2. Cicero, On Duties, 1.20, 3.21, 3.23, 3.31, 4.25-4.26, 4.28, 4.32, 4.39, 4.41, 5.15-5.17 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •assent / adsensio / adsensus / συγκατάθεσις Found in books: Maso (2022) 97, 128, 132| 1.20. De tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur; cuius partes duae, iustitia, in qua virtutis est splendor maximus, ex qua viri boni nomitur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet. Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis. 3.21. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. 3.23. Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus populorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica continetur, eodem modo constitutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri; hoc enim spectant leges, hoc volunt, incolumem esse civium coniunctionem; quam qui dirimunt, eos morte, exsilio, vinclis, damno coërcent. Atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et humana; cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam volent vivere), numquam committet, ut alienum appetat et id, quod alteri detraxerit, sibi adsumat. 3.31. Itaque lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum conservat et continet, decernet profecto, ut ab homine inerti atque inutili ad sapientem, bonum, fortem virum transferantur res ad vivendum necessariae, qui si occiderit, multum de communi utilitate detraxerit, modo hoc ita faciat, ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens hanc causam habeat ad iniuriam. Ita semper officio fungetur utilitati consulens hominum et ei, quam saepe commemoro, humanae societati. | 1.20. of the three remaining divisions, the most extensive in its application is the principle by which society and what we may call its "common bonds" are maintained. of this again there are two divisions â justice, in which is the crowning glory of the virtues and on the basis of which men are called "good men"; and, close akin to justice, charity, which may also be called kindness or generosity. The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests, private property for their own. 3.21. Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. 3.23. But this principle is established not by Nature's laws alone (that is, by the common rules of equity), but also by the statutes of particular communities, in accordance with which in individual states the public interests are maintained. In all these it is with one accord ordained that no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage to injure his neighbour. For it is to this that the laws have regard; this is their intent, that the bonds of union between citizens should not be impaired; and any attempt to destroy these bonds is repressed by the penalty of death, exile, imprisonment, or fine. Again, this principle follows much more effectually directly from the Reason which is in Nature, which is the law of gods and men. If anyone will hearken to that voice (and all will hearken to it who wish to live in accord with Nature's laws), he will never be guilty of coveting anything that is his neighbour's or of appropriating to himself what he has taken from his neighbour. 3.31. And therefore Nature's law itself, which protects and conserves human interests, will surely determine that a man who is wise, good, and brave, should in emergency have the necessaries of life transferred to him from a person who is idle and worthless; for the good man's death would be a heavy loss to the common weal; only let him beware that self-esteem and self-love do not find in such a transfer of possessions a pretext for wrong-doing. But, thus guided in his decision, the good man will always perform his duty, promoting the general interests of human society on which I am so fond of dwelling. |
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8. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.21, 3.23, 3.31, 4.25-4.26, 4.28, 4.32, 4.39, 4.41, 5.15-5.17 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •assent / adsensio / adsensus / συγκατάθεσις Found in books: Maso (2022) 97, 128, 132| 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.23. Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab isdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. sed quem ad modum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus alicui pluris eum faciat cui commendatus sit om. BEN 1 sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus sit, quam illum, a quo, sic sic sit BR minime mirum est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam ipsam autem BE sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae o(rmh/ Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. 3.31. sed sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii, ii V hi (hij) qui cum scientia vivere ultimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam esse dixerunt, atque ita sapientem beatum fore, nihil aliud alii momento ullo anteponentem, et qui, add.O.Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 252; Mdv. ut ut aut BE quidam Academici constituisse dicuntur, extremum bonorum et summum munus esse sapientis obsistere visis adsensusque suos firme sustinere. his singulis copiose responderi solet, sed quae perspicua sunt longa esse non debent. quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, fore ut add. Lamb. tollatur omnis ea, quae quaeratur laudeturque, prudentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis, quas posui, et iis, si quae similes earum sunt, relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint sint Mdv. sunt reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere. 4.25. sed primum positum sit positum sit primum BE nosmet ipsos commendatos esse nobis primamque ex natura hanc habere appetitionem, ut conservemus nosmet ipsos. hoc convenit; sequitur illud, ut animadvertamus qui simus ipsi, ut nos, quales oportet esse, servemus. sumus igitur homines. ex animo constamus et corpore, quae sunt cuiusdam modi, nosque oportet, ut prima appetitio apetitio N 2 petitio naturalis postulat, haec diligere constituereque ex his finem illum summi boni atque ultimi. quem, si prima vera sunt, ita constitui necesse est: earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, quam plurima et quam maxima adipisci. 4.26. hunc igitur finem illi tenuerunt, quodque ego pluribus verbis, illi brevius secundum naturam vivere, hoc iis bonorum videbatur videbatur Wes. apud Mdv. ; videatur extremum. Age nunc isti doceant, vel tu potius—quis enim ista melius?—, quonam modo ab isdem principiis profecti efficiatis, ut honeste vivere—id est enim vel e virtute vel naturae congruenter vivere—summum bonum sit, et quonam modo aut quo loco corpus subito deserueritis omniaque ea, quae, secundum naturam cum sint, secundum naturam cum sint BE cum secundum naturam sint N 2 secundum naturam sint ( om. cum) RN 1 V absint a nostra potestate, ipsum denique officium. quaero igitur, quo modo hae hae hec BE hee RV ee N tantae commendationes a natura profectae subito a sapientia relictae sint. 4.28. cuiuscumque enim modi animal constitueris, necesse est, etiamsi id sine corpore sit, ut fingimus, tamen esse in animo quaedam similia eorum, quae sunt in corpore, ut nullo ut nullo et nullo BE modo, nisi ut exposui, constitui possit finis bonorum. Chrysippus autem exponens differentias animantium ait alias earum corpore excellere, alias autem animo, non nullas valere utraque re; deinde disputat, quod cuiusque generis animantium animantium BE animā t R ani- mantis NV statui deceat extremum. cum autem hominem in eo genere posuisset, ut ei tribueret animi excellentiam, summum bonum id constituit, non ut excellere excellere BER excelleret NV animus, sed ut nihil esse praeter animum videretur. uno autem modo in virtute sola summum bonum recte poneretur, si quod esset animal, quod totum ex mente constaret, id ipsum tamen sic, ut ea mens nihil haberet in se, quod esset secundum naturam, ut valitudo est. 4.32. Atqui si, ut convenire debet inter nos, est quaedam appetitio naturalis ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, appetens, eorum omnium est aliquae summa aliquae summa aliqua e summa BERN aliqua summa V facienda. quo constituto tum licebit otiose ista quaerere, de magnitudine rerum, de excellentia, quanta in quoque sit ad beate vivendum, de istis ipsis obscurationibus, quae propter exiguitatem vix aut ne vix quidem appareant. quid, de quo nulla nulla BE multa RNV dissensio est? nemo enim est, qui aliter dixerit quin omnium naturarum simile esset id, ad quod omnia referrentur, referrentur E referentur B re- feruntur RNV quod est ultimum rerum appetendarum. omnis enim est natura diligens sui. quae est enim, quae se umquam deserat aut partem aliquam sui aut eius partis habitum aut vim aut ullius earum rerum, quae secundum naturam sunt, aut motum aut statum? quae autem natura suae primae institutionis oblita est? nulla profecto est, add. Mdv. (nulla est profecto Gz. est nulla profecto Bai. ) quin suam vim retineat a primo ad extremum. quo modo igitur evenit, ut hominis natura sola esset, quae hominem relinqueret, quae oblivisceretur corporis, quae summum bonum non in toto homine, sed in parte hominis poneret? 4.39. itaque non discedit ab eorum curatione, quibus praeposita vitam omnem debet gubernare, ut mirari satis istorum istorum Wes. apud Mdv. eorum inconstantiam non possim. possim marg. ed. Cratandr. possum BE possimus RNV naturalem enim appetitionem, quam vocant o(rmh/n, itemque officium, ipsam etiam virtutem tuentem tuentem om. BE ( cf. p. 136, 33 sqq. et p. 138, 4 sqq. 11 expetamus Bai. ea petamus BEV ea p utamus R earum petamus N 1 earum apetamus N 2 volunt esse earum rerum, quae secundum naturam sunt. cum autem ad summum bonum volunt pervenire, transiliunt omnia et duo nobis opera pro uno relinquunt, ut alia sumamus, alia expetamus, potius quam uno fine utrumque concluderent. 