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11 results for "benjamin"
1. Hebrew Bible, Ruth, 4.2 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 25
4.2. "וַיִּקַּח עֲשָׂרָה אֲנָשִׁים מִזִּקְנֵי הָעִיר וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁבוּ־פֹה וַיֵּשֵׁבוּ׃", 4.2. "וְעַמִּינָדָב הוֹלִיד אֶת־נַחְשׁוֹן וְנַחְשׁוֹן הוֹלִיד אֶת־שַׂלְמָה׃", 4.2. "And he took ten men of the elders of the city, and said: ‘Sit ye down here.’ And they sat down.",
2. Dead Sea Scrolls, of Discipline, 8.2-8.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 25
3. Tosefta, Sanhedrin, 6.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 104
6.6. "יש לך עדים אחרים ואמר אין לי אלא אלו יש לך ראיות אחרות ואמר אין לי אלא אלו ואחר זמן מצא עדים אחרים ומצא ראיות אחרות הרי זה אין מקבלין הימנו עד שיביא ראיה שלא היה יודע בהן לעולם אין העדים יכולין לחזור בהן עד שתחקר עדותן לב\"ד נחקרה עדותן לב\"ד אין יכולין לחזור בהן וזהו כללו של דבר עדים שהעידו לטמא ולטהר לרחק ולקרב לאסור ולהתיר לפטור ולחייב <לפטור ולחייב> עד שלא נחקרה עדותן ואמרו מבודין אנו הרי אלו נאמנים משנחקרה עדותן ואמרו מבודין אנו אין נאמנין לעולם אין העדים נעשים זוממין עד שיגמר הדין לא לוקין ולא משלמין ולא נהרגין עד שיגמר הדין לעולם אין אחד מן העדים נעשה זומם עד שיהיו שניהם זוממין ואין לוקה עד שיהיו שניהם לוקין ואין נהרג עד שיהיו שניהם נהרגים ולא משלם עד שיהיו שניהם משלמין אמר ר' יהודה בן טבאי אראה בנחמה אם לא הרגתי עד זומם בשביל לעקור מלבן של בייתוסין שהיו אומרים עד שיהרג הנדון אמר לו שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא שפכת דם נקי שהרי אמרה תורה (דברים י״ז:ו׳) על פי שנים עדים או שלשה עדים יומת המת בעדים ב' ובזוממין ב' מה עדים שנים אף זוממין ב' באותה שעה קבל עליו יהודה בן טבאי שלא יהיה מורה הלכה אלא ע\"פ שמעון בן שטח. ",
4. Mishnah, Makkot, 1.6 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 104
1.6. "אֵין הָעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין נֶהֱרָגִין, עַד שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין, שֶׁהֲרֵי הַצְּדוֹקִין אוֹמְרִים, עַד שֶׁיֵּהָרֵג, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ. אָמְרוּ לָהֶם חֲכָמִים, וַהֲלֹא כְבָר נֶאֱמַר (דברים יט) וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו, וַהֲרֵי אָחִיו קַיָּם. וְאִם כֵּן לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ, יָכוֹל מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁקִּבְּלוּ עֵדוּתָן יֵהָרֵגוּ, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר, נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ, הָא אֵינָן נֶהֱרָגִין עַד שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין: \n", 1.6. "Perjuring witnesses are not to be put to death until [after] the end of the trial. Because the Sadducees say: “[Perjurers were put to death] only after the accused had [actually] been executed, as it says, “ A life for a life” (Deuteronomy 19:21). The [Pharisaic] Sages said to them: “But has not it already been said “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19) which implies when his brother is still alive? If so, why does it say “A life for life”? For it might have been that perjurers are liable to be put to death from the moment their testimony had been taken, therefore the Torah states “A life for a life” that is to say that they are not executed until [after] the termination of the trial.",
5. Anon., Mekhilta Derabbi Yishmael, None (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 104
6. Anon., Sifre Deuteronomy, 190 (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 104
7. Palestinian Talmud, Sanhedrin, None (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 104
8. Babylonian Talmud, Hagigah, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 104
16b. הראשונים היו נשיאים ושניים להם אב ב"ד:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big ת"ר שלשה מזוגות הראשונים שאמרו שלא לסמוך ושנים מזוגות האחרונים שאמרו לסמוך (הראשונים) היו נשיאים ושניים להם אבות ב"ד דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים יהודה בן טבאי אב ב"ד ושמעון בן שטח נשיא,מאן תנא להא דתנו רבנן אמר רבי יהודה בן טבאי אראה בנחמה אם לא הרגתי עד זומם להוציא מלבן של צדוקין שהיו אומרים אין עדים זוממין נהרגין עד שיהרג הנידון,אמר לו שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא שפכת דם נקי שהרי אמרו חכמים אין עדים זוממין נהרגין עד שיזומו שניהם ואין לוקין עד שיזומו שניהם ואין משלמין ממון עד שיזומו שניהם,מיד קבל עליו יהודה בן טבאי שאינו מורה הלכה אלא בפני שמעון בן שטח,כל ימיו של יהודה בן טבאי היה משתטח על קברו של אותו הרוג והיה קולו נשמע כסבורין העם לומר שקולו של הרוג הוא אמר להם קולי הוא תדעו שלמחר הוא מת ואין קולו נשמע,אמר ליה רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי ודלמא פיוסי פייסיה או בדינא תבעי',מני הא אי אמרת בשלמא רבי מאיר דאמר שמעון בן שטח אב ב"ד ר"י בן טבאי נשיא היינו דקא