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8 results for "authority"
1. Theophrastus, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •authority (lat. auctoritas) Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 58
2. Cicero, De Finibus, 4.61, 5.9-5.13, 5.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •authority (lat. auctoritas) Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 32, 33, 46, 58, 59
4.61.  What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are pre‑eminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 5.9.  Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. 5.10.  Aristotle gave a complete account of the birth, nutrition and structure of all living creatures, Theophrastus of the natural history of plants and the causes and constitution of vegetable organisms in general; and the knowledge thus attained facilitated the investigation of the most obscure questions. In Logic their teachings include the rules of rhetoric as well as of dialectic; and Aristotle their founder started the practice of arguing both pro and contra upon every topic, not like Arcesilas, always controverting every proposition, but setting out all the possible arguments on either side in every subject. 5.11.  The third division of philosophy investigates the rules of human well-being; this too was treated by the Peripatetics, so as to comprise not only the principles of individual conduct but also of the government of states. From Aristotle we learn the manners, customs and institutions, and from Theophrastus the laws also, of nearly all the states not only of Greece but of the barbarians as well. Both described the proper qualifications of a statesman, both moreover wrote lengthy treatises on the best form of constitution; Theophrastus treated the subject more fully, discussing the forces and occasions of political change, and their control as circumstances demand. Among the alternative ideals of conduct they gave the highest place to the life of retirement, devoted to contemplation and to study. This was pronounced to be most worthy of the Wise Man, as most nearly resembling the life of the gods. And these topics they handle in a style as brilliant as it is illuminating. 5.12.  "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.13.  Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. 5.95.  "This then is our system which you think inconsistent. I on the other hand, seeing the celestial and divine existence of virtue, excellence so great that where virtue and the mighty and most glorious deeds that she inspires are found, there misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and annoyance can, do not hesitate to declare that every Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible for one to be happier than another." "Well, Piso," said I, "that is a position which you will find needs a great deal of defending; and if you can hold to it, you are welcome to convert not only my cousin Cicero, but also myself."
3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 4.61, 5.9-5.13, 5.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •authority (lat. auctoritas) Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 32, 33, 46, 58, 59
4.61. quid, si reviviscant Platonis illi et deinceps qui eorum auditores fuerunt, et tecum ita loquantur? Nos cum te, M. Cato, studiosissimum philosophiae, iustissimum virum, optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem, audiremus, admirati sumus, quid esset cur nobis Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sentirent ea, quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, nominibus uterentur iis, quae prima specie admirationem, re explicata risum moverent. tu autem, si tibi illa probabantur, cur non propriis verbis ea ea NV eas R illa BE tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne omnibus et Platoni ipsi nescio quem illum anteponebas? praesertim cum in re publica princeps esse velles ad eamque tuendam cum summa tua dignitate maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. a nobis enim ista quaesita, a nobis descripta, notata, add. Lamb. praecepta sunt, omniumque rerum publicarum rectionis rectionis Mdv. rectiones BERN rectores V genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et leges etiam et ERN leges et etiam B et etiam leges et V instituta ac mores civitatum perscripsimus. eloquentiae vero, quae et principibus maximo ornamento maximo ornamento RV maximo e ornamento B maximo cornamento E maxime (e ex corr. m. alt. ) ornamento N est, et qua te audimus audivimus RV valere plurimum, et qua te ... plurimum om. N quantum tibi ex monumentis monimentis RV nostris addidisses! Ea cum dixissent, quid tandem talibus viris responderes? 5.9. Sic est igitur locutus: Quantus ornatus in Peripateticorum disciplina sit satis est a me, ut brevissime potuit, paulo ante dictum. sed est forma eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex: una pars est naturae, naturae edd. natura ( etiam B) disserendi altera, vivendi tertia. Natura sic ab iis investigata est, ut nulla pars caelo, mari, terra, ut poe+tice loquar, praetermissa sit; quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo locuti essent, ut multa non modo probabili argumentatione, sed etiam necessaria mathematicorum ratione concluderent, maximam materiam ex rebus per se investigatis ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attulerunt. 5.10. persecutus est est N 2 om. BERN 1 V Non. p. 232 Aristoteles animantium omnium ortus, victus, figuras, Theophrastus autem stirpium naturas omniumque fere rerum, quae e terra gignerentur, causas atque rationes; qua ex cognitione facilior facta est investigatio rerum occultissimarum. Disserendique ab isdem non dialectice solum, sed etiam oratorie praecepta sunt tradita, ab Aristoteleque principe de singulis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia semper, sicut Arcesilas, diceret, et tamen ut in omnibus rebus, quicquid ex utraque parte dici posset, expromeret. exprimeret R 5.11. Cum autem tertia pars bene vivendi praecepta quaereret, ea quoque est ab isdem non solum ad privatae vitae rationem, sed etiam ad rerum publicarum rectionem relata. omnium fere civitatum non Graeciae solum, sed etiam barbariae ab Aristotele mores, instituta, disciplinas, a Theophrasto leges etiam cognovimus. cumque uterque eorum docuisset qualem in re publica principem esse conveniret, add. Ascens. 