| 1. Homer, Odyssey, 17.383-17.384 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 129 |
2. Homer, Iliad, 9.363 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 122 | 9.363. / my ships at early dawn sailing over the teeming Hellespont, and on board men right eager to ply the oar; and if so be the great Shaker of the Earth grants me fair voyaging, on the third day shall I reach deep-soiled Phthia. Possessions full many have I that I left on my ill-starred way hither, |
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3. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 7.50.4 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 129| 7.50.4. καὶ μελλόντων αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ἀποπλεῖν ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει: ἐτύγχανε γὰρ πασσέληνος οὖσα. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἵ τε πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὁ Νικίας (ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος) οὐδ’ ἂν διαβουλεύσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρίν, ὡς οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγοῦντο, τρὶς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μεῖναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις μελλήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μονὴ ἐγεγένητο. | 7.50.4. All was at last ready, and they were on the point of sailing away, when an eclipse of the moon, which was then at the full, took place. Most of the Athenians, deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged the generals to wait; and Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted to divination and practices of that kind, refused from that moment even to take the question of departure into consideration, until they had waited the thrice nine days prescribed by the soothsayers. The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the country; |
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4. Plato, Alcibiades Ii, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177| 148e. χρὴ μηχανῇ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀποτροπὴν εὑρεῖν, βουλευομένοις αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν κράτιστον εἶναι πέμψαντας πρὸς Ἄμμωνα ἐκεῖνον ἐπερωτᾶν· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις τάδε, καὶ ἀνθʼ ὅτου ποτὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις οἱ θεοὶ μᾶλλον νίκην διδόασιν ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἳ πλείστας, φάναι, μὲν θυσίας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄγομεν, ἀναθήμασί τε κεκοσμήκαμεν τὰ ἱερὰ αὐτῶν ὡς οὐδένες ἄλλοι, πομπάς τε πολυτελεστάτας καὶ σεμνοτάτας ἐδωρούμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνʼ ἕκαστον ἔτος, καὶ | 148e. took counsel together and decided that the best thing they could do was to send and inquire of Ammon ; and moreover, to ask also for what reason the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than to themselves: for we —such was the message— offer up to them more and finer sacrifices than any of the Greeks, and have adorned their temples with votive emblems as no other people have done, and presented to the gods the costliest and stateliest processions year by year, and spent more money thus than |
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5. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 230| 29a. ἣ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινόν τἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότʼ ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδʼ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δʼ ὡς εὖ εἰδότες | 29a. then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else whatsoever. It would be a terrible thing, and truly one might then justly hale me into court, on the charge that I do not believe that there are gods, since I disobey the oracle and fear death and think I am wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know. For no one knows whether death be not even the greatest of all blessings to man, but they fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. |
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6. Plato, Charmides, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 129 | 173c. our shoes, nay, everything about us, and various things besides, because we should be employing genuine craftsmen? And if you liked, we might concede that prophecy, as the knowledge of what is to be, and temperance directing her, will deter the charlatans, and establish the true prophets as our prognosticators. Thus equipped, the human race would indeed act and live |
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7. Plato, Critias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 230| 113e. πάντῃ ἴσον ἀφεστῶτας, ὥστε ἄβατον ἀνθρώποις εἶναι· πλοῖα γὰρ καὶ τὸ πλεῖν οὔπω τότε ἦν. αὐτὸς δὲ τήν τε ἐν μέσῳ νῆσον οἷα δὴ θεὸς εὐμαρῶς διεκόσμησεν, ὕδατα μὲν διττὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνω πηγαῖα κομίσας, τὸ μὲν θερμόν, ψυχρὸν δὲ ἐκ κρήνης ἀπορρέον ἕτερον, τροφὴν δὲ παντοίαν καὶ ἱκανὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναδιδούς. ΚΡΙ. παίδων δὲ ἀρρένων πέντε γενέσεις διδύμους γεννησάμενος ἐθρέψατο, καὶ τὴν νῆσον τὴν Ἀτλαντίδα πᾶσαν δέκα μέρη κατανείμας τῶν μὲν πρεσβυτάτων τῷ προτέρῳ | 113e. for at that time neither ships nor sailing were as yet in existence. And Poseidon himself set in order with ease, as a god would, the central island, bringing up from beneath the earth two springs of waters, the one flowing warm from its source, the other cold, and producing out of the earth all kinds of food in plenty. Crit. And he begat five pairs of twin sons and reared them up; and when he had divided all the island of Atlantis into ten portions, he assigned to the first-born of the eldest son |
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8. Plato, Crito, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 122| 43d. ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡ. οὔτοι δὴ ἀφῖκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν μέν μοι ἥξει τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ, εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω· οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον. | 43d. Crito. It has not exactly come, but I think it will come today from the reports of some men who have come from Sunium and left it there. Now it is clear from what they say that it will come today, and so tomorrow, Socrates, your life must end. Socrates. Well, Crito, good luck be with us! If this is the will of the gods, so be it. However, I do not think |
