Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

   Search:  
validated results only / all results

and or

Filtering options: (leave empty for all results)
By author:     
By work:        
By subject:
By additional keyword:       



Results for
Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

graph

graph

All subjects (including unvalidated):
subject book bibliographic info
action/activity, daytime Ker and Wessels (2020), The Values of Nighttime in Classical Antiquity: Between Dusk and Dawn, 3, 27, 155, 197
action/activity, nocturnal Ker and Wessels (2020), The Values of Nighttime in Classical Antiquity: Between Dusk and Dawn, 6, 10, 134, 141, 142, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 210, 266
activating, cause King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 242, 243
activating, nature, world soul d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 126
activation, intertextuality, hypotextual Kirkland (2022), Herodotus and Imperial Greek Literature: Criticism, Imitation, Reception, 19, 102, 103, 181, 242, 243
activation, of impurity though, liquids Balberg (2014), Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature, 90, 91, 92, 93
active, / personal phrasing, abstract nominal phrases in thucydides, vs. Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 173, 174, 175, 183, 231, 232, 260, 261, 262, 263, 313, 314
active, and contemplating parts of reason Nisula (2012), Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, 225, 229, 231
active, and passive, contrary, contraries, contrarieties Trott (2019), Aristotle on the Matter of Form: ? Feminist Metaphysics of Generation, 146, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 158
active, and passive, potential, potentiality Trott (2019), Aristotle on the Matter of Form: ? Feminist Metaphysics of Generation, 116, 117, 150
active, causes, forms, as Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 125, 126, 127, 128
active, engagement/response, readers Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 5, 6, 7, 10, 17, 20, 24, 25, 32, 37, 51, 59, 66, 71, 72, 83, 84, 96, 97, 99, 104, 112, 114, 115, 116, 123, 124, 125, 127, 129, 142, 146, 147, 151, 153, 157, 160, 161, 187, 195, 211, 212, 216, 222, 247, 250, 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, 273, 274, 282, 290, 293, 302, 307, 308, 313, 316
active, femininity Hasan Rokem (2003), Tales of the Neighborhood Jewish Narrative Dialogues in Late Antiquity, 131
active, in religion, oikos, oikia as entity Parker (2005), Polytheism and Society at Athens, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42
active, intellect and, philo’s logos Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 215, 216, 218, 221, 246, 253
active, intellect and, self-messianization Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 359
active, intellect identified with, metatron Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 253, 333, 334, 351
active, intellect identified with, torah Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 253, 332, 338, 354, 361
active, intellect intellect, acquired Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 238
active, intellect intellect, human Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 3, 225, 231, 234, 238, 333, 334, 338, 359, 367
active, intellect intellect, passive and potential Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 220, 231
active, intellect intellect, perfection of Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 238, 332, 333
active, intellect of emanation Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 219, 220, 234
active, intellect united with, yod Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 361
active, intellect with, two powers in heaven Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 238
active, intellect, angelic conception, merkavah, of Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 221, 222, 334, 351
active, intellect, apotheotic experience related to Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 238, 327, 334
active, intellect, cloud man, prophecy in devekut to Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 231, 247
active, intellect, devekut, human intellect’s conjunction with, to Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 231, 234, 238, 334
active, intellect, emanation of Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 219, 220, 234
active, intellect, human intellect’s conjunction cloud man, with, related to Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 231, 234, 238, 334
active, intellect, intellect Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 142
active, intellect, metatron identified with Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 253, 333, 334, 351
active, intellect, philosophical, aristotelian and neoplatonic Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 220, 359
active, intellect, philo’s logos related to Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 215, 216, 218, 221, 246, 253
active, intellect, prophecy, devekut to Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 231, 247
active, intellect, self-messianization and Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 359
active, intellect, torah identified with Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 253, 332, 338, 354, 361
active, intellect, unio mystica to Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 238
active, intellect, ẓaddik united with Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 361
active, interest in cult, lykourgos Papazarkadas (2011), Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens, 21, 23, 26, 50, 51, 154, 239
active, motion/change, kinêsis, κίνησις‎ d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 53, 56, 109, 110, 123, 146, 175, 287
active, nature, as Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 234
active, novation Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 376
active, oblivion Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, 197, 210
active, or passive role, prostitution Brule (2003), Women of Ancient Greece, 107
active, or passive, intercourse Brule (2003), Women of Ancient Greece, 85, 86, 107
active, participation, members’ Gabrielsen and Paganini (2021), Private Associations in the Ancient Greek World: Regulations and the Creation of Group Identity, 21, 41, 49, 54, 62, 64, 67, 73, 77, 83, 133, 160, 177, 213, 218, 244
active, philosophical life of essenes Taylor and Hay (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Contemplative Life: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 58, 59, 102, 103, 170
active, principle, in stoicism Zachhuber (2022), Time and Soul: From Aristotle to St. Augustine. 38
active, principle, nature, pervaded by the Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 37
active, principle, spirit, characterizations as Frey and Levison (2014), The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 42, 61
active, reading Pandey (2018), The Poetics of Power in Augustan Rome, 5, 101, 102, 103, 105, 153, 167, 169, 229, 240, 241
active, role of sarah Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 241
active, secured debt, novation Verhagen (2022), Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca, 376
active, sight, as Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 291, 294, 296
active, virtue, as Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245
active, vs. contemplative life, greco-roman political theory Niccolai (2023), Christianity, Philosophy, and Roman Power: Constantine, Julian, and the Bishops on Exegesis and Empire. 42, 43, 82, 84
active, vs. passive, invidia Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 85, 182, 183
active/causal/productive, gennetikê, γεννητική‎, paraktikê, παρακτική‎, potency/power, dunamis, δύναμις‎ d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 67, 69, 80, 83, 84, 92, 93, 96, 109, 136, 150, 151
active/passive, binaries Neis (2012), When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species. 210, 234
active/passive, distinction Harrison (2006), Augustine's Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero, 11, 74, 76, 77, 126, 127, 128
active/passive, distinction, distinguished from volition Harrison (2006), Augustine's Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero, 76, 126
active/passive, distinction, exclusion of external Harrison (2006), Augustine's Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero, 76, 110, 115, 127, 128
active/practical, life in de vita contemplativa Taylor and Hay (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Contemplative Life: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 30, 31, 106
actively, good passions, eupatheiai, contributing, boulēsis Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 80, 89
activeness, of converts Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 26, 31, 38, 166, 171, 181, 189, 195, 197, 285, 320, 324, 351, 355, 361
activism, scribal Klawans (2019), Heresy, Forgery, Novelty: Condemning, Denying, and Asserting Innovation in Ancient Judaism, 23, 24, 25
activities Gruen (2011), Rethinking the Other in Antiquity, 119, 120, 121, 125, 137, 138
activities, administration Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372
activities, as dictator, caesar, c. julius Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 58, 113, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 209
activities, at festivals, attic Parker (2005), Polytheism and Society at Athens, 178, 180, 182, 183, 185
activities, can coexist, plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, opposite capacities, unlike opposite Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 305
activities, christian, missionary Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 108, 110, 113
activities, conditions, vs. Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 137
activities, conversion and, missionary Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 116
activities, cult Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120
activities, cultural memory, obscure vs. spectacular Eidinow and Kindt (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, 261, 262
activities, ethos of missionary Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 103, 114, 116
activities, governed by, norms Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 390
activities, images of missionary Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116
activities, in ancient greco-roman mediterranean, women, religious Kraemer (2010), Unreliable Witnesses: Religion, Gender, and History in the Greco-Roman Mediterranean, 30, 39, 40, 64
activities, in antiquity, missionary Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 103
activities, in bathhouse Eliav (2023), A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean, 34, 35, 36, 39, 50, 60, 147, 164, 188, 189, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 207, 208, 209, 210, 224, 232, 237, 238, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250
activities, in the sex and sexual baths Eliav (2023), A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean, 40, 140, 144, 145, 146, 149, 188, 230, 239, 241, 250
activities, missionary Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 103, 104, 105, 106, 175, 176, 217
activities, not proclus, neoplatonist, only essence, of soul can be affected Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 206, 265
activities, of advocates Humfress (2007), Oppian's Halieutica: Charting a Didactic Epic, 94
activities, of animal species, soul, in relation to characteristic Singer and van Eijk (2018), Galen: Works on Human Nature: Volume 1, Mixtures (De Temperamentis), 10, 91, 92, 138
activities, of distinguished from soul, natural Singer and van Eijk (2018), Galen: Works on Human Nature: Volume 1, Mixtures (De Temperamentis), 60, 107, 112
activities, of intelligence, intelligible objects, as Kelsey (2021), Mind and World in Aristotle's De Anima 21, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141
activities, of night Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 78, 189, 190, 191
activities, of pastor, “herdsman” Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 48, 130, 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 150, 151, 152, 155, 234
activities, of the soul Pedersen (2004), Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos. 301, 302, 306, 314, 438, 446
activities, of therapeutae, musical Cosgrove (2022), Music at Social Meals in Greek and Roman Antiquity: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Augustine, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280
activities, of theurgy Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 291, 292, 293, 294, 299, 310
activities, of tiberius, sexual Shannon-Henderson (2019), Power Play in Latin Love Elegy and its Multiple Forms of Continuity in Ovid’s , 216
activities, of ẓaddik of theurgy Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 338, 359, 361
activities, oracular Noam (2018), Shifting Images of the Hasmoneans: Second Temple Legends and Their Reception in Josephus and Rabbinic Literature, 64, 65
activities, palestinian, missionary Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 111, 114, 115
activities, plotheia, lending Papazarkadas (2011), Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens, 121, 131, 143, 195
activities, prayers Mikalson (2010), Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, 41, 51, 174, 175, 245, 247
activities, pythagoreans, structure of daily Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 46, 48, 585
activities, rabbinic, missionary Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 113
activities, sacred Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022), Why We Sing: Music, Word, and Liturgy in Early Christianity, 14
