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54 results for "aristippus"
1. Plato, Charmides, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 402
163b. No indeed, he replied, nor working and making the same either: this I learnt from Hesiod, who said, Work is no reproach. Hes. WD 309 Now, do you suppose that if he had given the names of working and doing to such works as you were mentioning just now, he would have said there was no reproach in shoe-making or pickle-selling or serving the stews? It is not to be thought, Socrates; he rather held,
2. Antisthenes, Fragments, 116, 125-126, 13, 22, 70, 85, 122 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 330
3. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, on nature of pleasure and pain Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 382
64d. βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἁθρόον παρʼ ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δʼ εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἁθρόον ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ ἡρέμα καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀναίσθητον, τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον τούτοις ἐναντίως. τὸ δὲ μετʼ εὐπετείας γιγνόμενον ἅπαν αἰσθητὸν μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα, λύπης δὲ καὶ ἡδονῆς οὐ μετέχον, οἷον τὰ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτὴν παθήματα, ἣ δὴ σῶμα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐρρήθη καθʼ ἡμέραν συμφυὲς ἡμῶν γίγνεσθαι. ταύτῃ γὰρ τομαὶ μὲν καὶ καύσεις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα πάσχει λύπας οὐκ ἐμποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ 64d. When an affection which is against nature and violent occurs within us with intensity it is painful, whereas the return back to the natural condition, when intense, is pleasant; and an affection which is mild and gradual is imperceptible, while the converse is of a contrary character. And the affection which, in its entirety, takes place with ease is eminently perceptible, but it does not involve pain or pleasure; such, for example, are the affections of the visual stream itself, which, as we said before, becomes in the daylight a body substantially one with our own. For no pains are produced therein by cuttings or burning
4. Antisthenes, Fragments, 116, 122, 125-126, 13, 22, 85, 70 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 357
5. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic values •aristippus of cyrene, and virtue •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 394, 399
59c. ΦΑΙΔ. ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων . ΕΧ. τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο; ΦΑΙΔ. οὐ δῆτα: ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι. ΕΧ. ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν; ΦΑΙΔ. σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι. ΕΧ. τί οὖν δή; τίνες φῂς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ΦΑΙΔ. ἐγώ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι. 59c. Echecrates. Were any foreigners there? Phaedo. Yes, Simmias of Thebes and Cebes and Phaedonides, and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion. Echecrates. What? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there? Phaedo. No. They were said to be in Aegina . Echecrates. Was anyone else there? Phaedo. I think these were about all. Echecrates. Well then, what was the conversation? Phaedo. I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous day
6. Xenophon, The Education of Cyrus, 1.5.1 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, antisthenes and Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 333
1.5.1. ὁ μὲν δὴ Κῦρος οὕτως ἀπελθὼν ἐν Πέρσαις ἐνιαυτὸν λέγεται ἐν τοῖς παισὶν ἔτι γενέσθαι. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἱ παῖδες ἔσκωπτον αὐτὸν ὡς ἡδυπαθεῖν ἐν Μήδοις μεμαθηκὼς ἥκοι· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἐσθίοντα αὐτὸν ἑώρων ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἡδέως καὶ πίνοντα, καὶ εἴ ποτε ἐν ἑορτῇ εὐωχία γένοιτο, ἐπιδιδόντα μᾶλλον αὐτὸν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ μέρους ᾐσθάνοντο ἢ προσδεόμενον, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις δὲ τἆλλα κρατιστεύοντα αὐτὸν ἑώρων ἑαυτῶν, ἐνταῦθα δὴ πάλιν ὑπέπτησσον αὐτῷ οἱ ἥλικες. ἐπεὶ δὲ διελθὼν τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην ἤδη εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς ἐφήβους, ἐν τούτοις αὖ ἐδόκει κρατιστεύειν καὶ μελετῶν ἃ χρῆν καὶ καρτερῶν καὶ αἰδούμενος τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους καὶ πειθόμενος τοῖς ἄρχουσι. 1.5.1. Now when Cyrus had returned, as before Cyrus resumes his education in Persia narrated, he is said to have spent one more year in the class of boys in Persia . And at first the boys were inclined to make fun of him, saying that he had come back after having learned to live a life of luxurious ease among the Medes. But when they saw him eating and drinking with no less relish than they themselves, and, if there ever was feasting at any celebration, freely giving away a part of his own share rather than asking for more; and when, in addition to this, they saw him surpassing them in other things as well, then again his comrades began to have proper respect for him. And when he had passed through this discipline and had now entered the class of the youths, among these in turn he had the reputation of being the best both in attending to duty and in endurance, in respect toward his elders and in obedience to the officers.
7. Xenophon, Memoirs, 2.1-2.34, 2.1.1-2.1.17, 2.6.24, 3.8.1-3.8.2, 3.8.4-3.8.7 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, antisthenes and •aristippus of cyrene, life and character •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic method •aristippus of cyrene, and payment for teaching •aristippus of cyrene, plato and •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 333, 357, 386, 391, 398
2.1.1. ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ῥίγους καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνου. γνοὺς γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, εἰ δέοι σε παιδεύειν παραλαβόντα δύο τῶν νέων, τὸν μέν, ὅπως ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἄρχειν, τὸν δʼ, ὅπως μηδʼ ἀντιποιήσεται ἀρχῆς, πῶς ἂν ἑκάτερον παιδεύοις; βούλει σκοπῶμεν ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων· καὶ ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἔφη· δοκεῖ γοῦν μοι ἡ τροφὴ ἀρχὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ζῴη γʼ ἄν τις, εἰ μὴ τρέφοιτο. 2.1.2. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι σίτου ἅπτεσθαι, ὅταν ὥρα ἥκῃ, ἀμφοτέροις εἰκὸς παραγίγνεσθαι; εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. τὸ οὖν προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ κατεπεῖγον μᾶλλον πράττειν ἢ τῇ γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι πότερον ἂν αὐτῶν ἐθίζοιμεν; τὸν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν, ἔφη, νὴ Δία παιδευόμενον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἄπρακτα γίγνηται παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχήν. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ὅταν πιεῖν βούλωνται, τὸ δύνασθαι διψῶντα ἀνέχεσθαι τῷ αὐτῷ προσθετέον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 2.1.3. τὸ δὲ ὕπνου ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε δύνασθαι καὶ ὀψὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ πρῲ ἀναστῆναι καὶ ἀγρυπνῆσαι, εἴ τι δέοι, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. τί δέ, ἔφη, τὸ ἀφροδισίων ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε μὴ διὰ ταῦτα κωλύεσθαι πράττειν, εἴ τι δέοι; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. τί δέ, τὸ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους, ἀλλʼ ἐθελοντὴν ὑπομένειν ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ. τί δέ, τὸ μαθεῖν εἴ τι ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστι μάθημα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιπάλων, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθεῖναι μᾶλλον πρέποι; πολὺ νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄνευ τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων. 2.1.4. οὐκοῦν ὁ οὕτω πεπαιδευμένος ἧττον ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα ἁλίσκεσθαι; τούτων γὰρ δήπου τὰ μὲν γαστρὶ δελεαζόμενα, καὶ μάλα ἔνια δυσωπούμενα, ὅμως τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἀγόμενα πρὸς τὸ δέλεαρ ἁλίσκεται, τὰ δὲ ποτῷ ἐνεδρεύεται. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ὑπὸ λαγνείας, οἷον οἵ τε ὄρτυγες καὶ οἱ πέρδικες, πρὸς τὴν τῆς θηλείας φωνὴν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι τῶν ἀφροδισίων φερόμενοι καὶ ἐξιστάμενοι τοῦ τὰ δεινὰ ἀναλογίζεσθαι τοῖς θηράτροις ἐμπίπτουσι; συνέφη καὶ ταῦτα. 2.1.5. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ ταὐτὰ πάσχειν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τῶν θηρίων; ὥσπερ οἱ μοιχοὶ εἰσέρχονται εἰς τὰς εἰρκτάς, εἰδότες ὅτι κίνδυνος τῷ μοιχεύοντι ἅ τε ὁ νόμος ἀπειλεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἐνεδρευθῆναι καὶ ληφθέντα ὑβρισθῆναι· καὶ τηλικούτων μὲν ἐπικειμένων τῷ μοιχεύοντι κακῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ὄντων δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπολυσόντων τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίας ἐν ἀδείᾳ, ὅμως εἰς τὰ ἐπικίνδυνα φέρεσθαι, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο παντάπασι κακοδαιμονῶντός ἐστιν; 2.1.6. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. τὸ δὲ εἶναι μὲν τὰς ἀναγκαιοτάτας πλείστας πράξεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ, οἷον τάς τε πολεμικὰς καὶ τὰς γεωργικὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ τὰς ἐλαχίστας, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀγυμνάστως ἔχειν πρός τε ψύχη καὶ θάλπη οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πολλὴ ἀμέλεια εἶναι; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι τὸν μέλλοντα ἄρχειν ἀσκεῖν δεῖν καὶ ταῦτα εὐπετῶς φέρειν; 2.1.7. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν εἰ τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς τούτων ἁπάντων εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς τάττομεν, τοὺς ἀδυνάτους ταῦτα ποιεῖν εἰς τοὺς μηδʼ ἀντιποιησομένους τοῦ ἄρχειν τάξομεν; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τούτων ἑκατέρου τοῦ φύλου τὴν τάξιν οἶσθα, ἤδη ποτʼ ἐπεσκέψω, εἰς ποτέραν τῶν τάξεων τούτων σαυτὸν δικαίως ἂν τάττοις; 2.1.8. ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος· καὶ οὐδαμῶς γε τάττω ἐμαυτὸν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄρχειν βουλομένων τάξιν. καὶ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τό, μεγάλου ἔργου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὧν δέονται πορίζειν· καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν πολλὰ ὧν βούλεται ἐλλείπειν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως προεστῶτα, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡ πόλις βούλεται καταπράττῃ, τούτου δίκην ὑπέχειν, τοῦτο πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀφροσύνη ἐστί; 2.1.9. καὶ γὰρ ἀξιοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τοῖς οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι. ἐγώ τε γὰρ ἀξιῶ τοὺς θεράποντας ἐμοὶ μὲν ἄφθονα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μηδενὸς τούτων ἅπτεσθαι, αἵ τε πόλεις οἴονται χρῆναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πορίζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντων τούτων ἀπέχεσθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτούς τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν οὕτως ἂν παιδεύσας εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς καταστήσαιμι· ἐμαυτόν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν. 2.1.10. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· βούλει οὖν καὶ τοῦτο σκεψώμεθα, πότερον ἥδιον ζῶσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἢ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τῶν ἐθνῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἐν μὲν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Πέρσαι μὲν ἄρχουσιν, ἄρχονται δὲ Σύροι καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Λυδοί· ἐν δὲ τῇ Εὐρώπῃ Σκύθαι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Μαιῶται δὲ ἄρχονται· ἐν δὲ τῇ Λιβύῃ Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Λίβυες δὲ ἄρχονται. τούτων οὖν ποτέρους ἥδιον οἴει ζῆν; ἢ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτὸς εἶ, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν ἥδιον οἱ κρατοῦντες ἢ οἱ κρατούμενοι, ζῆν; 2.1.11. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν ἐμαυτὸν τάττω, ἀλλʼ εἶναί τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε διʼ ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει. 2.1.12. ἀλλʼ εἰ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ οὔτε διʼ ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας ἡ ὁδὸς αὕτη φέρει, οὕτω μηδὲ διʼ ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως ἄν τι λέγοις· εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὢν μήτε ἄρχειν ἀξιώσεις μήτε ἄρχεσθαι μηδὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑκὼν θεραπεύσεις, οἶμαί σε ὁρᾶν ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ κρείττονες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλαίοντας καθίσαντες δούλοις χρῆσθαι· 2.1.13. ἢ λανθάνουσί σε οἱ ἄλλων σπειράντων καὶ φυτευσάντων τόν τε σῖτον τέμνοντες καὶ δενδροκοποῦντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον πολιορκοῦντες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ μὴ θέλοντας θεραπεύειν, ἕως ἂν πείσωσιν ἑλέσθαι δουλεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι; καὶ ἰδίᾳ αὖ οἱ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀδυνάτους οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι καταδουλωσάμενοι καρποῦνται; ἀλλʼ ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη, ἵνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδʼ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι. 2.1.14. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· τοῦτο μέντοι ἤδη λέγεις δεινὸν πάλαισμα. τοὺς γὰρ ξένους, ἐξ οὗ ὅ τε Σίνις καὶ ὁ Σκείρων καὶ ὁ Προκρούστης ἀπέθανον, οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ· ἀλλὰ νῦν οἱ μὲν πολιτευόμενοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι καὶ νόμους τίθενται, ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ φίλους πρὸς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλουμένοις ἄλλους κτῶνται βοηθούς, καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐρύματα περιβάλλονται, καὶ ὅπλα κτῶνται οἷς ἀμυνοῦνται τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἄλλους ἔξωθεν συμμάχους κατασκευάζονται· καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα πάντα κεκτημένοι ὅμως ἀδικοῦνται· 2.1.15. σὺ δὲ οὐδὲν μὲν τούτων ἔχων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁδοῖς, ἔνθα πλεῖστοι ἀδικοῦνται, πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβων, εἰς ὁποίαν δʼ ἂν πόλιν ἀφίκῃ, τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἥττων ὤν, καὶ τοιοῦτος, οἵοις μάλιστα ἐπιτίθενται οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀδικεῖν, ὅμως διὰ τὸ ξένος εἶναι οὐκ ἂν οἴει ἀδικηθῆναι; ἦ διότι αἱ πόλεις σοι κηρύττουσιν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ προσιόντι καὶ ἀπιόντι, θαρρεῖς; ἢ διότι καὶ δοῦλος ἂν οἴει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος μηδενὶ δεσπότῃ λυσιτελεῖν; τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐθέλοι ἄνθρωπον ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχειν πονεῖν μὲν μηδὲν ἐθέλοντα, τῇ δὲ πολυτελεστάτῃ διαίτῃ χαίροντα; 2.1.16. σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς οἱ δεσπόται τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰκέταις χρῶνται. ἆρα οὐ τὴν μὲν λαγνείαν αὐτῶν τῷ λιμῷ σωφρονίζουσι; κλέπτειν δὲ κωλύουσιν ἀποκλείοντες ὅθεν ἄν τι λαβεῖν ᾖ; τοῦ δὲ δραπετεύειν δεσμοῖς ἀπείργουσι; τὴν ἀργίαν δὲ πληγαῖς ἐξαναγκάζουσιν; ἢ σὺ πῶς ποιεῖς, ὅταν τῶν οἰκετῶν τινα τοιοῦτον ὄντα καταμανθάνῃς; 2.1.17. κολάζω, ἔφη, πᾶσι κακοῖς, ἕως ἂν δουλεύειν ἀναγκάσω. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἴ γε πεινήσουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ ῥιγώσουσι καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἑκόντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅ τι διαφέρει τὸ αὐτὸ δέρμα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα μαστιγοῦσθαι ἢ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα πολιορκεῖσθαι ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀφροσύνη πρόσεστι τῷ θέλοντι τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν. 2.6.24. πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰκὸς τοὺς καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν μὴ μόνον ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμους ἀλλήλοις κοινωνοὺς εἶναι; οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τιμᾶσθαί τε καὶ ἄρχειν, ἵνα ἐξουσίαν ἔχωσι χρήματά τε κλέπτειν καὶ ἀνθρώπους βιάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδυπαθεῖν, ἄδικοί τε καὶ πονηροὶ ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἀδύνατοι ἄλλῳ συναρμόσαι. 3.8.1. Ἀριστίππου δὲ ἐπιχειροῦντος ἐλέγχειν τὸν Σωκράτην, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὑπʼ ἐκείνου τὸ πρότερον ἠλέγχετο, βουλόμενος τοὺς συνόντας ὠφελεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀπεκρίνατο οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ φυλαττόμενοι μή πῃ ὁ λόγος ἐπαλλαχθῇ, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἂν πεπεισμένοι μάλιστα πράττειν τὰ δέοντα. 3.8.2. ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἤρετο εἴ τι εἰδείη ἀγαθόν, ἵνα, εἴ τι εἴποι τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν ἢ χρήματα ἢ ὑγίειαν ἢ ῥώμην ἢ τόλμαν, δεικνύοι δὴ τοῦτο κακὸν ἐνίοτε ὄν. ὁ δὲ εἰδὼς ὅτι, ἐάν τι ἐνοχλῇ ἡμᾶς, δεόμεθα τοῦ παύσοντος, ἀπεκρίνατο ᾗπερ καὶ ποιεῖν κράτιστον, 3.8.4. πάλιν δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἐρωτῶντος αὐτὸν εἴ τι εἰδείη καλόν, καὶ πολλά, ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντα ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις; ὡς οἷόν τε μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀνομοιότατα ἔνια. πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ τῷ καλῷ ἀνόμοιον καλὸν ἂν εἴη; ὅτι νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, ἔστι μὲν τῷ καλῷ πρὸς δρόμον ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλος ἀνόμοιος καλὸς πρὸς πάλην, ἔστι δὲ ἀσπὶς καλὴ πρὸς τὸ προβάλλεσθαι ὡς ἔνι ἀνομοιοτάτη τῷ ἀκοντίῳ, καλῷ πρὸς τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχὺ φέρεσθαι. 3.8.5. οὐδὲν διαφερόντως, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνῃ μοι ἢ ὅτε σε ἠρώτησα εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἰδείης. σὺ δʼ οἴει, ἔφη, ἄλλο μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ καλὸν εἶναι; οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι πρὸς ταὐτὰ πάντα καλά τε κἀγαθά ἐστι; πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐ πρὸς ἄλλα μὲν ἀγαθόν, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ καλόν ἐστιν, ἔπειτα οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καλοί τε κἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καλά τε κἀγαθὰ φαίνεται, πρὸς ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οἷς ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται καλά τε κἀγαθὰ νομίζεται, πρὸς ἅπερ ἂν εὔχρηστα ᾖ. 3.8.6. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ κόφινος κοπροφόρος καλόν ἐστι; νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, καὶ χρυσῆ γε ἀσπὶς αἰσχρόν, ἐὰν πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ὁ μὲν καλῶς πεποιημένος ᾖ, ἡ δὲ κακῶς. λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, καλά τε καὶ αἰσχρὰ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι; 3.8.7. καὶ νὴ Δίʼ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη, ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά· πολλάκις γὰρ τό γε λιμοῦ ἀγαθὸν πυρετοῦ κακόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ πυρετοῦ ἀγαθὸν λιμοῦ κακόν ἐστι· πολλάκις δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον καλὸν πρὸς πάλην αἰσχρόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην καλὸν πρὸς δρόμον αἰσχρόν· πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ μὲν καὶ καλά ἐστι πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχῃ, κακὰ δὲ καὶ αἰσχρὰ πρὸς ἃ ἂν κακῶς. 