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21 results for "anticipation"

1. Plato, Philebus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 237

2. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 237

3. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.12.41, 4.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97, 237

4.14. "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his disagreeing with his ancestors, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to detect, if we can, what exactly was the novel element contributed by Zeno. Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.'

4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.12.41, 4.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97, 237

4.14. Sed haec hactenus. nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit, quam ob rem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret. hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum, finis hic bonorum qui continet del. Bentl., Ern. philosophiam et quis quis ARV quid (d ab alt. m. in ras. ) N qui BE a Stoicis et quem ad modum diceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus, si potuerimus, quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, dixissent edd. dixisset his verbis tria significari significari BE significare Stoici dicunt, unum eius modi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent. hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere.

5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.83, 3.28, 3.32-3.33, 3.52, 3.58-3.59, 3.76, 5.96 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236, 237

1.83. fit enim ad punctum temporis. Illud angit vel potius excruciat, discessus ab omnibus is quae sunt bona in vita . vide ne a malis nea malis K ( fuit m vel ni) dici verius possit. quid ego nunc lugeam vitam hominum? vere et iure possum; sed quid necesse est, cum id agam ne post mortem miseros nos putemus fore, etiam vitam efficere deplorando miseriorem? fecimus hoc in eo libro, in quo nosmet ipsos, quantum potuimus, consolati sumus. a malis igitur mors abducit, non a bonis, verum si sqq. Val. Max 8, 9 ext. 3 quaerimus. et quidem hoc ecquidem GRV h q dĕ (= haec quidem) K 1 (hoc quidem ss. 2 ) a Cyrenaico Hegesia he gesia R 1 sic copiose disputatur, ut is a rege Ptolomaeo ptolomeo K ptholomeo GV prohibitus esse dicatur illa in scholis dicere, quod quod V 2 s quo X multi is auditis mortem sibi ipsi consciscerent. -scerent in r. V c 3.28. Atque hoc quidem perspicuum est, tum tum add. G 2 aegritudinem existere, cum quid ita visum sit, ut magnum quoddam malum adesse et urgere videatur. Epicuro autem placet opinionem mali aegritudinem esse ea ante esse add. V 2 natura, esse, ea natura Usen. Ep. fr. 444 ( sed cf. 334,14 necesse esse eqs.) ex opinione pro opinionem Sey. efficere pro esse Bai. cf. quae dixi Herm. XLI 323 ut, quicumque intueatur in aliquod maius malum, si id sibi accidisse opinetur, sit continuo in aegritudine. aegritudinem X Cyrenaici non omni malo malo modo R 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GK 1 effici censent, sed insperato et necopinato malo. est id quidem non mediocre ad aegritudinem augendam: videntur enim omnia repentina graviora. ex hoc et illa iure laudantur: E/go cum genui, tu/m morituros moriturum et huic rei Sen. ad Pol. 11, 2 sci/vi et ei rei Enn. Telam. sc. 312. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 su/stuli. Prae/terea praeterea ae in r. V c ad Troia/m cum misi ob de/fendendam Grae/ciam, Sci/bam scibam Fronto p. 217 sciebam me in morti/ferum bellum, no/n in epulas mi/ttere. 3.32. Sed est, isdem de rebus quod dici possit subtilius, si prius Epicuri sententiam viderimus. qui censet Epic. fr. 444 necesse esse omnis in aegritudine esse, qui se in malis esse arbitrentur, sive illa ante provisa et expectata sint sive inveteraverint. nam neque vetustate minui mala nec fieri praemeditata leviora, stultamque etiam esse meditationem futuri mali aut fortasse ne futuri quidem: satis esse odiosum malum omne, cum venisset; cum venisset ex conv. K 2 qui autem semper cogitavisset accidere posse aliquid adversi, ei fieri illud sempiternum malum; si vero ne futurum quidem sit, sit ex si V c frustra suscipi miseriam voluntariam; voluntariam add. GR 1 in fine pag. ita semper angi aut accipiendo aut cogitando malo. 3.33. Levationem autem aegritudinis in duabus rebus ponit, avocatione a cogitanda molestia et revocatione revocationem GKV 1 ad contemplandas voluptates. parere pareri GR 1 ( corr. 1 ) V 1 ( corr. 2 ) enim censet animum rationi posse et, quo illa ducat, sequi. vetat igitur ratio intueri molestias, abstrahit ab acerbis cogitationibus, hebetem habetem V 1 aciem ad miserias contemplandas facit; facit add. V c ( ante aciem We. ft. rectius cf. docere 220,13 sed cf. off. 1, 12 extr. al. ) om. cett. a quibus cum cecinit cecidit X corr. 2 receptui, inpellit receptuimpellit VHK c (receptaimp. K 1 )G 2 (receptum pellit 1 ) receptū impellit R rursum et incitat ad conspiciendas totaque mente contrectandas contractandas K ( ex -tes 1 ) H varias voluptates, vetat... 