinite number of worlds, some coming to birth and others hurled into ruin at every minutest moment of time? or in the indivisible particles that produce all the marvels of creation without any controlling nature or reason? But I am forgetting the indulgence which I began to show you just now, and am taking too wide a range. I will grant therefore that everything is made out of indivisible bodies; but this takes us no farther, for we are trying to discover the nature of the gods. 1.68. Suppose we allow that the gods are made of atoms: then it follows that they are not eternal. For what is made of atoms came into existence at some time; but if the gods came into existence, before they came into existence there were no gods; and if the gods had a beginning, they must also perish, as you were arguing a little time ago about the world as conceived by Plato. Where then do we find that happiness and that eternity which in your system are the two catchwords that denote divinity? When you wish to make this out, you take cover in a thicket of jargon; you gave us the formula just now — God has not body but a semblance of body, not blood but a kind of blood. 1.69. "This is a very common practice with your school. You advance a paradox, and then, when you want to escape censure, you adduce in support of it some absolute impossibility; so that you would have done better to abandon the point in dispute rather than to offer so shameless a defence. For instance, Epicurus saw that if the atoms travelled downwards by their own weight, we should have no freedom of the will, since the motion of the atoms would be determined by necessity. He therefore invented a device to escape from determinism (the point had apparently escaped the notice of Democritus): he said that the atom while travelling vertically downward by the force of gravity makes a very slight swerve to the side. 1.70. This defence discredits him more than if he had had to abandon his original position. He does the same in his battle with the logicians. Their accepted doctrine is that in every disjunctive proposition of the form 'so‑and‑so either is or is not,' one of the two alternatives must be true. Epicurus took alarm; if such a proposition as 'Epicurus either will or will not be alive to‑morrow' were granted, one or other alternative would be necessary. Accordingly he denied the necessity of a disjunctive proposition altogether. Now what could be stupider than that? Arcesilas used to attack Zeno because, whereas he himself said that all sense-presentations are false, Zeno said that some were false, but not all. Epicurus feared that if a single sensation were admitted to be false, none would be true: he therefore said that all the senses give a true report. In none of these cases did he behave very cleverly, for to parry a lighter blow he laid himself open to one that was more severe. 1.71. "He does the same as regards the nature of the gods. In his desire to avoid the assumption of a dense cluster of atoms, which would involve the possibility of destruction and dissipation, he says that the gods have not a body but a semblance of body, and not blood but a semblance of blood. It is thought surprising that an augur can see an augur without smiling; but it is more surprising that you Epicureans keep a grave face when by yourselves. 'It is not body but a semblance of body.' I could understand what this supposition meant if it related to waxen images or figures of earthenware, but what 'a semblance of body' or 'a semblance of blood' may mean in the case of god, I cannot understand; nor can you either, Velleius, only you won't admit it. 1.72. "The fact is that you people merely repeat by rote the idle vapourings that Epicurus uttered when half asleep; for, as we read in his writings, he boasted that he had never had a teacher. This I for my part could well believe, even if he did not proclaim it, just as I believe the owner of an ill‑built house when he boasts that he did not employ an architect! He shows not the faintest trace of the Academy or the Lyceum, or even of the ordinary schoolboy studies. He might have heard Xenocrates — by heaven, what a master! — and some people think that he did, but he himself denies it, and he ought to know! He states that he heard a certain Pamphilus, a pupil of Plato, at Samos (where he resided in his youth with his father and brother — his father Neocles had gone there to take up land, but failing to make a living out of his farm, I believe kept a school). 1.73. However Epicurus pours endless scorn on this Platonist, so afraid is he of appearing ever to have learnt anything from a teacher. He stands convicted in the case of Nausiphanes, a follower of Democritus, whom he does not deny he heard lecture, but whom nevertheless he assails with every sort of abuse. Yet if he had not heard from him these doctrines of Democritus, what had he heard? for what is there in Epicurus's natural philosophy that does not come from Democritus? Since even if he introduced some alterations, for instance the swerve of the atoms, of which I spoke just now, yet most of his system is the same, the atoms, the void, the images, the infinity of space, and the countless number of worlds, their births and their destructions, in fact almost everything that is comprised in natural science. 1.74. "As to your formula 'a semblance of body' and 'a semblance of blood,' what meaning do you attach to it? That you have a better knowledge of the matter than I have I freely admit, and what is more, am quite content that this should be so; but once it is expressed in words, why should one of us be able to understand it and not the other? Well then, I do understand what body is and what blood is, but what 'a semblance of body' and 'a semblance of blood' are I don't understand in the very least. You are not trying to hide the truth from me, as Pythagoras used to hide it from strangers, nor yet are you speaking obscurely on purpose like Heraclitus, but (to speak candidly between ourselves) you don't understand it yourself any more than I do. 1.75. I am aware that what you maintain is that the gods possess a certain outward appearance, which has no firmness or solidity, no definite shape or outline, and which is free from gross admixture, volatile, transparent. Therefore we shall use the same language as we should of the Venus of Cos: her's is not real flesh but the likeness of flesh, and the mantling blush that dyes her fair cheek is not real blood but something that counterfeits blood; similarly in the god of Epicurus we shall say that there is no real substance but something that counterfeits substance. But assume that I accept as true a dogma that I cannot even understand: exhibit to me, pray, the forms and features of your shadow-deities. 1.76. On this topic you are at no loss for arguments designed to prove that the gods have the form of men: first because our minds possess a preconceived notion of such a character that, when a man thinks of god, it is the human form that presents itself to him; secondly, because inasmuch as the divine nature surpasses all other things, the divine form also must needs be the most beautiful, and no form is more beautiful than that of man. The third reason you advance is that no other shape is capable of being the abode of intelligence. 1.77. Well then, take these arguments one by one and consider what they amount to; for in my view they based on an arbitrary and quite inadmissible assumption on your part. First of all, was there ever any student so blind as not to see that human shape has been thus assigned to the gods either by the deliberate contrivance of philosophers, the better to enable them to turn the hearts of the ignorant from vicious practices to the observance of religion, or by superstition, to supply images for men to worship in the belief that in so doing they had direct access to the divine presence? These notions moreover have been fostered by poets, painters and artificers, who found it difficult to represent living and active deities in the likeness of any other shape than that of man. Perhaps also man's belief in his own superior beauty, to which you referred, may have contributed to the result. But surely you as a natural philosopher are aware what an insinuating go‑between and pander of her own charms nature is! Do you suppose that there is a single creature on land or in the sea which does not prefer an animal of its own specie to any other? If this were not so, why should not a bull desire to couple with a mare, or a horse with a cow? Do you imagine that an eagle or lion or dolphin thinks any shape more beautiful than its own? Is it then surprising if nature has likewise taught man to think his own species the most beautiful . . . that this was a reason why we should think the gods resemble man? 1.78. "Suppose animals possessed reason, do you not think that they would each assign pre‑eminence to their own species? For my part I protest (if I am to say what I think) that although I am not lacking in self-esteem yet I don't presume to call myself more beautiful than the famous bull on which Europa rode; for the question is not here of our intellectual and oratorical powers but of our outward form and aspect. Indeed if we choose to make imaginary combinations of shapes, would you not like to resemble the merman Triton who is depicted riding upon swimming monsters attached to his man's body? I am on ticklish ground here, for natural instinct is so strong that every man wishes to be like a man and nothing else. 1.79. Yes, and every ant like an ant! Still, the question is, like what man? How small a percentage of handsome people there are! When I was at Athens, there was scarcely one to be found in each platoon of the training-corps — I see why you smile, but the fact is all the same. Another point: we, who with the sanction of the philosophers of old are fond of the society of young men, often find even their defects agreeable. Alcaeus 'admires a mole upon his favourite's wrist'; of course a mole is a blemish, but Alcaeus thought it a beauty. Quintus Catulus, the father of our colleague and friend to‑day, was warmly attached to your fellow-townsman Roscius, and actually wrote the following verses in his honour: By chance abroad at dawn, I stood to pray To the uprising deity of day; When lo! upon my left — propitious sight — Suddenly Roscius dawned in radiance bright. Forgive me, heavenly pow'rs, if I declare, Meseem'd the mortal than the god more fair. To Catulus, Roscius was fairer than a god. As a matter of fact he had, as he has to‑day, a pronounced squint; but no matter — in the eyes of Catulus this in itself gave him piquancy and charm. 1.80. "I return to the gods. Can we imagine any gods, I do not say as cross-eyed as Roscius, but with a slight cast? Can we picture any of them with a mole, a snub nose, protruding ears, prominent brows and too large a head — defects not unknown among us men —, or are they entirely free from personal blemishes? Suppose we grant you that, are we also to say that they are all exactly alike? If not, there will be degrees of beauty among them, and therefore a god can fall short of supreme beauty. If on the other hand they are all alike, then the Academic school must have a large following in heaven, since if there is no difference between one god and another, among the gods knowledge and perception must be impossible. 1.81. "Furthermore, Velleius, what if your assumption, that when we think of god the only form that presents itself to us is that of a man, be entirely untrue? will you nevertheless continue to maintain your absurdities? Very likely we Romans do imagine god as you say, because from our childhood Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan and Apollo have been known to us with the aspect with which painters and sculptors have chosen to represent them, and not with that aspect only, but having that equipment, age and dress. But they are not so known to the Egyptians or Syrians, or any almost of the uncivilized races. Among these you will find a belief in certain animals more firmly established than is reverence for the holiest sanctuaries and images of the gods with us. 1.82. For we have often seen temples robbed and images of gods carried off from the holiest shrines by our fellow-countrymen, but no one ever even heard of an Egyptian laying profane hands on a crocodile or ibis or cat. What therefore do you infer? that the Egyptians do not believe their sacred bull Apis to be a god? Precisely as much as you believe the Saviour Juno of your native place to be a goddess. You never see her even in your dreams unless equipped with goat-skin, spear, buckler and slippers turned up at the toe. Yet that is not the aspect of the Argive Juno, nor of the Roman. It follows that Juno has one form for the Argives, another for the people of Lanuvium, and another for us. And indeed our Jupiter of the Capitol is not the same as the Africans' Juppiter Ammon. 1.83. Should not the physical philosopher therefore, that is, the explorer and tracker-out of nature, be ashamed to go to minds besotted with habit for evidence of truth? On your principle it will be legitimate to assert that Jupiter always wears a beard and Apollo never, and that Minerva has grey eyes and Neptune blue. Yes, and at Athens there is a much-praised statue of Vulcan made by Alcamenes, a standing figure, draped, which displays a slight lameness, though not enough to be unsightly. We shall therefore deem god to be lame, since tradition represents Vulcan so. Tell me now, do we also make out the gods to have the same names as those by which they are known to us? 1.84. But in the first place the gods have as many names as mankind has languages. You are Velleius wherever you travel, but Vulcan has a different name in Italy, in Africa and in Spain. Again, the total number of names even in our pontifical books is not great, but there are gods innumerable. Are they without names? You Epicureans at all events are forced to say so, since what is the point of more names when they are all exactly alike? How delightful it would be, Velleius, if when you did not know a thing you would admit your ignorance, instead of uttering this drivel, which must make even your own gorge rise with disgust? Do you really believe that god resembles me, or yourself? of course you do not. "What then? Am I to say that the sun is a god, or the moon, or the sky? If so, we must also say that it is happy; but what forms of enjoyment constitute its happiness? and wise; but how can wisdom reside in a senseless bulk like that? These are arguments employed by your own school. 1.85. Well then, if the gods do not possess the appearance of men, as I have proved, nor some such form as that of the heavenly bodies, as you are convinced, why do you hesitate to deny their existence? You do not dare to. Well, that is no doubt wise — although in this matter it is not the public that you fear, but the gods themselves: I personally am acquainted with Epicureans who worship every paltry image, albeit I am aware that according to some people's view Epicurus really abolished the gods, but nominally retained them in order not to offend the people of Athens. Thus the first of his selected aphorisms or maxims, which you call the Kyriai Doxai, runs, I believe, thus: That which is blessed and immortal neither experiences trouble nor causes it to anyone. Now there are people who think that the wording of this maxim was intentional, though really it was due to the author's inability to express himself clearly; their suspicion does an injustice to the most guileless of mankind. 1.86. It is in fact doubtful whether he means that there is a blessed and immortal being, or that, if there is, that being is such as he describes. They fail to notice that although his language is ambiguous here, yet in many other places both he and Metrodorus speak as plainly as you yourself did just now. Epicurus however does actually think that the gods exist, nor have I ever met anybody more afraid than he was of those things which he says are not terrible at all, I mean death and the gods. Terrors that do not very seriously alarm ordinary people, according to Epicurus haunt the minds of all mortal men: so many thousands commit brigandage, for which the penalty is death, and other men rob temples whenever they have the chance; I suppose the former are haunted by the fear of death and the latter by the terrors of religion! 1.87. "But as you have not the courage (for I will now address myself to Epicurus in person) to deny that the gods exist, what should hinder you from reckoning as divine the sun, or the world, or some form of ever-living intelligence? 'I have never seen a mind endowed with reason and with purpose,' he replies, 'that was embodied in any but a human form.' Well, but have you ever seen anything like the sun or the moon or the five planets? The sun, limiting his motion by the two extreme points of one orbit, completes his courses yearly. The moon, lit by the sun's rays, achieves this solar path in the space of a month. The five planets, holding the same orbit, but some nearer to and others farther from the earth, from the same starting-points complete the same distances in different periods of time. 1.88. Now, Epicurus, have you ever seen anything like this? Well, then, let us deny the existence of the sun, moon and planets, inasmuch as nothing can exist save that which we have touched or seen. And what of god himself? You have never seen him, have you? Why then do you believe in his existence? On this principle we must sweep aside everything unusual of which history or science informs us. The next thing would be for inland races to refuse to believe in the existence of the sea. How can such narrowness of mind be possible? It follows that, if you had been born in Seriphus and had never left the island, where you had been used to seeing nothing larger than hares and foxes, when lions and panthers were described to you, you would refuse to believe in their existence; and if somebody told you about an elephant, you would actually think that he was making fun of you! 1.89. "For your part, Velleius, you forsook the practice of your school for that of the logicians — a science of which your clan is entirely ignorant — and expressed the doctrine in the form of a syllogism. You assumed that the gods are happy: we grant it. But no one, you said, can be happy without virtue. This also we give you, and willingly. But virtue cannot exist without reason. To this also we must agree. You add, neither can reason exist save embodied in human form. Who do you suppose will grant you this? for if it were true, what need had you to arrive at it by successive steps? you might have taken it for granted. But what about your successive steps? I see how you proceeded step by step from happiness to virtue, from virtue to reason; but how from reason do you arrive at human form? That is not a step, it is a headlong plunge. 1.90. "Nor indeed do I understand why Epicurus preferred to say that gods are like men rather than that men are like gods. 'What is the difference?' you will ask me, 'for if A is like B, B is like A.' I am aware of it; but what I mean is, that the gods did not derive the pattern of their form from men; since the gods have always existed, and were never born — that is, if they are to be eternal; whereas men were born; therefore the human form existed before mankind, and it was the form of the immortal gods. We ought not to say that the gods have human form, but that our form is divine. "However, as to that, you may take your choice. What I want to know is, how did such a piece of good luck happen (for according to your school nothing in the universe was caused by design) — but be that as it may, 1.91. what accident was so potent, how did such a fortunate concourse of atoms come about, that suddenly men were born in the form of gods? Are we to think that divine seed fell from heaven to earth, and that thus men came into being resembling their sires? I wish that this were your story, for I should be glad to acknowledge my divine relations! But you do not say anything of the sort — you say that our likeness to the gods was caused by chance. "And now is there any need to search for arguments to refute this? I only wish I could discover the truth as easily as I can expose falsehood. For you gave a full and accurate review, which caused me for one to wonder at so much learning in a Roman, of the theological doctrines of the philosophers from Thales of Miletus downward. 