מורי הלכה בפני שמעון בן שטח אלא אי אמרת רבנן דאמרי יהודה בן טבאי אב ב"ד שמעון בן שטח נשיא אב ב"ד בפני נשיא מי מורה הלכה,לא מאי קבל עליו דקאמר לאצטרופי דאפי' אצטרופי נמי לא מצטריפנא:,יצא מנחם ונכנס שמאי כו': להיכן יצא אביי אמר יצא לתרבות רעה רבא אמר יצא לעבודת המלך תניא נמי הכי יצא מנחם לעבודת המלך ויצאו עמו שמונים זוגות תלמידים לבושין סיריקון,אמר רב שמן בר אבא א"ר יוחנן לעולם אל תהא שבות קלה בעיניך שהרי סמיכה אינה אלא משום שבות ונחלקו בה גדולי הדור,פשיטא שבות מצוה אצטריכא ליה,הא נמי פשיטא לאפוקי ממאן דאמר בסמיכה גופה פליגי קא משמע לן בשבות הוא דפליגי,אמר רמי בר חמא שמע מינה סמיכה בכל כחו בעינן דאי ס"ד לא בעינן בכל כחו מאי קא עביד ליסמוך,מיתיבי (ויקרא א, ב) דבר אל בני ישראל וסמך בני ישראל סומכין ואין בנות ישראל סומכות רבי יוסי ור' (ישמעאל) [שמעון] אומרים בנות ישראל סומכות רשות,אמר רבי יוסי סח לי אבא אלעזר פעם אחת היה לנו עגל של זבחי שלמים והביאנוהו לעזרת נשים וסמכו עליו נשים לא מפני שסמיכה בנשים אלא כדי לעשות נחת רוח לנשים ואי ס"ד סמיכה בכל כחו בעינן משום נחת רוח דנשים עבדינן עבודה בקדשים אלא לאו ש"מ לא בעינן בכל כחו,לעולם אימא לך בעינן בכל כחו דאמר להו אקפו ידייכו אי הכי לא מפני שסמיכה בנשים תיפוק ליה דאינה לסמיכה כלל,א"ר אמי חדא ועוד קאמר חדא דליתא לסמיכה כלל ועוד כדי לעשות נחת רוח לנשים,אמר רב פפא שמע מינה צדדין אסורין דאי ס"ד צדדין מותרין לסמוך לצדדין אלא לאו שמע מינה צדדין אסורין 16b. b The first /b members of each pair b served as i Nasi /i , and their counterparts /b served as b deputy i Nasi /i . /b , strong GEMARA: /strong b The Sages taught: Three of the first pairs who say not to place hands and two of the last pairs who say to place hands served as i Nasi /i , and their counterparts /b served as b deputy i Nasi /i ; /b this is b the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say /b the opposite: b Yehuda ben Tabbai /b was b deputy i Nasi /i and Shimon ben Shataḥ /b was the b i Nasi /i . /b ,The Gemara asks: b Who is the i tanna /i /b who taught b that which the Sages taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai said: /b I swear that b I will /b not b see the consolation /b of Israel b if I did not kill a conspiring witness. /b This means that Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai sentenced a conspiring witness to death, in order b to counter the views of the Sadducees, who would say: Conspiring witnesses are not executed unless the sentenced one has been executed. /b Their views opposed the traditional view, which maintains that conspiring witnesses are executed only if the one sentenced by their testimony has not yet been executed., b Shimon ben Shataḥ said to him: /b I swear that b I will /b not b see the consolation /b of Israel b if you did not shed innocent blood, as the Sages said: Conspiring witnesses are not executed unless they are both found to be conspirators; /b if only one is found to be a conspirator, he is not executed. b And they are not flogged /b if they are liable to such a penalty, b unless they are both found to be conspirators. And /b if they testified falsely that someone owed money, b they do not pay money unless they are both found to be conspirators. /b ,Hearing this, b Yehuda ben Tabbai immediately accepted upon himself not to rule /b on any matter of b law unless he was in the presence of Shimon ben Shataḥ, /b as he realized he could not rely on his own judgment.,The i baraita /i further relates: b All of Yehuda ben Tabbai’s days, he would prostrate himself on the grave of that executed /b individual, to request forgiveness, b and his voice was heard /b weeping. b The people thought that it was the voice of that executed /b person, rising from his grave. Yehuda ben Tabbai b said to them: It is my voice, /b and b you /b shall b know /b that it is so, b for tomorrow, /b i.e., sometime in the future, b he will die, and his voice will no /b longer b be heard. /b Yehuda ben Tabbai was referring to himself, but he did not want to mention something negative about himself in direct terms., b Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: /b This provides no conclusive proof that the voice was not that of the executed man, as b perhaps /b ben Tabbai b appeased /b the executed individual in the World-to-Come. b Or, /b alternatively, the latter may have b prosecuted him by the law /b of Heaven, and that is why his voice can no longer be heard.,The Gemara returns to its original question: b Whose /b opinion does b this /b i baraita /i follow? b Granted, if you say /b it is in accordance b with /b that of b Rabbi Meir, /b who b said /b that b Shimon ben Shataḥ was deputy i Nasi /i /b while b Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai was i Nasi /i , that /b explains why b he /b had previously b issued a halakhic ruling in the presence of