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18 results for "auctoritas"
1. Cicero, Academica, 2.8, 2.60, 2.62-2.64 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 280, 281, 282
2. Cicero, Pro Sestio, 137 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 279
3. Cicero, Philippicae, 1.1, 4.1-4.6 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 279, 280
4. Cicero, Letters, 13.19.3-13.19.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 291
5. Cicero, On Old Age, 3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 289, 290, 292
6. Cicero, Republic, 1.12-1.13, 1.34-1.37, 1.69, 2.21-2.22, 2.45, 2.51, 2.55-2.57, 2.67, 3.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 279, 290, 293, 294
1.12. Haec pluribus a me verbis dicta sunt ob eam causam, quod his libris erat instituta et suscepta mihi de re publica disputatio; quae ne frustra haberetur, dubitationem ad rem publicam adeundi in primis debui tollere. Ac tamen si qui sunt, qui philosophorum auctoritate moveantur, dent operam parumper atque audiant eos, quorum summa est auctoritas apud doctissimos homines et gloria; quos ego existimo, etiamsi qui ipsi rem publicam non gesserint, tamen, quoniam de re publica multa quaesierint et scripserint, functos esse aliquo rei publicae munere. Eos vero septem, quos Graeci sapientis nominaverunt, omnis paene video in media re publica esse versatos. Neque enim est ulla res, in qua propius ad deorum numen virtus accedat humana, quam civitatis aut condere novas aut conservare iam conditas. 1.13. Quibus de rebus, quoniam nobis contigit, ut iidem et in gerenda re publica aliquid essemus memoria dignum consecuti et in explicandis rationibus rerum civilium quandam facultatem non modo usu, sed etiam studio discendi et docendi † essemus auctores, cum superiores alii fuissent in disputationibus perpoliti, quorum res gestae nullae invenirentur, alii in gerendo probabiles, in disserendo rudes. Nec vero nostra quaedam est instituenda nova et a nobis inventa ratio, sed unius aetatis clarissimorum ac sapientissimorum nostrae civitatis virorum disputatio repetenda memoria est, quae mihi tibique quondam adulescentulo est a P. Rutilio Rufo, Smyrnae cum simul essemus compluris dies, exposita, in qua nihil fere, quod magno opere ad rationes omnium rerum pertineret, est praetermissum. 1.34. Cum id et Philus et Manilius et Mummius admodum adproba vissent Diom. GL I, p. 365 Keil Nullum est exemplum, cui malimus adsimulare rem publicam. Non. p. 85M, p. 289M Quare, si placet, deduc orationem tuam de caelo ad haec citeriora. non solum ob eam causam fieri volui, quod erat aequum de re publica potissimum principem rei publicae dicere, sed etiam quod memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio, duobus Graecis vel peritissimis rerum civilium, multaque colligere ac docere, optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum, quem maiores nostri nobis reliquissent. Qua in disputatione quoniam tu paratior es, feceris, ut etiam pro his dicam, si, de re publica quid sentias, explicaris, nobis gratum omnibus. 1.35. Tum ille: Non possum equidem dicere me ulla in cogitatione acrius aut diligentius solere versari quam in ista ipsa, quae mihi, Laeli, a te proponitur. Etenim cum in suo quemque opere artificem, qui quidem excellat, nihil aliud cogitare, meditari, curare videam, nisi quo sit in illo genere melior, ego, cum mihi sit unum opus hoc a parentibus maioribusque meis relictum, procuratio atque administratio rei publicae, non me inertiorem esse confitear quam opificem quemquam, si minus in maxima arte, quam illi in minimis, operae consumpserim? 1.36. Sed neque his contentus sum, quae de ista consultatione scripta nobis summi ex Graecia sapientissimique homines reliquerunt, neque ea, quae mihi videntur, anteferre illis audeo. Quam ob rem peto a vobis, ut me sic audiatis, neque ut omnino expertem Graecarum rerum neque ut eas nostris in hoc praesertim genere anteponentem, sed ut unum e togatis patris diligentia non inliberaliter institutum studioque discendi a pueritia incensum, usu tamen et domesticis praeceptis multo magis eruditum quam litteris. 1.37. Hic Philus: Non hercule, inquit, Scipio, dubito, quin tibi ingenio praestiterit nemo, usu quidem in re publica rerum maximarum facile omnis viceris; quibus autem studiis semper fueris, tenemus. Quam ob rem, si, ut dicis, animum quoque contulisti in istam rationem et quasi artem, habeo maximam gratiam Laelio; spero enim multo uberiora fore, quae a te dicentur, quam illa, quae a Graecis hominibus scripta sunt, omnia. Tum ille: Permagnam tu quidem expectationem, quod onus est ei, qui magnis de rebus dicturus est, gravissimum, inponis orationi meae. Et Philus: Quamvis sit magna, tamen eam vinces, ut soles; neque enim est periculum, ne te de re publica disserentem deficiat oratio. 1.69. Quod ita cum sit, ex tribus primis generibus longe praestat mea sententia regium, regio autem ipsi praestabit id, quod erit aequatum et temperatum ex tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis. Placet enim esse quiddam in re publica praestans et regale, esse aliud auctoritati principum inpartitum ac tributum, esse quasdam res servatas iudicio voluntatique multitudinis. Haec constitutio primum habet aequabilitatem quandam magnam, qua carere diutius vix possunt liberi, deinde firmitudinem, quod et illa prima facile in contraria vitia convertuntur, ut existat ex rege dominus, ex optimatibus factio, ex populo turba et confusio, quodque ipsa genera generibus saepe conmutantur novis, hoc in hac iuncta moderateque permixta conformatione rei publicae non ferme sine magnis principum vitiis evenit. Non est enim causa conversionis, ubi in suo quisque est gradu firmiter collocatus et non subest, quo praecipitet ac decidat. 