1.92. Did you think they were all out of their minds because they pronounced that god can exist without hands or feet? Does not even a consideration of the adaptation of man's limbs to their functions convince you that the gods do not require human limbs? What need is there for feet without walking, or for hands if nothing has to be grasped, or for the rest of the list of the various parts of the body, in which nothing is useless, nothing without a reason, nothing superfluous, so that no art can imitate the cunning of nature's handiwork? It seems then that god will have a tongue, and will not speak; teeth, a palate, a throat, for no use; the organs that nature has attached to the body for the purpose of procreation — these god will possess, but to no purpose; and not only the external but also the internal organs, the heart, lungs, liver and the rest, which if they are not useful are assuredly not beautiful — since your school holds that god possesses bodily parts because of their beauty. 1.93. "Was it dreams like these that not only encouraged Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus to contradict Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but actually emboldened a loose woman like Leontium to write a book refuting Theophrastus? Her style no doubt is the neatest of Attic, but all the same! — such was the licence that prevailed in the Garden of Epicurus. And yet you are touchy yourselves, indeed Zeno actually used to invoke the law. I need not mention Albucius. As for Phaedrus, though he was the most refined and courteous of old gentlemen, he used to lose his temper if I spoke too harshly; although Epicurus attacked Aristotle in the most insulting manner, abused Socrates' pupil Phaedo quite outrageously, devoted whole volumes to an onslaught on Timocrates, the brother of his own associate Metrodorus, for differing from him on some point or other of philosophy, showed no gratitude toward Democritus himself, whose system he adopted, and treated so badly his own master Nausiphanes, from whom he had learnt a considerable amount. As for Zeno, he aimed the shafts of his abuse not only at his contemporaries, Apollodorus, Silus and the rest, but Socrates himself, the father of philosophy, he declared to have been the Attic equivalent of our Roman buffoons; and he always alluded to Chrysippus in the feminine gender. 1.94. You yourself just now, when reeling off the list of philosophers like the censor calling the roll of the Senate, said that all those eminent men were fools, idiots and madmen. But if none of these discerned the truth about the divine nature, it is to be feared that the divine nature is entirely non‑existent. "For as for your school's account of the matter, it is the merest fairy-story, hardly worthy of old wives at work by lamplight. You don't perceive what a number of things you are let in for, if we consent to admit that men and gods have the same form. You will have to assign to god exactly the same physical exercises and care of the person as are proper to men: he will walk, run, recline, bend, sit, hold things in the hand, and lastly even converse and make speeches. 1.95. As for your saying that the gods are male and female, well, you must see what the consequence of that will be. For my part, I am at a loss to imagine how your great founder arrived at such notions. All the same you never cease vociferating that we must on no account relinquish the divine happiness and immortality. But what prevents god from being happy without having two legs? and why cannot your 'beatitude' or 'beatity,' whichever form we are to use — and either is certainly a hard mouthful, but words have to be softened by use — but whatever it is, why can it not apply to the sun yonder, or to this world of ours, or to some eternal intelligence devoid of bodily shape and members? 1.96. Your only answer is: 'I have never seen a happy sun or world.' Well, but have you ever seen any other world but this one? No, you will reply. Then why did you venture to assert the existence of, not thousands and thousands, but a countless number of worlds? 'That is what reason teaches.' Then will not reason teach you that when we seek to find a being who shall be supremely excellent, and happy and eternal as well — and nothing else constitutes divinity —, even as that being will surpass us in immortality, so also will it surpass us in mental excellence, and even as in mental excellence, so also in bodily. Why then, if we are inferior to god in all else, are we his equals in form? for man came nearer to the divine image in virtue than in outward aspect. 1.97. [Can you mention anything so childish (to press the same point still further) as to deny the existence of the various species of huge animals that grow in the Red Sea or in India? Yet not even the most diligent investigators could possibly collect information about all the vast multitude of creatures that exist on land and in the sea, the marshes and the rivers: the existence of which we are to deny, because we have never seen them!] "Then take your favourite argument from resemblance: how utterly pointless it really is! Why, does not a dog resemble a wolf? — and, to quote Ennius, How like us is that ugly brute, the ape! — but the two differ in habits. The elephant is the wisest of beasts, but the most ungainly in shape. 1.98. I speak of animals, but is it not the case even with men that when very much alike in appearance they differ widely in character, and when very much alike in character they are unlike in appearance? In fact, Velleius, if once we embark on this line of argument, see how far it takes us. You claimed it as axiomatic that reason can only exist in human form; but someone else will claim that it can only exist in a terrestrial creature, in one that has been born, has grown up, has been educated, consists of a soul and a body liable to decay and disease — in fine, that it can only exist in a mortal man. If you stand out against each of these assumptions, why be troubled about shape only? Rational intelligence exists in man, as you saw, only in conjunction with all the attributes that I have set out; yet you say that you can recognize god even with all these attributes stripped off, provided that the outward form remains. This is not to weigh the question, it is to toss up for what you are to say. 1.99. Unless indeed you happen never to have observed this either, that not only in a man but even in a tree whatever is superfluous or without a use is harmful. What a nuisance it is to have a single finger too many! Why is this? Because, given five fingers, there is no need of another either for appearance or for use. But your god has got not merely one finger more than he wants, but a head, neck, spine, sides, belly, back, flanks, hands, feet, thighs, legs. If this is to secure him immortality, what have these members to do with life? What has even the face? It depends more on the brain, heart, lungs and liver, for they are the abode of life: a man's countece and features have nothing to do with his vitality. 1.100. "Then you censured those who argued from the splendour and the beauty of creation, and who, observing the world itself, and the parts of the world, the sky and earth and sea, and the sun, moon and stars that adorn them, and discovering the laws of the seasons and their periodic successions, conjectured that there must exist some supreme and transcendent being who had created these things, and who imparted motion to them and guided and governed them. Though this guess may be wide of the mark, I can see what they are after; but as for you, what mighty masterpiece pray do you adduce as apparently the creation of divine intelligence, leading you to conjecture that gods exist? 'We have an idea of god implanted in our minds,' you say. Yes, and an idea of Jupiter with a beard, and Minerva in a helmet; but do you therefore believe that those deities are really like that? 1.101. The unlearned multitude are surely wiser here — they assign to god not only a man's limbs, but the use of those limbs. For they give him bow, arrows, spear, shield, trident, thunderbolt; and if they cannot see what actions the gods perform, yet they cannot conceive of god as entirely inactive. Even the Egyptians, whom we laugh at, deified animals solely on the score of some utility which they derived from them; for instance, the ibis, being a tall bird with stiff legs and a long horny beak, destroys a great quantity of snakes: it protects Egypt from plague, by killing and eating the flying serpents that are brought from the Libyan desert by the south-west wind, and so preventing them from harming the natives by their bite while alive and their stench when dead. I might describe the utility of the ichneumon, the crocodile and the cat, but I do not wish to be tedious. I will make my point thus: these animals are at all events deified by the barbarians for the benefits which they confer, but your gods not only do no service you can point to, but they don't do anything at all. 1.102. 'God,' he says, 'is free from trouble.' Obviously Epicurus thinks, as spoilt children do, that idleness is the best thing there is. Yet these very children even when idle amuse themselves with some active game: are we to suppose that god enjoys so complete a holiday, and is so sunk in sloth, that we must fear lest the least movement may jeopardize his happiness? This language not merely robs the gods of the movements and activities suitable to the divine nature, but also tends to make men slothful, if even god cannot be happy when actively employed. 1.103. "However, granting your view that god is the image and the likeness of man, what is his dwelling-place and local habitation? in what activities does he spend his life? what constitutes that happiness which you attribute to him? For a person who is to be happy must actively enjoy his blessings. As for locality, even the iimate elements each have their own particular region: earth occupies the lowest place, water covers the earth, to air is assigned the upper realm, and the ethereal fires occupy the highest confines of all. Animals again are divided into those that live on land and those that live in the water, while a third class are amphibious and dwell in both regions, and there are also some that are believed to be born from fire, and are occasionally seen fluttering about in glowing furnaces. 1.104. About your deity therefore I want to know, first, where he dwells; secondly, what motive he has for moving in space, that is, if he ever does so move; thirdly, it being a special characteristic of animate beings to desire some end that is appropriate their nature, what is the thing that god desires; fourthly, upon what subject does he employ his mental activity and reason; and lastly, how is he happy, and how eternal? For whichever of these questions you raise, you touch a tender spot. An argument based on such insecure premisses can come to no valid conclusion. 1.105. Your assertion was that the form of god is perceived by thought and not by the senses, that it has no solidity nor numerical persistence, and that our perception of it is such that it is seen owing to similarity and succession, a never-ceasing stream of similar forms arriving continually from the infinite number of atoms, and that thus it results that our mind, when its attention is fixed on these forms, conceives the divine nature to be happy and eternal. Now in the name of the very gods about whom we are talking, what can possibly be the meaning of this? If the gods only appeal to the faculty of thought, and have no solidity or definite outline, what difference does it make whether we think of a god or of a hippocentaur? Such mental pictures are called by all other philosophers mere empty imaginations, but you say they are the arrival and entrance into our minds of certain images. 1.106. Well then, when I seem to see Tiberius Gracchus in the middle of his speech in the Capitol producing the ballot‑box for the vote on Marcus Octavius, I explain this as an empty imagination of the mind, but your explanation is that the images of Gracchus and Octavius have actually remained on the spot, so that when I come to the Capitol these images are borne to my mind; the same thing happens, you say, in the case of god, whose appearance repeatedly impinges on men's minds, and so gives rise to the belief in happy and eternal deities. 1.107. Suppose that there are such images constantly impinging on our minds: but that is only the presentation of a certain form — surely not also of a reason for supposing that this form is happy and eternal? "But what is the nature of these images of yours, and whence do they arise? This extravagance, it is true, is borrowed from Democritus; but he has been widely criticized, nor can you find a satisfactory explanation, and the whole affair is a lame and impotent business. For how can be more improbable than that images of Homer, Archilochus, Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras and Plato should impinge on me at all — much less that they should do so in the actual shape that those men really bore? How then do these images arise? and of whom are they the images? Aristotle tells us that the poet Orpheus never existed, and the Pythagoreans say that the Orphic poem which we possess was the work of a certain Cecrops; yet Orpheus, that is, according to you, the image of him, often comes into my mind. 1.108. What of the fact that different images of the same person enter my mind and yours? or that images come to us of things that never existed at all and never can have existed — for instance, Scylla, and the Chimaera? or of people, places and cities which we have never seen? What of the fact that I can call up an image instantaneously, the very moment that I choose to do so? or that they come to me unbidden, even when I am asleep? Velleius, the whole affair is humbug. Yet you stamp these images not only on our eyes but also on our minds — so irresponsibly do you babble. 1.109. And how extravagantly! There is a constant passage or stream of visual presentations which collectively produce a single visual impression. I should be ashamed to say that I do not understand the doctrine, if you who maintain it understood it yourselves! How can you prove that the stream of images is continuous, or if it is, how are the images eternal? You say that there is an innumerable supply of atoms. Are you going to argue then that everything is eternal, for the same reason? You take refuge in the principle of 'equilibrium' (for so with your consent we will translate isonomia), and you say that because there is mortal substance there must also be immortal substance. On that showing, because there are mortal men, there are also some that are immortal, and because there are men born on land, there are men born in the water. 'And because there are forces of destruction, there are also forces of preservation.' Suppose there were, they would only preserve things that already exist; but I am not aware that your gods do exist. 1.110. But be that as it may, how do all your pictures of objects arise out of the atoms? even if the atoms existed, which they do not, they might conceivably be capable of pushing and jostling one another about by their collisions, but they could not create form, shape, colour, life. You fail entirely therefore to prove divine immortality. "Now let us consider divine happiness. Happiness is admittedly impossible without virtue. But virtue is in its nature active, and your god is entirely inactive. Therefore he is devoid of virtue. Therefore he is not happy either. 1.111. In what then does his life consist? 'In a constant succession of things good,' you reply, 'without any admixture of evils.' Things good — what things? Pleasures, I suppose — that is, of course, pleasures of the body, for your school recognizes no pleasures of the mind that do not arise from and come back to the body. I don't suppose that you, Velleius, are like the rest of the Epicureans, who are ashamed of certain utterances of Epicurus, in which he protests that he cannot conceive any good that is unconnected with the pleasures of the voluptuary and the sensualist, pleasures which in fact he proceeds without a blush to enumerate by name. 1.112. Well then, what viands and beverages, what harmonies of music and flowers of various hue, what delights of touch and smell will you assign to the gods, so as to keep them steeped in pleasure? The poets array banquets of nectar and ambrosia, with Hebe or Ganymede in attendance as cup‑bearer; but what will you do, Epicurean? I don't see either where your god is to procure these delights or how he is to enjoy them. It appears then that mankind is more bountifully equipped for happiness than is the deity, since man can experience a wider range of pleasures. 1.113. You tell me that you consider these pleasures inferior, which merely 'tickle' the senses (the expression is that of Epicurus). When will you cease jesting? Why, even our friend Philo was impatient with the Epicureans for affecting to despise the pleasures of senseless indulgence; for he had an excellent memory and could quote verbatim a number of maxims from the actual writings of Epicurus. As for Metrodorus, Epicurus's co‑partner in philosophy, he supplied him with many still more outspoken quotations; in fact Metrodorus takes his brother Timocrates to task for hesitating to measure every element of happiness by the standard of the belly, nor is this an isolated utterance, but he repeats it several times. I see you nod your assent, as you are acquainted with the passages; and did you deny it, I would produce the volumes. Not that I am at the moment criticizing your making pleasure the sole standard of value — that belongs to another inquiry. What I am trying to prove is that your gods are incapable of pleasure, and therefore by your verdict can have no happiness either. 1.114. 'But they are free from pain.' Does that satisfy the ideal of perfect bliss, overflowing with good things? 'God is engaged (they say) in ceaseless contemplation of his own happiness, for he has no other object for his thoughts.' I beg of you to realize in your imagination a vivid picture of a deity solely occupied for all eternity in reflecting 'What a good time I am having! How happy I am!' And yet I can't see how this happy god of yours is not to fear destruction, since he is subjected without a moment's respite to the buffeting and jostling of a horde of atoms that eternally assail him, while from his own person a ceaseless stream of images is given off. Your god is therefore neither happy nor eternal. 1.115. " 'Yes, but Epicurus actually wrote books about holiness and piety.' But what is the language of these books? Such that you think you are listening to a Coruncanius or a Scaevola, high priests, not to the man who destroyed the very foundations of religion, and overthrew — not by main force like Xerxes, but by argument — the temples and the altars of the immortal gods. Why, what reason have you for maintaining that men owe worship to the gods, if the gods not only pay no respect to men, but care for nothing and do nothing at all? 1.116. 'But deity possesses an excellence and pre‑eminence which must of its own nature attract the worship of the wise.' Now how can there be any excellence in a being so engrossed in the delights of his own pleasure that he always has been, is, and will continue to be entirely idle and inactive? Furthermore how can you owe piety to a person who has bestowed nothing upon you? or how can you owe anything at all to one who has done you no service? Piety is justice towards the gods; but how can any claims of justice exist between us and them, if god and man have nothing in common? Holiness is the science of divine worship; but I fail to see why the gods should be worshipped if we neither have received nor hope to receive benefit from them. 1.117. On the other hand what reason is there for adoring the gods on the ground of our admiration for the divine nature, if we cannot see that that nature possesses any special excellence? "As for freedom from superstition, which is the favourite boast of your school, that is easy to attain when you have deprived the gods of all power; unless perchance you think that it was possible for Diagoras or Theodorus to be superstitious, who denied the existence of the gods altogether. For my part, I don't see how it was possible even for Protagoras, who was not certain either that the gods exist or that they do not. For the doctrines of all these thinkers abolish not only superstition, which implies a groundless fear of the gods, but also religion, which consists in piously worshipping them. 1.118. Take again those who have asserted that the entire notion of the immortal gods is a fiction invented by wise men in the interest of the state, to the end that those whom reason was powerless to control might be led in the path of duty by religion; surely this view was absolutely and entirely destructive of religion. Or Prodicus of Ceos,',WIDTH,)" onmouseout="nd();" º who said that the gods were personifications of things beneficial to the life of man — pray what religion was left by his theory? 