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9. Plato, Epinomis, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 132| 985c. παρεχόμενον. τούτων δὴ τῶν πέντε ὄντως ὄντων ζῴων, ὅπῃ τινὲς ἐνέτυχον ἡμῶν, ἢ καθʼ ὕπνον ἐν ὀνειροπολίᾳ προστυχόντες, ἢ κατὰ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας λεχθέν τισιν ἐν ἀκοαῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν ἢ καὶ κάμνουσιν, ἢ καὶ τελευτῇ βίου προστυχέσι γενομένοις, ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ δόξας παραγενομένας, ὅθεν ἱερὰ πολλὰ πολλῶν γέγονεν, τὰ δὲ γενήσεται, τούτων πάντων νομοθέτης, ὅστις νοῦν κέκτηται καὶ τὸν βραχύτατον, οὔποτε μὴ τολμήσῃ καινοτομῶν, ἐπὶ θεοσέβειαν ἥτις μὴ σαφὲς ἔχει | 985c. five being really existent creatures, wherever any of us came upon them, either happening upon them in the dream-world of sleep, or by something spoken to persons listening in health, or equally in sickness, through ominous utterances and prophecies, or again when they have arrived at the end of life opinions that occur to us both in private and in public, whence many sanctities of many beings have arisen, and others shall arise—in regard to all these the lawgiver who possesses even the slightest degree of mind will never dare by innovations to turn his city to a divine worship which i |
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10. Plato, Euthyphro, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177| 14b. ΣΩ. ἦ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἠρώτων· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ | 14b. Socrates. You might, if you wished, Euthyphro, have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me. |
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11. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177| 195e. ΛΑ. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε τοὺς μάντεις καλεῖ τοὺς ἀνδρείους· τίς γὰρ δὴ ἄλλος εἴσεται ὅτῳ ἄμεινον ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι; καίτοι σύ, ὦ Νικία, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς μάντις εἶναι ἢ οὔτε μάντις οὔτε ἀνδρεῖος; ΝΙ. τί δέ; μάντει αὖ οἴει προσήκει τὰ δεινὰ γιγνώσκειν καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα; ΛΑ. ἔγωγε· τίνι γὰρ ἄλλῳ; ΝΙ. ὧι ἐγὼ λέγω πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε· ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα μόνον δεῖ γιγνώσκειν τῶν ἐσομένων, εἴτε τῳ θάνατος εἴτε νόσος εἴτε ἀποβολὴ χρημάτων ἔσται, | 195e. Lach. I do: it seems to be the seers whom he calls the courageous: for who else can know for which of us it is better to be alive than dead? And yet, Nicias, do you avow yourself to be a seer, or to be neither a seer nor courageous? Nic. What! Is it now a seer, think you, who has the gift of judging what is to be dreaded and what to be dared? Lach. That is my view: who else could it be? Nic. Much rather the man of whom I speak, my dear sir: for the seer’s business is to judge only the signs of what is yet to come—whether a man is to meet with death or disease or loss of property, |
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12. Plato, Menexenus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 230| 237e. νομίζει. μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι ἥδε ἔτεκεν ἡ γῆ τοὺς τῶνδέ τε καὶ ἡμετέρους προγόνους. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τεκὸν τροφὴν ἔχει ἐπιτηδείαν ᾧ ἂν τέκῃ, ᾧ καὶ γυνὴ δήλη τεκοῦσά τε ἀληθῶς καὶ μή, ἀλλʼ ὑποβαλλομένη, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ πηγὰς τροφῆς τῷ γεννωμένῳ. ΣΩ. ὃ δὴ καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα γῆ τε καὶ μήτηρ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον παρέχεται ὡς ἀνθρώπους γεννησαμένη· μόνη γὰρ ἐν τῷ τότε καὶ πρώτη τροφὴν ἀνθρωπείαν | 237e. And we have a signal proof of this statement in that this land of ours has given birth to the forefathers both of these men and of ourselves. For every creature that brings forth possesses a suitable supply of nourishment for its offspring; and by this test it is manifest also whether a woman be truly a mother or no, if she possesses no founts of nourishment for her child. Soc. Now our land, which is also our mother, furnishes to the full this proof of her having brought forth men; for, of all the lands that then existed, she was the first and the only one to produce human nourishment, |
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| 13. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 129 |
14. Plato, Statesman, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 129| 290c. τούτους ἐν ὑπηρετικῇ μοίρᾳ τινί. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΞΕ. ἔτι δὴ προσμείξωμεν ἐγγύτερον ἐπὶ τοὺς μήπω βεβασανισμένους. εἰσὶ δὲ οἵ τε περὶ μαντικὴν ἔχοντές τινος ἐπιστήμης διακόνου μόριον· ἑρμηνευταὶ γάρ που νομίζονται παρὰ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί. ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἱερέων αὖ γένος, ὡς τὸ νόμιμόν φησι, παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δωρεὰς θεοῖς διὰ θυσιῶν ἐπιστῆμόν | 290c. to look for them in any servile position. Y. Soc. Certainly. Str. But let us draw a little closer still to those whom we have not yet examined. There are men who have to do with divination and possess a portion of a certain menial science; for they are supposed to be interpreters of the gods to men. Y. Soc. Yes. Str. And then, too, the priests, according to law and custom, know how to give the gods, by means of sacrifices, the gifts that please them from u |
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15. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Johnston (2008), Ancient Greek Divination, 15| 571c. τῶν δὲ ἰσχυρότεραι καὶ πλείους. | 571c. while in others the remt is stronger and more numerous. What desires do you mean? he said. Those, said I, that are awakened in sleep when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and domit part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts. You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother |
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16. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Johnston (2008), Ancient Greek Divination, 9| 202e. μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ. | 202e. Through it are conveyed all divination and priestcraft concerning sacrifice and ritual |
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17. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 230| 149b. ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. εἴπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἴτιον; ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾷον μαθήσῃ ὃ βούλομαι. οἶσθα γάρ που ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἀλλʼ αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν. ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε. στερίφαις μὲν οὖν ἄρα | 149b. THEAET. Yes, I have. SOC. Shall I tell you the reason then? THEAET. Oh yes, do. SOC. Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing but only those do so who have become too old to bear. THEAET. Yes, certainly. SOC. They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess, has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she did not allow |
