|1. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 33.11 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship • friendship, differences between divine and human
Found in books: Allison (2020) 158; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 405
33.11. וְדִבֶּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה פָּנִים אֶל־פָּנִים כַּאֲשֶׁר יְדַבֵּר אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ וְשָׁב אֶל־הַמַּחֲנֶה וּמְשָׁרְתוֹ יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּן־נוּן נַעַר לֹא יָמִישׁ מִתּוֹךְ הָאֹהֶל׃''. None
|33.11. And the LORD spoke unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend. And he would return into the camp; but his minister Joshua, the son of Nun, a young man, departed not out of the Tent.''. None|
|2. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 41.8 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • friends, friendship • friendship
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 405; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 85
41.8. וְאַתָּה יִשְׂרָאֵל עַבְדִּי יַעֲקֹב אֲשֶׁר בְּחַרְתִּיךָ זֶרַע אַבְרָהָם אֹהֲבִי׃''. None
|41.8. But thou, Israel, My servant, Jacob whom I have chosen, The seed of Abraham My friend;''. None|
|3. Homer, Iliad, 9.628-9.630, 9.639-9.642, 22.263 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Democritus, on friendship • friendship • friendship (philia) • friendship (philia), in Democritus • friendship, established by oaths
Found in books: Braund and Most (2004) 210; Liatsi (2021) 39; Sommerstein and Torrance (2014) 66; Wolfsdorf (2020) 575
9.628. οἵ που νῦν ἕαται ποτιδέγμενοι. αὐτάρ Ἀχιλλεὺς 9.629. ἄγριον ἐν στήθεσσι θέτο μεγαλήτορα θυμὸν 9.630. σχέτλιος, οὐδὲ μετατρέπεται φιλότητος ἑταίρων
9.639. ἄλλά τε πόλλʼ ἐπὶ τῇσι· σὺ δʼ ἵλαον ἔνθεο θυμόν, 9.640. αἴδεσσαι δὲ μέλαθρον· ὑπωρόφιοι δέ τοί εἰμεν 9.641. πληθύος ἐκ Δαναῶν, μέμαμεν δέ τοι ἔξοχον ἄλλων 9.642. κήδιστοί τʼ ἔμεναι καὶ φίλτατοι ὅσσοι Ἀχαιοί.
22.263. οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν,''. None
|9.628. let us go our way, for the fulfillment of the charge laid on us will not methinks be brought to pass by our coming hither; and it behoveth us with speed to declare the message, though it be no wise good, to the Danaans, that, I ween, now sit waiting therefor. But Achilles hath wrought to fury the proud heart within him, 9.630. cruel man! neither recketh he of the love of his comrades wherewith we ever honoured him amid the ships above all others—pitiless one! Lo, a man accepteth recompense from the slayer of his brother, or for his dead son; and the slayer abideth in his own land for the paying of a great price, ' "|
9.639. and the kinsman's heart and proud spirit are restrained by the taking of recompense. But as for thee, the gods have put in thy breast a heart that is obdurate and evil by reason of one only girl; whereas we now offer thee seven, far the best that there be, and many other gffts besides; nay then, take to thee a heart of grace, " '9.640. and have respect unto thine hall; for under thy roof are we come from the host of the Danaans, and we would fain be nearest to thee and dearest beyond all other Achaeans as many as there be. Then in answer to him spake Achilles, swift of foot:Aias, sprung from Zeus, thou son of Telamon, captain of the host,
22.263. Then with an angry glance from beneath his brows spake unto him Achilles, swift of foot:Hector, talk not to me, thou madman, of covets. As between lions and men there are no oaths of faith, nor do wolves and lambs have hearts of concord but are evil-minded continually one against the other, ''. None
|4. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship • love and friendship
Found in books: Humphreys (2018) 92; Long (2019) 100
118a. ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἔφη. ΦΑΙΔ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας: καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. unit="para"/ἤδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος — ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ — εἶπεν — ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο — ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα: ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων : ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν: ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς. ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.''. None
|118a. his thighs; and passing upwards in this way he showed us that he was growing cold and rigid. And again he touched him and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone. The chill had now reached the region about the groin, and uncovering his face, which had been covered, he said—and these were his last words— Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not neglect it. That, said Crito, shall be done; but see if you have anything else to say. To this question he made no reply, but after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.''. None|
|5. Xenophon, The Persian Expedition, 2.6.28 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Achilles and Patroklos, as friendship • friendship,
Found in books: Hau (2017) 241; Hubbard (2014) 234
|2.6.28. 3. At this time it was that a certain shepherd ventured to set himself up for a king; he was called Athrongeus. It was his strength of body that made him expect such a dignity, as well as his soul, which despised death; and besides these qualifications, he had four brethren like himself. |
2.6.28. Nor was this mourning of a private nature, but the lamentations were very great, the mourning solemn, and the weeping such as was loudly heard all over the city, as being for those men who had perished for the laws of their country, and for the temple.
2.6.28. Then it was that Josephus’s friends, and the guards of his body, were so affrighted at this violent assault of the multitude, that they all fled away but four; and as he was asleep, they awakened him, as the people were going to set fire to the house.''. None
|6. Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.4 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship, • handclasping (dexiōsis), signifying friendship
Found in books: Hau (2017) 218; Sommerstein and Torrance (2014) 365
|5.1.4. Now I am aware that I am not describing in these incidents any enterprise involving money expended or danger incurred or any memorable stratagem; and yet, by Zeus, it seems to me that it is well worth a man’s while to consider what sort of conduct it was that enabled Teleutias to inspire the men he commanded with such a feeling toward himself. For to attain to this is indeed the achievement of a true man, more noteworthy than the expenditure of much money and the encountering of many dangers.''. None|
|7. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, friendship • Aristotle, on friendship • Aristoxenus, account of friendship not Platonic or Aristotelian • Epicureanism, on friendship • Epicurus, friendship • Plato, on friendship • Stoicism, friendship • friends and friendship • friendship • friendship (philia) • friendship (philia), in Aristotle • friendship, Aristotle on • friendship, divine • friendship, divine-human • gods (Epicurean), friendship among • gods (Epicurean), human friendship with • laws, of friendship
Found in books: Allison (2020) 68; Graver (2007) 250; Huffman (2019) 548, 549; Jedan (2009) 208; Liatsi (2021) 18, 93; Malherbe et al (2014) 335; Schibli (2002) 202, 203; Segev (2017) 23, 24; Wolfsdorf (2020) 484, 485
|8. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Empedocles, on friendship • Pythagoreanism xxv, and friendship • friends and friendship • friendship (philia) • friendship (philia), Pythagorean • friendship (philia), in Empedocles
Found in books: Huffman (2019) 544; Wolfsdorf (2020) 571
|9. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.31, 1.65-1.67, 1.69, 2.77, 2.79, 2.81-2.85, 2.101-2.103, 3.55, 3.60, 3.62-3.64, 3.68, 3.70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on friendship • Epicurus, friendship • Epicurus, on friendship/patronage • Friendship / amicitia • Stoicism, friendship • Zeno of Citium, on friendship • community, commonalty in friendship • friends and friendship • friendship • friendship, • friendship, Aristotle on • friendship, Epicurean • friendship, Epicurean understandings • friendship, among the wise • friendship, concord within • friendship, symmetry within • friendship, value of • goods, within friendship • love and friendship • self-sufficiency, within friendship
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 56, 197, 247; Gordon (2012) 166; Graver (2007) 175, 181, 250, 251; Huffman (2019) 541, 543; Long (2006) 30, 191; Long (2019) 138, 139, 199; Malherbe et al (2014) 181; Maso (2022) 28, 29, 100; Yona (2018) 46, 161, 164, 165
2.77. nam inter ista tam magnifica verba tamque praeclara non habet ullum voluptas locum, non modo illa, quam in motu esse dicitis, quam omnes urbani rustici, omnes, inquam, qui Latine loquuntur, voluptatem vocant, sed ne haec quidem stabilis, quam praeter vos nemo appellat voluptatem. Vide igitur ne non debeas debeas dubeca s R verbis nostris uti, sententiis tuis. quodsi vultum tibi, si incessum fingeres, fingeres BEN 2 fringeres AN 1 V fringens R quo gravior viderere, non esses tui similis; verba tu fingas et ea dicas, quae non sentias? aut etiam, ut vestitum, sic sententiam habeas aliam domesticam, aliam forensem, ut in fronte ostentatio sit, intus veritas occultetur? vide, quaeso, rectumne sit. mihi quidem eae eae edd. hae A he R ee (= esse) NV et BE verae videntur opiniones, quae honestae, quae laudabiles, quae gloriosae, quae in senatu, quae apud populum, quae in omni coetu concilioque profitendae sint, sunt R ne id non pudeat non pudeat pudeat non (ne E) BE sentire, quod pudeat dicere. Amicitiae vero locus ubi esse potest aut quis amicus esse cuiquam, quem non ipsum amet propter ipsum?
2.79. sed quid ages tandem, si utilitas ab amicitia, ut fit saepe, defecerit? relinquesne? quae relinquesne? quae relinquens neque A 1 relinquens ne que E relinquens ne q ; R relinquens nequaquam N 1 relinques? nequaquam N 2 V ista amicitia est? retinebis? qui convenit? quid enim de amicitia statueris utilitatis causa expetenda vides. Ne in odium veniam, si amicum destitero tueri. Primum cur ista res digna odio est, nisi quod est turpis? odio est non quod est turpis n (= nisi, puncto, ut videtur, sub n posito: n) quod est|sine quo R quodsi, ne quo incommodo afficiare, non relinques amicum, tamen, ne sine fructu alligatus sis, ut moriatur optabis. Quid, si non modo utilitatem tibi nullam afferet, sed iacturae rei familiaris erunt faciendae, labores suscipiendi, suscipiendi labores NV adeundum vitae periculum? ne tum quidem te respicies et cogitabis sibi quemque natum esse et suis voluptatibus? vadem te ad mortem tyranno dabis pro amico, ut Pythagoreus ille Siculo fecit fecit siculo tirāno R tyranno? aut, Pylades cum sis, dices te esse Orestem, Oresten A horestē R honestem V ut moriare pro amico? aut, si esses Orestes, Pyladem refelleres, te indicares et, si id non probares, quo minus ambo una necaremini non precarere? non deprecarere edit. Venet. 1480
2.81. Et quidem iure fortasse, sed tamen non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis. in omni enim arte vel studio vel quavis scientia vel in ipsa virtute optimum quidque rarissimum est. ac mihi quidem, quod et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei et Epicurei et Lamb. et epicurei A et epicurij N 1 epicurei (epicuri E) sunt BE epicurei RV epicurij N 2 fuerunt et hodie sunt et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves nec voluptate, sed sed se A 1 BER officio consilia moderantes, hoc videtur maior vis honestatis et minor voluptatis. ita enim vivunt quidam, ut eorum vita refellatur oratio. atque ut ceteri dicere existimantur melius quam facere, sic hi mihi videntur facere melius quam dicere. 2.82. Sed haec nihil sane ad rem; illa videamus, quae a te de amicitia dicta sunt. dicta sunt p. 28, 17—30, 26 e quibus Ex quibus NV unum unum p. 29, 4 sqq. mihi videbar ab ipso Epicuro dictum cognoscere, amicitiam a voluptate non posse divelli posse diuelli posset. Satis (rell. om., cf. p. 70, 1) R ob eamque rem colendam esse, quod, quoniam add. Se. (cf. ad p. 31, 25); si sine P. Man. cum sine Mdv. sine ea tuto et sine metu vivi non posset, ne ne Mdv. nec iucunde quidem posset. ne iucunde quidem posset om. B satis est ad hoc responsum. Attulisti aliud aliud p. 30, 5 sqq. humanius horum recentiorum, numquam dictum ab ipso illo, illo ipso BE illo ( om. ipso) Non. quod sciam, horum ... sciam Non. p. 167 primo utilitatis causa amicum expeti, cum autem usus accessisset, tum ipsum amari per se etiam omissa spe voluptatis. voluptatis utilitatis V; in marg. vel utilitatis add. A 2 hoc etsi multimodis multis modis NV reprehendi potest, tamen accipio, quod dant. dat R mihi enim satis est, ipsis non satis. nam aliquando posse recte fieri dicunt nulla expectata nec quaesita quaesita exquisita BE voluptate. 2.83. Posuisti etiam posuisti etiam p. 30, 18 sqq. dicere alios foedus quoddam inter se facere sapientis, ut, quem ad modum sint in se ipsos animati, eodem modo sint erga amicos; id et fieri posse et saepe esse factum et ad voluptates percipiendas perspiciendas ABER maxime pertinere. hoc foedus facere si potuerunt, faciant etiam illud, ut aequitatem, modestiam, virtutes omnes per se ipsas gratis diligant. an an BE at vero, si fructibus et emolumentis et utilitatibus amicitias colemus, si nulla caritas erit, quae faciat amicitiam ipsam sua sponte, vi sua, ex se et propter se expetendam, dubium est, quin fundos et insulas amicis anteponamus? 2.84. Licet hic rursus ea commemores, ea commemores p. 28,19 sqq. quae optimis verbis ab Epicuro de laude amicitiae dicta sunt. non quaero, quid dicat, sed quid convenienter possit rationi rationi possit R et sententiae suae dicere. Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita. est quaesita (quesita) ARN 2 V est quaesita est N 1 quesita est BE Num igitur utiliorem tibi hunc Triarium putas esse posse, quam si tua sint Puteolis granaria? gramana ABERN 1 gramina V, N 2 ( ubi a man. poster. adscr. est grana- ria puto) collige omnia, quae soletis: Praesidium praesidium p. 30, 3 amicorum. Satis est tibi in te, satis in legibus, satis in mediocribus amicitiis praesidii. praesidii marg. ed. Cratandr.; praesidium iam contemni non poteris. odium autem et invidiam facile vitabis. ad eas enim res res enim BE ab Epicuro praecepta dantur. et tamen tantis vectigalibus ad liberalitatem liberalitatem ed. Colon. 1467 libertatem utens etiam etiam P. Man. eam (eam N 2 ) sine hac Pyladea amicitia multorum te benivolentia praeclare tuebere et munies. tuebere et munies Mdv. tuebare munies BE et tuebere et munies ARNV At quicum ioca seria, ut dicitur, quicum arcana, quicum occulta omnia? 2.85. Tecum optime, deinde etiam cum mediocri amico. sed fac ista esse non inportuna; inportuna A 1 BE, V (imp.); inoportuna (superscr. priore o ab alt. ut videtur man.) A 2 in oportuna N oportuna R quid ad utilitatem tantae pecuniae? vides igitur, si amicitiam sua caritate metiare, nihil esse praestantius, sin emolumento, summas familiaritates praediorum fructuosorum mercede superari. me igitur ipsum ames oportet, non mea, si veri amici futuri sumus. Sed in rebus apertissimis nimium longi sumus. perfecto enim et concluso neque virtutibus neque amicitiis usquam locum esse, si ad voluptatem omnia referantur, nihil praeterea est magnopere dicendum. ac tamen, attamen V ne cui loco non videatur esse responsum, pauca etiam nunc dicam ad reliquam orationem tuam.