1.119. Or those who teach that brave or famous or powerful men have been deified after death, and that it is these who are the real objects of the worship, prayers and adoration which we are accustomed to offer — are not they entirely devoid of all sense of religion? This theory was chiefly developed by Euhemerus, who was translated and imitated especially by our poet Ennius. Yet Euhemerus describes the death and burial of certain gods; are we then to think of him as upholding religion, or rather as utterly and entirely destroying it? I say nothing of the holy and awe‑inspiring sanctuary of Eleusis, Where tribes from earth's remotest confines seek Initiation, and I pass over Samothrace and those occult mysteries Which throngs of worshippers at dead of night In forest coverts deep do celebrate at Lemnos, since such mysteries when interpreted and rationalized prove to have more to do with natural science than with theology. 1.120. "For my own part I believe that even that very eminent man Democritus, the fountain-head from which Epicurus derived the streams that watered his little garden, has no fixed opinion about the nature of the gods. At one moment he holds the view that the universe includes images endowed with divinity; at another he says that there exist in this same universe the elements from which the mind is compounded, and that these are gods; at another, that they are animate images, which are wont to exercise a beneficent or harmful influence over us; and again that they are certain vast images of such a size as to envelop and enfold the entire world. All these fancies are more worthy of Democritus's native city than of himself; 1.121. for who could form a mental picture of such images? who could adore them and deem them worthy of worship or reverence? "Epicurus however, in abolishing divine beneficence and divine benevolence, uprooted and exterminated all religion from the human heart. For while asserting the supreme goodness and excellence of the divine nature, he yet denies to god the attribute of benevolence — that is to say, he does away with that which is the most essential element of supreme goodness and excellence. For what can be better or more excellent than kindness and beneficence? Make out god to be devoid of either, and you make him devoid of all love, affection or esteem for any other being, human or divine. It follows not merely that the gods do not care for mankind, but that they have no care for one another. How much more truth there is in the Stoics, whom you censure! They hold that all wise men are friends, even when strangers to each other, since nothing is more lovable than virtue, and he that attains to it will have our esteem in whatever country he dwells. 1.122. But as for you, what mischief you cause when you reckon kindness and benevolence as weaknesses! Apart altogether from the nature and attributes of deity, do you think that even human beneficence and benignity are solely due to human infirmity? Is there no natural affection between the good? There is something attractive in the very sound of the word 'love,' from which the Latin term for friendship is derived. If we base our friendship on its profit to ourselves, and not on its advantage to those whom we love, it will not be friendship at all, but a mere bartering of selfish interests. That is our standard of value for meadows and fields and herds of cattle: we esteem them for the profits that we derive from them; but affection and friendship between men is disinterested; how much more so therefore is that of the gods, who, although in need of nothing, yet both love each other and care for the interests of men. If this be not so, why do we worship and pray to them? why have pontiffs and augurs to preside over our sacrifices and auspices? why make petitions and vow offerings to heaven? 'Why, but Epicurus (you tell me) actually wrote a treatise on holiness.' 1.123. Epicurus is making fun of us, though he is not so much a humorist as a loose and careless writer. For how can holiness exist if the gods pay no heed to man's affairs? Yet what is the meaning of an animate being that pays no heed to anything? "It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as the good friend of us all, Posidonius, argued in the fifth book of his On the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular odium. Indeed he could not have been so senseless as really to imagine god to be like a feeble human being, but resembling him only in outline and surface, not in solid substance, and possessing all man's limbs but entirely incapable of using them, an emaciated and transparent being, showing no kindness or beneficence to anybody, caring for nothing and doing nothing at all. In the first place, a being of this nature is an absolute impossibility, and Epicurus was aware of this, and so actually abolishes the gods, although professedly retaining them. 1.124. Secondly, even if god exists, yet is of such a nature that he feels no benevolence or affection towards men, good‑bye to him, say I — not 'God be gracious to me,' why should I say that? for he cannot be gracious to anybody, since, as you tell us, all benevolence and affection is a mark of weakness." |
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6. Cicero, On Duties, 1.57-1.58, 3.22, 3.32, 3.82-3.83 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on caesar as malignant growth Found in books: Walters (2020) 114| 1.57. Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiars, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt. 1.58. Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus,proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est. Quam ob rem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur iis maxime, quos ante dixi, vita autem victusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime, estque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugavit. 3.22. Ut, si unum quodque membrum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non repugte natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras facultates, copias, opes augeamus. 3.32. Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudicium est. Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare, atque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate extermidum est. Etenim, ut membra quaedam amputantur, si et ipsa sanguine et tamquam spiritu carere coeperunt et nocent reliquis partibus corporis, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae a communi tamquam humanitatis corpore segreganda est. Huius generis quaestiones sunt omnes eae, in quibus ex tempore officium exquiritur. 3.82. Est ergo ulla res tanti aut commodum ullum tam expetendum, ut viri boni et splendorem et nomen amittas? Quid est, quod afferre tantum utilitas ista, quae dicitur, possit, quantum auferre, si boni viri nomen eripuerit, fidem iustitiamque detraxerit? Quid enim interest, utrum ex homine se convertat quis in beluam an hominis figura immanitatem gerat beluae? Quid? qui omnia recta et honesta neglegunt, dum modo potentiam consequantur, nonne idem faciunt, quod is, qui etiam socerum habere voluit eum, cuius ipse audacia potens esset? Utile ei videbatur plurimum posse alterius invidia; id quam iniustum in patriam et quam turpe esset, non videbat. Ipse autem socer in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis habebat, quos dicam, ut potero, incondite fortasse, sed tamen, ut res possit intellegi: Nam sí violandum est Iús, regdi grátia Violándum est; aliis rébus pietatém colas. Capitalis Eteocles vel potius Euripides, qui id unum, quod omnum sceleratissimum fuerit, exceperit! 3.83. Quid igitur minuta colligimus, hereditates, mercaturas, venditiones fraudulentas? ecce tibi, qui rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit idque perfecerit! Hanc cupiditatem si honestam quis esse dicit, amens est; probat enim legum et libertatis interitum earumque oppressionem taetram et detestabilem gloriosam putat. Qui autem fatetur honestum non esse in ea civitate, quae libera fuerit quaeque esse debeat, regnare, sed ei, qui id facere possit, esse utile, qua hunc obiurgatione aut quo potius convicio a tanto errore coner avellere? Potest enim, di immortales! cuiquam esse utile foedissimum et taeterrimum parricidium patriae, quamvis is, qui se eo obstrinxerit, ab oppressis civibus parens nominetur? Honestate igitur dirigenda utilitas est, et quidem sic, ut haec duo verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare videantur. | 1.57. But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there is no social relation among them all more close, none more close, none more dear than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; one native land embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the more execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and who are and have been engaged in compassing her utter destruction. 1.58. Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where most of our moral obligation is due, country would come first, and parents; for their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation; next come children and the whole family, who look to us alone for support and can have no other protection; finally, our kinsmen, with whom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our lot is one. All needful material assistance is, therefore, due first of all to those whom I have named; but intimate relationship of life and living, counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest which is cemented by congeniality of character. 3.22. Suppose, by way of comparison, that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably be annihilated. For, without any conflict with Nature's laws, it is granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but Nature's laws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by despoiling others. 3.32. As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite simple: we have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it is not opposed to Nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally right to kill; â nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper measures; for, as certain members are amputated, if they show signs themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity. of this sort are all those problems in which we have to determine what moral duty is, as it varies with varying circumstances. 3.82. Is there, then, any object of such value or any advantage so worth the winning that, to gain it, one should sacrifice the name of a "good man" and the lustre of his reputation? What is there that your soâcalled expediency can bring to you that will compensate for what it can take away, if it steals from you the name of a "good man" and causes you to lose your sense of honour and justice? For what difference does it make whether a man is actually transformed into a beast or whether, keeping the outward appearance of a man, he has the savage nature of a beast within? Again, when people disregard everything that is morally right and true, if only they may secure power thereby, are they not pursuing the same course as he who wished to have as a father-inâlaw the man by whose effrontery he might gain power for himself? He thought it advantageous to secure supreme power while the odium of it fell upon another; and he failed to see how unjust to his country this was, and how wrong morally. But the father-inâlaw himself used to have continually upon his lips the Greek verses from the Phoenissae, which I will reproduce as well as I can â awkwardly, it may be, but still so that the meaning can be understood: "If wrong may e'er be right, for a throne's sake Were wrong most right:â be God in all else feared!" Our tyrant deserved his death for having made an exception of the one thing that was the blackest crime of all. 3.83. Why do we gather instances of petty crime â legacies criminally obtained and fraudulent buying and selling? Behold, here you have a man who was ambitious to be king of the Roman People and master of the whole world; and he achieved it! The man who maintains that such an ambition is morally right is a madman; for he justifies the destruction of law and liberty and thinks their hideous and detestable suppression glorious. But if anyone agrees that it is not morally right to be kind in a state that once was free and that ought to be free now, and yet imagines that it is advantageous for him who can reach that position, with what remonstrance or rather with what appeal should I try to tear him away from so strange a delusion? For, oh ye immortal gods! can the most horrible and hideous of all murders â that of fatherland â bring advantage to anybody, even though he who has committed such a crime receives from his enslaved fellow-citizens the title of "Father of his Country"? Expediency, therefore, must be measured by the standard of moral rectitude, and in such a way, too, that these two words shall seem in sound only to be different but in real meaning to be one and the same. |
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7. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.26, 2.48, 2.266, 3.8-3.12 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute •junius brutus, m. (brutus), assassination of caesar •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153; Walters (2020) 75, 79| 1.26. Hi primo die de temporibus deque universa re publica, quam ob causam venerant, multum inter se usque ad extremum tempus diei conlocuti sunt; quo quidem sermone multa divinitus a tribus illis consularibus Cotta deplorata et commemorata narrabat, ut nihil incidisset postea civitati mali, quod non impendere illi tanto ante vidissent. 2.48. nam et testimonium saepe dicendum est ac non numquam etiam accuratius, ut mihi etiam necesse fuit in Sex. Titium, seditiosum civem et turbulentum; explicavi in eo testimonio dicendo omnia consilia consulatus mei, quibus illi tribuno plebis pro re publica restitissem, quaeque ab eo contra rem publicam facta arbitrarer, exposui; diu retentus sum, multa audivi, multa respondi. Num igitur placet, cum de eloquentia praecipias, aliquid etiam de testimoniis dicendis quasi in arte tradere?' 2.266. quisque optime Graece sciret, ita esse nequissimum." Valde autem ridentur etiam imagines, quae fere in deformitatem aut in aliquod vitium corporis ducuntur cum similitudine turpioris: ut meum illud in Helvium Manciam "iam ostendam cuius modi sis," cum ille "ostende, quaeso"; demonstravi digito pictum Gallum in Mariano scuto Cimbrico sub Novis distortum, eiecta lingua, buccis fluentibus; risus est commotus; nihil tam Manciae simile visum est; ut cum Tito Pinario mentum in dicendo intorquenti: "tum ut 3.8. Fuit hoc luctuosum suis, acerbum patriae, grave bonis omnibus; sed ei tamen rem publicam casus secuti sunt, ut mihi non erepta L. Crasso a dis immortalibus vita, sed donata mors esse videatur. Non vidit flagrantem bello Italiam, non ardentem invidia senatum, non sceleris nefarii principes civitatis reos, non luctum filiae, non exsilium generi, non acerbissimam C. Mari fugam, non illam post reditum eius caedem omnium crudelissimam, non denique in omni genere deformatam eam civitatem, in qua ipse florentissima multum omnibus gloria praestitisset. 3.9. Et quoniam attigi cogitatione vim varietatemque fortunae, non vagabitur oratio mea longius atque eis fere ipsis definietur viris, qui hoc sermone, quem referre suscepimus, continentur. Quis enim non iure beatam L. Crassi mortem illam, quae est a multis saepe defleta, dixerit, cum horum ipsorum sit, qui tum cum illo postremum fere conlocuti sunt, eventum recordatus? Tenemus enim memoria Q. Catulum, virum omni laude praestantem, cum sibi non incolumem fortunam, sed exsilium et fugam deprecaretur, esse coactum, ut vita se ipse privaret. 3.10. Iam M. Antoni in eis ipsis rostris, in quibus ille rem publicam constantissime consul defenderat quaeque censor imperatoriis manubiis ornarat, positum caput illud fuit, a quo erant multorum civium capita servata; neque vero longe ab eo C. Iuli caput hospitis Etrusci scelere proditum cum L. Iuli fratris capite iacuit, ut ille, qui haec non vidit, et vixisse cum re publica pariter et cum illa simul exstinctus esse videatur. Neque enim propinquum suum, maximi animi virum, P. Crassum, suapte interfectum manu neque conlegae sui, pontificis maximi, sanguine simulacrum Vestae respersum esse vidit; cui maerori, qua mente ille in patriam fuit, etiam C. Carbonis, inimicissimi hominis, eodem illo die mors fuisset nefaria; 3.11. non vidit eorum ipsorum, qui tum adulescentes Crasso se dicarant, horribilis miserosque casus; ex quibus C. Cotta, quem ille florentem reliquerat, paucis diebus post mortem Crassi depulsus per invidiam tribunatu non multis ab eo tempore mensibus eiectus est e civitate; Sulpicius autem, qui in eadem invidiae flamma fuisset, quibuscum privatus coniunctissime vixerat, hos in tribunatu spoliare instituit omni dignitate; cui quidem ad summam gloriam eloquentiae efflorescenti ferro erepta vita est et poena temeritatis non sine magno rei publicae malo constituta. 3.12. Ego vero te, Crasse, cum vitae flore tum mortis opportunitate divino consilio et ornatum et exstinctum esse arbitror; nam tibi aut pro virtute animi constantiaque tua civilis ferri subeunda fuit crudelitas aut, si qua te fortuna ab atrocitate mortis vindicasset, eadem esse te funerum patriae spectatorem coegisset; neque solum tibi improborum dominatus, sed etiam propter admixtam civium caedem bonorum victoria maerori fuisset. | |
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8. Cicero, Republic, 3.33-3.34 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Found in books: Walters (2020) 79| 3.33. Lactant. Div. Inst. 6.8.6 Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpres eius alius, nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit. 3.34. August. C.D. 22.6 nullum bellum suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute. 3.34. Sed his poenis quas etiam stultissimi sentiunt, egestate, exilio, vinculis, verberibus, elabuntur saepe privati oblata mortis celeritate, civitatibus autem mors ipsa poena est, quae videtur a poena singulos vindicare; debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut aeterna sit. Itaque nullus interitus est rei publicae naturalis ut hominis, in quo mors non modo necessaria est, verum etiam optanda persaepe. Civitas autem cum tollitur, deletur, extinguitur, simile est quodam modo, ut parva magnis conferamus, ac si omnis hic mundus intereat et concidat. | |
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| 9. Cicero, Letters, a b c d\n0 13.12/2 13.12/2 13 12/2\n1 8.11.4 8.11.4 8 11 \n2 14.14.4 14.14.4 14 14 \n3 13.16.1 13.16.1 13 16 \n4 1.8.2 1.8.2 1 8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020) 108 |
| 10. Cicero, Letters, 1.16.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on caesar as malignant growth Found in books: Walters (2020) 114 |
| 11. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 2.16.2, 4.3.1, 4.5.2-4.5.6, 5.13.3-5.13.4, 5.16.3, 6.1.1-6.1.6, 6.2.2, 6.4.2-6.4.3, 6.10.52, 6.13.5, 6.21.1-6.21.3, 15.15.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute •junius brutus, m. (brutus), consolations of cicero in de virtute Found in books: Walters (2020) 79, 93 |
| 12. Cicero, In Catilinam, 3.19-3.21 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Found in books: Walters (2020) 80 |
| 13. Cicero, In Vatinium, 35 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), assassination of caesar Found in books: Walters (2020) 108 |
| 14. Cicero, In Verrem, 2.1.32, 2.2.158, 2.2.160, 2.4.6, 2.4.126 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •brutus, marcus junius •junius brutus, m., image venerated •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Bexley (2022) 105; Rutledge (2012) 108, 153, 156 |