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18. Plato, Theages, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177| 128d. ΣΩ. οὔκ, ὠγαθέ, ἀλλά σε λέληθεν οἷον τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ἐγὼ δέ σοι φράσω. ἔστι γάρ τι θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἣ ὅταν γένηται ἀεί μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι τῶν φίλων ἀνακοινῶται καὶ γένηται ἡ φωνή, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, ἀποτρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πράττειν. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. Χαρμίδην γὰρ τουτονὶ γιγνώσκετε τὸν καλὸν | 128d. Soc. No, good sir, the meaning of it escapes you; but I will tell it you. There is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything; and if one of my friends consults me and the voice occurs, the same thing happens: it prohibits, and does not allow him to act. And I will produce witnesses to convince you of these facts. You know our Charmides here, who has grown so handsome, the son of Glaucon: |
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19. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 230| 41d. ἐγὼ παραδώσω· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῷα καὶ γεννᾶτε τροφήν τε διδόντες αὐξάνετε καὶ φθίνοντα πάλιν δέχεσθε. | 41d. For the rest, do ye weave together the mortal with the immortal, and thereby fashion and generate living creatures, and give them food that they may grow, and when they waste away receive them to yourselves again. |
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| 20. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177 |
| 21. Hippocrates, The Sacred Disease, 18 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle on divination Found in books: Johnston (2008), Ancient Greek Divination, 15 |
| 22. Hippocrates, On Regimen In Acute Diseases, 1.2 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle on divination Found in books: Johnston (2008), Ancient Greek Divination, 15 |
| 23. Xenophon, Symposium, 4.47-4.49 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177, 230 |
| 24. Xenophon, Apology, 14, 13 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 119 |
25. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.1.9, 1.1.15, 1.3.1-1.3.2, 1.4.7, 1.4.12, 1.4.14-1.4.18, 4.3.12, 4.3.16 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 132, 177, 230| 1.1.9. τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης, δαιμονᾶν ἔφη· δαιμονᾶν δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντευομένους ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν (οἷον εἴ τις ἐπερωτῴη πότερον ἐπιστάμενον ἡνιοχεῖν ἐπὶ ζεῦγος λαβεῖν κρεῖττον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, ἢ πότερον ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν κρεῖττον λαβεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον), ἢ ἃ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας ἢ μετρήσαντας ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι· τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθανομένους ἀθέμιτα ποιεῖν ἡγεῖτο. ἔφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μανθάνειν, ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἵλεῳ σημαίνειν. 1.1.15. ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τάδε, ἆρʼ, ὥσπερ οἱ τἀνθρώπεια μανθάνοντες ἡγοῦνται τοῦθʼ ὅ τι ἂν μάθωσιν ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτῳ ἂν βούλωνται ποιήσειν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ τὰ θεῖα ζητοῦντες νομίζουσιν, ἐπειδὰν γνῶσιν αἷς ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται, ποιήσειν, ὅταν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀνέμους καὶ ὕδατα καὶ ὥρας καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου δέωνται τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ τοιοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδʼ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἀρκεῖ δʼ αὐτοῖς γνῶναι μόνον ᾗ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεται. 1.3.1. ὡς δὲ δὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν ἐδόκει μοι τοὺς συνόντας τὰ μὲν ἔργῳ δεικνύων ἑαυτὸν οἷος ἦν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διαλεγόμενος, τούτων δὴ γράψω ὁπόσα ἂν διαμνημονεύσω. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φανερὸς ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων ᾗπερ ἡ Πυθία ἀποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπείας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων· ἥ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρῄνει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πως ποιοῦντας περιέργους καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. 1.3.2. καὶ ηὔχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἁπλῶς τἀγαθὰ διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὁποῖα ἀγαθά ἐστι· τοὺς δʼ εὐχομένους χρυσίον ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν διάφορον ἐνόμιζεν εὔχεσθαι ἢ εἰ κυβείαν ἢ μάχην ἢ ἄλλο τι εὔχοιντο τῶν φανερῶς ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο. 1.4.7. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ οὕτω γε σκοπουμένῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζῴου τεχνήμασι. τὸ δὲ ἐμφῦσαι μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τεκνοποιίας, ἐμφῦσαι δὲ ταῖς γειναμέναις ἔρωτα τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν, τοῖς δὲ τραφεῖσι μέγιστον μὲν πόθον τοῦ ζῆν, μέγιστον δὲ φόβον τοῦ θανάτου; ἀμέλει καὶ ταῦτα ἔοικε μηχανήμασί τινος ζῷα εἶναι βουλευσαμένου. 1.4.12. καὶ μὴν γλῶττάν γε πάντων τῶν ζῴων ἐχόντων, μόνην τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησαν οἵαν ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχῇ ψαύουσαν τοῦ στόματος ἀρθροῦν τε τὴν φωνὴν καὶ σημαίνειν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἃ βουλόμεθα. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἡδονὰς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ζῴοις δοῦναι περιγράψαντας τοῦ ἔτους χρόνον, ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι γήρως ταῦτα παρέχειν. 1.4.14. οὐ γὰρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον ὅτι παρὰ τἆλλα ζῷα ὥσπερ θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες; οὔτε γὰρ βοὸς ἂν ἔχων σῶμα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ γνώμην ἐδύνατʼ ἂν πράττειν ἃ ἐβούλετο, οὔθʼ ὅσα χεῖρας ἔχει, ἄφρονα δʼ ἐστί, πλέον οὐδὲν ἔχει. σὺ δʼ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πλείστου ἀξίων τετυχηκὼς οὐκ οἴει σοῦ θεοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; ἀλλʼ ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι, νομιεῖς αὐτοὺς σοῦ φροντίζειν; 1.4.15. ὅταν πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σὺ φὴς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. ὅταν δὲ Ἀθηναίοις, ἔφη, πυνθανομένοις τι διὰ μαντικῆς φράζωσιν, οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖς φράζειν αὐτούς, οὐδʼ ὅταν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τέρατα πέμποντες προσημαίνωσιν, οὐδʼ ὅταν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ μόνον σὲ ἐξαιροῦντες ἐν ἀμελείᾳ κατατίθενται; 1.4.16. οἴει δʼ ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι ὡς ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατωμένους τὸν πάντα χρόνον οὐδέποτʼ ἂν αἰσθέσθαι; οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολυχρονιώτατα καὶ σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη, θεοσεβέστατά ἐστι, καὶ αἱ φρονιμώταται ἡλικίαι θεῶν ἐπιμελέσταται; 1.4.17. ὠγαθέ, ἔφη, κατάμαθε ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται. οἴεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν, μηδὲ τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φροντίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἱκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. 