2.101. quaero autem quid sit, quod, cum dissolutione, id est morte, sensus omnis extinguatur, et cum reliqui nihil sit omnino, quod pertineat ad nos, tam accurate tamque diligenter caveat et sanciat ut Amynomachus et Timocrates, heredes sui, de Hermarchi sententia dent quod satis sit ad diem agendum natalem suum quotannis mense Gamelione itemque omnibus mensibus vicesimo die lunae dent ad eorum epulas, qui una secum philosophati sint, ut et ut et et ut A sui et Metrodori memoria colatur. 2.102. haec ego non possum dicere non esse hominis quamvis et belli et humani, sapientis vero nullo modo, physici praesertim, quem se ille esse vult, putare putare edd. putari ullum esse cuiusquam diem natalem. quid? idemne potest esse dies saepius, qui semel fuit? certe non potest. an eiusdem modi? ne id quidem, nisi multa annorum intercesserint milia, ut omnium siderum eodem, unde profecta sint, sunt R fiat ad unum tempus reversio. nullus est igitur cuiusquam dies natalis. At habetur! Et ego id scilicet nesciebam! Sed ut sit, etiamne post mortem coletur? idque testamento cavebit is, qui nobis quasi oraculum ediderit nihil post mortem ad nos pertinere? ad nos pertinere post mortem A haec non erant eius, qui innumerabilis mundos infinitasque regiones, quarum nulla esset ora, nulla extremitas, mente peragravisset. num quid tale Democritus? ut alios omittam, hunc appello, quem ille unum secutus est. 2.103. quodsi dies notandus fuit, eumne potius, quo natus, an eum, quo sapiens factus est? Non potuit, inquies, fieri sapiens, nisi natus esset. et sustul. P. Man. et Lamb. Isto modo, ne si avia quidem eius nata non esset. res tota, Torquate, non doctorum hominum, velle post mortem epulis celebrari memoriam sui nominis. quos quidem dies quem ad modum agatis et in quantam hominum facetorum urbanitatem incurratis, non dico— nihil opus est litibus—; tantum dico, magis fuisse vestrum agere Epicuri diem natalem, quam illius testamento cavere ut ageretur.
3.55. Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello, quae telika/ dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere, quod uno uno dett., om. ABERNV non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci poihtika/, alia utrumque. de pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam sapientiam deft. sapientem volunt esse. nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo est in illo Dav. est illo ABERN 1 est cum illo N 2 cum illo V pertinenti genere, quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones adfert et efficit, id efficiens dici potest. secl. Mdv.
3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser.
3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.64. mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum.
3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.
3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V' '. None
|2.77. \xa0For in that glorious array of high-sounding words, pleasure finds no place, not only what your school calls 'kinetic' pleasure, which is what every one, polished or rustic, every one, I\xa0say, who can speak Latin, means by pleasure, but not even this 'static' pleasure, which no one but you Epicureans would call pleasure at all. \xa0Well then, are you sure you have any right to employ our words with meanings of your own? If you assumed an unnatural expression or demeanour, in order to look more important, that would be insincere. Are you then to affect an artificial language, and say what you do not think? Or are you to change your opinions like your clothes, and have one set for indoor wear and another when you walk abroad? Outside, all show and pretence, but your genuine self concealed within? Reflect, I\xa0beg of you, is this honest? In my view those opinions are true which are honourable, praiseworthy and noble â\x80\x94 which can be openly avowed in the senate and the popular assembly, and in every company and gathering, so that one need not be ashamed to say what one is not ashamed to think. <" '|
2.79. \xa0But what, pray, will you do, if, as often happens, expediency parts company with friendship? Will you throw your friend over? What sort of friendship is that? Will you keep him? How does that square with your principles? You remember your pronouncement that friendship is desirable for the sake of expediency. \'I\xa0might become unpopular if I\xa0left a friend in the lurch." Well, in the first place, why is such conduct unpopular, unless because it is base? And if you refrain from deserting a friend because to do so will have inconvenient consequences, still you will long for his death to release you from an unprofitable tie. What if he not only brings you no advantage, but causes you to suffer loss of property, to undergo toil and trouble, to risk your life? Will you not even then take interest into account, and reflect that each man is born for himself and for his own pleasure? Will you go bail with your life to a tyrant on behalf of a friend, as the famous Pythagorean did to the Sicilian despot? or being Pylades will you say you are Orestes, so as to die in your friend\'s stead? or supposing you were Orestes, would you say Pylades was lying and reveal your identity, and if they would not believe you, would you make no appeal against your both dying together? <' "
2.81. \xa0'But he won many disciples.' Yes, and perhaps he deserved to do so; but still the witness of the crowd does not carry much weight; for as in every art or study, or science of any kind, so in right conduct itself, supreme excellence is extremely rare. And to my mind the fact that Epicurus himself was a good man and that many Epicureans both have been and toâ\x80\x91day are loyal to their friends, consistent and high-principled throughout their lives, ruling their conduct by duty and not by pleasure, â\x80\x94 all this does but enforce the value of moral goodness and diminish that of pleasure. The fact is that some persons' lives and behaviour refute the principles they profess. Most men's words are thought to be better than their deeds; these people's deeds on the contrary seem to me better than their words. <" '2.82. \xa0"But this I\xa0admit is a digression. Let us return to what you said about friendship. In one of your remarks I\xa0seemed to recognize a saying of Epicurus himself, â\x80\x94 that friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure, and that it deserves to be cultivated for the reason that without it we cannot live secure and free from alarm, and therefore cannot live agreeably. Enough has been said in answer to this already. You quoted another and a more humane dictum of the more modern Epicureans, which so far as I\xa0know was never uttered by the master himself. This was to the effect that, although at the outset we desire a man\'s friendship for utilitarian reasons, yet when intimacy has grown up we love our friend for his own sake, even if all prospect of pleasure be left out of sight. It is possible to take exception to this on several grounds; still I\xa0won\'t refuse what they give, as it is sufficient for my case and not sufficient for theirs. For it amounts to saying that moral action is occasionally possible, â\x80\x94 action prompted by no anticipation or desire of pleasure. < 2.83. \xa0You further alleged that other thinkers speak of wise men as making a sort of mutual compact to entertain the same sentiments towards their friends as they feel towards themselves; this (you said) was possible, and in fact had often occurred; and it was highly conducive to the attainment of pleasure. If men have succeeded in making this compact, let them make a further compact to love fair-dealing, self-control, and all the virtues, for their own sakes and without reward. If on the other hand we are to cultivate friendships for their results, for profit and utility, if there is to be no affection to render friendship, in and for itself, intrinsically and spontaneously desirable, can we doubt that we shall value land and house-property more than friends? <' "2.84. \xa0It is no good your once again repeating Epicurus's admirable remarks in praise of friendship. I\xa0am not asking what Epicurus actually says, but what he can say consistently while holding the theory he professes. 'Friendship is originally sought after from motives of utility.' Well, but surely you don't reckon Triarius here a more valuable asset than the granaries at Puteoli would be if they belonged to you? Cite all the stock Epicurean maxims. 'Friends are a protection.' You can protect yourself; the laws will protect you; ordinary friendships offer protection enough; you will be too powerful to despise as it is, while hatred and envy it will be easy to avoid, â\x80\x94 Epicurus gives rules for doing so! And in any case, with so large an income to give away, you can dispense with the romantic sort of friendship that we have in mind; you will have plenty of well-wishers to defend you quite effectively. <" '2.85. \xa0But a confidant, to share your \'grave thoughts or gay\' as the saying is, all your secrets and private affairs? Your best confidant is yourself; also you may confide in a friend of the average type. But granting that friendship has the conveniences you mention, what are they compared with the advantages of vast wealth? You see then that although if you measure friendship by the test of its own charm it is unsurpassed in value, by the standard of profit the most affectionate intimacy is outweighed by the rents of a valuable estate. So you must love me yourself, not my possessions, if we are to be genuine friends."But we dwell too long upon the obvious. For when it has been conclusively proved that if pleasure is the sole standard there is no room left either for virtue or for friendship, there is no great need to say anything further. Still I\xa0do not want you to think I\xa0have failed to answer any of your points, so I\xa0will now say a\xa0few words in reply to the remainder of your discourse. <
2.101. \xa0However in spite of this I\xa0understand the meaning intended. What I\xa0want to know is this: if all sensation is annihilated by dissolution, that is, by death, and if nothing whatever that can affect us remains, why is it that he makes such precise and careful provision and stipulation \'that his heirs, \')" onMouseOut="nd();"Amynomachus and Timocrates, shall after consultation with Hermarchus assign a sufficient sum to celebrate his birthday every year in the month of Gamelion, and also on the twentieth day of every month shall assign a sum for a banquet to his fellow-students in philosophy, in order to keep alive the memory of himself and of Metrodorus\'? <' "2.102. \xa0That these are the words of as amiable and kindly a man as you like, I\xa0cannot deny; but what business has a philosopher, and especially a natural philosopher, which Epicurus claims to be, to think that any day can be anybody's birthday? Why, can the identical day that has once occurred recur again and again? Assuredly it is impossible. Or can a similar day recur? This too is impossible, except after an interval of many thousands of years, when all the heavenly bodies simultaneously achieve their return to the point from which they started. It follows that there is no such thing as anybody's birthday. 'But a certain day is so regarded.' Much obliged, I\xa0am sure, for the information! But even granting birthdays, is a person's birthday to be observed when he is dead? And to provide for this by will â\x80\x94 is this appropriate for a man who told us in oracular tones that nothing can affect us after death? Such a provision ill became one whose 'intellect had roamed' over unnumbered worlds and realms of infinite space, without shores or circumference. Did Democritus do anything of the kind? (To omit others, I\xa0cite the case of the philosopher who was Epicurus's only master.) <" "2.103. \xa0And if a special day was to be kept, did he do well to take the day on which he was born, and not rather that on which he became a Wise Man? You will object that he could not have become a Wise Man if he had not first of all been born. You might equally well say, if his grandmother had not been born either. The entire notion of wishing one's name and memory to be celebrated by a banquet after one's death is alien to a man of learning. I\xa0won't refer to your mode of keeping these anniversaries, or the shafts of wit you bring upon you from persons with a sense of humour. We do not want to quarrel. I\xa0only remark that it was more your business to keep Epicurus's birthday than his business to provide by will for its celebration. <" '
3.55. \xa0"Next comes the division of goods into three classes, first those which are \'constituents\' of the final end (for so I\xa0represent the term telika, this being a case of an idea which we may decide, as we agreed, to express in several words as we cannot do so in one, in order to make the meaning clear), secondly those which are \'productive\' of the End, the Greek poiÄ\x93tika; and thirdly those which are both. The only instances of goods of the \'constituent\' class are moral action; the only instance of a \'productive\' good is a friend. Wisdom, according to the Stoics, is both constituent and productive; for as being itself an appropriate activity it comes under what I\xa0called the constituent class; as causing and producing moral actions, it can be called productive. <' "
3.60. \xa0But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. <" '
3.62. \xa0"Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature\'s scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature\'s operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. <' "3.63. \xa0From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâ\x80\x91pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâ\x80\x91pen, which swims out of the seaâ\x80\x91pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â\x80\x94 these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. <" '3.64. \xa0"Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâ\x80\x91abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. <
3.68. \xa0Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. <
3.70. \xa0"They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among \'things beneficial.\' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends\' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man\'s own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another\'s loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I\xa0am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. <' ". None
