1. Homer, Iliad, 3.170, 3.219 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 22 | 3.170. / neither one so royal: he is like unto one that is a king. And Helen, fair among women, answered him, saying:Revered art thou in mine eyes, dear father of my husband, and dread. Would that evil death had been my pleasure when I followed thy son hither, and left my bridal chamber and my kinfolk 3.219. / nor of rambling, though verily in years he was the younger. But whenever Odysseus of many wiles arose, he would stand and look down with eyes fixed upon the ground, and his staff he would move neither backwards nor forwards, but would hold it stiff, in semblance like a man of no understanding; |
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| 2. Homer, Odyssey, 2.223 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269 |
| 3. Parmenides, Fragments, None (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 77 |
| 4. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 451 |
| 5. Melissus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 77 |
| 6. Antisthenes, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 77 |
7. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 685| 494c. ΣΩ. καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν; ΚΑΛ. λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν. ΣΩ. εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνῇ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδʼ ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν. | 494c. Soc. And feeling thirst and drinking when thirsty? Call. Yes, and having all the other desires, and being able to satisfy them, and so with these enjoyments leading a happy life. Soc. Bravo, my fine fellow! Do go on as you have begun, and mind you show no bashfulness about it. I too, it seems, must try not to be too bashful. First of all, tell me whether a man who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching. |
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| 8. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 264 |
| 9. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 264 |
10. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 228| 246a. κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη. | 246a. that that which moves itself is nothing else than the soul,—then the soul would necessarily be ungenerated and immortal. Concerning the immortality of the soul this is enough; but about its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure; let us therefore speak in that way. We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all good and |
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11. Plato, Statesman, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Ebrey and Kraut (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed, 531| 310a. ΞΕ. τοῖς δʼ εὐγενέσι γενομένοις τε ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἤθεσι θρεφθεῖσί τε κατὰ φύσιν μόνοις διὰ νόμων ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῦτʼ εἶναι τέχνῃ φάρμακον, καὶ καθάπερ εἴπομεν τοῦτον θειότερον εἶναι τὸν σύνδεσμον ἀρετῆς μερῶν φύσεως ἀνομοίων καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία φερομένων. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ἀληθέστατα. ΞΕ. τοὺς μὴν λοιπούς, ὄντας ἀνθρωπίνους δεσμούς, ὑπάρχοντος τούτου τοῦ θείου σχεδὸν οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν οὔτε ἐννοεῖν οὔτε ἐννοήσαντα ἀποτελεῖν. | 310a. Str. But we may say that in those only who were of noble nature from their birth and have been nurtured as befits such natures it is implanted by the laws, and for them this is the medicine prescribed by science, and, as we said before, this bond which unites unlike and divergent parts of virtue is more divine. Y. Soc. Very true. Str. The remaining bonds, moreover, being human, are not very difficult to devise or, after one has devised them, to create, when once this divine bond exists. |
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| 12. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 264 |
| 13. Plato, Sophist, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 41 |
| 14. Gorgias of Leontini, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 121 |
15. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 685| 152a. ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλʼ ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που; ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ; ΘΕΑΙ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω. | 152a. the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not. You have read that, I suppose? THEAET. Yes, I have read it often. SOC. Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you —you and I being man ? THEAET. Yes, that is what he says. |
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| 16. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 141 |
| 17. Antisthenes, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 77 |
| 18. Septuagint, Prayer of Azariah, 1.12-1.13, 1.21-1.24, 1.26, 1.62, 1.191, 1.193, 1.237 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 46, 54, 57, 81, 116 |
| 19. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 54; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 41, 133 |
| 20. Aristotle, Interpretation, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 296 |
| 21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 22. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 58 |
| 23. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2.1-2.11 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa), in stoicism differs by assent •belief (doxa), not distinguished from appearance in plato •belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 41 |
| 24. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 25. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 26. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 27. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 28. Timon of Phlius, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 29. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 30. Menander, Fragments, 215 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 31. Antisthenes of Rhodes, Fragments, None (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 77 |
| 32. Plautus, Aulularia, 24-25, 23 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 270 |
| 33. Plautus, Captiui, 922-923 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 298 |
| 34. Plautus, Mostellaria, 100-156, 84-96, 98-99, 97 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 245 |
| 35. Cicero, On The Haruspices, 9.19 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 293 |
36. Cicero, Academica, 1.41, 2.18, 2.24-2.25, 2.30-2.32, 2.55-2.58, 2.66-2.67, 2.77-2.78, 2.84-2.87, 2.145 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 56, 96, 231, 232, 235| 1.41. visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec? hoc Dav. ' ATT. nos vero inquit; inquam Ald. quonam quoniam ng 1 quam p 1 ; (quo)nam ... sed in ras. p enim alio alio om. *dn modo katalhmpto\n diceres? — VA. “sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum probatum *g esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat at, del. Man. ac gf cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re in re iure mw usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existebat existebat Pl. -erat p -eret rw extiterat *g etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla imb. adsensio Pl. et cum falso incognitoque communis. | |