1.4.18. ἂν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύων γιγνώσκεις τοὺς ἀντιθεραπεύειν ἐθέλοντας καὶ χαριζόμενος τοὺς ἀντιχαριζομένους καὶ συμβουλευόμενος καταμανθάνεις τοὺς φρονίμους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν θεῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνῃς θεραπεύων, εἴ τί σοι θελήσουσι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνθρώποις συμβουλεύειν, γνώσει τὸ θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥσθʼ ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτούς . 4.3.12. τὸ δὲ καὶ ἑρμηνείαν δοῦναι, διʼ ἧς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδίδομέν τε ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν καὶ νόμους τιθέμεθα καὶ πολιτευόμεθα; παντάπασιν ἐοίκασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ θεοὶ πολλὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ καί, ᾗ ἀδυνατοῦμεν τὰ συμφέροντα προνοεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων, ταύτῃ αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν συνεργεῖν, διὰ μαντικῆς τοῖς πυνθανομένοις φράζοντας τὰ ἀποβησόμενα καὶ διδάσκοντας ᾗ ἂν ἄριστα γίγνοιτο; σοὶ δʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή. 4.3.16. ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀθύμει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεός, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν ἐπερωτᾷ πῶς ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς χαρίζοιτο, ἀποκρίνεται· νόμῳ πόλεως· νόμος δὲ δήπου πανταχοῦ ἐστι κατὰ δύναμιν ἱεροῖς θεοὺς ἀρέσκεσθαι. πῶς οὖν ἄν τις κάλλιον καὶ εὐσεβέστερον τιμῴη θεοὺς ἤ, ὡς αὐτοὶ κελεύουσιν, οὕτω ποιῶν; | 1.1.9. If any man thinks that these matters are wholly within the grasp of the human mind and nothing in them is beyond our reason, that man, he said, is irrational. But it is no less irrational to seek the guidance of heaven in matters which men are permitted by the gods to decide for themselves by study: to ask, for instance, Is it better to get an experienced coachman to drive my carriage or a man without experience? Cyropaedia I. vi. 6. Is it better to get an experienced seaman to steer my ship or a man without experience? So too with what we may know by reckoning, measurement or weighing. To put such questions to the gods seemed to his mind profane. In short, what the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination: for to him that is in their grace the gods grant a sign. 1.1.15. Nor were those the only questions he asked about such theorists. Students of human nature, he said, think that they will apply their knowledge in due course for the good of themselves and any others they choose. Do those who pry into heavenly phenomena imagine that, once they have discovered the laws by which these are produced, they will create at their will winds, waters, seasons and such things to their need? Or have they no such expectation, and are they satisfied with knowing the causes of these various phenomena? 1.3.1. In order to support my opinion that he benefited his companions, alike by actions that revealed his own character and by his conversation, I will set down what I recollect of these. First, then, for his attitude towards religion; his deeds and words were clearly in harmony with the answer given by the Priestess at Delphi to such questions as What is my duty about sacrifice? or about cult of ancestors. For the answer of the Priestess is, Follow the custom of the State: that is the way to act piously. And so Socrates acted himself and counselled others to act. To take any other course he considered presumption and folly. 1.3.2. And again, when he prayed he asked simply for good gifts, Cyropaedia I. vi. 5. for the gods know best what things are good. To pray for gold or silver or sovereignty or any other such thing, was just like praying for a gamble or a fight or anything of which the result is obviously uncertain. 1.4.7. When I regard them in this light they do look very like the handiwork of a wise and loving creator. What of the natural desire to beget children, the mother’s desire to rear her babe, the child’s strong will to live and strong fear of death? Undoubtedly these, too, look like the contrivances of one who deliberately willed the existence of living creatures. 1.4.12. Again, though all creatures have a tongue, the tongue of man alone has been formed by them to be capable of contact with different parts of the mouth, so as to enable us to articulate the voice and express all our wants to one another. Once more, for all other creatures they have prescribed a fixed season of sexual indulgence; in our case the only time limit they have set is old age. 1.4.14. For is it not obvious to you that, in comparison with the other animals, men live like gods, by nature peerless both in body and in soul? For with a man’s reason and the body of an ox we could not carry out our wishes, and the possession of hands without reason is of little worth. Do you, then, having received the two most precious gifts, yet think that the gods take no care of you? What are they to do, to make you believe that they are heedful of you? 1.4.15. I will believe when they send counsellors, as you declare they do, saying, Do this, avoid that. But when the Athenians inquire of them by divination and they reply, do you not suppose that to you, too, the answer is given? Or when they send portents for warning to the Greeks, or to all the world? Are you their one exception, the only one consigned to neglect? 1.4.16. Or do you suppose that the gods would have put into man a belief in their ability to help and harm, if they had not that power; and that man throughout the ages would never have detected the fraud? Do you not see that the wisest and most enduring of human institutions, cities and nations, are most god-fearing, and that the most thoughtful period of life is the most religious? 1.4.17. Be well assured, my good friend, that the mind within you directs your body according to its will; and equally you must think that Thought indwelling in the Universal disposes all things according to its pleasure. For think not that your eye can travel over many furlongs and yet god’s eye cannot see the the whole world at once; that your soul can ponder on things in Egypt and in Sicily , and god’s thought is not sufficient to pay heed to the whole world at once. 1.4.18. Nay, but just as by serving men you find out who is willing to serve you in return, by being kind who will be kind to you in return, and by taking counsel, discover the masters of thought, so try the gods by serving them, and see whether they will vouchsafe to counsel you in matters hidden from man. Then you will know that such is the greatness and such the nature of the deity that he sees all things Cyropaedia VIII. vii. 22. and hears all things alike, and is present in all places and heedful of all things. 