|10. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.44 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Friendship / amicitia • friendship, Epicurean understandings
Found in books: Maso (2022) 100; Yona (2018) 46
|1.44. You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the uimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) "". None|
|11. Cicero, On Duties, 1.20-1.22, 1.30, 1.42-1.45, 1.56-1.57, 1.65, 1.120, 1.151, 2.31, 2.38, 2.69-2.71 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Caesar,, On Friendship (De amicitia) • Friendship / amicitia • friends and friendship • friendship • friendship (Ciceronian) • friendship, • friendship, three levels of • friendship,, libidinal language of • patronage, overlap with true friendship
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 57, 197, 247, 280; Bowditch (2001) 19, 23; Huffman (2019) 541; Long (2006) 322; Mackey (2022) 140; Malherbe et al (2014) 541; Maso (2022) 28, 29, 79; Yona (2018) 80, 167, 168
1.20. De tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur; cuius partes duae, iustitia, in qua virtutis est splendor maximus, ex qua viri boni nomitur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet. Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis. 1.21. Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt, aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut lege, pactione, condicione, sorte; ex quo fit, ut ager Arpinas Arpinatium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum; similisque est privatarum possessionum discriptio. Ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae natura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat; e quo si quis sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae societatis. 1.22. Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gigtur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem.
1.30. est enim difficilis cura rerum alienarum. Quamquam Terentianus ille Chremes humani nihil a se alienum putat ; sed tamen, quia magis ea percipimus atque sentimus, quae nobis ipsis aut prospera aut adversa eveniunt, quam illa, quae ceteris, quae quasi longo intervallo interiecto videmus, aliter de illis ac de nobis iudicamus. Quocirca bene praecipiunt, qui vetant quicquam agere, quod dubites aequum sit an iniquum. Aequitas enim lucet ipsa per se, dubitatio cogitationem significat iniuriae.
1.42. Deinceps, ut erat propositum, de beneficentia ae de liberalitate dicatur, qua quidem nihil est naturae hominis accommodatius, sed habet multas cautiones. Videndum est enim, primum ne obsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri et ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit quam facultates, tum ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur; id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam haec referenda sunt omnia. Nam et qui gratificantur cuipiam, quod obsit illi, cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberales, sed perniciosi assentatores iudicandi sunt, et qui aliis nocent, ut in alios liberales sint, in eadem sunt iniustitia, ut si in suam rem aliena convertant. 1.43. Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, iique arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem tantum abest ab officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur, quae prosit amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil est enim liberale, quod non idem iustum. 1.44. Alter locus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam facultates, quod, qui benigniores volunt esse, quam res patitur, primum in eo peccant, quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos; quas enim copias his et suppeditari aequius est et relinqui, eas transferunt ad alienos. Inest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas plerumque rapiendi et auferendi per iniuriam, ut ad largiendum suppetant copiae. Videre etiam licet plerosque non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria ductos, ut benefici videantur, facere multa, quae proficisci ab ostentatione magis quam a voluntate videantur. Talis autem sinulatio vanitati est coniunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati. 1.45. Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia dilectus esset dignitatis; in quo et mores eius erunt spectandi, in quem beneficium conferetur, et animus erga nos et communitas ac societas vitae et ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata; quae ut concurrant omnia, optabile est; si minus, plures causae maioresque ponderis plus habebunt.
1.56. Et quamquam omnis virtus nos ad se allicit facitque, ut eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse videatur, tamen iustitia et liberalitas id maxime efficit. Nihil autem est amabilius nec copulatius quam morum similitudo bonorum; in quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eaedem voluntates, in iis fit ut aeque quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso, efficiturque id, quod Pythagoras vult in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus. Magna etiam illa communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultro et citro datis acceptis, quae et mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt, firma devinciuntur societate. 1.57. Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiars, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt.
1.65. Fortes igitur et magimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam.
1.120. Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, sed naturae magis; multo enim et firmior est et constantior, ut fortuna non numquam tamquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur. Qui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consilium vivendi omne contulerit, is constantiam teneat (id enim maxime decet), nisi forte se intellexerit errasse in deligendo genere vitae. Quod si acciderit (potest autem accidere), facienda morum institutorumque mutatio est. Eam mutationem si tempora adiuvabunt, facilius commodiusque faciemus; sin minus, sensim erit pedetemptimque facienda, ut amicitias, quae minus delectent et minus probentur, magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam repente praecidere.
1.151. Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura autem, si tenuis est. sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesque contulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius; de qua quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim assumes, quae ad hunc locum pertinebunt.
2.31. Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse non aeque omnes egent, sed tamen, si cui haec suppetunt, adiuvant aliquantum cum ad cetera, tum ad amicitias comparandas. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius; nunc dicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri, sed attingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat plurimum. Summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat. Haec autem, si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, quibus rebus pariuntur a singulis, eisdem fere a multitudine. Sed est alius quoque quidam aditus ad multitudinem, ut in universorum animos tamquam influere possimus.
2.38. Ergo et haec animi despicientia admirabilitatem magnam facit et maxime iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur, mirifica quaedam multitudini videtur, nec iniuria; nemo enim iustus esse potest, qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsilium, qui egestatem timet, aut qui ea, quae sunt his contraria, aequitati anteponit. Maximeque admirantur eum, qui pecunia non movetur; quod in quo viro perspectum sit, hunc igni spectatum arbitrantur. Itaque illa tria, quae proposita sunt ad gloriarm omnia iustitia conficit, et benivolentiam, quod prodesse vult plurimis, et ob eandem causam fidem et admirationem, quod eas res spernit et neglegit, ad quas plerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur.
2.69. Sed cum in hominibus iuvandis aut mores spectari aut fortuna soleat, dictu quidem est proclive, itaque volgo loquuntur, se in beneficiis collocandis mores hominum, non fortunam sequi. Honesta oratio est; sed quis est tandem, qui inopis et optimi viri causae non anteponat in opera danda gratiam fortunati et potentis? a quo enim expeditior et celerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est voluntas nostra propensior. Sed animadvertendum est diligentius, quae natura rerum sit. Nimirum enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiamsi referre gratiam non potest, habere certe potest. Commode autem, quicumque dixit, pecuniam qui habeat, non reddidisse, qui reddiderit, non habere, gratiam autem et, qui rettulerit, habere et, qui habeat, rettulisse. At qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, ii ne obligari quidem beneficio volunt; quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, cum ipsi quamvis magnum aliquod acceperint, atque etiam a se aut postulari aut exspectari aliquid suspicantur, patrocinio vero se usos aut clientes appellari mortis instar putant. 2.70. At vero ille tenuis, cum, quicquid factum sit, se spectatum, non fortunam putet, non modo illi, qui est meritus, sed etiam illis, a quibus exspectat (eget enim multis), gratum se videri studet neque vero verbis auget suum munus, si quo forte fungitur, sed etiam extenuat. Videndumque illud est, quod, si opulentum fortunatumque defenderis, in uno illo aut, si forte, in liberis eius manet gratia; sin autem inopem, probum tamen et modestum, omnes non improbi humiles, quae magna in populo multitudo est, praesidium sibi paratum vident. 2.71. Quam ob rem melius apud bonos quam apud fortunatos beneficium collocari puto. Danda omnino opera est, ut omni generi satis facere possimus; sed si res in contentionem veniet, nimirum Themistocles est auctor adhibendus; qui cum consuleretur, utrum bono viro pauperi an minus probato diviti filiam collocaret: Ego vero, inquit, malo virum, qui pecunia egeat, quam pecuniam, quae viro. Sed corrupti mores depravatique sunt admiratione divitiarum; quarum magnitudo quid ad unum quemque nostrum pertinet? Illum fortasse adiuvat, qui habet. Ne id quidem semper; sed fac iuvare; utentior sane sit, honestior vero quo modo? Quodsi etiam bonus erit vir, ne impediant divitiae, quo minus iuvetur, modo ne adiuvent, sitque omne iudicium, non quam locuples, sed qualis quisque sit! Extremum autem praeceptum in beneficiis operaque danda, ne quid contra aequitatem contendas, ne quid pro iniuria; fundamentum enim est perpetuae commendationis et famae iustitia, sine qua nihil potest esse laudabile.''. None
|1.20. \xa0of the three remaining divisions, the most extensive in its application is the principle by which society and what we may call its "common bonds" are maintained. of this again there are two divisions â\x80\x94 justice, in which is the crowning glory of the virtues and on the basis of which men are called "good men"; and, close akin to justice, charity, which may also be called kindness or generosity. The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests, private property for their own. < 1.21. \xa0There is, however, no such thing as private ownership established by nature, but property becomes private either through long occupancy (as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory) or through conquest (is in the case of those who took it in war) or by due process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that, he will be violating the laws of human society. <' "1.22. \xa0But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man. <" '|
1.30. \xa0and yet in Terence\'s play, we know, Chremes "thinks that nothing that concerns man is foreign to him." Nevertheless, when things turn out for our own good or ill, we realize it more fully and feel it more deeply than when the same things happen to others and we see them only, as it were, in the far distance; and for this reason we judge their case differently from our own. It is, therefore, an excellent rule that they give who bid us not to do a thing, when there is a doubt whether it be right or wrong; for righteousness shines with a brilliance of its own, but doubt is a sign that we are thinking of a possible wrong. <
1.42. \xa0Next in order, as outlined above, let us speak of kindness and generosity. Nothing appeals more to the best in human nature than this, but it calls for the exercise of caution in many particulars; we must, in the first place, see to it that our act of kindness shall not prove an injury either to the object of our beneficence or to others; in the second place, that it shall not be beyond our means; and finally, that it shall be proportioned to the worthiness of the recipient; for this is the corner-stone of justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of kindness must be measured. For those who confer a harmful favour upon someone whom they seemingly wish to help are to be accounted not generous benefactors but dangerous sycophants; and likewise those who injure one man, in order to be generous to another, are guilty of the same injustice as if they diverted to their own accounts the property of their neighbours. < 1.43. \xa0Now, there are many â\x80\x94 and especially those who are ambitious for eminence and glory â\x80\x94 who rob one to enrich another; and they expect to be thought generous towards their friends, if they put them in the way of getting rich, no matter by what means. Such conduct, however, is so remote from moral duty that nothing can be more completely opposed to duty. We must, therefore, take care to indulge only in such liberality as will help our friends and hurt no one. The conveyance of property by Lucius Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to the hands of strangers should, for that reason, not be regarded as generosity; for nothing is generous if it is not at the same time just. < 1.44. \xa0The second point for the exercise of caution was that our beneficence should not exceed our means; for those who wish to be more open-handed than their circumstances permit are guilty of two faults: first they do wrong to their next of kin; for they transfer to strangers property which would more justly be placed at their service or bequeathed to them. And second, such generosity too often engenders a passion for plundering and misappropriating property, in order to supply the means for making large gifts. We may also observe that a great many people do many things that seem to be inspired more by a spirit of ostentation than by heart-felt kindness; for such people are not really generous but are rather influenced by a sort of ambition to make a show of being open-handed. Such a pose is nearer akin to hypocrisy than to generosity or moral goodness. < 1.45. \xa0The third rule laid down was that in acts of kindness we should weigh with discrimination the worthiness of the object of our benevolence; we should take into consideration his moral character, his attitude toward us, the intimacy of his relation to us, and our common social ties, as well as the services he has hitherto rendered in our interest. It is to be desired that all these considerations should be combined in the same person; if they are not, then the more numerous and the more important considerations must have the greater weight. <