2.1.1. In other conversations I thought that he exhorted his companions to practise self-control in the matter of eating and drinking, and sexual indulgence, and sleeping, and endurance of cold and heat and toil. Aware that one of his companions was rather intemperate in such matters, he said: Tell me, Aristippus, if you were required to take charge of two youths and educate them so that the one would be fit to rule and the other would never think of putting himself forward, how would you educate them? Shall we consider it, beginning with the elementary question of food? Oh yes, replied Aristippus, food does seem to come first; for one can’t live without food. 2.1.2. Well, now, will not a desire for food naturally arise in both at certain times? Yes, naturally. Now which of the two should we train in the habit of transacting urgent business before he satisfies his hunger? The one who is being trained to rule, undoubtedly; else State business might be neglected during his tenure. And must not the same one be given power to resist thirst when both want to drink? Certainly. 2.1.3. And to which shall we give the power of limiting his sleep so that he can go late to bed and get up early, and do without sleep if need be? To the same again. And the power to control his passions, so that he may not be hindered in doing necessary work? To the same again. And to which shall we give the habit of not shirking a task, but undertaking it willingly? That too will go to the one who is being trained to rule. And to which would the knowledge needful for overcoming enemies be more appropriately given? Without doubt to the one who is being trained to rule; for the other lessons would be useless without such knowledge. 2.1.4. Don’t you think that with this education he will be less likely to be caught by his enemy than other creatures? Some of them, you know, are so greedy, that in spite of extreme timidity in some cases, they are drawn irresistibly to the bait to get food, and are caught; and others are snared by drink. Yes, certainly. Others again — quails and partridges, for instance — are so amorous, that when they hear the cry of the female, they are carried away by desire and anticipation, throw caution to the winds and blunder into the nets. Is it not so? 2.1.5. He agreed again. Now, don’t you think it disgraceful that a man should be in the same plight as the silliest of wild creatures? Thus an adulterer enters the women’s quarters, knowing that by committing adultery he is in danger of incurring the penalties threatened by the law, and that he may be trapped, caught and ill-treated. When such misery and disgrace hang over the adulterer’s head, and there are many remedies to relieve him of his carnal desire without risk, is it not sheer lunacy to plunge headlong into danger? Yes, I think it is. 2.1.6. And considering that the great majority of essential occupations, warfare, agriculture and very many others, are carried on in the open air, don’t you think it gross negligence that so many men are untrained to withstand cold and heat? He agreed again. Don’t you think then, that one who is going to rule must adapt himself to bear them lightly? Certainly. 2.1.7. If then we classify those who control themselves in all these matters as fit to rule, shall we not classify those who cannot behave so as men with no claim to be rulers? He agreed again. Well now, as you know the category to which each of these species belongs, have you ever considered in which category you ought to put yourself? 2.1.8. I have; and I do not for a moment put myself in the category of those who want to be rulers. Cyropaedia I. vi. 7; vii. ii, 26 f. For considering how hard a matter it is to provide for one’s own needs, I think it absurd not to be content to do that, but to shoulder the burden of supplying the wants of the community as well. That anyone should sacrifice a large part of his own wishes and make himself accountable as head of the state for the least failure to carry out all the wishes of the community is surely the height of folly. 2.1.9. For states claim to treat their rulers just as I claim to treat my servants. I expect my men to provide me with necessaries in abundance, but not to touch any of them; and states hold it to be the business of the ruler to supply them with all manner of good things, and to abstain from all of them himself. And so, should anyone want to bring plenty of trouble on himself and others, I would educate him as you propose and number him with those fitted to be rulers : but myself I classify with those who wish for a life of the greatest ease and pleasure that can be had. Here Socrates asked: 2.1.10. Shall we then consider whether the rulers or the ruled live the pleasanter life? Certainly, replied Aristippus. To take first the nations known to us. In Asia the rulers are the Persians; the Syrians, Lydians and Phrygians are the ruled. In Europe the Scythians rule, and the Maeotians are ruled. In Africa the Carthaginians rule, and the Libyans are ruled. Which of the two classes, think you, enjoys the pleasanter life? Or take the Greeks, of whom you yourself are one; do you think that the controlling or the controlled communities enjoy the pleasanter life? 2.1.11. Nay, replied Aristippus, for my part I am no candidate for slavery; but there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I am fain to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery, but through liberty, which is the royal road to happiness. 2.1.12. Ah, said Socrates , if only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the rulers 2.1.13. — I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves. You cannot be unaware that where some have sown and planted, others cut their corn and fell their trees, and in all manner of ways harass the weaker if they refuse to bow down, until they are persuaded to accept slavery as an escape from war with the stronger. So, too, in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble folk? Yes, but my plan for avoiding such treatment is this. I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land. 2.1.14. A very cunning trick, that! cried Socrates , for ever since the death of Sinis and Sceiron and Procrustes Highwaymen slain by Theseus, Plutarch, Thes. c. 8 f. no one injures strangers! And yet nowadays those who take a hand in the affairs of their homeland pass laws to protect themselves from injury, get friends to help them over and above those whom nature has given them, encompass their cities with fortresses, get themselves weapons to ward off the workers of mischief; and besides all this seek to make allies in other lands; and in spite of all these precautions, they are still wronged. 2.1.15. But you, with none of these advantages, spend much time on the open road, where so many come to harm; and into whatever city you enter, you rank below all its citizens, and are one of those specially marked down for attack by intending wrongdoers; and yet, because you are a stranger, do you expect to escape injury? What gives you confidence? Is it that the cities by proclamation guarantee your safety in your coming and going? Or is it the thought that no master would find you worth having among his slaves? For who would care to have a man in his house who wants to do no work and has a weakness for high living? 2.1.16. But now let us see how masters treat such servants. Do they not starve them to keep them from immorality, lock up the stores to stop their stealing, clap fetters on them so that they can’t run away, and beat the laziness out of them with whips? What do you do yourself to cure such faults among your servants? 2.1.17. I make their lives a burden to them until I reduce them to submission. But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates , which you appear to identify with happiness? How are they better off than those whose sufferings are compulsory, if they must bear hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and endure all these tortures willingly? For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner kicks or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering. 2.6.24. Surely, then, it is likely that true gentlemen will share public honours too not only without harm to one another, but to their common benefit? For those who desire to win honour and to bear rule in their cities that they may have power to embezzle, to treat others with violence, to live in luxury, are bound to be unjust, unscrupulous, incapable of unity. 3.8.1. When Aristippus attempted to cross-examine Socrates in the same fashion as he had been cross-examined by him in their previous encounter, Socrates , wishing to benefit his companions, answered like a man who is resolved to do what is right, and not like a debater guarding against any distortion of the argument. 3.8.2. Aristippus asked if he knew of anything good, in order that if Socrates mentioned some good thing, such as food, drink, money, health, strength, or daring, he might show that it is sometimes bad. But he, knowing that when anything troubles us we need what will put an end to the trouble, gave the best answer: 3.8.4. Again Aristippus asked him whether he knew of anything beautiful: Yes, many things, he replied. All like one another? On the contrary, some are as unlike as they can be. How then can that which is unlike the beautiful be beautiful? The reason, of course, is that a beautiful wrestler is unlike a beautiful runner, a shield beautiful for defence is utterly unlike a javelin beautiful for swift and powerful hurling. 3.8.5. That is the same answer as you gave to my question whether you knew of anything good. You think, do you, that good is one thing and beautiful another? Don’t you know that all things are both beautiful and good in relation to the same things? In the first place, Virtue is not a good thing in relation to some things and a beautiful thing in relation to others. Men, again, are called beautiful and good in the same respect and in relation to the same things: it is in relation to the same things that men’s bodies look beautiful and good and that all other things men use are thought beautiful and good, namely, in relation to those things for which they are useful. 3.8.6. Is a dung basket beautiful then? of course, and a golden shield is ugly, if the one is well made for its special work and the other badly. Do you mean that the same things are both beautiful and ugly? of course — and both good and bad. 3.8.7. For what is good for hunger is often bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; what is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling, and what is beautiful for wrestling ugly for running. For all things are good and beautiful in relation to those purposes for which they are well adapted, bad and ugly in relation to those for which they are ill adapted.
