The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Index Database

Results for
Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

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All subjects (including unvalidated):

subject	book bibliographic info
brain	Hitch (2017), Animal sacrifice in the ancient Greek world, 167, 168 Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 12, 14, 15, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 52, 53, 54, 56, 71, 74, 75, 77, 78, 103, 224 Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 64, 100, 182, 200, 210 Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012), Medical Understandings of Emotions in Antiquity: Theory, Practice, Suffering, 37, 263, 272 King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 215, 233 Laes Goodey and Rose (2013), Disabilities in Roman Antiquity: Disparate Bodies, 2, 18, 26, 27, 38, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 147, 158, 159 Nuno et al. (2021), SENSORIVM: The Senses in Roman Polytheism, 1, 9, 10, 57, 67, 115, 119 Singer and van Eijk (2018), Galen: Works on Human Nature: Volume 1, Mixtures (De Temperamentis), 9, 23, 92, 106, 125, 140, 141 Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 146, 153 Van der Horst (2014), Studies in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, 8 Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 524 van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 119, 126, 129, 131, 132, 178, 224, 228
brain and the stomach	Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012), Medical Understandings of Emotions in Antiquity: Theory, Practice, Suffering, 272
brain as cause of disease	van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 51, 59
brain body	Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 230, 239
brain enkephalos	Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2012), Medical Understandings of Emotions in Antiquity: Theory, Practice, Suffering, 118
brain in ancient physiology	Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 23, 226
brain mind and	Beck (2006), The Religion of the Mithras Cult in the Roman Empire: Mysteries of the Unconquered Sun, 135, 136, 149, 151, 182, 183, 184, 185
brain of victim, sacrificial	Lupu (2005), Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents (NGSL) 313
brain tracks, one physical, one emotions, two cognitive, with varying interconnection	Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 146, 153
brain/meninges, membranes of the	Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 15, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 56, 57
brains	Hitch (2017), Animal sacrifice in the ancient Greek world, 225, 229, 232

List of validated texts:

2 validated results for "brain"

1. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Brain • brain • brain, as cause of disease

Found in books: Inwood and Warren (2020), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, 75, 103; Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 100, 200; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 524; van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 51, 126, 131

2. Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.3 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • brain • brain, in ancient physiology

Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 226; King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 215

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3.1.3 But since a rational animal not only has within itself these natural movements, but has moreover, to a greater extent than other animals, the power of reason, by which it can judge and determine regarding natural movements, and disapprove and reject some, while approving and adopting others, so by the judgment of this reason may the movements of men be governed and directed towards a commendable life. And from this it follows that, since the nature of this reason which is in man has within itself the power of distinguishing between good and evil, and while distinguishing possesses the faculty of selecting what it has approved, it may justly be deemed worthy of praise in choosing what is good, and deserving of censure in following that which is base or wicked. This indeed must by no means escape our notice, that in some dumb animals there is found a more regular movement than in others, as in hunting-dogs or war-horses, so that they may appear to some to be moved by a kind of rational sense. But we must believe this to be the result not so much of reason as of some natural instinct, largely bestowed for purposes of that kind. Now, as we had begun to remark, seeing that such is the nature of a rational animal, some things may happen to us human beings from without; and these, coming in contact with our sense of sight, or hearing, or any other of our senses, may incite and arouse us to good movements, or the contrary; and seeing they come to us from an external source, it is not within our own power to prevent their coming. But to determine and approve what use we ought to make of those things which thus happen, is the duty of no other than of that reason within us, i.e., of our own judgment; by the decision of which reason we use the incitement, which comes to us from without for that purpose, which reason approves, our natural movements being determined by its authority either to good actions or the reverse. ^3.1.3 The rational animal, however, has, in addition to its phantasial nature, also reason, which judges the phantasies, and disapproves of some and accepts others, in order that the animal may be led according to them. Therefore, since there are in the nature of reason aids towards the contemplation of virtue and vice, by following which, after beholding good and evil, we select the one and avoid the other, we are deserving of praise when we give ourselves to the practice of virtue, and censurable when we do the reverse. We must not, however, be ignorant that the greater part of the nature assigned to all things is a varying quantity among animals, both in a greater and a less degree; so that the instinct in hunting-dogs and in war-horses approaches somehow, so to speak, to the faculty of reason. Now, to fall under some one of those external causes which stir up within us this phantasy or that, is confessedly not one of those things that are dependent upon ourselves; but to determine that we shall use the occurrence in this way or differently, is the prerogative of nothing else than of the reason within us, which, as occasion offers, arouses us towards efforts inciting to what is virtuous and becoming, or turns us aside to what is the reverse.'' None

Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database