1. Homer, Odyssey, 19.34 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22| 19.34. χρύσεον λύχνον ἔχουσα, φάος περικαλλὲς ἐποίει. | |
|
2. Homer, Iliad, 20.95 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22| 20.95. ἥ οἱ πρόσθεν ἰοῦσα τίθει φάος ἠδʼ ἐκέλευεν | 20.95. who ever went before him and set there a light of deliverance, and bade him slay Leleges and Trojans with spear of bronze. Wherefore may it not be that any man face Achilles in fight, for that ever by his side is some god, that wardeth from him ruin. Aye, and of itself his spear flieth straight, and ceaseth not |
|
3. Plato, Phaedrus, 242b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22| 242b. λόγων μηδένα πλείους ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι γεγενῆσθαι ἤτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα —Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πάμπολυ κρατεῖς—καὶ νῦν αὖ δοκεῖς αἴτιός μοι γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι. ΦΑΙ. οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτῳ; ΣΩ. ἡνίκʼ ἔμελλον, ὠγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο | 242b. no one of all those who have been born in your lifetime has produced more discourses than you, either by speaking them yourself or compelling others to do so. I except Simmias the Theban; but you are far ahead of all the rest. And now I think you have become the cause of another, spoken by me. Phaedrus. That is not exactly a declaration of war! But how is this, and what is the discourse? Socrates. My good friend, when I was about to cross the stream, the spirit and the sign |
|
| 4. Plato, Laws, 876e4-877b2 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 49 |
5. Plato, Apology of Socrates, 40b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22| 40b. οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν. καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτʼ ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτʼ ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, | 40b. either when I left my home in the morning, or when I came here to the court, or at any point of my speech, when I was going to say anything; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech; but now, in this affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying. What then do I suppose is the reason? I will tell you. This which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing, and those of us who think death is an evil |
|
6. Plato, Theages, 129b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22| 129b. ἀνίστατο ἐκ τοῦ συμποσίου ὁ Τίμαρχος καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ Φιλημονίδου ἀποκτενοῦντες Νικίαν τὸν Ἡροσκαμάνδρου, ἠπιστάσθην μὲν αὐτὼ μόνω τὴν ἐπιβουλήν, ὁ δὲ Τίμαρχος ἀνιστάμενος πρὸς ἐμὲ εἶπεν, τί λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; ὑμεῖς μὲν πίνετε, ἐμὲ δὲ δεῖ ποι ἐξαναστῆναι· ἥξω δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ἐὰν τύχω. καί μοι ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, μηδαμῶς, ἔφην, ἀναστῇς· γέγονε γάρ μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. καὶ ὃς ἐπέσχε. | 129b. on of Philemonides, got up from the wine-party to kill Nicias, son of Heroscamandrus, those two alone had knowledge of the plot; and Timarchus, as he got up, said to me: What say you, Socrates? Go on drinking, all of you; I have to get up and go somewhere, but I will join you a little later, if I get the chance. Then occurred that voice of mine, and I said to him: No, no, do not get up; for my accustomed spiritual sign has occurred to me. |
|
7. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis (dds) Found in books: Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 142| 5.10. Nec vero Pythagoras nominis solum inventor, sed rerum etiam ipsarum amplificator amplicator G fuit. qui cum post cum post ( eras. q) K hunc Phliasium sermonem in Italiam venisset, exornavit eam Graeciam, quae magna dicta est, et privatim et publice praestantissumis et institutis et artibus. cuius de disciplina aliud tempus fuerit fortasse dicendi. sed ab antiqua philosophia usque ad Socratem, qui Archelaum, Anaxagorae discipulum, audierat, numeri motusque tractabantur, et unde omnia orerentur orarentur K quove reciderent, recederent X corr. V 1 aut c s studioseque ab is siderum magnitudines intervalla cursus currus G 1 antiquirebantur G ( alt. i e corr. 2 ) anquirebantur et cuncta caelestia. Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus domos s ac fort. V 1 (u e corr. c ) domibus Gr. etiam introduxit et coëgit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere. | |
|