activities, tradition and, missionary Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 18, 19, 104, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 217
activities, uniting the yod, theurgical sefirot, of Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 359, 361
activities, women, economic and professional Bruun and Edmondson (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Roman Epigraphy, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593
activities, women, in supernatural Eidinow (2007), Oracles, Curses, and Risk Among the Ancient Greeks, 236
activity Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 20, 22, 72, 74, 86, 87, 91
King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 31, 123, 125, 133, 135, 136, 149, 150, 152, 158, 159, 218, 241, 242, 244
activity, actio = gr. energeia Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 57, 101, 124, 128, 129, 150, 151, 153, 167, 179, 180
activity, affection, πάσχειν, as Kelsey (2021), Mind and World in Aristotle's De Anima 57, 58
activity, and immorality, women Huebner and Laes (2019), Aulus Gellius and Roman Reading Culture: Text, Presence and Imperial Knowledge in the 'Noctes Atticae', 141
activity, and pleasure calculus, sexual Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115
activity, and, wealth, wickedness, social Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 19, 93, 165, 168
activity, ark, build/building Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 95, 96, 101
activity, at mountain sites, late antique pagan Konig (2022), The Folds of Olympus: Mountains in Ancient Greek and Roman Culture, 65, 77
activity, between male lovers, sexual Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 425
activity, body, and sexual Brakke, Satlow, Weitzman (2005), Religion and the Self in Antiquity. 207
activity, boiotian koinon, and interstate Wilding (2022), Reinventing the Amphiareion at Oropos, 125, 129, 152, 158
activity, build/building Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 176
activity, by the wicked, build/building Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 137, 193, 194, 205, 261, 262, 280, 322, 345, 418, 419, 420, 421, 425, 555
activity, campus martius, male and female spheres of Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 104, 105, 106
activity, causal d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 68
activity, cities, and economic Parkins and Smith (1998), Trade, Traders and the Ancient City, 227, 229
activity, city, as a setting for medical Jouanna (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, 45, 51
activity, civic, female Sweeney (2013), Foundation Myths and Politics in Ancient Ionia, 119
activity, cognitive Dilley (2019), Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline, 4, 12, 13
activity, contemplation of art, sexual Dilley (2019), Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline, 195, 196, 197
activity, curses, and sexual Dilley (2019), Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline, 196
activity, cyrenaic advice, sexual Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 408
activity, dangers of excess/irresponsibility, sexual Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 150
activity, dead sea scrolls, and temple Taylor (2012), The Essenes, the Scrolls, and the Dead Sea, 302
activity, decrees about, sexual Liddel (2020), Decrees of Fourth-Century Athens (403/2-322/1 BC): Volume 2, Political and Cultural Perspectives, 230
activity, diogenes and, sexual Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 656, 657
activity, divine d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 244
activity, double Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 102, 125, 126, 127, 146, 147, 176
activity, economic Avery-Peck, Chilton, and Scott Green (2014), A Legacy of Learning: Essays in Honor of Jacob Neusner , 43, 44, 247
activity, education, logos’ educational Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 273
activity, emotions, and demonic Champion (2022), Dorotheus of Gaza and Ascetic Education, 126, 127, 131, 138, 143, 144, 146, 148, 205, 209
activity, enclosure, build/building Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 103, 107, 108, 122
activity, energeia, potency/power, dunamis, δύναμις‎, precedes ἐνέργεια‎ d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 80, 81
activity, ephrem the syrian, on divine Brakke, Satlow, Weitzman (2005), Religion and the Self in Antiquity. 157
activity, epistemology, rational Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 135, 137, 138, 139
activity, eschatological temple, build/building Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 132, 133, 138, 150
activity, essence, distinguished from Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 206
activity, ethnographic attitudes, sexual Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 506, 510
activity, explicit descriptions, sexual Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 110, 115
activity, female spheres of Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 12, 94, 95, 99, 104, 105, 106, 160, 161, 162, 273
activity, first build/building temple, rebuilding Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 115, 122
activity, first temple, build/building Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 109, 110, 112, 122
activity, forum, male and female spheres of Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 19, 20, 160
activity, gender, philosophy, as male Ayres Champion and Crawford (2023), The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions. 348
activity, god, energeia Penniman (2017), Raised on Christian Milk: Food and the Formation of the Soul in Early Christianity, 151
activity, god, ένέργεια, of Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 181, 182, 186, 302
activity, growth of instruction genre, egyptian, intellectual Damm (2018), Religions and Education in Antiquity, 205, 207
activity, in cosmos d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 146
activity, in rabbinic literature, human exegetical Shemesh (2009), Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from Qumran to the Rabbis. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68
activity, in reversion d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 81
activity, in the afterlife, sexual Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 560
activity, in time d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 132
activity, in worship, passivity, vs. Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 267, 268
activity, intellectual d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 234, 274
activity, islands, in the aegean, and economic Kowalzig (2007), Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece, 211, 258, 259
activity, israel, cultic Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 20, 21, 26, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 51, 68, 72, 77, 80, 122, 123, 124, 144, 145, 182
activity, jerome, on scribal Dilley (2019), Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline, 121, 122
activity, male spheres of Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 19, 20, 21, 104, 105, 106, 160, 161
activity, medical advice, sexual Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 522, 523
activity, missionary Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 56, 116
activity, of adam, cultic Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 20, 21, 22, 26, 35
activity, of being-life-intellect, eternal/timeless d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 132, 145
activity, of demiurge, geometry, as O'Brien (2015), The Demiurge in Ancient Thought, 21, 31, 50, 108, 110, 165
activity, of demons, xii, origin nature and Sider (2001), Christian and Pagan in the Roman Empire: The Witness of Tertullian, 46, 48
activity, of forms in cosmos d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 159, 161
activity, of forms, double d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 108
activity, of gods, creation and Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 133, 134
activity, of holy spirit Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 268
activity, of intellect d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 59
activity, of paradigm d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 119, 150, 152, 158, 159
activity, of paul, saint, missionary Parkins and Smith (1998), Trade, Traders and the Ancient City, 207
activity, of peace Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 206, 218, 222, 223
activity, of pseudo-dionysius, theandric Ayres Champion and Crawford (2023), The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions. 653
activity, of reason Ebrey and Kraut (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed, 308, 365, 395, 538
activity, of soul in time d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 127
activity, of soul, constant Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 296
activity, of world soul, thought Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 32
activity, ordering of knowledge, epistemology in late antique world, irenaeus on ordering of Ayres Champion and Crawford (2023), The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions. 86
activity, pastoral Konig (2022), The Folds of Olympus: Mountains in Ancient Greek and Roman Culture, 21, 24, 25, 28, 37, 48, 232, 247, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265, 266, 271, 273, 298, 300
activity, peace, and religious Kowalzig (2007), Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece, 81, 82, 93, 94, 113, 115, 116, 157, 158, 159, 384, 385
activity, philosophy, as male Ayres Champion and Crawford (2023), The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions. 348
activity, plato, demiurge cessation of Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 145
activity, plotinus on double d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 107
activity, redaction, as authorial Reed (2005), Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity: The Reception of Enochic Literature. 10, 14
activity, religion, and cult Eidinow (2007), Oracles, Curses, and Risk Among the Ancient Greeks, 38
activity, religion, enabling theoretical Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 61, 77, 85, 173
activity, religious Bruun and Edmondson (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Roman Epigraphy, 218
activity, retribution, as Trudinger (2004), The Psalms of the Tamid Service: A Liturgical Text from the Second Temple, 120
activity, ritual Bergmann et al. (2023), The Power of Psalms in Post-Biblical Judaism: Liturgy, Ritual and Community. 22, 23, 70, 88, 95, 98, 100, 244, 254, 256
activity, roman entertainment, as leisure Spielman (2020), Jews and Entertainment in the Ancient World. 172
activity, same-sex erotic Dilley (2019), Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline, 196, 197
activity, scribal Dilley (2019), Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline, 120, 121, 122
Strong (2021), The Fables of Jesus in the Gospel of Luke: A New Foundation for the Study of Parables 438, 439, 440, 441, 442
activity, scribes/scribal Fraade (2011), Legal Fictions: Studies of Law and Narrative in the Discursive Worlds of Ancient Jewish Sectarians and Sages, 20, 39, 40, 55, 56, 86, 150, 152, 180, 195, 217, 268, 386, 481
activity, second build/building temple, rebuilding Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 138
activity, second temple, build/building Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 138
activity, self-reflective Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 110, 118, 120, 122
activity, sexual Laes Goodey and Rose (2013), Disabilities in Roman Antiquity: Disparate Bodies, 7, 30, 31, 66, 223
Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119
activity, theoretical or intellectual, actio = gr. energeia Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 167, 169, 170
activity, third asia minor, building century Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 193
activity, third tiberias synagogues/proseuchai, building century Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 185
activity, tower in babylonia, build/building Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 634
activity, traces of third man, due to their inner d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 157, 158, 159, 164
activity, traders, merchants, mercantile Salvesen et al. (2020), Israel in Egypt: The Land of Egypt as Concept and Reality for Jews in Antiquity and the Early Medieval Period, 154, 269, 284, 355, 560, 635, 636, 641
activity, travel, missionary Nasrallah (2019), Archaeology and the Letters of Paul, 82, 83, 85, 100, 101, 102, 103, 128
activity, violent death, and other ritual Ekroth (2013), The Sacrificial Rituals of Greek Hero-Cults in the Archaic to the Early Hellenistic Period, 222, 235, 257, 264, 333
activity, virtues, of soul's Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 208
activity, wickedness and, smell, social Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 19, 93, 165, 168
activity, women, pauls missionary Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 117, 501
activity, έἐέργεια Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 333, 337, 340, 342, 344, 349, 350
activity, ζωή, life/vital ζῆν Kelsey (2021), Mind and World in Aristotle's De Anima 11, 12, 13, 35, 36, 37
activity, ἐνέργεια Kelsey (2021), Mind and World in Aristotle's De Anima 11, 12, 13, 35, 36, 37, 130, 131
god, act/activity, mighty/ powerful of Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 19, 324, 332, 336, 342, 343, 345, 347, 348, 352, 355, 358, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 423, 425
offices/activities, tiberius, emperor, religious Galinsky (2016), Memory in Ancient Rome and Early Christianity, 100