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37. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.46-1.53, 3.64, 5.42 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa),bentham, j. •belief, doxastic Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 189; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 200, 245| 1.46. quodsi Quid si A 1 vitam omnem perturbari videmus errore et inscientia, sapientiamque esse solam, quae nos a libidinum impetu et a formidinum terrore vindicet et ipsius fortunae modice ferre doceat iniurias et omnis monstret vias, quae ad quietem et ad tranquillitatem et ad tranquillitatem AR et tranquillitatem ferant, quid est cur dubitemus dicere et sapientiam propter voluptates expetendam et insipientiam propter molestias esse fugiendam? 1.47. Eademque ratione ne temperantiam quidem propter se expetendam esse dicemus, sed quia pacem animis afferat et eos quasi concordia quadam placet ac leniat. temperantia est enim, quae in rebus aut expetendis aut fugiendis ut rationem sequamur monet. nec enim satis est iudicare quid faciendum non faciendumve sit, sed stare etiam oportet in eo, quod sit iudicatum. plerique autem, quod tenere atque servare id, quod ipsi statuerunt, non possunt, victi et debilitati obiecta specie voluptatis tradunt se libidinibus constringendos nec quid eventurum proventurum R sit provident ob eamque causam propter voluptatem et parvam et non non om. A 1 RN 1 necessariam et quae vel aliter pararetur et qua etiam carere possent sine dolore tum in morbos gravis, tum in damna, tum in dedecora incurrunt, saepe etiam legum iudiciorumque poenis obligantur. 1.48. Qui autem ita frui volunt voluptatibus, ut nulli propter eas consequantur dolores, et qui suum iudicium retinent, ne voluptate victi faciant id, quod sentiant non esse faciendum, ii ii A 1 V in BE hi A 2 hii RN voluptatem maximam adipiscuntur praetermittenda voluptate. idem etiam dolorem saepe perpetiuntur, ne, si id non faciant, incidant in maiorem. ex quo intellegitur nec intemperantiam propter se esse fugiendam temperantiamque expetendam, non quia voluptates fugiat, sed quia maiores consequatur. 1.49. Eadem fortitudinis ratio reperietur. nam neque laborum perfunctio neque perpessio dolorum per se ipsa allicit nec patientia nec assiduitas assiduitates ANV nec vigiliae nec ea ea om. BE ipsa, quae laudatur, industria, ne fortitudo quidem, sed ista sequimur, ut sine cura metuque vivamus animumque et corpus, quantum efficere possimus, possimus AEN possumus molestia liberemus. ut enim mortis metu omnis quietae vitae status perturbatur, et ut succumbere doloribus eosque humili animo inbecilloque ferre miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi multi parentes, parentis R multi amicos, non nulli patriam, plerique autem se ipsos penitus perdiderunt, sic robustus animus et excelsus omni est liber cura et angore, cum et mortem contemnit, qua qui qui quia A 1 BE affecti sunt in eadem causa sunt, qua ante quam nati, et ad dolores ita paratus est, ut meminerit maximos morte finiri, parvos multa habere intervalla requietis, mediocrium nos esse dominos, ut, si tolerabiles sint, feramus, si minus, animo aequo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tamquam e theatro exeamus. quibus rebus intellegitur nec timiditatem ignaviamque vituperari nec fortitudinem patientiamque laudari suo nomine, sed illas reici, quia dolorem pariant, has optari, quia voluptatem. 1.50. Iustitia restat, ut de omni virtute sit dictum. sed similia fere dici possunt. ut enim sapientiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem copulatas esse docui cum voluptate, ut ab ea nullo modo nec divelli nec distrahi possint, sic de iustitia iudicandum est, quae non modo numquam nocet cuiquam, sed contra semper afficit afficit ( cf. Tusc. 3,11 qui contra affecti sint) Se. aliquid ( in N ante aliquid ab alt. m. superscr. est alit) cum vi sua vi sua V, N (vi ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ); in sua BER sua vi A atque natura, quod tranquillat tranquillat Se. tranquillet animos, tum spe nihil earum rerum defuturum, quas natura non non om. RNV depravata desiderat. desiderat R 1 V desideret Et add. Lamb. quem ad modum temeritas et libido et ignavia semper animum excruciant et semper sollicitant turbulentaeque sunt, sic inprobitas si add. Mdv. cuius in mente consedit, hoc ipso, quod adest, turbulenta est est: si Grut. et si ABE turbulenta non potest fieri Et si RN turbulenta non potest fieri Si V ; si vero molita quippiam est, quamvis occulte fecerit, numquam tamen id confidet fore semper occultum. plerumque improborum facta primo suspicio insequitur, dein deinde NV sermo atque fama, tum accusator, tum iudex; index A multi etiam, ut te consule, ipsi se indicaverunt. indicaverunt A 2 RN indicaverat A 1 iudicaverunt BEV 1.51. quodsi qui satis sibi contra hominum sibi contra hominum ibi contra hominum V hominum sibi contra R conscientiam conscientiam t n scientiam R cumscientiam A 1 saepti esse et et om. E muniti et muniti om. R videntur, deorum tamen horrent easque ipsas sollicitudines, quibus eorum animi noctesque diesque noctes diesque R diesque noctesque B exeduntur, a diis inmortalibus supplicii causa importari inport. N putant. quae autem tanta ex improbis factis ad minuendas vitae molestias accessio potest fieri, quanta ad augendas, cum conscientia factorum, tum poena legum odioque civium? et tamen in quibusdam neque pecuniae modus est neque honoris neque imperii nec libidinum nec epularum nec reliquarum cupiditatum, quas nulla praeda umquam improbe parta minuit, minuit imminit BE sed add. dett. (sed auget potius atque inflammat) potius inflammat, ut coe+rcendi magis quam dedocendi esse videantur. 1.52. Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad iustitiam, aequitatem, fidem, neque homini infanti aut inpotenti iniuste facta conducunt, qui nec facile efficere possit, quod conetur, nec optinere, si effecerit, et opes vel fortunae fortuna E vel ingenii ingenii edd. ingenia liberalitati magis conveniunt, qua qui utuntur, utantur ARNV benivolentiam sibi conciliant et, quod aptissimum est ad quiete vivendum, caritatem, praesertim cum omnino nulla sit causa peccandi. 1.53. quae enim cupiditates a natura proficiscuntur, facile explentur sine ulla iniuria, iniuria ulla BE quae autem ies sunt, iis parendum non est. nihil enim desiderabile concupiscunt, plusque in ipsa iniuria detrimenti est quam in iis rebus emolumenti, quae pariuntur iniuria. Itaque ne iustitiam quidem recte quis dixerit per se ipsam optabilem, sed quia iucunditatis vel plurimum afferat. nam diligi et carum esse iucundum est propterea, quia tutiorem vitam et voluptatem pleniorem pleniorem voluptatem BE efficit. itaque non ob ea solum incommoda, quae eveniunt eveniunt et veniunt ARN inprobis, fugiendam inprobitatem putamus, sed multo etiam magis, quod, cuius in animo versatur, numquam sinit eum respirare, numquam adquiescere. 3.64. mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum. 5.42. quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo, in quo loco natae sunt, ex eo se non commovent, deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur. movetur moventur NV serpere anguiculos, nare nare natare Non. anaticulas, anaticulas V aneticulas BERN anaticulos Non. volare Non. evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, videamus boves Non. boves videmus BE nepas nepas RN 1 Non. nespas vel vespas V vespas BEN 2 aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. serpere ... ducem Non. p. 145 quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet. parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint. cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit, et animo utuntur et sensibus conitunturque, ut sese sese ut BE utuntur ed. Iuntina utantur erigant, et manibus utuntur et eos agnoscunt, a quibus educantur. deinde aequalibus delectantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur deque eo, quod ipsis superat, aliis gratificari volunt animadvertuntque ea, quae domi fiunt, curiosius incipiuntque commentari aliquid et discere et discere facere R et eorum, quos vident, volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant, si vicerunt, vicerunt Mdv.. vicerint BENV dicerint R efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque que om. BEN demittunt. quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est. | 3.64. "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâabiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 5.42. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. |
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| 38. Philodemus, (Pars I) \ On Piety, 26.737-26.740, 27.758-27.761 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 242 |
| 39. Philodemus of Gadara, De Pietate \ , 26.737-26.740, 27.758-27.761 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 242 |
