1. Homer, Odyssey, 1.346-1.347 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 32 1.346. μῆτερ ἐμή, τί τʼ ἄρα φθονέεις ἐρίηρον ἀοιδὸν 1.347. τέρπειν ὅππῃ οἱ νόος ὄρνυται; οὔ νύ τʼ ἀοιδοὶ | |
|
2. Theophrastus, Characters, 17 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 80 |
3. Bion Proconnesius 3. Jh. N. Chr, Fragments, f16a (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 32, 80 |
4. Cicero, On Friendship, 20, 70-74, 69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 48 |
5. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.31 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 46 1.31. Sunt autem quidam e nostris, qui haec subtilius velint tradere et negent satis esse quid bonum sit aut quid malum sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. esse. Et fugiendum itaque aiunt (om. expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse cf. ad p. 12, 5) R itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem, ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum asperdum sentiamus. Alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur, cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant. | |
|
6. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.44 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 46 | 1.44. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that prenotion was called πρόληψις by Epicurus; an appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in these words is true: "That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail." We have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question. For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity. 1.44. You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the uimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) |
|
7. Cicero, On Duties, 1.120, 1.134-1.137, 1.151 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 48, 80, 86 1.120. Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, sed naturae magis; multo enim et firmior est et constantior, ut fortuna non numquam tamquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur. Qui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consilium vivendi omne contulerit, is constantiam teneat (id enim maxime decet), nisi forte se intellexerit errasse in deligendo genere vitae. Quod si acciderit (potest autem accidere), facienda morum institutorumque mutatio est. Eam mutationem si tempora adiuvabunt, facilius commodiusque faciemus; sin minus, sensim erit pedetemptimque facienda, ut amicitias, quae minus delectent et minus probentur, magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam repente praecidere. 1.136. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit,cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. 1.151. Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura autem, si tenuis est. sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesque contulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius; de qua quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim assumes, quae ad hunc locum pertinebunt. | 1.120. But since the most powerful influence in the choice of a career is exerted by Nature, and the next most powerful by Fortune, we must, of course, take account of them both in deciding upon our calling in life; but, of the two, Nature claims the more attention. For Nature is so much more stable and steadfast, that for Fortune to come into conflict with Nature seems like a combat between a mortal and a goddess. If, therefore, he has conformed his whole plan of life to the kind of nature that is his (that is, his better nature), let him go on with it consistently â for that is the essence of Propriety â unless, perchance, he should discover that he has made a mistake in choosing his life work. If this should happen (and it can easily happen), he must change his vocation and mode of life. If circumstances favour such change, it will be effected with greater ease and convenience. If not, it must be made gradually, step by step, just as, when friendships become no longer pleasing or desirable, it is more proper (so wise men think) to undo the bond little by little than to sever it at a stroke. < 1.136. But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration toward those with whom we converse. It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly â never at all, unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious can be done. < 1.151. But the professions in which either a higher degree of intelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is derived â medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching â these are proper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, satisfied with the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman. But since I have discussed this quite fully in my Cato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point. |
|
8. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , 3.26, 3.27, 5, 7, 7.26-8.8, 26.4, 26.5, 26.6, 26.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 66 |
9. Philodemus, De Oeconomia, 14.23-14.30, 15.3-15.6, 23.11-23.16, 23.23-23.36, 26.1-26.9, 27.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 46, 47, 86 |
10. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.1060-3.1067, 3.1076-3.1094 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 66, 80 3.1060. exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille, 3.1061. esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque revertit, 3.1062. quippe foris nihilo melius qui sentiat esse. 3.1063. currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter 3.1064. auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans; 3.1065. oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae, 3.1066. aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit, 3.1067. aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit. 3.1076. Denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis 3.1077. quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido? 3.1078. certe equidem finis vitae mortalibus adstat 3.1079. nec devitari letum pote, quin obeamus. 3.1080. praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque 3.1081. nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas; 3.1082. sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur 3.1083. cetera; post aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus 3.1084. et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis. 3.1085. posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas, 3.1086. quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet. 3.1087. nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum 3.1088. tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus, 3.1089. quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti. 3.1090. proinde licet quod vis vivendo condere saecla, 3.1091. mors aeterna tamen nihilo minus illa manebit, 3.1092. nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno 3.1093. lumine qui finem vitai fecit, et ille, 3.1094. mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante. | 3.1076. And too, when all is said, What evil lust of life is this so great Subdues us to live, so dreadfully distraught In perils and alarms? one fixed end of life abideth for mortality; Death's not to shun, and we must go to meet. Besides we're busied with the same devices, Ever and ever, and we are at them ever, And there's no new delight that may be forged By living on. But whilst the thing we long for Is lacking, that seems good above all else; Thereafter, when we've touched it, something else We long for; ever one equal thirst of life Grips us agape. And doubtful 'tis what fortune The future times may carry, or what be That chance may bring, or what the issue next Awaiting us. Nor by prolonging life Take we the least away from death's own time, Nor can we pluck one moment off, whereby To minish the aeons of our state of death. Therefore, O man, by living on, fulfil As many generations as thou may: Eternal death shall there be waiting still; And he who died with light of yesterday Shall be no briefer time in death's No-more Than he who perished months or years before. |
|
11. Horace, Sermones, 1.1.4-1.1.12, 1.1.28, 1.1.31, 1.6.7-1.6.8, 1.6.11, 1.6.45-1.6.64, 2.6.73-2.6.76 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 46, 48, 80, 86 | 1.6.45. I turn again to myself, now, the son of a freedman, Denounced by everyone as ‘the son of a freedman’ Because I’m your close friend now, Maecenas, earlier Because as tribune I commanded a Roman legion. Yet the situations differ, since one who’d begrudge Me honours, shouldn’t begrudge me your friendship, Given you’re careful only to patronise the worthy, Men free of self-seeking. I can’t say I was lucky Enough to win your friendship just by good fortune: It wasn’t luck indeed that revealed you to me: Virgil, The best of men, and Varius, told you what I was. Meeting you face to face, I stuttered a few words, Mute diffidence preventing me saying more. I didn’t claim to be born of a famous father, Or rode a horse round a Tarentine estate, I said what I was. You said little, as is your way, I left: nine months later you recalled me, asking Me to be one of your friends. And I think it’s fine To have pleased you, who separate true from false, Not by a man’s father but by his pure life and heart. |
|
12. Livy, History, 3.26.8-3.26.11 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 86 3.26.8. L. Quinctius trans Tiberim, contra eum ipsum locum, ubi nunc navalia sunt, quattuor iugerum colebat agrum, quae prata Quinctia vocantur. 3.26.9. ibi ab legatis, seu fossam fodiens palae innixus seu cum araret, operi certe, id quod constat, agresti intentus, salute data in vicem redditaque rogatus, ut, quod bene verteret ipsi reique publicae, togatus mandata senatus audiret, admiratus rogitansque “satin salve?” togam propere e tugurio proferre uxorem Raciliam iubet. 3.26.10. qua simul absterso pulvere ac sudore velatus processit, dictatorem eum legati gratulantes consalutant, in urbem vocant, qui terror sit in exercitu, exponunt. | 3.26.9. After mutual salutations he was requested to put on his toga that he might hear the mandate of the senate, and they expressed the hope that it might turn out well for him and for the State. He asked them, in surprise, if all was well, and bade his wife, Racilia, bring him his toga quickly from the cottage. [10] Wiping off the dust and perspiration, he put it on and came forward, on which the deputation saluted him as Dictator and congratulated him, invited him to the City and explained the state of apprehension in which the army were. [11] A vessel had been provided for him by the government, and after he had crossed over, he was welcomed by his three sons, who had come out to meet him. They were followed by other relatives and friends, and by the majority of the senate. Escorted by this numerous gathering and preceded by the lictors, he was conducted to his house. |
|
13. Plutarch, On Love of Wealth, 524 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 86 |
14. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1043e (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 47 |
15. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 10.121b, 7.188, 4.47 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 46 |
16. Philodemus, On Choices And Avoidances, 5.15-5.17 Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 86 |
17. Philodemus, On Arrogance, 16.15-16.27 Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 86 |
18. Philodemus, On Gratitude, 11.18 Tagged with subjects: •allen, walter, jr. Found in books: Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 66 |