4.41. Itaque contra est, ac dicitis; nam constitui virtus nullo modo potest, nisi ea, quae sunt prima naturae, ut ad summam ad summam A.Man. (?); ad summum (assummum V) pertinentia tenebit. quaesita enim virtus est, non quae relinqueret naturam, sed quae tueretur. at illa, ut vobis placet, partem quandam tuetur, reliquam deserit. Atque ipsa hominis institutio si loqueretur, hoc diceret, primos suos quasi coeptus coeptus ceptus RN conceptus V appetendi fuisse, ut se conservaret in ea natura, in qua ortus esset. nondum autem explanatum satis erat, quid maxime natura vellet. explanetur igitur. quid ergo ergo g (= igitur) R aliud intellegetur intelligetur dett. intelligeretur nisi uti ne quae uti ne quae ut ineque BER ut eque NV pars naturae neglegatur? in qua si nihil est praeter rationem, sit in una virtute finis bonorum; sin est etiam corpus, ista explanatio naturae nempe hoc effecerit, ut ea, quae ante explanationem tenebamus, relinquamus. ergo id est convenienter naturae vivere, a natura discedere. 5.15. Facit igitur Lucius noster prudenter, qui audire de summo bono potissimum velit; hoc enim constituto in philosophia constituta sunt omnia. nam ceteris in rebus sive praetermissum sive ignoratum est quippiam, non plus incommodi est, quam quanti quaeque earum rerum est, in quibus neglectum est aliquid. aliquod BERN summum autem bonum si ignoretur, vivendi rationem ignorari necesse est, ex quo tantus error consequitur, ut quem in portum se recipiant scire non possint. cognitis autem rerum finibus, cum intellegitur, quid quod BEN 1 V sit et bonorum extremum et malorum, inventa vitae via est vita e via est R et via una est BE via est N 1 vite via est N 2 (vite in marg. add. ), est via V conformatioque confirmatioque ERNV omnium officiorum, cum quaeritur, cum quaeritur Se. cum- que igitur R cum igitur BEN 1 V Est igitur N 2 cum exigitur Mdv. quo quodque quodque BE quid R quidque N quicque V referatur; 5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. 5.17. constitit autem fere inter omnes id, in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem o(rmh\n o(rmh/n ] bonū R Graeci vocant. quid autem sit, quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis dissensio. totius enim quaestionis eius, quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur, in his quid sit extremum et ultimum, et quid ultimum BE fons reperiendus est, in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur. Voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris. vacuitatem doloris alii censent primum ascitam ascitam cod. Glogav., Mdv. ; ascitum RV as|scitum N assertum BE et primum declinatum dolorem. | 3.21. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â in Stoic phraseology ennoia â and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. 3.23. "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormÄ, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. 3.31. But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said, as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consot with and things contrary to nature, the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence is abolished altogether? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature. 4.25. But let it be granted to begin with, that we have an affection for ourselves, and that the earliest impulse bestowed upon us by nature is a desire for self-preservation. On this we are agreed; and the implication is that we must study what we ourselves are, in order to keep ourselves true to our proper character. We are then human beings, consisting of soul and body, and these of a certain kind. These we are bound to esteem, as our earliest natural instinct demands, and out of these we must construct our End, our Chief and Ultimate Good. And, if our premises are correct, this End must be pronounced to consist in the attainment of the largest number of the most important of the things in accordance with nature. 4.26. This then was the conception of the end that they upheld; the supreme Good they believed to be the thing which I have described at some length, but which they more briefly expressed by the formula 'life according to nature.'"Now then let us call upon your leaders, or better upon yourself (for who is more qualified to speak for your school?) to explain this: how in the world do you contrive, starting from the same first principles, to reach the conclusion that the Chief Good is morality of life? â for that is equivalent to your 'life in agreement with virtue' or 'life in harmony with nature.' By what means or at what point did you suddenly discard the body, and all those things which are in accordance with nature but out of our control, and lastly duty itself? My question then is, how comes it that so many things that Nature strongly recommends have been suddenly abandoned by Wisdom? 