40. Cicero, On Duties, 1.26, 1.51-1.54, 1.57-1.58, 1.153, 1.160, 3.64, 5.42 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 195, 199, 200, 201, 245| 1.26. Maxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iustitiae capiat oblivio, cum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt. Quod enim est apud Ennium: Núlla sancta sócietas Néc fides regni ést. id latius patet. Nam quicquid eius modi est, in quo non possint plures excellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio, ut difficillimum sit servare sanctam societatem. Declaravit id modo temeritas C. Caesaris, qui omnia iura divina et humana pervertit propter eum, quem sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat, principatum. Est autem in hoc genere molestum, quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque exsistunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, gloriae cupiditates. Quo magis cavendum est, ne quid in eo genere peccetur. 1.51. Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium autem communia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in permultas potest: Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam, Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit. Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet, cum illi accénderit. Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; 1.52. ex quo sunt illa communia: non prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit, consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem: Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales. 1.53. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa infinita discedatur, propior est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime homines coniunguntur; interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana, porticus, viae, leges, iura: iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea et familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur. 1.54. Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos tamquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur conubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui; quae propagatio et suboles origo est rerum publicarum. Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines et caritate; 1.57. Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiars, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt. 1.58. Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus,proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est. Quam ob rem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur iis maxime, quos ante dixi, vita autem victusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime, estque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugavit. 1.153. Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento confirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum affluentibus copiis quamvis omnia, quae cognitione digna sint, summo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam sofi/an Graeci vocant—prudentiam enim, quam Graeci fro/nhsin dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur ad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognition anteponenda est. 1.160. Quare hoc quidem effectum sit, in officiis deligendis id genus officiorum excellere, quod teneatur hominum societate. Etenim cognitionem prudentiamque sequetur considerata actio; ita fit, ut agere considerate pluris sit quam cogitare prudenter. Atque haec quidem hactenus. Patefactus enim locus est ipse, ut non difficile sit in exquirendo officio, quid cuique sit praeponendum, videre. In ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum, ex quibus, quid cuique praestet, intellegi possit, ut prima dis immortalibus, secunda patriae, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis debeantur. 3.64. Sed, sive et simulatio et dissimulatio dolus malus est, perpaucae res sunt, in quibus non dolus malus iste versetur, sive vir bonus est is, qui prodest, quibus potest, nocet nemini, certe istum virum bonum non facile reperimus. Numquam igitur est utile peccare, quia semper est turpe, et, quia semper est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est utile. | 1.26. The great majority of people, however, when they fall a prey to ambition for either military or civil authority, are carried away by it so completely that they quite lose sight of the claims of justice. For Ennius says: "There is no fellowship inviolate, No faith is kept, when kingship is concerned;" and the truth of his words has an uncommonly wide application. For whenever a situation is of such a nature that not more than one can hold pre-eminence in it, competition for it usually becomes so keen that it is an extremely difficult matter to maintain a "fellowship inviolate." We saw this proved but now in the effrontery of Gaius Caesar, who, to gain that sovereign power which by a depraved imagination he had conceived in his fancy, trod underfoot all laws of gods and men. But the trouble about this matter is that it is in the greatest souls and in the most brilliant geniuses that we usually find ambitions for civil and military authority, for power, and for glory, springing; and therefore we must be the more heedful not to go wrong in that direction. 1.51. This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common." Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and, though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally: "Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his: No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit." In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. 1.52. On this principle we have the following maxims:"Deny no one the water that flows by;" "Let anyone who will take fire from our fire;" "Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;" for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss. We should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing something to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are limited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of universal liberality must be regulated according to that test of Ennius â "No less shines his" â in order that we may continue to have the means for being generous to our friends. 1.53. Then, too, there are a great many degrees of closeness or remoteness in human society. To proceed beyond the universal bond of our common humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the same people, tribe, and tongue, by which men are very closely bound together; it is a still closer relation to be citizens of the same city-state; for fellow-citizens have much in common â forum, temples colonnades, streets, statutes, laws, courts, rights of suffrage, to say nothing of social and friendly circles and diverse business relations with many. But a still closer social union exists between kindred. Starting with that infinite bond of union of the human race in general, the conception is now confined to a small and narrow circle. 1.54. For since the reproductive instinct is by Nature's gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And this is the foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it were, of the state. Then follow the bonds between brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then of second cousins; and when they can no longer be sheltered under one roof, they go out into other homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these in turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and from these again a new stock of relations; and from this propagation and after-growth states have their beginnings. The bonds of common blood hold men fast through good-will and affection; 1.57. But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there is no social relation among them all more close, none more close, none more dear than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; one native land embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the more execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and who are and have been engaged in compassing her utter destruction. 1.58. Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where most of our moral obligation is due, country would come first, and parents; for their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation; next come children and the whole family, who look to us alone for support and can have no other protection; finally, our kinsmen, with whom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our lot is one. All needful material assistance is, therefore, due first of all to those whom I have named; but intimate relationship of life and living, counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest which is cemented by congeniality of character. 1.153. My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to Nature which depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon knowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: (1) suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that, with an abundance of everything pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace study and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the solitude were so complete that he could never see a human being, he would die. And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom â what the Greeks call ÏοÏία; for by prudence, which they call ÏÏÏνηÏιÏ, we understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and of things to be avoided. (2) Again, that wisdom which I have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty which is connected with the social obligation is the most important duty. And (3) service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best seen in the safeguarding of human interests. It is essential, then, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above speculative knowledge. 1.160. This, then, may be regarded as settled: in choosing between conflicting duties, that class takes precedence which is demanded by the interests of human society. [And this is the natural sequence; for discreet action will presuppose learning and practical wisdom; it follows, therefore, that discreet action is of more value than wise (but inactive) speculation.] So much must suffice for this topic. For, in its essence, it has been made so clear, that in determining a question of duty it is not difficult to see which duty is to be preferred to any other. Moreover, even in the social relations themselves there are gradations of duty so well defined that it can easily be seen which duty takes precedence of any other: our first duty is to the immortal gods; our second, to country; our third, to parents; and so on, in a descending scale, to the rest. 3.64. Be that as it may, if both pretence and concealment constitute "criminal fraud," there are very few transactions into which "criminal fraud" does not enter; or, if he only is a good man who helps all he can, and harms no one, it will certainly be no easy matter for us to find the good man as thus defined. To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness is always moral. |