1511 pluribus praeterea conscripsisset cum scripsisset NV qui esset optimus rei publicae status, hoc amplius Theophrastus: quae essent in re publica status ... in re publica om. BER rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum, quibus esset moderandum, utcumque res postularet. vitae autem degendae elegendae E eligendae B ratio maxime quidem illis illis quidem BE placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae vite erat BE simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima. atque his de rebus et splendida est eorum et illustris oratio. 5.12. De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod e)cwteriko/n appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. sed cum beata vita quaeratur idque sit unum, quod philosophia philosophia dett. philosophiam spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut labefactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo non numquam variari inter eos inter eos variari R et dubitari videtur. quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam praestare vitam vitam praestare BE sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, delicatior videtur NV ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis et roboris. Simus igitur contenti his. 5.13. namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus. huius, Lyco, lyco V lico R lisias et N 2 ( versu ultra marg. continuato; ex priore script. lic cognosci posse videtur ); om. BE spatio vacuo rel. oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ipsi rebus R ieiunior. concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas, in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet. 5.95. Haec igitur est nostra ratio, quae tibi videtur inconstans, cum propter virtutis caelestem quandam et divinam tantamque praestantiam, ut, ubi virtus sit resque magnae et add. Gz. (e cod. Spirensi ?) summe laudabiles laudabilesque RV virtute gestae, ibi esse miseria et aerumna non possit, tamen labor possit, possit molestia, labor possit possit molestia BE labor possit molestia R labor possit et molestia V non dubitem dicere omnes sapientes esse semper semper esse BE beatos, sed tamen fieri posse, ut sit alius alio beatior. atqui iste locus est, Piso, tibi etiam atque etiam confirmandus, inquam; quem si tenueris, non modo meum Ciceronem, sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit. 4.61.  What if those pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling but upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with the highest honour to yourself. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; and reduced it to a system; its nomenclature, its principles are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are pre‑eminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" 5.9.  Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the elements of being and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. 5.10.  Aristotle gave a complete account of the birth, nutrition and structure of all living creatures, Theophrastus of the natural history of plants and the causes and constitution of vegetable organisms in general; and the knowledge thus attained facilitated the investigation of the most obscure questions. In Logic their teachings include the rules of rhetoric as well as of dialectic; and Aristotle their founder started the practice of arguing both pro and contra upon every topic, not like Arcesilas, always controverting every proposition, but setting out all the possible arguments on either side in every subject. 5.11.  The third division of philosophy investigates the rules of human well-being; this too was treated by the Peripatetics, so as to comprise not only the principles of individual conduct but also of the government of states. From Aristotle we learn the manners, customs and institutions, and from Theophrastus the laws also, of nearly all the states not only of Greece but of the barbarians as well. Both described the proper qualifications of a statesman, both moreover wrote lengthy treatises on the best form of constitution; Theophrastus treated the subject more fully, discussing the forces and occasions of political change, and their control as circumstances demand. Among the alternative ideals of conduct they gave the highest place to the life of retirement, devoted to contemplation and to study. This was pronounced to be most worthy of the Wise Man, as most nearly resembling the life of the gods. And these topics they handle in a style as brilliant as it is illuminating. 5.12.  "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, nor did they disagree among themselves. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus's book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; though if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. 5.13.  Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own teachers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somehow lacking in weight. 5.95.  "This then is our system which you think inconsistent. I on the other hand, seeing the celestial and divine existence of virtue, excellence so great that where virtue and the mighty and most glorious deeds that she inspires are found, there misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and annoyance can, do not hesitate to declare that every Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible for one to be happier than another." "Well, Piso," said I, "that is a position which you will find needs a great deal of defending; and if you can hold to it, you are welcome to convert not only my cousin Cicero, but also myself."
