| 1. Plato, Sophist, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent •belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 22, 41 |
| 2. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent •belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 41 |
| 3. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 22 |
| 4. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 134 |
| 5. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 22, 41, 133 |
| 6. Aristotle, Poetics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 23 |
| 7. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 22, 23, 41 |
| 8. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 22 |
9. Cicero, On Duties, 1.101, 2.18 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent, questioning of appearances Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 331| 1.101. Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura; una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est o(rmh/ Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumque sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet. Omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate et neglegentia nec vero agere quicquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere; haec est enim fere discriptio officii. 2.18. Etenim virtus omnis tribus in rebus fere vertitur, quarum una est in perspiciendo, quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique, quid consequens, ex quo quaeque gigtur, quae cuiusque rei causa sit, alterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci pa/qh nomit, appetitionesque, quas illi o(rma/s, oboedientes efficere rationi, tertium iis, quibuscum congregemur, uti moderate et scienter, quorum studiis ea, quae natura desiderat, expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque, si quid importetur nobis incommodi, propulsemus ulciscamurque eos, qui nocere nobis conati sint, tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas humanitasque patitur. | 1.101. Now we find that the essential activity of the spirit is twofold: one force is appetite (that is, á½Ïμή, in Greek), which impels a man this way and that; the other is reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and what should be left undone. The result is that reason commands, appetite obeys. Again, every action ought to be free from undue haste or carelessness; neither ought we to do anything for which we cannot assign a reasonable motive; for in these words we have practically a definition of duty. 2.18. And, indeed, virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in three properties; the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is [Temperance,] the ability to restrain the passions (which the Greeks call Ïάθη) and make the impulses (á½Ïμαί) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated, in order that we may through their cooperation have our natural wants supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward of any impending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to injure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity will permit. |
|
10. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.22, 3.82-3.83, 4.14-4.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent, questioning of appearances •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 67, 332| 3.22. Haec sic sic R c? V c si X dicuntur a Stoicis concludunturque contortius. sed latius aliquando aliquando cf. 323,22 aliquanto s male, cf. de orat. 1, 133 opt. gen. 23 dicenda sunt et diffusius; sententiis tamen utendum eorum potissimum, qui qui ex quā ut v. G 2 maxime forti et, ut ita dicam, virili utuntur ratione atque sententia. nam Peripatetici, familiares nostri, quibus nihil est uberius, nihil eruditius, nihil gravius, mediocritates vel perturbationum vel morborum animi mihi non sane probant. omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, mediocre iocre in r. G 2 malum malum Bouh. magnum alt. id om. H est; nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. nam ut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, sanum non est, sic in animo ista mediocritas caret sanitate. itaque praeclare nostri, ut alia multa, molestiam sollicitudinem angorem propter similitudinem corporum aegrorum aegritudinem aegritudinem cf. Aug. civ. 14,17 ext. nominaverunt. 3.82. et tamen, ut medici uti medici K ( er. n) toto corpore curando minimae etiam parti, si condoluit, medentur, sic philosophia cum universam aegritudinem sustulit, sustulit aegritudinem sustulit tamen si X (sustullit G 1 V 1 condoluit tamen si K 1 medenturaegr. sustulit add. c ) corr. Keil, Quaest. Tull. p. XVIII etiam, si quis error alicunde alicunde Ern. aliunde extitit, si paupertas momordit, si ignominia pupugit, pupigit G 1 R 1 V 1 si quid tenebrarum obfudit exilium, exsilium GV 1 aut eorum quae quaeque (quaeque G) modo X corr. s modo dixi si quid si quid sicut K extitit. etsi singularum rerum sunt propriae consolationes, de quibus audies tu quidem, cum voles. sed ad eundem fontem revertendum est, aegritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod iis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur, sed iudicio, sed opinione, sed quadam invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri oportere. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.15. sed quae iudicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam etiam ilia H quae efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, metus recessum quendam animi et fugam, laetitia profusam hilaritatem, libido lubido K x li bido R effrenatam effrenata X corr. K 2 R c adpetentiam. opinationem autem, quam in omnis definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse inbecillam adsensionem. | |
|
| 11. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, None (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 134 |
| 12. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.1.5, 2.2.1-2.2.2, 2.2.4-2.2.6, 2.3.1-2.3.5, 2.4.1-2.4.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 66 |
| 13. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent •belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 41 |
| 14. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1, 15, 3, 9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 332 |
| 15. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent, questioning of appearances Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 332 |
| 16. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1.7, 1.1.23, 1.12.34, 1.17.21-1.17.28, 1.22.10, 2.18, 2.18.12, 2.19.32, 2.19.39, 3.3.14-3.3.19, 3.8.1-3.8.5, 3.24.69, 3.24.84-3.24.88, 4.1.72-4.1.80, 4.1.100, 4.1.111, 4.6.10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent, questioning of appearances •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 68, 215, 216, 330, 331, 332 |
| 17. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 68 |
| 18. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 113.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 66 |
| 19. Aspasius, Nicomachian Ethics, 42.27-47.2, 44.21, 44.22, 44.33-45.10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 41, 134 |
| 20. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.235 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 28 |
| 21. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 32.185.37 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 134 |
| 22. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 33, 205.15-22 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 332 |
| 23. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1.15 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 68 |
| 24. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 132 |