1.56. \xa0And while every virtue attracts us and makes us love those who seem to possess it, still justice and generosity do so most of all. Nothing, moreover, is more conducive to love and intimacy than compatibility of character in good men; for when two people have the same ideals and the same tastes, it is a natural consequence that each loves the other as himself; and the result is, as Pythagoras requires of ideal friendship, that several are united in one. Another strong bond of fellowship is effected by mutual interchange of kind services; and as long as these kindnesses are mutual and acceptable, those between whom they are interchanged are united by the ties of an enduring intimacy. < 1.57. \xa0But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there is no social relation among them all more close, none more close, none more dear than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; one native land embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the more execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and who are and have been engaged in compassing her utter destruction. <' "
1.65. \xa0So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements. <" '
1.120. \xa0But since the most powerful influence in the choice of a career is exerted by Nature, and the next most powerful by Fortune, we must, of course, take account of them both in deciding upon our calling in life; but, of the two, Nature claims the more attention. For Nature is so much more stable and steadfast, that for Fortune to come into conflict with Nature seems like a combat between a mortal and a goddess. If, therefore, he has conformed his whole plan of life to the kind of nature that is his (that is, his better nature), let him go on with it consistently â\x80\x94 for that is the essence of Propriety â\x80\x94 unless, perchance, he should discover that he has made a mistake in choosing his life work. If this should happen (and it can easily happen), he must change his vocation and mode of life. If circumstances favour such change, it will be effected with greater ease and convenience. If not, it must be made gradually, step by step, just as, when friendships become no longer pleasing or desirable, it is more proper (so wise men think) to undo the bond little by little than to sever it at a stroke. <
1.151. \xa0But the professions in which either a higher degree of intelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is derived â\x80\x94 medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching â\x80\x94 these are proper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I\xa0should say, satisfied with the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman. But since I\xa0have discussed this quite fully in my Cato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point.
2.31. \xa0All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of political honour, fame and the good-will of their fellow-citizens; nevertheless, if these honours come to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in the acquisition of friends. But friendship has been discussed in another book of mine, entitled "Laelius." Let us now take up the discussion of Glory, although I\xa0have published two books on that subject also. Still, let us touch briefly on it here, since it is of very great help in the conduct of more important business. The highest, truest glory depends upon the following three things: the affection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the people. Such sentiments, if I\xa0may speak plainly and concisely, are awakened in the masses in the same way as in individuals. But there is also another avenue of approach to the masses, by which we can, as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once. <
2.38. \xa0As, then, this superiority of mind to such externals inspires great admiration, so justice, above all, on the basis of which alone men are called "good men," seems to people generally a quite marvellous virtue â\x80\x94 and not without good reason; for no one can be just who fears death or pain or exile or poverty, or who values their opposites above equity. And people admire especially the man who is uninfluenced by money; and if a man has proved himself in this direction, they think him tried as by fire. Those three requisites, therefore, which were presupposed as the means of obtaining glory, are all secured by justice: (1)\xa0good-will, for it seeks to be of help to the greatest number; (2)\xa0confidence, for the same reason; and (3)\xa0admiration, because it scorns and cares nothing for those things, with a consuming passion for which most people are carried away. <
2.69. \xa0Now in rendering helpful service to people, we usually consider either their character or their circumstances. And so it is an easy remark, and one commonly made, to say that in investing kindnesses we look not to people\'s outward circumstances, but to their character. The phrase is admirable! But who is there, pray, that does not in performing a service set the favour of a rich and influential man above the cause of a poor, though most worthy, person? For, as a rule, our will is more inclined to the one from whom we expect a prompter and speedier return. But we should observe more carefully how the matter really stands: the poor man of whom we spoke cannot return a favour in kind, of course, but if he is a good man he can do it at least in thankfulness of heart. As someone has happily said, "A\xa0man has not repaid money, if he still has it; if he has repaid it, he has ceased to have it. But a man still has the sense of favour, if he has returned the favour; and if he has the sense of the favour, he has repaid it." On the other hand, they who consider themselves wealthy, honoured, the favourites of fortune, do not wish even to be put under obligations by our kind services. Why, they actually think that they have conferred a favour by accepting one, however great; and they even suspect that a claim is thereby set up against them or that something is expected in return. Nay more, it is bitter as death to them to have accepted a patron or to be called clients. < 2.70. \xa0Your man of slender means, on the other hand, feels that whatever is done for him is done out of regard for himself and not for his outward circumstances. Hence he strives to show himself grateful not only to the one who has obliged him in the past but also to those from whom he expects similar favours in the future â\x80\x94 and he needs the help of many; and his own service, if he happens to render any in return, he does not exaggerate, but he actually depreciates it. This fact, furthermore, should not be overlooked â\x80\x94 that, if one defends a wealthy favourite of fortune, the favour does not extend further than to the man himself or, possibly, to his children. But, if one defends a man who is poor but honest and upright, all the lowly who are not dishonest â\x80\x94 and there is a large proportion of that sort among the people â\x80\x94 look upon such an advocate as a tower of defence raised up for them. < 2.71. \xa0I\xa0think, therefore, that kindness to the good is a better investment than kindness to the favourites of fortune. We must, of course, put forth every effort to oblige all sorts and conditions of men, if we can. But if it comes to a conflict of duty on this point, we must, I\xa0should say, follow the advice of Themistocles: when someone asked his advice whether he should give his daughter in marriage to a man who was poor but honest or to one who was rich but less esteemed, he said: "For my part, I\xa0prefer a man without money to money without a man." But the moral sense of toâ\x80\x91day is demoralized and depraved by our worship of wealth. of what concern to any one of us is the size of another man\'s fortune? It is, perhaps, an advantage to its possessor; but not always even that. But suppose it is; he may, to be sure, have more money to spend; but how is he any the better man for that? Still, if he is a good man, as well as a rich one, let not his riches be a hindrance to his being aided, if only they are not the motive to it; but in conferring favours our decision should depend entirely upon a man\'s character, not on his wealth. The supreme rule, then, in the matter of kindnesses to be rendered by personal service is never to take up a case in opposition to the right nor in defence of the wrong. For the foundation of enduring reputation and fame is justice, and without justice there can be nothing worthy of praise. <''. None
|12. Septuagint, Ecclesiasticus (Siracides), 4.3, 6.7, 9.1-9.9, 22.23, 40.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Friendship • friends, friendship • friendship • friendship,
Found in books: Beyerle and Goff (2022) 347, 349, 360; Merz and Tieleman (2012) 158; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 84, 174, 176; Wilson (2010) 332; Wilson (2012) 266, 393
|4.3. Do not add to the troubles of an angry mind,nor delay your gift to a beggar. |
4.3. Do not be like a lion in your home,nor be a faultfinder with your servants.
9.1. Do not be jealous of the wife of your bosom,and do not teach her an evil lesson to your own hurt.
9.1. Forsake not an old friend,for a new one does not compare with him. A new friend is like new wine;when it has aged you will drink it with pleasure. 9.2. Do not give yourself to a woman so that she gains mastery over your strength. 9.3. Do not go to meet a loose woman,lest you fall into her snares. 9.4. Do not associate with a woman singer,lest you be caught in her intrigues. 9.5. Do not look intently at a virgin,lest you stumble and incur penalties for her. 9.6. Do not give yourself to harlots lest you lose your inheritance. 9.7. Do not look around in the streets of a city,nor wander about in its deserted sections. 9.8. Turn away your eyes from a shapely woman,and do not look intently at beauty belonging to another;many have been misled by a womans beauty,and by it passion is kindled like a fire. 9.9. Never dine with another mans wife,nor revel with her at wine;lest your heart turn aside to her,and in blood you be plunged into destruction.
22.23. For first of all, she has disobeyed the law of the Most High;second, she has committed an offense against her husband;and third, she has committed adultery through harlotry and brought forth children by another man.
22.23. Gain the trust of your neighbor in his poverty,that you may rejoice with him in his prosperity;stand by him in time of affliction,that you may share with him in his inheritance.
40.23. A friend or a companion never meets one amiss,but a wife with her husband is better than both.' '. None
|13. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, friendship • Aristotle, on friendship • Epicureanism, on friendship • Epicurus, friendship • Friendship / amicitia • Stoicism, friendship • amicitia • amicitia (friendship) • clichés, of friendship • friends and friendship • friends, friendship • friendship • friendship (Ciceronian) • friendship, • friendship, Greek tradition • friendship, Roman tradition • friendship, between equals • friendship, definition of • letter, friendship
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 296, 297; Conybeare (2000) 62, 63; Huffman (2019) 550; Kazantzidis and Spatharas (2018) 192; Mackey (2022) 140; Malherbe et al (2014) 327, 335; Maso (2022) 42, 43, 64, 79; Mueller (2002) 82, 83; Schibli (2002) 203; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 84; Wilson (2010) 332
|14. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus, on friendship/patronage • friendship • friendship, Epicurean understandings
Found in books: Long (2006) 30; Yona (2018) 161, 164, 165
|15. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Friendship / amicitia • friendship, • friendship, Epicurean understandings
Found in books: Atkins and Bénatouïl (2021) 295; Maso (2022) 37; Yona (2018) 246
|16. Horace, Sermones, 1.6.62, 2.6.65-2.6.66, 2.6.71-2.6.76, 2.6.116 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • Caesar,, On Friendship (De amicitia) • Philodemus of Gadara, on friendship/intimacy • Satires (Horace), treatment of friendship • friendship and the satirist • friendship, Epicurean understandings
Found in books: Bowditch (2001) 23; Keane (2015) 61, 152; Yona (2018) 4, 46, 158, 246, 247
|1.6.62. 2. And now, in the first place, I cannot but greatly wonder at those men who suppose that we must attend to none but Grecians, when we are inquiring about the most ancient facts, and must inform ourselves of their truth from them only, while we must not believe ourselves nor other men; for I am convinced that the very reverse is the truth of the case. I mean this,—if we will not be led by vain opinions, but will make inquiry after truth from facts themselves; |
1.6.62. 12. As for ourselves, therefore, we neither inhabit a maritime country, nor do we delight in merchandise, nor in such a mixture with other men as arises from it; but the cities we dwell in are remote from the sea, and having a fruitful country for our habitation, we take pains in cultivating that only. Our principal care of all is this, to educate our children well; and we think it to be the most necessary business of our whole life to observe the laws that have been given us, and to keep those rules of piety that have been delivered down to us.
