| 1. Aristotle, Soul, 2.5 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •actuality, second Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 78 |
2. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.83, 4.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), the second judgement is about the appropriateness of actual or imagined pursuit or avoidance Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 31| 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. | |
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| 3. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.4.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), the second judgement is about the appropriateness of actual or imagined pursuit or avoidance Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 31 |
| 4. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), the second judgement is about the appropriateness of actual or imagined pursuit or avoidance Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 31 |
| 5. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.3.2, 4.4.24, 4.7.5, 4.7.14 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), the second judgement is about the appropriateness of actual or imagined pursuit or avoidance Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 31, 33 |
6. Origen, Against Celsus, 5.39 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •actuality, second Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 78 | 5.39. We must therefore inquire what may be fittingly eaten or not by the rational and gentle animal, which acts always in conformity with reason; and not worship at random, sheep, or goats, or cattle; to abstain from which is an act of moderation, for much advantage is derived by men from these animals. Whereas, is it not the most foolish of all things to spare crocodiles, and to treat them as sacred to some fabulous divinity or other? For it is a mark of exceeding stupidity to spare those animals which do not spare us, and to bestow care on those which make a prey of human beings. But Celsus approves of those who, in keeping with the laws of their country, worship and tend crocodiles, and not a word does he say against them, while the Christians appear deserving of censure, who have been taught to loath evil, and to turn away from wicked works, and to reverence and honour virtue as being generated by God, and as being His Son. For we must not, on account of their feminine name and nature, regard wisdom and righteousness as females; for these things are in our view the Son of God, as His genuine disciple has shown, when he said of Him, Who of God is made to us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption. And although we may call Him a second God, let men know that by the term second God we mean nothing else than a virtue capable of including all other virtues, and a reason capable of containing all reason whatsoever which exists in all things, which have arisen naturally, directly, and for the general advantage, and which reason, we say, dwelt in the soul of Jesus, and was united to Him in a degree far above all other souls, seeing He alone was enabled completely to receive the highest share in the absolute reason, and the absolute wisdom, and the absolute righteousness. |
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7. Origen, On First Principles, 1.2.2 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •actuality, second Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 78 | 1.2.2. Let no one, however, imagine that we mean anything impersonal when we call Him the wisdom of God; or suppose, for example, that we understand Him to be, not a living being endowed with wisdom, but something which makes men wise, giving itself to, and implanting itself in, the minds of those who are made capable of receiving His virtues and intelligence. If, then, it is once rightly understood that the only-begotten Son of God is His wisdom hypostatically existing, I know not whether our curiosity ought to advance beyond this, or entertain any suspicion that that ὑπόστασις or substantia contains anything of a bodily nature, since everything that is corporeal is distinguished either by form, or color, or magnitude. And who in his sound senses ever sought for form, or color, or size, in wisdom, in respect of its being wisdom? And who that is capable of entertaining reverential thoughts or feelings regarding God, can suppose or believe that God the Father ever existed, even for a moment of time, without having generated this Wisdom? For in that case he must say either that God was unable to generate Wisdom before He produced her, so that He afterwards called into being her who formerly did not exist, or that He possessed the power indeed, but — what cannot be said of God without impiety — was unwilling to use it; both of which suppositions, it is patent to all, are alike absurd and impious: for they amount to this, either that God advanced from a condition of inability to one of ability, or that, although possessed of the power, He concealed it, and delayed the generation of Wisdom. Wherefore we have always held that God is the Father of His only-begotten Son, who was born indeed of Him, and derives from Him what He is, but without any beginning, not only such as may be measured by any divisions of time, but even that which the mind alone can contemplate within itself, or behold, so to speak, with the naked powers of the understanding. And therefore we must believe that Wisdom was generated before any beginning that can be either comprehended or expressed. And since all the creative power of the coming creation was included in this very existence of Wisdom (whether of those things which have an original or of those which have a derived existence), having been formed beforehand and arranged by the power of foreknowledge; on account of these very creatures which had been described, as it were, and prefigured in Wisdom herself, does Wisdom say, in the words of Solomon, that she was created the beginning of the ways of God, inasmuch as she contained within herself either the beginnings, or forms, or species of all creation. |
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| 8. Zacharias, Ammonius Sive De Mundi Opificio Disputatio, 180-185, 187-207, 372-374, 186 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 78 |
| 9. Damaskios, De Principiis, 2.117-2.118 (5th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •actuality, second Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 78 |
| 10. Papyri, Rdge, 36.18, 47.18-48.7, 79.5, 79.6, 84.14, 84.15, 92.1-93.14 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Marmodoro and Prince (2015) 78 |
| 11. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 31 |