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| 41. Cicero, Pro Sestio, 91 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 196 |
42. Cicero, Pro Flacco, 69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 69| 69. ratio constat, aurum in aerario est; furtum non reprehenditur, invidia quaeritur; a iudicibus oratio avertitur, vox in coronam turbamque effunditur. Sua cuique civitati religio, Laeli, est, nostra nobis. stantibus Hierosolymis pacatisque Iudaeis tamen istorum religio sacrorum a splendore huius imperi, gravitate nominis nostri, maiorum institutis abhorrebat; nunc vero hoc magis, quod illa gens quid de nostro imperio sentiret ostendit armis; quam cara dis immortalibus esset docuit, quod est victa, quod elocata, quod serva facta. | |
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43. Cicero, Republic, 1.39, 1.49, 2.17-2.20, 3.45, 6.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 41, 196, 199, 201| 1.39. Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio; non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita generatum, ut ne in omnium quidem rerum affluen tia 1.49. Et vero negant oportere indomiti populi vitio genus hoc totum liberi populi repudiari, concordi populo et omnia referente ad incolumitatem et ad libertatem suam nihil esse inmutabilius, nihil firmius; facillimam autem in ea re publica esse concordiam, in qua idem conducat omnibus; ex utilitatis varietatibus, cum aliis aliud expediat, nasci discordias; itaque, cum patres rerum potirentur, numquam constitisse civitatis statum; multo iam id in regnis minus, quorum, ut ait Ennius, 'nulla regni sancta societas nec fides est.' Quare cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum, ius autem legis aequale, quo iure societas civium teneri potest, cum par non sit condicio civium? Si enim pecunias aequari non placet, si ingenia omnium paria esse non possunt, iura certe paria debent esse eorum inter se, qui sunt cives in eadem re publica. Quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas? 2.17. Ac Romulus cum septem et triginta regnavisset annos et haec egregia duo firmamenta rei publicae peperisset, auspicia et senatum, tantum est consecutus, ut, cum subito sole obscurato non conparuisset, deorum in numero conlocatus putaretur; quam opinionem nemo umquam mortalis adsequi potuit sine eximia virtutis gloria. 2.18. Atque hoc eo magis est in Romulo admirandum, quod ceteri, qui dii ex hominibus facti esse dicuntur, minus eruditis hominum saeculis fuerunt, ut fingendi proclivis esset ratio, cum imperiti facile ad credendum inpellerentur, Romuli autem aetatem minus his sescentis annis iam inveteratis litteris atque doctrinis omnique illo antiquo ex inculta hominum vita errore sublato fuisse cernimus. Nam si, id quod Graecorum investigatur annalibus, Roma condita est secundo anno Olympiadis septumae, in id saeculum Romuli cecidit aetas, cum iam plena Graecia poetarum et musicorum esset minorque fabulis nisi de veteribus rebus haberetur fides. Nam centum et octo annis postquam Lycurgus leges scribere instituit, prima posita est Olympias, quam quidam nominis errore ab eodem Lycurgo constitutam putant; Homerum autem, qui minimum dicunt, Lycurgi aetati triginta annis anteponunt fere. 2.19. Ex quo intellegi potest permultis annis ante Homerum fuisse quam Romulum, ut iam doctis hominibus ac temporibus ipsis eruditis ad fingendum vix quicquam esset loci. Antiquitas enim recepit fabulas fictas etiam non numquam August. C.D. 22.6 incondite, haec aetas autem iam exculta praesertim eludens omne, quod fieri non potest, respuit. 2.20. us ne pos ei us, ut di xeru nt quidam, e x filia. Quo autem ille mor tuus, e odem est an no na tus Si moni des Ol ympia de se xta et quin qua gesima, ut f acilius intel legi pos sit tu m de Ro mu li inmortalitate creditum, cum iam inveterata vita hominum ac tractata esset et cognita. Sed profecto tanta fuit in eo vis ingenii atque virtutis, ut id de Romulo Proculo Iulio, homini agresti, crederetur, quod multis iam ante saeculis nullo alio de mortali homines credidissent; qui inpulsu patrum, quo illi a se invidiam interitus Romuli pellerent, in contione dixisse fertur a se visum esse in eo colle Romulum, qui nunc Quirinalis vocatur; eum sibi mandasse, ut populum rogaret, ut sibi eo in colle delubrum fieret; se deum esse et Quirinum vocari. 3.45. S. Venio nunc ad tertium genus illud, in quo esse videbuntur fortasse angustiae. Cum per populum agi dicuntur et esse in populi potestate omnia, cum, de quocumque volt, supplicium sumit multitudo, cum agunt, rapiunt, tenent, dissipant, quae volunt, pot esne tum, Laeli, negare rem esse illam p ub licam? cum populi sint omnia, quoniam quidem populi esse rem volumus rem publicam. Tum Laelius: Ac nullam quidem citius negav e rim esse rem publicam, quam istam, quae tota ....... p.pu......... ni.s.ls.. ..... mo.....obis non placu it Syracusis fuisse rem publicam neq ue Agrigenti neq ue Athenis, cum es se nt tyranni, ne c hic, cum decemviri; ne c video, qui magis in multitudinis dominatu rei publicae nomen appareat, quia primum mihi populus non est, ut tu optime definisti, Scipio, nisi qui consensu iuris continet u r, sed est tam tyrannus iste conventus, quam si esset unus, hoc etiam taetrior, quia nihil ista, quae populi speciem et nomen imitatur, immanius belua est. Nec vero convenit, cum furiosorum bona legibus in adgnatorum potestate sint, quod eorum iam 6.13. Sed quo sis, Africane, alacrior ad tutandam rem publicam, sic habeto: omnibus, qui patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auxerint, certum esse in caelo definitum locum, ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruantur; nihil est enim illi principi deo, qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptius quam concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur; harum rectores et conservatores hinc profecti huc revertuntur. | |
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| 44. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.46-1.53 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa),bentham, j. Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 189 |
45. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.116, 2.8, 3.5-3.6, 3.44 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 116; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 21, 293 | 1.116. 'But deity possesses an excellence and pre‑eminence which must of its own nature attract the worship of the wise.' Now how can there be any excellence in a being so engrossed in the delights of his own pleasure that he always has been, is, and will continue to be entirely idle and inactive? Furthermore how can you owe piety to a person who has bestowed nothing upon you? or how can you owe anything at all to one who has done you no service? Piety is justice towards the gods; but how can any claims of justice exist between us and them, if god and man have nothing in common? Holiness is the science of divine worship; but I fail to see why the gods should be worshipped if we neither have received nor hope to receive benefit from them. 2.8. Caelius writes that Gaius Flaminius after ignoring the claims of religion fell at the battle of Trasimene, when a serious blow was inflicted on the state. The fate of these men may serve to indicate that our empire was won by those commanders who obeyed the dictates of religion. Moreover if we care to compare our national characteristics with those of foreign peoples, we shall find that, while in all other respects we are only the equals or even the inferiors of others, yet in the sense of religion, that is, in reverence for the gods, we are far superior. 