335, 4 voluptates H quibus ille et praeteritarum memoria et spe consequentium sapientis vitam refertam putat. refert amputat G 1 R 1 V 1 Haec nostro more nos diximus, Epicurii epicurei R c K 2 dicunt suo; sed quae quae ex qui V 2 dicant, videamus, quo modo, neglegamus. 3.52. qui tum aegritudinem censent existere, si necopinato quid evenerit. est id quidem magnum, ut supra supra p. 332, 6 dixi; etiam Chrysippo Chrys. fr. eth. 417 crysippo X ita videri scio, quod provisum ante non sit, id ferire ferire fieri X corr. V c aut 1 vehementius; sed non sunt in hoc hic in hoc G ( exp. 2 ) omnia. quamquam hostium et ante hostium add. V 2 non male repens adventus advetus G 1 R 1 V 1 magis aliquanto aliquando X corr. V c aut 1 conturbat quam expectatus, et maris subita tempestas quam ante provisa terret provisitaret K 1 navigantes vehementius, et eius modi sunt pleraque. sed cum diligenter necopinatorum naturam consideres, nihil aliud reperias repperias G R 1 V nisi omnia videri subita maiora, et quidem ob duas causas, primum quod, quanta sint quae accidunt, post accidunt V c in mg. add. : et qualia, cum repente accidunt ( non inepte cf. p. 345, 21 ) considerandi spatium non datur, deinde, cum cum tum G videtur praecaveri potuisse, si provisum esset, quasi culpa contractum malum aegritudinem acriorem facit. 3.58. similiter commemorandis exemplis orbitates quoque liberum liberorum V c praedicantur, eorumque, eorum quoque K 1 qui gravius ferunt, luctus aliorum exemplis leniuntur. sic perpessio ceterorum facit, ut ea quae acciderint multo minora maiora ex minora V c quam quanta sint existimata, videantur. ita fit, sensim cogitantibus ut, quantum sit ementita opinio, appareat. atque hoc idem et Telamo ille declarat: ego cum genui et Theseus: futuras mecum commentabar miserias tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli add. R 2, moriturum scivi V 3 et Anaxagoras: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. cf. p. 332, 9 sqq. hi enim omnes diu cogitantes de rebus humanis intellegebant eas nequaquam pro opinione volgi esse extimescendas. extimescendas KR 1 existimescendas R c G existimiscendas G 1 e corr. V et mihi quidem videtur idem fere accidere is qui ante meditantur, quod is quibus medetur dies, nisi quod ratio ratio V ratione GKR ( unde in hoc quae- dam 2? ) quaedam sanat illos, hos ipsa natura intellecto eo quod rem continet, illud illud continet X trp. B malum, quod opinatum sit esse maxumum, nequaquam esse tantum, ut vitam beatam possit evertere. 3.59. hoc igitur efficitur, ut ex illo necopinato plaga maior sit, non, ut illi putant, ut, cum duobus pares casus evenerint, is modo aegritudine adficiatur, aff. KR cui ille necopinato casus evenerit. Itaque dicuntur non nulli in maerore, cum de hac communi hominum condicione audivissent, ea lege esse nos natos, ut nemo in perpetuum esse posset expers mali, gravius etiam tulisse. quocirca Carneades, ut video nostrum scribere Antiochum, anthiochum KR reprendere reprehendere KV c Chrysippum crysippum X Chr. fr. eth. 487 solebat laudantem Euripideum carmen illud: Eurip. Hypsip. fr. 757 ( S. Eur. ed. Arn. p. 62 ) Morta/lis nemo est que/m non non om. X add. K 2 V c attinga/t attingit W (attigit K) vix recte, cf. Mue. in Seyfferti Laelio p. 143 dolor Morbu/sque; multis multis Lb. multi su/nt humandi li/beri, Rursu/m creandi, mo/rsque mors quae GK (morsquę) R 1 V (s in r. c ) est finita o/mnibus. Quae ge/neri genere X corr. V 3 humano ango/rem nequicquam a/dferunt: adferant V 2 Redde/nda terrae est te/rra, tum tum tam Sey. nam Küh. vita o/mnibus Mete/nda ut fruges. si/c iubet Nece/ssitas. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 5.96. quocirca corpus gaudere tam diu, dum praesentem sentiret voluptatem, animum et praesentem percipere pariter cum corpore et prospicere venientem nec praeteritam praeterfluere sinere. ita perpetuas et contextas contestas ex contentas K c voluptates in sapiente fore semper, cum expectatio expectatione G 1 speratarum voluptatum cum cum add. Lb. perceptarum memoria iungeretur.

6. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97

7. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.44-1.49, 2.646-2.651, 3.31-3.93, 3.830-3.1094, 5.1218-5.1240, 6.379-6.422 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236, 237

1.44. omnis enim per se divum natura necessest 1.45. immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur 1.46. semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe; 1.47. nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, 1.48. ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, 1.49. nec bene promeritis capitur nec tangitur ira. 2.646. omnis enim per se divom natura necessest 2.647. inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur 2.648. semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe; 2.649. nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, 2.650. ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, 2.651. nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira. 3.31. Et quoniam docui, cunctarum exordia rerum 3.32. qualia sint et quam variis distantia formis 3.33. sponte sua volitent aeterno percita motu, 3.34. quove modo possint res ex his quaeque creari, 3.35. hasce secundum res animi natura videtur 3.36. atque animae claranda meis iam versibus esse 3.37. et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, 3.38. funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo 3.39. omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam 3.40. esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit. 3.41. nam quod saepe homines morbos magis esse timendos 3.42. infamemque ferunt vitam quam Tartara leti 3.43. et se scire animi naturam sanguinis esse, 3.44. aut etiam venti, si fert ita forte voluntas, 3.45. nec prosum quicquam nostrae rationis egere, 3.46. hinc licet advertas animum magis omnia laudis 3.47. iactari causa quam quod res ipsa probetur. 3.48. extorres idem patria longeque fugati 3.49. conspectu ex hominum, foedati crimine turpi, 3.50. omnibus aerumnis adfecti denique vivunt, 3.51. et quo cumque tamen miseri venere parentant 3.52. et nigras mactant pecudes et manibus divis 3.53. inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis 3.54. acrius advertunt animos ad religionem. 3.55. quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis 3.56. convenit adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit; 3.57. nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo 3.58. eliciuntur et eripitur persona amanare. 3.59. denique avarities et honorum caeca cupido, 3.60. quae miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines 3.61. iuris et inter dum socios scelerum atque ministros 3.62. noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 3.63. ad summas emergere opes, haec vulnera vitae 3.64. non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur. 3.65. turpis enim ferme contemptus et acris egestas 3.66. semota ab dulci vita stabilique videtur 3.67. et quasi iam leti portas cunctarier ante; 3.68. unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti 3.69. effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse, 3.70. sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque 3.71. conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes, 3.72. crudeles gaudent in tristi funere fratris 3.73. et consanguineum mensas odere timentque. 3.74. consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore 3.75. macerat invidia ante oculos illum esse potentem, 3.76. illum aspectari, claro qui incedit honore, 3.77. ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur. 3.78. intereunt partim statuarum et nominis ergo. 3.79. et saepe usque adeo, mortis formidine, vitae 3.80. percipit humanos odium lucisque videndae, 3.81. ut sibi consciscant maerenti pectore letum 3.82. obliti fontem curarum hunc esse timorem: 3.83. hunc vexare pudorem, hunc vincula amicitiai 3.84. rumpere et in summa pietate evertere suadet: 3.85. nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentis 3.86. prodiderunt vitare Acherusia templa petentes. 3.87. nam vel uti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis 3.88. in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus 3.89. inter dum, nihilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam 3.90. quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura. 3.91. hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 3.92. non radii solis neque lucida tela diei 3.93. discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque. 3.830. Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum, 3.831. quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur. 3.832. et vel ut ante acto nihil tempore sensimus aegri, 3.833. ad confligendum venientibus undique Poenis, 3.834. omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu 3.835. horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris auris, 3.836. in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum 3.837. omnibus humanis esset terraque marique, 3.838. sic, ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animai 3.839. discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti, 3.840. scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum, 3.841. accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere, 3.842. non si terra mari miscebitur et mare caelo. 3.843. et si iam nostro sentit de corpore postquam 3.844. distractast animi natura animaeque potestas, 3.845. nil tamen est ad nos, qui comptu coniugioque 3.846. corporis atque animae consistimus uniter apti. 3.847. nec, si materiem nostram collegerit aetas 3.848. post obitum rursumque redegerit ut sita nunc est, 3.849. atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae, 3.850. pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, 3.851. interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri. 3.852. et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante 3.853. qui fuimus, neque iam de illis nos adficit angor. 