8. Cicero, On Divination, 2.19-2.21 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 437| 2.19. Aut si negas esse fortunam et omnia, quae fiunt quaeque futura sunt, ex omni aeternitate definita dicis esse fataliter, muta definitionem divinationis, quam dicebas praesensionem esse rerum fortuitarum. Si enim nihil fieri potest, nihil accidere, nihil evenire, nisi quod ab omni aeternitate certum fuerit esse futurum rato tempore, quae potest esse fortuna? qua sublata qui locus est divinationi? quae a te fortuitarum rerum est dicta praesensio. Quamquam dicebas omnia, quae fierent futurave essent, fato contineri. Anile sane et plenum superstitionis fati nomen ipsum; sed tamen apud Stoicos de isto fato multa dicuntur; de quo alias; nunc quod necesse est. 2.20. Si omnia fato, quid mihi divinatio prodest? Quod enim is, qui divinat, praedicit, id vero futurum est, ut ne illud quidem sciam quale sit, quod Deiotarum, necessarium nostrum, ex itinere aquila revocavit; qui nisi revertisset, in eo conclavi ei cubandum fuisset, quod proxuma nocte corruit; ruina igitur oppressus esset. At id neque, si fatum fuerat, effugisset nec, si non fuerat, in eum casum incidisset. Quid ergo adiuvat divinatio? aut quid est, quod me moneant aut sortes aut exta aut ulla praedictio? Si enim fatum fuit classes populi Romani bello Punico primo, alteram naufragio, alteram a Poenis depressam, interire, etiamsi tripudium solistumum pulli fecissent L. Iunio et P. Claudio consulibus, classes tamen interissent. Sin, cum auspiciis obtemperatum esset, interiturae classes non fuerunt, non interierunt fato; vultis autem omnia fato; 2.21. nulla igitur est divinatio. Quodsi fatum fuit bello Punico secundo exercitum populi Romani ad lacum Trasumennum interire, num id vitari potuit, si Flaminius consul iis signis iisque auspiciis, quibus pugnare prohibebatur, paruisset? Certe potuit. Aut igitur non fato interiit exercitus, aut, si fato (quod certe vobis ita dicendum est), etiamsi obtemperasset auspiciis, idem eventurum fuisset; mutari enim fata non possunt. Ubi est igitur ista divinatio Stoicorum? quae, si fato omnia fiunt, nihil nos admonere potest, ut cautiores simus; quoquo enim modo nos gesserimus, fiet tamen illud, quod futurum est; sin autem id potest flecti, nullum est fatum; ita ne divinatio quidem, quoniam ea rerum futurarum est. Nihil autem est pro certo futurum, quod potest aliqua procuratione accidere ne fiat. | 2.19. But if you deny the existence of chance and assert that the course of everything present or future has been inevitably determined from all eternity, then you must change your definition of divination, which you said was the foreknowledge of things that happen by chance. For if nothing can happen, nothing befall, nothing come to pass, except what has been determined from all eternity as bound to happen at a fixed time, how can there be such a thing as chance? And if there is no such thing as chance, what room is there for that divination, which you termed a foreknowledge of things that happen by chance? And you were inconsistent enough, too, to say that everything that is or will be is controlled by Fate! Why, the very word Fate is full of superstition and old womens credulity, and yet the Stoics have much to say of this Fate of yours. A discussion on Fate is reserved for another occasion; at present I shall speak of it only in so far as it is necessary. [8] 2.21. Again, if it was the will of Fate that the Roman army should perish at Lake Trasimenus in the Second Punic War, could that result have been avoided if the consul Flaminius had obeyed the signs and the auspices which forbade his joining battle? Assuredly not. Therefore, either the army did not perish by the will of Fate, or, if it did (and you are certainly bound as a Stoic to say that it did), the same result would have happened even if the auspices had been obeyed; for the decrees of Fate are unchangeable. Then what becomes of that vaunted divination of you Stoics? For if all things happen by Fate, it does us no good to be warned to be on our guard, since that which is to happen, will happen regardless of what we do. But if that which is to be can be turned aside, there is no such thing as Fate; so, too, there is no such thing as divination — since divination deals with things that are going to happen. But nothing is certain to happen which there is some means of dealing with so as to prevent its happening. [9] |
|
9. Plutarch, On The Sign of Socrates, 580d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22 | 580d. Showed him the way, illuminating his path in matters dark and inscrutable to human wisdom, through the frequent concordance of the sign with his own decisions, to which it lent a divine sanction. For further and greater instances you must ask Simmias and Socrates' other friends; but Iwas myself present (Ihad come to visit Euthyphron the soothsayer) when Socrates â you recall the incident, Simmias â happened to be making the ascent toward the Symbolon and the house of Andocides, putting some question to Euthyphron the while and sounding him out playfully. |
|
| 10. Vettius Valens, Anthologies, 1.1.1-1.1.2 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22 |
| 11. Apuleius, On Plato, 1.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis (dds) Found in books: Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 129 |
| 12. Apuleius, De Mundo, 24 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis (dds) Found in books: Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 133, 142 |