8. Xenophon, On Household Management, 5.2 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, antisthenes and Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 333
9. Xenophon, Symposium, 4.8, 4.29-4.44, 4.61 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, antisthenes and Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 330, 333, 357
10. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 392, 403
11. Aristotle, Metaphysics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 390
12. Callimachus, Epigrams, 20 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 388
13. Antisthenes of Rhodes, Fragments, 116, 122, 125-126, 13, 22, 85, 70 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 357
14. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 2.15, 3.28-3.35 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, plato and •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 386, 388
2.15. Video plane, sed plus desidero. Experiar equidem; sed magna res est, animoque mihi opus est non repugte. Habebis id quidem. ut enim heri feci, et heri feci Char. GL. I 200, 12 sic nunc rationem, quo ea me cumque ducet, sequar. Primum igitur de inbecillitate imb. R multorum et de variis disciplinis philosophorum loquar. quorum princeps et auctoritate et antiquitate Socraticus Aristippus aristiphus X corr. V c non dubitavit summum malum dolorem dicere. deinde ad hanc enervatam muliebremque sententiam satis docilem se Epicurus praebuit. p K ( ss. 2 ) hunc post Rhodius Hieronymus hieronimus X dolore vacare vacaredolore R 1 vacare V summum bonum dixit: tantum in dolore duxit di xit K ( man.c.? ) mali. ceteri praeter Zenonem, Aristonem, Pyrrhonem pyrronem X (phyrr. K 1 ) idem fere quod modo quod modo edd. quomodo tu: malum illud quidem, sed alia peiora. 3.28. Atque hoc quidem perspicuum est, tum tum add. G 2 aegritudinem existere, cum quid ita visum sit, ut magnum quoddam malum adesse et urgere videatur. Epicuro autem placet opinionem mali aegritudinem esse ea ante esse add. V 2 natura, esse, ea natura Usen. Ep. fr. 444 ( sed cf. 334,14 necesse esse eqs.) ex opinione pro opinionem Sey. efficere pro esse Bai. cf. quae dixi Herm. XLI 323 ut, quicumque intueatur in aliquod maius malum, si id sibi accidisse opinetur, sit continuo in aegritudine. aegritudinem X Cyrenaici non omni malo malo modo R 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GK 1 effici censent, sed insperato et necopinato malo. est id quidem non mediocre ad aegritudinem augendam: videntur enim omnia repentina graviora. ex hoc et illa iure laudantur: E/go cum genui, tu/m morituros moriturum et huic rei Sen. ad Pol. 11, 2 sci/vi et ei rei Enn. Telam. sc. 312. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 su/stuli. Prae/terea praeterea ae in r. V c ad Troia/m cum misi ob de/fendendam Grae/ciam, Sci/bam scibam Fronto p. 217 sciebam me in morti/ferum bellum, no/n in epulas mi/ttere. 3.29. haec igitur praemeditatio futurorum malorum lenit eorum adventum, quae venientia longe ante videris. itaque apud Euripiden a Theseo dicta laudantur; licet Eurip. fr. 964 euripidĕ K thesseo GKR 1 enim, ut saepe facimus, in Latinum illa convertere: Nam qui hae/c audita a do/cto meminisse/m viro, Futu/ras mecum co/mmentabar mi/serias: Aut mo/rtem acerbam aut alt. aut add. G 2 exilii X e/xili maesta/m fugam Aut se/mper aliquam mo/lem meditaba/r mali, Ut, si/ qua invecta di/ritas casu/ foret, Ne me i/nparatum cu/ra lacerare/t repens. lacerare trepens G 1 R 1 3.30. quod autem Theseus a docto se audisse dicit, id de se ipso de ipso K 1 ( ex dese ipse) V 1 (se add. 1 ) Anax. A 33 loquitur Euripides. fuerat enim auditor Anaxagorae, quem ferunt nuntiata morte filii dixisse: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. quae vox declarat is esse haec acerba, quibus non fuerint cogitata. ergo id quidem non dubium, quin omnia, quae mala putentur, sint inprovisa graviora. itaque quamquam non haec una res efficit maximam aegritudinem, tamen, quoniam multum potest provisio animi et praeparatio ad minuendum dolorem, sint semper omnia homini humana meditata. et et ex e V c nimirum haec est illa praestans et divina sapientia, et perceptas penitus et pertractatas res humanas habere, nihil admirari, ammirari GR 1 V cum acciderit, nihil, ante quam evenerit, non evenire posse arbitrari. Quam ob rem o/mnis, cum secu/ndae res sunt ma/xume, tum ma/xume tum maxume add. K c maxime alt. loco GRV bis H Medita/ri secum opo/rtet, quo pacto a/dversam adversum KRH aerumna/m ferant. fuerant H ferat K 1 Peri/cla, pericula X damna pe/regre rediens se/mper secum co/gitet, pericla damna exilia peregre rediens semper cogitet Ter. codd. Aut fi/li filii p. X peccatum au/t uxoris mo/rtem aut morbum fi/liae, Commu/nia esse haec, ne/ quid horum umquam a/ccidat animo/ novum; c. e. haec, fieri posse, ut ne quid animo sit novom Ter. Quicqui/d praeter praeter propter K spem eve/niat, omne id de/putare esse i/n lucro. ergo .. 22 lucro H ... 22 Ter. Phormio 241–6 ergo hoc hoc ex haec G 2 Terentius a philosophia sumptum cum tam commode dixerit, nos, e quorum fontibus id haustum est, non et dicemus hoc melius et constantius sentiemus? 3.31. hic est enim ille voltus semper idem, quem dicitur Xanthippe praedicare solita in et in G ( exp. 2 ) viro suo fuisse Socrate: socrate V 2 B e corr. M socratem KRV 1 socratam G ( ss. 2 ) del. Ba. def. Va. opp. 2 p. 130 eodem semper se vidisse exeuntem et ante exeuntem add. V c illum domo et revertentem. Nec vero ea frons erat, quae M. Crassi quem crassi V 1 que crassi G 1 illius veteris, quem semel ait in omni vita risisse riesisse R 1 risisse, sed prius i in r. GV Luc. fr. 1300 Lucilius, sed tranquilla et serena; sic enim accepimus. iure autem erat semper idem voltus, cum mentis, a qua is fingitur, nulla fieret fieret R ( R c? ) fieret V (t a m. 2 ) fieri G 1 K mutatio. quare accipio equidem quidem G 1 a Cyrenaicis haec arma contra casus et eventus, quibus eorum advenientes impetus diuturna praemeditatione frangantur, frangatur R 1 simulque iudico malum illud opinionis esse, non naturae; si enim in re esset, esset s We. essent cur fierent provisa leviora? 3.32. Sed est, isdem de rebus quod dici possit subtilius, si prius Epicuri sententiam viderimus. qui censet Epic. fr. 444 necesse esse omnis in aegritudine esse, qui se in malis esse arbitrentur, sive illa ante provisa et expectata sint sive inveteraverint. nam neque vetustate minui mala nec fieri praemeditata leviora, stultamque etiam esse meditationem futuri mali aut fortasse ne futuri quidem: satis esse odiosum malum omne, cum venisset; cum venisset ex conv. K 2 qui autem semper cogitavisset accidere posse aliquid adversi, ei fieri illud sempiternum malum; si vero ne futurum quidem sit, sit ex si V c frustra suscipi miseriam voluntariam; voluntariam add. GR 1 in fine pag. ita semper angi aut accipiendo aut cogitando malo. 3.33. Levationem autem aegritudinis in duabus rebus ponit, avocatione a cogitanda molestia et revocatione revocationem GKV 1 ad contemplandas voluptates. parere pareri GR 1 ( corr. 1 ) V 1 ( corr. 2 ) enim censet animum rationi posse et, quo illa ducat, sequi. vetat igitur ratio intueri molestias, abstrahit ab acerbis cogitationibus, hebetem habetem V 1 aciem ad miserias contemplandas facit; facit add. V c ( ante aciem We. ft. rectius cf. docere 220,13 sed cf. off. 1, 12 extr. al. ) om. cett. a quibus cum cecinit cecidit X corr. 2 receptui, inpellit receptuimpellit VHK c (receptaimp. K 1 )G 2 (receptum pellit 1 ) receptū impellit R rursum et incitat ad conspiciendas totaque mente contrectandas contractandas K ( ex -tes 1 ) H varias voluptates, vetat... 335, 4 voluptates H quibus ille et praeteritarum memoria et spe consequentium sapientis vitam refertam putat. refert amputat G 1 R 1 V 1 Haec nostro more nos diximus, Epicurii epicurei R c K 2 dicunt suo; sed quae quae ex qui V 2 dicant, videamus, quo modo, neglegamus. 3.34. Principio male reprehendunt praemeditationem rerum futurarum. nihil est enim quod tam optundat optundat V (at in r. ) R c optundet GR 1 obtundet HK 1 (-at 2 ) elevetque aegritudinem quam perpetua in omni vita cogitatio nihil esse quod non accidere possit, quam meditatio condicionis conditionis X humanae, quam vitae lex commentatioque parendi, quae non hoc adfert, ut semper maereamus, sed ut numquam. neque enim, qui rerum naturam, qui vitae varietatem, qui inbecillitatem imb. KR c H generis humani cogitat, maeret, cum haec cogitat, sed tum vel vel om. H maxime sapientiae fungitur munere: utrumque enim consequitur, ut et considerandis rebus humanis proprio ad proprio in mg. adscr. non V rec philosophiae fruatur fruatur fungatur Man. ( sed phil. off. est 'id quod homini praestare potest ac debet philo- sophia' ) officio et adversis casibus triplici consolatione sanetur, sanentur X corr. K 2 R 2 V 2 primum quod nihil ei accidit nisi quod posse accidere diu cogitaverit, suppl. Po. cogitavit pro -erit Dav. quae cogitatio una maxime molestias omnis extenuat et diluit, deinde quod humana humane humana humane humane KV 1 (hu- mana add. 2 ) H humana G human e R ( del. c ) cf. Ps. Plut. cons. ad Ap. 118 c fe/rein ta\ a)nqrw/pina a)nqrwpi/nws ferenda intellegit, postremo quod videt malum nullum esse nisi culpam, culpam autem nullam esse, cum id, quod ab homine non potuerit praestari, praestari vel praecaveri R vet sed cf. ( etiam ad ea quae hic antecedunt ) epist. 6,1, 4 ( et 9,16,5 ) evenerit. nihil ... 336,2 evenerit H 3.35. Nam revocatio avocatio V 2 illa, quam adfert, adfret G 1 K 1 cum a contuendis nos malis avocat, nulla est. non est enim in nostra potestate fodicantibus is his W eis Non. opinemur] -mur in r. G 2 -ur in r. V 1? rebus, quas malas esse opinemur, dissimulatio vel oblivio: on... 6 oblivio Non. 66, 15 lacerant, vexant, stimulos admovent, ignis adhibent, respirare non sinunt, et tu oblivisci iubes, quod contra naturam est, qui, quod a natura add. Tr. quia natura X datum est, auxilium extorqueas inveterati doloris? est enim tarda illa quidem quidam V 1 medicina, sed tamen magna, quam adfert longinquitas et dies. Iubes me bona cogitare, oblivisci malorum. diceres aliquid, et magno quidem philosopho dignum, si ea bona esse sentires, quae essent homine dignissima. Pythagoras mihi si diceret aut Socrates aut Plato:
15. Cicero, On Duties, 1.148 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 398
1.148. Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de iis nihil est praecipiendum; illa enim ipsa praecepta sunt, nec quemquam hoc errore duci oportet, ut, si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra rnorem consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sint, idem sibi arbitretur licere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hane licentiam assequebantur. Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum. 1.148.  But no rules need to be given about what is done in accordance with the established customs and conventions of a community; for these are in themselves rules; and no one ought to make the mistake of supposing that, because Socrates or Aristippus did or said something contrary to the manners and established customs of their city, he has a right to do the same; it was only by reason of their great and superhuman virtues that those famous men acquired this special privilege. But the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected, for it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility nothing can be upright, nothing morally good.
16. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 3.77 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic values •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 403
3.77. These are fables of the poets, whereas we aim at being philosophers, who set down facts, not fictions. And all the same, even these gods of poetry would be held guilty of mistaken kindness if they knew that their gifts would bring their sons disaster. Just as, if a favourite saying of Aristo of Chios was true, that philosophers are harmful to their hearers when the hearers put a bad interpretation on doctrines good in themselves (for he allowed it was possible to leave the school of Aristippus a profligate, or that of Zeno cantankerous), then clearly, if their pupils were likely to go away depraved because they misinterpreted the philosophers' discourses, it would be better for the philosophers to keep silence than to do harm to those who heard them:
17. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.23, 1.26, 2.39-2.41, 5.17-5.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, plato and •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, on nature of pleasure and pain Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 382, 386, 407, 408
1.23. Confirmat autem illud vel maxime, quod ipsa natura, ut ait ille, sciscat et probet, id est voluptatem et dolorem. ad haec et quae sequamur et quae fugiamus refert omnia. quod quamquam Aristippi est a Cyrenaicisque melius liberiusque defenditur, tamen eius modi esse iudico, ut nihil homine videatur indignius. ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur. ac fieri potest, ut errem, sed ita prorsus existimo, neque eum Torquatum, qui hoc primus cognomen invenerit, invenit BE aut torquem illum hosti detraxisse, ut aliquam ex eo perciperet corpore voluptatem, aut cum Latinis tertio consulatu conflixisse apud Veserim propter voluptatem; quod vero securi percussit percussit Mdv. percusserit filium, privavisse privasse BER se etiam videtur multis voluptatibus, cum ipsi naturae patrioque amori praetulerit ius maiestatis atque imperii. 1.26. Haec igitur Epicuri non probo, inquam. De cetero vellem equidem aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructior— est enim, quod tibi ita videri necesse est, non satis politus iis artibus, quas qui tenent, eruditi appellantur —aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. quamquam te quidem video minime esse deterritum. Quae cum dixissem, magis ut illum provocarem quam ut ipse loquerer, tum Triarius leniter leniter dett. leuiter arridens: Tu quidem, inquit, totum Tu quidem inquit totum tum quid totum inquit (inquid B) BE Epicurum paene e philosophorum choro sustulisti. quid ei reliquisti, nisi te, quoquo modo quoque modo A 1 quoque ut modo RN 1 V quoque ut id modo N 2 loqueretur, intellegere, quid diceret? aliena dixit in physicis nec ea ipsa, quae tibi probarentur; si qua in iis corrigere voluit, deteriora fecit. disserendi artem nullam habuit. voluptatem cum summum bonum diceret, primum in eo ipso parum vidit, deinde hoc quoque alienum; nam ante Aristippus, et ille melius. post melius add. in V Etenim quoniam detractis de ho- mine sensibus; idem in N (et enim cet ) ab alt. m. in marg. adscr. posito post melius signo eodemque in marg.; melius Etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nichil est necesse est quid ad naturam aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. Et expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse. addidisti R (cf. p. 13, 32 sqq. et p. 14, 8 sq.) addidisti ad extremum etiam indoctum fuisse. 2.39. Huius ego nunc auctoritatem sequens idem faciam. quantum enim potero, minuam contentiones omnesque simplices sententias sententias simplices A eorum, in quibus nulla inest inest est BE virtutis adiunctio, omnino adiunctio omnino omnino adiunctio E omnis adiunctio B a philosophia semovendas putabo, primum Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque omnium, quos non est veritum in ea voluptate, quae maxima dulcedine sensum moveret, summum bonum ponere primum ... bonum ponere Macrob. (gramm. Lat. ex rec. H. Keil V 648) contemnentis istam vacuitatem doloris. 2.40. hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum intellegendum, om. ad, AN et agendum, esse natum quasi mortalem deum, contraque ut tardam aliquam et languidam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi voluptatem hoc divinum animal ortum esse voluerunt, quo nihil mihi videtur absurdius. 2.41. Atque haec contra Aristippum, qui eam voluptatem non modo summam, sed solam etiam ducit, quam omnes unam appellamus voluptatem. aliter autem vobis placet. sed ille, ut dixi, vitiose. nec enim figura corporis nec ratio excellens ingenii humani significat ad unam hanc hanc unam RV rem natum hominem, ut frueretur voluptatibus. Nec vero audiendus Hieronymus, cui summum bonum est idem, quod vos interdum vel potius nimium saepe minimum sepe V sepe minimum BE dicitis, nihil dolere. non enim, si malum est dolor, carere eo malo satis est ad bene vivendum. hoc dixerit potius Ennius: 'Nimium boni est, cui nihil est mali'. nos beatam vitam non depulsione mali, sed adeptione boni iudicemus, nec eam cessando, sive gaudentem, gaudendo NV ut Aristippus, sive non dolentem, dolendo V ut hic, sed agendo aliquid considerandove quaeramus. 5.17. constitit autem fere inter omnes id, in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem o(rmh\n o(rmh/n ] bonū R Graeci vocant. quid autem sit, quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis dissensio. totius enim quaestionis eius, quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur, in his quid sit extremum et ultimum, et quid ultimum BE fons reperiendus est, in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur. Voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris. vacuitatem doloris alii censent primum ascitam ascitam cod. Glogav., Mdv. ; ascitum RV as|scitum N assertum BE et primum declinatum dolorem. 5.18. ab iis iis Lamb. 2, Mdv. ; his alii, quae prima secundum naturam nomit, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valitudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima prima om. R in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid aliquid Wes. aliquod sit, quo primum primum dett. prima BE primo RNV natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad ad ( prius ) om. BERN repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid aliquod BE referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. 5.19. ex eo autem, quod statuerit esse, quo primum natura moveatur, existet recti etiam ratio atque honesti, quae cum uno aliquo aliquo uno BE ex tribus illis congruere possit, possit. u aut non dolendi ita sit ut quanta ( v. 19 ) R rell. om. ut aut id honestum sit, facere omnia aut voluptatis causa, etiam si eam secl. Mdv. non consequare, aut non dolendi, etiam etiam N 2 in ras., aut BEV si id assequi nequeas, aut eorum, quae secundum naturam sunt, adipiscendi, etiam si nihil consequare. ita ita N 2 aut non dolendi ita R ( cf. ad v. 14 ), N 1 V; aut nichil dolendi ita BE fit ut, quanta differentia est in principiis naturalibus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum malorumque dissimilitudo. alii rursum isdem a principiis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem aut ad non dolendum aut ad prima illa secundum naturam optinenda. 5.20. expositis iam igitur sex de summo bono sententiis trium proximarum hi principes: voluptatis Aristippus, non dolendi Hieronymus, fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor, sed defensor disserendi causa fuit. superiores tres erant, quae esse possent, quarum est una sola defensa, eaque vehementer. nam voluptatis causa facere omnia, cum, etiamsi nihil consequamur, tamen ipsum illud consilium ita faciendi per se expetendum et honestum et solum bonum sit, nemo dixit. ne vitationem quidem doloris ipsam per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit, nisi nisi Urs. ne si etiam evitare posset. at vero facere omnia, ut adipiscamur, quae secundum naturam sint, sunt BE etiam si ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt. 2.39.  "Guided by the authority of Reason I will now adopt a similar procedure myself. As far as possible I will narrow the issue, and will assume that all the simple theories, of those who include no admixture of virtue, are to be eliminated from philosophy altogether. First among these comes the system of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school in general, who did not shrink from finding their Chief Good in pleasure of the sort that excites the highest amount of actively agreeable sensation, and who despised your freedom from pain. 2.40.  They failed to see that just as the horse is designed by nature for running, the ox for ploughing, and the dog for hunting, so man, as Aristotle observes, is born for two purposes, thought and action: he is as it were a mortal God. The Cyrenaics held on the contrary that this godlike animal came into being, like some dull, half-witted sheep, in order to feed and to enjoy the pleasure of procreation, — a view that seems to me the climax of absurdity. 2.41.  So much in answer to Aristippus, who considers pleasure in the only sense in which we all of us employ the term to be not merely the highest but the sole pleasure that exists. Your school holds a different view. However, as I said, Aristippus is wrong. Neither man's bodily conformation nor his surpassing mental faculty of reason indicates that he was born for the sole purpose of enjoying pleasure. Nor yet can we listen to Hieronymus, whose Chief Good is the same as is occasionally, or rather only too frequently, upheld by yourselves, freedom from pain. If pain is an evil, to be without this evil is not enough to constitute the Good Life. Let Ennius say if he likes that Enough, and more, of good Is his who hath no ill; but let us reckon happiness not by the avoidance of evil but by the attainment of good. Let us seek it not in the idle acceptance whether of positive delights, like Aristippus, or of freedom from pain, like Hieronymus, but in a life of action or of contemplation. 5.17.  Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormē. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire — as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil. 5.18.  "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.19.  "Now, from whichever Prudence decides to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may correspond with one or other of the three objects aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeed in attaining it; or at absence of pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them. Hence there is a divergence between the different conceptions of the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely equivalent to the difference of opinion as to the primary natural objects. — Others again starting from the same primary objects will make the sole standard of right action the actual attainment of pleasure, freedom from pain, or the primary things in accordance with nature, respectively. 5.20.  "Thus we have now set forth six views as to the Chief Good. The leading upholders of the latter three are: of pleasure, Aristippus; of freedom from pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of what we have called the primary things in accordance with nature, Carneades, — that is, he did not originate this view but he upheld it for purposes of argument. The three former were possible views, but only one of them has been actually maintained, though that with great vigour. No one has asserted pleasure to be the sole aim of action in the sense that the mere intention of attaining pleasure, although unsuccessful, is in itself desirable and moral and the only good. Nor yet has anyone held that the effort to avoid pain is in itself a thing desirable, without one's being able actually to avoid it. On the other hand, that morality consists in using every endeavour to obtain the things in accordance with nature, and that this endeavour even though unsuccessful is itself the sole thing desirable and the sole good, is actually maintained by the Stoics.