2.21. Videtisne igitur unius viri consilio non solum ortum novum populum neque ut in cunabulis vagientem relictum, sed adultum iam et paene puberem? Tum Laelius: Nos vero videmus, et te quidem ingressum ratione ad disputandum nova, quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris. Nam princeps ille, quo nemo in scribendo praestantior fuit, aream sibi sumsit, in qua civitatem extrueret arbitratu suo, praeclaram ille quidem fortasse, sed a vita hominum abhorrentem et moribus, 2.22. reliqui disseruerunt sine ullo certo exemplari formaque rei publicae de generibus et de rationibus civitatum; tu mihi videris utrumque facturus; es enim ita ingressus, ut, quae ipse reperias, tribuere aliis malis quam, ut facit apud Platonem Socrates, ipse fingere et illa de urbis situ revoces ad rationem, quae a Romulo casu aut necessitate facta sunt, et disputes non vaganti oratione, sed defixa in una re publica. Quare perge, ut instituisti; prospicere enim iam videor te reliquos reges persequente quasi perfectam rem publicam. 2.45. Hic ille iam vertetur orbis, cuius naturalem motum atque circuitum a primo discite adgnoscere. Id enim est caput civilis prudentiae, in qua omnis haec nostra versatur oratio, videre itinera flexusque rerum publicarum, ut, cum sciatis, quo quaeque res inclinet, retinere aut ante possitis occurrere. Nam rex ille, de quo loquor, primum optimi regis caede maculatus integra mente non erat, et cum metueret ipse poenam sceleris sui summam, metui se volebat; deinde victoriis divitiisque subnixus exultabat insolentia neque suos mores regere poterat neque suorum libidines. 2.51. Quare prima sit haec forma et species et origo tyranni inventa nobis in ea re publica, quam auspicato Romulus condiderit, non in illa, quam, ut perscripsit Plato, sibi ipse Socrates tripertito illo in sermone depinxerit, ut, quem ad modum Tarquinius, non novam potestatem nactus, sed, quam habebat, usus iniuste totum genus hoc regiae civitatis everterit; sit huic oppositus alter, bonus et sapiens et peritus utilitatis dignitatisque civilis quasi tutor et procurator rei publicae; sic enim appelletur, quicumque erit rector et gubernator civitatis. Quem virum facite ut agnoscatis; is est enim, qui consilio et opera civitatem tueri potest. Quod quoniam nomen minus est adhuc tritum sermone nostro saepiusque genus eius hominis erit in reliqua nobis oratione trac tandum 2.55. Itaque Publicola lege illa de provocatione perlata statim securis de fascibus demi iussit postridieque sibi collegam Sp. Lucretium subrogavit suosque ad eum, quod erat maior natu, lictores transire iussit instituitque primus, ut singulis consulibus alternis mensibus lictores praeirent, ne plura insignia essent inperii in libero populo quam in regno fuissent. Haud mediocris hic, ut ego quidem intellego, vir fuit, qui modica libertate populo data facilius tenuit auctoritatem principum. Neque ego haec nunc sine causa tam vetera vobis et tam obsoleta decanto, sed inlustribus in personis temporibusque exempla hominum rerumque definio, ad quae reliqua oratio derigatur mea. 2.56. Tenuit igitur hoc in statu senatus rem publicam temporibus illis, ut in populo libero pauca per populum, pleraque senatus auctoritate et instituto ac more gererentur, atque uti consules potestatem haberent tempore dumtaxat annuam, genere ipso ac iure regiam. Quodque erat ad optinendam potentiam nobilium vel maximum, vehementer id retinebatur, populi comitia ne essent rata, nisi ea patrum adprobavisset auctoritas. Atque his ipsis temporibus dictator etiam est institutus decem fere annis post primos consules, T. Larcius, novumque id genus imperii visum est et proximum similitudini regiae. Sed tamen omnia summa cum auctoritate a principibus cedente populo tenebantur, magnaeque res temporibus illis a fortissimis viris summo imperio praeditis, dictatoribus atque consulibus, belli gerebantur. 2.57. Sed id, quod fieri natura rerum ipsa cogebat, ut plusculum sibi iuris populus adscisceret liberatus a regibus, non longo intervallo, sexto decimo fere anno, Postumo Cominio Sp. Cassio consulibus consecutus est; in quo defuit fortasse ratio, sed tamen vincit ipsa rerum publicarum natura saepe rationem. Id enim tenetote, quod initio dixi, nisi aequabilis haec in civitate conpensatio sit et iuris et officii et muneris, ut et potestatis satis in magistratibus et auctoritatis in principum consilio et libertatis in populo sit, non posse hunc incommutabilem rei publicae conservari statum. 2.67. quem iam dudum quaero et ad quem cupio pervenire. L. Prudentem fortasse quaeris? Tum ille: Istum ipsum. L. Est tibi ex eis ipsis, qui adsunt, bella copia, vel ut a te ipso ordiare. Tum Scipio: Atque utinam ex omni senatu pro rata parte esset! Sed tamen est ille prudens, qui, ut saepe in Africa vidimus, immani et vastae insidens beluae coercet et regit beluam, quocumque vult, levi admonitu †non actu inflectit illam feram. L. Novi et, tibi cum essem legatus, saepe vidi. S. Ergo ille Indus aut Poenus unam coercet beluam, et eam docilem et humanis moribus adsuetam; at vero ea, quae latet in animis hominum quaeque pars animi mens vocatur, non unam aut facilem ad subigendum frenat et domat, si quando id efficit, quod perraro potest. Namque et illa tenenda est ferox 3.8. cati. Et Philus: Praeclaram vero causam ad me defertis, cum me improbitatis patrocinium suscipere voltis. Atqui id tibi, inquit Laelius, verendum est, si ea dixeris, quae contra iustitiam dici solent, ne sic etiam sentire videare, cum et ipse sis quasi unicum exemplum antiquae probitatis et fidei neque sit ignota consuetudo tua contrarias in partis disserendi, quod ita facillume verum inveniri putes. Et Philus: Heia vero, inquit, geram morem vobis et me oblinam sciens; quod quoniam, qui aurum quaerunt, non putant sibi recusandum, nos, cum iustitiam quaeramus, rem multo omni auro cariorem, nullam profecto molestiam fugere debemus. Atque utinam, quem ad modum oratione sum usurus aliena, sic mihi ore uti liceret alieno! Nunc ea dicenda sunt L. Furio Philo, quae Carneades, Graecus homo et consuetus, quod commodum esset, verbis
7. Cicero, De Oratore, 3.148 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 266
3.148. Tum Crassus 'pervulgatas res requiris' inquit 'et tibi non incognitas, Sulpici: quis enim de isto genere non docuit, non instituit, non scriptum etiam reliquit? Sed geram morem et ea dumtaxat, quae mihi nota sunt, breviter exponam tibi; censebo tamen ad eos, qui auctores et inventores sunt harum sane minutarum rerum, revertendum.