List of validated texts:
107 validated results for "active"
1. Septuagint, Tobit, 13.9-13.18 (th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Build/Building Activity, Eschatological Temple • Build/Building Activity, First Temple • Build/Building Activity, First Temple, rebuilding • Build/Building Activity, Second Temple • Build/Building Activity, Second Temple, rebuilding • Piety, Trilogy of pious actions →Alms, Fast, Prayer

 Found in books: Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 75; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 110, 115, 138

sup>
13.9 O Jerusalem, the holy city,he will afflict you for the deeds of your sons,but again he will show mercy to the sons of the righteous. 13.10 Give thanks worthily to the Lord,and praise the King of the ages,that his tent may be raised for you again with joy. May he cheer those within you who are captives,and love those within you who are distressed,to all generations for ever. 13.11 Many nations will come from afar to the name of the Lord God,bearing gifts in their hands, gifts for the King of heaven. Generations of generations will give you joyful praise. 13.12 Cursed are all who hate you;blessed for ever will be all who love you. 13.13 Rejoice and be glad for the sons of the righteous;for they will be gathered together,and will praise the Lord of the righteous. 13.14 How blessed are those who love you!They will rejoice in your peace. Blessed are those who grieved over all your afflictions;for they will rejoice for you upon seeing all your glory,and they will be made glad for ever. 13.15 Let my soul praise God the great King. 13.16 For Jerusalem will be built with sapphires and emeralds,her walls with precious stones,and her towers and battlements with pure gold. 13.17 The streets of Jerusalem will be paved with beryl and ruby and stones of Ophir; 13.18 all her lanes will cry `Hallelujah! and will give praise,saying, `Blessed is God, who has exalted you for ever."'' None
2. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 5.12-5.15, 6.4, 13.12, 13.14, 18.20, 26.12, 31.9-31.13 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Action • Actions of Israelite farmer • Activity (labor) • Scribes/Scribal Activity • Sin, collective guilt for individual action • evil, actions • rabbinic literature, human exegetical activity in • sight, as active • speech, as opposed to action • theurgy, activities of • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022), Why We Sing: Music, Word, and Liturgy in Early Christianity, 233, 245; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 294; Brooks (1983), Support for the Poor in the Mishnaic Law of Agriculture: Tractate Peah, 31, 156; Fraade (2011), Legal Fictions: Studies of Law and Narrative in the Discursive Worlds of Ancient Jewish Sectarians and Sages, 217, 386; Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 292; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 31, 38; Neusner (2001), The Theology of Halakha, 25, 223, 224; Shemesh (2009), Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from Qumran to the Rabbis. 49