4.3.12. and think of the power of expression, which enables us to impart to one another all good things by teaching and to take our share of them, to enact laws and to administer states. Truly, Socrates , it does appear that the gods devote much care to man. Yet again, in so far as we are powerless of ourselves to foresee what is expedient for the future, Cyropaedia I. vi. 46. the gods lend us their aid, revealing the issues by divination to inquirers, and teaching them how to obtain the best results. With you, Socrates , they seem to deal even more friendly than with other men, if it is true that, even unasked, they warn you by signs what to do and what not to do. 4.3.16. Nay, be not down-hearted, Euthydemus; for you know that to the inquiry, How am I to please the gods? the Delphic god replies, Follow the custom of the state ; and everywhere, I suppose, it is the custom that men propitiate the gods with sacrifices according to their power. How then can a man honour the gods more excellently and more devoutly than by doing as they themselves ordain? |
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| 26. Democritus, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 124 |
| 27. Xenophon, On Household Management, 11.7-11.8 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177 |
| 28. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination in sleep Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 170 |
| 29. Aristotle, On Dreams, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 145 |
| 30. Aristotle, Memory And Reminiscence, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination in sleep Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 145 |
| 31. Aristotle, Sleep And Waking, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 186 |
| 32. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 145, 257 |
| 33. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 257, 258 |
| 34. Aristotle, Prophesying By Dreams, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 145 |
| 35. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 119, 132 |
| 36. Aristotle, Problems, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 156 |
| 37. Bion Proconnesius 3. Jh. N. Chr, Fragments, 29 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 177 |
| 38. Aristotle, Fragments, 10 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 230 |
| 39. Aristotle, History of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: van der EIjk (2005), Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease, 187 |
| 40. Philodemus, (Pars I) \ On Piety, 225-227, 229-231, 228 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 124 |
41. Cicero, On Divination, 1.3.5-1.3.6, 1.5, 1.11-1.12, 1.34, 1.50.113, 1.62, 1.64, 1.72, 1.109-1.111, 2.26-2.27, 2.48.100, 2.120 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination •aristotle on divination Found in books: Johnston (2008), Ancient Greek Divination, 9, 15, 16; Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 124| 1.5. Atque haec, ut ego arbitror, veteres rerum magis eventis moniti quam ratione docti probaverunt. Philosophorum vero exquisita quaedam argumenta, cur esset vera divinatio, collecta sunt; e quibus, ut de antiquissumis loquar, Colophonius Xenophanes unus, qui deos esse diceret, divinationem funditus sustulit; reliqui vero omnes praeter Epicurum balbutientem de natura deorum divinationem probaverunt, sed non uno modo. Nam cum Socrates omnesque Socratici Zenoque et ii, qui ab eo essent profecti, manerent in antiquorum philosophorum sententia vetere Academia et Peripateticis consentientibus, cumque huic rei magnam auctoritatem Pythagoras iam ante tribuisset, qui etiam ipse augur vellet esse, plurumisque locis gravis auctor Democritus praesensionem rerum futurarum conprobaret, Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit, Cratippusque, familiaris noster, quem ego parem summis Peripateticis iudico, isdem rebus fidem tribuit, reliqua divinationis genera reiecit. 1.11. Ego vero, inquam, philosophiae, Quinte, semper vaco; hoc autem tempore, cum sit nihil aliud, quod lubenter agere possim, multo magis aveo audire, de divinatione quid sentias. Nihil, inquit, equidem novi, nec quod praeter ceteros ipse sentiam; nam cum antiquissimam sententiam, tum omnium populorum et gentium consensu conprobatam sequor. Duo sunt enim dividi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae. 1.12. Quae est autem gens aut quae civitas, quae non aut extispicum aut monstra aut fulgora interpretantium aut augurum aut astrologorum aut sortium (ea enim fere artis sunt) aut somniorum aut vaticinationum (haec enim duo naturalia putantur) praedictione moveatur? Quarum quidem rerum eventa magis arbitror quam causas quaeri oportere. Est enim vis et natura quaedam, quae tum observatis longo tempore significationibus, tum aliquo instinctu inflatuque divino futura praenuntiat. Quare omittat urguere Carneades, quod faciebat etiam Panaetius requirens, Iuppiterne cornicem a laeva, corvum ab dextera canere iussisset. Observata sunt haec tempore inmenso et in significatione eventis animadversa et notata. Nihil est autem, quod non longinquitas temporum excipiente memoria prodendisque monumentis efficere atque adsequi possit. 1.34. Iis igitur adsentior, qui duo genera divinationum esse dixerunt, unum, quod particeps esset artis, alterum, quod arte careret. Est enim ars in iis, qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt. Carent autem arte ii, qui non ratione aut coniectura observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quadam animi aut soluto liberoque motu futura praesentiunt, quod et somniantibus saepe contingit et non numquam vaticitibus per furorem, ut Bacis Boeotius, ut Epimenides Cres, ut Sibylla Erythraea. Cuius generis oracla etiam habenda sunt, non ea, quae aequatis sortibus ducuntur, sed illa, quae instinctu divino adflatuque funduntur; etsi ipsa sors contemnenda non est, si et auctoritatem habet vetustatis, ut eae sunt sortes, quas e terra editas accepimus; quae tamen ductae ut in rem apte cadant, fieri credo posse divinitus. Quorum omnium interpretes, ut grammatici poe+tarum, proxime ad eorum, quos interpretantur, divinationem videntur accedere. 1.62. Epicurum igitur audiemus potius? Namque Carneades concertationis studio modo hoc, modo illud ait; ille, quod sentit; sentit autem nihil umquam elegans, nihil decorum. Hunc ergo antepones Platoni et Socrati? qui ut rationem non redderent, auctoritate tamen hos minutos philosophos vincerent. Iubet igitur Plato sic ad somnum proficisci corporibus adfectis, ut nihil sit, quod errorem animis perturbationemque adferat. Ex quo etiam Pythagoriis interdictum putatur, ne faba vescerentur, quod habet inflationem magnam is cibus tranquillitati mentis quaerenti vera contrariam. 