8. Cicero, On Duties, 2.31 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 288
2.31. Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse non aeque omnes egent, sed tamen, si cui haec suppetunt, adiuvant aliquantum cum ad cetera, tum ad amicitias comparandas. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius; nunc dicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri, sed attingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat plurimum. Summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat. Haec autem, si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, quibus rebus pariuntur a singulis, eisdem fere a multitudine. Sed est alius quoque quidam aditus ad multitudinem, ut in universorum animos tamquam influere possimus. 2.31.  All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of political honour, fame and the good-will of their fellow-citizens; nevertheless, if these honours come to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in the acquisition of friends. But friendship has been discussed in another book of mine, entitled "Laelius." Let us now take up the discussion of Glory, although I have published two books on that subject also. Still, let us touch briefly on it here, since it is of very great help in the conduct of more important business. The highest, truest glory depends upon the following three things: the affection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the people. Such sentiments, if I may speak plainly and concisely, are awakened in the masses in the same way as in individuals. But there is also another avenue of approach to the masses, by which we can, as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once.
9. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10, 2.168, 3.5-3.6, 3.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 280, 283, 286
1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason. 2.168. "These are more or less the things that occurred to me which I thought proper to be said upon the subject of the nature of the gods. And for your part, Cotta, would you but listen to me, you would plead the same cause, and reflect that you are a leading citizen and a pontife, and you would take advantage of the liberty enjoyed by your school of arguing both pro and contra to choose to espouse my side, and preferably to devote to this purpose those powers of eloquence which your rhetorical exercises have bestowed upon you and which the Academy has fostered. For the habit of arguing in support of atheism, whether it be done from conviction or in pretence, is a wicked and impious practice." 3.5. "Very well," rejoined Cotta, "let us then proceed as the argument itself may lead us. But before we come to the subject, let me say a few words about myself. I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that you put forward at the conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontife. This no doubt meant that I ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion. For my part I always shall uphold them and always have done so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall ever dislodge me from the belief as to the worship of the immortal gods which I have inherited from our forefathers. But on any question of el I am guided by the high pontifes, Titus Coruncanius, Publius Scipio and Publius Scaevola, not by Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, who was both an augur and a philosopher, to whose discourse upon religion, in his famous oration, I would rather listen than to any leader of the Stoics. The religion of the Roman people comprises ritual, auspices, and the third additional division consisting of all such prophetic warnings as the interpreters of the Sybil or the soothsayers have derived from portents and prodigies. While, I have always thought that none of these departments of religion was to be despised, and I have held the conviction that Romulus by his auspices and Numa by his establishment of our ritual laid the foundations of our state, which assuredly could never have been as great as it is had not the fullest measure of divine favour been obtained for it. 3.6. There, Balbus, is the opinion of a Cotta and a pontife; now oblige me by letting me know yours. You are a philosopher, and I ought to receive from you a proof of your religion, whereas I must believe the word of our ancestors even without proof." "What proof then do you require of me, Cotta?" replied Balbus. "You divided your discourse under four heads," said Cotta; "first you designed to prove the existence of the gods; secondly, to describe their nature; thirdly, to show that the world is governed by them; and lastly, that they care for the welfare of men. These, if I remember rightly, were the headings that you laid down." "You are quite right," said Balbus; "but now tell me what it is that you want to know." 3.95. "I on my side," replied Cotta, "only desire to be refuted. My purpose was rather to discuss the doctrines I have expounded than to pronounce judgement upon them, and I am confident that you can easily defeat me." "Oh, no doubt," interposed Velleius; "why, he thinks that even our dreams are sent to us by Jupiter — though dreams themselves are not so unsubstantial as a Stoic disquisition on the nature of the gods." Here the conversation ended, and we parted, Velleius thinking Cotta's discourse to be the truer, while I felt that that of Balbus approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth.