15. Cicero, Oratio Post Reditum Ad Populum, 17 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Found in books: Walters (2020) 80| 17. tantum debeo quantum hominem homini debere vix fas est. huius consilia, P. Lentuli sententiam, senatus auctoritatem vos secuti me me hic suppl. Halm, post in eo ed. R. in eo loco, in quo vestris beneficiis fueram, isdem centuriis quibus conlocaratis reposuistis. eodem tempore audistis eodem ex loco summos viros, ornatissimos atque amplissimos homines, principes civitatis, omnis consularis, omnis praetorios eadem dicere, ut omnium testimonio per me unum unum om. Hb s all. rem publicam conservatam esse constaret. itaque cum P. Servilius, gravissimus vir et ornatissimus civis, dixisset opera mea rem publicam incolumem magistratibus deinceps traditam, dixerunt in eandem sententiam ceteri. sed audistis eo eodem b2s tempore clarissimi viri non solum auctoritatem, sed etiam testimonium, L. Gelli: qui quia suam classem adtemptatam magno cum suo periculo paene sensit, dixit in contione vestrum vestra Naugerius (1), si ego consul cum fui non fuissem, rem publicam funditus interituram fuisse. | |
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| 16. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum, 1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •brutus m. junius Found in books: Maso (2022) 22 |
| 17. Cicero, Pro Caelio, 78 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153 |
18. Cicero, Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo, 33-34, 27 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020) 117| 27. citizens, the Roman knights, who then combined with the senate in defence of the safety of the republic? What are we to say of the aerarian tribunes, “The tribuni aerarii, who constituted an order in the latter days of the republic, and who were, in fact, the representatives of the most respectable plebeians, were originally heads of tribes, who acted as; general inspectors and collectors of the aes militare for the payment of the troops.” “The charge of the treasury was originally entrusted to the quaestors and their assistants, the tribuni aerarii .” “Niebuhr supposes that the tribuni aerani, who occur down to the end of the republic, were only the successors of the tribunes of the tribes.” Vide Smith, Dict. Ant. pp. 19, 20, 987, vv. Aerarii, Aerarium, Tribunus . and of the men of all the other orders in the state, who then took up arms in defence of the common liberties of all? But why do I speak of all those men who obeyed the command of the consuls? What is to become of the reputation of the consuls themselves? Are we to condemn Lucius Flaccus, a man always most diligent in the service of the republic, and in the discharge of his duty as a magistrate, and in his priesthood, and in the religious ceremonies over which he presided, as guilty of nefarious wickedness and parricide, now that he is dead? And are we to mute with hum in this stigma and infamy, after death, the name of even Caius Marius? Are we, I say, to condemn Caius Marius now that he is dead, as guilty of nefarious wickedness, and parricide, whom we may rightly entitle the father of his country, the parent of your liberties, and of this republic? | |
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19. Cicero, Brutus, 322, 330 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020) 80, 93| 330. nos autem, Brute, quoniam post Hortensi clarisimi oratoris mortem orbae eloquentiae quasi tutores relicti sumus, domi teneamus eam saeptam liberal custodia et hos ignotos atque impudentis procos repudiemus tueamurque ut adultam virginem caste et ab amatorum amatorum vulg. : armatorum L impetu quantum possumus prohibeamus. Equidem etsi doleo me in vitam paulo serius tamquam in viam ingressum, prius quam confectum iter sit, in hanc rei publicae noctem incidisse, tamen ea consolatione sustentor quam tu mihi, Brute, adhibuisti tuis suavissimis litteris, quibus me forti animo esse oportere censebas, quod ea gessissem quae de me etiam me tacente [me] tacente Stangl ipsa loquerentur viverentque mortuo viverentque mortuo Stangl : mortuoque (me add. Ernesti ) viverent vulg. : mortuo viverentque vulg. ; quae, si recte esset, salute salute vulg. : saluti L rei publicae, sin secus, interitu ipso testimonium meorum de re publica consiliorum darent. . | |
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20. Cicero, Pro Sulla, 32-33, 6 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020) 108| 6. quis nostrum adfuit Vargunteio? nemo, ne hic quidem Q. Hortensius Q. om. e , praesertim qui illum solus antea de ambitu defendisset. non enim iam se ullo officio cum illo coniunctum arbitrabatur, cum ille tanto scelere commisso omnium officiorum societatem diremisset. quis nostrum Serv. Sullam, quis Publium Publium P. Lentulum ς , quis M. Laecam, quis C. C. suppl. Manutius Cornelium defendendum putavit, quis eis horum iis horum Garatoni : horum iis π k : his horum cett. adfuit? nemo . quid ita? quia ceteris in in ceteris e causis etiam nocentis viri boni, si necessarii sunt, deserendos deserendos e : defendendos cett. esse non putant; in hoc crimine non solum levitatis est culpa culpa est Tk : culpa e verum etiam quaedam contagio sceleris, si defendas eum eum om. T quem obstrictum esse patriae parricidio parricidio TEea π : om. cett. suspicere. | |
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21. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.8-1.23, 1.70, 1.75, 1.87-1.88, 1.97-1.100, 1.103, 3.79, 5.11, 5.50, 5.73-5.82, 5.119 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •brutus m. junius •junius brutus, m. (brutus), consolations of cicero in de virtute •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Found in books: Maso (2022) 32, 35; Walters (2020) 93| 1.8. itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. fiebat autem ita ut, cum is his G 1 V 1 H qui audire audiri X ( corr. V 2 l e ss. K 2 ) vellet dixisset, quid quod K 1 V 2 sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et et om. V 1 add. 2 Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Philosophia ... 221, 7 narretur H (27 fieri 220, 5 litteris et 220,13 adulescentes 220, 18 dicere bis ) ergo ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c ita nascetur exordium: Malum ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c mihi videtur esse mors. 1.9. Isne, qui mortui sunt, an is, quibus moriendum est? Utrisque. Est miserum igitur, quoniam malum. Certe. Ergo et i, quibus evenit iam ut morerentur, morirentur K 1 et i, quibus eventurum est, miseri. Mihi ita videtur. Nemo ergo non miser. Prorsus nemo. Et quidem, si tibi constare vis, omnes, quicumque nati sunt eruntve, non solum miseri, sed etiam semper miseri. nam si solos eos diceres miseros quibus moriendum esset, neminem tu quidem eorum qui viverent exciperes—moriendum est enim omnibus—, esset tamen tam V 1 add. 2 miseriae finis in morte. quoniam autem etiam mortui miseri sunt, in miseriam nascimur sempiternam. necesse est enim miseros necesse enim est m. K 1 sed est erasnm esse eos qui centum milibus annorum ante occiderunt, vel potius omnis, quicumque nati sunt. Ita prorsus existimo. Dic quaeso: 1.10. num nunc ex. num K 1 te illa terrent, triceps apud inferos Cerberus, Cocyti coyc ti R 1 fremitus, travectio traiectio ex trav. K 1 transv. V c mg. ('al trans') g Trag. inc.111 Acherontis, mento summam aquam aquam trisyll. cf. Lachm. ad Lucr. 6, 552 quam Nonii L 1 A A attingens amnem Bue. adtinget ( vel -it) senextus Nonii L 1 A A enectus siti Tantalus? summam... tantalus Non. 401,29 enectus ... Tantalus Prisc, GL 2, 470, 18 tantulus X ( corr. K 2 ) Nonii et Prisciani pars tum illud, quod Sisyphus sisyphius X ( sed 2. eras. in V. sis. K 1 aut c ) Nonii pars versat versus? cf. Marx ad Lucil. 1375 saxum sudans nitendo neque proficit hilum? tum ... hlium Non. 121,4; 353, 8. fortasse etiam inexorabiles iudices, Minos et Rhadamanthus? apud quos nec te L. Crassus defendet defendet om. RK 1 ( add. 2 ) nec M. Antonius nec, quoniam apud Graecos iudices res agetur, poteris adhibere Demosthenen; demostenen K tibi ipsi pro te erit maxima corona causa dicenda. dicenda causa K haec fortasse metuis et idcirco mortem censes esse sempiternum malum. Adeone me delirare censes, ut ista esse credam? An tu ante G 1 haec non an tu an non ( 2. an in r. ) V 1? credis? Minime vero. Male hercule narras. Cur? quaeso. Quia disertus dissertus KR 1 esse possem, si contra ista dicerem. Quis enim non in eius modi causa? aut quid negotii est haec poëtarum et pictorum portenta convincere? aut convincere Non. 375, 29 1.11. Atqui pleni libri sunt contra ista ipsa disserentium dissenentium G 1 (dissotium corr. G 1? ) RV 1 ( corr. ipse? ) diserentium K philosophorum. Inepte sane. quis enim est est om. K 1, add. c tam excors, quem ista moveant? commoveant V 2 Si ergo apud inferos miseri non sunt, ne sunt quidem apud inferos ulli. Ita prorsus prossus G existimo. Ubi sunt Inde ab ubi - 223, 24 iam sunt multa in K madore corrupta ergo i, quos miseros dicis, aut quem locum incolunt? si enim sunt, nusquam esse non possunt. Ego vero nusquam esse illos puto. Igitur ne esse quidem? Prorsus isto modo, et tamen miseros miseros cf. Serv. Aen. 4, 20 ob id ipsum quidem, quidem om. K quia nulli sint. 1.12. Iam mallem Cerberum metueres quam ista tam inconsiderate diceres. Quid qui We. tandem? Quem esse negas, eundem esse dicis. ubi est acumen tuum? cum enim miserum esse dicis, tum eum qui non sit dicis esse. Non sum ita hebes, ut istud dicam. Quid dicis igitur? Miserum esse verbi causa M. M. V 2 s om. X Crassum, qui illas fortunas morte morti V 1 demiserit ut v. K dimiserit, miserum Cn. CN. R Gn. vel gn. GV (in K evanidum ) Pompeium, qui tanta gloria sit sit om. V 1, unde V c orbatus sit orbatus, tanta dignitate tanta gl. V c omnis denique miseros, miseros V (exp. 2? ) qui hac luce careant. Revolveris eodem. sint enim oportet, si miseri sunt; tu autem modo negabas eos esse, qui mortui essent. Si igitur non sunt, nihil possunt esse; ita ne ne longius verbum habuisse vid. K miseri quidem sunt. Non dico fortasse etiam, etiam exp. V vet quod sentio; nam istuc ipsum, non esse, cum fueris, miserrimum puto. Quid? 1.13. miserius quam omnino numquam fuisse? ita, qui nondum nati sunt, miseri iam sunt, quia non sunt, et nos, si post mortem miseri futuri sumus, miseri fuimus ante quam nati. ego autem non commemini, ante quam sum natus, me miserum; tu si meliore similiore K 1 R 1 memoria es, velim scire, ecquid de te recordere. quid K ( add. 2 aut c ) recordere s recordare X Ita iocaris, quasi ego dicam eos miseros, qui nati non sint, et non eos miseros, qui mortui sunt. m. sint V c Esse ergo eos dicis. Immo, quia non sint, cum fuerint, eo miseros esse. Pugtia te loqui non vides? quid enim tam pugnat, quam non modo ñ modo 2 miserum, sed omnino om i m K quicquam esse, qui non sit? an tu egressus porta Capena cum Calatini catilini G Scipionum Serviliorum Metellorum sepulcra vides, miseros putas putas vocas K rec illos? Quoniam me verbo premis, premis s. v. add. K c posthac non ita dicam, miseros esse, sed tantum miseros, ob id ipsum, quia non sint. si nt V Non dicis igitur: miser est M. Crassus miser e mori crassus K m. rec. quae ductus evanidos restituit, sed tantum: miser M. Crassus ? Ita plane. Quasi non necesse sit, quicquid isto modo pronunties, id aut esse aut non esse! an tu dialecticis ne ne ex non R c imbutus quidem es? 1.14. in primis enim hoc traditur: omne pronuntiatum pronuntiatum eqs. Gell. 16, 8, 8 (Hier. adv. Rufin. 1, 486) (sic sic ex si V c enim mihi in praesentia occurrit ut appellarem a)ci/wma a Il w m a R aciwML V, sed praeter 1. a omnia i. r. V c azioma K azi w ma G 1, utar post alio, si invenero alio si inv. V ( dist. 2? ) alios et inv. GKR melius) —id ergo est pronuntiatum, quod est verum aut falsum. cum igitur dicis: miser M. Crassus, aut hoc dicis: miser est Crassus, ut possit iudicari, verum id falsumne sit, aut nihil dicis omnino. Age, iam concedo non eos s. non add. V 2 sunt V esse miseros, qui mortui sint, quoniam extorsisti, ut faterer, qui omnino non essent, eos ne ne s. v. K 1 miseros quidem esse posse. quid? quid ecce K ante ecce adscr. m (= magister ) K 2, post esse d ( disc. ) K ree qui vivimus, cum moriendum sit, nonne miseri sumus? quae enim potest in vita esse iucunditas, cum dies et noctes cogitandum sit iam iamque esse moriendum? Ecquid ecqui X( W ?) ergo intellegis, quantum mali de humana condicione deieceris? 1.15. Quonam modo? Quia, si mors mors V c mori X 1 (V 1 ) etiam mortuis miserum esset, infinitum quoddam et sempiternum malum haberemus in vita; in vita del. Bai., sed vita hic non opponitur mortis tempori. nunc video calcem, ad quam cum sit decursum, nihil sit praeterea extimescendum. sed tu mihi videris Epicharmi, epicarmi G 1 (corr. 1 ) K acuti nec insulsi insulsi insul in r. V c hominis ut Siculi, sententiam sequi. Quam? non enim novi. Dicam, si potero, Latine. scis enim me Graece loqui in Latino sermone non plus solere quam in Graeco Latine. Et recte quidem. sed quae tandem est Epicharmi epicarmi GRV 1 (corr. 2 ) ista sententia? E/mori nolo/, Epich. fr. 247 sed me esse mo/rtuum nihil nihili edd. vett. ae/stimo. Iam adgnosco adgnosco RV (sed d erasum) adn. G 1 agn. K Graecum. graeco G 1 gradum ex graecum V 2? sed Man. et sed quoniam coëgisti, ut concederem, qui mortui essent, eos miseros non esse, perfice, si potes, ut ne moriendum quidem esse miserum putem. 1.16. Iam istuc quidem nihil negotii est, sed ego maiora molior. sed ego maiora molior add. V c (sed maiora molior vel sed getiam maiora molior s ) om. X Quo modo hoc nihil negotii est? aut quae sunt tandem ista maiora? Quia, quoniam post mortem mali nihil est, nihil est add. K 2 V 2 om. X ne mors quidem ne quidem mors K est malum, cui proxumum proximum KV tempus est post mortem, in quo mali nihil esse concedis: ita ne moriendum quidem nequidem moriendum K esse malum est; id id estK 2 s idem R idẽ GK 1 V est enim perveniendum esse ad id, quod non esse malum confitemur. Uberius ista, quaeso. haec enim spinosiora, prius ut confitear me cogunt quam ut adsentiar. sed quae sunt ea, quae dicis te maiora moliri? Ut doceam, si possim, non modo malum non esse, sed bonum etiam esse mortem. Non postulo id quidem, quidem id K aveo abeo V 1 habeo V 2 GKR aveo s tamen audire. ut enim non efficias quod vis, tamen, mors ut malum non sit, efficies. sed nihil te interpellabo; continentem orationem audire malo. Quid, si te rogavero siero- gavero V 1 (corr. c ) K 1 hoc loco pauciora habuit, evanidas litteras m. rec. sic fere restituit : rqiero aliquid? 1.17. nonne respondebis? Superbum id quidem est, sed, nisi quid necesse erit, malo non roges. non roges V Geram tibi morem et ea quae vis, ut potero, explicabo, nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint et fixa, quae dixero, sed ut homunculus unus e multis probabilia coniectura sequens. ultra enim quo progrediar, quam ut veri similia videam, non habeo; certa dicent i, qui et qui et V percipi ea posse dicunt et se et se V sapientis sapientes V 2 esse profitentur. Tu, ut videtur; nos ad audiendum parati sumus. 1.18. Mors igitur ipsa, quae videtur notissima res esse, quid sit, primum est videndum. sunt enim qui discessum animi a corpore putent putent s ( cf. censeant) putant X (varietatem modorum def. Gaffiot, Le subjonc- tif de subordination Paris 1906 p. 52) esse mortem; sunt qui nullum censeant fieri discessum, sed una animum et corpus occidere, animumque in corpore extingui. qui discedere animum censent, cessent V 1 alii statim dissipari, alii diu permanere, alii semper. quid sit porro ipse animus aut ubi aut unde, magna dissensio est. aliis cor ipsum animus aut ubi... 227.1 animus in mg. G 1 aut unde... dicuntur Non. 66,5 videtur, ex quo excordes, vecordes vec. HM vaec. VG 1 (sed a 1 )R 1 ( sed a 1? ) Nonii codd. pr. F H vęc. K concordesque vecordes excordes concordes H signis transponendi non satis dilucidis additis dicuntur quid igitur sit animus... est. nam animus ab ani- ma dictus est (227, 12). aliis ... 227, 2 dicuntur H et Nasica ille prudens bis consul Corculum et egregie cordatus homo, catus Aelius Sextus . Ennius ann. 331 Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem; aliis pars quaedam cerebri visa est animi animi om. K 1, post princip. add. c principatum tenere; aliis nec cor ipsum placet nec cerebri quandam partem esse animum, 1.19. sed alii in corde, alii in cerebro dixerunt animi esse sedem et locum; animum autem alii animam, ut fere nostri— declarat nomen: ut fere nostri declarant nomen. nam W corr. Dav. declarant nomina Sey. nam et agere animam et efflare dicimus et animosos et bene animatos et ex animi sententia; ipse autem animus ab anima dictus est—; Zenoni Zeno fr. 134. Stoico animus ignis videtur. sed haec quidem quae dixi, cor, cerebrum, animam, ignem volgo, reliqua fere singuli. ut multo multo Bentl. multi cf. Lact. inst. 7, 13, 9 opif. 16, 13 ante veteres, proxime autem Aristoxenus, musicus idemque philosophus, ipsius corporis intentionem quandam, velut in cantu et fidibus quae a(rmoni/a armonia W cf. I 24.41 dicitur: sic ex corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos. 1.20. hic ab artificio suo non recessit et tamen dixit aliquid, quod ipsum quale esset erat multo ante et dictum et explanatum a Platone. Xenocrates Xen. fr. 67 animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse ullum, ull in r. V c ullum s numerum verum X cf. ac. 2,124 dixit esse, cuius vis, ut iam ante Pythagorae visum erat, in natura maxuma esset. eius doctor Plato triplicem finxit animum, animam X ( sed u supra a V 1? ) cuius principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit, et duas partes parere separare X in parere corr. V c (e priore loco iterum ss. V 3 ) voluit, iram et cupiditatem, quas quas-cupiditatem om. H locis disclusit: disclusit om. X add. V 2 R rec s (suis add. s ) cf. I,80 Pr. 32 iram in pectore, cupiditatem supter subter RHK 1 ( l sup ss. K 2 ) collocavit V 2 praecordia locavit. Plato ... 228, 2 locavit H 1.21. Dicaearchus dice archus KRV dicaearc us | G 1 autem in eo sermone, quem Corinthi chorinthi GK habitum tribus libris exponit, doctorum dictorum X, corr. in KV hominum disputantium primo libro multos loquentes facit; duobus Pherecratem pherecraten G pthiotam X (pth. G phiot. K) quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum, disserentem inducit nihil esse omnino animum, animum omnino K et hoc esse nomen totum ie, frustraque et post frustraque add. V 1? vix recte animalia et animantis animantes V 2 appellari, neque in homine inesse animum vel animam nec in bestia, vimque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis aequabiliter aequabiliter V (exp. m. vet.) esse fusam nec separabilem a corpore esse, quippe quae nulla sit, nec sit quicquam nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita figuratum ut temperatione naturae vigeat et sentiat. 1.22. Aristoteles, longe omnibus—Platonem semper excipio—praestans et ingenio et diligentia, cum quattuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orerentur, orirentur H s quintam quandam naturam censet esse, esse esset GR 1 e corr. e qua equa G 1 ( in mg. de) K 1 (equae K 2 ut v. ) R esse qua V (quae V 2 ) sit mens; cogitare enim et providere et discere et docere et invenire aliquid et tam multa alia alia X exp. V vet , cf. 247,14 meminisse, amare odisse, cupere timere, angi laetari, haec et et om. H similia eorum in horum quattuor generum inesse nullo nullo numero H putat; quintum genus genus om. H adhibet vacans nomine et sic sic exp. V vet ipsum animum e)ndele/xeian endelecheian GKVH, sed in R inter e et a graecum com- pendium diphthongi ei ( ) scriptum est appellat appellant G 1 V 1 novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem. Nisi quae me forte fugiunt, fugiunt (exp. m. vet.) V haec hae V rec s sunt fere omnium post fere add. V 2 de animo sententiae. Aristoteles cum quattuor ... 229, 3 de animo sentiae H Democritum enim, magnum illum quidem virum, sed levibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum anim um V ( ss. c ) concursu quodam fortuito, omittamus; nihil est enim apud istos, quod non atomorum turba conficiat. nihil... eorum t. conficiat Non. 269,12 1.23. Harum sententiarum quae vera sit, deus aliqui aliquis V rec s viderit; harum ... viderit Lact. inst. 7,8, 9 (postquam breviter ad § 18—22 respexit) quae veri simillima, magna quaestio est. harum ... 