1.64. Divinare autem morientes illo etiam exemplo confirmat Posidonius, quod adfert, Rhodium quendam morientem sex aequales nominasse et dixisse, qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinde deinceps moriturus esset. Sed tribus modis censet deorum adpulsu homines somniare, uno, quod provideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui deorum cognatione teneatur, altero, quod plenus ae+r sit inmortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant, tertio, quod ipsi di cum dormientibus conloquantur. Idque, ut modo dixi, facilius evenit adpropinquante morte, ut animi futura augurentur. 1.72. in quo haruspices, augures coniectoresque numerantur. Haec inprobantur a Peripateticis, a Stoicis defenduntur. Quorum alia sunt posita in monumentis et disciplina, quod Etruscorum declarant et haruspicini et fulgurales et rituales libri, vestri etiam augurales, alia autem subito ex tempore coniectura explicantur, ut apud Homerum Calchas, qui ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratus est, et ut in Sullae scriptum historia videmus, quod te inspectante factum est, ut, cum ille in agro Nolano inmolaret ante praetorium, ab infima ara subito anguis emergeret, cum quidem C. Postumius haruspex oraret illum, ut in expeditionem exercitum educeret; id cum Sulla fecisset, tum ante oppidum Nolam florentissuma Samnitium castra cepit. 1.109. Sed ut, unde huc digressa est, eodem redeat oratio: si nihil queam disputare, quam ob rem quidque fiat, et tantum modo fieri ea, quae commemoravi, doceam, parumne Epicuro Carneadive respondeam? Quid, si etiam ratio exstat artificiosae praesensionis facilis, divinae autem paulo obscurior? Quae enim extis, quae fulgoribus, quae portentis, quae astris praesentiuntur, haec notata sunt observatione diuturna. Adfert autem vetustas omnibus in rebus longinqua observatione incredibilem scientiam; quae potest esse etiam sine motu atque inpulsu deorum, cum, quid ex quoque eveniat, et quid quamque rem significet, crebra animadversione perspectum est. 1.110. Altera divinatio est naturalis, ut ante dixi; quae physica disputandi subtilitate referenda est ad naturam deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus; cumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est cognatione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri. Sed vigilantes animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt diiunguntque se a societate divina vinclis corporis inpediti. 1.111. Rarum est quoddam genus eorum, qui se a corpore avocent et ad divinarum rerum cognitionem cura omni studioque rapiantur. Horum sunt auguria non divini impetus, sed rationis humanae; nam et natura futura praesentiunt, ut aquarum eluviones et deflagrationem futuram aliquando caeli atque terrarum; alii autem in re publica exercitati, ut de Atheniensi Solone accepimus, orientem tyrannidem multo ante prospiciunt; quos prudentes possumus dicere, id est providentes, divinos nullo modo possumus, non plus quam Milesium Thalem, qui, ut obiurgatores suos convinceret ostenderetque etiam philosophum, si ei commodum esset, pecuniam facere posse, omnem oleam, ante quam florere coepisset, in agro Milesio coe+misse dicitur. 2.26. Sed haec fuerit nobis tamquam levis armaturae prima orationis excursio; nunc comminus agamus experiamurque, si possimus cornua commovere disputationis tuae. Duo enim genera dividi esse dicebas, unum artificiosum, alterum naturale; artificiosum constare partim ex coniectura, partim ex observatione diuturna; naturale, quod animus arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus ex divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Artificiosa divinationis illa fere genera ponebas: extispicum eorumque, qui ex fulgoribus ostentisque praedicerent, tum augurum eorumque, qui signis aut ominibus uterentur, omneque genus coniecturale in hoc fere genere ponebas. 2.27. Illud autem naturale aut concitatione mentis edi et quasi fundi videbatur aut animo per somnum sensibus et curis vacuo provideri. Duxisti autem divinationem omnem a tribus rebus, a deo, a fato, a natura. Sed tamen cum explicare nihil posses, pugnasti commenticiorum exemplorum mirifica copia. De quo primum hoc libet dicere: Hoc ego philosophi non esse arbitror, testibus uti, qui aut casu veri aut malitia falsi fictique esse possunt; argumentis et rationibus oportet, quare quidque ita sit, docere, non eventis, iis praesertim, quibus mihi liceat non credere. 2.120. Utrum igitur censemus dormientium animos per sene ipsos in somniando moveri an, ut Democritus censet, externa et adventicia visione pulsari? Sive enim sic est sive illo modo, videri possunt permulta somniantibus falsa pro veris. Nam et navigantibus moveri videntur ea, quae stant, et quodam obtutu oculorum duo pro uno lucernae lumina. Quid dicam, insanis, quid ebriis quam multa falsa videantur? Quodsi eius modi visis credendum non est, cur somniis credatur, nescio. Nam tam licet de his erroribus, si velis, quam de somniis disputare, ut ea, quae stant, si moveri videantur, terrae motum significare dicas aut repentinam aliquam fugam, gemino autem lucernae lumine declarari dissensionem ac seditionem moveri . Iam ex insanorum aut ebriorum visis innumerabilia coniectura trahi possunt, | 1.5. Now my opinion is that, in sanctioning such usages, the ancients were influenced more by actual results than convinced by reason. However certain very subtle arguments to prove the trustworthiness of divination have been gathered by philosophers. of these — to mention the most ancient — Xenophanes of Colophon, while asserting the existence of gods, was the only one who repudiated divination in its entirety; but all the others, with the exception of Epicurus, who babbled about the nature of the gods, approved of divination, though not in the same degree. For example, Socrates and all of the Socratic School, and Zeno and his followers, continued in the faith of the ancient philosophers and in agreement with the Old Academy and with the Peripatetics. Their predecessor, Pythagoras, who even wished to be considered an augur himself, gave the weight of his great name to the same practice; and that eminent author, Democritus, in many passages, strongly affirmed his belief in a presentiment of things to come. Moreover, Dicaearchus, the Peripatetic, though he accepted divination by dreams and frenzy, cast away all other kinds; and my intimate friend, Cratippus, whom I consider the peer of the greatest of the Peripatetics, also gave credence to the same kinds of divination but rejected the rest. 1.11. Really, my dear Quintus, said I, I always have time for philosophy. Moreover, since there is nothing else at this time that I can do with pleasure, I am all the more eager to hear what you think about divination.There is, I assure you, said he, nothing new or original in my views; for those which I adopt are not only very old, but they are endorsed by the consent of all peoples and nations. There are two kinds of divination: the first is dependent on art, the other on nature. 