18. Cicero, De Oratore, 3.61 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic values •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 403
3.61. Hinc discidium illud exstitit quasi linguae atque cordis, absurdum sane et inutile et reprehendendum, ut alii nos sapere, alii dicere docerent. Nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, proseminatae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum disiunctae et dispares, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur.
19. Cicero, Academica, 2.42.131 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, plato and •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 386
20. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.23, 1.26, 2.39-2.41, 5.17-5.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, plato and •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, on nature of pleasure and pain Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 382, 386, 407, 408
2.39.  "Guided by the authority of Reason I will now adopt a similar procedure myself. As far as possible I will narrow the issue, and will assume that all the simple theories, of those who include no admixture of virtue, are to be eliminated from philosophy altogether. First among these comes the system of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school in general, who did not shrink from finding their Chief Good in pleasure of the sort that excites the highest amount of actively agreeable sensation, and who despised your freedom from pain. 2.40.  They failed to see that just as the horse is designed by nature for running, the ox for ploughing, and the dog for hunting, so man, as Aristotle observes, is born for two purposes, thought and action: he is as it were a mortal God. The Cyrenaics held on the contrary that this godlike animal came into being, like some dull, half-witted sheep, in order to feed and to enjoy the pleasure of procreation, — a view that seems to me the climax of absurdity. 2.41.  So much in answer to Aristippus, who considers pleasure in the only sense in which we all of us employ the term to be not merely the highest but the sole pleasure that exists. Your school holds a different view. However, as I said, Aristippus is wrong. Neither man's bodily conformation nor his surpassing mental faculty of reason indicates that he was born for the sole purpose of enjoying pleasure. Nor yet can we listen to Hieronymus, whose Chief Good is the same as is occasionally, or rather only too frequently, upheld by yourselves, freedom from pain. If pain is an evil, to be without this evil is not enough to constitute the Good Life. Let Ennius say if he likes that Enough, and more, of good Is his who hath no ill; but let us reckon happiness not by the avoidance of evil but by the attainment of good. Let us seek it not in the idle acceptance whether of positive delights, like Aristippus, or of freedom from pain, like Hieronymus, but in a life of action or of contemplation. 5.17.  Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormē. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire — as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil. 5.18.  "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct. 5.19.  "Now, from whichever Prudence decides to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may correspond with one or other of the three objects aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeed in attaining it; or at absence of pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them. Hence there is a divergence between the different conceptions of the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely equivalent to the difference of opinion as to the primary natural objects. — Others again starting from the same primary objects will make the sole standard of right action the actual attainment of pleasure, freedom from pain, or the primary things in accordance with nature, respectively. 5.20.  "Thus we have now set forth six views as to the Chief Good. The leading upholders of the latter three are: of pleasure, Aristippus; of freedom from pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of what we have called the primary things in accordance with nature, Carneades, — that is, he did not originate this view but he upheld it for purposes of argument. The three former were possible views, but only one of them has been actually maintained, though that with great vigour. No one has asserted pleasure to be the sole aim of action in the sense that the mere intention of attaining pleasure, although unsuccessful, is in itself desirable and moral and the only good. Nor yet has anyone held that the effort to avoid pain is in itself a thing desirable, without one's being able actually to avoid it. On the other hand, that morality consists in using every endeavour to obtain the things in accordance with nature, and that this endeavour even though unsuccessful is itself the sole thing desirable and the sole good, is actually maintained by the Stoics.
21. Demetrius, Style, 288, 287 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 399
22. Plutarch, Dion, 19.3, 19.7 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, antisthenes and •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 400, 402
23. Plutarch, On Being A Busybody, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 389
516c. and what AandB's private conversation in the corner was about. Yet Socrates went about seeking to solve the question of what arguments Pythagoras used to carry conviction; and Aristippus, when he met Ischomachus at Olympia, asked him by what manner of conversation Socrates succeeded in so affecting the young men. And when Aristippus had gleaned afew odd seeds and samples of Socrates' talk, he was so moved that he suffered a physical collapse and became quite pale and thin. Finally he sailed for Athens and slaked his burning thirst with draughts from the fountain-head, and engaged in a study of the man and his words and his philosophy, of which the end and aim was to come to recognize one's own vices and so rid oneself of them. Yet there are some who cannot bear to face their own lives,
24. Plutarch, On The Control of Anger, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 399
462d. And Polemon, when a man who was fond of precious stones and quite mad about expensive seal-rings reviled him, made no answer, but fixed his gaze on one of the seal-rings and eyed it closely. The man, accordingly, was pleased and said to him, "Do not look at it in this light, Polemon, but under the sun's rays, and it will appear to you far more beautiful." Aristippus, again, when anger had arisen between him and Aeschines and someone said, "Where now, Aristippus, is the friendship of you two?" replied, "It is asleep, but Ishall awaken it"; and, going to Aeschines, he said, "DoI appear to you so utterly unfortunate and incurable as not to receive correction from you?"
25. Plutarch, Dialogue On Love, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 401
26. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 404
27. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, 23.7, 23.8, 23.9, 23.10, 23.11, 23.12, 23.13, 23.14, 42.1, 42.2, 42.3, 42.4, 42.5, 42.6, 42.7, 42.8, 42.9, 49, 291.1-3.4, 342.4-15.1, 492.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 406
28. Plutarch, Fragments, 42 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and value of externals •aristippus of cyrene, and virtue Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 395
29. Plutarch, How A Man May Become Aware of His Progress In Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic method •aristippus of cyrene, and payment for teaching Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 391
30. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and value of externals •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 396
469c. but tried to find sour wine for his own luncheon; and when one of his slaves was asked by the other what he had left his master doing, he answered, "Hunting bad when good was at hand." Most persons, in fact, do pass by the excellent and palatable conditions of their lot and hasten to those that are unpleasant and disagreeable. Aristippus, however, was not one of these, but was wise enough, like one who weighs things in a balance, by weighing the bad against the better, to rise above the conditions in which he found himself and thus to lighten his spirits. At any rate, when he had lost a fine estate, he asked one of those who made a great pretence of condoling with him and sharing in his ill humour at misfortune,"Isn't it true that you have only one small bit of land, while Ihave three farms remaining?" When the person agreed that this was so,
31. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.191-7.200, 11.73 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, antisthenes and •aristippus of cyrene, on nature of pleasure and pain •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 330, 333, 382, 383
32. Aelian, Varia Historia, 14.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, plato and •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 384, 385
33. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.215, 3.21.181 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, on nature of pleasure and pain •aristippus of cyrene, antisthenes and Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 330, 382
34. Apuleius, Florida, 2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic values •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 403
35. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 403
36. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.20.106 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, on nature of pleasure and pain Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 382
37. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.7-2.9, 2.12, 2.60-2.62, 2.65-2.69, 2.71-2.73, 2.75-2.82, 2.85-2.86, 2.89, 2.91, 2.93, 4.4, 6.2-6.3, 6.10-6.12, 6.15, 10.136-10.137 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic values •aristippus of cyrene, and payment for teaching •aristippus of cyrene, and virtue •aristippus of cyrene, life and character •aristippus of cyrene, antisthenes and •aristippus of cyrene, on nature of pleasure and pain •aristippus of cyrene, plato and •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic method •aristippus of cyrene, and value of externals Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 328, 330, 357, 382, 384, 385, 386, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 403, 404, 407
2.7. For, when they accused him of neglecting it, he replied, Why then do you not look after it? And at last he went into retirement and engaged in physical investigation without troubling himself about public affairs. When some one inquired, Have you no concern in your native land? Gently, he replied, I am greatly concerned with my fatherland, and pointed to the sky.He is said to have been twenty years old at the invasion of Xerxes and to have lived seventy-two years. Apollodorus in his Chronology says that he was born in the 70th Olympiad, and died in the first year of the 88th Olympiad. He began to study philosophy at Athens in the archonship of Callias when he was twenty; Demetrius of Phalerum states this in his list of archons; and at Athens they say he remained for thirty years. 2.8. He declared the sun to be a mass of red-hot metal and to be larger than the Peloponnesus, though others ascribe this view to Tantalus; he declared that there were dwellings on the moon, and moreover hills and ravines. He took as his principles the homoeomeries or homogeneous molecules; for just as gold consists of fine particles which are called gold-dust, so he held the whole universe to be compounded of minute bodies having parts homogeneous to themselves. His moving principle was Mind; of bodies, he said, some, like earth, were heavy, occupying the region below, others, light like fire, held the region above, while water and air were intermediate in position. For in this way over the earth, which is flat, the sea sinks down after the moisture has been evaporated by the sun. 2.9. In the beginning the stars moved in the sky as in a revolving dome, so that the celestial pole which is always visible was vertically overhead; but subsequently the pole took its inclined position. He held the Milky Way to be a reflection of the light of stars which are not shone upon by the sun; comets to be a conjunction of planets which emit flames; shooting-stars to be a sort of sparks thrown off by the air. He held that winds arise when the air is rarefied by the sun's heat; that thunder is a clashing together of the clouds, lightning their violent friction; an earthquake a subsidence of air into the earth.Animals were produced from moisture, heat, and an earthy substance; later the species were propagated by generation from one another, males from the right side, females from the left. 2.12. and says that Anaxagoras declared the whole firmament to be made of stones; that the rapidity of rotation caused it to cohere; and that if this were relaxed it would fall.of the trial of Anaxagoras different accounts are given. Sotion in his Succession of the Philosophers says that he was indicted by Cleon on a charge of impiety, because he declared the sun to be a mass of red-hot metal; that his pupil Pericles defended him, and he was fined five talents and banished. Satyrus in his Lives says that the prosecutor was Thucydides, the opponent of Pericles, and the charge one of treasonable correspondence with Persia as well as of impiety; and that sentence of death was passed on Anaxagoras by default. 