sup>
5.12 שָׁמוֹר אֶת־יוֹם הַשַׁבָּת לְקַדְּשׁוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוְּךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ 5.13 שֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים תַּעֲבֹד וְעָשִׂיתָ כָּל־מְלַאכְתֶּךָ׃ 5.14 וְיוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי שַׁבָּת לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כָל־מְלָאכָה אַתָּה וּבִנְךָ־וּבִתֶּךָ וְעַבְדְּךָ־וַאֲמָתֶךָ וְשׁוֹרְךָ וַחֲמֹרְךָ וְכָל־בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ וְגֵרְךָ אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ לְמַעַן יָנוּחַ עַבְדְּךָ וַאֲמָתְךָ כָּמוֹךָ׃ 5.15 וְזָכַרְתָּ כִּי־עֶבֶד הָיִיתָ בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם וַיֹּצִאֲךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ מִשָּׁם בְּיָד חֲזָקָה וּבִזְרֹעַ נְטוּיָה עַל־כֵּן צִוְּךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת־יוֹם הַשַׁבָּת׃
6.4 שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֶחָד׃
13.12 וְכָל־יִשְׂרָאֵל יִשְׁמְעוּ וְיִרָאוּן וְלֹא־יוֹסִפוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת כַּדָּבָר הָרָע הַזֶּה בְּקִרְבֶּךָ׃
13.14 יָצְאוּ אֲנָשִׁים בְּנֵי־בְלִיַּעַל מִקִּרְבֶּךָ וַיַּדִּיחוּ אֶת־יֹשְׁבֵי עִירָם לֵאמֹר נֵלְכָה וְנַעַבְדָה אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יְדַעְתֶּם׃' 26.12 כִּי תְכַלֶּה לַעְשֵׂר אֶת־כָּל־מַעְשַׂר תְּבוּאָתְךָ בַּשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁלִישִׁת שְׁנַת הַמַּעֲשֵׂר וְנָתַתָּה לַלֵּוִי לַגֵּר לַיָּתוֹם וְלָאַלְמָנָה וְאָכְלוּ בִשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְשָׂבֵעוּ׃
31.9 וַיִּכְתֹּב מֹשֶׁה אֶת־הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת וַיִּתְּנָהּ אֶל־הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּנֵי לֵוִי הַנֹּשְׂאִים אֶת־אֲרוֹן בְּרִית יְהוָה וְאֶל־כָּל־זִקְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃ 31.11 בְּבוֹא כָל־יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵרָאוֹת אֶת־פְּנֵי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בַּמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחָר תִּקְרָא אֶת־הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת נֶגֶד כָּל־יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּאָזְנֵיהֶם׃ 31.12 הַקְהֵל אֶת־הָעָם הָאֲנָשִׁים וְהַנָּשִׁים וְהַטַּף וְגֵרְךָ אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ לְמַעַן יִשְׁמְעוּ וּלְמַעַן יִלְמְדוּ וְיָרְאוּ אֶת־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם וְשָׁמְרוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת־כָּל־דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת׃ 31.13 וּבְנֵיהֶם אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יָדְעוּ יִשְׁמְעוּ וְלָמְדוּ לְיִרְאָה אֶת־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם כָּל־הַיָּמִים אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם חַיִּים עַל־הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם עֹבְרִים אֶת־הַיַּרְדֵּן שָׁמָּה לְרִשְׁתָּהּ׃'' None		sup>
5.12 Observe the sabbath day, to keep it holy, as the LORD thy God commanded thee. 5.13 Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work; 5.14 but the seventh day is a sabbath unto the LORD thy God, in it thou shalt not do any manner of work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates; that thy man-servant and thy maid-servant may rest as well as thou. 5.15 And thou shalt remember that thou was a servant in the land of Egypt, and the LORD thy God brought thee out thence by a mighty hand and by an outstretched arm; therefore the LORD thy God commanded thee to keep the sabbath day.
6.4 HEAR, O ISRAEL: THE LORD OUR GOD, THE LORD IS ONE.
13.12 And all Israel shall hear, and fear, and shall do no more any such wickedness as this is in the midst of thee.
13.14 ’Certain base fellows are gone out from the midst of thee, and have drawn away the inhabitants of their city, saying: Let us go and serve other gods, which ye have not known’;
18.20 But the prophet, that shall speak a word presumptuously in My name, which I have not commanded him to speak, or that shall speak in the name of other gods, that same prophet shall die.’
26.12 When thou hast made an end of tithing all the tithe of thine increase in the third year, which is the year of tithing, and hast given it unto the Levite, to the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow, that they may eat within thy gates, and be satisfied,
31.9 And Moses wrote this law, and delivered it unto the priests the sons of Levi, that bore the ark of the covet of the LORD, and unto all the elders of Israel. 31.10 And Moses commanded them, saying: ‘At the end of every seven years, in the set time of the year of release, in the feast of tabernacles, 31.11 when all Israel is come to appear before the LORD thy God in the place which He shall choose, thou shalt read this law before all Israel in their hearing. 31.12 Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones, and thy stranger that is within thy gates, that they may hear, and that they may learn, and fear the LORD your God, and observe to do all the words of this law; 31.13 and that their children, who have not known, may hear, and learn to fear the LORD your God, as long as ye live in the land whither ye go over the Jordan to possess it.’'' None
3. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 20.2-20.17, 33.23 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Action • Active Intellect, Philo’s Logos related to • Active Intellect, angelic conception (merkavah) of • Epistemology, rational activity • Philo’s Logos, Active Intellect and • Plato, Demiurge cessation of activity • evil, actions • group-orientation, and moral actions • morality, moral actions • passivity, vs. activity, in worship • speech, as opposed to action • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022), Why We Sing: Music, Word, and Liturgy in Early Christianity, 233, 245; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 268; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 389; Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 138; Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 221; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 39; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 145

sup>
20.2 אָנֹכִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר הוֹצֵאתִיךָ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם מִבֵּית עֲבָדִים׃
20.2 לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן אִתִּי אֱלֹהֵי כֶסֶף וֵאלֹהֵי זָהָב לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ לָכֶם׃ 20.3 לֹא יִהְיֶה־לְךָ אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים עַל־פָּנָיַ 20.4 לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה־לְךָ פֶסֶל וְכָל־תְּמוּנָה אֲשֶׁר בַּשָּׁמַיִם מִמַּעַל וַאֲשֶׁר בָּאָרֶץ מִתַָּחַת וַאֲשֶׁר בַּמַּיִם מִתַּחַת לָאָרֶץ 20.5 לֹא־תִשְׁתַּחְוֶה לָהֶם וְלֹא תָעָבְדֵם כִּי אָנֹכִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֵל קַנָּא פֹּקֵד עֲוֺן אָבֹת עַל־בָּנִים עַל־שִׁלֵּשִׁים וְעַל־רִבֵּעִים לְשֹׂנְאָי׃ 20.6 וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים לְאֹהֲבַי וּלְשֹׁמְרֵי מִצְוֺתָי׃ 20.7 לֹא תִשָּׂא אֶת־שֵׁם־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לַשָּׁוְא כִּי לֹא יְנַקֶּה יְהוָה אֵת אֲשֶׁר־יִשָּׂא אֶת־שְׁמוֹ לַשָּׁוְא׃ 20.8 זָכוֹר אֶת־יוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת לְקַדְּשׁוֹ 20.9 שֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים תַּעֲבֹד וְעָשִׂיתָ כָּל־מְלַאכְתֶּךָ' '20.11 כִּי שֵׁשֶׁת־יָמִים עָשָׂה יְהוָה אֶת־הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֶת־הַיָּם וְאֶת־כָּל־אֲשֶׁר־בָּם וַיָּנַח בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי עַל־כֵּן בֵּרַךְ יְהוָה אֶת־יוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת וַיְקַדְּשֵׁהוּ׃ 20.12 כַּבֵּד אֶת־אָבִיךָ וְאֶת־אִמֶּךָ לְמַעַן יַאֲרִכוּן יָמֶיךָ עַל הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ׃ 20.13 לֹא תִּרְצָח׃ לֹא תִּנְאָף׃ לֹא תִּגְנֹב׃ לֹא־תַעֲנֶה בְרֵעֲךָ עֵד שָׁקֶר׃ 20.14 לֹא תַחְמֹד בֵּית רֵעֶךָ לֹא־תַחְמֹד אֵשֶׁת רֵעֶךָ וְעַבְדּוֹ וַאֲמָתוֹ וְשׁוֹרוֹ וַחֲמֹרוֹ וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר לְרֵעֶךָ׃ 20.15 וְכָל־הָעָם רֹאִים אֶת־הַקּוֹלֹת וְאֶת־הַלַּפִּידִם וְאֵת קוֹל הַשֹּׁפָר וְאֶת־הָהָר עָשֵׁן וַיַּרְא הָעָם וַיָּנֻעוּ וַיַּעַמְדוּ מֵרָחֹק׃ 20.16 וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֶל־מֹשֶׁה דַּבֵּר־אַתָּה עִמָּנוּ וְנִשְׁמָעָה וְאַל־יְדַבֵּר עִמָּנוּ אֱלֹהִים פֶּן־נָמוּת׃ 20.17 וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל־הָעָם אַל־תִּירָאוּ כִּי לְבַעֲבוּר נַסּוֹת אֶתְכֶם בָּא הָאֱלֹהִים וּבַעֲבוּר תִּהְיֶה יִרְאָתוֹ עַל־פְּנֵיכֶם לְבִלְתִּי תֶחֱטָאוּ׃
33.23 וַהֲסִרֹתִי אֶת־כַּפִּי וְרָאִיתָ אֶת־אֲחֹרָי וּפָנַי לֹא יֵרָאוּ׃'' None		sup>
20.2 I am the LORD thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. 20.3 Thou shalt have no other gods before Me. 20.4 Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, nor any manner of likeness, of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; 20.5 thou shalt not bow down unto them, nor serve them; for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me; 20.6 and showing mercy unto the thousandth generation of them that love Me and keep My commandments. 20.7 Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain; for the LORD will not hold him guiltless that taketh His name in vain. 20.8 Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. 20.9 Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work; 20.10 but the seventh day is a sabbath unto the LORD thy God, in it thou shalt not do any manner of work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates; 20.11 for in six days the LORD made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested on the seventh day; wherefore the LORD blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it. 20.12 Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee. 20.13 Thou shalt not murder. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour. 20.14 Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house; thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbour’s. 20.15 And all the people perceived the thunderings, and the lightnings, and the voice of the horn, and the mountain smoking; and when the people saw it, they trembled, and stood afar off. 20.16 And they said unto Moses: ‘Speak thou with us, and we will hear; but let not God speak with us, lest we die.’ 20.17 And Moses said unto the people: ‘Fear not; for God is come to prove you, and that His fear may be before you, that ye sin not.’
33.23 And I will take away My hand, and thou shalt see My back; but My face shall not be seen.’' ' None
4. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 6.3, 11.7, 18.1 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Adam, Cultic activity of • Build/Building Activity, By the Wicked • Build/Building Activity, Tower in Babylonia • God, Expulsion actions • Israel, Cultic activity • habituation, and body, action of • passivity, vs. activity, in worship • sacred, activities