4.28. In fact you may construct a living creature of any sort you like, but even if it be devoid of a body like our imaginary being, nevertheless its mind will be bound to possess certain attributes analogous to those of the body, and consequently it will be impossible to set up for it an end of Goods on any other lines than those which I have laid down. Chrysippus, on the other hand, in his survey of the different species of living things states that in some the body is the principal part, in others the mind, while there are some that are equally endowed in respect of either; and then he proceeds to discuss what constitutes the ultimate good proper to each species. Man he so classified as to make the mind the principal part in him; and yet he so defined man's End as to make it appear, not that he is principally mind, but that he consists of nothing else. But the only case in which it would be correct to place the Chief Good in virtue alone is if there existed a creature consisting solely of pure intellect, with the further proviso that this intellect possessed nothing of its own that was in accordance with nature, as bodily health is. 4.32. "Yet if, as you and we are bound to agree, there does exist a certain natural instinct to desire the things in accordance with nature, the right procedure is to add together all these things in one definite total. This point established, it will then be open to us to investigate at our leisure your questions about the importance of the separate items, and the value of their respective contributions to happiness, and about that eclipse, as you call it, of the things so small as to be almost or quite imperceptible. Then what of a point on which no disagreement exists? I mean this: no one will dispute that the supreme and final End, the thing ultimately desirable, is analogous for all natural species alike. For love of self is inherent in every species; since what species exists that ever abandons itself or any part of itself, or any habit or faculty of any such part, or any of the things, whether processes or states, that are in accordance with its nature? What species ever forgot its own original constitution? Assuredly there is not one that does not retain its own proper faculty from start to finish. 4.39. Accordingly each never abandons its task of safeguarding the earlier elements; its business is by controlling these to steer the whole course of life; so that I cannot sufficiently marvel at the inconsistency of your teachers. Natural desire, which they term hormÄ, and also duty, and even virtue itself they reckon among things according to Nature. Yet when they want to arrive at the Supreme Good, they leap over all of these, and leave us with two tasks instead of one, some things we are to 'adopt,' others to 'desire'; instead of including both tasks under a single End. 4.41. Hence the truth is just the opposite of what you say; virtue is an absolute impossibility, unless it holds to the objects of the primary instincts as going to make up the sum of good. For we started to look for a virtue that should protect, not abandon, nature; whereas virtue as you conceive it protects a particular part of our nature but leaves the remainder in the lurch. Man's constitution itself, if it could speak, would declare that its earliest tentative movements of desire were aimed at preserving itself in the natural character with which it was born into the world. But at that stage the principal intention of nature had not yet been fully revealed. Well, suppose it revealed. What then? will it be construed otherwise than as forbidding that any part of man's nature should be ignored? If man consists solely of a reasoning faculty, let it be granted that the End of Goods is contained in virtue alone; but if he has a body as well, the revelation of our nature, on your showing, will actually have resulted in our relinquishing the things to which we held before that revelation took place. At this rate 'to live in harmony with nature' means to depart from nature. 5.15. "Our young friend Lucius is therefore well advised in desiring most of all to hear about the Chief Good; for when you have settled that point in a system of philosophy, you have settled everything. On any other topic, some degree of incompleteness or uncertainty causes no more mischief than is proportionate to the importance of the particular topic on which the neglect has occurred; but uncertainty as to the Chief Good necessarily involves uncertainty as to the principles of conduct, and this must carry men so far out of their course that they cannot know what harbour to steer for. On the other hand when we have ascertained the Ends of things, knowing the ultimate Good and ultimate Evil, we have discovered a map of life, a chart of all the duties; 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.17. Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormÄ. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire â as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil. |
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