3.854. nam cum respicias inmensi temporis omne 3.855. praeteritum spatium, tum motus materiai 3.856. multimodi quam sint, facile hoc adcredere possis, 3.857. semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta 3.858. haec eadem, quibus e nunc nos sumus, ante fuisse. 3.859. nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente; 3.860. inter enim iectast vitai pausa vageque 3.861. deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes. 3.862. debet enim, misere si forte aegreque futurumst; 3.863. ipse quoque esse in eo tum tempore, cui male possit 3.864. accidere. id quoniam mors eximit, esseque prohibet 3.865. illum cui possint incommoda conciliari, 3.866. scire licet nobis nihil esse in morte timendum 3.867. nec miserum fieri qui non est posse, neque hilum 3.868. differre an nullo fuerit iam tempore natus, 3.869. mortalem vitam mors cum inmortalis ademit. 3.870. Proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum, 3.871. post mortem fore ut aut putescat corpore posto 3.872. aut flammis interfiat malisve ferarum, 3.873. scire licet non sincerum sonere atque subesse 3.874. caecum aliquem cordi stimulum, quamvis neget ipse 3.875. credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum; 3.876. non, ut opinor, enim dat quod promittit et unde 3.877. nec radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit, 3.878. sed facit esse sui quiddam super inscius ipse. 3.879. vivus enim sibi cum proponit quisque futurum, 3.880. corpus uti volucres lacerent in morte feraeque, 3.881. ipse sui miseret; neque enim se dividit illim 3.882. nec removet satis a proiecto corpore et illum 3.883. se fingit sensuque suo contaminat astans. 3.884. hinc indignatur se mortalem esse creatum 3.885. nec videt in vera nullum fore morte alium se, 3.886. qui possit vivus sibi se lugere peremptum 3.887. stansque iacentem se lacerari urive dolere. 3.888. nam si in morte malumst malis morsuque ferarum 3.889. tractari, non invenio qui non sit acerbum 3.890. ignibus inpositum calidis torrescere flammis 3.891. aut in melle situm suffocari atque rigere 3.892. frigore, cum summo gelidi cubat aequore saxi, 3.893. urgerive superne obrutum pondere terrae. 3.894. 'Iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta neque uxor 3.895. optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati 3.896. praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent. 3.897. non poteris factis florentibus esse tuisque 3.898. praesidium. misero misere' aiunt 'omnia ademit 3.899. una dies infesta tibi tot praemia vitae.' 3.900. illud in his rebus non addunt 'nec tibi earum 3.901. iam desiderium rerum super insidet una.' 3.902. quod bene si videant animo dictisque sequantur, 3.903. dissoluant animi magno se angore metuque. 3.904. 'tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris aevi 3.905. quod super est cunctis privatus doloribus aegris; 3.906. at nos horrifico cinefactum te prope busto 3.907. insatiabiliter deflevimus, aeternumque 3.908. nulla dies nobis maerorem e pectore demet.' 3.909. illud ab hoc igitur quaerendum est, quid sit amari 3.910. tanto opere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem, 3.911. cur quisquam aeterno possit tabescere luctu. 3.912. Hoc etiam faciunt ubi discubuere tenentque 3.913. pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis, 3.914. ex animo ut dicant: 'brevis hic est fructus homullis; 3.915. iam fuerit neque post umquam revocare licebit.' 3.916. tam quam in morte mali cum primis hoc sit eorum, 3.917. quod sitis exurat miseros atque arida torrat, 3.918. aut aliae cuius desiderium insideat rei. 3.919. nec sibi enim quisquam tum se vitamque requiret, 3.920. cum pariter mens et corpus sopita quiescunt; 3.921. nam licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem, 3.922. nec desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum, 3.923. et tamen haud quaquam nostros tunc illa per artus 3.924. longe ab sensiferis primordia motibus errant, 3.925. cum correptus homo ex somno se colligit ipse. 3.926. multo igitur mortem minus ad nos esse putandumst, 3.927. si minus esse potest quam quod nihil esse videmus; 3.928. maior enim turbae disiectus materiai 3.929. consequitur leto nec quisquam expergitus extat, 3.930. frigida quem semel est vitai pausa secuta. 3.931. Denique si vocem rerum natura repente. 3.932. mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa: 3.933. 'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris 3.934. luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles? 3.935. nam si grata fuit tibi vita ante acta priorque 3.936. et non omnia pertusum congesta quasi in vas 3.937. commoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiere; 3.938. cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis 3.939. aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem? 3.940. sin ea quae fructus cumque es periere profusa 3.941. vitaque in offensost, cur amplius addere quaeris, 3.942. rursum quod pereat male et ingratum occidat omne, 3.943. non potius vitae finem facis atque laboris? 3.944. nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inveniamque, 3.945. quod placeat, nihil est; eadem sunt omnia semper. 3.946. si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus 3.947. confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant, 3.948. omnia si perges vivendo vincere saecla, 3.949. atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus', 3.950. quid respondemus, nisi iustam intendere litem 3.951. naturam et veram verbis exponere causam? 3.952. grandior hic vero si iam seniorque queratur 3.953. atque obitum lamentetur miser amplius aequo, 3.954. non merito inclamet magis et voce increpet acri: 3.955. 'aufer abhinc lacrimas, baratre, et compesce querellas. 