3.5. "Very well," rejoined Cotta, "let us then proceed as the argument itself may lead us. But before we come to the subject, let me say a few words about myself. I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that you put forward at the conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontife. This no doubt meant that I ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion. For my part I always shall uphold them and always have done so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall ever dislodge me from the belief as to the worship of the immortal gods which I have inherited from our forefathers. But on any question of el I am guided by the high pontifes, Titus Coruncanius, Publius Scipio and Publius Scaevola, not by Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, who was both an augur and a philosopher, to whose discourse upon religion, in his famous oration, I would rather listen than to any leader of the Stoics. The religion of the Roman people comprises ritual, auspices, and the third additional division consisting of all such prophetic warnings as the interpreters of the Sybil or the soothsayers have derived from portents and prodigies. While, I have always thought that none of these departments of religion was to be despised, and I have held the conviction that Romulus by his auspices and Numa by his establishment of our ritual laid the foundations of our state, which assuredly could never have been as great as it is had not the fullest measure of divine favour been obtained for it. 3.6. There, Balbus, is the opinion of a Cotta and a pontife; now oblige me by letting me know yours. You are a philosopher, and I ought to receive from you a proof of your religion, whereas I must believe the word of our ancestors even without proof." "What proof then do you require of me, Cotta?" replied Balbus. "You divided your discourse under four heads," said Cotta; "first you designed to prove the existence of the gods; secondly, to describe their nature; thirdly, to show that the world is governed by them; and lastly, that they care for the welfare of men. These, if I remember rightly, were the headings that you laid down." "You are quite right," said Balbus; "but now tell me what it is that you want to know." 3.44. No, you say, we must draw the line at that; well then, orcus is not a god either; what are you to say about his brothers then?' These arguments were advanced by Carneades, not with the object of establishing atheism (for what could less befit a philosopher?) but in order to prove the Stoic theology worthless; accordingly he used to pursue his inquiry thus: 'Well now,' he would say, 'if these brothers are included among the gods, can we deny the divinity of their father Saturation, who is held in the highest reverence by the common people in the west? And if he is a god, we must also admit that his father Caelus is a god. And if so, the parents of Caelus, the Aether and the Day, must be held to be gods, and their brothers and sisters, whom the ancient genealogists name Love, Guile, Dear, Toil, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Darkness, Misery, Lamentation, Favour, Fraud, Obstinacy, the Parcae, the Daughters of Hesperus, the Dreams: all of these are fabled to be the children of erebus and Night.' Either therefore you must accept these monstrosities or you must discard the first claimants also. |
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| 46. Cicero, On Laws, 1.4, 2.15-2.16, 2.19, 2.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 41, 48, 200, 201, 281 |
47. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 204| 5.95. Totumque fr. 439 hoc de voluptate sic ille praecipit, ut voluptatem ipsam per se, quia voluptas sit, semper optandam et et add. s cf. p. 423, 4 de orat. 1, 231 al. (asyndeton ipsum tolerari potest cf. exsibilatur exploditur parad. 26) expetendam putet, eademque ratione dolorem ob id ipsum, quia dolor sit, semper esse fugiendum; itaque hac usurum compensatione conpensatione K sapientem, ut et ut et s ut om. X et om. voluptatem fugiat, si ea eam maiorem dolorem effectura sit, et dolorem suscipiat maiorem efficientem voluptatem; omniaque iucunda, iocunda GR 1 ( ss. 1 ) quamquam sensu corporis iudicentur, ad animum referri tamen. | |
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48. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.28-3.29, 3.145, 5.1164-5.1167, 6.75-6.78 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 204; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 241, 242| 3.28. his ibi me rebus quaedam divina voluptas 3.29. percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua vi 3.145. idque sibi solum per se sapit et sibi gaudet, 5.1164. quae nunc in magnis florent sacra rebus locisque, 5.1165. unde etiam nunc est mortalibus insitus horror, 5.1166. qui delubra deum nova toto suscitat orbi 5.1167. terrarum et festis cogit celebrare diebus, 6.75. saepe oberunt; non quo violari summa deum vis 6.76. possit, ut ex ira poenas petere inbibat acris, 6.77. sed quia tute tibi placida cum pace quietos 6.78. constitues magnos irarum volvere fluctus, | |
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| 49. Horace, Letters, 2.1.139-2.1.144 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 268 |
50. Ovid, Fasti, 2.639, 2.641-2.642 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 268, 269| 2.639. Nox ubi transient, solito celebretur honore 2.641. Termine, sive lapis, sive es defossus in agro 2.642. stipes, ab antiquis tu quoque numen habes. | 2.639. When night has passed, let the god be celebrated 2.641. Terminus, whether a stone or a stump buried in the earth, 2.642. You have been a god since ancient times. |
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| 51. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 115 |
| 52. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 58 |
| 53. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 28.3.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 330, 338 |
| 54. Plutarch, Advice About Keeping Well, 125 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 55. Plutarch, Table Talk, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 22 |
56. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 12.3.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 196 | 12.3.6. And yet such a general would bear a very close resemblance to the advocate who leaves much of the detail that is necessary for success to the care of others, more especially in view of the fact that this, the most necessary element in the management of a case, is not as difficult as it may perhaps seem to outside observers. For every point of law, which is certain, is based either on written law or accepted custom: if, on the other hand, the point is doubtful, it must be examined in the light of equity. |
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| 57. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269 |
| 58. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.1.5, 2.3.4-2.3.5, 2.4.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa), in stoicism differs by assent •belief (doxa), not distinguished from appearance in plato •belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 41, 42 |
| 59. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, 26 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 188 |
| 60. Aspasius, Nicomachian Ethics, 44.21, 44.22, 44.33-45.10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 133 |
| 61. Gorgias Atheniensis, Fragments, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 121 |
| 62. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.28.1-1.28.5, 3.3.2-3.3.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 231 |
| 63. Gellius, Attic Nights, 2.28.2-2.28.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 21 |
| 64. Gaius, Instiutiones, 2.4, 2.7, 3.154, 3.194 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 192, 195, 203 |
| 65. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 188 |
| 66. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.12, 3.235-3.238 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) •belief (doxa), on plotinus Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 28; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 685 |
| 67. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 1.11, 1.13, 1.55, 7.51, 7.151-7.157, 7.253, 8.5, 9.49, 9.58, 9.137-9.181 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 54, 81, 96, 116, 231, 235; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 21 |
| 68. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 14.18.3-14.18.4 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 54 |
| 69. Plotinus, Enneads, a b c d\n0 1.3[20] 1.3[20] 1 3[20]\n1 3.6.3(17-19) 3.6.3(17 3 6 \n2 3.6.4(13-38) 3.6.4(13 3 6 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 185 |