10. Cicero, On Laws, 2.32-2.33 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 287
11. Cicero, On The Haruspices, 18-19 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 287
12. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.1-1.12, 1.29 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 266, 293
1.1. Non eram nescius, Brute, cum, quae summis ingeniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sermone tractavissent, ea Latinis litteris mandaremus, fore ut hic noster labor in varias reprehensiones incurreret. nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt, si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. erunt etiam, et ii quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. 1.2. contra quos omnis dicendum breviter existimo. Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis responsum est eo libro, quo a nobis philosophia philosophia a nobis BE defensa et collaudata est, cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi veritus ne movere hominum studia viderer, retinere non posse. Qui autem, si maxime hoc placeat, placet BEV moderatius tamen id volunt fieri, difficilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo, quod semel admissum admissum dett iam missum coe+rceri reprimique non potest, ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis, qui omnino avocent a philosophia, quam his, qui rebus infinitis modum constituant in reque eo meliore, quo maior sit, mediocritatem desiderent. 1.3. sive enim ad sapientiam perveniri potest, non paranda nobis solum ea, sed fruenda etiam sapientia om. cod. Eliens. Davisii, P. Man. est; sive hoc difficile est, tamen nec modus est ullus ullus est BE investigandi veri, nisi inveneris, et quaerendi defatigatio defetigatio A 2 turpis est, cum id, quod quaeritur, sit pulcherrimum. etenim si delectamur, cum scribimus, quis est tam invidus, qui ab eo nos abducat? sin laboramus, quis est, qui alienae modum statuat industriae? nam ut Terentianus Chremes non inhumanus, qui novum vicinum non vult 'fodere au/t arare aut a/liquid ferre de/nique'— non enim illum ab industria, sed ab inliberali labore deterret—, sic isti curiosi, quos offendit noster minime nobis iniucundus labor. 1.4. Iis iis Man. sec. Bai. ; his igitur est difficilius satis facere, qui se Latina latina A 1 B E latinia R latine A 2 NV scripta dicunt contemnere. in quibus hoc primum est in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non delectet eos sermo patrius, cum idem fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini nomini pene BE Romano est, qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii spernat aut reiciat, quod se isdem Euripidis fabulis delectari dicat, Latinas litteras oderit? Synephebos ego, inquit, potius Caecilii aut Andriam Terentii quam utramque Medri legam? A quibus tantum dissentio, ut, cum Sophocles vel optime scripserit Electram, tamen male conversam Atilii atrilii ( ut videtur )R acilii BE mihi legendam putem, de quo Lucilius: Lucilius Se. lucinius A 1 ; licinius (altera parte prioris u erasa) A 2 ; licinius BER, N (litin.), V; Licinus C.F.W. Mue. 1.5. 'ferreum scriptorem', verum, opinor, scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit. rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poe+tis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidii delicatissimi. mihi quidem nulli satis eruditi videntur, quibus nostra ignota sunt. an Utina/m an Utinam Mur (ad Phil. 14, 5), at utinam ABERN aut umnam V ne in nemore nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? 1.6. Quid? quod BEN 2 si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque eisque eisdem N his (hys) BE nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca antepot iis, quae et splendide dicta sint dicta sint dett. dicta sunt neque sint conversa de Graecis? nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos ipsos NV ipso quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant, quam legendi sunt. quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. quid? Theophrastus Theophrastus A. Man. theophrastum RNV theophastrum A theoprastum BE mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? quid? Epicurei epicuri BE num num BE non RV non ( superscr. ab alt. m. uel num) A non ( superscr. ab alt. m. nun) N desistunt de isdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis isdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est, cur nostri a nostris non legantur? 1.7. Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poe+tae fabulas, male, male AR 2 N 2 mali BEN 1 mole R 1 magis V credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Medro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius, Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia; alia Urs. alias sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris. 1.8. ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire, usui uenire superscr. ab alt. m. illud e; ut sit illud euenire, A; uenire usu R ut abhorreant a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. quibus ego assentior, dum modo de isdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. res vero bonas verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas dictas V dictatas quis non legat? nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a Scaevola est praetore praetore P. Man. praetor salutatus Athenis Albucius. 1.9. quem quidem locum comit comit Se. c o N cum ABERV cf. ad p. 5,10; 23,1; 26,12; 44,8; 46,15; 160,31 multa venustate et omni sale idem Lucilius, apud quem praeclare Scaevola: Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum, municipem Ponti, Ponti edd. pontii (pontu BE) Tritani, Tritani Bai. tritanii A 2 RV tiranii A 1 tritanu BE centurionum, praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque, maluisti dici. Graece ergo praetor Athenis, id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto: 'chaere,' chaere care BE inquam, Tite! lictores, turma omnis chorusque: chorusque cohorsque 'primus quantum video Man.' Mdv. 'chaere, Tite!' hinc hic A 1 BERV mi BEV; om. in ras. A; m R; mi in fine versus N 1, add. itii ( ut sit mutii) N 2 hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus. Sed iure Mucius. 1.10. ego autem mirari satis mirari satis Mdv. satis mirari A. Man.; non mirari Böck. mirari (R in mg. ad aū in fine versus pos. adscriptum habet a man. rec. nō) non queo unde hoc sit tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium. non est omnino hic hic omnino BE docendi locus; sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, modo non inopem N 2 modo inopem ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. quando enim nobis, vel dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poe+tis, postea quidem quam fuit quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit? Ego vero, quoniam quoniam Otto con (conforensibus superscr. ab alt. man. u sup. o priore ) N c vel ī (superscr.) R cum forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor videor N 2 V videri praesidium, in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, sum dett. sim debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, possum BE possim in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, nec cum istis tantopere tanto opere N pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, malunt BER modo legant illa ipsa, ne simulent, et iis servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magnopere desiderent. 