| 13. Apuleius, On The God of Socrates, 6.132, 15.151, 16.155 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22; Pinheiro et al., Philosophy and the Ancient Novel (2015) 94 |
| 14. Augustine, De Divinatione Demonum, 1.1-2.6, 2.6 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 437 |
| 15. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations, 38.9 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: MacDougall, Philosophy at the Festival: The Festal Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus and the Classical Tradition (2022) 115 |
16. Augustine, The City of God, 8.5, 8.12 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis (dds) Found in books: Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 271 | 8.5. If, then, Plato defined the wise man as one who imitates, knows, loves this God, and who is rendered blessed through fellowship with Him in His own blessedness, why discuss with the other philosophers? It is evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists. To them, therefore, let that fabulous theology give place which delights the minds of men with the crimes of the gods; and that civil theology also, in which impure demons, under the name of gods, have seduced the peoples of the earth given up to earthly pleasures, desiring to be honored by the errors of men, and by filling the minds of their worshippers with impure desires, exciting them to make the representation of their crimes one of the rites of their worship, while they themselves found in the spectators of these exhibitions a most pleasing spectacle - a theology in which, whatever was honorable in the temple, was defiled by its mixture with the obscenity of the theatre, and whatever was base in the theatre was vindicated by the abominations of the temples. To these philosophers also the interpretations of Varro must give place, in which he explains the sacred rites as having reference to heaven and earth, and to the seeds and operations of perishable things; for, in the first place, those rites have not the signification which he would have men believe is attached to them, and therefore truth does not follow him in his attempt so to interpret them; and even if they had this signification, still those things ought not to be worshipped by the rational soul as its god which are placed below it in the scale of nature, nor ought the soul to prefer to itself as gods things to which the true God has given it the preference. The same must be said of those writings pertaining to the sacred rites, which Numa Pompilius took care to conceal by causing them to be buried along with himself, and which, when they were afterwards turned up by the plough, were burned by order of the senate. And, to treat Numa with all honor, let us mention as belonging to the same rank as these writings that which Alexander of Macedon wrote to his mother as communicated to him by Leo, an Egyptian high priest. In this letter not only Picus and Faunus, and Æneas and Romulus or even Hercules, and Æsculapius and Liber, born of Semele, and the twin sons of Tyndareus, or any other mortals who have been deified, but even the principal gods themselves, to whom Cicero, in his Tusculan questions, alludes without mentioning their names, Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others whom Varro attempts to identify with the parts or the elements of the world, are shown to have been men. There is, as we have said, a similarity between this case and that of Numa; for the priest being afraid because he had revealed a mystery, earnestly begged of Alexander to command his mother to burn the letter which conveyed these communications to her. Let these two theologies, then, the fabulous and the civil, give place to the Platonic philosophers, who have recognized the true God as the author of all things, the source of the light of truth, and the bountiful bestower of all blessedness. And not these only, but to these great acknowledgers of so great a God, those philosophers must yield who, having their mind enslaved to their body, supposed the principles of all things to be material; as Thales, who held that the first principle of all things was water; Anaximenes, that it was air; the Stoics, that it was fire; Epicurus, who affirmed that it consisted of atoms, that is to say, of minute corpuscules; and many others whom it is needless to enumerate, but who believed that bodies, simple or compound, animate or iimate, but nevertheless bodies, were the cause and principle of all things. For some of them - as, for instance, the Epicureans- believed that living things could originate from things without life; others held that all things living or without life spring from a living principle, but that, nevertheless, all things, being material, spring from a material principle. For the Stoics thought that fire, that is, one of the four material elements of which this visible world is composed, was both living and