 Found in books: Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022), Why We Sing: Music, Word, and Liturgy in Early Christianity, 14; Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 267, 268; Champion (2022), Dorotheus of Gaza and Ascetic Education, 54; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 30, 35, 37, 112, 113, 114, 115, 182; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 345, 634

sup>
6.3 וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה לֹא־יָדוֹן רוּחִי בָאָדָם לְעֹלָם בְּשַׁגַּם הוּא בָשָׂר וְהָיוּ יָמָיו מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה׃
11.7 הָבָה נֵרְדָה וְנָבְלָה שָׁם שְׂפָתָם אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִשְׁמְעוּ אִישׁ שְׂפַת רֵעֵהוּ׃
18.1 וַיֵּרָא אֵלָיו יְהוָה בְּאֵלֹנֵי מַמְרֵא וְהוּא יֹשֵׁב פֶּתַח־הָאֹהֶל כְּחֹם הַיּוֹם׃'
18.1 וַיֹּאמֶר שׁוֹב אָשׁוּב אֵלֶיךָ כָּעֵת חַיָּה וְהִנֵּה־בֵן לְשָׂרָה אִשְׁתֶּךָ וְשָׂרָה שֹׁמַעַת פֶּתַח הָאֹהֶל וְהוּא אַחֲרָיו׃ ' None		sup>
6.3 And the LORD said: ‘My spirit shall not abide in man for ever, for that he also is flesh; therefore shall his days be a hundred and twenty years.’
11.7 Come, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech.’
18.1 And the LORD appeared unto him by the terebinths of Mamre, as he sat in the tent door in the heat of the day;' ' None
5. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 14.4, 19.18 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Actions of Israelite farmer • Build/Building Activity, By the Wicked • night, activities of • ritual, activity • scribal activism

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 78; Bergmann et al. (2023), The Power of Psalms in Post-Biblical Judaism: Liturgy, Ritual and Community. 22; Brooks (1983), Support for the Poor in the Mishnaic Law of Agriculture: Tractate Peah, 35; Klawans (2019), Heresy, Forgery, Novelty: Condemning, Denying, and Asserting Innovation in Ancient Judaism, 23, 24; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 419

sup>
14.4 וְצִוָּה הַכֹּהֵן וְחִלְּצוּ אֶת־הָאֲבָנִים אֲשֶׁר בָּהֵן הַנָּגַע וְהִשְׁלִיכוּ אֶתְהֶן אֶל־מִחוּץ לָעִיר אֶל־מָקוֹם טָמֵא׃
14.4 וְצִוָּה הַכֹּהֵן וְלָקַח לַמִּטַּהֵר שְׁתֵּי־צִפֳּרִים חַיּוֹת טְהֹרוֹת וְעֵץ אֶרֶז וּשְׁנִי תוֹלַעַת וְאֵזֹב׃
19.18 לֹא־תִקֹּם וְלֹא־תִטֹּר אֶת־בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ אֲנִי יְהוָה׃' ' None		sup>
14.4 then shall the priest command to take for him that is to be cleansed two living clean birds, and cedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop.
19.18 Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.' ' None
6. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 6.24-6.26, 18.5-18.6, 21.18 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Actions of Israelite farmer • Build/Building Activity, By the Wicked • Israel, Cultic activity • Scribes/Scribal Activity • action, importance of • rabbinic literature, human exegetical activity in

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 207; Brooks (1983), Support for the Poor in the Mishnaic Law of Agriculture: Tractate Peah, 31, 177; Fraade (2011), Legal Fictions: Studies of Law and Narrative in the Discursive Worlds of Ancient Jewish Sectarians and Sages, 55; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 37; Shemesh (2009), Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from Qumran to the Rabbis. 42, 43; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 262

sup>
6.24 יְבָרֶכְךָ יְהוָה וְיִשְׁמְרֶךָ׃ 6.25 יָאֵר יְהוָה פָּנָיו אֵלֶיךָ וִיחֻנֶּךָּ׃ 6.26 יִשָּׂא יְהוָה פָּנָיו אֵלֶיךָ וְיָשֵׂם לְךָ שָׁלוֹם׃
18.5 וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֵת מִשְׁמֶרֶת הַקֹּדֶשׁ וְאֵת מִשְׁמֶרֶת הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְלֹא־יִהְיֶה עוֹד קֶצֶף עַל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃ 18.6 וַאֲנִי הִנֵּה לָקַחְתִּי אֶת־אֲחֵיכֶם הַלְוִיִּם מִתּוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לָכֶם מַתָּנָה נְתֻנִים לַיהוָה לַעֲבֹד אֶת־עֲבֹדַת אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד׃
21.18 בְּאֵר חֲפָרוּהָ שָׂרִים כָּרוּהָ נְדִיבֵי הָעָם בִּמְחֹקֵק בְּמִשְׁעֲנֹתָם וּמִמִּדְבָּר מַתָּנָה׃'' None		sup>
6.24 The LORD bless thee, and keep thee; 6.25 The LORD make His face to shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee; 6.26 The LORD lift up His countece upon thee, and give thee peace.
18.5 And ye shall keep the charge of the holy things, and the charge of the altar, that there be wrath no more upon the children of Israel. 18.6 And I, behold, I have taken your brethren the Levites from among the children of Israel; for you they are given as a gift unto the LORD, to do the service of the tent of meeting.
21.18 The well, which the princes digged, Which the nobles of the people delved, With the sceptre, and with their staves. And from the wilderness to Mattanah;'' None
7. Hebrew Bible, Psalms, 1.2, 79.3, 118.22 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Active Intellect, Metatron identified with • Active Intellect, angelic conception (merkavah) of • Active Intellect, apotheotic experience related to • Active Intellect, devekut (human intellect’s conjunction with) to • Build/Building Activity, By the Wicked • Cloud Man, Active Intellect (human intellect’s conjunction with) related to • God,act/activity, mighty/ powerful of • Metatron, Active Intellect identified with • Scribes/Scribal Activity • intellect Active Intellect, human