1.11. qui autem alia malunt scribi a nobis, aequi esse debent, quod et scripta multa sunt, sic ut plura nemini nemini edd. memini e nostris, et scribentur fortasse plura, si vita suppetet; et tamen, qui diligenter haec, quae de philosophia litteris mandamus, legere assueverit, iudicabit nulla ad legendum his esse potiora. quid est enim in vita tantopere quaerendum quam cum omnia in philosophia, tum id, quod his libris quaeritur, qui qui Or. quis ARNV quid BE sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum, quo sint omnia bene vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda, quid sequatur natura ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum? qua de re cum sit inter doctissimos summa dissensio, quis alienum putet eius esse dignitatis, dignitatis esse BE quam mihi quisque tribuat, tribuat A 1 tribuit ( in N cum ras. 1 vel 2 litt. post alteram t) quid in omni munere vitae optimum et verissimum sit, exquirere? 1.12. an, partus ancillae sitne in fructu habendus, disseretur inter principes civitatis, P. Scaevolam M'. M.' que edd. m. que ARNV m BE que Manilium, ab iisque M. Brutus dissentiet—quod et acutum genus est et ad usus civium non inutile, nosque ea scripta reliquaque eiusdem generis et legimus libenter et legemus—, haec, quae vitam omnem continent, neglegentur? neglegentur A. Man. negleguntur (neglig. BEN neg|glig. V) nam, ut sint illa vendibiliora, haec uberiora certe sunt. quamquam id quidem licebit iis existimare, qui legerint. nos autem hanc omnem quaestionem de finibus bonorum et malorum fere a nobis explicatam esse his litteris arbitramur, in quibus, quantum potuimus, non modo quid nobis probaretur, sed etiam quid a singulis philosophiae disciplinis diceretur, persecuti sumus. 1.29. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic:
13. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.1-1.12, 1.29 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 266, 293
14. Cicero, On Fate, 1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 292
15. Cicero, On Divination, 2.8, 2.28, 2.45, 2.70, 2.74, 2.81-2.87, 2.148-2.150 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 280, 284, 285, 286
2.8. Nam cum de divinatione Quintus frater ea disseruisset, quae superiore libro scripta sunt, satisque ambulatum videretur, tum in bibliotheca, quae in Lycio est, adsedimus. Atque ego: Adcurate tu quidem, inquam, Quinte, et Stoice Stoicorum sententiam defendisti, quodque me maxime delectat, plurimis nostris exemplis usus es, et iis quidem claris et inlustribus. Dicendum est mihi igitur ad ea, quae sunt a te dicta, sed ita, nihil ut adfirmem, quaeram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi ipse diffidens. Si enim aliquid certi haberem, quod dicerem, ego ipse divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego. 2.28. Ut ordiar ab haruspicina, quam ego rei publicae causa communisque religionis colendam censeo. Sed soli sumus; licet verum exquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitanti. Inspiciamus, si placet, exta primum. Persuaderi igitur cuiquam potest ea, quae significari dicuntur extis, cognita esse ab haruspicibus observatione diuturna? Quam diuturna ista fuit? aut quam longinquo tempore observari potuit? aut quo modo est conlatum inter ipsos, quae pars inimica, quae pars familiaris esset, quod fissum periculum, quod commodum aliquod ostenderet? An haec inter se haruspices Etrusci, Elii, Aegyptii, Poeni contulerunt? At id, praeterquam quod fieri non potuit, ne fingi quidem potest; alios enim alio more videmus exta interpretari, nec esse unam omnium disciplinam. 2.45. quid, cum in altissimos montis, quod plerumque fit? quid, cum in desertas solitudines? quid, cum in earum gentium oras, in quibus haec ne observantur quidem? At inventum est caput in Tiberi. Quasi ego artem aliquam istorum esse negem! divinationem nego. Caeli enim distributio, quam ante dixi, et certarum rerum notatio docet, unde fulmen venerit, quo concesserit; quid significet autem, nulla ratio docet. Sed urges me meis versibus: Nam pater altitos stellanti nixus Olympo Ipse suos quondam tumulos ac templa petivit Et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignis. Tum statua Nattae, tum simulacra deorum Romulusque et Remus cum altrice belua vi fulminis icti conciderunt, deque his rebus haruspicum extiterunt responsa verissuma. 2.70. Satis multa de ostentis; auspicia restant et sortes eae, quae ducuntur, non illae, quae vaticinatione funduntur, quae oracla verius dicimus; de quibus tum dicemus, cum ad naturalem divinationem venerimus. Restat etiam de Chaldaeis; sed primum auspicia videamus. Difficilis auguri locus ad contra dicendum. Marso fortasse, sed Romano facillumus. Non enim sumus ii nos augures, qui avium reliquorumve signorum observatione futura dicamus. Et tamen credo Romulum, qui urbem auspicato condidit, habuisse opinionem esse in providendis rebus augurandi scientiam (errabat enim multis in rebus antiquitas), quam vel usu iam vel doctrina vel vetustate immutatam videmus; retinetur autem et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates rei publicae mos, religio, disciplina, ius augurium, collegii auctoritas. 2.74. Iam de caelo servare non ipsos censes solitos, qui auspicabantur? Nunc imperant pullario; ille renuntiat. Fulmen sinistrum auspicium optumum habemus ad omnis res praeterquam ad comitia; quod quidem institutum rei publicae causa est, ut comitiorum vel in iudiciis populi vel in iure legum vel in creandis magistratibus principes civitatis essent interpretes. At Ti. Gracchi litteris Scipio et Figulus consules, cum augures iudicassent eos vitio creatos esse, magistratu se abdicaverunt. Quis negat augurum disciplinam esse? divinationem nego. At haruspices divini; quos cum Ti. Gracchus propter mortem repentinam eius, qui in praerogativa referenda subito concidisset, in senatum introduxisset, non iustum rogatorem fuisse dixerunt. 2.81. At omnes reges, populi, nationes utuntur auspiciis. Quasi vero quicquam sit tam valde quam nihil sapere vulgare, aut quasi tibi ipsi in iudicando placeat multitudo! Quotus quisque est, qui voluptatem neget esse bonum? plerique etiam summum bonum dicunt. Num igitur eorum frequentia Stoici de sententia deterrentur? aut num plerisque in rebus sequitur eorum auctoritatem multitudo? Quid mirum igitur, si in auspiciis et in omni divinatione inbecilli animi superstitiosa ista concipiant, verum dispicere non possint? 2.82. Quae autem est inter augures conveniens et coniuncta constantia? Ad nostri augurii consuetudinem dixit Ennius: Tum tonuit laevum bene tempestate serena. At Homericus Aiax apud Achillem querens de ferocitate Troianorum nescio quid hoc modo nuntiat: Prospera Iuppiter his dextris fulgoribus edit. Ita nobis sinistra videntur, Graiis et barbaris dextra meliora. Quamquam haud ignoro, quae bona sint, sinistra nos dicere, etiamsi dextra sint; sed certe nostri sinistrum nominaverunt externique dextrum, quia plerumque id melius videbatur. 