9 quaestio est H utrum igitur inter has sententias diiudicare malumus an ad propositum redire? Cuperem equidem utrumque, si posset, sed est difficile confundere. quare si, ut ista non disserantur, liberari mortis metu possumus, possimus K 2 id agamus; sin id non potest nisi hac quaestione animorum explicata, nunc, si videtur, hoc, illud alias. Quod malle te intellego, id puto esse commodius; efficiet enim ratio ut, quaecumque vera sit earum sententiarum quas exposui, mors aut malum non sit aut sit bonum potius. 1.70. minis utilitati agros omnis et maria parentia—: haec igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare quin is is H his GKRV praesit aliquis vel effector, si haec nata sunt, sînt K 1 ut Platoni videtur, vel, si semper fuerunt, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris? numeris K 1 sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non videas ut deum add. G 1 in mg. non vides, tamen, ut deum adgnoscis adgn. G (3 agd n.) KR a gn. V agn. H ex operibus eius, sic ex memoria rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omnique omniaque GK 1 (omni atque c )R omni que V pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis adgnoscito. adgn. G (3 agd n.) KR In quo igitur loco est? credo equidem in capite et cur credam adferre possum. sed alias, ubi nunc ante ubi add. V rec sit animus; certe quidem in te est. quidem interest K 1 quae est eius ei' (= eius) in r. V c et X ei s V rec natura? propria, puto, et sua. sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem: spiritabilem V nihil ad id de quo agimus. illud modo videto, ut deum noris, etsi eius ignores et locum et faciem ... 13 locum et om. H s faciem, faciem aciem in r. V 1 sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiamsi ignores et locum et formam. 1.75. nam quid nam quid quid enim V 2 aliud agimus, cum a voluptate, vol. G 1 a uuol. K 1 id est id ( pro id est) V a corpore, cum a re familiari, quae est ministra et famula corporis, cum a re publica, cum a negotio omni sevocamus omni sev. (s. i. r. V c )V omni sev. ex omnis ev. R animum, quid, inquam, in quantum GR 1 V 1 tum agimus nisi animum ad se ipsum advocamus, advocamus s avoc. X (voc. K 1 a add. K c ) secum esse cogimus cogita mus G 1 maximeque a corpore abducimus? secernere autem a corpore animum, nec quicquam post animum add. V 2 : id est se ipsum nec quicquam K ( c K c ) aliud, est mori est mori Bentl. ēmori K emori GRVH ( post aliud add. quam R al.m. nisi V rec ) cf. Plato Phaed. 67d Lact. epit. 41 : deum vere colere id est, nec quicquam aliud, sapientia. discere. quare hoc commentemur, mihi crede, disiungamusque credidis iung. GR 1 (corr. 1? ) V 1 (corr. 2 ) credi disi. H credi siung K 1 nos a corporibus, id est id ( pro id est) V consuescamus mori. hoc, et dum erimus in terris, erit illi illi K caelesti vitae simile, et cum illuc ex his vinclis vinculis K 2 V 2 emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum. Tota... 23 animorum H nam qui in compedibus corporis semper fuerunt, etiam cum soluti sunt, tardius ingrediuntur, ut i qui ferro vincti multos annos fuerunt. fuerint V 1 quo cum venerimus, tum denique vivemus. nam haec quidem vita vita s. v. add. K 1 mors est, quam lamentari possem, si liberet. nam haec... 5 liberet Aug. epist. 155,4 liberetur GKR 1 (corr. 1 ) V 1 (ur eras. ) liberet Aug. Satis tu quidem in Consolatione es lamentatus; 1.87. ergo etiam carere mortuos vitae commodis idque esse miserum? certe ita dicant necesse est. an potest is, qui non est, re ulla carere? triste enim est nomen ipsum carendi, quia subicitur haec vis: habuit, non habet; desiderat requirit indiget. haec, opinor, incommoda sunt carentis: caret oculis, odiosa caecitas; liberis, orbitas. valet hoc in vivis, mortuorum autem non modo vitae commodis, sed ne vita quidem ipsa quisquam caret. de mortuis loquor, qui nulli sunt: nos, qui sumus, num aut cornibus aut si cornibus X si exp. V vet aut sic c. Sey. caremus aut pinnis? aut pinnis V ( a m. rec. ) ecquis id ecquis id Dav. sit qui id R dixerit? certe nemo. quid sit quid G sit q K ( q K 1 alt. i add. c ) sit q id V ( is V c ) qd ( V c ) V ita? quia, cum id non habeas quod tibi nec usu nec natura sit aptum, non careas, etiamsi sentias sentias V (n in r. c ) te non habere. 1.88. hoc premendum etiam atque etiam est et urguendum arguendum X ( unde argumentum s ) urguendum (u in r. et V 2 ) V cf. Verr.1,36 leg. agr.1, 16 Phil. 4,12 (prem. et urg. coni. ) fin. 5,80 illud urgueam, non intellegere eum ( cf. nat. deor. 3, 76) Planc. 48 etiam atque etiam insto atque urgeo insector posco confirmato illo, de quo, si mortales animi sunt, dubitare non possumus, quin qui V 1 tantus interitus in morte sit, ut ne minima quidem suspicio suspitio KV 1 -ici- in r. G 1 sensus relinquatur—hoc igitur probe stabilito et fixo illud excutiendum est, ut sciatur, quid sit q sit V ( ss. V c ) carere, ne relinquatur aliquid erroris in verbo. carere igitur hoc significat: egere eo quod habere velis; inest enim velle in carendo, nisi cum sic tamquam in febri dicitur alia quadam notione verbi. dicitur enim alio modo etiam carere, cum aliquid non habeas et non habere te sentias, etiamsi id facile patiare. ita add. Sauppe carere in morte non dicitur; nec enim esset dolendum; dicitur illud: bono carere, quod est malum. sed ne vivus quidem bono caret, si eo non indiget; sed in vivo intellegi tamen potest regno te carere—dici autem hoc in te satis subtiliter non potest; posset in Tarquinio, cum regno esset expulsus—: at in mortuo ne ne add. V 2 intellegi quidem. carere enim sentientis est; est post nec V C aut 2 nec sensus in mortuo: ne carere necarere V nec car. GKR quidem igitur in mortuo est. Quamquam quid opus est in hoc philosophari, cum rem non magnopere philosophia egere videamus? 1.97. vadit enim enim om. s in eundem carcerem atque in eundem paucis post annis scyphum Socrates, eodem scelere iudicum quo tyrannorum Theramenes. QHPAMENHC X Apol. 40csqq. (libere reddita) quae est igitur eius oratio, qua facit eum Plato usum apud iudices iam morte multatum? magna me inquit “spes tenet, iudices, bene mihi evenire, quod mittar ad mortem. necesse est enim sit alterum de duobus, ut aut sensus omnino omnes omnis K (acst s = accusativus ss. 2 ) mors auferat aut in alium quendam locum ex his locis morte migretur. meretur K quam ob rem, sive sensus extinguitur morsque ei somno similis est, qui non numquam etiam sine visis somniorum placatissimam quietem adfert, di dii GRV boni, quid lucri est emori! aut quam multi dies reperiri repp. GR (corr. 1 ) V possunt, qui tali nocti antepotur! cui si si V 2 s om. X similis est perpetuitas omnis consequentis temporis, quis me beatior? 1.98. sin vera sunt quae dicuntur, migrationem esse mortem in eas oras, horas K 1 V 2 quas qui e vita excesserunt incolunt, id hic in id corr. K c multo iam beatius est. tene, cum ab is, qui se iudicum numero numerū V 1 haberi volunt, evaseris, ad eos venire, qui vere iudices appellentur, Minoem Rhadamanthum Aeacum Aeacum s Aiacem X Triptolemum, convenireque eos qui iuste et et s om. X ( e)ge/nonto e)n tw=|n e(autw=n bi/w| ) cum fide vixerint— haec peregrinatio mediocris vobis videri potest? ut vero conloqui cum Orpheo Musaeo Homero Hesiodo liceat, quanti tandem aestimatis? equidem saepe emori, si fieri posset, vellem, ut ea quae dico mihi liceret invisere. invisere V (ise in r. V c ) invenire rell. quanta delectatione autem adficerer, cum Palamedem, cum Aiacem, cum alios iudicio iniquo iniquorum ventos GR iniquorũ ventos K iniquo ( eras. 3—4 litt., tum circum in fine versus V c ) ventos V ( ei)/ tis a)/llos dia\ kri/din a)/dikon te/qnhken circumventos convenirem! temptarem etiam summi regis, qui maximas copias duxit ad Troiam, et Ulixi ulixis V 2 Sisyphique prudentiam, nec ob eam rem, cum haec exquirerem sicut hic faciebam, capite damnarer.—Ne vos quidem, iudices i qui me absolvistis, hi X si V 2 mortem timueritis. 1.99. nec nec c in r. V c enim cuiquam bono mali quicquam evenire potest nec vivo nec mortuo, nec umquam eius res a dis inmortalibus imm. KR neglegentur, nec mihi ipsi hoc accidit fortuito. nec vero ego is, a quibus accusatus aut a quibus condemnatus sum, habeo quod suscenseam, succenseam K 2 in mg. V c nisi quod mihi nocere se crediderunt.” et haec quidem hoc modo; nihil autem melius extremo: sed tempus est inquit iam hinc abire, habire G 1 R 1 me, ut moriar, vos, ut vitam agatis. utrum autem sit melius, dii inmortales imm. V 2 sciunt, hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem. utrum... 26 neminem libere Lact. inst. 7,2, 10 Ne ego h' supra ego V 2 haud aut X haud V 2 paulo hunc animum malim mallim G ( 2. l in r. ) K 1 RV 1 quam eorum omnium fortunas, qui de hoc iudicaverunt. etsi, quod praeter deos negat scire quemquam, id scit scit sit V 1 ipse utrum sit melius—nam dixit ante—, sed suum illud, nihil ut adfirmet, tenet ad extremum; 1.100. nos autem teneamus, ut nihil censeamus esse malum, quod sit a natura datum omnibus, intellegamusque, intellegamus quae G 1 RV 1 si mors malum sit, esse sempiternum malum. nam vitae miserae mors finis esse videtur; mors si est misera, finis esse nullus potest. Sed quid ego Socratem aut S. et aut X (et eras. in V) Theramenem, praestantis viros virtutis et sapientiae gloria, commemoro, cum Lacedaemonius lacedem. GK quidam, cuius ne nomen quidem proditum est, mortem tantopere contempserit, ut, cum ad eam duceretur damnatus ab ephoris et esset voltu hilari atque laeto dixissetque ei quidam inimicus: contemnisne leges Lycurgi? lygurgi X, responderit: ego vero illi maximam gratiam habeo, qui me ea poena multaverit, quam sine mutuatione mutatione K 1 V et sine versura possem dissolvere. o virum Sparta sparta V dignum! ut mihi quidem, qui tam magno animo fuerit, innocens damnatus esse videatur. talis innumerabilis nostra civitas tulit. 1.103. cum enim de inmortalitate imm. R animorum disputavisset et iam moriendi tempus urgeret, rogatus a Critone, quem ad modum sepeliri se sepeliri V Plato Phaed. 115 c—e (libere) vellet, multam multa V 1 vero inquit operam, amici, frustra consumpsi; Critoni enim nostro non persuasi me hinc hic K 1 avolaturum neque mei mei Bentl. ( s ?) me quicquam relicturum. verum tamen, Crito, si me adsequi potueris aut sicubi ctus nactus KR 1 e corr. V rec n atus G 1 eris, ut tibi videbitur, videtur X videbitur s o(/pws a)/n soi fi/lon h)=| (cf. We.) sepelito. sed, mihi crede, nemo nemo vestrŭ G 1 (tum iterum scripsit nemo vestrŭ, sed ipse delevit) me vestrum, cum hinc excessero, consequetur. praeclare is is Hei. id (Socrates opponitur Diogeni) quidem, qui et amico permiserit et se ostenderit de hoc toto genere nihil laborare. 3.79. ne ne n onne K ( ss. 2 ) illa quidem firmissima consolatio est, quamquam quamquam quidquam K 1 et usitata est et saepe prodest: non tibi hoc soli. prodest haec quidem, ut dixi, dixi p. 345, 13 sed nec semper nec omnibus; sunt enim qui respuant; sed refert, quo modo adhibeatur. ut enim enim om. G 1 tulerit quisque eorum qui sapienter tulerunt, non quo quisque incommodo adfectus sit, praedicandum est. Chrysippi crys. KR chris. G ad veritatem firmissima est, ad tempus aegritudinis difficilis. magnum opus opus s onus X est probare maerenti illum suo iudicio et, quod se se exp. V 2 ita putet oportere facere, maerere. Nimirum igitur, ut in causis non semper utimur eodem statu—sic enim appellamus controversiarum genera—, sed ad tempus, ad controversiae naturam, ad personam accommodamus, sic in aegritudine lenienda, quam lenienda. nam quam X nam del. s quisque curationem recipere possit, videndum est. nimirum ... 26 est H 5.11. cuius multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo Platonis memoria et litteris consecrata plura genera effecit effecit s efficit X dissentientium philosophorum, e quibus nos id potissimum consecuti consecuti con del. V 2 sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, arbitramur V 2 s ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione, quid esset simillimum veri, quaereremus. quaeremus G 1 K quem morem moyerem G 2 cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias saepe et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam eam ( del. c ) R consuetudinem disputaremus. et quadridui quidem sermonem superioribus ad ad a R missimus G 1 K te perscriptum libris misimus, quinto autem die cum eodem in loco consedissemus, sic est propositum, de quo disputaremus: 5.50. quod si est, add. Lb. beata vita glorianda et praedicanda et prae se ferenda est; nihil est enim aliud quod praedicandum et prae se ferendum praeferendum V ( cf. ad 426, 20 ) sit. quibus positis intellegis quid sequatur. Et quidem, nisi ea vita beata est, quae est eadem honesta, sit aliud necesse est melius vita beata; quod erit enim enim add. G 2 honestum, certe fatebuntur esse melius. ita erit beata vita melius aliquid; quo quid potest dici perversius? dicimus itaque sapientem...9 pacem et 14 beata... 427,7 perversius H Quid? cum fatentur satis magnam vim esse in vitiis ad invitusad V miseram vitam, nonne fatendum est eandem vim in virtute virtute B 1 virtutem X virtutum s esse ad beatam vitam? contrariorum enim contraria sunt consequentia. 5.73. An Epic.fr.604 tu me in viola putabas aut in rosa dicere? an Epicuro, qui qui G 1 quia G 2 KRV cf.438,19 tantum modo induit personam philosophi et sibi ipse hoc nomen inscripsit, dicere licebit, licebit alt. i in r. V quod quidem, ut habet se res, me tamen plaudente dicit, nullum sapienti esse tempus, etiamsi uratur torqueatur secetur, quin possit exclamare: quam pro nihilo puto! cum praesertim omne malum dolore definiat defirmat ( vel defirniat) V 1 bonum voluptate, haec nostra honesta turpia inrideat dicatque nos in vocibus Epic.fr.511 occupatos iis sonos fundere, neque quicquam ad nos pertinere nisi quod aut leve aut asperum in corpore sentiatur: huic ergo, ut dixi, non multum differenti a iudicio ferarum oblivisci licebit sui et tum fortunam contemnere, cum sit omne et bonum eius et malum in potestate fortunae, tum dicere se se add. G 2 beatum in summo cruciatu atque tormentis, cum constituerit non modo summum malum esse dolorem, sed etiam solum? 5.74. nec vero illa sibi remedia comparavit ad tolerandum tollerandum X (toll endum G 1 ) dolorem, firmitatem animi, turpitudinis verecundiam, exercitationem consuetudinemque patiendi, praecepta fortitudinis, praecepta fortitudinis del.Sey.sed Cic.l.2,34—41 exercitationem consuetudinemque,postea (cf. maxime 51. 53) praecepta fortitudinis animo proposita (p.313,15sqq.) valere ad tolerandum dolorem exponit (cf.p.285.6 295, 24sqq.fin.2,94.95; 4, 31). cf.etiam Plasberg, Festschrift f. Vahlen p.234 (obloq. Se.,Jb.d.ph.V.29 p.97) duritiam virilem, sed una se dicit recordatione adquiescere praeteritarum voluptatium, voluptatum Bai.cf.Neue 1, 410 ut si quis aestuans, cum vim caloris non non postea add. R 1 facile patiatur, patiatur putatur V 1 recordari velit sese sese s esse X (se V 3 ) aliquando in Arpinati nostro gelidis fluminibus circumfusum fuisse. non enim video, quo modo sedare possint 5.75. mala praesentia praeteritae voluptates—sed cum is is his G 1 KV 1 dicat semper beatum esse sapientem, cui dicere hoc, si si add. G 2 sibi constare vellet, non liceret, quidnam faciendum est is qui nihil expetendum, nihil in bonis ducendum, quod honestate careat, existumant? existumant -a- e corr. R 1 Me quidem auctore auctore ex auctoritate R c etiam Peripatetici veteresque Academici balbuttire balbuttire GR Non. balbut ire V 1 balbutire K aliquando desit me...24 desit Non. 80, 13 aperteque et clara voce audeant dicere beatam vitam in Phalaridis taurum descensuram. decen suram X ( corr. V 3 ) 5.76. sint enim tria genera bonorum, ut ut aut V iam a laqueis Stoicorum, quibus usum me pluribus quam soleo intellego, recedamus, sint sane illa genera bonorum, dum corporis et et s om. X externa iaceant humi et tantum modo, quia sumenda sint, appellentur bona, animi animi Jeep (cf.427,14 443,3 458,6;divini ani- mi bona divina sunt caelumque contingunt) autem illa alii K alia GRV illa add. G 2 divina longe lateque se pandant caelumque contingant; ut, ut del.Lb.sed cf.p.242,25 ea qui adeptus sit, cur eum beatum modo et non beatissimum etiam dixerim? Dolorem vero sapiens extimescet? is enim huic maxime maxime huic G 1 sententiae repugnat. nam nam non V contra mortem nostram atque nostrorum contraque aegritudinem et reliquas animi perturbationes satis esse videmur videmus K superiorum dierum disputationibus armati et parati; dolor esse videtur acerrumus virtutis virtutis We. virtuti istis ard. G adversarius; is ardentis faces intentat, is fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam se debilitaturum minatur. 5.77. huic igitur succumbet virtus, huic beata sapientis et constantis viri vita cedet? caedet RV quam turpe, o dii boni! pueri Spartiatae non ingemescunt ingemiscunt K 1 R c B verberum verberum ex verborum V 1 G 2 dolore laniati. adulescentium greges reges V 1 Lacedaemone vidimus ipsi incredibili contentione contione X (conditione G 1 ) corr. B 1 s certantis pugnis calcibus unguibus morsu denique, cum exanimarentur prius quam victos se faterentur. quae barbaria India vastior aut agrestior? quae...agrestior? Non.415,11 in ea tamen aut... tamen add. V c gente primum sqq. cf.Val.Max.3,3,6 ext.2,6,14 ei, qui sapientes habentur, nudi aetatem agunt et Caucasi nives hiemalemque vim perferunt sine sqq. cf.Val.Max.3,3,6 ext.2,6,14 dolore, cumque ad flammam se adplicaverunt, applicaverunt KRV sine gemitu aduruntur. 5.78. mulieres vero in India, cum est cuius cuiuis V 3 communis Geel ( sed tum plures...nuptae post mortuus legeretur; cf.etiam Se., Jb.d.ph.V.26 p.301 ) earum vir mortuus, in certamen iudiciumque veniunt, quam plurumum ille dilexerit— plures enim singulis solent esse nuptae—; quae est victrix, ea laeta prosequentibus suis una unam V 1 cum viro in rogum imponitur, ponitur G 1 illa ilia cf.Quint.inst.1,3,2 victa quae Se. non male,cf.Claud.de nupt.Hon.64 (superatae cum...maerore in vita remanent Val.M. ) maesta discedit. numquam naturam mos vinceret; vinceret vincit H est enim ea semper invicta; sed nos umbris deliciis delitiis X (deliciis V, sed ci in r scr.,alt. i ss. V 2 ) otio languore langore G desidia animum infecimus, opinionibus maloque more delenitum delinitum V 1 H mollivimus. mollium KR 1 ( corr. 1 aut c )H Aegyptiorum morem quis ignorat? ignoret K quorum inbutae mentes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificinam carnifici. nam X prius subierint quam ibim aut aspidem aut faelem felem GV cf.nat.deor.1, 82 aut canem aut corcodillum corcodillum GRV corcodrillum KH cf.Th.l.l. violent, volent V 1 quorum etiamsi inprudentes quippiam fecerint, poenam nullam recusent. 5.79. de hominibus loquor; quid? bestiae non frigus, non famem, non montivagos atque silvestris cursus lustrationesque patiuntur? non pro suo sua G 1 partu ita propugt, ut ut K vulnera excipiant, nullos impetus nullos ictus reformident? omitto, quae omittoque p.G 1 V 1 perferant quaeque patiantur ambitiosi honoris causa, laudis studiosi gloriae gratia, amore incensi cupiditatis. plena plana GRV 1 ( corr. 3 ) vita exemplorum exemplum G 1 est. 5.80. Sed adhibeat oratio modum et redeat illuc, unde deflexit. dabit, inquam, dabit, dabit, inquam edd. vett. se in tormenta vita beata nec iustitiam temperantiam in primisque fortitudinem, magnitudinem animi, patientiam patientia GRVH prosecuta, cum tortoris os viderit, consistet virtutibusque omnibus sine ullo animi terrore ad cruciatum profectis resistet extra extra ( fuit et) R fores, ut ante ante cf.p. 410,8 dixi, limenque lumenque G 1 carceris. quid enim ea foedius, quid deformius sola relicta, a add. Lb. comitatu pulcherrimo pulcherrumo KR segregata? quod tamen fieri nullo pacto potest; nec enim virtutes sine beata vita cohaerere possunt nec illa sine virtutibus. 5.81. itaque eam tergiversari non sinent sinent s V rec Non. sinenti secumque rapient, itaque...6 rapienti Non.41,26 ad quemcumque ipsae ipse X dolorem cruciatumque ducentur. sapientis est enim proprium nihil quod paenitere possit possit add. G 2 facere, nihil invitum, splendide constanter graviter graviter c nstanter R honeste omnia, nihil ita expectare exspectare GRH ( alt.loco ) quasi certo incerto H (inc. alt.loco futurum, nihil, cum acciderit, admirari, ut inopinatum opinatum R 1 ac novum accidisse videatur, omnia ad suum arbitrium referre, suis stare iudiciis. quo quod G ( exp. 2 ) quid sit beatius, mihi certe in mentem venire non potest. numquam...441, 7 sapientis ( om. 441, 12 omnia...14 potest) H 5.82. Stoicorum quidem facilis conclusio est; qui cum finem bonorum esse esse om. H senserint congruere congruę G 1 naturae cumque ea convenienter vivere, cum id sit in sapientis sapientis Lb. sapiente situm non officio solum, verum etiam etiam om. H potestate, sequatur necesse est, ut, cuius in potestate summum bonum, in eiusdem vita beata ita ista V 1 sit. ita fit semper vita beata sapientis. Habes, quae fortissime de beata vita dici putem et, quo modo nunc est, nisi quid tu melius attuleris, etiam verissime. Melius equidem adferre nihil possum, sed a te impetrarim lubenter, ut, nisi molestum sit, sit est Ha. quoniam te nulla vincula impediunt ullius ullius V 3 B Corr s illius X certae disciplinae libasque ex omnibus, quodcumque te maxime specie veritatis movet,—quod paulo ante paulo ante 438,22 Peripateticos veteremque Academiam hortari videbare, ut sine retractatione libere dicere dicerent G ( corr. 1 ) RV ( corr. rec ) auderent audirent K sapientis esse semper beatissimos, id velim audire, quem ad modum his putes consentaneum esse id dicere. multa multi K 1 enim a te contra istam sententiam dicta sunt et Stoicorum ratione conclusa. 5.119. Quodsi is philosophis, his philosophis XF ii ( vel hi) philosophi corr. s V b vulgo; sed anacoluthon ( C. pergere volebat : semper beatus videtur sapiens cf. p. 418,23 ) tolerari potest, si v. 458,3 si i (et X id ut vid. F ei We. ) scribitur. quorum ea sententia est, ut virtus per se ipsa nihil valeat, omneque, omnesque XF ut v. omneque s quod honestum nos et laudabile esse dicamus, dicimus s id illi cassum cassum ex casus G 1 casum V quiddam et ii iis F vocis sono decoratum esse dicant,— si i si i cf. ad p. 457,21 tamen semper beatum censent esse sapientem, quid tandem a Socrate et Platone profectis perfectis KRH ( in V legi non potest ) philosophis faciendum videtur? uidetur V b (ui solum nunc in V dispicitur ) vides XF iudicas Sey. quorum alii tantam praestantiam in bonis animi esse dicunt, ut ab is is his X iis F corporis et externa obruantur, obruantur F cf. p. 314, 22 fin. 5,91 observant X (observan in V dispicitur observent R 2 ) obscurentur s (observatur pro obruatur Gr. p. 358, 1 ) alii autem haec ne ne nec K bona quidem ducunt, in animo reponunt omnia. haud...458, 8 omnia H | |