2.6.65. However, it is not a very easy thing to go over this man’s discourse, nor to know plainly what he means; yet does he seem, amidst a great confusion and disorder in his falsehoods, to produce, in the first place, such things as resemble what we have examined already, and relate to the departure of our forefathers out of Egypt;
2.6.65. nay, when last of all Caesar had taken Alexandria, she came to that pitch of cruelty, that she declared she had some hope of preserving her affairs still, in case she could kill the Jews, though it were with her own hand; to such a degree of barbarity and perfidiousness had she arrived; and doth any one think that we cannot boast ourselves of any thing, if, as Apion says, this queen did not at a time of famine distribute wheat among us?
2.6.116. nay, when last of all Caesar had taken Alexandria, she came to that pitch of cruelty, that she declared she had some hope of preserving her affairs still, in case she could kill the Jews, though it were with her own hand; to such a degree of barbarity and perfidiousness had she arrived; and doth any one think that we cannot boast ourselves of any thing, if, as Apion says, this queen did not at a time of famine distribute wheat among us? ''. None
|17. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 89-93 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • friends, friendship • friendship
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 405; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 82
|89. For there are some men, who, looking upon written laws as symbols of things appreciable by the intellect, have studied some things with superfluous accuracy, and have treated others with neglectful indifference; whom I should blame for their levity; for they ought to attend to both classes of things, applying themselves both to an accurate investigation of invisible things, and also to an irreproachable observance of those laws which are notorious. '90. But now men living solitarily by themselves as if they were in a desert, or else as if they were mere souls unconnected with the body, and as if they had no knowledge of any city, or village, or house, or in short of any company of men whatever, overlook what appears to the many to be true, and seek for plain naked truth by itself, whom the sacred scripture teaches not to neglect a good reputation, and not to break through any established customs which divine men of greater wisdom than any in our time have enacted or established. 91. For although the seventh day is a lesson to teach us the power which exists in the uncreated God, and also that the creature is entitled to rest from his labours, it does not follow that on that account we may abrogate the laws which are established respecting it, so as to light a fire, or till land, or carry burdens, or bring accusations, or conduct suits at law, or demand a restoration of a deposit, or exact the repayment of a debt, or do any other of the things which are usually permitted at times which are not days of festival. 92. Nor does it follow, because the feast is the symbol of the joy of the soul and of its gratitude towards God, that we are to repudiate the assemblies ordained at the periodical seasons of the year; nor because the rite of circumcision is an emblem of the excision of pleasures and of all the passions, and of the destruction of that impious opinion, according to which the mind has imagined itself to be by itself competent to produce offspring, does it follow that we are to annul the law which has been enacted about circumcision. Since we shall neglect the laws about the due observance of the ceremonies in the temple, and numbers of others too, if we exclude all figurative interpretation and attend only to those things which are expressly ordained in plain words. 93. But it is right to think that this class of things resembles the body, and the other class the soul; therefore, just as we take care of the body because it is the abode of the soul, so also must we take care of the laws that are enacted in plain terms: for while they are regarded, those other things also will be more clearly understood, of which these laws are the symbols, and in the same way one will escape blame and accusation from men in general. '. None|
|18. Philo of Alexandria, On Dreams, 1.195 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • friends, friendship • friendship
Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020) 269, 405; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 13
|1.195. for at the beginning of his account of this transaction, Moses says that "God did tempt Abraham, and said unto him, Abraham, Abraham; and he said, Behold, here am I. And he said unto him, Take now thy beloved son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and offer him up." And when he had brought the victim to the altar, then the angel of the Lord called him out of heaven, saying, "Abraham, Abraham," and he answered, "Behold, here am I. And he said, Lay not thy hand upon the child, and do nothing to Him." ''. None|
|19. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • amicitia • friend, friendship
Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 150; Tuori (2016) 101
|20. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • flattery, blurring of distinction from friendship • friendship,, as cultural discourse • friendship,, libidinal language of • patronage, overlap with true friendship
Found in books: Bowditch (2001) 18, 175, 178; Yona (2018) 167, 189
|21. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship • friendship, Epicurean • friendship, Epicurean understandings • friendship, three levels of
Found in books: Gordon (2012) 117; Long (2006) 202; Yona (2018) 51, 74
|22. Anon., Didache, 4.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship • friendship, and economic interdependence
Found in books: Allison (2020) 120; Wilson (2012) 239
|4.8. My child, him that speaks to you the word of God remember night and day; and you shall honour him as the Lord; for in the place whence lordly rule is uttered, there is the Lord. And you shall seek out day by day the faces of the saints, in order that you may rest upon their words. You shall not long for division, but shall bring those who contend to peace. You shall judge righteously, you shall not respect persons in reproving for transgressions. You shall not be undecided whether it shall be or no. Be not a stretcher forth of the hands to receive and a drawer of them back to give. If you have anything, through your hands you shall give ransom for your sins. You shall not hesitate to give, nor murmur when you give; for you shall know who is the good repayer of the hire. You shall not turn away from him that is in want, but you shall share all things with your brother, and shall not say that they are your own; for if you are partakers in that which is immortal, how much more in things which are mortal? You shall not remove your hand from your son or from your daughter, but from their youth shall teach them the fear of God. Ephesians 6:4 You shall not enjoin anything in your bitterness upon your bondman or maidservant, who hope in the same God, lest ever they shall fear not God who is over both; Ephesians 6:9; Colossians 4:1 for he comes not to call according to the outward appearance, but unto them whom the Spirit has prepared. And you bondmen shall be subject to your masters as to a type of God, in modesty and fear. Ephesians 6:5; Colossians 3:22 You shall hate all hypocrisy and everything which is not pleasing to the Lord. Forsake in no way the commandments of the Lord; but you shall keep what you have received, neither adding thereto nor taking away therefrom . Deuteronomy 12:32 In the church you shall acknowledge your transgressions, and you shall not come near for your prayer with an evil conscience. This is the way of life. ''. None|
|23. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 14.34-14.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Antipater father of Herod, friendship of, with Roman generals • amicitia
Found in books: Rutledge (2012) 149; Udoh (2006) 29
14.34. Μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ Πομπηίου εἰς Δαμασκὸν ἀφικομένου καὶ κοίλην Συρίαν ἐπιόντος ἧκον παρ' αὐτὸν πρέσβεις ἐξ ὅλης Συρίας καὶ Αἰγύπτου καὶ ἐκ τῆς ̓Ιουδαίας: ἔπεμψε γὰρ αὐτῷ μέγα δῶρον ̓Αριστόβουλος ἄμπελον χρυσῆν ἐκ πεντακοσίων ταλάντων." "
14.34. Πάκορος δ' ὁ Πάρθων στρατηγὸς σὺν ἱππεῦσιν ὀλίγοις ̓Αντιγόνου δεηθέντος εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἔρχεται, λόγῳ μὲν ὡς καταπαύσειεν τὴν στάσιν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς συμπράξων ἐκείνῳ τὴν ἀρχήν." '14.35. μέμνηται δὲ τοῦ δώρου καὶ Στράβων ὁ Καππάδοξ λέγων οὕτως: “ἦλθεν δὲ καὶ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου πρεσβεία καὶ στέφανος ἀπὸ χρυσῶν τετρακισχιλίων καὶ ἐκ τῆς ̓Ιουδαίας εἴτε ἄμπελος εἴτε κῆπος: τερπωλὴν ὠνόμαζον τὸ δημιούργημα. 14.35. οἱ δὲ τὸ πᾶν εἰδότες ὑπεκρίνοντο δολερῶς καὶ δεῖν αὐτὸν ἔφασαν μετὰ σφῶν ἐξελθόντα πρὸ τοῦ τείχους ὑπαντᾶν τοῖς τὰ γράμματα κομίζουσιν: οὐδέπω γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰλῆφθαι πρὸς τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν, ἥκειν μέντοι δηλοῦντας ὅσα κατορθώσειε Φασάηλος. 14.36. οὓς δὴ καὶ τρεψάμενος καὶ κρατήσας οὐχ ὡς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ τις τοιαύτῃ καθεστώς, ἀλλ' ὡς κάλλιστα καὶ μετὰ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος πρὸς πόλεμον παρεσκευασμένος, ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χωρίῳ, ἐν ᾧ τῶν ̓Ιουδαίων ἐκράτησε, μετὰ χρόνον βασιλεύσας ἔκτισε καὶ βασίλειον κατεσκεύασεν ἀξιολογώτατον καὶ πόλιν περὶ αὐτὸ ̔Ηρωδίαν προσαγορεύσας."14.36. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ δῶρον ἱστορήκαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνακείμενον ἐν ̔Ρώμῃ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Καπετωλίου ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχον ̓Αλεξάνδρου τοῦ τῶν ̓Ιουδαίων βασιλέως. ἐτιμήθη δὲ εἶναι πεντακοσίων ταλάντων” ̓Αριστόβουλον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο λέγεται πέμψαι τὸν ̓Ιουδαίων δυνάστην.' "". None
|14.34. 1. A little afterward Pompey came to Damascus, and marched over Celesyria; at which time there came ambassadors to him from all Syria, and Egypt, and out of Judea also, for Aristobulus had sent him a great present, which was a golden vine of the value of five hundred talents. |
14.34. yet was Pacorus, the general of the Parthians, at the desire of Antigonus, admitted into the city, with a few of his horsemen, under pretence indeed as if he would still the sedition, but in reality to assist Antigonus in obtaining the government. 14.35. Now Strabo of Cappadocia mentions this present in these words: “There came also an embassage out of Egypt, and a crown of the value of four thousand pieces of gold; and out of Judea there came another, whether you call it a vine or a garden; they call the thing Terpole, the Delight. 14.35. who, although they knew the whole matter, dissembled with him in a deceitful way; and said that he ought to go out with them before the walls, and meet those which were bringing him his letters, for that they were not taken by his adversaries, but were coming to give him an account of the good success Phasaelus had had. 14.36. However, we ourselves saw that present reposited at Rome, in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, with this inscription, ‘The gift of Alexander, the king of the Jews.’ It was valued at five hundred talents; and the report is, that Aristobulus, the governor of the Jews, sent it.”'14.36. whom he also put to flight, and overcame, not like one that was in distress and in necessity, but like one that was excellently prepared for war, and had what he wanted in great plenty. And in this very place where he overcame the Jews it was that he some time afterward build a most excellent palace, and a city round about it, and called it Herodium. '. None
|24. Josephus Flavius, Against Apion, 2.201 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship, • friendship, homoerotic
Found in books: Hubbard (2014) 545; Wilson (2010) 270
2.201. γυνὴ χείρων, φησίν, ἀνδρὸς εἰς ἅπαντα. τοιγαροῦν ὑπακουέτω, μὴ πρὸς ὕβριν, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἄρχηται: θεὸς γὰρ ἀνδρὶ τὸ κράτος ἔδωκεν. ταύτῃ συνεῖναι δεῖ τὸν γήμαντα μόνῃ, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἄλλου πειρᾶν ἀνόσιον. εἰ δέ τις τοῦτο πράξειεν, οὐδεμία θανάτου παραίτησις, οὔτ' εἰ βιάσαιτο παρθένον ἑτέρῳ προωμολογημένην, οὔτ' εἰ πείσειεν γεγαμημένην."". None
|2.201. for (says the scripture) “A woman is inferior to her husband in all things.” Let her, therefore, be obedient to him; not so, that he should abuse her, but that she may acknowledge her duty to her husband; for God hath given the authority to the husband. A husband, therefore, is to lie only with his wife whom he hath married; but to have to do with another man’s wife is a wicked thing; which, if any one ventures upon, death is inevitably his punishment: no more can he avoid the same who forces a virgin betrothed to another man, or entices another man’s wife. ''. None|
|25. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 2.6-2.7, 2.10-2.12, 5.9-5.13, 8.10-8.12, 9.24, 12.25, 14.1, 14.24-14.25, 15.32, 16.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Christ, and friendship • Epicureanism, on friendship • Friendship, in biography • clichés, of friendship • friendship • friendship, Epicurean • friendship, and moral formation • friendship, based on first two commandments • friendship, differences between divine and human • friendship, divine-human • friendship, of God • friendship, spiritualization of • letter, friendship
Found in books: Allison (2020) 136, 137, 139, 140, 147, 148, 149, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164; Conybeare (2000) 76, 77, 78; Gray (2021) 43; Malherbe et al (2014) 295, 370, 374, 409, 594
2.6. Σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, σοφίαν δὲ οὐ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργουμένων· 2.7. ἀλλὰ λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ, τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην, ἣν προώρισεν ὁ θεὸς πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν·
2.10. ἡμῖν γὰρ ἀπεκάλυψεν ὁ θεὸς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα πάντα ἐραυνᾷ, καὶ τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ. 2.11. τίς γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ; οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ. 2.12. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ἐλάβομεν ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν·
5.9. Ἔγραψα ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι πόρνοις, 5.10. οὐ πάντως τοῖς πόρνοις τοῦ κόσμου τούτου ἢ τοῖς πλεονέκταις καὶ ἅρπαξιν ἢ εἰδωλολάτραις, ἐπεὶ ὠφείλετε ἄρα ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελθεῖν. 5.11. νῦν δὲ ἔγραψα ὑμῖν μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι ἐάν τις ἀδελφὸς ὀνομαζόμενος ᾖ πόρνος ἢ πλεονέκτης ἢ εἰδωλολάτρης ἢ λοίδορος ἢ μέθυσος ἢ ἅρπαξ, τῷ τοιούτῳ μηδὲ συνεσθίειν. 5.12. τί γάρ μοι τοὺς ἔξω κρίνειν; οὐχὶ τοὺς ἔσω ὑμεῖς κρίνετε, τοὺς δὲ ἔξω ὁ θεὸς κρίνει; 5.13. ἐξάρατε τὸν πονηρὸν ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν.