1.12. Now — to mention those almost entirely dependent on art — what nation or what state disregards the prophecies of soothsayers, or of interpreters of prodigies and lightnings, or of augurs, or of astrologers, or of oracles, or — to mention the two kinds which are classed as natural means of divination — the forewarnings of dreams, or of frenzy? of these methods of divining it behoves us, I think, to examine the results rather than the causes. For there is a certain natural power, which now, through long-continued observation of signs and now, through some divine excitement and inspiration, makes prophetic announcement of the future. [7] Therefore let Carneades cease to press the question, which Panaetius also used to urge, whether Jove had ordered the crow to croak on the left side and the raven on the right. Such signs as these have been observed for an unlimited time, and the results have been checked and recorded. Moreover, there is nothing which length of time cannot accomplish and attain when aided by memory to receive and records to preserve. 1.34. I agree, therefore, with those who have said that there are two kinds of divination: one, which is allied with art; the other, which is devoid of art. Those diviners employ art, who, having learned the known by observation, seek the unknown by deduction. On the other hand those do without art who, unaided by reason or deduction or by signs which have been observed and recorded, forecast the future while under the influence of mental excitement, or of some free and unrestrained emotion. This condition often occurs to men while dreaming and sometimes to persons who prophesy while in a frenzy — like Bacis of Boeotia, Epimenides of Crete and the Sibyl of Erythraea. In this latter class must be placed oracles — not oracles given by means of equalized lots — but those uttered under the impulse of divine inspiration; although divination by lot is not in itself to be despised, if it has the sanction of antiquity, as in the case of those lots which, according to tradition, sprang out of the earth; for in spite of everything, I am inclined to think that they may, under the power of God, be so drawn as to give an appropriate response. Men capable of correctly interpreting all these signs of the future seem to approach very near to the divine spirit of the gods whose wills they interpret, just as scholars do when they interpret the poets. 1.62. Then shall we listen to Epicurus rather than to Plato? As for Carneades, in his ardour for controversy he asserts this and now that. But, you retort, Epicurus says what he thinks. But he thinks nothing that is ever well reasoned, or worthy of a philosopher. Will you, then, put this man before Plato or Socrates, who though they gave no reason, would yet prevail over these petty philosophers by the mere weight of their name? Now Platos advice to us is to set out for the land of dreams with bodies so prepared that no error or confusion may assail the soul. For this reason, it is thought, the Pythagoreans were forbidden to indulge in beans; for that food produces great flatulence and induces a condition at war with a soul in search for truth. 1.64. Moreover, proof of the power of dying men to prophesy is also given by Posidonius in his well-known account of a certain Rhodian, who, when on his death-bed, named six men of equal age and foretold which of them would die first, which second, and so on. Now Posidonius holds the view that there are three ways in which men dream as the result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the gods; second, the air is full of immortal souls, already clearly stamped, as it were, with the marks of truth; and third, the gods in person converse with men when they are asleep. And, as I said just now, it is when death is at hand that men most readily discern signs of the future. 1.72. But those methods of divination which are dependent on conjecture, or on deductions from events previously observed and recorded, are, as I have said before, not natural, but artificial, and include the inspection of entrails, augury, and the interpretation of dreams. These are disapproved of by the Peripatetics and defended by the Stoics. Some are based upon records and usage, as is evident from the Etruscan books on divination by means of inspection of entrails and by means of thunder and lightning, and as is also evident from the books of your augural college; while others are dependent on conjecture made suddenly and on the spur of the moment. An instance of the latter kind is that of Calchas in Homer, prophesying the number of years of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows. We find another illustration of conjectural divination in the history of Sulla in an occurrence which you witnessed. While he was offering sacrifices in front of his head-quarters in the Nolan district a snake suddenly came out from beneath the altar. The soothsayer, Gaius Postumius, begged Sulla to proceed with his march at once. Sulla did so and captured the strongly fortified camp of the Samnites which lay in front of the town of Nola. 1.109. But let us bring the discussion back to the point from which it wandered. Assume that I can give no reason for any of the instances of divination which I have mentioned and that I can do no more than show that they did occur, is that not a sufficient answer to Epicurus and to Carneades? And what does it matter if, as between artificial and natural divination, the explanation of the former is easy and of the latter is somewhat hard? For the results of those artificial means of divination, by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and astrology, have been the subject of observation for a long period of time. But in every field of inquiry great length of time employed in continued observation begets an extraordinary fund of knowledge, which may be acquired even without the intervention or inspiration of the gods, since repeated observation makes it clear what effect follows any given cause, and what sign precedes any given event. 1.110. The second division of divination, as I said before, is the natural; and it, according to exact teaching of physics, must be ascribed to divine Nature, from which, as the wisest philosophers maintain, our souls have been drawn and poured forth. And since the universe is wholly filled with the Eternal Intelligence and the Divine Mind, it must be that human souls are influenced by their contact with divine souls. But when men are awake their souls, as a rule, are subject to the demands of everyday life and are withdrawn from divine association because they are hampered by the chains of the flesh. 1.111. However, there is a certain class of men, though small in number, who withdraw themselves from carnal influences and are wholly possessed by an ardent concern for the contemplation of things divine. Some of these men make predictions, not as the result of direct heavenly inspiration, but by the use of their own reason. For example, by means of natural law, they foretell certain events, such as a flood, or the future destruction of heaven and earth by fire. Others, who are engaged in public life, like Solon of Athens, as history describes him, discover the rise of tyranny long in advance. Such men we may call foresighted — that is, able to foresee the future; but we can no more apply the term divine to them than we can apply it to Thales of Miletus, who, as the story goes, in order to confound his critics and thereby show that even a philosopher, if he sees fit, can make money, bought up the entire olive crop in the district of Miletus before it had begun to bloom. 