Shimon ben Shataḥ /b to execute the conspiring witness, and only after that unfortunate incident did he undertake to issue rulings only in the presence of his colleague. b But if you say /b that the i baraita /i is in accordance with b the Sages, who said: Yehuda ben Tabbai /b was b deputy i Nasi /i /b and b Shimon ben Shataḥ /b the b i Nasi /i , /b why did he need to make such a commitment? b May /b the b deputy i Nasi /i issue a halakhic ruling in the presence of /b the b i Nasi /i ? /b ,The Gemara refutes this: b No; what /b did he mean by b accepting upon himself /b not to rule on his own? b He spoke /b with regard b to joining /b the ruling of others: b Even /b with regard to b joining /b the ruling of others, b I will also not join /b until I have first heard the view of Shimon ben Shataḥ.,§ It is taught in the mishna: b Menaḥem departed and Shammai entered. /b The Gemara asks: b To where did /b Menaḥem b depart? Abaye said: He departed and went astray. /b Therefore, the mishna did not wish to delve into the details of his case. b Rava said: He departed for the king’s service. /b He received a post from the king and had to leave the court. b This is also taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Menaḥem departed for the king’s service, and eighty pairs of students dressed in silk robes left with him /b to work for the king, and that they no longer studied Torah.,§ b Rav Shemen bar Abba said /b that b Rabbi Yoḥa said: A rabbinic decree [ i shevut /i ] should never be taken lightly in your eyes, since placing hands /b on the head of an offering on a Festival b is prohibited only as a rabbinic decree /b because it is considered making use of an animal, which is not considered a prohibited labor but merely resembles one, and yet b the greatest /b scholars b of each generation disputed it. /b ,The Gemara is puzzled by this statement: This b is obvious. /b Since it is an accepted rabbinic decree, why should people take it lightly? The Gemara answers: It was b necessary for him /b to state it because it is b a rabbinic decree related to a mitzva. /b In other words, although this rabbinic decree of placing the hands on an animal is not performed for one’s own sake but for the purpose of a mitzva, it was nevertheless a serious matter in the eyes of the Sages.,The Gemara remains puzzled: b This too is obvious. /b In that case as well, the act is prohibited by the Sages. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥa’s statement comes b to exclude /b the opinion b of the one who said /b that b they disagree with regard to the actual /b obligation of b placing hands, /b i.e., whether or not obligatory peace-offerings require placing the hands. b He /b therefore b teaches us /b that b it is a rabbinic decree /b that is the subject b of their dispute, /b not the requirement itself., b Rami bar Ḥama said: /b You can b learn from here, /b from this dispute, that the mitzva of b placing hands /b requires not only placing one’s hands on the animal’s head, but b we also require /b that one places his hands b with all his strength. For if it enters your mind /b that b we do not require all his strength, what /b prohibition b does one violate /b by placing his hands? b Let him place /b them on a Festival as well, as this does not resemble a prohibited action at all., b The Gemara raises an objection /b to this from a i baraita /i : b “Speak to the children of [ i benei /i ] Israel” /b (Leviticus 1:2). The word i benei /i literally means: Sons of. And it states nearby: b “And he shall place /b his hand on the head of the burnt-offering” (Leviticus 1:4), from which we learn that b the sons of Israel place /b their hands, b but the daughters of Israel do not place /b them. b Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yishmael say: It is optional for the daughters of Israel to place /b their hands. They may place their hands if they so choose, although they are not obligated to do so., b Rabbi Yosei said: /b The Sage b Abba Elazar related to me /b the following incident: b On one occasion, we had a calf for a peace-offering, and we brought it to the Women’s Courtyard, and women placed /b their hands b on it. /b We did this b not because there /b is an obligation of b placing hands in /b the case of b women, but in order to please the women, /b by allowing them to sacrifice an offering, in all of its particulars, as men do. Now, b if it enters your mind /b that b we require /b placing hands b with all one’s strength, /b would b we perform work with consecrated /b offerings b in order to please /b the b women? /b Placing one’s hands forcefully on an animal is considered performing work with it, and if one does