8.10. ἐὰν γάρ τις ἴδῃ σὲ τὸν ἔχοντα γνῶσιν ἐν εἰδωλίῳ κατακείμενον, οὐχὶ ἡ συνείδησις αὐτοῦ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος οἰκοδομηθήσεται εἰς τὸ τὰ εἰδωλόθυτα ἐσθίειν; 8.11. ἀπόλλυται γὰρ ὁ ἀσθενῶν ἐν τῇ σῇ γνώσει, ὁ ἀδελφὸς διʼ ὃν Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν. 8.12. οὕτως δὲ ἁμαρτάνοντες εἰς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τύπτοντες αὐτῶν τὴν συνείδησιν ἀσθενοῦσαν εἰς Χριστὸν ἁμαρτάνετε.
9.24. Οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι οἱ ἐν σταδίῳ τρέχοντες πάντες μὲν τρέχουσιν, εἷς δὲ λαμβάνει τὸ βραβεῖον; οὕτως τρέχετε ἵνα καταλάβητε.
12.25. ἵνα μὴ ᾖ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων μεριμνῶσι τὰ μέλη.
14.1. Διώκετε τὴν ἀγάπην, ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ πνευματικά, μᾶλλον δὲ ἵνα προφητεύητε.
14.24. ἐὰν δὲ πάντες προφητεύωσιν, εἰσέλθῃ δέ τις ἄπιστος ἢ ἰδιώτης, ἐλέγχεται ὑπὸ πάντων, ἀνακρίνεται ὑπὸ πάντων, 14.25. τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς καρδίας αὐτοῦ φανερὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὕτως πεσὼν ἐπὶ πρόσωπονπροσκυνήσειτῷ θεῷ, ἀπαγγέλλων ὅτιὌντως ὁ θεὸς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστίν.
15.32. εἰ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐθηριομάχησα ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, τί μοι τὸ ὄφελος; εἰ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται,φάγωμεν καὶ πίωμεν, αὔριον γὰρ ἀποθνήσκομεν.
16.12. Περὶ δὲ Ἀπολλὼ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, πολλὰ παρεκάλεσα αὐτὸν ἵνα ἔλθῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς μετὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· καὶ πάντως οὐκ ἦν θέλημα ἵνα νῦν ἔλθῃ, ἐλεύσεται δὲ ὅταν εὐκαιρήσῃ.''. None
|2.6. We speak wisdom, however, among those who are fullgrown; yet a wisdom not of this world, nor of the rulers of this world,who are coming to nothing.' "2.7. But we speak God's wisdom in amystery, the wisdom that has been hidden, which God foreordained beforethe worlds to our glory," '|
2.10. But to us, God revealed them through the Spirit. For theSpirit searches all things, yes, the deep things of God.' "2.11. For whoamong men knows the things of a man, except the spirit of the man,which is in him? Even so, no one knows the things of God, except God'sSpirit." '2.12. But we received, not the spirit of the world, but theSpirit which is from God, that we might know the things that werefreely given to us by God.
5.9. I wrote to you in my letter to have no company with sexual sinners; 5.10. yet not at all meaning with the sexual sinners of this world, orwith the covetous and extortioners, or with idolaters; for then youwould have to leave the world.' "5.11. But as it is, I wrote to you notto associate with anyone who is called a brother who is a sexualsinner, or covetous, or an idolater, or a slanderer, or a drunkard, oran extortioner. Don't even eat with such a person." "5.12. For what haveI to do with also judging those who are outside? Don't you judge thosewho are within?" '5.13. But those who are outside, God judges. "Put awaythe wicked man from among yourselves."' "
8.10. For if a man seesyou who have knowledge sitting in an idol's temple, won't hisconscience, if he is weak, be emboldened to eat things sacrificed toidols?" '8.11. And through your knowledge, he who is weak perishes, thebrother for whose sake Christ died. 8.12. Thus, sinning against thebrothers, and wounding their conscience when it is weak, you sinagainst Christ.' "
9.24. Don't youknow that those who run in a race all run, but one receives the prize?Run like that, that you may win." '
12.25. thatthere should be no division in the body, but that the members shouldhave the same care for one another.
14.1. Follow after love, and earnestly desire spiritual gifts, butespecially that you may prophesy.
14.24. But if all prophesy, and someoneunbelieving or unlearned comes in, he is reproved by all, and he isjudged by all. 14.25. And thus the secrets of his heart are revealed.So he will fall down on his face and worship God, declaring that God isamong you indeed.
15.32. If I fought withanimals at Ephesus for human purposes, what does it profit me? If thedead are not raised, then "let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die."
16.12. Now concerning Apollos, the brother, I begged him much tocome to you with the brothers; and it was not at all his desire to comenow; but he will come when he has an opportunity.''. None
|26. New Testament, 1 Thessalonians, 2.3, 2.5, 4.9-4.12, 5.9, 5.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, on friendship • Friendship, in biography • friendship • friendship, Epicurean • friendship, and economic interdependence • friendship, and moral formation • friendship, differences between divine and human • friendship, divine-human • gods (Epicurean), human friendship with • topos, topoi, boldness-friendship
Found in books: Allison (2020) 120, 122, 123, 149, 154, 164, 183; Gray (2021) 49; Malherbe et al (2014) 66, 338, 370, 371, 593, 736, 763
2.3. ἡ γὰρ παράκλησις ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐκ πλάνης οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀκαθαρσίας οὐδὲ ἐν δόλῳ,
2.5. οὔτε γάρ ποτε ἐν λόγῳ κολακίας ἐγενήθημεν, καθὼς οἴδατε, οὔτε προφάσει πλεονεξίας, θεὸς μάρτυς,
4.9. Περὶ δὲ τῆς φιλαδελφίας οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε γράφειν ὑμῖν, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς θεοδίδακτοί ἐστε εἰς τὸ ἀγαπᾷν ἀλλήλους· 4.10. καὶ γὰρ ποιεῖτε αὐτὸ εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς τοὺς ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ. Παρακαλοῦμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, περισσεύειν μᾶλλον, 4.11. καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι ἡσυχάζειν καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ταῖς χερσὶν ὑμῶν, καθὼς ὑμῖν παρηγγείλαμεν, 4.12. ἵνα περιπατῆτε εὐσχημόνως πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω καὶ μηδενὸς χρείαν ἔχητε.
5.9. ὅτι οὐκ ἔθετο ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ὀργὴν ἀλλὰ εἰς περιποίησιν σωτηρίας διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ,
5.11. Διὸ παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους καὶ οἰκοδομεῖτε εἷς τὸν ἕνα, καθὼς καὶ ποιεῖτε.''. None
|2.3. For our exhortation is not of error, nor of uncleanness, nor in deception. |
2.5. For neither were we at any time found using words of flattery, as you know, nor a cloak of covetousness (God is witness),
4.9. But concerning brotherly love, you have no need that one write to you. For you yourselves are taught by God to love one another, 4.10. for indeed you do it toward all the brothers who are in all Macedonia. But we exhort you, brothers, that you abound more and more; 4.11. and that you make it your ambition to lead a quiet life, and to do your own business, and to work with your own hands, even as we charged you; 4.12. that you may walk properly toward those who are outside, and may have need of nothing. ' "
5.9. For God didn't appoint us to wrath, but to the obtaining of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, " '
5.11. Therefore exhort one another, and build each other up, even as you also do. ''. None
|27. New Testament, 2 Thessalonians, 3.6-3.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship • friendship, and economic interdependence
Found in books: Allison (2020) 120, 123; Malherbe et al (2014) 594
3.6. Παραγγέλλομεν δὲ ὑμῖν, ἀδελφοί, ἐν ὀνόματι τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ στέλλεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀδελφοῦ ἀτάκτως περιπατοῦντος καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὴν παρά δοσιν ἣν παρελάβετε παρʼ ἡμῶν. 3.7. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἴδατε πῶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἠτακτήσαμεν ἐν ὑμῖν οὐδὲ δωρεὰν ἄρτον ἐφάγομεν παρά τινος, 3.8. ἀλλʼ ἐν κόπῳ καὶ μόχθῳ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἐργαζόμενοι πρὸς τὸ μὴ 3.9. ἐπιβαρῆσαί τινα ὑμῶν· οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐξουσίαν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ἑαυτοὺς τύπον δῶμεν ὑμῖν εἰς τὸ μιμεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς. 3.10. καὶ γὰρ ὅτε ἦμεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, τοῦτο παρηγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν, ὅτι εἴ τις οὐ θέλει ἐργάζεσθαι μηδὲ ἐσθιέτω. 3.11. ἀκούομεν γάρ τινας περιπατοῦντας ἐν ὑμῖν ἀτάκτως, μηδὲν ἐργαζομένους ἀλλὰ περιεργαζομένους· 3.12. τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις παραγγέλλομεν καὶ παρακαλοῦμεν ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ ἵνα μετὰ ἡσυχίας ἐργαζόμενοι τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἄρτον ἐσθίωσιν. 3.13. Ὑμεῖς δέ, ἀδελφοί, μὴ ἐνκακήσητε καλοποιοῦντες.''. None
|3.6. Now we command you, brothers, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you withdraw yourselves from every brother who walks in rebellion, and not after the tradition which they received from us. ' "3.7. For you know how you ought to imitate us. For we didn't behave ourselves rebelliously among you, " "3.8. neither did we eat bread from anyone's hand without paying for it, but in labor and travail worked night and day, that we might not burden any of you; " "3.9. not because we don't have the right, but to make ourselves an example to you, that you should imitate us. " '3.10. For even when we were with you, we commanded you this: "If anyone will not work, neither let him eat."' "3.11. For we hear of some who walk among you in rebellion, who don't work at all, but are busybodies. " '3.12. Now those who are that way, we command and exhort in the Lord Jesus Christ, that with quietness they work, and eat their own bread. ' "3.13. But you, brothers, don't be weary in doing well. "'. None|
|28. New Testament, James, 4.4, 4.8-4.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, on friendship • friends, friendship • friendship
Found in books: Malherbe et al (2014) 371, 736; Smith and Stuckenbruck (2020) 69
4.4. μοιχαλίδες, οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου ἔχθρα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστίν; ὃς ἐὰν οὖν βουληθῇ φίλος εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου, ἐχθρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ καθίσταται.