4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 3.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •authority (lat. auctoritas) Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 34, 35
1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 3.10. Give permission therefore for my reason to join issue with yours. "You adduce all these arguments to prove that the gods exist, and by arguing you render doubtful a matter which in my opinion admits no doubt at all. For I have committed to memory not only the number but also the order of your arguments. The first was that when we look up at the sky, we at once perceive that some power exists whereby the heavenly bodies are governed. And from this you went on to quote: Behold this dazzling vault of heaven, which all mankind as Jove invoke;
5. Cicero, Lucullus, 8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •authority (lat. auctoritas) Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 35
6. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.26, 1.55, 5.34 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •authority (lat. auctoritas) Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 33, 34
1.26. Expone igitur, nisi molestum est, primum, si potes, potest G 1 animos remanere post mortem, tum, si minus id obtinebis obtenebis GR 1 V —est enim arduum—, docebis carere omni malo mortem. ego enim istuc ipsum vereor ne ne me G malum sit non dico carere sensu, sed carendum esse. Auctoribus quidem ad istam sententiam, quam vis obtineri, uti optimis optineri V possumus, quod in omnibus causis et debet et solet valere plurimum, et primum quidem omni antiquitate, quae quo propius propius opius in r. V c aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae erant vera vera ss. K c veru ( aaper- tum! ) in vera corr. R cernebant. cercebant G 1 (corr. ipse) R cernebant K cerneba t V (-bat s ) Itaque unum illud erat insitum priscis illis, quos cascos cassos R cassus K 1 ann. 24 appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum neque excessu vitae sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret; 1.55. moveat, quae se ipsa moveat ( to\ au)to\ e(auto\ kinou=n ) Macr. quae se ipsam semper m. X sed semper del. V vet quae sese m. Somn. neque nata certe est et aeterna est.” semper enim movetur...245, 3 aeterna est ( sine 19 vel... 23 neget) H licet concurrant omnes plebei philosophi—sic enim i, qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia dissident, appellandi videntur—, non modo nihil umquam tam eleganter eliganter K el eg. R 1 explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter supt. hic GR conclusum sit intellegent. sentit igitur animus se moveri; quod cum sentit, illud ilium X, corr. K c V 2 s una sentit, se vi sua, non aliena moveri, nec accidere posse ut ipse umquam a se deseratur. ad R 1 ex quo efficitur aeternitas, nisi quid habes ad haec. dicere post haec add. V 2 Ego vero facile sim sim def. Plasb. ad ac. 2,147 cl. Ter. Andr. 203 sum s passus ne in mentem quidem mihi aliquid contra venire; ita isti faveo sententiae. Quid? 5.34. quare demus hoc sane Bruto, ut sit beatus semper sapiens—quam sibi conveniat, ipse ipsa X corr. V 2 viderit; gloria quidem huius sententiae quis est illo viro dignior?—, nos tamen teneamus, ut sit idem beatissimus. Et si Zeno Citieus, ticieus R cici eus K 1 advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex, insinuasse se se om. Non. in antiquam philosophiam videtur, advena... 3 videtur Non. 457, 25 huius sententiae gravitas a Platonis auctoritate repetatur, apud quem saepe haec oratio usurpata est, ut nihil praeter virtutem diceretur bonum. velut velud KR in Gorgia Gorg. 470 d Socrates, cum esset ex eo quaesitum, Archelaum arcelaum hic X (arcael.G) Perdiccae filium, qui tum fortunatissimus haberetur, nonne beatum putaret, haud scio inquit;
7. Strabo, Geography, 13.1.54 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •authority (lat. auctoritas) Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 59
13.1.54. From Scepsis came the Socratic philosophers Erastus and Coriscus and Neleus the son of Coriscus, this last a man who not only was a pupil of Aristotle and Theophrastus, but also inherited the library of Theophrastus, which included that of Aristotle. At any rate, Aristotle bequeathed his own library to Theophrastus, to whom he also left his school; and he is the first man, so far as I know, to have collected books and to have taught the kings in Egypt how to arrange a library. Theophrastus bequeathed it to Neleus; and Neleus took it to Scepsis and bequeathed it to his heirs, ordinary people, who kept the books locked up and not even carefully stored. But when they heard bow zealously the Attalic kings to whom the city was subject were searching for books to build up the library in Pergamum, they hid their books underground in a kind of trench. But much later, when the books had been damaged by moisture and moths, their descendants sold them to Apellicon of Teos for a large sum of money, both the books of Aristotle and those of Theophrastus. But Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher; and therefore, seeking a restoration of the parts that had been eaten through, he made new copies of the text, filling up the gaps incorrectly, and published the books full of errors. The result was that the earlier school of Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus had no books at all, with the exception of only a few, mostly exoteric works, and were therefore able to philosophize about nothing in a practical way, but only to talk bombast about commonplace propositions, whereas the later school, from the time the books in question appeared, though better able to philosophise and Aristotelise, were forced to call most of their statements probabilities, because of the large number of errors. Rome also contributed much to this; for, immediately after the death of Apellicon, Sulla, who had captured Athens, carried off Apellicon's library to Rome, where Tyrannion the grammarian, who was fond of Aristotle, got it in his hands by paying court to the librarian, as did also certain booksellers who used bad copyists and would not collate the texts — a thing that also takes place in the case of the other books that are copied for selling, both here and at Alexandria. However, this is enough about these men.
8. Cicero, Academic Books, 17, 33  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 58