 Found in books: Fraade (2011), Legal Fictions: Studies of Law and Narrative in the Discursive Worlds of Ancient Jewish Sectarians and Sages, 39, 195; Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 334; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 355; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 205, 421

sup>
1.2 כִּי אִם בְּתוֹרַת יְהוָה חֶפְצוֹ וּבְתוֹרָתוֹ יֶהְגֶּה יוֹמָם וָלָיְלָה׃
79.3 שָׁפְכוּ דָמָם כַּמַּיִם סְבִיבוֹת יְרוּשָׁלִָם וְאֵין קוֹבֵר׃
118.22 אֶבֶן מָאֲסוּ הַבּוֹנִים הָיְתָה לְרֹאשׁ פִּנָּה׃'' None		sup>
1.2 But his delight is in the law of the LORD; and in His law doth he meditate day and night.
79.3 They have shed their blood like water Round about Jerusalem, with none to bury them.
118.22 The stone which the builders rejected Is become the chief corner-stone.'' None
8. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 40.3, 54.16, 61.2 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Build/Building Activity, By the Wicked • Scribes/Scribal Activity • rabbinic literature, human exegetical activity in • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Fraade (2011), Legal Fictions: Studies of Law and Narrative in the Discursive Worlds of Ancient Jewish Sectarians and Sages, 56, 150; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 49; Shemesh (2009), Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from Qumran to the Rabbis. 42, 43, 44; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 280

sup>
40.3 וְיִעֲפוּ נְעָרִים וְיִגָעוּ וּבַחוּרִים כָּשׁוֹל יִכָּשֵׁלוּ׃
40.3 קוֹל קוֹרֵא בַּמִּדְבָּר פַּנּוּ דֶּרֶךְ יְהוָה יַשְּׁרוּ בָּעֲרָבָה מְסִלָּה לֵאלֹהֵינוּ׃
54.16 הן הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי בָּרָאתִי חָרָשׁ נֹפֵחַ בְּאֵשׁ פֶּחָם וּמוֹצִיא כְלִי לְמַעֲשֵׂהוּ וְאָנֹכִי בָּרָאתִי מַשְׁחִית לְחַבֵּל׃
61.2 לִקְרֹא שְׁנַת־רָצוֹן לַיהוָה וְיוֹם נָקָם לֵאלֹהֵינוּ לְנַחֵם כָּל־אֲבֵלִים׃'' None		sup>
40.3 Hark! one calleth: ‘Clear ye in the wilderness the way of the LORD, make plain in the desert a highway for our God.
54.16 Behold, I have created the smith That bloweth the fire of coals, And bringeth forth a weapon for his work; And I have created the waster to destroy.
61.2 To proclaim the year of the LORD’S good pleasure, And the day of vengeance of our God; To comfort all that mourn;'' None
9. Hebrew Bible, Jeremiah, 1.15-1.16, 17.7 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Actions of Israelite farmer • Israel, Cultic activity • Prophecy, symbolic actions • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Brooks (1983), Support for the Poor in the Mishnaic Law of Agriculture: Tractate Peah, 151; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 37; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 31; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 124

sup>
1.15 כִּי הִנְנִי קֹרֵא לְכָל־מִשְׁפְּחוֹת מַמְלְכוֹת צָפוֹנָה נְאֻם־יְהוָה וּבָאוּ וְנָתְנוּ אִישׁ כִּסְאוֹ פֶּתַח שַׁעֲרֵי יְרוּשָׁלִַם וְעַל כָּל־חוֹמֹתֶיהָ סָבִיב וְעַל כָּל־עָרֵי יְהוּדָה׃ 1.16 וְדִבַּרְתִּי מִשְׁפָּטַי אוֹתָם עַל כָּל־רָעָתָם אֲשֶׁר עֲזָבוּנִי וַיְקַטְּרוּ לֵאלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים וַיִּשְׁתַּחֲווּ לְמַעֲשֵׂי יְדֵיהֶם׃
17.7 בָּרוּךְ הַגֶּבֶר אֲשֶׁר יִבְטַח בַּיהוָה וְהָיָה יְהוָה מִבְטַחוֹ׃'' None		sup>
1.15 For, lo, I will call all the families of the kingdoms of the north, saith the LORD; and they shall come, and they shall set every one his throne at the entrance of the gates of Jerusalem, and against all the walls thereof round about, and against all the cities of Judah. 1.16 And I will utter My judgments against them touching all their wickedness; in that they have forsaken me, and have offered unto other gods, and worshipped the work of their own hands.
17.7 Blessed is the man that trusteth in the LORD, And whose trust the LORD is.'' None
10. Homer, Iliad, 3.125-3.128, 9.363, 9.412-9.416 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, taken by heroines • action/activity, nocturnal • gender, weaving as women’s activity • heroines, actions of • male spheres of activity • memories, kept alive or evoked in ritual, contested, of conflict • weaving, as gendered activity

 Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 21; Johnson (2008), Ovid before Exile: Art and Punishment in the Metamorphoses, 81; Ker and Wessels (2020), The Values of Nighttime in Classical Antiquity: Between Dusk and Dawn, 203; Kowalzig (2007), Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece, 198; Lyons (1997), Gender and Immortality: Heroines in Ancient Greek Myth and Cult, 56

sup>
3.125 τὴν δʼ εὗρʼ ἐν μεγάρῳ· ἣ δὲ μέγαν ἱστὸν ὕφαινε 3.126 δίπλακα πορφυρέην, πολέας δʼ ἐνέπασσεν ἀέθλους 3.127 Τρώων θʼ ἱπποδάμων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων, 3.128 οὕς ἑθεν εἵνεκʼ ἔπασχον ὑπʼ Ἄρηος παλαμάων·
9.363 ἤματί κε τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοίμην.
9.412 εἰ μέν κʼ αὖθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι, 9.413 ὤλετο μέν μοι νόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται· 9.414 εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδʼ ἵκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν, 9.415 ὤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν 9.416 ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μʼ ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.'' None		sup>
3.125 She found Helen in the hall, where she was weaving a great purple web of double fold, and thereon was broidering many battles of the horse-taming Trojans and the brazen-coated Achaeans, that for her sake they had endured at the hands of Ares. Close to her side then came Iris, swift of foot, and spake to her, saying:
9.363 my ships at early dawn sailing over the teeming Hellespont, and on board men right eager to ply the oar; and if so be the great Shaker of the Earth grants me fair voyaging, on the third day shall I reach deep-soiled Phthia. Possessions full many have I that I left on my ill-starred way hither,
9.412 For my mother the goddess, silver-footed Thetis, telleth me that twofold fates are bearing me toward the doom of death: if I abide here and war about the city of the Trojans, then lost is my home-return, but my renown shall be imperishable; but if I return home to my dear native land, 9.415 lost then is my glorious renown, yet shall my life long endure, neither shall the doom of death come soon upon me. 9.416 lost then is my glorious renown, yet shall my life long endure, neither shall the doom of death come soon upon me. '' None
11. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Israel, Cultic activity • Piety, Trilogy of pious actions →Alms, Fast, Prayer • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 37; Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 16; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 24
12. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Prophecy, symbolic actions • ritual, activity

 Found in books: Bergmann et al. (2023), The Power of Psalms in Post-Biblical Judaism: Liturgy, Ritual and Community. 22; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 26
13. None, None, nan (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action • action/activity, nocturnal • gender, weaving as women’s activity • memories, kept alive or evoked in ritual, contested, of conflict • weaving, as gendered activity

 Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 12; Johnson (2008), Ovid before Exile: Art and Punishment in the Metamorphoses, 81, 82; Ker and Wessels (2020), The Values of Nighttime in Classical Antiquity: Between Dusk and Dawn, 202; Kowalzig (2007), Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece, 137
14. Euripides, Trojan Women, 108 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Trojan Women (Euripides), action and logos • action, pursuit and avoidance

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 227; Pillinger (2019), Cassandra and the Poetics of Prophecy in Greek and Latin Literature, 78, 79

sup>
108 ὦ πολὺς ὄγκος συστελλόμενος'' None		sup>
108 Ah me! ah me! What else but tears is now my hapless lot, whose country, children, husband, all are lost? Ah! the high-blown pride of ancestors, humbled! how brought to nothing after all!'' None
15. Hebrew Bible, Ecclesiastes, 2.14 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Build/Building Activity, By the Wicked • rabbinic literature, human exegetical activity in