4.8. ἐγγίσατε τῷ θεῷ, καὶ ἐγγίσει ὑμῖν. καθαρίσατε χεῖρας, ἁμαρτωλοί, καὶ ἁγνίσατε καρδίας, δίψυχοι. 4.9. ταλαιπωρήσατε καὶ πενθήσατε καὶ κλαύσατε· ὁ γέλως ὑμῶν εἰς πένθος μετατραπήτω καὶ ἡ χαρὰ εἰς κατήφειαν·''. None
|4.4. You adulterers and adulteresses, don't you know that friendship with the world is enmity with God? Whoever therefore wants to be a friend of the world makes himself an enemy of God. " '|
4.8. Draw near to God, and he will draw near to you. Cleanse your hands, you sinners; and purify your hearts, you double-minded. 4.9. Lament, mourn, and weep. Let your laughter be turned to mourning, and your joy to gloom. '". None
|29. New Testament, Ephesians, 4.25 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • amicitia • friendship • friendship, in absentia
Found in books: Conybeare (2000) 70; Wilson (2012) 184
4.25. Διὸ ἀποθέμενοι τὸ ψεῦδος λαλεῖτε ἀλήθειαν ἕκαστος μετὰ τοῦ πλησίον αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐσμὲν ἀλλήλων μέλη.''. None
|4.25. Therefore, putting away falsehood, speak truth each one with his neighbor. For we are members one of another. ''. None|
|30. New Testament, Philippians, 1.6, 1.27, 2.2-2.3, 4.1-4.4, 4.8-4.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, friendship • Stoicism, friendship • amicitia, • clichés, of friendship • friendship • friendship (philia) • friendship in Paul • friendship, and economic interdependence • friendship, definition of • friendship, differences between divine and human • friendship, virtue of • letter, friendship • virtue, and friendship • virtue, of friendship
Found in books: Allison (2020) 121, 122, 161; Bay (2022) 245; Engberg-Pedersen (2010) 186; Gunderson (2022) 105; Malherbe et al (2014) 6, 7, 259, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 336, 337, 409
1.6. πεποιθὼς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ὁ ἐναρξάμενος ἐν ὑμῖν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιτελέσει ἄχρι ἡμέρας Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ·
1.27. Μόνον ἀξίως τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ χριστοῦ πολιτεύεσθε, ἵνα εἴτε ἐλθὼν καὶ ἰδὼν ὑμᾶς εἴτε ἀπὼν ἀκούω τὰ περὶ ὑμῶν, ὅτι στήκετε ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι, μιᾷ ψυχῇ συναθλοῦντες τῇ πίστει τοῦ εὐαγγελίου,
2.2. πληρώσατέ μου τὴν χαρὰν ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγάπην ἔχοντες, σύνψυχοι, τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες, 2.3. μηδὲν κατʼ ἐριθίαν μηδὲ κατὰ κενοδοξίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ταπεινοφροσύνῃ ἀλλήλους ἡγούμενοι ὑπερέχοντας ἑαυτῶν,
4.1. Ὥστε, ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοὶ καὶ ἐπιπόθητοι, χαρὰ καὶ στέφανός μου, οὕτως στήκετε ἐν κυρίῳ, ἀγαπητοί. 4.2. Εὐοδίαν παρακαλῶ καὶ Συντύχην παρακαλῶ τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν κυρίῳ. 4.3. ναὶ ἐρωτῶ καὶ σέ, γνήσιε σύνζυγε, συνλαμβάνου αὐταῖς, αἵτινες ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ συνήθλησάν μοι μετὰ καὶ Κλήμεντος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συνεργῶν μου, ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐνβίβλῳ ζωῆς. 4.4. Χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ πάντοτε· πάλιν ἐρῶ, χαίρετε.
4.8. Τὸ λοιπόν, ἀδελφοί, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, ὅσα σεμνά, ὅσα δίκαια, ὅσα ἁγνά, ὅσα προσφιλῆ, ὅσα εὔφημα, εἴ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ εἴ τις ἔπαινος, ταῦτα λογίζεσθε· 4.9. ἃ καὶ ἐμάθετε καὶ παρελάβετε καὶ ἠκούσατε καὶ εἴδετε ἐν ἐμοί, ταῦτα πράσσετε· καὶ ὁ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης ἔσται μεθʼ ὑμῶν.
4.10. Ἐχάρην δὲ ἐν κυρίῳ μεγάλως ὅτι ἤδη ποτὲ ἀνεθάλετε τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ φρονεῖν, ἐφʼ ᾧ καὶ ἐφρονεῖτε ἠκαιρεῖσθε δέ.
4.11. οὐχ ὅτι καθʼ ὑστέρησιν λέγω, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμαθον ἐν οἷς εἰμὶ αὐτάρκης εἶναι· οἶδα καὶ ταπεινοῦσθαι,
4.12. οἶδα καὶ περισσεύειν· ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν μεμύημαι, καὶ χορτάζεσθαι καὶ πεινᾷν, καὶ περισσεύειν καὶ ὑστερεῖσθαι·
4.13. πάντα ἰσχύω ἐν τῷ ἐνδυναμοῦντί με.
4.14. πλὴν καλῶς ἐποιήσατε συνκοινωνήσαντές μου τῇ θλίψει.
4.15. οἴδατε δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς, Φιλιππήσιοι, ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, ὅτε ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας, οὐδεμία μοι ἐκκλησία ἐκοινώνησεν εἰς λόγον δόσεως καὶ λήμψεως εἰ μὴ ὑμεῖς μόνοι,
4.16. ὅτι καὶ ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ καὶ ἅπαξ καὶ δὶς εἰς τὴν χρείαν μοι ἐπέμψατε.
4.17. οὐχ ὅτι ἐπιζητῶ τὸ δόμα, ἀλλὰ ἐπιζητῶ τὸν καρπὸν τὸν πλεονάζοντα εἰς λόγον ὑμῶν.
4.18. ἀπέχω δὲ πάντα καὶ περισσεύω· πεπλήρωμαι δεξάμενος παρὰ Ἐπαφροδίτου τὰ παρʼ ὑμῶν,ὀσμὴν εὐωδίας,θυσίαν δεκτήν, εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ.
4.19. ὁ δὲ θεός μου πληρώσει πᾶσαν χρείαν ὑμῶν κατὰ τὸ πλοῦτος αὐτοῦ ἐν δόξῃ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 4.20. τῷ δὲ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ ἡμῶν ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων· ἀμήν.''. None
|1.6. being confident of this very thing, that he who began a good work in you will complete it until the day of Jesus Christ. |
1.27. Only let your manner of life be worthy of the gospel of Christ, that, whether I come and see you or am absent, I may hear of your state, that you stand firm in one spirit, with one soul striving for the faith of the gospel;
2.2. make my joy full, by being like-minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of one mind; 2.3. doing nothing through rivalry or through conceit, but in humility, each counting others better than himself;
4.1. Therefore, my brothers, beloved and longed for, my joy and crown, so stand firm in the Lord, my beloved. 4.2. I exhort Euodia, and I exhort Syntyche, to think the same way in the Lord. 4.3. Yes, I beg you also, true yoke-fellow, help these women, for they labored with me in the gospel, with Clement also, and the rest of my fellow workers, whose names are in the book of life. 4.4. Rejoice in the Lord always! Again I will say, Rejoice!
4.8. Finally, brothers, whatever things are true, whatever things are honorable, whatever things are just, whatever things are pure, whatever things are lovely, whatever things are of good report; if there is any virtue, and if there is any praise, think about these things. 4.9. The things which you learned, received, heard, and saw in me: do these things, and the God of peace will be with you.
4.10. But I rejoice in the Lord greatly, that now at length you have revived your thought for me; in which you did indeed take thought, but you lacked opportunity.
4.11. Not that I speak in respect to lack, for I have learned in whatever state I am, to be content in it.
4.12. I know how to be humbled, and I know also how to abound. In everything and in all things I have learned the secret both to be filled and to be hungry, both to abound and to be in need.
4.13. I can do all things through Christ, who strengthens me.
4.14. However you did well that you had fellowship with my affliction.
4.15. You yourselves also know, you Philippians, that in the beginning of the gospel, when I departed from Macedonia, no assembly had fellowship with me in the matter of giving and receiving but you only.
4.16. For even in Thessalonica you sent once and again to my need.
4.17. Not that I seek for the gift, but I seek for the fruit that increases to your account.
4.18. But I have all things, and abound. I am filled, having received from Epaphroditus the things that came from you, a sweet-smelling fragrance, an acceptable and well-pleasing sacrifice to God.
4.19. My God will supply every need of yours according to his riches in glory in Christ Jesus. 4.20. Now to our God and Father be the glory forever and ever! Amen. ''. None
|31. New Testament, Romans, 11.11, 12.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Epicureanism, on friendship • friendship (philia) • friendship, and economic interdependence • friendship, differences between divine and human • friendship, divine-human
Found in books: Allison (2020) 122, 140, 157; Gunderson (2022) 91; Malherbe et al (2014) 371
11.11. Λέγω οὖν, μὴ ἔπταισαν ἵνα πέσωσιν; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῶν παραπτώματι ἡ σωτηρία τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, εἰς τὸπαραζηλῶσαιαὐτούς.