3.956. omnia perfunctus vitai praemia marces; 3.957. sed quia semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis, 3.958. inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque vita, 3.959. et nec opiti mors ad caput adstitit ante 3.960. quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum. 3.961. nunc aliena tua tamen aetate omnia mitte 3.962. aequo animoque, age dum, magnis concede necessis?' 3.963. iure, ut opinor, agat, iure increpet inciletque; 3.964. cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas 3.965. semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest. 3.966. Nec quisquam in barathrum nec Tartara deditur atra; 3.967. materies opus est, ut crescant postera saecla; 3.968. quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur; 3.969. nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere cadentque. 3.970. sic alid ex alio numquam desistet oriri 3.971. vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu. 3.972. respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas 3.973. temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante. 3.974. hoc igitur speculum nobis natura futuri 3.975. temporis exponit post mortem denique nostram. 3.976. numquid ibi horribile apparet, num triste videtur 3.977. quicquam, non omni somno securius exstat? 3.978. Atque ea ni mirum quae cumque Acherunte profundo 3.979. prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis. 3.980. nec miser inpendens magnum timet aere aëre saxum 3.981. Tantalus, ut famast, cassa formidine torpens; 3.982. sed magis in vita divom metus urget iis 3.983. mortalis casumque timent quem cuique ferat fors. 3.984. nec Tityon volucres ineunt Acherunte iacentem 3.985. nec quod sub magno scrutentur pectore quicquam 3.986. perpetuam aetatem possunt reperire profecto. 3.987. quam libet immani proiectu corporis exstet, 3.988. qui non sola novem dispessis iugera membris 3.989. optineat, sed qui terrai totius orbem, 3.990. non tamen aeternum poterit perferre dolorem 3.991. nec praebere cibum proprio de corpore semper. 3.992. sed Tityos nobis hic est, in amore iacentem 3.993. quem volucres lacerant atque exest anxius angor 3.994. aut alia quavis scindunt cuppedine curae. 3.995. Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est, 3.996. qui petere a populo fasces saevasque secures 3.997. imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit. 3.998. nam petere imperium, quod iest nec datur umquam, 3.999. atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem, 3.1000. hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte 3.1001. saxum, quod tamen e summo iam vertice rusum 3.1002. volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi. 3.1003. deinde animi ingratam naturam pascere semper 3.1004. atque explere bonis rebus satiareque numquam, 3.1005. quod faciunt nobis annorum tempora, circum 3.1006. cum redeunt fetusque ferunt variosque lepores, 3.1007. nec tamen explemur vitai fructibus umquam, 3.1008. hoc, ut opinor, id est, aevo florente puellas 3.1009. quod memorant laticem pertusum congerere in vas, 3.1010. quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur. 3.1011. Cerberus et Furiae iam vero et lucis egestas, 3.1012. Tartarus horriferos eructans faucibus aestus! 3.1013. qui neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto; 3.1014. sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis 3.1015. est insignibus insignis scelerisque luela, 3.1016. carcer et horribilis de saxo iactus deorsum, 3.1017. verbera carnifices robur pix lammina taedae; 3.1018. quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis 3.1019. praemetuens adhibet stimulos torretque flagellis, 3.1020. nec videt interea qui terminus esse malorum 3.1021. possit nec quae sit poenarum denique finis, 3.1022. atque eadem metuit magis haec ne in morte gravescant. 3.1023. hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita. 3.1024. Hoc etiam tibi tute interdum dicere possis. 3.1025. 'lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancus reliquit, 3.1026. qui melior multis quam tu fuit, improbe, rebus. 3.1027. inde alii multi reges rerumque potentes 3.1028. occiderunt, magnis qui gentibus imperitarunt. 3.1029. ille quoque ipse, viam qui quondam per mare magnum 3.1030. stravit iterque dedit legionibus ire per altum 3.1031. ac pedibus salsas docuit super ire lucunas 3.1032. et contempsit equis insultans murmura ponti, 3.1033. lumine adempto animam moribundo corpore fudit. 3.1034. Scipiadas, belli fulmen, Carthaginis horror, 3.1035. ossa dedit terrae proinde ac famul infimus esset. 3.1036. adde repertores doctrinarum atque leporum, 3.1037. adde Heliconiadum comites; quorum unus Homerus 3.1038. sceptra potitus eadem aliis sopitus quietest. 3.1039. denique Democritum post quam matura vetustas 3.1040. admonuit memores motus languescere mentis, 3.1041. sponte sua leto caput obvius optulit ipse. 3.1042. ipse Epicurus obit decurso lumine vitae, 3.1043. qui genus humanum ingenio superavit et omnis 3.1044. restinxit stellas exortus ut aetherius sol. 3.1045. tu vero dubitabis et indignabere obire? 3.1046. mortua cui vita est prope iam vivo atque videnti, 3.1047. qui somno partem maiorem conteris aevi, 3.1048. et viligans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas 3.1049. sollicitamque geris cassa formidine mentem 3.1050. nec reperire potes tibi quid sit saepe mali, cum 3.1051. ebrius urgeris multis miser undique curis 3.1052. atque animo incerto fluitans errore vagaris.' 