| 70. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 5.46.1-5.46.4, 9.46.4-9.46.7, 22.10.1-22.10.2 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 69, 194, 281, 296 |
71. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.89, 2.91, 4.32, 4.36, 4.52, 6.7, 6.11, 6.26-6.28, 6.53, 6.83, 6.85-6.86, 6.101, 6.103-6.104, 7.12, 7.162-7.163, 7.171, 7.183, 9.45, 9.61-9.62, 9.111, 10.37, 10.78, 10.127 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 57, 77, 81, 95, 96, 106, 204, 205; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 684 | 2.89. The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. 2.91. They do not accept the doctrine that every wise man lives pleasantly and every fool painfully, but regard it as true for the most part only. It is sufficient even if we enjoy but each single pleasure as it comes. They say that prudence is a good, though desirable not in itself but on account of its consequences; that we make friends from interested motives, just as we cherish any part of the body so long as we have it; that some of the virtues are found even in the foolish; that bodily training contributes to the acquisition of virtue; that the sage will not give way to envy or love or superstition, since these weaknesses are due to mere empty opinion; he will, however, feel pain and fear, these being natural affections; 4.32. He also attended the lectures of the geometer Hipponicus, at whom he pointed a jest as one who was in all besides a listless, yawning sluggard but yet proficient in his subject. Geometry, he said, must have flown into his mouth while it was agape. When this man's mind gave way, Arcesilaus took him to his house and nursed him until he was completely restored. He took over the school on the death of Crates, a certain Socratides having retired in his favour. According to some, one result of his suspending judgement on all matters was that he never so much as wrote a book. Others relate that he was caught revising some works of Crantor, which according to some he published, according to others he burnt. He would seem to have held Plato in admiration, and he possessed a copy of his works. 4.36. A certain dialectic, a follower of Alexinus, was unable to repeat properly some argument of his teacher, whereupon Arcesilaus reminded him of the story of Philoxenus and the brickmakers. He found them singing some of his melodies out of tune; so he retaliated by trampling on the bricks they were making, saying, If you spoil my work, I'll spoil yours. He was, moreover, genuinely annoyed with any who took up their studies too late. By some natural impulse he was betrayed into using such phrases as I assert, and So-and-so (mentioning the name) will not assent to this. And this trait many of his pupils imitated, as they did also his style of speaking and his whole address. 4.52. For little else was needed to convert him to the doctrine of entire insensibility.Next he went over to Theodorean views, after he had heard the lectures of Theodorus the Atheist, who used every kind of sophistical argument. And after Theodorus he attended the lectures of Theophrastus the Peripatetic. He was fond of display and great at cutting up anything with a jest, using vulgar names for things. Because he employed every style of speech in combination, Eratosthenes, we hear, said of him that he was the first to deck philosophy with bright-flowered robes. He was clever also at parody. Here is a specimen of his style:O gentle Archytas, musician-born, blessed in thine own conceit, most skilled of men to stir the bass of strife. 6.7. Being asked what learning is the most necessary, he replied, How to get rid of having anything to unlearn. And he advised that when men are slandered, they should endure it more courageously than if they were pelted with stones.And he used to taunt Plato with being conceited. At all events when in a procession he spied a spirited charger he said, turning to Plato, It seems to me that you would have made just such a proud, showy steed. This because Plato was constantly praising horseflesh. And one day he visited Plato, who was ill, and seeing the basin into which Plato had vomited, remarked, The bile I see, but not the pride. 6.11. And he held virtue to be sufficient in itself to ensure happiness, since it needed nothing else except the strength of a Socrates. And he maintained that virtue is an affair of deeds and does not need a store of words or learning; that the wise man is self-sufficing, for all the goods of others are his; that ill repute is a good thing and much the same as pain; that the wise man will be guided in his public acts not by the established laws but by the law of virtue; that he will also marry in order to have children from union with the handsomest women; furthermore that he will not disdain to love, for only the wise man knows who are worthy to be loved. 6.26. And one day when Plato had invited to his house friends coming from Dionysius, Diogenes trampled upon his carpets and said, I trample upon Plato's vainglory. Plato's reply was, How much pride you expose to view, Diogenes, by seeming not to be proud. Others tell us that what Diogenes said was, I trample upon the pride of Plato, who retorted, Yes, Diogenes, with pride of another sort. Sotion, however, in his fourth book makes the Cynic address this remark to Plato himself. Diogenes once asked him for wine, and after that also for some dried figs; and Plato sent him a whole jar full. Then the other said, If some one asks you how many two and two are, will you answer, Twenty? So, it seems, you neither give as you are asked nor answer as you are questioned. Thus he scoffed at him as one who talked without end. 6.27. Being asked where in Greece he saw good men, he replied, Good men nowhere, but good boys at Lacedaemon. When one day he was gravely discoursing and nobody attended to him, he began whistling, and as people clustered about him, he reproached them with coming in all seriousness to hear nonsense, but slowly and contemptuously when the theme was serious. He would say that men strive in digging and kicking to outdo one another, but no one strives to become a good man and true. 6.28. And he would wonder that the grammarians should investigate the ills of Odysseus, while they were ignorant of their own. Or that the musicians should tune the strings of the lyre, while leaving the dispositions of their own souls discordant; that the mathematicians should gaze at the sun and the moon, but overlook matters close at hand; that the orators should make a fuss about justice in their speeches, but never practise it; or that the avaricious should cry out against money, while inordinately fond of it. He used also to condemn those who praised honest men for being superior to money, while themselves envying the very rich. He was moved to anger that men should sacrifice to the gods to ensure health and in the midst of the sacrifice should feast to the detriment of health. He was astonished that when slaves saw their masters were gluttons, they did not steal some of the viands. 6.53. Noticing a good-looking youth lying in an exposed position, he nudged him and cried, Up, man, up, lest some foe thrust a dart into thy back! To one who was feasting lavishly he said:Short-liv'd thou'lt be, my son, by what thou – buy'st.As Plato was conversing about Ideas and using the nouns tablehood and cuphood, he said, Table and cup I see; but your tablehood and cuphood, Plato, I can nowise see. That's readily accounted for, said Plato, for you have the eyes to see the visible table and cup; but not the understanding by which ideal tablehood and cuphood are discerned. 6.83. He came to be a distinguished man; so much so that he is even mentioned by the comic poet Meder. At any rate in one of his plays, The Groom, his words are:One Monimus there was, a wise man, Philo,But not so very famous.a. He, you mean,Who carried the scrip?b. Nay, not one scrip, but three.Yet never a word, so help me Zeus, spake heTo match the saying, Know thyself, nor suchFamed watchwords. Far beyond all these he went,Your dusty mendicant, pronouncing wholly vainAll man's supposings.Monimus indeed showed himself a very grave moralist, so that he ever despised mere opinion and sought only truth.He has left us, besides some trifles blended with covert earnestness, two books, On Impulses and an Exhortation to Philosophy. 6.85. 