2.26. But this introductory part of my discussion has been mere skirmishing with light infantry; now let me come to close quarters and see if I cannot drive in both wings of your argument.[11] You divided divination into two kinds, one artificial and the other natural. The artificial, you said, consists in part of conjecture and in part of long-continued observation; while the natural is that which the soul has seized, or, rather, has obtained, from a source outside itself — that is, from God, whence all human souls have been drawn off, received, or poured out. Under the head of artificial divination you placed predictions made from the inspection of entrails, those made from lightnings and portents, those made by augurs, and by persons who depend entirely upon premonitory signs. Under the same head you included practically every method of prophecy in which conjecture was employed. 2.27. Natural divination, on the other hand, according to your view, is the result — the effusion, as it were — of mental excitement, or it is the prophetic power which the soul has during sleep while free from bodily sensation and worldly cares. Moreover, you derived every form of divination from three sources — God, Fate, and Nature. And although you could not give a reason for any kind of divination, still you carried on the war by marshalling an astonishing array of examples from fiction. of such a course I wish to say emphatically that it is not becoming in a philosopher to introduce testimony which may be either true by accident, or false and fabricated through malice. You ought to have employed arguments and reason to show that all your propositions were true and you ought not to have resorted to so‑called occurrences — certainly not to such occurrences as are unworthy of belief. [12] 2.120. Then shall we believe that the souls of sleepers while dreaming are spontaneously moved? or, as Democritus thinks, that they are impelled to action by phantoms from without? Whether the one theory or the other be correct, the fact remains that men in sleep assume many false apparitions to be true. Likewise, to men who are sailing, stationary objects on shore seem to be moving; and also, sometimes in looking at a lamp, by some sort of optical illusion we see two flames instead of one. Why need I mention how many non-existent things are seen by men who are drunk or crazy? And if we are to put no trust in such apparitions of the waking man I do not understand why we should put any trust in dreams. of course you may argue, if you will, about these tricks of vision as you would about dreams, and say, for example, that when stationary objects appear to be in motion, it foretells an earthquake or a sudden flight; and when the lamps flame appears to be double it portends that insurrection and rebellion are afoot! [59] |
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| 42. Plutarch, Table Talk, 8.10.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle on divination Found in books: Johnston (2008), Ancient Greek Divination, 15 |
43. Plutarch, Nicias, 23.1-23.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 129| 23.1. ὡς δʼ ἦν ἕτοιμα ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τῶν πολεμίων οὐδεὶς παρεφύλαττεν, ἅτε δὴ μὴ προσδοκώντων, ἐξέλιπεν ἡ σελήνη τῆς νυκτός, μέγα δέος τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἢ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐκπεπληγμένοις τὰ τοιαῦτα. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἡλίου τὴν περὶ τὰς τριακάδας ἐπισκότησιν ἁμῶς γέ πως ἤδη συνεφρόνουν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ γενομένην ὑπὸ τῆς σελήνης· 23.2. αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν σελήνην, ᾧτινι συντυγχάνουσα καὶ πῶς αἰφνίδιον ἐκ πανσελήνου τὸ φῶς ἀπόλλυσι καὶ χρόας ἵησι παντοδαπάς, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἦν καταλαβεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἀλλόκοτον ἡγοῦντο καὶ πρὸ συμφορῶν τινων μεγάλων ἐκ θεοῦ γινόμενον σημεῖον. ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος σαφέστατόν τε πάντων καὶ θαρραλεώτατον περὶ σελήνης καταυγασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς λόγον εἰς γραφὴν καταθέμενος Ἀναξαγόρας οὔτʼ αὐτὸς ἦν παλαιὸς οὔτε ὁ λόγος ἔνδοξος, ἀλλʼ ἀπόρρητος ἔτι καὶ διʼ ὀλίγων καὶ μετʼ εὐλαβείας τινὸς ἢ πίστεως βαδίζων. 23.3. οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τότε καλουμένους, ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπρονοήτους καὶ κατηναγκασμένα πάθη διατρίβοντας τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Πρωταγόρας ἔφυγε, καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν εἱρχθέντα μόλις περιεποιήσατο Περικλῆς, καὶ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲν αὐτῷ τῶν γε τοιούτων προσῆκον, ὅμως ἀπώλετο διὰ φιλοσοφίαν. 23.4. ὀψὲ δʼ ἡ Πλάτωνος ἐκλάμψασα δόξα διὰ τὸν βίον τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ ὅτι ταῖς θείαις καὶ κυριωτέραις ἀρχαῖς ὑπέταξε τὰς φυσικὰς ἀνάγκας, ἀφεῖλε τὴν τῶν λόγων τούτων διαβολήν, καὶ τοῖς μαθήμασιν εἰς ἅπαντας ὁδὸν ἐνέδωκεν. ὁ γοῦν ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δίων, καθʼ ὃν χρόνον ἔμελλεν ἄρας ἐκ Ζακύνθου πλεῖν ἐπὶ Διονύσιον, ἐκλιπούσης τῆς σελήνης, οὐδὲν διαταραχθεὶς ἀνήχθη, καὶ κατασχὼν ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐξέβαλε τὸν τύραννον. 23.5. τῷ μέντοι Νικίᾳ συνηνέχθη τότε μηδὲ μάντιν ἔχειν ἔμπειρον· ὁ γὰρ συνήθης αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πολὺ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἀφαιρῶν Στιλβίδης ἐτεθνήκει μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν. ἐπεὶ τὸ σημεῖον, ὥς φησι Φιλόχορος, φεύγουσιν οὐκ ἦν πονηρόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ χρηστόν· ἐπικρύψεως γὰρ αἱ σὺν φόβῳ πράξεις δέονται, τὸ δὲ φῶς πολέμιόν ἐστιν αὐταῖς. 23.6. ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν περὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἐποιοῦντο φυλακήν, ὡς Αὐτοκλείδης διέγραψεν ἐν τοῖς ἐξηγητικοῖς· ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἄλλην ἔπεισε σελήνης ἀναμένειν περίοδον, ὥσπερ οὐκ εὐθὺς θεασάμενος αὐτὴν ἀποκαθαρθεῖσαν, ὅτε τὸν σκιερὸν τόπον καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀντιφραττόμενον παρῆλθε. | 23.1. 23.2. 23.3. 23.4. 23.5. 23.6. |
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| 44. Diogenes, Fragments, 327, 375 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 124, 130 |
| 45. Epicurus, Letters, 353 Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 124 |
| 46. €˜Constantius of Lyon’, Life of St Germanus of Auxerre, None Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 119 |
| 47. Diogenes Laertius, Fragments, [G] V B, 2.35 Tagged with subjects: •aristotle, on divination Found in books: Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 122 |