 Found in books: Shemesh (2009), Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from Qumran to the Rabbis. 61; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 205

sup>
2.14 הֶחָכָם עֵינָיו בְּרֹאשׁוֹ וְהַכְּסִיל בַּחֹשֶׁךְ הוֹלֵךְ וְיָדַעְתִּי גַם־אָנִי שֶׁמִּקְרֶה אֶחָד יִקְרֶה אֶת־כֻּלָּם׃'' None		sup>
2.14 The wise man, his eyes are in his head; But the fool walketh in darkness. And I also perceived that one event happeneth to them all.'' None
16. Hebrew Bible, Nehemiah, 8.1 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Piety, Trilogy of pious actions →Alms, Fast, Prayer • Scribes/Scribal Activity • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Fraade (2011), Legal Fictions: Studies of Law and Narrative in the Discursive Worlds of Ancient Jewish Sectarians and Sages, 217; Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 75; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 23, 32

sup>
8.1 וַיֵּאָסְפוּ כָל־הָעָם כְּאִישׁ אֶחָד אֶל־הָרְחוֹב אֲשֶׁר לִפְנֵי שַׁעַר־הַמָּיִם וַיֹּאמְרוּ לְעֶזְרָא הַסֹּפֵר לְהָבִיא אֶת־סֵפֶר תּוֹרַת מֹשֶׁה אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה יְהוָה אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל׃'
8.1 וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם לְכוּ אִכְלוּ מַשְׁמַנִּים וּשְׁתוּ מַמְתַקִּים וְשִׁלְחוּ מָנוֹת לְאֵין נָכוֹן לוֹ כִּי־קָדוֹשׁ הַיּוֹם לַאֲדֹנֵינוּ וְאַל־תֵּעָצֵבוּ כִּי־חֶדְוַת יְהוָה הִיא מָעֻזְּכֶם׃ ' None		sup>
8.1 all the people gathered themselves together as one man into the broad place that was before the water gate; and they spoke unto Ezra the scribe to bring the book of the Law of Moses, which the LORD had commanded to Israel.' ' None
17. Hebrew Bible, Zechariah, 3.10 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Femininity, active • Prophecy, symbolic actions

 Found in books: Hasan Rokem (2003), Tales of the Neighborhood Jewish Narrative Dialogues in Late Antiquity, 131; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 26

sup>
3.10 In that day, saith the LORD of hosts, shall ye call every man his neighbour under the vine and under the fig-tree.'' None
18. Herodotus, Histories, 2.64, 5.72 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action • dromena (ritual actions) • memories, kept alive or evoked in ritual, of connectivity • sexual activity, ethnographic attitudes

 Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 12; Kowalzig (2007), Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece, 308; Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), Inner Purity and Pollution in Greek Religion, 97; Wolfsdorf (2020), Early Greek Ethics, 510

sup>
2.64 καὶ τὸ μὴ μίσγεσθαι γυναιξὶ ἐν ἱροῖσι μηδὲ ἀλούτους ἀπὸ γυναικῶν ἐς ἱρὰ ἐσιέναι οὗτοι εἰσὶ οἱ πρῶτοι θρησκεύσαντες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι σχεδὸν πάντες ἄνθρωποι, πλὴν Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Ἑλλήνων, μίσγονται ἐν ἱροῖσι καὶ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν ἀνιστάμενοι ἄλουτοι ἐσέρχονται ἐς ἱρόν, νομίζοντες ἀνθρώπους εἶναι κατά περ τὰ ἄλλα κτήνεα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα κτήνεα ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀρνίθων γένεα ὀχευόμενα ἔν τε τοῖσι νηοῖσι τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἐν τοῖσι τεμένεσι· εἰ ὦν εἶναι τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο μὴ φίλον, οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲ τὰ κτήνεα ποιέειν. οὗτοι μέν νυν τοιαῦτα ἐπιλέγοντες ποιεῦσι ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀρεστά·
5.72 Κλεομένης δὲ ὡς πέμπων ἐξέβαλλε Κλεισθένεα καὶ τοὺς ἐναγέας, Κλεισθένης μὲν αὐτὸς ὑπεξέσχε, μετὰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἧσσον παρῆν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ὁ Κλεομένης οὐ σὺν μεγάλῃ χειρί, ἀπικόμενος δὲ ἀγηλατέει ἑπτακόσια ἐπίστια Ἀθηναίων, τά οἱ ὑπέθετο ὁ Ἰσαγόρης. ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσας δεύτερα τὴν βουλὴν καταλύειν ἐπειρᾶτο, τριηκοσίοισι δὲ τοῖσι Ἰσαγόρεω στασιώτῃσι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐνεχείριζε. ἀντισταθείσης δὲ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ οὐ βουλομένης πείθεσθαι, ὅ τε Κλεομένης καὶ ὁ Ἰσαγόρης καὶ οἱ στασιῶται αὐτοῦ καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. Ἀθηναίων δὲ οἱ λοιποὶ τὰ αὐτὰ φρονήσαντες ἐπολιόρκεον αὐτοὺς ἡμέρας δύο· τῇ δὲ τρίτῃ ὑπόσπονδοι ἐξέρχονται ἐκ τῆς χώρης ὅσοι ἦσαν αὐτῶν Λακεδαιμόνιοι. ἐπετελέετο δὲ τῷ Κλεομένεϊ ἡ φήμη. ὡς γὰρ ἀνέβη ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν μέλλων δὴ αὐτὴν κατασχήσειν, ἤιε ἐς τὸ ἄδυτον τῆς θεοῦ ὡς προσερέων· ἡ δὲ ἱρείη ἐξαναστᾶσα ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου, πρὶν ἢ τὰς θύρας αὐτὸν ἀμεῖψαι, εἶπε “ὦ ξεῖνε Λακεδαιμόνιε, πάλιν χώρεε μηδὲ ἔσιθι ἐς τὸ ἱρόν· οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν Δωριεῦσι παριέναι ἐνθαῦτα.” ὁ δὲ εἶπε “ὦ γύναι, ἀλλʼ οὐ Δωριεύς εἰμι ἀλλʼ Ἀχαιός.” ὃ μὲν δὴ τῇ κλεηδόνι οὐδὲν χρεώμενος ἐπεχείρησέ τε καὶ τότε πάλιν ἐξέπιπτε μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους Ἀθηναῖοι κατέδησαν τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, ἐν δὲ αὐτοῖσι καὶ Τιμησίθεον τὸν Δελφόν, τοῦ ἔργα χειρῶν τε καὶ λήματος ἔχοιμʼ ἂν μέγιστα καταλέξαι.'' None		sup>
2.64 Furthermore, it was the Egyptians who first made it a matter of religious observance not to have intercourse with women in temples or to enter a temple after such intercourse without washing. Nearly all other peoples are less careful in this matter than are the Egyptians and Greeks, and consider a man to be like any other animal; ,for beasts and birds (they say) are seen to mate both in the temples and in the sacred precincts; now were this displeasing to the god, the beasts would not do so. This is the reason given by others for practices which I, for my part, dislike; ' "
5.72 When Cleomenes had sent for and demanded the banishment of Cleisthenes and the Accursed, Cleisthenes himself secretly departed. Afterwards, however, Cleomenes appeared in Athens with no great force. Upon his arrival, he, in order to take away the curse, banished seven hundred Athenian families named for him by Isagoras. Having so done he next attempted to dissolve the Council, entrusting the offices of government to Isagoras' faction. ,The Council, however, resisted him, whereupon Cleomenes and Isagoras and his partisans seized the acropolis. The rest of the Athenians united and besieged them for two days. On the third day as many of them as were Lacedaemonians left the country under truce. ,The prophetic voice that Cleomenes heard accordingly had its fulfillment, for when he went up to the acropolis with the intention of taking possession of it, he approached the shrine of the goddess to address himself to her. The priestess rose up from her seat, and before he had passed through the door-way, she said, “Go back, Lacedaemonian stranger, and do not enter the holy place since it is not lawful that Dorians should pass in here. “My lady,” he answered, “I am not a Dorian, but an Achaean.” ,So without taking heed of the omen, he tried to do as he pleased and was, as I have said, then again cast out together with his Lacedaemonians. As for the rest, the Athenians imprisoned them under sentence of death. Among the prisoners was Timesitheus the Delphian, whose achievements of strength and courage were quite formidable. "' None
19. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, right actions (katorthomata) • good, appropriate actions (kathēkonta) • joy, as right action