intelligent, the maker of the world and of all things contained in it - that it was in fact God. These and others like them have only been able to suppose that which their hearts enslaved to sense have vainly suggested to them. And yet they have within themselves something which they could not see: they represented to themselves inwardly things which they had seen without, even when they were not seeing them, but only thinking of them. But this representation in thought is no longer a body, but only the similitude of a body; and that faculty of the mind by which this similitude of a body is seen is neither a body nor the similitude of a body; and the faculty which judges whether the representation is beautiful or ugly is without doubt superior to the object judged of. This principle is the understanding of man, the rational soul; and it is certainly not a body, since that similitude of a body which it beholds and judges of is itself not a body. The soul is neither earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire, of which four bodies, called the four elements, we see that this world is composed. And if the soul is not a body, how should God, its Creator, be a body? Let all those philosophers, then, give place, as we have said, to the Platonists, and those also who have been ashamed to say that God is a body, but yet have thought that our souls are of the same nature as God. They have not been staggered by the great changeableness of the soul - an attribute which it would be impious to ascribe to the divine nature, - but they say it is the body which changes the soul, for in itself it is unchangeable. As well might they say, Flesh is wounded by some body, for in itself it is invulnerable. In a word, that which is unchangeable can be changed by nothing, so that that which can be changed by the body cannot properly be said to be immutable. 8.12. But we need not determine from what source he learned these things - whether it was from the books of the ancients who preceded him, or, as is more likely, from the words of the apostle: Because that which is known of God, has been manifested among them, for God has manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by those things which have been made, also His eternal power and Godhead. Romans 1:20 From whatever source he may have derived this knowledge, then, I think I have made it sufficiently plain that I have not chosen the Platonic philosophers undeservedly as the parties with whom to discuss; because the question we have just taken up concerns the natural theology, - the question, namely, whether sacred rites are to be performed to one God, or to many, for the sake of the happiness which is to be after death. I have specially chosen them because their juster thoughts concerning the one God who made heaven and earth, have made them illustrious among philosophers. This has given them such superiority to all others in the judgment of posterity, that, though Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, a man of eminent abilities, inferior in eloquence to Plato, yet far superior to many in that respect, had founded the Peripatetic sect - so called because they were in the habit of walking about during their disputations - and though he had, through the greatness of his fame, gathered very many disciples into his school, even during the life of his master; and though Plato at his death was succeeded in his school, which was called the Academy, by Speusippus, his sister's son, and Xenocrates, his beloved disciple, who, together with their successors, were called from this name of the school, Academics; nevertheless the most illustrious recent philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato, have been unwilling to be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but have preferred the name of Platonists. Among these were the renowned Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, who were Greeks, and the African Apuleius, who was learned both in the Greek and Latin tongues. All these, however, and the rest who were of the same school, and also Plato himself, thought that sacred rites ought to be performed in honor of many gods. |
|
| 17. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, 2.302 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis (dds) Found in books: Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 102, 129, 133, 142, 271 |
| 18. Augustine, Letters, 9.2-9.3 (7th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 437 |
| 19. Ps.-Aristotle, Peri Kosmou, 391b19, 391b20, 391b21, 391b22, 391b23, 391b24, 391b25, 397b15, 397b14 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Hoenig, Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (2018) 133 |
| 20. Paulus Alexandrinus, Introduction, 23 Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22 |
| 21. Plato, Sixth Letter, 344b7 Tagged with subjects: •apuleius, de deo socratis Found in books: Gieseler Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology: Origins and Influence (2015) 22 |