it without being obligated to do so, he has thereby performed work with an offering. b Rather, isn’t it /b correct to b conclude from this /b that b we do not require /b placing hands b with all one’s strength? /b ,The Gemara rejects this: b Actually, I /b could b say to you /b that b we do require /b placing hands b with all one’s strength, /b but here they allowed women to place their hands b by saying to them: Ease your hands /b and do not press forcefully, so that their hand placing should not constitute work. The Gemara retorts: b If so, /b then the reason formulated as: b Not because there /b is an obligation to b place hands in /b the case of b women, /b is irrelevant to this law. b Let him derive /b the permission for women to do so from the reason that b it is not /b considered b placing hands at all. /b If placing hands must be performed with all one’s strength, this action the women are performing does not constitute placing hands., b Rabbi Ami said: He stated one /b reason b and another. One /b reason is b that it is not /b considered b placing hands at all, /b as it is not performed with all of one’s strength; b and another /b reason is that they allowed it b in order to please the women. /b , b Rav Pappa said: Learn from this /b that anything upon which one may not place objects or upon which one may not sit on Shabbat, its b sides are /b likewise b prohibited, for if it enters your mind /b to say that the b sides are permitted, /b they could have told the women b to place /b their hands b on the sides, /b i.e., on the head of the animal rather than on its back, as the head of the animal is considered as if it were one of its sides. b Rather, /b must one b not conclude from this /b that the b sides are prohibited? /b
9. Babylonian Talmud, Makkot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 104
5b. אי איסטטית היא זו אפי' כת ראשונה נמי לא אמר ר' אבהו שקדמו והרגו,מאי דהוה הוה אלא אמר רבא הכי קאמר אם אינה אלא כת אחת נהרגת אי איכא טפי אין נהרגין הא בלבד קאמר קשיא,ההיא איתתא דאתאי סהדי ואישתקור אייתי סהדי ואישתקור אזלה אייתי סהדי אחריני דלא אישתקור אמר ריש לקיש הוחזקה זו א"ל ר' אלעזר אם היא הוחזקה כל ישראל מי הוחזקו,זימנין הוו יתבי קמיה דרבי יוחנן אתא כי האי מעשה לקמייהו אמר ריש לקיש הוחזקה זו א"ל רבי יוחנן אם הוחזקה זו כל ישראל מי הוחזקו הדר חזיה לרבי אלעזר בישות אמר ליה שמעת מילי מבר נפחא ולא אמרת לי משמיה,לימא ריש לקיש דאמר כרבי יהודה ורבי יוחנן דאמר כרבנן,אמר לך ריש לקיש אנא דאמרי לך אפי' לרבנן עד כאן לא קא אמרי רבנן התם דליכא דקא מהדר אבל הכא איכא הא דקא מהדרא,ורבי יוחנן אמר לך אנא דאמרי אפי' לרבי יהודה עד כאן לא קאמר רבי יהודה התם דאמרינן אטו כולי עלמא גבי הני הוו קיימי אבל הכא הני ידעי בסהדותא והני לא ידעי בסהדותא:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big אין העדים זוממין נהרגין עד שיגמר הדין שהרי הצדוקין אומרים עד שיהרג שנאמר (שמות כא, כג) נפש תחת נפש,אמרו להם חכמים והלא כבר נאמר (דברים יט, יט) ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו והרי אחיו קיים ואם כן למה נאמר נפש תחת נפש יכול משעה שקבלו עדותן יהרגו תלמוד לומר נפש תחת נפש הא אינן נהרגין עד שיגמר הדין:, big strongגמ׳ /strong /big תנא בריבי אומר לא הרגו נהרגין הרגו אין נהרגין אמר אביו בני לאו קל וחומר הוא,אמר לו לימדתנו רבינו שאין עונשין מן הדין דתניא (ויקרא כ, יז) איש אשר יקח [את] אחותו בת אביו או בת אמו אין לי אלא בת אביו שלא בת אמו ובת אמו שלא בת אביו בת אמו ובת אביו מנין ת"ל ערות אחותו גילה,עד שלא יאמר יש לי בדין אם ענש על בת אביו שלא בת אמו ובת אמו שלא בת אביו בת אביו ובת אמו לא כל שכן הא למדת שאין עונשין מן הדין,עונש שמענו אזהרה מנין תלמוד לומר (ויקרא יח, ט) ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך אין לי אלא בת אביו שלא בת אמו ובת אמו שלא בת אביו בת אביו ובת אמו מנין תלמוד לומר (ויקרא יח, יא) ערות בת אשת אביך מולדת אביך אחותך היא,עד שלא יאמר יש לי מן הדין מה אם הוזהר על בת אמו שלא בת אביו ובת אביו שלא בת אמו בת אביו ובת אמו לא כל שכן הא למדת שאין מזהירין מן הדין,חייבי מלקיות מנין תלמוד לומר רשע רשע,חייבי גליות מנין אתיא רוצח רוצח,תניא אמר רבי יהודה בן טבאי אראה בנחמה אם לא הרגתי עד זומם להוציא מלבן של צדוקים שהיו אומרים אין העדים זוממין נהרגין עד שיהרג הנדון,אמר לו שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא שפכת דם נקי שהרי אמרו חכמים אין העדים זוממין נהרגין עד שיזומו שניהם ואין לוקין עד שיזומו שניהם,מיד קבל עליו ר' יהודה בן טבאי שאינו מורה הוראה אלא לפני שמעון בן שטח וכל ימיו של ר' יהודה בן טבאי היה משתטח על קברו של אותו העד והיה קולו נשמע וכסבורין העם לומר קולו של הרוג אמר קולי שלי הוא תדעו למחר הוא מת אין קולו נשמע,אמר ליה רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי דלמא בדינא קם בהדיה אי נמי פיוסי פייסיה:, big strongמתני׳ /strong /big (דברים יז, ו) על פי שנים עדים או שלשה עדים יומת המת אם מתקיימת העדות בשנים למה פרט הכתוב בשלשה אלא להקיש (שלשה לשנים) מה שלשה מזימין את