2.83. Haec quanta dissensio est! Quid? quod aliis avibus utuntur, aliis signis, aliter observant, alia respondent, non necesse est fateri partim horum errore susceptum esse, partim superstitione, multa fallendo? Atque his superstitionibus non dubitasti etiam omina adiungere. Aemilia Paulo Persam perisse, quod pater omen accepit; Caecilia se sororis filiae sedes suas tradere. Iam illa: Favete linguis et praerogativam, omen comitiorum. Hoc est ipsum esse contra se copiosum et disertum. Quando enim ista observans quieto et libero animo esse poteris, ut ad rem gerendam non superstitionem habeas, sed rationem ducem? Itane? si quis aliquid ex sua re atque ex suo sermone dixerit et eius verbum aliquod apte ceciderit ad id, quod ages aut cogitabis, ea res tibi aut timorem adferet aut alacritatem? 2.84. Cum M. Crassus exercitum Brundisii inponeret, quidam in portu caricas Cauno advectas vendens Cauneas clamitabat. Dicamus, si placet, monitum ab eo Crassum, caveret ne iret; non fuisse periturum, si omini paruisset. Quae si suscipiamus, pedis offensio nobis et abruptio corrigiae et sternumenta erunt observanda. 2.85. Sortes restant et Chaldaei, ut ad vates veniamus et ad somnia. Dicendum igitur putas de sortibus? Quid enim sors est? Idem prope modum, quod micare, quod talos iacere, quod tesseras, quibus in rebus temeritas et casus, non ratio nec consilium valet. Tota res est inventa fallaciis aut ad quaestum aut ad superstitionem aut ad errorem. Atque ut in haruspicina fecimus, sic videamus, clarissumarum sortium quae tradatur inventio. Numerium Suffustium Praenestinorum monumenta declarant, honestum hominem et nobilem, somniis crebris, ad extremum etiam minacibus cum iuberetur certo in loco silicem caedere, perterritum visis irridentibus suis civibus id agere coepisse; itaque perfracto saxo sortis erupisse in robore insculptas priscarum litterarum notis. Is est hodie locus saeptus religiose propter Iovis pueri, qui lactens cum Iunone Fortunae in gremio sedens mammam adpetens castissime colitur a matribus. 2.86. Eodemque tempore in eo loco, ubi Fortunae nunc est aedes, mel ex olea fluxisse dicunt, haruspicesque dixisse summa nobilitate illas sortis futuras, eorumque iussu ex illa olea arcam esse factam, eoque conditas sortis, quae hodie Fortunae monitu tolluntur. Quid igitur in his potest esse certi, quae Fortunae monitu pueri manu miscentur atque ducuntur? quo modo autem istae positae in illo loco? quis robur illud cecidit, dolavit, inscripsit? Nihil est, inquiunt, quod deus efficere non possit. Utinam sapientis Stoicos effecisset, ne omnia cum superstitiosa sollicitudine et miseria crederent! Sed hoc quidem genus divinationis vita iam communis explosit; fani pulchritudo et vetustas Praenestinarum etiam nunc retinet sortium nomen, atque id in volgus. 2.87. Quis enim magistratus aut quis vir inlustrior utitur sortibus? ceteris vero in locis sortes plane refrixerunt. Quod Carneadem Clitomachus scribit dicere solitum, nusquam se fortunatiorem quam Praeneste vidisse Fortunam. Ergo hoc divinationis genus omittamus. Ad Chaldaeorum monstra veniamus; de quibus Eudoxus, Platonis auditor, in astrologia iudicio doctissimorum hominum facile princeps, sic opinatur, id quod scriptum reliquit, Chaldaeis in praedictione et in notatione cuiusque vitae ex natali die minime esse credendum. 2.148. Explodatur igitur haec quoque somniorum divinatio pariter cum ceteris. Nam, ut vere loquamur, superstitio fusa per gentis oppressit omnium fere animos atque hominum inbecillitatem occupavit. Quod et in iis libris dictum est, qui sunt de natura deorum, et hac disputatione id maxume egimus. Multum enim et nobismet ipsis et nostris profuturi videbamur, si eam funditus sustulissemus. Nec vero (id enim diligenter intellegi volo) superstitione tollenda religio tollitur. Nam et maiorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est, et esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri. 2.149. Quam ob rem, ut religio propaganda etiam est, quae est iuncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes eligendae. Instat enim et urget et, quo te cumque verteris, persequitur, sive tu vatem sive tu omen audieris, sive immolaris sive avem aspexeris, si Chaldaeum, si haruspicem videris, si fulserit, si tonuerit, si tactum aliquid erit de caelo, si ostenti simile natum factumve quippiam; quorum necesse est plerumque aliquid eveniat, ut numquam liceat quieta mente consistere. 2.150. Perfugium videtur omnium laborum et sollicitudinum esse somnus. At ex eo ipso plurumae curae metusque nascuntur; qui quidem ipsi per se minus valerent et magis contemnerentur, nisi somniorum patrocinium philosophi suscepissent, nec ii quidem contemptissimi, sed in primis acuti et consequentia et repugtia videntes, qui prope iam absoluti et perfecti putantur. Quorum licentiae nisi Carneades restitisset, haud scio an soli iam philosophi iudicarentur. Cum quibus omnis fere nobis disceptatio contentioque est, non quod eos maxume contemnamus, sed quod videntur acutissime sententias suas prudentissimeque defendere. Cum autem proprium sit Academiae iudicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare, quae simillima veri videantur, conferre causas et, quid in quamque sententiam dici possit, expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate iudicium audientium relinquere integrum ac liberum, tenebimus hanc consuetudinem a Socrate traditam eaque inter nos, si tibi, Quinte frater, placebit, quam saepissime utemur. Mihi vero, inquit ille, nihil potest esse iucundius. Quae cum essent dicta, surreximus. 2.8. After my brother Quintus had delivered his views on divination, as set out in the preceding volume, and we had walked as much as we wished, we took our seats in the library in my Lyceum, and I remarked:Really, my dear Quintus, you have defended the Stoic doctrine with accuracy and like a Stoic. But the thing that delights me most is the fact that you illustrated your argument with many incidents taken from Roman sources — incidents, too, of a distinguished and noble type. I must now reply to what you said, but I must do so with great diffidence and with many misgivings, and in such a way as to affirm nothing and question everything. For if I should assume anything that I said to be certain I should myself be playing the diviner while saying that no such thing as divination exists! 2.28. In discussing separately the various methods of divination, I shall begin with soothsaying, which, according to my deliberate judgement, should be cultivated from reasons of political expediency and in order that we may have a state religion. But we are alone and for that reason we may, without causing ill-will, make an earnest inquiry into the truth of soothsaying — certainly I can do so, since in most things my philosophy is that of doubt. In the first place, then, if you please, let us make an inspection of entrails! Now can anybody be induced to believe that the things said to be predicted by means of entrails were learned by the soothsayers through long-continued observation? How long, pray, did the observations last? How could the observations have continued for a long time? How did the soothsayers manage to agree among themselves what part of the entrails was unfavourable, and what part favourable; or what cleft in the liver indicated danger and what promised some advantage? Are the soothsayers of Etruria, Elis, Egypt, and of Carthage in accord on these matters? Apart from such an agreement being impossible in fact, it is impossible even to imagine; and, moreover, we see some nations interpreting entrails in one way and some in another; hence there is no uniformity of practice. 