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22 results for "bett"
1. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 85
166a. λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε οἶμαι χωρήσεται καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων· οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν εἰ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνῆσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησεν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν. τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥᾳθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῇδʼ ἔχει· ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν διʼ ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῇς, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἷάπερ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ 166a. Our estimable Socrates here frightened a little boy by asking if it was possible for one and the same person to remember and at the same time not to know one and the same thing, and when the child in his fright said no, because he could not foresee what would result, Socrates made poor me a laughing-stock in his talk. But, you slovenly Socrates, the facts stand thus: when you examine any doctrine of mine by the method of questioning, if the person who is questioned makes such replies as I should make and comes to grief, then I am refuted,
2. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 75
3. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 75
4. Cicero, Academica, 1.44 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 687
1.44. Tum ego Cum Zenone inquam “ut accepimus Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi quidem mihi *gp videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et vel ut iam ante et iam ante Dav. ad Lact. epit. 32 et ueluti amantes *g*d Socratem Democritum Anaxagoram Empedoclem omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus imbecillos inbecilles p 1 sgf animos brevia curricula vitae et et om. sgf ut Democritus cf. p. 43, 13 in profundo veritatem esse demersam, demersam gfx dim- smnp m diuersam *d opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati ueritate *g relinqui, deinceps deinceps denique Bentl. densis IACvHeusde ' Cic. filopla/twn ' ( 1836 ) 236 n. 1 omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. cf. Lact. inst. 3, 4, 11. 28, 12 s. 30, 6 Democr. fr. 117 Deiels Emped. fr. 2 D. ( Kranz Herm. 47, 29 n. 2 )
5. Cicero, De Finibus, 2.43, 4.43 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 690
2.43.  Aristo and Pyrrho thought all these things utterly worthless, and said, for example, that there was absolutely nothing to choose between the most perfect health and the most grievous sickness; and consequently men have long ago quite rightly given up arguing against them. For in insisting upon the unique importance of virtue in such a sense as to rob it of any power of choice among external things and to deny it any starting-point or basis, they destroyed the very virtue they desired to cherish. Again, Erillus, in basing everything on knowledge, fixed his eyes on one definite Good, but this not the greatest Good, nor one that could serve as the guide of life. Accordingly Erillus himself has long ago been set aside; since Chrysippus no one has even troubled to refute him."Accordingly your school remains; for there is no coming to grips with the Academics, who affirm nothing positively, and despairing of a knowledge of certain truth, make up their minds to take apparent probability as their guide. 4.43.  "In my view, therefore, while all who have defined the End of Goods as the life of moral conduct are in error, some are more wrong than others. The most mistaken no doubt is Pyrrho, because his conception of virtue leaves nothing as an object of desire whatever. Next in error comes Aristo, who did not venture to leave a mere negation, but introduced as the Wise Man's motives of desire 'whatever chanced to enter his mind' and 'whatever struck him.' Aristo is better than Pyrrho in so far as he allowed desire of some sort, but worse than the rest because he departed so utterly from nature. Now the Stoics in placing the End of Goods in virtue alone resemble the philosophers already mentioned; but in trying to find a foundation for virtuous action they are an improvement upon Pyrrho, and in not finding this in imaginary 'things that strike the mind' they do better than Aristo; though in speaking of certain things as 'suitable to nature' and 'to be adopted for their own sakes,' and then refusing to include them in the End of Goods, they desert nature and approximate in some degree to Aristo. For Aristo invented his vague 'things that strike the mind'; while the Stoics, though recognizing, it is true, the primary objects of nature, yet allow no connection between these and their Ends or sum of Goods. In making the primary objects 'preferred,' so as to admit a certain principle of choice among things, they seem to be following nature, but in refusing to allow them to have anything to do with happiness, they again abandon nature.
6. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.43, 4.43 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 690
2.43. Quae quod quod Mdv. cum Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt sunt visa BE pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est desitum est contra eos BE disputari. dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selectione se lectione R electione BE delectione V expoliarent expoliarent N ( sed hamulus ad litt. r pertinens et ent in ras. ), V; expoliaverunt AR spoliaverunt BE nec ei quicquam, aut unde oriretur, darent, oriretur darent ARN 2 ore retunderet BE orientur darent N 1 orirentur darent V aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt. Erillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit, sed nec optimum nec quo vita gubernari possit. itaque hic ipse iam pridem est reiectus; post enim Chrysippum contra eum add. Se. (est contra eum disp. H. A. Koch p. 37 ) non sane est disputatum. Restatis igitur vos; nam cum Academicis incerta incerta V ĩcerta (˜ et cer ab alt. man., cer in ras. ) N uncta AR iuncta BE luctatio est, qui nihil affirmant et quasi desperata cognitione certi id sequi volunt, quodcumque veri simile videatur. 4.43. Itaque mihi videntur omnes quidem illi errasse, qui finem bonorum esse dixerunt honeste vivere, sed alius alio magis, Pyrrho scilicet maxime, qui virtute constituta nihil omnino, quod appetendum sit, relinquat, deinde Aristo, qui nihil relinquere non est ausus, introduxit autem, quibus commotus sapiens appeteret aliquid, quodcumque quodcumque ( ante in) N quod cuique BEV cuique R in mentem incideret, et quodcumque tamquam occurreret. is hoc melior quam Pyrrho, quod aliquod genus appetendi dedit, deterior quam ceteri, quod penitus a a N 2 ( in ras. in fine versus ), om. BERV natura natura ( in marg. ad initium versus add. ) N 2 recessit. Stoici autem, quod finem bonorum in una virtute ponunt, similes sunt illorum; quod autem principium officii quaerunt, melius quam Pyrrho; quod ea non occurrentia fingunt, vincunt Aristonem; quod autem ea, quae que ( q B) et ad BE ad naturam accommodata et per se assumenda esse dicunt, non adiungunt ad finem bonorum, desciscunt a natura et quodam modo sunt non dissimiles Aristonis. ille enim occurrentia nescio quae comminiscebatur; hi autem ponunt illi quidem prima naturae, sed ea seiungunt a finibus et a a ( post et) om. BE summa bonorum; quae cum praeponunt, praeponunt A. (?) Man. proponunt ut sit aliqua rerum selectio, naturam videntur sequi; cum autem negant ea quicquam ad beatam vitam pertinere, rursus naturam relinquunt. 2.43.  Aristo and Pyrrho thought all these things utterly worthless, and said, for example, that there was absolutely nothing to choose between the most perfect health and the most grievous sickness; and consequently men have long ago quite rightly given up arguing against them. For in insisting upon the unique importance of virtue in such a sense as to rob it of any power of choice among external things and to deny it any starting-point or basis, they destroyed the very virtue they desired to cherish. Again, Erillus, in basing everything on knowledge, fixed his eyes on one definite Good, but this not the greatest Good, nor one that could serve as the guide of life. Accordingly Erillus himself has long ago been set aside; since Chrysippus no one has even troubled to refute him."Accordingly your school remains; for there is no coming to grips with the Academics, who affirm nothing positively, and despairing of a knowledge of certain truth, make up their minds to take apparent probability as their guide. 4.43.  "In my view, therefore, while all who have defined the End of Goods as the life of moral conduct are in error, some are more wrong than others. The most mistaken no doubt is Pyrrho, because his conception of virtue leaves nothing as an object of desire whatever. Next in error comes Aristo, who did not venture to leave a mere negation, but introduced as the Wise Man's motives of desire 'whatever chanced to enter his mind' and 'whatever struck him.' Aristo is better than Pyrrho in so far as he allowed desire of some sort, but worse than the rest because he departed so utterly from nature. Now the Stoics in placing the End of Goods in virtue alone resemble the philosophers already mentioned; but in trying to find a foundation for virtuous action they are an improvement upon Pyrrho, and in not finding this in imaginary 'things that strike the mind' they do better than Aristo; though in speaking of certain things as 'suitable to nature' and 'to be adopted for their own sakes,' and then refusing to include them in the End of Goods, they desert nature and approximate in some degree to Aristo. For Aristo invented his vague 'things that strike the mind'; while the Stoics, though recognizing, it is true, the primary objects of nature, yet allow no connection between these and their Ends or sum of Goods. In making the primary objects 'preferred,' so as to admit a certain principle of choice among things, they seem to be following nature, but in refusing to allow them to have anything to do with happiness, they again abandon nature.
7. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 3.82 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 687
3.82. and before him, for how many years was Pisistratus tyrant of Athens, the very flower of Greece! 'Ah but Phalaris (you say) met with punishment, and so did Apollodorus.' Yes, but not till after they had tortured and killed many victims. Many brigands too are frequently punished, but still we cannot say that the captives cruelly murdered do not outnumber the brigands executed. It is related that Anaxarchus the disciple of Democritus was cruelly butchered by the tyrant of Cyprus, and Zeno of elea tortured to death. Why need I mention Socrates, whose death when I read Plato never fails to move me to tears? Do you see then that the verdict of the gods, if they do regard men's fortunes, has destroyed all distinction between them?
8. Plutarch, Sayings of Kings And Commanders, 179 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 690
9. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, 466 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 687
10. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, 8.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 687
11. Plutarch, Alexander The Great, 52.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 690, 691
52.5. λέγεται δέ ποτε παρὰ δεῖπνον ὑπὲρ ὡρῶν καὶ κράσεως τοῦ περιέχοντος λόγων ὄντων, τὸν Καλλισθένην, μετέχοντα δόξης τοῖς λέγουσι τἀκεῖ μᾶλλον εἶναι ψυχρὰ καὶ δυσχείμερα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ἐναντιουμένου τοῦ Ἀναξάρχου καὶ φιλονεικοῦντος, εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνάγκη σοὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνων ὁμολογεῖν ψυχρότερα· σὺ γὰρ ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐν τρίβωνι διεχείμαζες, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τρεῖς ἐπιβεβλημένος δάπιδας κατάκεισαι. τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀνάξαρχον καὶ τοῦτο προσπαρώξυνε. 52.5. It is said that once at supper the conversation turned upon seasons and weather, and that Callisthenes, who held with those who maintain that it is more cold and wintry there than in Greece, was stoutly opposed by Anaxarchus, whereupon he said: You surely must admit that it is colder here than there; for there you used to go about in winter in a cloak merely, but here you recline at table with three rugs thrown over you. of course this also added to the irritation of Anaxarchus.
12. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 690
446b. are also those famous lines: I, like some ship, am tied by ropes to shore, And when winds blow, our cables do not hold. For here the poet calls "cables" the judgements which resist shameful conduct and then are broken by passion, as by a great gust of wind. Truly the intemperate man is swept along to his pleasures by his desires with sails full-spread and delivers himself over to them and steers his course directly thither; whereas the course of the incontinent man zigzags here and there, as he strives to emerge from his passion and to stave it off and is yet swept down and shipwrecked on the reef of shameful conduct. Just as Timon used to lampoon Anaxarchus: The Cynic might of Anaxarchus seemed Steadfast and bold, wherever he wished, to spring; Well did he know the truth, they said, and yet
13. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.87-7.88, 7.135, 7.138-7.139, 7.199-7.200 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 683, 687, 689, 691
14. Aelian, Varia Historia, 4.14 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 691
15. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 1.64.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 687, 691
16. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 690
17. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.3, 1.213, 1.216, 1.226 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 75, 683
18. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 14.18.1-14.18.5 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 683
19. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.16, 9.45, 9.61-9.63, 9.67, 9.72 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 683, 689, 690
7.16. He used to dispute very carefully with Philo the logician and study along with him. Hence Zeno, who was the junior, had as great an admiration for Philo as his master Diodorus. And he had about him certain ragged dirty fellows, as Timon says in these lines:The while he got together a crowd of ignorant serfs, who surpassed all men in beggary and were the emptiest of townsfolk.Zeno himself was sour and of a frowning countece. He was very niggardly too, clinging to meanness unworthy of a Greek, on the plea of economy, If he pitched into anyone he would do it concisely, and not effusively, keeping him rather at arm's length. I mean, for example, his remark upon the fop showing himself off. 9.45. All things happen by virtue of necessity, the vortex being the cause of the creation of all things, and this he calls necessity. The end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion. This he calls well-being and many other names. The qualities of things exist merely by convention; in nature there is nothing but atoms and void space. These, then, are his opinions.of his works Thrasylus has made an ordered catalogue, arranging them in fours, as he also arranged Plato's works. 9.61. 11. PYRRHOPyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates. According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, he was first a painter; then he studied under Stilpo's son Bryson: thus Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers. Afterwards he joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement. He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust. And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself any more this than that. 9.62. He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but he was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, used to follow close after him. But Aenesidemus says that it was only his philosophy that was based upon suspension of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his everyday acts. He lived to be nearly ninety.This is what Antigonus of Carystus says of Pyrrho in his book upon him. At first he was a poor and unknown painter, and there are still some indifferent torch-racers of his in the gymnasium at Elis. 9.63. He would withdraw from the world and live in solitude, rarely showing himself to his relatives; this he did because he had heard an Indian reproach Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to teach others what is good while he himself danced attendance on kings in their courts. He would maintain the same composure at all times, so that, even if you left him when he was in the middle of a speech, he would finish what he had to say with no audience but himself, although in his youth he had been hasty. often, our informant adds, he would leave his home and, telling no one, would go roaming about with whomsoever he chanced to meet. And once, when Anaxarchus fell into a slough, he passed by without giving him any help, and, while others blamed him, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and sang-froid. 9.67. They say that, when septic salves and surgical and caustic remedies were applied to a wound he had sustained, he did not so much as frown. Timon also portrays his disposition in the full account which he gives of him to Pytho. Philo of Athens, a friend of his, used to say that he was most fond of Democritus, and then of Homer, admiring him and continually repeating the lineAs leaves on trees, such is the life of man.He also admired Homer because he likened men to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these verses as well:Ay, friend, die thou; why thus thy fate deplore?Patroclus too, thy better, is no more,and all the passages which dwell on the unstable purpose, vain pursuits, and childish folly of man. 9.72. Furthermore, they find Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and Democritus to be sceptics: Xenophanes because he says,Clear truth hath no man seen nor e'er shall knowand Zeno because he would destroy motion, saying, A moving body moves neither where it is nor where it is not; Democritus because he rejects qualities, saying, Opinion says hot or cold, but the reality is atoms and empty space, and again, of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well. Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and seeks after the probable explanation. Euripides says:
20. Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Apud S.E. M, 7.87-7.88  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 687
21. Monimus, Apud S.E. M, 7.87-7.88  Tagged with subjects: •bett, richard Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 687