השנים אף השנים יזומו את הג' ומנין אפי' מאה ת"ל עדים,ר' שמעון אומר מה שנים אינן נהרגין עד שיהיו שניהם זוממין אף שלשה אינן נהרגין עד שיהיו שלשתן זוממין ומנין אפי' מאה ת"ל עדים,רבי עקיבא אומר לא בא השלישי להקל אלא להחמיר עליו ולעשות דינו כיוצא באלו,ואם כן ענש הכתוב לנטפל לעוברי עבירה כעוברי עבירה על אחת כמה וכמה ישלם שכר לנטפל לעושי מצוה כעושי מצוה,ומה שנים נמצא אחד מהן קרוב או פסול עדותן בטלה אף שלשה נמצא אחד מהן קרוב או פסול עדותן בטלה מנין אפי' מאה ת"ל עדים 5b. The Gemara asks: b If /b Rabbi Yehuda states that b this /b situation b is a conspiracy, /b and there is suspicion that the second set is not truthful, let b even /b the b first set /b of witnesses who were rendered conspiring witnesses based on their testimony b also not /b be executed. b Rabbi Abbahu said: /b The mishna is referring to a case b where /b the judges b already executed /b the first set of witnesses. Rabbi Yehuda is saying that no witnesses are executed other than the first set of witnesses, who were already executed.,The Gemara challenges: If so, b what was, /b already b was; /b there is no point in stating it as a i halakha /i . b Rather, Rava said this /b is what Rabbi Yehuda b is saying: If it is only one set /b of witnesses that is rendered conspiring witnesses by the second set, the witnesses b are executed; if there is more /b than one set b they are not executed /b at all. The Gemara asks: b But doesn’t /b Rabbi Yehuda b say: /b It is only the first set b alone /b that is executed? This indicates that contrary to Rava’s explanation, it is a case involving more than one set of witnesses. The Gemara notes: Indeed, this matter is b difficult. /b ,Apropos the dispute in the mishna, the Gemara relates: There was b a certain woman who brought witnesses /b to testify on her behalf, b and they were /b proven to be b liars. She brought /b other b witnesses, and they /b too b were /b proven to be b liars. She went /b and b brought /b yet b other witnesses, who were not /b proven to be b liars. /b There is an amoraic dispute whether the testimony of the third set of witnesses is accepted. b Reish Lakish said: This /b woman b has assumed the presumptive status /b of dishonesty because of her repeated reliance on false witnesses; therefore, the testimony of the third set is rejected. b Rabbi Elazar said to him: If she has assumed the presumptive status /b of dishonesty, b has the entire Jewish people assumed /b that b presumptive status? /b Why assume that these witnesses are dishonest?,The Gemara relates: On another b occasion, /b Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar b were sitting before Rabbi Yoḥa /b and b an incident similar to this /b one b came before them /b for judgment. b Reish Lakish said: This /b woman b has assumed the presumptive status /b of dishonesty. b Rabbi Yoḥa said to him: If she has assumed the presumptive status /b of dishonesty, b has the entire Jewish people assumed /b that b presumptive status? /b When Reish Lakish heard Rabbi Yoḥa respond in a manner identical to the earlier response of Rabbi Elazar, b he turned /b his head and b glared angrily at Rabbi Elazar, /b and b he said to him: You heard /b this b matter from bar Nappaḥa, /b i.e., Rabbi Yoḥa, b and you did not say /b it b to me in his name? /b Had I known that you were stating Rabbi Yoḥa’s opinion I would have accepted it.,The Gemara suggests: b Let us say /b that b Reish Lakish stated /b his opinion that this woman has assumed the presumptive status of dishonesty b in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b who invalidates the testimony of witnesses based on suspicion that arises due to the circumstances even though there is no proof that they lied. b And Rabbi Yoḥa stated /b his opinion b in accordance with /b the opinion of b the Rabbis, /b who do not invalidate testimony based on unsubstantiated suspicion.,The Gemara rejects this suggestion: b Reish Lakish /b could b say to you: I state /b my opinion b even in accordance with /b the opinion of b the Rabbis, /b as b the Rabbis say /b that one relies on witnesses who render multiple sets of witnesses conspiring witnesses b only there, /b in the mishna, in a case b where there is no one who is seeking /b to hire witnesses to testify on his behalf, and one could assert that their testimony is true. b But here, there is this /b woman b who is seeking /b to hire witnesses to testify on her behalf, which arouses suspicion that she hired them to lie on her behalf., b And Rabbi Yoḥa /b could b say to you: I state /b my opinion b even in accordance with /b the opinion of b Rabbi Yehuda, /b as b Rabbi Yehuda says /b that the testimony of the second set is invalid based on unsubstantiated suspicion