3.1053. Si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur 3.1054. pondus inesse animo, quod se gravitate fatiget, 3.1055. e quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde 3.1056. tanta mali tam quam moles in pectore constet, 3.1057. haut ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus 3.1058. quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper, 3.1059. commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit. 3.1060. exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille, 3.1061. esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque revertit , 3.1062. quippe foris nihilo melius qui sentiat esse. 3.1063. currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter 3.1064. auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans; 3.1065. oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae, 3.1066. aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit, 3.1067. aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit. 3.1068. hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, ut fit, 3.1069. effugere haut potis est: ingratius haeret et odit 3.1070. propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger; 3.1071. quam bene si videat, iam rebus quisque relictis 3.1072. naturam primum studeat cognoscere rerum, 3.1073. temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae, 3.1074. ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis 3.1075. aetas, post mortem quae restat cumque manendo. 3.1076. Denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis 3.1077. quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido? 3.1078. certe equidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat 3.1079. nec devitari letum pote, quin obeamus. 3.1080. praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque 3.1081. nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas; 3.1082. sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur 3.1083. cetera; post aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus 3.1084. et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis. 3.1085. posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas, 3.1086. quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet. 3.1087. nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum 3.1088. tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus, 3.1089. quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti. 3.1090. proinde licet quod vis vivendo condere saecla, 3.1091. mors aeterna tamen nihilo minus illa manebit, 3.1092. nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno 3.1093. lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille, 3.1094. mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante. 5.1218. praeterea cui non animus formidine divum 5.1219. contrahitur, cui non correpunt membra pavore, 5.1220. fulminis horribili cum plaga torrida tellus 5.1221. contremit et magnum percurrunt murmura caelum? 5.1222. non populi gentesque tremunt, regesque superbi 5.1223. corripiunt divum percussi membra timore, 5.1224. ne quod ob admissum foede dictumve superbe 5.1225. poenarum grave sit solvendi tempus adauctum? 5.1226. summa etiam cum vis violenti per mare venti 5.1227. induperatorem classis super aequora verrit 5.1228. cum validis pariter legionibus atque elephantis, 5.1229. non divom pacem votis adit ac prece quaesit 5.1230. ventorum pavidus paces animasque secundas? 5.1231. ne quiquam, quoniam violento turbine saepe 5.1232. correptus nihilo fertur minus ad vada leti. 5.1233. usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam 5.1234. opterit et pulchros fascis saevasque secures 5.1235. proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur. 5.1236. denique sub pedibus tellus cum tota vacillat 5.1237. concussaeque cadunt urbes dubiaeque mitur, 5.1238. quid mirum si se temnunt mortalia saecla 5.1239. atque potestatis magnas mirasque relinquunt 5.1240. in rebus viris divum, quae cuncta gubernent? 6.379. Hoc est igniferi naturam fulminis ipsam 6.380. perspicere et qua vi faciat rem quamque videre, 6.381. non Tyrrhena retro volventem carmina frustra 6.382. indicia occultae divum perquirere mentis, 6.383. unde volans ignis pervenerit aut in utram se 6.384. verterit hinc partim, quo pacto per loca saepta 6.385. insinuarit, et hinc dominatus ut extulerit se, 6.386. quidve nocere queat de caelo fulminis ictus. 6.387. quod si Iuppiter atque alii fulgentia divi 6.388. terrifico quatiunt sonitu caelestia templa 6.389. et iaciunt ignem quo cuiquest cumque voluntas, 6.390. cur quibus incautum scelus aversabile cumquest 6.391. non faciunt icti flammas ut fulguris halent 6.392. pectore perfixo, documen mortalibus acre, 6.393. et potius nulla sibi turpi conscius in re 6.394. volvitur in flammis innoxius inque peditur 6.395. turbine caelesti subito correptus et igni? 6.396. cur etiam loca sola petunt frustraque laborant? 6.397. an tum bracchia consuescunt firmantque lacertos? 6.398. in terraque patris cur telum perpetiuntur 6.399. optundi? cur ipse sinit neque parcit in hostis? 6.400. denique cur numquam caelo iacit undique puro 6.401. Iuppiter in terras fulmen sonitusque profundit? 6.402. an simul ac nubes successere, ipse in eas tum 6.403. descendit, prope ut hinc teli determinet ictus? 6.404. in mare qua porro mittit ratione? quid undas 6.405. arguit et liquidam molem camposque natantis? 6.406. praeterea si vult caveamus fulminis ictum, 6.407. cur dubitat facere ut possimus cernere missum? 6.408. si nec opitis autem volt opprimere igni, 6.409. cur tonat ex illa parte, ut vitare queamus, 6.410. cur tenebras ante et fremitus et murmura concit? 6.411. et simul in multas partis qui credere possis 6.412. mittere? an hoc ausis numquam contendere factum, 6.413. ut fierent ictus uno sub tempore plures? 6.414. at saepest numero factum fierique necessest, 6.415. ut pluere in multis regionibus et cadere imbris, 6.416. fulmina sic uno fieri sub tempore multa. 6.417. postremo cur sancta deum delubra suasque 6.418. discutit infesto praeclaras fulmine sedes 6.419. et bene facta deum frangit simulacra suisque 6.420. demit imaginibus violento volnere honorem? 6.421. altaque cur plerumque petit loca plurimaque eius 6.422. montibus in summis vestigia cernimus ignis?

8. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 9.1-9.10, 11.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236

9. Plutarch, On The Control of Anger, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236

10. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236

11. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.24.84-3.24.88, 4.1.111 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236

12. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236

13. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 78.14, 101.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236

14. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236

15. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.7.7-4.7.11, 4.7.24, 5.6.1, 5.6.20 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97, 236

16. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.7-3.8 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97

3.7. Let us now pass to the other part of philosophy, which they themselves call moral, in which is contained the method of the whole of philosophy, since in natural philosophy there is only delight, in this there is utility also. And since it is more dangerous to commit a fault in arranging the condition of life and in forming the character, greater diligence must be used, that we may know how we ought to live. For in the former subject some indulgence may be granted: for whether they say anything, they bestow no advantage; or if they foolishly rave, they do no injury. But in this subject there is no room for difference of opinion, none for error. All must entertain the same sentiments, and philosophy itself must give instructions as it were with one mouth; because if any error shall be committed, life is altogether overthrown. In that former part, as there is less danger, so there is more difficulty; because the obscurity of the subject compels us to entertain different and various opinions. But in this, as there is more danger, so there is less difficulty; because the very use of the subjects and daily experiments are able to teach what is truer and better. Let us see, therefore, whether they agree, or what assistance they give us for the better guidance of life. It is not necessary to enlarge on every point; let us select one, and especially that which is the chief and principal thing, in which the whole of wisdom centres and depends. Epicurus deems that the chief good consists in pleasure of mind, Aristippus in pleasure of the body. Callipho and Dinomachus united virtue with pleasure, Diodorus with the privation of pain, Hieronymus placed the chief good in the absence of pain; the Peripatetics, again, in the goods of the mind, the body, and fortune. The chief good of Herillus is knowledge; that of Zeno, to live agreeably to nature; that of certain Stoics, to follow virtue. Aristotle placed the chief good in integrity and virtue. These are the sentiments of nearly all. In such a difference of opinions, whom do we follow? Whom do we believe? All are of equal authority. If we are able to select that which is better, it follows that philosophy is not necessary for us; because we are already wise, inasmuch as we judge respecting the opinions of the wise. But since we come for the sake of learning wisdom, how can we judge, who have not yet begun to be wise? Especially when the Academic is close at hand, to draw us back by the cloak, and forbid us to believe any one, without bringing forward that which we may follow. 3.8. What then remains, but that we leave raving and obstinate wranglers, and come to the judge, who is in truth the giver of simple and calm wisdom? Which is able not only to mould us, and lead us into the way, but also to pass an opinion on the controversies of those men. This teaches us what is the true and highest good of man; but before I begin to speak on this subject, all those opinions must be refuted, that it may appear that no one of those philosophers was wise. Since the inquiry is respecting the duty of man, the chief good of the chief animal ought to be placed in that which it cannot have in common with the other animals. But as teeth are the peculiar property of wild beasts, horns of cattle, and wings of birds, so something peculiar to himself ought to be attributed to man, without which he would lose the fixed order of his condition. For that which is given to all for the purpose of life or generation, is indeed a natural good; but still it is not the greatest, unless it be peculiar to each class. Therefore he was not a wise man who believed that pleasure of the mind is the chief good, since that, whether it be freedom from anxiety or joy, is common to all. I do not consider Aristippus even worthy of an answer; for since he is always rushing into pleasures of the body, and is only the slave of sensual indulgences, no one can regard him as a man: for he lived in such a manner that there was no difference between him and a brute, except this only, that he had the faculty of speech. But if the power of speaking were given to the ass, or the dog, or swine, and you were to inquire from these why they so furiously pursue the females, that they can scarcely be separated from them, and even neglect their food and I drink; why they either drive away other males, or do not abstain from the pursuit even when vanquished, but often, when bruised by stronger animals, they are more determined in their pursuit; why they dread neither rain nor cold; why they undertake labour, and do not shrink from danger - what other answer will they give, but that the chief good is bodily pleasure?- that they eagerly seek it, in order that they may be affected with the most agreeable sensations; and that these are of so much importance, that, for the sake of attaining them, they imagine that no labour, nor wounds, nor death itself, ought to be refused by them? Shall we then seek precepts of living from these men, who have no other feelings than those of the irrational creatures? The Cyrenaics say that virtue itself is to be praised on this account, because it is productive of pleasure. True, says the filthy dog, or the swine wallowing in the mire. For it is on this account that I contend with my adversary with the utmost exertion of strength, that my valour may procure for me pleasure; of which I must necessarily be deprived if I shall come off vanquished. Shall we therefore learn wisdom from these men, who differ from cattle and the brutes, not in feeling, but in language? To regard the absence of pain as the chief good, is not indeed the part of Peripatetic and Stoic, but of clinical philosophers. For who would not imagine that the discussion was carried on by those who were ill, and under the influence of some pain? What is so ridiculous, as to esteem that the chief good which the physician is able to give? We must therefore feel pain in order that we may enjoy good; and that, too, severely and frequently, that afterwards the absence of pain may be attended with greater pleasure. He is therefore most wretched who has never felt pain, because he is without that which is good; whereas we used to regard him as most happy, because he was without evil. He was not far distant from this folly, who said that the entire absence of pain was the chief good. For, besides the fact that every animal avoids pain, who can bestow upon himself that good, towards the obtaining of which we can do no more than wish? But the chief good cannot make any one happy, unless it shall be always in his power; and it is not virtue, nor learning, nor labour, which affords this to man, but nature herself bestows it upon all living creatures. They who joined pleasure with virtuous principle, wished to avoid this common blending together of all, but they made a contradictory kind of good; since he who is abandoned to pleasure must of necessity be destitute of virtuous principle, and he who aims at principle must be destitute of pleasure. The chief good of the Peripatetics may possibly appear excessive, various, and - excepting those goods which belong to the mind, and what they are is a great subject of dispute - common to man with the beasts. For goods belonging to the body - that is, safety, freedom from pain, health - are no less necessary for dumb creatures than for man; and I know not if they are not more necessary for them, because man can be relieved by remedies and services, the dumb animals cannot. The same is true of those which they call the goods of fortune; for as man has need of resources for the support of life, so have they need of prey and pasture. Thus, by introducing a good which is not within the power of man, they made man altogether subject to the power of another. Let us also hear Zeno, for he at times dreams of virtue. The chief good, he says, is to live in accordance with nature. Therefore we must live after the manner of the brutes. For in these are found all the things which ought to be absent from man: they are eager for pleasures, they fear, they deceive, they lie in wait, they kill; and that which is especially to the point, they have no knowledge of God. Why, therefore, does he teach me to live according to nature, which is of itself prone to a worse course, and under the influence of some more soothing blandishments plunges headlong into vices? Or if he says that the nature of brutes is different from the nature of man, because man is born to virtue, he says something to the purpose; but, however, it will not be a definition of the chief good, because there is no animal which does not live in accordance with its nature. He who made knowledge the chief good, gave something peculiar to man; but men desire knowledge for the sake of something else, and not for its own sake. For who is contented with knowing, without seeking some advantage from his knowledge? The arts are learned for the purpose of being put into exercise; but they are exercised either for the support of life, or pleasure, or for glory. That, therefore, is not the chief good which is not sought for on its own account. What difference, therefore, does it make, whether we consider knowledge to be the chief good, or those very things which knowledge produces from itself, that is, means of subsistence, glory, pleasure? And these things are not peculiar to man, and therefore they are not the chief goods; for the desire of pleasure and of food does not exist in man alone, but also in the brutes. How is it with regard to the desire of glory? Is it not discovered in horses, since they exult in victory, and are grieved when vanquished? So great is their love of praises, so great is their eagerness for victory. Nor without reason does that most excellent poet say that we must try what grief they feel when overcome, and how they rejoice in victory. But if those things which knowledge produces are common to man with other animals, it follows that knowledge is not the chief good. Moreover, it is no slight fault of this definition that bare knowledge is set forth. For all will begin to appear happy who shall have the knowledge of any art, even those who shall know mischievous subjects; so that he who shall have learned to mix poisons, is as happy as he who has learned to apply remedies. I ask, therefore, to what subject knowledge is to be referred. If to the causes of natural things, what happiness will be proposed to me, if I shall know the sources of the Nile, or the vain dreams of the natural philosophers respecting the heaven? Why should I mention that on these subjects there is no knowledge, but mere conjecture, which varies according to the abilities of men? It only remains that the knowledge of good and evil things is the chief good. Why, then, did he call knowledge the chief good more than wisdom, when both words have the same signification and meaning? But no one has yet said that the chief good is wisdom, though this might more properly have been said. For knowledge is insufficient for the undertaking of that which is good and avoiding that which is evil, unless virtue also is added. For many of the philosophers, though they discussed the nature of good and evil things, yet from the compulsion of nature lived in a manner different from their discourse, because they were without virtue. But virtue united with knowledge is wisdom. It remains that we refute those also who judged virtue itself to be the chief good, and Marcus Tullius was also of this opinion; and in this they were very inconsiderate. For virtue itself is not the chief good, but it is the contriver and mother of the chief good; for this cannot be attained without virtue. Each point is easily understood. For I ask whether they imagine that it is easy to arrive at that distinguished good, or that it is reached only with difficulty and labour? Let them apply their ingenuity, and defend error. If it is easily attained to, and without labour, it cannot be the chief good. For why should we torment ourselves, why wear ourselves out with striving day and night, seeing that the object of our pursuit is so close at hand, that any one who wishes may grasp it without any effort of the mind? But if we do not attain even to a common and moderate good except by labour, since good things are by their nature arduous and difficult, whereas evil things have a downward tendency, it follows that the greatest labour is necessary for the attainment of the greatest good. And if this is most true, then there is need of another virtue, that we may arrive at that virtue which is called the chief good; but this is incongruous and absurd, that virtue should arrive at itself by means of itself. If no good can be reached unless by labour, it is evident that it is virtue by which it is reached, since the force and office of virtue consist in the undertaking and carrying through of labours. Therefore the chief good cannot be that by which it is necessary to arrive at another. But they, since they were ignorant of the effects and tendency of virtue, and could discover nothing more honourable, stopped at the very name of virtue, and said that it ought to be sought, though no advantage was proposed from it; and thus they fixed for themselves a good which itself stood in need of a good. From these Aristotle was not far removed, who thought that virtue together with honour was the chief good; as though it were possible for any virtue to exist unless it were honourable, and as though it would not cease to be virtue if it had any measure of disgrace. But he saw that it might happen that a bad opinion is entertained respecting virtue by a depraved judgment, and therefore he thought that deference should be paid to what in the estimation of men constitutes a departure from what is right and good, because it is not in our power that virtue should be honoured simply for its own deserts. For what is honourable character, except perpetual honour, conferred on any one by the favourable report of the people? What, then, will happen, if through the error and perverseness of men a bad reputation should ensue? Shall we cast aside virtue because it is judged to be base and disgraceful by the foolish? And since it is capable of being oppressed and harassed, in order that it may be of itself a peculiar and lasting good, it ought to stand in need of no outward assistance, so as not to depend by itself upon its own strength, and to remain steadfast. And thus no good is to be hoped by it from man, nor is any evil to be refused.

17. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97

7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.

18. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 5 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236

19. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 5 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236

20. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.76.2-2.76.6 Tagged with subjects: •anticipation of misfortune, posidonius •posidonius, stoic, and anticipation (proendēmein) of misfortune Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 97

21. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 1-2 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 236, 237

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database