5. CRATESCrates, son of Ascondas, was a Theban. He too was amongst the Cynic's famous pupils. Hippobotus, however, alleges that he was a pupil not of Diogenes, but of Bryson the Achaean. The following playful lines are attributed to him:There is a city Pera in the midst of wine-dark vapour,Fair, fruitful, passing squalid, owning nought,Into which sails nor fool nor parasiteNor glutton, slave of sensual appetite,But thyme it bears, garlic, and figs and loaves,For which things' sake men fight not each with other,Nor stand to arms for money or for fame. 6.86. There is also his widely circulated day-book, which runs as follows:Set down for the chef ten minas, for the doctorOne drachma, for a flatterer talents five,For counsel smoke, for mercenary beautyA talent, for a philosopher three obols.He was known as the Door-opener – the caller to whom all doors fly open – from his habit of entering every house and admonishing those within. Here is another specimen of his composition:That much I have which I have learnt and thought,The noble lessons taught me by the Muses:But wealth amassed is prey to vanity.And again he says that what he has gained from philosophy isA quart of lupins and to care for no one.This too is quoted as his:Hunger stops love, or, if not hunger, Time,Or, failing both these means of help, – a halter. 6.101. There have been six men named Menippus: the first the man who wrote a History of the Lydians and abridged Xanthus; the second my present subject; the third a sophist of Stratonicea, a Carian by descent; the fourth a sculptor; the fifth and sixth painters, both mentioned by Apollodorus.However, the writings of Menippus the Cynic are thirteen in number:Necromancy.Wills.Epistles artificially composed as if by the gods.Replies to the physicists and mathematicians and grammarians; andA book about the birth of Epicurus; andThe School's reverence for the twentieth day.Besides other works. 6.103. Such are the lives of the several Cynics. But we will go on to append the doctrines which they held in common – if, that is, we decide that Cynicism is really a philosophy, and not, as some maintain, just a way of life. They are content then, like Ariston of Chios, to do away with the subjects of Logic and Physics and to devote their whole attention to Ethics. And what some assert of Socrates, Diocles records of Diogenes, representing him as saying: We must inquire intoWhate'er of good or ill within our halls is wrought.They also dispense with the ordinary subjects of instruction. At least Antisthenes used to say that those who had attained discretion had better not study literature, lest they should be perverted by alien influences. 6.104. So they get rid of geometry and music and all such studies. Anyhow, when somebody showed Diogenes a clock, he pronounced it a serviceable instrument to save one from being late for dinner. Again, to a man who gave a musical recital before him he said:By men's minds states are ordered well, and households,Not by the lyre's twanged strings or flute's trilled notes.They hold further that Life according to Virtue is the End to be sought, as Antisthenes says in his Heracles: exactly like the Stoics. For indeed there is a certain close relationship between the two schools. Hence it has been said that Cynicism is a short cut to virtue; and after the same pattern did Zeno of Citium live his life. 7.12. Thraso of the deme Anacaea, Philocles of Peiraeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystus, Medon of Acharnae, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Paeania have been elected commissioners for the making of the crown and the building.These are the terms of the decree.Antigonus of Carystus tells us that he never denied that he was a citizen of Citium. For when he was one of those who contributed to the restoration of the baths and his name was inscribed upon the pillar as Zeno the philosopher, he requested that the words of Citium should be added. He made a hollow lid for a flask and used to carry about money in it, in order that there might be provision at hand for the necessities of his master Crates. 7.162. After meeting Polemo, says Diocles of Magnesia, while Zeno was suffering from a protracted illness, he recanted his views. The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses. 7.163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you? and when the other answered No, he rejoined,Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?The books attributed to him are as follows:Exhortations, two books.of Zeno's Doctrines.Dialogues.Lectures, six books.Dissertations on Philosophy, seven books.Dissertations on Love.Commonplaces on Vainglory.Notebooks, twenty-five volumes.Memorabilia, three books.Anecdotes, eleven books.Against the Rhetoricians.An Answer to the Counter-pleas of Alexinus.Against the Dialecticians, three books.Letters to Cleanthes, four books.Panaetius and Sosicrates consider the Letters to be alone genuine; all the other works named they attribute to Ariston the Peripatetic. 7.171. Once when he was reproached with cowardice, he replied, That is why I so seldom go wrong. Again, when extolling his own manner of life above that of the wealthy, he used to say that, while they were playing at ball, he was at work digging hard and barren ground. He would often find fault with himself too, and one day when Ariston heard him doing this and asked, Who is it you are scolding so? he, laughing, said, An old man with grey hairs and no wits. To some one who declared that Arcesilaus did not do what he ought, his reply was, No more of this; do not censure him. For if by his words he does away with duty, he maintains it at all events by his deeds. And Arcesilaus rejoined, I am not to be won by flattery. Whereupon Cleanthes said, True, but my flattery consists in alleging that your theory is incompatible with your practice. 7.183. At wine-parties he used to behave quietly, though he was unsteady on his legs; which caused the woman-slave to say, As for Chrysippus, only his legs get tipsy. His opinion of himself was so high that when some one inquired, To whom shall I entrust my son? he replied, To me: for, if I had dreamt of there being anyone better than myself, I should myself be studying with him. Hence, it is said, the application to him of the line:He alone has understanding; the others flit shadow-like around;andBut for Chrysippus, there had been no Stoa. 9.45. All things happen by virtue of necessity, the vortex being the cause of the creation of all things, and this he calls necessity. The end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion. This he calls well-being and many other names. The qualities of things exist merely by convention; in nature there is nothing but atoms and void space. These, then, are his opinions.of his works Thrasylus has made an ordered catalogue, arranging them in fours, as he also arranged Plato's works. 9.61. 11. PYRRHOPyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates. According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, he was first a painter; then he studied under Stilpo's son Bryson: thus Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers. Afterwards he joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement. He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust. And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself any more this than that. 9.62. He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but he was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, used to follow close after him. But Aenesidemus says that it was only his philosophy that was based upon suspension of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his everyday acts. He lived to be nearly ninety.This is what Antigonus of Carystus says of Pyrrho in his book upon him. At first he was a poor and unknown painter, and there are still some indifferent torch-racers of his in the gymnasium at Elis. 9.111. There are also reputed works of his extending to twenty thousand verses which are mentioned by Antigonus of Carystus, who also wrote his life. There are three silli in which, from his point of view as a Sceptic, he abuses every one and lampoons the dogmatic philosophers, using the form of parody. In the first he speaks in the first person throughout, the second and third are in the form of dialogues; for he represents himself as questioning Xenophanes of Colophon about each philosopher in turn, while Xenophanes answers him; in the second he speaks of the more ancient philosophers, in the third of the later, which is why some have entitled it the Epilogue. 10.37. Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning. 10.78. Further, we must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of things of most moment is the business of natural science, and that happiness depends on this (viz. on the knowledge of celestial and atmospheric phenomena), and upon knowing what the heavenly bodies really are, and any kindred facts contributing to exact knowledge in this respect.Further, we must recognize on such points as this no plurality of causes or contingency, but must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature. And the mind can grasp the absolute truth of this. 10.127. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. |