b only there, /b in the mishna, where circumstances exacerbate the suspicion that they are lying, b as we say: Is that to say /b that b everyone, /b the numerous sets of witnesses, b was standing near these /b witnesses who testify in order to render them conspiring witnesses? b But here, /b perhaps b these /b witnesses who came last and were not proven to be liars b know /b the content b of the testimony, and these /b witnesses who were proven to be liars b do not know /b the content b of the testimony. /b The fact that the testimony of the first sets of witnesses was rendered void has no bearing on the status of other witnesses., strong MISHNA: /strong b The conspiring witnesses are executed only /b if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after b the verdict /b of the accused b is concluded. /b This is in contrast to the opinion of the Sadducees, b as the Sadducees say: /b Conspiring witnesses are executed b only /b if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after the accused b is killed /b on the basis of their testimony, b as it is stated: “A life for a life” /b (Exodus 21:23; see Deuteronomy 19:21)., b The Rabbis said to /b the Sadducees: b But wasn’t it already stated: “And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother” /b (Deuteronomy 19:19), b and /b this latter verse indicates that b his /b accused b brother is alive? And if so, why is it stated: “A life for a life”? /b One b might /b have thought that if they are rendered conspiring witnesses b from the moment /b the judges b accepted their testimony /b in court, b they will be executed, /b even though no verdict was concluded. Therefore, b the verse states: “A life for a life,” /b teaching that b they are executed only /b if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after b the verdict /b of the accused b will be concluded, /b from the moment that the court is on the verge of taking his life., strong GEMARA: /strong It is b taught /b with regard to the i halakha /i in the mishna that a Sage referred to as b the Distinguished /b [ b i Beribbi /i /b ] b says: /b If the conspiring witnesses have b not /b yet b killed /b the accused with their testimony b they are executed, /b but if b they killed /b the accused with their testimony b they are not executed. The father of /b that Sage, who was also a prominent Sage, b said /b to him: b My son, is /b this matter b not /b derived through b an i a fortiori /i /b inference? If, when they were unsuccessful in their attempt to kill the accused they are executed, all the more so if they were successful in killing him should they be executed., b He said to /b his father: b You have taught us, our teacher, that one does not administer punishment /b based b on /b an i a fortiori /i b inference. /b The punishment must be stated in the Torah. b As it is taught /b in a i baraita /i that among the relatives with whom engaging in intercourse is forbidden it states: b “A man who takes his sister, the daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother” /b (Leviticus 20:17): b I have /b derived b only the daughter of his father who is not the daughter of his mother, or the daughter of his mother who is not the daughter of his father. From where /b is it derived that one is liable for engaging in intercourse with his sister who is both b the daughter of his mother and the daughter of his father? /b It is derived from a verse, as b the verse states: “He has uncovered the nakedness of his sister” /b (Leviticus 20:17), indicating that one is liable for engaging in intercourse with any sister.,The i baraita /i continues: Even b if /b the verse b had not stated /b that one is liable for engaging in intercourse with his sister, i.e., one’s sister with whom he has both parents in common, b I have /b proof b from /b an i a fortiori /i b inference: If /b the Torah b punished /b an individual for engaging in intercourse b with the daughter of his father who is not the daughter of his mother, or /b for engaging in intercourse with b the daughter of his mother who is not the daughter of his father, /b is it b not all the more so /b clear that he should be punished for engaging in intercourse with his sister who is both b the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother? /b From the fact that the Torah explicitly prohibited intercourse in that case and did not rely on the inference, b you learn that one does not administer punishment /b based b on /b an i a fortiori /i b inference. /b ,The i baraita /i continues: b We heard /b from that verse (Leviticus 20:17) the b punishment /b for engaging in intercourse with one’s sister with whom he has both parents in common. b From