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| 22. Varro, On Agriculture, 3.5.12 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153 |
| 23. Varro, On The Latin Language, 7.12 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 305 |
24. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 2.1-2.6 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108| 2.1. Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis 2.2. e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; 2.3. non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas, 2.4. sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suavest. 2.5. per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli; 2.6. suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri | |
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| 25. Seneca The Elder, Controversies, 8.2 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108 |
| 26. Seneca The Elder, Suasoriae, 6.17.22 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •brutus m. junius Found in books: Maso (2022) 3 |
27. Ovid, Fasti, 5.579-5.596 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 251| 5.579. nec satis est meruisse semel cognomina Marti: 5.580. persequitur Parthi signa retenta manu. 5.581. gens fuit et campis et equis et tuta sagittis 5.582. et circumfusis invia fluminibus, 5.583. addiderant animos Crassorum funera genti, 5.584. cum periit miles signaque duxque simul. 5.585. signa, decus belli, Parthus Romana tenebat, 5.586. Romanaeque aquilae signifer hostis erat. 5.587. isque pudor mansisset adhuc, nisi fortibus armis 5.588. Caesaris Ausoniae protegerentur opes. 5.589. ille notas veteres et longi dedecus aevi 5.590. sustulit: agnorunt signa recepta suos. 5.591. quid tibi nunc solitae mitti post terga sagittae, 5.592. quid loca, quid rapidi profuit usus equi, 5.593. Parthe? refers aquilas, victos quoque porrigis arcus: 5.594. pignora iam nostri nulla pudoris habes. 5.595. rite deo templumque datum nomenque bis ulto, 5.596. et meritus voti debita solvit honor, | 5.579. A temple, and be called the Avenger, if I win.’ 5.580. So he vowed, and returned rejoicing from the rout. 5.581. Nor is he satisfied to have earned Mars that name, 5.582. But seeks the standards lost to Parthian hands, 5.583. That race protected by deserts, horses, arrows, 5.584. Inaccessible, behind their encircling rivers. 5.585. The nation’s pride had been roused by the death 5.586. of the Crassi, when army, leader, standards all were lost. 5.587. The Parthians kept the Roman standards, ornament 5.588. of war, and an enemy bore the Roman eagle. 5.589. That shame would have remained, if Italy’s power 5.590. Had not been defended by Caesar’s strong weapons. 5.591. He ended the old reproach, a generation of disgrace: 5.592. The standards were regained, and knew their own. 5.593. What use now the arrows fired from behind your backs, 5.594. Your deserts and your swift horses, you Parthians? 5.595. You carry the eagles home: offer your unstrung bows: 5.596. Now you no longer own the emblems of our shame. |
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| 28. Nicolaus of Damascus, Fragments, 80 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), assassination of caesar Found in books: Walters (2020) 108 |
| 29. Livy, Per., 116 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), assassination of caesar Found in books: Walters (2020) 108 |
| 30. Livy, History, 39.5 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 156 |
| 31. Nepos, Fragments, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Found in books: Walters (2020) 79 |
| 32. Martial, Epigrams, 12.15 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 156 |
| 33. Philippus Thessalonicensis, Epigrams, 8.15 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on caesar as malignant growth Found in books: Walters (2020) 114 |
| 34. Lucan, Pharsalia, 2.121 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Found in books: Walters (2020) 79 |
35. Plutarch, Brutus, 1.1, 9.6-9.8, 13.5-13.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. •junius brutus, m. (brutus), assassination of caesar Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153, 305; Walters (2020) 75| 1.1. Μάρκου δὲ Βρούτουπρόγονος ἦν Ἰούνιος Βροῦτος, ὃν ἀνέστησαν ἐν Καπιτωλίῳ χαλκοῦν οἱ πάλαι Ῥωμαῖοι μέσον τῶν βασιλέων, ἐσπασμένον ξίφος, ὡς βεβαιότατα καταλύσαντα Ταρκυνίους. 9.6. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνδριάντι τοῦ προπάτορος Βρούτου τοῦ καταλύσαντος τὴν τῶν βασιλέων ἀρχήν ἐπέγραφον εἴθε νῦν ἦς, Βροῦτε· καὶ ὢφελε ζῆν Βροῦτος. 9.7. τὸ δʼαὐτοῦ Βρούτου βῆμα στρατηγοῦντος εὑρίσκετο μεθʼ ἡμέραν ἀνάπλεων γραμμάτων τοιούτων Βροῦτε, καθεύδεις; καὶ οὐκ εἶ Βροῦτος ἀληθῶς. 9.8. αἴτιοι δὲ τούτων οἱ Καίσαρος κόλακες ἄλλας τε τιμὰς ἐπιφθόνους ἀνευρίσκοντες αὐτῷ καὶ διαδήματα τοῖς ἀνδριᾶσι νύκτωρ ἐπιτιθέντες, ὡς τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπαξόμενοι βασιλέα προσειπεῖν ἀντὶ δικτάτορος. 13.5. λαβοῦσα μαχαίριον ᾧ τοὺς ὄνυχας οἱ κουρεῖς ἀφαιροῦσι, καί πάσας ἐξελάσασα τοῦ θαλάμου τὰς ὀπαδούς, τομὴν ἐνέβαλε τῷ μηρῷ βαθεῖαν, ὥστε ῥύσιν αἵματος πολλὴν γενέσθαι καί μετὰ μικρὸν ὀδύνας τε νεανικὰς καί φρικώδεις πυρετοὺς ἐπιλαβεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος. 13.6. ἀγωνιῶντος δὲ τοῦ Βρούτου καί δυσφοροῦντος ἐν ἀκμῇ τῆς ἀλγηδόνος οὖσα διελέχθη πρὸς αὐτὸν οὕτως· 13.7. ἐγὼ,Βροῦτε, Κάτωνος οὖσα θυγάτηρ εἰς τὸν σὸν ἐδόθην οἶκον οὐχ ὥσπερ αἱ παλλακευόμεναι, κοίτης μεθέξουσα καί τραπέζης μόνον, ἀλλὰ κοινωνὸς μὲν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι, κοινωνὸς δὲ ἀνιαρῶν. 13.8. τὰ μὲν οὖν σὰ πάντα περὶ τὸν γάμον ἄμεμπτα· τῶν δὲ παρʼ ἐμοῦ τίς ἀπόδειξις ἢ χάρις, εἰ μήτε σοι πάθος ἀπόρρητον συνδιοίσω μήτε φροντίδα πίστεως δεομένην; 13.9. οἶδʼὅτι γυναικεία φύσις ἀσθενὴς δοκεῖ λόγον ἐνεγκεῖν ἀπόρρητον ἀλλʼ,ʼ ἔστι τίς, ὦ Βροῦτε, καί τροφῆς ἀγαθῆς καί ὁμιλίας χρηστῆς εἰς ἦθος ἰσχύς· 13.10. ἐμοὶ δὲ καί τὸ Κάτωνος εἶναι θυγατέρα καί τὸ Βρούτου γυναῖκα πρόσεστιν οἷς πρότερον μὲν ἧττον ἐπεποίθειν, νῦν δʼ ἐμαυτὴν ἔγνωκα καί πρὸς πόνον ἀήττητον εἶναι. 13.11. ταῦτʼ εἰποῦσα δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ τὸ τραῦμα καί διηγεῖται τὴν πεῖραν. ὁ δʼ ἐκπλαγεὶς καί ἀνατείνας τὰς χεῖρας ἐπεύξατο δοῦναι τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτῷ κατορθοῦντι τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀνδρὶ Πορκίας ἀξίῳ φανῆναι. καί τότε μὲν ἀνελάμβανε τὴν γυναῖκα. | 1.1. 9.6. 9.7. 9.8. 13.5. 13.6. 13.7. 13.8. 13.9. 13.10. 13.11. |
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| 36. Plutarch, Julius Caesar, 61.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 305 |
| 37. Plutarch, Cicero, 32.6-32.7 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •brutus m. junius Found in books: Maso (2022) 3 |
| 38. Plutarch, Comparison of Dion And Brutus, 5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 95, 156 |
39. Plutarch, Galba, 26.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 156| 26.4. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν δρόμος ἦν, οὐ φυγῇ σκιδναμένων, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τὰς στοὰς καὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς ἀγορᾶς, ὥσπερ θέαν καταλαμβανόντων. Ἀτιλλίου δὲ Βεργελίωνος εἰκόνα Γάλβᾳ προσουδίσαντος, ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου ποιησάμενοι περιηκόντισαν τὸ φορεῖον ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔτυχον αὐτοῦ, προσῆγον ἐσπασμένοις τοῖς ξίφεσιν. ἤμυνε δὲ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ ὑπέστη πλὴν ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, ὃν μόνον ἥλιος ἐπεῖδεν ἐν μυριάσι τοσαύταις ἄξιον τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας· | 26.4. |
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40. Plutarch, Lucullus, 37.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 156| 37.2. ἐλθόντος δʼ εἰς ἀγῶνα τοῦ Λουκούλλου μέγαν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ δυνατώτατοι καταμίξαντες ἑαυτοὺς ταῖς φυλαῖς πολλῇ δεήσει καὶ σπουδῇ μόλις ἔπεισαν τὸν δῆμον ἐπιτρέψαι θριαμβεῦσαι, οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι, μήκει τε πομπῆς καὶ πλήθει τῶν κομιζομένων ἐκπληκτικὸν καὶ ὀχλώδη θρίαμβον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ὅπλοις τῶν πολεμίων οὖσι παμπόλλοις καὶ τοῖς βασιλικοῖς μηχανήμασι τὸν Φλαμίνειον ἱππόδρομον διεκόσμησε· καὶ θέα τις ἦν αὐτὴ καθʼ ἑαυτὴν οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος· | 37.2. |
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| 41. Martial, Epigrams, 12.15 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 156 |
42. Plutarch, Marius, 23.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153; Walters (2020) 75| 23.5. ἔνθα δὴ Κάτλος ἔδειξεν ἑαυτόν, ὥσπερ χρὴ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλειον ἄρχοντα, τὴν αὑτοῦ δόξαν ἐν ὑστέρῳ τῶν πολιτῶν τιθέμενον. ἐπεὶ γάρ οὐκ ἔπειθε τοὺς στρατιώτας μένειν, ἀλλʼ ἑώρα περιδεῶς ἀναζευγνύντας, ἄρασθαι κελεύσας τὸν ἀετὸν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἀπερχομένων ὥρμησε δρόμῳ καὶ πρῶτος ἡγεῖτο, βουλόμενος αὑτοῦ τὸ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῆς πατρίδος γενέσθαι, καὶ δοκεῖν μὴ φεύγοντας, ἀλλʼ ἑπομένους τῷ στρατηγῷ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν. | 23.5. |
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| 43. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 22.13, 34.84, 35.25, 35.173, 36.26, 36.114, 37.4, 37.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108, 153, 156, 251 |
| 44. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 6.3.38 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153 |
| 45. Plutarch, Tiberius And Gaius Gracchus, 17.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 305 |
| 46. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 6.3.38 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153 |
| 47. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 7.64.9-7.64.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108 |
| 48. Suetonius, Augustus, 31.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •brutus, marcus junius •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Bexley (2022) 109; Rutledge (2012) 251 |
| 49. Suetonius, Iulius, 10.1, 79.1, 80.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 156, 305 |
| 50. Suetonius, Nero, 45 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 305 |
| 51. Suetonius, Tiberius, 13.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 156 |
| 52. Plutarch, Moralia, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108 |
| 53. Suetonius, Vitellius, 8.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 251 |
54. Tacitus, Annals, 3.76, 16.7 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108| 3.76. Et Iunia sexagesimo quarto post Philippensem aciem anno supremum diem explevit, Catone avunculo genita, C. Cassii uxor, M. Bruti soror. testamentum eius multo apud vulgum rumore fuit, quia in magnis opibus cum ferme cunctos proceres cum honore nominavisset Caesarem omisit. quod civiliter acceptum neque prohibuit quo minus laudatione pro rostris ceterisque sollemnibus funus cohonestaretur. viginti clarissimarum familiarum imagines antelatae sunt, Manlii, Quinctii aliaque eiusdem nobilitatis nomina. sed praefulgebant Cassius atque Brutus eo ipso quod effigies eorum non visebantur. 16.7. Mortem Poppaeae ut palam tristem, ita recordantibus laetam ob impudicitiam eius saevitiamque, nova insuper invidia Nero complevit prohibendo C. Cassium officio exequiarum, quod primum indicium mali. neque in longum dilatum est, sed Silanus additur, nullo crimine nisi quod Cassius opibus vetustis et gravitate morum, Silanus claritudine generis et modesta iuventa praecellebant. igitur missa ad senatum oratione removendos a re publica utrosque disseruit, obiectavitque Cassio quod inter imagines maiorum etiam C. Cassi effigiem coluisset, ita inscriptam 'duci partium': quippe semina belli civilis et defectionem a domo Caesarum quaesitam; ac ne memoria tantum infensi nominis ad discordias uteretur, adsumpsisse L. Silanum, iuvenem genere nobilem, animo praeruptum, quem novis rebus ostentaret. | 3.76. Junia, too, born niece to Cato, wife of Caius Cassius, sister of Marcus Brutus, looked her last on life, sixty-three full years after the field of Philippi. Her will was busily discussed by the crowd; because in disposing of her great wealth she mentioned nearly every patrician of note in complimentary terms, but omitted the Caesar. The slur was taken in good part, and he offered no objection to the celebration of her funeral with a panegyric at the Rostra and the rest of the customary ceremonies. The effigies of twenty great houses preceded her to the tomb â members of the Manlian and Quinctian families, and names of equal splendour. But Brutus and Cassius shone brighter than all by the very fact that their portraits were unseen. 16.7. To the death of Poppaea, outwardly regretted, but welcome to all who remembered her profligacy and cruelty, Nero added a fresh measure of odium by prohibiting Gaius Cassius from attendance at the funeral. It was the first hint of mischief. Nor was the mischief long delayed. Silanus was associated with him; their only crime being that Cassius was eminent for a great hereditary fortune and an austere character, Silanus for a noble lineage and a temperate youth. Accordingly, the emperor sent a speech to the senate, arguing that both should be removed from public life, and objecting to the former that, among his other ancestral effigies, he had honoured a bust of Gaius Cassius, inscribed:â "To the leader of the cause." The seeds of civil war, and revolt from the house of the Caesars, â such were the objects he had pursued. And, not to rely merely on the memory of a hated name as an incentive to faction, he had taken to himself a partner in Lucius Silanus, a youth of noble family and headstrong temper, who was to be his figure-head for a revolution. |
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| 55. Tacitus, Histories, 1.36 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 156 |
| 56. Appian, Civil Wars, 1.29-1.33, 2.106, 2.108, 2.144 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), assassination of caesar •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 305; Walters (2020) 75, 108 |
57. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 31.148 (1st cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153 | 31.148. Why, even Nero, who had so great a craving and enthusiasm in that business that he did not keep his hands off of even the treasures of Olympia or of Delphi â although he honoured those sanctuaries above all others â but went still farther and removed most of the statues on the Acropolis of Athens and many of those at Pergamum, although that precinct was his very own (for what need is there to speak of those in other places?), left undisturbed only those in your city and showed towards you such signal goodwill and honour that he esteemed your entire city more sacred than the foremost sanctuaries. |
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58. Pliny The Younger, Letters, 1.17, 3.7.8 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108 | 1.17. To Cornelius Titianus. Faith and loyalty are not yet extinct among men 0 |
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59. Pliny The Younger, Letters, 1.17, 3.7.8 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108 | 1.17. To Cornelius Titianus. Faith and loyalty are not yet extinct among men 0 |
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60. Pausanias, Description of Greece, 10.7.1, 10.19.2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 153| 10.7.1. ἔοικε δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιβεβουλεῦσθαι πλείστων ἤδη. οὗτός τε ὁ Εὐβοεὺς λῃστὴς καὶ ἔτεσιν ὕστερον τὸ ἔθνος τὸ Φλεγυῶν, ἔτι δὲ Πύρρος ὁ Ἀχιλλέως ἐπεχείρησεν αὐτῷ, καὶ δυνάμεως μοῖρα τῆς Ξέρξου, καὶ οἱ χρόνον τε ἐπὶ πλεῖστον καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ θεοῦ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἐπελθόντες οἱ ἐν Φωκεῦσι δυνάσται, καὶ ἡ Γαλατῶν στρατιά. ἔμελλε δὲ ἄρα οὐδὲ τῆς Νέρωνος ἐς πάντα ὀλιγωρίας ἀπειράτως ἕξειν, ὃς τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα πεντακοσίας θεῶν τε ἀναμὶξ ἀφείλετο καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἰκόνας χαλκᾶς. 10.19.2. οὗτοι περὶ τὸ ὄρος τὸ Πήλιον ἐπιπεσόντος ναυτικῷ τῷ Ξέρξου βιαίου χειμῶνος προσεξειργάσαντό σφισιν ἀπώλειαν, τάς τε ἀγκύρας καὶ εἰ δή τι ἄλλο ἔρυμα ταῖς τριήρεσιν ἦν ὑφέλκοντες. ἀντὶ τούτου μὲν οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες καὶ αὐτὸν Σκύλλιν καὶ τὴν παῖδα ἀνέθεσαν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀνδριᾶσιν ὁπόσους Νέρων ἔλαβεν ἐκ Δελφῶν, ἐν τούτοις τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τῆς Ὕδνης ἀπεπλήρωσεν ἡ εἰκών. καταδύονται δὲ ἐς θάλασσαν γένους τοῦ θήλεος αἱ καθαρῶς ἔτι παρθένοι. | 10.7.1. It seems that from the beginning the sanctuary at Delphi has been plotted against by a vast number of men. Attacks were made against it by this Euboean pirate, and years afterwards by the Phlegyan nation; furthermore by Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, by a portion of the army of Xerxes, by the Phocian chieftains, whose attacks on the wealth of the god were the longest and fiercest, and by the Gallic invaders. It was fated too that Delphi was to suffer from the universal irreverence of Nero, who robbed Apollo of five hundred bronze statues, some of gods, some of men. 10.19.2. When the fleet of Xerxes was attacked by a violent storm off Mount Pelion, father and daughter completed its destruction by dragging away under the sea the anchors and any other security the triremes had. In return for this deed the Amphictyons dedicated statues of Scyllis and his daughter. The statue of Hydna completed the number of the statues that Nero carried off from Delphi . Only those of the female sex who are pure virgins may dive into the sea. This sentence is probably a marginal note which has crept into the text. |