12.13. ταῖς χρείαις τῶν ἁγίων κοινωνοῦντες, τὴν φιλοξενίαν διώκοντες.''. None
|11.11. I ask then, did they stumble that they might fall? May it never be! But by their fall salvation has come to the Gentiles, to provoke them to jealousy. |
12.13. contributing to the needs of the saints; given to hospitality. ''. None
|32. New Testament, Matthew, 5.23-5.24 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship • friendship, with saints
Found in books: O, Daly (2020) 255, 256; Wilson (2012) 297
5.23. ἐὰν οὖν προσφέρῃς τὸ δῶρόν σου ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον κἀκεῖ μνησθῇς ὅτι ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἔχει τι κατὰ σοῦ, 5.24. ἄφες ἐκεῖ τὸ δῶρόν σου ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου, καὶ ὕπαγε πρῶτον διαλλάγηθι τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου, καὶ τότε ἐλθὼν πρόσφερε τὸ δῶρόν σου.''. None
|5.23. "If therefore you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has anything against you, 5.24. leave your gift there before the altar, and go your way. First be reconciled to your brother, and then come and offer your gift. ''. None|
|33. Plutarch, On The Education of Children, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pythagoreanism xxv, and friendship • friendship • friendship (philia), Pythagorean
Found in books: Wilson (2012) 266; Wolfsdorf (2020) 13
|12e. "Do not taste of black-tails;" that, "Do not spend your time with men of black character, because of their malevolence.""Do not step over the beam of a balance"; that is, one should give greatest heed to justice and not transgress it."Do not sit on a peck measure"; as much as to say that we should avoid idleness and have forethought for providing our daily bread."Do not give your hand to everybody"; instead of, "Do not make friends too readily.""Do not wear a tight ring"; means that one should live his life unhampered, and not subject it to any bond."Do not poke a fire with steel"; instead of,"Do not provoke an angry man." Indeed, it is wrong to do so, and we should yield to men who are in a temper."Do not eat your heart"; as much as to say, "Do not injure your soul by wasting it with worries."''. None|
|34. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 3.2, 9.8, 40.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Stoicism, and friendship • friendship • friendship (philia) • friendship, concord within • friendship, in Senecan Stoicism • friendship,, as cultural discourse • goods, within friendship • self-sufficiency, within friendship
Found in books: Bexley (2022) 279, 280; Bowditch (2001) 178; Graver (2007) 251; Gunderson (2022) 168; Long (2006) 369; Wilson (2012) 266
|3.2. Now if you used this word of ours1 in the popular sense, and called him "friend" in the same way in which we speak of all candidates for election as "honourable gentlemen," and as we greet all men whom we meet casually, if their names slip us for the moment, with the salutation "my dear sir," – so be it. But if you consider any man a friend whom you do not trust as you trust yourself, you are mightily mistaken and you do not sufficiently understand what true friendship means. Indeed, I would have you discuss everything with a friend; but first of all discuss the man himself. When friendship is settled, you must trust; before friendship is formed, you must pass judgment. Those persons indeed put last first and confound their duties, who, violating the rules of Theophrastus,2 judge a man after they have made him their friend, instead of making him their friend after they have judged him. Ponder for a long time whether you shall admit a given person to your friendship; but when you have decided to admit him, welcome him with all your heart and soul. Speak as boldly with him as with yourself. |
9.8. Let us now return to the question. The wise man, I say, self-sufficient though he be, nevertheless desires friends if only for the purpose of practising friendship, in order that his noble qualities may not lie dormant. Not, however, for the purpose mentioned by Epicurus6 in the letter quoted above: "That there may be someone to sit by him when he is ill, to help him when he is in prison or in want;" but that he may have someone by whose sick-bed he himself may sit, someone a prisoner in hostile hands whom he himself may set free. He who regards himself only, and enters upon friendships for this reason, reckons wrongly. The end will be like the beginning: he has made friends with one who might assist him out of bondage; at the first rattle of the chain such a friend will desert him. ' "
40.1. I thank you for writing to me so often; for you are revealing your real self to me in the only way you can. I never receive a letter from you without being in your company forthwith. If the pictures of our absent friends are pleasing to us, though they only refresh the memory and lighten our longing by a solace that is unreal and unsubstantial, how much more pleasant is a letter, which brings us real traces, real evidences, of an absent friend! For that which is sweetest when we meet face to face is afforded by the impress of a friend's hand upon his letter, – recognition. "'. None
|35. Tacitus, Annals, 4.74 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Tiberius, and altar of Mercy and Friendship • altars, clementia and amicitia • amicitia
Found in books: Clark (2007) 267; Rutledge (2012) 294
4.74. Clarum inde inter Germanos Frisium nomen, dissimulante Tiberio damna ne cui bellum permitteret. neque senatus in eo cura an imperii extrema dehonestarentur: pavor internus occupaverat animos cui remedium adulatione quaerebatur. ita quamquam diversis super rebus consulerentur, aram clementiae, aram amicitiae effigiesque circum Caesaris ac Seiani censuere crebrisque precibus efflagitabant visendi sui copiam facerent. non illi tamen in urbem aut propinqua urbi degressi sunt: satis visum omittere insulam et in proximo Campaniae aspici. eo venire patres, eques, magna pars plebis, anxii erga Seianum cuius durior congressus atque eo per ambitum et societate consiliorum parabatur. satis constabat auctam ei adrogantiam foedum illud in propatulo servitium spectanti; quippe Romae sueti discursus et magnitudine urbis incertum quod quisque ad negotium pergat: ibi campo aut litore iacentes nullo discrimine noctem ac diem iuxta gratiam aut fastus ianitorum perpetiebantur donec id quoque vetitum: et revenere in urbem trepidi quos non sermone, non visu dignatus erat, quidam male alacres quibus infaustae amicitiae gravis exitus imminebat.''. None
|4.74. \xa0Thus the Frisian name won celebrity in Germany; while Tiberius, rather than entrust anyone with the conduct of the war, suppressed our losses. The senate, too, had other anxieties than a question of national dishonour on the confines of the empire: an internal panic had preoccupied all minds, and the antidote was being sought in sycophancy. Thus, although their opinion was being taken on totally unrelated subjects, they voted an altar of Mercy and an altar of Friendship with statues of the Caesar and Sejanus on either hand, and with reiterated petitions conjured the pair to vouchsafe themselves to sight. Neither of them, however, came down so far as Rome or the neighbourhood of Rome: it was deemed enough to emerge from their isle and present themselves to view on the nearest shore of Campania. To Campania went senators and knights, with a large part of the populace, their anxieties centred round Sejanus; access to whom had grown harder, and had therefore to be procured by interest and by a partnership in his designs. It was evident enough that his arrogance was increased by the sight of this repulsive servility so openly exhibited. At Rome, movement is the rule, and the extent of the city leaves it uncertain upon what errand the passer-by is bent: there, littering without distinction the plain or the beach, they suffered day and night alike the patronage or the insolence of his janitors, until that privilege, too, was vetoed, and they retraced their steps to the capital\xa0â\x80\x94 those whom he had honoured neither by word nor by look, in fear and trembling; a\xa0few, over whom hung the fatal issue of that infelicitous friendship, with misplaced cheerfulness of heart. <''. None|
|36. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship and the satirist • love and friendship
Found in books: Keane (2015) 54; Long (2019) 137
|37. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • friendship • friendship, and economic interdependence
Found in books: Allison (2020) 121; Wilson (2012) 330
|38. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Pythagoreanism xxv, and friendship • friends and friendship • friendship (philia), Pythagorean
Found in books: Huffman (2019) 545; Wolfsdorf (2020) 13
|39. Pliny The Younger, Letters, 3.21, 8.23, 10.12 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • amicitia • friend of Rome, friendship, euergetism and • friendship (philia)
Found in books: Brodd and Reed (2011) 195; Gunderson (2022) 166; Hanghan (2019) 31, 88; Hitch (2017) 31, 88; König and Whitton (2018) 110
|10.12. To Trajan. I know, Sir, that you have not lost sight of the requests I put forward, for your memory never forgets an opportunity for conferring a kindness. Nevertheless, as you have often indulged me in this manner, I would at the same time most earnestly entreat and recommend you to see fit to promote Attius Sura to the praetorship when a vacancy arises. He is a most unambitious man, but he is encouraged to entertain hopes of this office by the splendour of his family, by his remarkable integrity of conduct during his years of poverty, and, above all, by the happy days on which he has fallen, which incite and encourage those of your subjects who have good consciences to hope for the enjoyment of your kindness. ' '. None|
|40. Tertullian, On The Flesh of Christ, 11 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • amicitia
Found in books: Hanghan (2019) 35; Hitch (2017) 35
|11. But we meet another argument of theirs, when we raise the question why Christ, in assuming a flesh composed of soul, should seem to have had a soul that was made of flesh? For God, they say, desired to make the soul visible to men, by enduing it with a bodily nature, although it was before invisible; of its own nature, indeed, it was incapable of seeing anything, even its own self, by reason of the obstacle of this flesh, so that it was even a matter of doubt whether it was born or not. The soul, therefore (they further say), was made corporeal in Christ, in order that we might see it when undergoing birth, and death, and (what is more) resurrection. But yet, how was this possible, that by means of the flesh the soul should demonstrate itself to itself or to us, when it could not possibly be ascertained that it would offer this mode of exhibiting itself by the flesh, until the thing came into existence to which it was unknown, that is to say, the flesh? It received darkness, forsooth, in order to be able to shine! Now, let us first turn our attention to this point, whether it was requisite that the soul should exhibit itself in the manner contended for; and next consider whether their previous position be that the soul is wholly invisible (inquiring further) whether this invisibility is the result of its incorporeality, or whether it actually possesses some sort of body peculiar to itself. And yet, although they say that it is invisible, they determine it to be corporeal, but having somewhat that is invisible. For if it has nothing invisible how can it be said to be invisible? But even its existence is an impossibility, unless it has that which is instrumental to its existence. Since, however, it exists, it must needs have a something through which it exists. If it has this something, it must be its body. Everything which exists is a bodily existence sui generis. Nothing lacks bodily existence but that which is non-existent. If, then, the soul has an invisible body, He who had proposed to make it visible would certainly have done His work better if He had made that part of it which was accounted invisible, visible; because then there would have been no untruth or weakness in the case, and neither of these flaws is suitable to God. (But as the case stands in the hypothesis) there is untruth, since He has set forth the soul as being a different thing from what it really is; and there is weakness, since He was unable to make it appear to be that which it is. No one who wishes to exhibit a man covers him with a veil or a mask. This, however, is precisely what has been done to the soul, if it has been clothed with a covering belonging to something else, by being converted into flesh. But even if the soul is, on their hypothesis, supposed to be incorporeal, so that the soul, whatever it is, should by some mysterious force of the reason be quite unknown, only not be a body, then in that case it were not beyond the power of God - indeed it would be more consistent with His plan - if He displayed the soul in some new sort of body, different from that which we all have in common, one of which we should have quite a different notion, (being spared the idea that) He had set His mind on making, without an adequate cause, a visible soul instead of an invisible one - a fit incentive, no doubt, for such questions as they start, by their maintece of a human flesh for it. Christ, however, could not have appeared among men except as a man. Restore, therefore, to Christ, His faith; believe that He who willed to walk the earth as a man exhibited even a soul of a thoroughly human condition, not making it of flesh, but clothing it with flesh. ''. None|
|41. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.85, 7.130, 8.17, 10.120-10.121 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • Aristotle, on friendship • Pythagoreanism xxv, and friendship • friends and friendship • friendship • friendship (philia), Pythagorean • friendship, Aristotle on • friendship, Epicurean understandings • friendship, concord within • friendship, symmetry within • friendship, three levels of • friendship, value of • friendship, within erotic love • goods, within friendship • love and friendship • patronage, overlap with true friendship • self-sufficiency, within friendship
Found in books: Graver (2007) 185, 186, 250, 251; Huffman (2019) 545; Long (2006) 30, 191; Long (2019) 199, 200; Wolfsdorf (2020) 13; Yona (2018) 45, 168
|7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it." "|
7.130. Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise of Love, and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease." "
8.17. The following were his watchwords or precepts: don't stir the fire with a knife, don't step over the beam of a balance, don't sit down on your bushel, don't eat your heart, don't help a man off with a load but help him on, always roll your bed-clothes up, don't put God's image on the circle of a ring, don't leave the pan's imprint on the ashes, don't wipe up a mess with a torch, don't commit a nuisance towards the sun, don't walk the highway, don't shake hands too eagerly, don't have swallows under your own roof, don't keep birds with hooked claws, don't make water on nor stand upon your nail-and hair-trimmings, turn the sharp blade away, when you go abroad don't turn round at the frontier." ". None
|42. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • amicitia
Found in books: Hanghan (2019) 6, 35, 125; Hitch (2017) 6, 35, 125
|43. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • amicitia
Found in books: Hanghan (2019) 6, 25, 31, 32, 35, 36, 40, 41, 49, 67, 82, 88, 90, 96, 119, 125, 143, 153, 179; Hitch (2017) 6, 25, 31, 32, 35, 36, 40, 41, 49, 67, 82, 88, 90, 96, 119, 125, 143, 153, 179
|44. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
Tagged with subjects: • amicitia
Found in books: Hanghan (2019) 35; Hitch (2017) 35
|45. Vergil, Aeneis, 1.745-1.746
Tagged with subjects: • Guest-friendship in Egypt, and Lucan’s Caesar • Guest-friendship in Egypt, and Lucan’s Pompey • Guest-friendship in Egypt, and Statius’ Celer • friendship, Epicurean
Found in books: Gordon (2012) 65; Manolaraki (2012) 194
1.745. quid tantum Oceano properent se tinguere soles 1.746. hiberni, vel quae tardis mora noctibus obstet.''. None
|1.745. Oenotrians had it, and their sons, 't is said, " "1.746. have called it Italy, a chieftain's name "". None|
|46. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • friendship
Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2019) 222; Schibli (2002) 268
|47. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • friendship • friendship, Epicurean • friendship, divine-human • gods (Epicurean), human friendship with • love and friendship
Found in books: Allison (2020) 71; Gordon (2012) 5, 59, 60; Long (2006) 30, 200; Long (2019) 73
|48. None, None, nan
Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus, on friendship/patronage • friendship, Epicurean • friendship, Epicurean understandings • friendship, and moral formation • friendship, differences between divine and human • friendship, divine-human • friendship, three levels of • gods (Epicurean), human friendship with • love and friendship
Found in books: Allison (2020) 74, 110; Gordon (2012) 5, 59; Long (2019) 73, 75; Yona (2018) 45, 160