2.45. What, for example, is his object in hurling them into the middle of the sea? or, as he so often does, on to the tops of lofty mountains? Why, pray, does he waste them in solitary deserts? And why does he fling them on the shores of peoples who do not take any notice of them?[20] Oh! but you say, the head was found in the Tiber. As if I contended that your soothsayers were devoid of art! My contention is that there is no divination. By dividing the heavens in the manner already indicated and by noting what happened in each division the soothsayers learn whence the thunderbolt comes and whither it goes, but no method can show that the thunderbolt has any prophetic value. However, you array those verses of mine against me:For high-thundering Jove, as he stood on starry Olympus,Hurtled his blows at the temples and monuments raised in his honour,And on the Capitols site unloosed the bolts of his lightning.Then, the poem goes on to say, the statue of Natta, the images of the gods and the piece representing Romulus and Remus, with their wolf-nurse, were struck by a thunderbolt and fell to the ground. The prophecies made by the soothsayers from these events were fulfilled to the letter. 2.70. Enough has been said of portents; auspices remain and so do lots — I mean lots that are drawn, and not those uttered by prophets, and more correctly styled oracles. I shall speak of oracles when I get to natural divination. In addition I must discuss the Chaldeans. But first let us consider auspices. To argue against auspices is a hard thing, you say, for an augur to do. Yes, for a Marsian, perhaps; but very easy for a Roman. For we Roman augurs are not the sort who foretell the future by observing the flights of birds and other signs. And yet, I admit that Romulus, who founded the city by the direction of auspices, believed that augury was an art useful in seeing things to come — for the ancients had erroneous views on many subjects. But we see that the art has undergone a change, due to experience, education, or the long lapse of time. However, out of respect for the opinion of the masses and because of the great service to the State we maintain the augural practices, discipline, religious rites and laws, as well as the authority of the augural college. 2.74. Again, do you not think that formerly it was the habit of the celebrants themselves to make observation of the heavens? Now they order the poulterer, and he gives responses! We regard lightning on the left as a most favourable omen for everything except for an election, and this exception was made, no doubt, from reasons of political expediency so that the rulers of the State would be the judges of the regularity of an election, whether held to pass judgements in criminal cases, or to enact laws, or to elect magistrates.The consuls, Scipio and Figulus, you say, resigned their office when the augurs rendered a decision based on a letter written by Tiberius Gracchus, to the effect that those consuls had not been elected according to augural law. Who denies that augury is an art? What I deny is the existence of divination. But you say: Soothsayers have the power of divination; and you mention the fact that, on account of the unexpected death of the person who had suddenly fallen while bringing in the report of the vote of the prerogative century, Tiberius Gracchus introduced the soothsayers into the Senate and they declared that the president had violated augural law. 2.81. But, you say, all kings, peoples, and nations employ auspices. As if there were anything so absolutely common as want of sense, or as if you yourself in deciding anything would accept the opinion of the mob! How often will you find a man who will say that pleasure is not a good! Most people actually call it the highest good. Then will the Stoics abandon their views about pleasure because the crowd is against them? or do you think that the multitude follows the lead of the Stoics in very many matters? What wonder, then, if in auspices and in every kind of divination weak minds should adopt the superstitious practices which you have mentioned and should be unable to discern the truth? 2.82. Moreover, there is no uniformity, and no consistent and constant agreement between augurs. Ennius, speaking with reference to the Roman system of augury, said:Then on the left, from out a cloudless sky,Joves thunder rolled its goodly omen forth.But Homers Ajax, in complaining to Achilles of some ferocious deed or other of the Trojans, speaks in this wise:For their success Jove thunders on the right.So we regard signs on the left as best — Greeks and barbarians, those on the right. And yet I am aware that we call favourable signs sinistra, or left-hand signs, even though they may be on the right. Undoubtedly our ancestors in choosing the left side and foreign nations the right were both influenced by what experience had shown them was the more favourable quarter in most cases. 2.83. What a conflict this is! In view, then, of the differences between different nations in the responses, in the manner in which observations are made and in the kinds of birds and signs employed, need I assert that divination is compounded of a little error, a little superstition, and a good deal of fraud?[40] And to these superstitions you have actually joined omens! For example: Aemilia told Paulus that Persa was dead and her father accepted this as an omen. Caecilia said that she surrendered her seat to her sisters daughter. Then you go on and speak of the order of silence, favete linguis and the prerogative, or omen of the elections. This is indeed turning the artillery of ones eloquence and learning against oneself! For while on the watch for these oracles of yours could you be so free and calm of mind that you would have reason and not superstition to guide your course? Now, if a person in the course of his own business or conversation should make some remark, and a word spoken by him happened to apply to what you were doing or thinking, do you really believe that such an accident should cause you either fear or joy? 2.84. When Marcus Crassus was embarking his army at Brundisium a man who was selling Caunian figs at the harbour, repeatedly cried out Cauneas, Cauneas. Let us say, if you will, that this was a warning to Crassus to bid him Beware of going, and that if he had obeyed the omen he would not have perished. But if we are going to accept chance utterances of this kind as omens, we had better look out when we stumble, or break a shoe-string, or sneeze![41] Lots and the Chaldean astrologers remain to be discussed before we come to prophets and to dreams. 