where /b is the b prohibition /b against engaging in those acts of intercourse derived? It is derived from a verse, as b the verse states: “The nakedness of your sister, the daughter of your father or the daughter of your mother… /b you shall not uncover” (Leviticus 18:9). b I have /b derived the prohibition against engaging in intercourse b only /b with b the daughter of his father who is not the daughter of his mother, or /b with b the daughter of his mother who is not the daughter of his father. From where /b do I derive a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with his sister who is both b the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother? /b It is derived from a verse, as b the verse states: “The nakedness of the daughter of your father’s wife, born of your father; she is your sister” /b (Leviticus 18:11), indicating that engaging in intercourse with any sister is prohibited.,The i baraita /i continues: Even b if /b the verse b had not stated /b that engaging in intercourse with one’s sister with whom he has both parents in common is forbidden, b I have /b proof for this b from /b an i a fortiori /i b inference: If one was prohibited /b from engaging in intercourse b with the daughter of his mother who is not the daughter of his father, and /b with b the daughter of his father who is not the daughter of his mother, /b is it b not all the more so /b clear that he is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with his sister who is both b the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother? You learn /b from this b that one does not /b derive b a prohibition /b based b on /b an i a fortiori /i b inference. /b ,The i baraita /i continues: b From where /b is it derived that one does not administer punishment to b those liable /b to receive b lashes /b based on an i a fortiori /i inference, and that the principle is not limited to capital punishment? b The verse states /b a verbal analogy between the term “wicked” written with regard to those liable to be executed and the term “wicked” written with regard to those liable to receive lashes. With regard to those liable to be executed, it is written: “Who is b wicked /b and deserves to die” (Numbers 35:31). With regard to those liable to receive lashes, it is written: “And it shall be if the b wicked /b is deserving of lashes” (Deuteronomy 25:2)., b From where /b is it derived that one does not administer punishment to b those liable to be exiled /b based on an i a fortiori /i inference? It is b derived /b by means of a verbal analogy between the term b “murderer” /b written with regard to those who kill intentionally (see Numbers 35:21) and the term b “murderer” /b written with regard to those who kill unwittingly (see Numbers 35:11). The conclusion is that one does not administer any punishment based on an i a fortiori /i inference.,§ Apropos the dispute between the Sadducees and the Sages, b it is taught /b in a i baraita /i : b Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai says /b in the form of an oath: b I will /b not b see the /b future b consolation /b of the Jewish people b if I did not /b as a member of the court b kill /b a single b conspiring witness, /b in order b to eradicate /b this reasoning b from the hearts of the Sadducees, who would say: The conspiring witnesses are executed only /b if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after the accused b will be killed. /b Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai killed the conspiring witness while the accused remained alive., b Shimon ben Shataḥ said to him: I will /b not b see the consolation /b of the Jewish people b if you did not shed /b thereby b innocent blood, as the Sages said: Conspiring witnesses are not executed unless both of them are rendered conspiring /b witnesses, b and they are not flogged unless both of them are rendered conspiring /b witnesses. In this case, only one was rendered a conspiring witness., b Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai immediately accepted /b a commitment b upon himself that he would issue a halakhic ruling only /b when he was b before Shimon ben Shataḥ, /b to avoid mistakes in the future. b And /b throughout b all of Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai’s days he would /b tearfully b prostrate himself on the grave of that witness /b whom he executed, to request forgiveness for having done so, b and his voice was heard /b from a distance. b And the people thought to say /b that it was b the voice of /b the b executed /b witness that was heard. Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai b said /b to them: b It is my voice. Know /b that this is so, as b tomorrow, /b i.e., sometime in the future, b he, /b referring to himself, b will die, /b and b his voice will no /b longer b be heard. /b , b Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: /b The fact that the voice will cease after Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai’s death is inconclusive as proof that the voice is not that of the executed witness. b Perhaps /b the reason that the voice of the executed person will no longer be heard is that b he confronted /b Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai b in trial /b before the heavenly court, obviating the need for crying from his grave. b Alternatively, /b perhaps Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai b appeased /b the executed witness in the World-to-Come, and there is silence because no grievances remained., strong MISHNA: /strong It is written: b “At the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he who is to die be executed” /b (Deuteronomy 17:6). The question is: b If the testimony is valid with two /b witnesses, b why did the verse specify /b that it is valid b with three? Rather, /b it is b to juxtapose /b and liken b three to two: Just as three /b witnesses b can render the two /b witnesses b conspiring /b witnesses, b so too, the two /b witnesses b can render the three /b wit-nesses b conspiring /b witnesses. b And from where /b is it derived that two witnesses can render b even one hundred /b witnesses conspiring witnesses? It is derived from a verse, as b the verse states: /b “Three b witnesses.” /b Since the verse is obviously discussing witnesses, the term witnesses is superfluous, as it could have stated: Two or three. The term “witnesses” teaches that two witnesses can render a set of witnesses conspiring witnesses irrespective of their number., b Rabbi Shimon says /b that three witnesses are mentioned in the verse in order to teach: b Just as two /b witnesses who testified that a person is liable to be executed b are not killed /b for this testimony b unless both of them are /b found to be b conspiring /b witnesses, b so too, three /b witnesses who testified together b are not killed unless /b all b three of them are /b found to be b conspiring /b witnesses. b And from where /b is it derived that the same i halakha /i applies b even /b to b one hundred /b witnesses? It is derived from a verse, as b the verse states: /b “Three b witnesses.” /b The superfluous term “witnesses” teaches that the status of all witnesses who come to court as a single set of witnesses is that of one testimony with regard to this i halakha /i ., b Rabbi Akiva says: The third /b witness mentioned in this verse b does not come /b for the judges b to be lenient /b concerning him; b rather, /b its mention comes for the judges b to be stringent concerning him and to render his halakhic status like /b that of b these /b two witnesses who testified with him. One could claim that since the testimony of the third witness is superfluous, as the testimony of the other two witnesses sufficed, the third witness and any other witnesses beyond the first two should be exempt. Therefore, the verse teaches that since he testified with them and was rendered a conspiring witness with them, he too is executed.,One can learn a moral from this i halakha /i : b And if the verse punished one who associates with transgressors /b with a punishment b like /b the one received by the b transgressors, /b even though his role in the transgression is ancillary, b all the more so will /b God b pay a reward to one who associates with those who perform a mitzva like /b the reward of those b who perform /b the b mitzva /b themselves, even though his role in performing the mitzva is ancillary.,The mishna cites another derivation based on the juxtaposition of two to three: b And just as /b with regard to b two /b witnesses, if b one of them is found /b to be b a relative or /b is otherwise b disqualified, their /b entire b testimony is voided, /b as it is no longer the testimony of two witnesses, b so too, /b with regard to b three /b witnesses who came to testify as one set, if b one of them is found /b to be b a relative or /b is otherwise b disqualified, their /b entire b testimony is voided, /b even though two valid witnesses remain. b From where /b is it derived that the same i halakha /i applies b even /b in the case of b one hundred /b witnesses? It is derived from a verse, as b the verse states: “Witnesses.” /b
10. Anon., Exodus Rabbah, 15.20 (4th cent. CE - 9th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 25
11. Anon., Midrash Tannaim To Deut, 19.18  Tagged with subjects: •benjamin of nahawend Found in books: Schiffman (1983) 104