2.60. 7. AESCHINESAeschines was the son of Charinus the sausagemaker, but others make his father's name Lysanias. He was a citizen of Athens, industrious from his birth up. For this reason he never quitted Socrates; hence Socrates' remark, Only the sausage-maker's son knows how to honour me. Idomeneus declared that it was Aeschines, not Crito, who advised Socrates in the prison about making his escape, but that Plato put the words into the mouth of Crito because Aeschines was more attached to Aristippus than to himself. It was said maliciously – by Menedemus of Eretria in particular – that most of the dialogues which Aeschines passed off as his own were really dialogues of Socrates obtained by him from Xanthippe. Those of them which are said to have no beginning (ἀκέφαλοι) are very slovenly and show none of the vigour of Socrates; Pisistratus of Ephesus even denied that they were written by Aeschines. 2.61. Persaeus indeed attributes the majority of the seven to Pasiphon of the school of Eretria, who inserted them among the dialogues of Aeschines. Moreover, Aeschines made use of the Little Cyrus, the Lesser Heracles and the Alcibiades of Antisthenes as well as dialogues by other authors. However that may be, of the writings of Aeschines those stamped with a Socratic character are seven, namely Miltiades, which for that reason is somewhat weak; then Callias, Axiochus, Aspasia, Alcibiades, Telauges, and Rhinon.They say that want drove him to Sicily to the court of Dionysius, and that Plato took no notice of him, but he was introduced to Dionysius by Aristippus, and on presenting certain dialogues received gifts from him. 2.62. Afterwards on his return to Athens he did not venture to lecture owing to the popularity of Plato and Aristippus. But he took fees from pupils, and subsequently composed forensic speeches for aggrieved clients. This is the point of Timon's reference to him as the might of Aeschines, that not unconvincing writer. They say that Socrates, seeing how he was pinched by poverty, advised him to borrow from himself by reducing his rations. Aristippus among others had suspicions of the genuineness of his dialogues. At all events, as he was reading one at Megara, Aristippus rallied him by asking, Where did you get that, you thief? 2.65. 8. ARISTIPPUSAristippus was by birth a citizen of Cyrene and, as Aeschines informs us, was drawn to Athens by the fame of Socrates. Having come forward as a lecturer or sophist, as Phanias of Eresus, the Peripatetic, informs us, he was the first of the followers of Socrates to charge fees and to send money to his master. And on one occasion the sum of twenty minae which he had sent was returned to him, Socrates declaring that the supernatural sign would not let him take it; the very offer, in fact, annoyed him. Xenophon was no friend to Aristippus; and for this reason he has made Socrates direct against Aristippus the discourse in which he denounces pleasure. Not but what Theodorus in his work On Sects abuses him, and so does Plato in the dialogue On the Soul, as has been shown elsewhere. 2.66. He was capable of adapting himself to place, time and person, and of playing his part appropriately under whatever circumstances. Hence he found more favour than anybody else with Dionysius, because he could always turn the situation to good account. He derived pleasure from what was present, and did not toil to procure the enjoyment of something not present Hence Diogenes called him the king's poodle Timon, too, sneered at him for luxury in these words:Such was the delicate nature of Aristippus, who groped after error by touch.He is said to have ordered a partridge to be bought at a cost of fifty drachmae, and, when someone censured him, he inquired, Would not you have given an obol for it? and, being answered in the affirmative, rejoined, Fifty drachmae are no more to me. 2.67. And when Dionysius gave him his choice of three courtesans, he carried off all three, saying, Paris paid dearly for giving the preference to one out of three. And when he had brought them as far as the porch, he let them go. To such lengths did he go both in choosing and in disdaining. Hence the remark of Strato, or by some accounts of Plato, You alone are endowed with the gift to flaunt in robes or go in rags. He bore with Dionysius when he spat on him, and to one who took him to task he replied, If the fishermen let themselves be drenched with sea-water in order to catch a gudgeon, ought I not to endure to be wetted with negus in order to take a blenny? 2.68. Diogenes, washing the dirt from his vegetables, saw him passing and jeered at him in these terms, If you had learnt to make these your diet, you would not have paid court to kings, to which his rejoinder was, And if you knew how to associate with men, you would not be washing vegetables. Being asked what he had gained from philosophy, he replied, The ability to feel at ease in any society. Being reproached for his extravagance, he said, If it were wrong to be extravagant, it would not be in vogue at the festivals of the gods.Being once asked what advantage philosophers have, he replied, Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on living as we do now. 2.69. When Dionysius inquired what was the reason that philosophers go to rich men's houses, while rich men no longer visit philosophers, his reply was that the one know what they need while the other do not. When he was reproached by Plato for his extravagance, he inquired, Do you think Dionysius a good man? and the reply being in the affirmative, And yet, said he, he lives more extravagantly than I do. So that there is nothing to hinder a man living extravagantly and well. To the question how the educated differ from the uneducated, he replied, Exactly as horses that have been trained differ from untrained horses. One day, as he entered the house of a courtesan, one of the lads with him blushed, whereupon he remarked, It is not going in that is dangerous, but being unable to go out. 2.71. It happened once that he set sail for Corinth and, being overtaken by a storm, he was in great consternation. Some one said, We plain men are not alarmed, and are you philosophers turned cowards? To this he replied, The lives at stake in the two cases are not comparable. When some one gave himself airs for his wide learning, this is what he said: As those who eat most and take the most exercise are not better in health than those who restrict themselves to what they require, so too it is not wide reading but useful reading that tends to excellence. An advocate, having pleaded for him and won the case, thereupon put the question, What good did Socrates do you? Thus much, was the reply, that what you said of me in your speech was true. 2.72. He gave his daughter Arete the very best advice, training her up to despise excess. He was asked by some one in what way his son would be the better for being educated. He replied, If nothing more than this, at all events, when in the theatre he will not sit down like a stone upon stone. When some one brought his son as a pupil, he asked a fee of 500 drachmae. The father objected, For that sum I can buy a slave. Then do so, was the reply, and you will have two. He said that he did not take money from his friends for his own use, but to teach them upon what objects their money should be spent. When he was reproached for employing a rhetorician to conduct his case, he made reply, Well, if I give a dinner, I hire a cook. 2.73. Being once compelled by Dionysius to enunciate some doctrine of philosophy, It would be ludicrous, he said, that you should learn from me what to say, and yet instruct me when to say it. At this, they say, Dionysius was offended and made him recline at the end of the table. And Aristippus said, You must have wished to confer distinction on the last place. To some one who boasted of his diving, Are you not ashamed, said he, to brag of that which a dolphin can do? Being asked on one occasion what is the difference between the wise man and the unwise, Strip them both, said he, and send them among strangers and you will know. To one who boasted that he could drink a great deal without getting drunk, his rejoinder was, And so can a mule. 2.75. To those who censured him his defence was, I have Lais, not she me; and it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted. to one who reproached him with extravagance in catering, he replied, Wouldn't you have bought this if you could have got it for three obols? The answer being in the affirmative, Very well, then, said Aristippus, I am no longer a lover of pleasure, it is you who are a lover of money. One day Simus, the steward of Dionysius, a Phrygian by birth and a rascally fellow, was showing him costly houses with tesselated pavements, when Aristippus coughed up phlegm and spat in his face. And on his resenting this he replied, I could not find any place more suitable. 2.76. When Charondas (or, as others say, Phaedo) inquired, Who is this who reeks with unguents? he replied, It is I, unlucky wight, and the still more unlucky Persian king. But, as none of the other animals are at any disadvantage on that account, consider whether it be not the same with man. Confound the effeminates who spoil for us the use of good perfume. Being asked how Socrates died, he answered, As I would wish to die myself. Polyxenus the sophist once paid him a visit and, after having seen ladies present and expensive entertainment, reproached him with it later. After an interval Aristippus asked him, Can you join us today? 2.77. On the other accepting the invitation, Aristippus inquired, Why, then, did you find fault? For you appear to blame the cost and not the entertainment. When his servant was carrying money and found the load too heavy – the story is told by Bion in his Lectures – Aristippus cried, Pour away the greater part, and carry no more than you can manage. Being once on a voyage, as soon as he discovered the vessel to be manned by pirates, he took out his money and began to count it, and then, as if by inadvertence, he let the money fall into the sea, and naturally broke out into lamentation. Another version of the story attributes to him the further remark that it was better for the money to perish on account of Aristippus than for Aristippus to perish on account of the money. Dionysius once asked him what he was come for, and he said it was to impart what he had and obtain what he had not. 2.78. But some make his answer to have been, When I needed wisdom, I went to Socrates; now that I am in need of money, I come to you. He used to complain of mankind that in purchasing earthenware they made trial whether it rang true, but had no regular standard by which to judge life. Others attribute this remark to Diogenes. One day Dionysius over the wine commanded everybody to put on purple and dance. Plato declined, quoting the line:I could not stoop to put on women's robes.Aristippus, however, put on the dress and, as he was about to dance, was ready with the repartee:Even amid the Bacchic revelryTrue modesty will not be put to shame. 2.79. He made a request to Dionysius on behalf of a friend and, failing to obtain it, fell down at his feet. And when some one jeered at him, he made reply, It is not I who am to blame, but Dionysius who has his ears in his feet. He was once staying in Asia and was taken prisoner by Artaphernes, the satrap. Can you be cheerful under these circumstances? some one asked. Yes, you simpleton, was the reply, for when should I be more cheerful than now that I am about to converse with Artaphernes? Those who went through the ordinary curriculum, but in their studies stopped short at philosophy, he used to compare to the suitors of Penelope. For the suitors won Melantho, Polydora and the rest of the handmaidens, but were anything but successful in their wooing of the mistress. 2.80. A similar remark is ascribed to Ariston. For, he said, when Odysseus went down into the under-world, he saw nearly all the dead and made their acquaintance, but he never set eyes upon their queen herself.Again, when Aristippus was asked what are the subjects which handsome boys ought to learn, his reply was, Those which will be useful to them when they are grown up. To the critic who censured him for leaving Socrates to go to Dionysius, his rejoinder was, Yes, but I came to Socrates for education and to Dionysius for recreation. When he had made some money by teaching, Socrates asked him, Where did you get so much? to which he replied, Where you got so little. 