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| 72. Iamblichus, Concerning The Mysteries, 2.11, 10.2, 96.13-97.2, 286.14-287.3 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan |
73. Augustine, The City of God, 7.17 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 21 | 7.17. And the same is true with respect to all the rest, as is true with respect to those things which I have mentioned for the sake of example. They do not explain them, but rather involve them. They rush hither and there, to this side or to that, according as they are driven by the impulse of erratic opinion; so that even Varro himself has chosen rather to doubt concerning all things, than to affirm anything. For, having written the first of the three last books concerning the certain gods, and having commenced in the second of these to speak of the uncertain gods, he says: I ought not to be censured for having stated in this book the doubtful opinions concerning the gods. For he who, when he has read them, shall think that they both ought to be, and can be, conclusively judged of, will do so himself. For my own part, I can be more easily led to doubt the things which I have written in the first book, than to attempt to reduce all the things I shall write in this one to any orderly system. Thus he makes uncertain not only that book concerning the uncertain gods, but also that other concerning the certain gods. Moreover, in that third book concerning the select gods, after having exhibited by anticipation as much of the natural theology as he deemed necessary, and when about to commence to speak of the vanities and lying insanities of the civil theology, where he was not only without the guidance of the truth of things, but was also pressed by the authority of tradition, he says: I will write in this book concerning the public gods of the Roman people, to whom they have dedicated temples, and whom they have conspicuously distinguished by many adornments; but, as Xenophon of Colophon writes, I will state what I think, not what I am prepared to maintain: it is for man to think those things, for God to know them. It is not, then, an account of things comprehended and most certainly believed which he promised, when about to write those things which were instituted by men. He only timidly promises an account of things which are but the subject of doubtful opinion. Nor, indeed, was it possible for him to affirm with the same certainty that Janus was the world, and such like things; or to discover with the same certainty such things as how Jupiter was the son of Saturn, while Saturn was made subject to him as king:- he could, I say, neither affirm nor discover such things with the same certainty with which he knew such things as that the world existed, that the heavens and earth existed, the heavens bright with stars, and the earth fertile through seeds; or with the same perfect conviction with which he believed that this universal mass of nature is governed and administered by a certain invisible and mighty force. |
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| 74. Augustine, Commentary On Genesis, 9.14.25 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa), hence for stoics and augustine voluntary Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 47 |
| 75. Libanius, Orations, 46.3 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 269 |
| 76. Augustine, Confessions, 1.8.13, 1.14.23 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 245, 268, 269, 270, 281, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298 |
| 77. Ambrosiaster, Commentary On Romans, 34.17-34.20 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 185 |
| 78. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 1.446, 11.558 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 203, 270 |
| 79. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 1.1.22-1.1.24, 1.204.3-1.204.15, 1.236.19, 1.249.12-1.249.27, 1.251.6-1.251.7, 1.251.21-1.251.24 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 141 |
| 80. Damaskios, In Phaedonem (Versio 1), 144.3-144.4 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 264, 266 |
| 81. Proclus, Commentary On Plato'S Republic, 163.19-164.7, 208.5, 208.6, 208.7, 208.8, 208.9, 208.10, 233.3 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 277 |
| 82. Justinian, Digest, None (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 196 |
| 83. Proclus, Hypotyposis Astronomicarum Positionum, 1.7, 1.9, 2.18, 4.15-16, 4.25, 5.20, 7.52, 28.17, 146.7, 236.20 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan |
| 84. Proclus, In Platonis Alcibiadem, 189.10-189.11, 189.15, 192.3 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) of forms Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 205, 269 |
| 85. Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem Commentarii, 4.893.12-4.893.18, 4.949.11-4.949.31 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) of forms Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 200, 205, 228 |
| 86. Proclus, In Primum Euclidis Librum Commentarius, 19.22, 22.17, 51.4, 51.5, 153.17, 153.18, 153.19, 155.8, 155.9, 181.4, 181.5, 181.6, 181.7, 181.8, 181.9, 181.10, 181.11, 181.12, 181.13, 181.14, 181.15, 184.14, 184.15, 185.19, 185.20, 185.21, 185.22, 185.23, 185.24, 185.25, 191.21, 191.22, 191.23-192.1, 191.23, 191.24, 191.25, 192.8, 192.25, 361.11-363.18 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 182 |
| 87. Proclus, Institutio Theologica, 124, 194-195, 7 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 204 |
| 88. Proclus, Theologia Platonica ( ), 1.29, 2.6, 3.7, 30.7-10, 42.16-2475, 124.12-125.2, 124.12-20 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan |
| 89. Menander Protector, Fragments, 215 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 90. Hermias, Life of Isidore, 122 Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 182 |
| 91. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 47 |
92. Vergil, Aeneis, 8.349 Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 203 | 8.349. burst wide the doorway of the sooty den, |
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| 93. Simplicius of Cilicia, In Aristotelis De Caelo Libros Commentaria, 7.559.14-560.1 (missingth cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •parmenides, his ontology, doxastic things available for discussion, belief, (in)correct accounts Found in books: Tor (2017), Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology, 303 |
| 94. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 12, 31-32, 5, 33 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 684 |
| 95. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, 1.1.1, 1.1.9 Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 293 |
| 96. Gregory of Nyssa, On The Creation of Man, 12.4 Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa), in stoicism differs by assent •belief (doxa), not distinguished from appearance in plato •belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 41 |
| 97. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 21 Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa), in stoicism differs by assent •belief (doxa), not distinguished from appearance in plato •belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 41 |
| 98. Crates of Thebes, Fragments, 3, 7 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 99. Bion of Boysthenes, Fr., None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 81 |
| 101. Polystratus, De Contemptu, 23.26-6.23 Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 684, 685 |
| 105. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 14 |
| 106. Anon., Doxographi Graeci, 590 Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 21 |
| 107. Epicurus, Ep. Hdt., 77 Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 240 |
| 108. Gaius, Ep., 2.9.17 Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 195 |
| 109. Epicurus, Sententiae Vaticanae, 33, 58, 27 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 207 |
| 110. Suda, Stoic Fragments, 21, μ198 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan |
| 111. Aristotle, 1, 2.6 Tagged with subjects: •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) •belief/opinion (doxa, δόξα) of forms Found in books: d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 205 |
| 112. Anon., Anonymi Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum, 2.11 Tagged with subjects: •belief (doxa) Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 232 |
| 113. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 124, 127, 132 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 188, 189 |
| 114. Epicurus, Kd, 29 Tagged with subjects: •belief, doxastic Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 241 |