| 25. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 2.1.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent, questioning of appearances Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 216 |
26. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.114, 8.7, 10.34 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent, questioning of appearances Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 67, 134, 331 | 7.114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines:Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.Resentment is anger in an early stage.Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another's ills. Delight is the mind's propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue. 8.7. But the book which passes as the work of Pythagoras is by Lysis of Tarentum, a Pythagorean, who fled to Thebes and taught Epaminondas. Heraclides, the son of Serapion, in his Epitome of Sotion, says that he also wrote a poem On the Universe, and secondly the Sacred Poem which begins:Young men, come reverence in quietudeAll these my words;thirdly On the Soul, fourthly of Piety, fifthly Helothales the Father of Epicharmus of Cos, sixthly Croton, and other works as well. The same authority says that the poem On the Mysteries was written by Hippasus to defame Pythagoras, and that many others written by Aston of Croton were ascribed to Pythagoras. 10.34. Opinion they also call conception or assumption, and declare it to be true and false; for it is true if it is subsequently confirmed or if it is not contradicted by evidence, and false if it is not subsequently confirmed or is contradicted by evidence. Hence the introduction of the phrase, that which awaits confirmation, e.g. to wait and get close to the tower and then learn what it looks like at close quarters.They affirm that there are two states of feeling, pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined; and that there are two kinds of inquiry, the one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words. So much, then, for his division and criterion in their main outline.But we must return to the letter.Epicurus to Herodotus, greeting. |
|
27. Origen, On First Principles, 3.2.2 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 66 | 3.2.2. We, however, who see the reason (of the thing) more clearly, do not hold this opinion, taking into account those (sins) which manifestly originate as a necessary consequence of our bodily constitution. Must we indeed suppose that the devil is the cause of our feeling hunger or thirst? Nobody, I think, will venture to maintain that. If, then, he is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, wherein lies the difference when each individual has attained the age of puberty, and that period has called forth the incentives of the natural heat? It will undoubtedly follow, that as the devil is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, so neither is he the cause of that appetency which naturally arises at the time of maturity, viz., the desire of sexual intercourse. Now it is certain that this cause is not always so set in motion by the devil that we should be obliged to suppose that bodies would nor possess a desire for intercourse of that kind if the devil did not exist. Let us consider, in the next place, if, as we have already shown, food is desired by human beings, not from a suggestion of the devil, but by a kind of natural instinct, whether, if there were no devil, it were possible for human experience to exhibit such restraint in partaking of food as never to exceed the proper limits; i.e., that no one would either take otherwise than the case required, or more than reason would allow; and so it would result that men, observing due measure and moderation in the matter of eating, would never go wrong. I do not think, indeed, that so great moderation could be observed by men (even if there were no instigation by the devil inciting thereto), as that no individual, in partaking of food, would go beyond due limits and restraint, until he had learned to do so from long usage and experience. What, then, is the state of the case? In the matter of eating and drinking it was possible for us to go wrong, even without any incitement from the devil, if we should happen to be either less temperate or less careful (than we ought); and are we to suppose, then, in our appetite for sexual intercourse, or in the restraint of our natural desires, our condition is not something similar? I am of opinion, indeed, that the same course of reasoning must be understood to apply to other natural movements as those of covetousness, or of anger, or of sorrow, or of all those generally which through the vice of intemperance exceed the natural bounds of moderation. There are therefore manifest reasons for holding the opinion, that as in good things the human will is of itself weak to accomplish any good (for it is by divine help that it is brought to perfection in everything); so also, in things of an opposite nature we receive certain initial elements, and, as it were, seeds of sins, from those things which we use agreeably to nature; but when we have indulged them beyond what is proper, and have not resisted the first movements to intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the occasion of this first transgression, incites and presses us hard in every way, seeking to extend our sins over a wider field, and furnishing us human beings with occasions and beginnings of sins, which these hostile powers spread far and wide, and, if possible, beyond all limits. Thus, when men at first for a little desire money, covetousness begins to grow as the passion increases, and finally the fall into avarice takes place. And after this, when blindness of mind has succeeded passion, and the hostile powers, by their suggestions, hurry on the mind, money is now no longer desired, but stolen, and acquired by force, or even by shedding human blood. Finally, a confirmatory evidence of the fact that vices of such enormity proceed from demons, may be easily seen in this, that those individuals who are oppressed either by immoderate love, or incontrollable anger, or excessive sorrow, do not suffer less than those who are bodily vexed by devils. For it is recorded in certain histories, that some have fallen into madness from a state of love, others from a state of anger, not a few from a state of sorrow, and even from one of excessive joy; which results, I think, from this, that those opposing powers, i.e., those demons, having gained a lodgment in their minds which has been already laid open to them by intemperance, have taken complete possession of their sensitive nature, especially when no feeling of the glory of virtue has aroused them to resistance. |
|
| 28. Plotinus, Enneads, 3.6.3(17-19), 3.6.4(13-38) (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 41 |
| 29. Musonius Rufus, Ed.Hense, Fragments, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 332 |
| 30. Pseudo‐Athanasius, Life And Activity of Syncletica, None Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 66 |
| 31. Pseudo‐Plutarch, Is The Emotional Element In Humans A Part Or A Capacity of The Soul?, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 68 |
| 32. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 67 |
| 33. Gregory of Nyssa, On The Creation of Man, 12.4 Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent •belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 41 |
| 34. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 21 Tagged with subjects: •appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent •belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 41 |