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61. Tertullian, On Modesty, 16 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 305 | 16. Necessary it is, therefore, that the (character of the) apostle should be continuously pointed out to them; whom I will maintain to be such in the second of Corinthians withal, as I know (him to be) in all his letters. (He it is) who even in the first (Epistle) was the first of all (the apostles) to dedicate the temple of God: Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and that in you the Lord dwells? - who likewise, for the consecrating and purifying (of) that temple, wrote the law pertaining to the temple-keepers: If any shall have marred the temple of God, him shall God mar; for the temple of God is holy, which (temple) are you. Come, now; who in the world has (ever) redintegrated one who has been marred by God (that is, delivered to Satan with a view to destruction of the flesh), after subjoining for that reason, Let none seduce himself; that is, let none presume that one marred by God can possibly be redintegrated anew? Just as, again, among all other crimes - nay, even before all others - when affirming that adulterers, and fornicators, and effeminates, and co-habitors with males, will not attain the kingdom of God, he premised, Do not err - to wit, if you think they will attain it. But to them from whom the kingdom is taken away, of course the life which exists in the kingdom is not permitted either. Moreover, by superadding, But such indeed you have been; but you have received ablution, but you have been sanctified, in the Name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God; in as far as he puts on the paid side of the account such sins before baptism, in so far after baptism he determines them irremissible, if it is true, (as it is), that they are not allowed to receive ablution anew. Recognise, too, in what follows, Paul (in the character of) an immoveable column of discipline and its rules: Meats for the belly, and the belly for meats: God makes a full end both of the one and of the others; but the body (is) not for fornication, but for God: for Let Us make man, said God, (conformable) to Our image and likeness. And God made man; (conformable) to the image and likeness of God made He him. The Lord for the body: yes; for the Word was made flesh. Moreover, God both raised up the Lord, and will raise up us through His own power; on account, to wit, of the union of our body with Him. And accordingly, Do you not know your bodies (to be) members of Christ? because Christ, too, is God's temple. Overturn this temple, and I will in three days' space resuscitate it. Taking away the members of Christ, shall I make (them) members of an harlot? Do you not know, that whoever is agglutinated to an harlot is made one body? (for the two shall be (made) into one flesh): but whoever is agglutinated to the Lord is one spirit? Flee fornication. If revocable by pardon, in what sense am I to flee it, to turn adulterer anew? I shall gain nothing if I do flee it: I shall be one body, to which by communion I shall be agglutinated. Every sin which a human being may have committed is extraneous to the body; but whoever fornicates, sins against his own body. And, for fear you should fly to that statement for a licence to fornication, on the ground that you will be sinning against a thing which is yours, not the Lord's, he takes you away from yourself, and awards you, according to his previous disposition, to Christ: And you are not your own; immediately opposing (thereto), for bought you are with a price - the blood, to wit, of the Lord: glorify and extol the Lord in your body. See whether he who gives this injunction be likely to have pardoned one who has disgraced the Lord, and who has cast Him down from (the empire of) his body, and this indeed through incest. If you wish to imbibe to the utmost all knowledge of the apostle, in order to understand with what an axe of censorship he lops, and eradicates, and extirpates, every forest of lusts, for fear of permitting anything to regain strength and sprout again; behold him desiring souls to keep a fast from the legitimate fruit of nature - the apple, I mean, of marriage: But with regard to what you wrote, good it is for a man to have no contact with a woman; but, on account of fornication, let each one have his own wife: let husband to wife, and wife to husband, render what is due. Who but must know that it was against his will that he relaxed the bond of this good, in order to prevent fornication? But if he either has granted, or does grant, indulgence to fornication, of course he has frustrated the design of his own remedy. and will be bound immediately to put the curb upon the nuptials of continence, if the fornication for the sake of which those nuptials are permitted shall cease to be feared. For (a fornication) which has indulgence granted it will not be feared. And yet he professes that he has granted the use of marriage by way of indulgence, not of command. For he wills all to be on a level with himself. But when things lawful are (only) granted by way of indulgence, who hope for things unlawful? To the unmarried also, and widows, he says, It is good, by his example, to persevere (in their present state); but if they were too weak, to marry; because it is preferable to marry than to burn. With what fires, I pray you, is it preferable to burn- (the fires) of concupiscence, or (the fires) of penalty? Nay, but if fornication is pardonable, it will not be an object of concupiscence. But it is more (the manner) of an apostle to take forethought for the fires of penalty. Wherefore, if it is penalty which burns, it follows that fornication, which penalty awaits, is not pardonable. Meantime withal, while prohibiting divorce, he uses the Lord's precept against adultery as an instrument for providing, in place of divorce, either perseverance in widowhood, or else a reconciliation of peace: inasmuch as whoever shall have dismissed a wife (for any cause) except the cause of adultery, makes her commit adultery; and he who marries one dismissed by a husband commits adultery. What powerful remedies does the Holy Spirit furnish, to prevent, to wit, the commission anew of that which He wills not should anew be pardoned! Now, if in all cases he says it is best for a man thus to be; You are joined to a wife, seek not loosing (that you may give no occasion to adultery); you are loosed from a wife, seek not a wife, that you may reserve an opportunity for yourself: but withal, if you shall have married a wife, and if a virgin shall have married, she sins not; pressure, however, of the flesh such shall have,- even here he is granting a permission by way of sparing them. On the other hand, he lays it down that the time is wound up, in order that even they who have wives may be as if they had them not. For the fashion of this world is passing away,- (this world) no longer, to wit, requiring (the command), Grow and multiply. Thus he wills us to pass our life without anxiety, because the unmarried care about the Lord, how they may please God; the married, however, muse about the world, how they may please their spouse. Thus he pronounces that the preserver of a virgin does better than her giver in marriage. Thus, too, he discriminatingly judges her to be more blessed, who, after losing her husband subsequently to her entrance into the faith, lovingly embraces the opportunity of widowhood. Thus he commends as Divine all these counsels of continence: I think, he says, I too have the Spirit of God. Who is this your most audacious asserter of all immodesty, plainly a most faithful advocate of the adulterous, and fornicators, and incestuous, in whose honour he has undertaken this cause against the Holy Spirit, so that he recites a false testimony from (the writings of) His apostle? No such indulgence granted Paul, who endeavours to obliterate necessity of the flesh wholly from (the list of) even honourable pretexts (for marriage unions). He does grant indulgence, I allow - not to adulteries, but to nuptials. He does spare, I allow - marriages, not harlotries. He tries to avoid giving pardon even to nature, for fear he may flatter guilt. He is studious to put restraints upon the union which is heir to blessing, for fear that which is heir to curse be excused. This (one possibility) was left him - to purge the flesh from (natural) dregs, for (cleanse it) from (foul) stains he cannot. But this is the usual way with perverse and ignorant heretics; yes, and by this time even with Psychics universally: to arm themselves with the opportune support of some one ambiguous passage, in opposition to the disciplined host of sentences of the entire document. |
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62. Cassius Dio, Roman History, 37.9.1-37.9.2, 38.19.1, 43.17.5, 43.45.3-43.45.4, 44.4.4, 44.9.1-44.9.3, 44.12, 44.12.1, 48.42, 53.32.4, 55.10.3, 59.26.3, 63.25 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Bexley (2022) 105, 106, 109; Maso (2022) 3; Rutledge (2012) 95, 153, 156, 251, 305; Walters (2020) 80, 108 | 37.9.1. Over these successes the Romans naturally rejoiced, but the portents that occurred thoroughly disquieted them. On the Capitol many statues and images were melted by thunderbolts, among others one of Jupiter, set upon a pillar; and a likeness of the she-wolf with Romulus and Remus, mounted on a pedestal, fell down; 37.9.2. also the letters of the columns on which the laws were inscribed became blurred and indistinct. Accordingly, on the advice of the soothsayers they offered many expiatory sacrifices and voted that a larger statue of Jupiter should be set up, looking toward the east and the Forum, in order that the conspiracies by which they were disturbed might come to light. 38.19.1. "Indeed," said Cicero, "if you have any arguments that will dispel this mist from my soul and restore me to the light of old, I am most ready to listen. For words, as drugs, are of many varieties, and divers potencies, so that it will not be surprising if you should be able to steep in some mixture of philosophy even me, for all my brilliant feats in the senate, the assemblies, and the law-courts." 43.17.5. and beginning to love each other without suspicion as if we were in some sort new citizens. In this way you will conduct yourselves toward me as toward a father, enjoying the forethought and solicitude which I shall give you and fearing nothing unpleasant, and I will take thought for you as for my children, 43.45.3. Another likeness they set up in the temple of Quirinus with the inscription, "To the Invincible God," and another on the Capitol beside the former kings of Rome. 43.45.4. Now it occurs to me to marvel at the coincidence: there were eight such statues, â seven to the kings, and an eighth to the Brutus who overthrew the Tarquins, â and they set up the statue of Caesar beside the last of these; and it was from this cause chiefly that the other Brutus, Marcus, was roused to plot against him. 44.4.4. In addition to these remarkable privileges they named him father of his country, stamped this title on the coinage, voted to celebrate his birthday by public sacrifice, ordered that he should have a statue in the cities and in all the temples of Rome, 44.9.1. When he had reached this point, the men who were plotting against him hesitated no longer, but in order to embitter even his best friends against him, they did their best to traduce him, finally saluting him as king, a name which they often used also among themselves. 44.9.2. When he kept refusing the title and rebuking in a way those who thus accosted him, yet did nothing by which it would be thought that he was really displeased at it, they secretly adorned his statue, which stood on the rostra, with a diadem. 44.9.3. And when the tribunes, Gaius Epidius Marullus and Lucius Caesetius Flavius, took it down, he became violently angry, although they uttered no word of abuse and moreover actually praised him before the populace as not wanting anything of the sort. For the time being, though vexed, he held his peace. 44.12. 1. Making the most of his having the same name as the great Brutus who overthrew the Tarquins, they scattered broadcast many pamphlets, declaring that he was not truly that man's descendant; for the older Brutus had put to death both his sons, the only ones he had, when they were mere lads, and left no offspring whatever.,2. Nevertheless, the majority pretended to accept such a relationship, in order that Brutus, as a kinsman of that famous man, might be induced to perform deeds as great. They kept continually calling upon him, shouting out "Brutus, Brutus!" and adding further "We need a Brutus.",3. Finally on the statue of the early Brutus they wrote "Would that thou wert living!" and upon the tribunal of the living Brutus (for he was praetor at the time and this is the name given to the seat on which the praetor sits in judgment) "Brutus, thou sleepest," and "Thou art not Brutus." 44.12.1. Making the most of his having the same name as the great Brutus who overthrew the Tarquins, they scattered broadcast many pamphlets, declaring that he was not truly that man's descendant; for the older Brutus had put to death both his sons, the only ones he had, when they were mere lads, and left no offspring whatever. 48.42. 1. There was another on the part of the Cerretani in Spain, and they were subjugated by Calvinus after he had met with a preliminary success and also a reverse, â the latter through his lieutet, who was ambushed by the barbarians and deserted by his soldiers.,2. Calvinus undertook no operation against the enemy until he had punished these deserters; calling them together as if for some other purpose, he made the rest of the army surround them, and then put to death every tenth man in two centuries and punished many of the centurions, including the one who was serving in the primus pilus, as it is called.,3. After doing this and gaining, like Marcus Crassus, a reputation for his disciplining of his army, he set out against his opponents and with no great difficulty vanquished them.,4. And he obtained a triumph in spite of the fact that Spain had been assigned to Caesar; for those in power could grant the honours at will to those who served as their lieutets. The gold customarily given by the cities for the triumph Calvinus took from the Spanish towns alone, and of it he spent only a part on the festival, but the greater portion on (Opens in another window)')" onMouseOut="nd();" the Regia.,5. This had been burned down, and he now rebuilt and dedicated it, adorning it splendidly with various objects and with statues in particular, which he asked Caesar to send him, intimating that he would give them back. And when he asked for them later, he did not return them, excusing himself by a witticism.,6. Pretending that he had not enough assistants, he said: "Send some men and take them." And thus Caesar, since he shrank from the sacrilege, allowed them to remain as votive offerings. 53.32.4. For this act he received praise, as also because he chose in his stead Lucius Sestius, who had always been an enthusiastic follower of Brutus, had fought with him in all his wars, and even at this time kept alive his memory, had images of him, and delivered eulogies upon him. Augustus, it would appear, so far from disliking the man's devotion and loyalty, actually honoured these qualities in him. 55.10.3. that the senate should take its votes there in regard to the granting of triumphs, and that the victors after celebrating them should dedicate to this Mars their sceptre and their crown; that such victors and all others who receive triumphal honours should have their statues in bronze erected in the Forum; 59.26.3. When Gaius showed pleasure at this and declared that he had become reconciled with them, they voted various festivals and also decreed that the emperor should sit on a high platform even in the very senate-house, to prevent anyone from approaching him, and should have a military guard even there; they likewise voted that his statues should be guarded. 63.25. 1. Rufus mourned his death greatly, but refused to accept the office of emperor, although his soldiers frequently urged it upon him and he might easily have obtained it. For he was an energetic man and had a large and zealous military force, and his soldiers threw down and shattered the images of Nero and called Rufus by the titles of Caesar and Augustus. |
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| 63. Gellius, Attic Nights, 9.11.10, 12.10 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 251, 305 |
| 64. Obsequens, De Prodigiis, 61 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Found in books: Walters (2020) 80 |
| 65. Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Al. Sev., 25.9, 26.4, 26.8, 28.6 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 251 |
66. Augustine, The City of God, 2.9, 2.12-2.13, 2.21, 3.15 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •brutus m. junius Found in books: Maso (2022) 21 | 2.9. The opinion of the ancient Romans on this matter is attested by Cicero in his work De Republica, in which Scipio, one of the interlocutors, says, The lewdness of comedy could never have been suffered by audiences, unless the customs of society had previously sanctioned the same lewdness. And in the earlier days the Greeks preserved a certain reasonableness in their license, and made it a law, that whatever comedy wished to say of any one, it must say it of him by name. And so in the same work of Cicero's, Scipio says, Whom has it not aspersed? Nay, whom has it not worried? Whom has it spared? Allow that it may assail demagogues and factions, men injurious to the commonwealth - a Cleon, a Cleophon, a Hyperbolus. That is tolerable, though it had been more seemly for the public censor to brand such men, than for a poet to lampoon them; but to blacken the fame of Pericles with scurrilous verse, after he had with the utmost dignity presided over their state alike in war and in peace, was as unworthy of a poet, as if our own Plautus or N vius were to bring Publius and Cneius Scipio on the comic stage, or as if C cilius were to caricature Cato. And then a little after he goes on: Though our Twelve Tables attached the penalty of death only to a very few offenses, yet among these few this was one: if any man should have sung a pasquinade, or have composed a satire calculated to bring infamy or disgrace on another person. Wisely decreed. For it is by the decisions of magistrates, and by a well-informed justice, that our lives ought to be judged, and not by the flighty fancies of poets; neither ought we to be exposed to hear calumnies, save where we have the liberty of replying, and defending ourselves before an adequate tribunal. This much I have judged it advisable to quote from the fourth book of Cicero's De Republica; and I have made the quotation word for word, with the exception of some words omitted, and some slightly transposed, for the sake of giving the sense more readily. And certainly the extract is pertinent to the matter I am endeavoring to explain. Cicero makes some further remarks, and concludes the passage by showing that the ancient Romans did not permit any living man to be either praised or blamed on the stage. But the Greeks, as I said, though not so moral, were more logical in allowing this license which the Romans forbade; for they saw that their gods approved and enjoyed the scurrilous language of low comedy when directed not only against men, but even against themselves; and this, whether the infamous actions imputed to them were the fictions of poets, or were their actual iniquities commemorated and acted in the theatres. And would that the spectators had judged them worthy only of laughter, and not of imitation! Manifestly it had been a stretch of pride to spare the good name of the leading men and the common citizens, when the very deities did not grudge that their own reputation should be blemished. 