2.81. A courtesan having told him that she was with child by him, he replied, You are no more sure of this than if, after running through coarse rushes, you were to say you had been pricked by one in particular. Someone accused him of exposing his son as if it was not his offspring Whereupon he replied, Phlegm, too, and vermin we know to be of our own begetting, but for all that, because they are useless, we cast them as far from us as possible. He received a sum of money from Dionysius at the same time that Plato carried off a book and, when he was twitted with this, his reply was,, Well, I want money, Plato wants books. Some one asked him why he let himself be refuted by Dionysius. For the same reason, said he, as the others refute him. 2.82. Dionysius met a request of his for money with the words, Nay, but you told me that the wise man would never be in want. To which he retorted, Pay! Pay! and then let us discuss the question; and when he was paid, Now you see, do you not, said he, that I was not found wanting? Dionysius having repeated to him the lines:Whoso betakes him to a prince's court Becomes his slave, albeit of free birth,he retorted:If a free man he come, no slave is he.This is stated by Diocles in his work On the Lives of Philosophers; other writers refer the anecdotes to Plato. After getting in a rage with Aeschines, he presently addressed him thus: Are we not to make it up and desist from vapouring, or will you wait for some one to reconcile us over the wine-bowl? To which he replied, Agreed. 2.85. According to Sotion in his second book, and Panaetius, the following treatises are his:On Education.On Virtue.Introduction to Philosophy.Artabazus.The Ship-wrecked.The Exiles.Six books of Essays.Three books of Occasional Writings (χρεῖαι).To Lais.To Porus.To Socrates.On Fortune.He laid down as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation.Having written his life, let me now proceed to pass in review the philosophers of the Cyrenaic school which sprang from him, although some call themselves followers of Hegesias, others followers of Anniceris, others again of Theodorus. Not but what we shall notice further the pupils of Phaedo, the chief of whom were called the school of Eretria. 2.86. The case stands thus. The disciples of Aristippus were his daughter Arete, Aethiops of Ptolemais, and Antipater of Cyrene. The pupil of Arete was Aristippus, who went by the name of mother-taught, and his pupil was Theodorus, known as the atheist, subsequently as god. Antipater's pupil was Epitimides of Cyrene, his was Paraebates, and he had as pupils Hegesias, the advocate of suicide, and Anniceris, who ransomed Plato.Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. 2.89. The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. 2.91. They do not accept the doctrine that every wise man lives pleasantly and every fool painfully, but regard it as true for the most part only. It is sufficient even if we enjoy but each single pleasure as it comes. They say that prudence is a good, though desirable not in itself but on account of its consequences; that we make friends from interested motives, just as we cherish any part of the body so long as we have it; that some of the virtues are found even in the foolish; that bodily training contributes to the acquisition of virtue; that the sage will not give way to envy or love or superstition, since these weaknesses are due to mere empty opinion; he will, however, feel pain and fear, these being natural affections; 2.93. They also held that nothing is just or honourable or base by nature, but only by convention and custom. Nevertheless the good man will be deterred from wrong-doing by the penalties imposed and the prejudices that it would arouse. Further that the wise man really exists. They allow progress to be attainable in philosophy as well as in other matters. They maintain that the pain of one man exceeds that of another, and that the senses are not always true and trustworthy.The school of Hegesias, as it is called, adopted the same ends, namely pleasure and pain. In their view there is no such thing as gratitude or friendship or beneficence, because it is not for themselves that we choose to do these things but simply from motives of interest, apart from which such conduct is nowhere found. 4.4. Plutarch in the Lives of Lysander and Sulla makes his malady to have been morbus pedicularis. That his body wasted away is affirmed by Timotheus in his book On Lives. Speusippus, he says, meeting a rich man who was in love with one who was no beauty, said to him, Why, pray, are you in such sore need of him? For ten talents I will find you a more handsome bride.He has left behind a vast store of memoirs and numerous dialogues, among them:Aristippus the Cyrenaic.On Wealth, one book.On Pleasure, one book.On Justice,On Philosophy,On Friendship,On the Gods,The Philosopher,A Reply to Cephalus,Cephalus,Clinomachus or Lysias,The Citizen,of the Soul,A Reply to Gryllus, 6.2. To begin with, he became a pupil of Gorgias the rhetorician, and hence the rhetorical style that he introduces in his dialogues, and especially in his Truth and in his Exhortations. According to Hermippus he intended at the public gathering for the Isthmian games to discourse on the faults and merits of Athenians, Thebans and Lacedaemonians, but begged to be excused when he saw throngs arriving from those cities.Later on, however, he came into touch with Socrates, and derived so much benefit from him that he used to advise his own disciples to become fellow-pupils with him of Socrates. He lived in the Peiraeus, and every day would tramp the five miles to Athens in order to hear Socrates. From Socrates he learned his hardihood, emulating his disregard of feeling, and thus he inaugurated the Cynic way of life. He demonstrated that pain is a good thing by instancing the great Heracles and Cyrus, drawing the one example from the Greek world and the other from the barbarians. 6.3. He was the first to define statement (or assertion) by saying that a statement is that which sets forth what a thing was or is. He used repeatedly to say, I'd rather be mad than feel pleasure, and We ought to make love to such women as will feel a proper gratitude. When a lad from Pontus was about to attend his lectures, and asked him what he required, the answer was, Come with a new book, a new pen, and new tablets, if you have a mind to (implying the need of brains as well). When someone inquired what sort of wife he ought to marry, he said, If she's beautiful, you'll not have her to yourself; if she's ugly, you'll pay for it dearly. Being told that Plato was abusing him, he remarked, It is a royal privilege to do good and be ill spoken of. 6.10. For he fell in with some youths from Pontus whom the fame of Socrates had brought to Athens, and he led them off to Anytus, whom he ironically declared to be wiser than Socrates; whereupon (it is said) those about him with much indignation drove Anytus out of the city. If he saw a woman anywhere decked out with ornaments, he would hasten to her house and bid her husband bring out his horse and arms, and then, if the man possessed them, let his extravagance alone, for (he said) the man could with these defend himself; but, if he had none, he would bid him strip off the finery.Favourite themes with him were the following. He would prove that virtue can be taught; that nobility belongs to none other than the virtuous. 6.11. And he held virtue to be sufficient in itself to ensure happiness, since it needed nothing else except the strength of a Socrates. And he maintained that virtue is an affair of deeds and does not need a store of words or learning; that the wise man is self-sufficing, for all the goods of others are his; that ill repute is a good thing and much the same as pain; that the wise man will be guided in his public acts not by the established laws but by the law of virtue; that he will also marry in order to have children from union with the handsomest women; furthermore that he will not disdain to love, for only the wise man knows who are worthy to be loved. 6.12. Diocles records the following sayings of his: To the wise man nothing is foreign or impracticable. A good man deserves to be loved. Men of worth are friends. Make allies of men who are at once brave and just. Virtue is a weapon that cannot be taken away. It is better to be with a handful of good men fighting against all the bad, than with hosts of bad men against a handful of good men. Pay attention to your enemies, for they are the first to discover your mistakes. Esteem an honest man above a kinsman. Virtue is the same for women as for men. Good actions are fair and evil actions foul. Count all wickedness foreign and alien. 6.15. Antisthenes gave the impulse to the indifference of Diogenes, the continence of Crates, and the hardihood of Zeno, himself laying the foundations of their state. Xenophon calls him the most agreeable of men in conversation and the most temperate in everything else.His writings are preserved in ten volumes. The first includes:A Treatise on Expression, or Styles of Speaking.Ajax, or The Speech of Ajax.Odysseus, or Concerning Odysseus.A Defence of Orestes, or Concerning Forensic Writers.Isography (similar writing), or Lysias and Isocrates.A Reply to the Speech of Isocrates entitled Without Witnesses.Vol. 2 includes:of the Nature of Animals.of Procreation of Children, or of Marriage: a discourse on love.of the Sophists: a work on Physiognomy. 10.136. He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are: Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest. The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are: Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity. 10.137. He further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they hold that pains of body are worse than mental pains; at all events evil-doers are made to suffer bodily punishment; whereas Epicurus holds the pains of the mind to be the worse; at any rate the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present. In this way also he holds mental pleasures to be greater than those of the body. And as proof that pleasure is the end he adduces the fact that living things, so soon as they are born, are well content with pleasure and are at enmity with pain, by the prompting of nature and apart from reason. Left to our own feelings, then, we shun pain; as when even Heracles, devoured by the poisoned robe, cries aloud,And bites and yells, and rock to rock resounds,Headlands of Locris and Euboean cliffs.
38. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.8.6-3.8.10, 7.7.11 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, plato and •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 386
39. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 14.18.31-14.18.32 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism •aristippus of cyrene, life and character •aristippus of cyrene, on nature of pleasure and pain Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 383, 387, 388
40. Lactantius, Epitome Divinarum Institutionum, 28.3 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, plato and •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 386
41. John Chrysostom, Homilies On Matthew, 33.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 400
42. Stobaeus, Anthology, 3.17.17, 3.37.24, 4.8.18, 4.8.23 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and value of externals •aristippus of cyrene, and virtue •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic values •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 394, 395
43. Philodemus, De Electionibus Et Fugis, 2.5-2.15, 3.6-3.14, 17.1-17.3  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and hedonism Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 404, 405
45. Aristippus of Cyrene, Ssr Iv A, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 402
46. Papyri, Papyri Herculanenses, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 404
50. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 3, 18  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 404
52. Suidas Thessalius, Fragments, None  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and value of externals •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 396
53. Plutarch, [De Vita Et Poesia Homeri], 2.150  Tagged with subjects: •aristippus of cyrene, and socratic values •aristippus of cyrene, and value of externals •aristippus of cyrene, life and character Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 397
54. Anon., Socraticorum Epistulae, 11, 16, 27  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 396, 397