2.85. And pray what is the need, do you think, to talk about the casting of lots? It is much like playing at morra, dice, or knuckle-bones, in which recklessness and luck prevail rather than reflection and judgement. The whole scheme of divination by lots was fraudulently contrived from mercenary motives, or as a means of encouraging superstition and error. But let us follow the method used in the discussion of soothsaying and consider the traditional origin of the most famous lots. According to the annals of Praeneste Numerius Suffustius, who was a distinguished man of noble birth, was admonished by dreams, often repeated, and finally even by threats, to split open a flint rock which was lying in a designated place. Frightened by the visions and disregarding the jeers of his fellow-townsmen he set about doing as he had been directed. And so when he had broken open the stone, the lots sprang forth carved on oak, in ancient characters. The site where the stone was found is religiously guarded to this day. It is hard by the statue of the infant Jupiter, who is represented as sitting with Juno in the lap of Fortune and reaching for her breast, and it is held in the highest reverence by mothers. 2.86. There is a tradition that, concurrently with the finding of the lots and in the spot where the temple of Fortune now stands, honey flowed from an olive-tree. Now the soothsayers, who had declared that those lots would enjoy an unrivalled reputation, gave orders that a chest should be made from the tree and lots placed in the chest. At the present time the lots are taken from their receptacle if Fortune directs. What reliance, pray, can you put in these lots, which at Fortunes nod are shuffled and drawn by the hand of a child? And how did they ever get in that rock? Who cut down the oak-tree? and who fashioned and carved the lots? Oh! but somebody says, God can bring anything to pass. If so, then I wish he had made the Stoics wise, so that they would not be so pitiably and distressingly superstitious and so prone to believe everything they hear! This sort of divining, however, has now been discarded by general usage. The beauty and age of the temple still preserve the name of the lots of Praeneste — that is, among the common people, 2.87. for no magistrate and no man of any reputation ever consults them; but in all other places lots have gone entirely out of use. And this explains the remark which, according to Clitomachus, Carneades used to make that he had at no other place seen Fortune more fortunate than at Praeneste. Then let us dismiss this branch of divination.[42] Let us come to Chaldean manifestations. In discussing them Platos pupil, Eudoxus, whom the best scholars consider easily the first in astronomy, has left the following opinion in writing: No reliance whatever is to be placed in Chaldean astrologers when they profess to forecast a mans future from the position of the stars on the day of his birth. 2.148. Then let dreams, as a means of divination, be rejected along with the rest. Speaking frankly, superstition, which is widespread among the nations, has taken advantage of human weakness to cast its spell over the mind of almost every man. This same view was stated in my treatise On the Nature of the Gods; and to prove the correctness of that view has been the chief aim of the present discussion. For I thought that I should be rendering a great service both to myself and to my countrymen if I could tear this superstition up by the roots. But I want it distinctly understood that the destruction of superstition does not mean the destruction of religion. For I consider it the part of wisdom to preserve the institutions of our forefathers by retaining their sacred rites and ceremonies. Furthermore, the celestial order and the beauty of the universe compel me to confess that there is some excellent and eternal Being, who deserves the respect and homage of men. 2.149. Wherefore, just as it is a duty to extend the influence of true religion, which is closely associated with the knowledge of nature, so it is a duty to weed out every root of superstition. For superstition is ever at your heels to urge you on; it follows you at every turn. It is with you when you listen to a prophet, or an omen; when you offer sacrifices or watch the flight of birds; when you consult an astrologer or a soothsayer; when it thunders or lightens or there is a bolt from on high; or when some so‑called prodigy is born or is made. And since necessarily some of these signs are nearly always being given, no one who believes in them can ever remain in a tranquil state of mind. 2.150. Sleep is regarded as a refuge from every toil and care; but it is actually made the fruitful source of worry and fear. In fact dreams would be less regarded on their own account and would be viewed with greater indifference had they not been taken under the guardianship of philosophers — not philosophers of the meaner sort, but those of the keenest wit, competent to see what follows logically and what does not — men who are considered well-nigh perfect and infallible. Indeed, if their arrogance had not been resisted by Carneades, it is probable that by this time they would have adjudged the only philosophers. While most of my war of words has been with these men, it is not because I hold them in especial contempt, but on the contrary, it is because they seem to me to defend their own views with the greatest acuteness and skill. Moreover, it is characteristic of the Academy to put forward no conclusions of its own, but to approve those which seem to approach nearest to the truth; to compare arguments; to draw forth all that may be said in behalf of any opinion; and, without asserting any authority of its own, to leave the judgement of the inquirer wholly free. That same method, which by the way we inherited from Socrates, I shall, if agreeable to you, my dear Quintus, follow as often as possible in our future discussions.Nothing could please me better, Quintus replied.When this was said, we arose.
16. Cicero, On Friendship, 1-4, 6, 5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 288, 290, 293
17. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.33 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •auctoritas, contrasted with ratio Found in books: Wardy and Warren (2018), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, 281
5.33. Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum et testificaris, quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant: nos in diem vivimus; quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus, itaque soli sumus liberi. verum tamen, quoniam de constantia paulo ante diximus, non ego hoc loco id quaerendum puto, verumne sit, verumne scit K 1 verume sit G 1 quod Zenoni placuerit quodque eius auditori audituri G Aristoni, bonum esse solum, quod honestum esset, sed si ita esset, tum tum exp. V rec (C?) fueritne consentaneum, ut totum add. Po. sed, ni ita esset, num consentaneum esset, tum ut Se. ( sed agitur de Zenonis doctrina cf .v. 29 sqq. ), alia alii ( ad tum cf. parad. 29 fin. 4,33 al. ) hoc beate vivere in una virtute poneret.