2.12. The Romans, however, as Scipio boasts in that same discussion, declined having their conduct and good name subjected to the assaults and slanders of the poets, and went so far as to make it a capital crime if any one should dare to compose such verses. This was a very honorable course to pursue, so far as they themselves were concerned, but in respect of the gods it was proud and irreligious: for they knew that the gods not only tolerated, but relished, being lashed by the injurious expressions of the poets, and yet they themselves would not suffer this same handling; and what their ritual prescribed as acceptable to the gods, their law prohibited as injurious to themselves. How then, Scipio, do you praise the Romans for refusing this license to the poets, so that no citizen could be calumniated, while you know that the gods were not included under this protection? Do you count your senate-house worthy of so much higher a regard than the Capitol? Is the one city of Rome more valuable in your eyes than the whole heaven of gods, that you prohibit your poets from uttering any injurious words against a citizen, though they may with impunity cast what imputations they please upon the gods, without the interference of senator, censor, prince, or pontiff? It was, forsooth, intolerable that Plautus or N vus should attack Publius and Cneius Scipio, insufferable that C cilius should lampoon Cato; but quite proper that your Terence should encourage youthful lust by the wicked example of supreme Jove. 2.13. But Scipio, were he alive, would possibly reply: How could we attach a penalty to that which the gods themselves have consecrated? For the theatrical entertainments in which such things are said, and acted, and performed, were introduced into Roman society by the gods, who ordered that they should be dedicated and exhibited in their honor. But was not this, then, the plainest proof that they were no true gods, nor in any respect worthy of receiving divine honours from the republic? Suppose they had required that in their honor the citizens of Rome should be held up to ridicule, every Roman would have resented the hateful proposal. How then, I would ask, can they be esteemed worthy of worship, when they propose that their own crimes be used as material for celebrating their praises? Does not this artifice expose them, and prove that they are detestable devils? Thus the Romans, though they were superstitious enough to serve as gods those who made no secret of their desire to be worshipped in licentious plays, yet had sufficient regard to their hereditary dignity and virtue, to prompt them to refuse to players any such rewards as the Greeks accorded them. On this point we have this testimony of Scipio, recorded in Cicero: They [the Romans] considered comedy and all theatrical performances as disgraceful, and therefore not only debarred players from offices and honors open to ordinary citizens, but also decreed that their names should be branded by the censor, and erased from the roll of their tribe. An excellent decree, and another testimony to the sagacity of Rome; but I could wish their prudence had been more thorough-going and consistent. For when I hear that if any Roman citizen chose the stage as his profession, he not only closed to himself every laudable career, but even became an outcast from his own tribe, I cannot but exclaim: This is the true Roman spirit, this is worthy of a state jealous of its reputation. But then some one interrupts my rapture, by inquiring with what consistency players are debarred from all honors, while plays are counted among the honors due to the gods? For a long while the virtue of Rome was uncontaminated by theatrical exhibitions; and if they had been adopted for the sake of gratifying the taste of the citizens, they would have been introduced hand in hand with the relaxation of manners. But the fact is, that it was the gods who demanded that they should be exhibited to gratify them. With what justice, then, is the player excommunicated by whom God is worshipped? On what pretext can you at once adore him who exacts, and brand him who acts these plays? This, then, is the controversy in which the Greeks and Romans are engaged. The Greeks think they justly honor players, because they worship the gods who demand plays; the Romans, on the other hand, do not suffer an actor to disgrace by his name his own plebeian tribe, far less the senatorial order. And the whole of this discussion may be summed up in the following syllogism. The Greeks give us the major premise: If such gods are to be worshipped, then certainly such men may be honored. The Romans add the minor: But such men must by no means be honoured. The Christians draw the conclusion: Therefore such gods must by no means be worshipped. 2.21. But if our adversaries do not care how foully and disgracefully the Roman republic be stained by corrupt practices, so long only as it holds together and continues in being, and if they therefore pooh-pooh the testimony of Sallust to its utterly wicked and profligate condition, what will they make of Cicero's statement, that even in his time it had become entirely extinct, and that there remained extant no Roman republic at all? He introduces Scipio (the Scipio who had destroyed Carthage) discussing the republic, at a time when already there were presentiments of its speedy ruin by that corruption which Sallust describes. In fact, at the time when the discussion took place, one of the Gracchi, who, according to Sallust, was the first great instigator of seditions, had already been put to death. His death, indeed, is mentioned in the same book. Now Scipio, at the end of the second book, says: As among the different sounds which proceed from lyres, flutes, and the human voice, there must be maintained a certain harmony which a cultivated ear cannot endure to hear disturbed or jarring, but which may be elicited in full and absolute concord by the modulation even of voices very unlike one another; so, where reason is allowed to modulate the diverse elements of the state, there is obtained a perfect concord from the upper, lower, and middle classes as from various sounds; and what musicians call harmony in singing, is concord in matters of state, which is the strictest bond and best security of any republic, and which by no ingenuity can be retained where justice has become extinct. Then, when he had expatiated somewhat more fully, and had more copiously illustrated the benefits of its presence and the ruinous effects of its absence upon a state, Pilus, one of the company present at the discussion, struck in and demanded that the question should be more thoroughly sifted, and that the subject of justice should be freely discussed for the sake of ascertaining what truth there was in the maxim which was then becoming daily more current, that the republic cannot be governed without injustice. Scipio expressed his willingness to have this maxim discussed and sifted, and gave it as his opinion that it was baseless, and that no progress could be made in discussing the republic unless it was established, not only that this maxim, that the republic cannot be governed without injustice, was false, but also that the truth is, that it cannot be governed without the most absolute justice. And the discussion of this question, being deferred till the next day, is carried on in the third book with great animation. For Pilus himself undertook to defend the position that the republic cannot be governed without injustice, at the same time being at special pains to clear himself of any real participation in that opinion. He advocated with great keenness the cause of injustice against justice, and endeavored by plausible reasons and examples to demonstrate that the former is beneficial, the latter useless, to the republic. Then, at the request of the company, L lius attempted to defend justice, and strained every nerve to prove that nothing is so hurtful to a state as injustice; and that without justice a republic can neither be governed, nor even continue to exist. When this question has been handled to the satisfaction of the company, Scipio reverts to the original thread of discourse, and repeats with commendation his own brief definition of a republic, that it is the good of the people. The people he defines as being not every assemblage or mob, but an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of law, and by a community of interests. Then he shows the use of definition in debate; and from these definitions of his own he gathers that a republic, or good of the people, then exists only when it is well and justly governed, whether by a monarch, or an aristocracy, or by the whole people. But when the monarch is unjust, or, as the Greeks say, a tyrant; or the aristocrats are unjust, and form a faction; or the people themselves are unjust, and become, as Scipio for want of a better name calls them, themselves the tyrant, then the republic is not only blemished (as had been proved the day before), but by legitimate deduction from those definitions, it altogether ceases to be. For it could not be the people's good when a tyrant factiously lorded it over the state; neither would the people be any longer a people if it were unjust, since it would no longer answer the definition of a people - an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of law, and by a community of interests. When, therefore, the Roman republic was such as Sallust described it, it was not utterly wicked and profligate, as he says, but had altogether ceased to exist, if we are to admit the reasoning of that debate maintained on the subject of the republic by its best representatives. Tully himself, too, speaking not in the person of Scipio or any one else, but uttering his own sentiments, uses the following language in the beginning of the fifth book, after quoting a line from the poet Ennius, in which he said, Rome's severe morality and her citizens are her safeguard. This verse, says Cicero, seems to me to have all the sententious truthfulness of an oracle. For neither would the citizens have availed without the morality of the community, nor would the morality of the commons without outstanding men have availed either to establish or so long to maintain in vigor so grand a republic with so wide and just an empire. Accordingly, before our day, the hereditary usages formed our foremost men, and they on their part retained the usages and institutions of their fathers. But our age, receiving the republic as a chef-d'oeuvre of another age which has already begun to grow old, has not merely neglected to restore the colors of the original, but has not even been at the pains to preserve so much as the general outline and most outstanding features. For what survives of that primitive morality which the poet called Rome's safeguard? It is so obsolete and forgotten, that, far from practising it, one does not even know it. And of the citizens what shall I say? Morality has perished through poverty of great men; a poverty for which we must not only assign a reason, but for the guilt of which we must answer as criminals charged with a capital crime. For it is through our vices, and not by any mishap, that we retain only the name of a republic, and have long since lost the reality. This is the confession of Cicero, long indeed after the death of Africanus, whom he introduced as an interlocutor in his work De Republica, but still before the coming of Christ. Yet, if the disasters he bewails had been lamented after the Christian religion had been diffused, and had begun to prevail, is there a man of our adversaries who would not have thought that they were to be imputed to the Christians? Why, then, did their gods not take steps then to prevent the decay and extinction of that republic, over the loss of which Cicero, long before Christ had come in the flesh, sings so mournful a dirge? Its admirers have need to inquire whether, even in the days of primitive men and morals, true justice flourished in it; or was it not perhaps even then, to use the casual expression of Cicero, rather a colored painting than the living reality? But, if God will, we shall consider this elsewhere. For I mean in its own place to show that - according to the definitions in which Cicero himself, using Scipio as his mouthpiece, briefly propounded what a republic is, and what a people is, and according to many testimonies, both of his own lips and of those who took part in that same debate - Rome never was a republic, because true justice had never a place in it. But accepting the more feasible definitions of a republic, I grant there was a republic of a certain kind, and certainly much better administered by the more ancient Romans than by their modern representatives. But the fact is, true justice has no existence save in that republic whose founder and ruler is Christ, if at least any choose to call this a republic; and indeed we cannot deny that it is the people's good. But if perchance this name, which has become familiar in other connections, be considered alien to our common parlance, we may at all events say that in this city is true justice; the city of which Holy Scripture says, Glorious things are said of you, O city of God. 3.15. And what was the end of the kings themselves? of Romulus, a flattering legend tells us that he was assumed into heaven. But certain Roman historians relate that he was torn in pieces by the senate for his ferocity, and that a man, Julius Proculus, was suborned to give out that Romulus had appeared to him, and through him commanded the Roman people to worship him as a god; and that in this way the people, who were beginning to resent the action of the senate, were quieted and pacified. For an eclipse of the sun had also happened; and this was attributed to the divine power of Romulus by the ignorant multitude, who did not know that it was brought about by the fixed laws of the sun's course: though this grief of the sun might rather have been considered proof that Romulus had been slain, and that the crime was indicated by this deprivation of the sun's light; as, in truth, was the case when the Lord was crucified through the cruelty and impiety of the Jews. For it is sufficiently demonstrated that this latter obscuration of the sun did not occur by the natural laws of the heavenly bodies, because it was then the Jewish Passover, which is held only at full moon, whereas natural eclipses of the sun happen only at the last quarter of the moon. Cicero, too, shows plainly enough that the apotheosis of Romulus was imaginary rather than real, when, even while he is praising him in one of Scipio's remarks in the De Republica, he says: Such a reputation had he acquired, that when he suddenly disappeared during an eclipse of the sun, he was supposed to have been assumed into the number of the gods, which could be supposed of no mortal who had not the highest reputation for virtue. By these words, he suddenly disappeared, we are to understand that he was mysteriously made away with by the violence either of the tempest or of a murderous assault. For their other writers speak not only of an eclipse, but of a sudden storm also, which certainly either afforded opportunity for the crime, or itself made an end of Romulus. And of Tullus Hostilius, who was the third king of Rome, and who was himself destroyed by lightning, Cicero in the same book says, that he was not supposed to have been deified by this death, possibly because the Romans were unwilling to vulgarize the promotion they were assured or persuaded of in the case of Romulus, lest they should bring it into contempt by gratuitously assigning it to all and sundry. In one of his invectives, too, he says, in round terms, The founder of this city, Romulus, we have raised to immortality and divinity by kindly celebrating his services; implying that his deification was not real, but reputed, and called so by courtesy on account of his virtues. In the dialogue Hortensius, too, while speaking of the regular eclipses of the sun, he says that they produce the same darkness as covered the death of Romulus, which happened during an eclipse of the sun. Here you see he does not at all shrink from speaking of his death, for Cicero was more of a reasoner than an eulogist. The other kings of Rome, too, with the exception of Numa Pompilius and Ancus Marcius, who died natural deaths, what horrible ends they had! Tullus Hostilius, the conqueror and destroyer of Alba, was, as I said, himself and all his house consumed by lightning. Priscus Tarquinius was slain by his predecessor's sons. Servius Tullius was foully murdered by his son-in-law Tarquinius Superbus, who succeeded him on the throne. Nor did so flagrant a parricide committed against Rome's best king drive from their altars and shrines those gods who were said to have been moved by Paris' adultery to treat poor Troy in this style, and abandon it to the fire and sword of the Greeks. Nay, the very Tarquin who had murdered, was allowed to succeed his father-in-law. And this infamous parricide, during the reign he had secured by murder, was allowed to triumph in many victorious wars, and to build the Capitol from their spoils; the gods meanwhile not departing, but abiding, and abetting, and suffering their king Jupiter to preside and reign over them in that very splendid Capitol, the work of a parricide. For he did not build the Capitol in the days of his innocence, and then suffer banishment for subsequent crimes; but to that reign during which he built the Capitol, he won his way by unnatural crime. And when he was afterwards banished by the Romans, and forbidden the city, it was not for his own but his son's wickedness in the affair of Lucretia - a crime perpetrated not only without his cognizance, but in his absence. For at that time he was besieging Ardea, and fighting Rome's battles; and we cannot say what he would have done had he been aware of his son's crime. Notwithstanding, though his opinion was neither inquired into nor ascertained, the people stripped him of royalty; and when he returned to Rome with his army, it was admitted, but he was excluded, abandoned by his troops, and the gates shut in his face. And yet, after he had appealed to the neighboring states, and tormented the Romans with calamitous but unsuccessful wars, and when he was deserted by the ally on whom he most depended, despairing of regaining the kingdom, he lived a retired and quiet life for fourteen years, as it is reported, in Tusculum, a Roman town, where he grew old in his wife's company, and at last terminated his days in a much more desirable fashion than his father-in-law, who had perished by the hand of his son-in-law; his own daughter abetting, if report be true. And this Tarquin the Romans called, not the Cruel, nor the Infamous, but the Proud; their own pride perhaps resenting his tyrannical airs. So little did they make of his murdering their best king, his own father-in-law, that they elected him their own king. I wonder if it was not even more criminal in them to reward so bountifully so great a criminal. And yet there was no word of the gods abandoning the altars; unless, perhaps, some one will say in defense of the gods, that they remained at Rome for the purpose of punishing the Romans, rather than of aiding and profiting them, seducing them by empty victories, and wearing them out by severe wars. Such was the life of the Romans under the kings during the much-praised epoch of the state which extends to the expulsion of Tarquinius Superbus in the 243d year, during which all those victories, which were bought with so much blood and such disasters, hardly pushed Rome's dominion twenty miles from the city; a territory which would by no means bear comparison with that of any petty G tulian state. |
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| 67. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 1.726, 9.645 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 305 |
| 68. Cassiodorus, Variarum Libri Xii, 7.13 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 305 |
69. Vergil, Aeneis, 1.202-1.206 Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m., image venerated Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 108 | 1.202. till rocks and blazing torches fill the air 1.203. (rage never lacks for arms)—if haply then 1.204. ome wise man comes, whose reverend looks attest 1.205. a life to duty given, swift silence falls; 1.206. all ears are turned attentive; and he sways |
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| 70. Marc., Marc., 22 Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), on the death of the republic in de virtute Found in books: Walters (2020) 79 |
| 72. Epigraphy, Inscr. Ital., 13.3.183 Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), assassination of caesar Found in books: Walters (2020) 108 |
| 73. Florus, Epit., 2.13.91, 2.17.1 Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), assassination of caesar •junius brutus, m. (brutus), as parricide Found in books: Walters (2020) 108, 117 |
| 74. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020) 117 |
| 75. Various, Pal. Vat. Lat., 5757 Tagged with subjects: •brutus m. junius Found in books: Maso (2022) 21 |
| 76. Cicero, Digesta Justiniana, 47.10.27 Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 305 |
| 77. Caes., Fr., 76.1 Tagged with subjects: •junius brutus, m. (brutus), assassination of caesar •junius brutus, m. (brutus), as parricide Found in books: Walters (2020) 108, 117 |
| 78. Epigraphy, Ils, 72, 71 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Walters (2020) 108 |