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 230; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 58

280e οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἤδη τοῦτο ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαίμονα ποιῆσαί τινα, τό τε κεκτῆσθαι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς;— ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. —πότερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς χρῆταί τις ἢ καὶ ἐὰν μή;— ἐὰν ὀρθῶς. ΣΩ. καλῶς γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις. πλέον γάρ που οἶμαι θάτερόν ἐστιν, ἐάν τις χρῆται ὁτῳοῦν μὴ ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἢ ἐὰν ἐᾷ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακόν, τὸ δὲ οὔτε'' None280e Cleinias, for making a man happy—in the possession of these goods and using them? Soc.'' None
20. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Plato, Demiurge cessation of activity • geometry, as activity of Demiurge

 Found in books: O'Brien (2015), The Demiurge in Ancient Thought, 31; Potter Suh and Holladay (2021), Hellenistic Jewish Literature and the New Testament: Collected Essays, 145

42e προσγενέσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ πάνθʼ ὅσα ἀκόλουθα ἐκείνοις ἀπεργασαμένους ἄρχειν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾶν ζῷον, ὅτι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον. ΤΙ. μένοντος δὲ νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν ἐπείθοντο αὐτῇ, καὶ λαβόντες ἀθάνατον ἀρχὴν θνητοῦ ζῴου, μιμούμενοι τὸν σφέτερον δημιουργόν, πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου δανειζόμενοι'' None42e and of governing this mortal creature in the fairest and best way possible, to the utmost of their power, except in so far as it might itself become the cause of its own evils. Tim. And as He thus abode, His children gave heed to their Father’s command and obeyed it. They took the immortal principle of the mortal living creature, and imitating their own Maker, they borrowed from the Cosmos portions of fire and earth and water and air,'' None
21. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.23.6, 2.1, 3.84, 4.65.4 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Abstract nominal phrases in Thucydides, vs. active / personal phrasing • Aristotle, on goals of action • correlation between action and result as a means of moralising, • readers, active engagement/response

 Found in books: Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 10; Hau (2017), Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus, 197, 208; Huffman (2019), A History of Pythagoreanism, 115; Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 183, 260, 261, 262, 263

sup>
1.23.6 τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν: αἱ δ’ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ’ ἦσαν ἑκατέρων, ἀφ’ ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.
4.65.4 οὕτω τῇ τε παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι ἠξίουν σφίσι μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλῃ τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρᾳ παρασκευῇ κατεργάζεσθαι. αἰτία δ’ ἦν ἡ παρὰ λόγον τῶν πλεόνων εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν τῆς ἐλπίδος.' ' None		sup>
1.23.6 The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. Still it is well to give the grounds alleged by either side, which led to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of the war.
4.65.4 So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the citizens that nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes. ' ' None
22. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action (danced) • cult activities • memories, kept alive or evoked in ritual, contested, of conflict

 Found in books: Gianvittorio-Ungar and Schlapbach (2021), Choreonarratives: Dancing Stories in Greek and Roman Antiquity and Beyond, 165, 173, 174; Kowalzig (2007), Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece, 195, 199; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 105
23. None, None, nan (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • activities • readers, active engagement/response

 Found in books: Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 66; Gruen (2011), Rethinking the Other in Antiquity, 119
24. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotelian, Proairesis involved in all action that is upto us • action, vs. virtue of character • actions, relation to virtues of character • goodness, of action

 Found in books: Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 217; Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 139; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 327
25. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Action (πρᾶξις) • Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotelian, Proairesis involved in all action that is upto us • Assent, distinguished assent in Christians to thoughts, to their lingering, to the pleasure of their lingering, to action • action • action, denied to animals • action, end of • action, in relation to emotion • action, the subject of Aristotle’s discussion • action, vs. virtue of character • action-tendency • actions, gods do not engage in • actions, relation to virtues of character • activity (ἐνέργεια) • emotions (passions, affections, pathē), as passive-cum-active • goodness, of action • intelligible objects, as activities of intelligence • life/vital activity (ζωή, ζῆν) • reason, and virtuous action • self-reflective activity • theoretical activity • theoria, as activity of episteme (Aristotle)

 Found in books: Fortenbaugh (2006), Aristotle's Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric, 170, 179; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 200, 202, 203, 206, 209, 210, 211, 217, 218; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 66, 74; Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 59; Kelsey (2021), Mind and World in Aristotle's De Anima 11, 35, 37, 140, 141; Osborne (1996), Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love. 142; Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 94, 127, 128, 129, 133, 137, 139, 140, 142; Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 120, 122; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 327, 376; Ward (2021), Searching for the Divine in Plato and Aristotle: Philosophical Theoria and Traditional Practice, 92, 176, 182
26. None, None, nan (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • activity of Paradigm • self-reflective activity

 Found in books: Segev (2017), Aristotle on Religion, 120; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 119
27. Anon., Jubilees, 10.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Build/Building Activity, Ark • ritual actions

 Found in books: Nutzman (2022), Contested Cures: Identity and Ritual Healing in Roman and Late Antique Palestine 127; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 96

sup>
10.14 And He said: "Let the tenth part of them remain before him, and let nine parts descend into the place of condemnation."'' None
28. Cicero, On Divination, 1.18 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action/activity, nocturnal • pastor (“herdsman”), activities of

 Found in books: Ker and Wessels (2020), The Values of Nighttime in Classical Antiquity: Between Dusk and Dawn, 266; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 141

sup>
1.18 Nam primum astrorum volucris te consule motus Concursusque gravis stellarum ardore micantis Tu quoque, cum tumulos Albano in monte nivalis Lustrasti et laeto mactasti lacte Latinas, Vidisti et claro tremulos ardore cometas, Multaque misceri nocturna strage putasti, Quod ferme dirum in tempus cecidere Latinae, Cum claram speciem concreto lumine luna Abdidit et subito stellanti nocte perempta est. Quid vero Phoebi fax, tristis nuntia belli, Quae magnum ad columen flammato ardore volabat, Praecipitis caeli partis obitusque petessens? Aut cum terribili perculsus fulmine civis Luce sereti vitalia lumina liquit? Aut cum se gravido tremefecit corpore tellus? Iam vero variae nocturno tempore visae Terribiles formae bellum motusque monebant, Multaque per terras vates oracla furenti Pectore fundebant tristis minitantia casus,'' None		sup>
1.18 You, being consul, at once did observe the swift constellations,Noting the glare of luminous stars in direful conjunction:Then you beheld the tremulous sheen of the Northern aurora,When, on ascending the mountainous heights of snowy Albanus,You offered joyful libations of milk at the Feast of the Latins;Ominous surely the time wherein fell that Feast of the Latins;Many a warning was given, it seemed, of slaughter nocturnal;Then, of a sudden, the moon at her full was blotted from heaven —Hidden her features resplendent, though night was bejewelled with planets;Then did that dolorous herald of War, the torch of Apollo,Mount all aflame to the dome of the sky, where the sun has its setting;Then did a Roman depart from these radiant abodes of the living,Stricken by terrible lightning from heavens serene and unclouded.Then through the fruit-laden body of earth ran the shock of an earthquake;Spectres at night were observed, appalling and changeful of figure,Giving their warning that war was at hand, and internal commotion;Over all lands there outpoured, from the frenzied bosoms of prophets,Dreadful predictions, gloomy forecasts of impending disaster.'' None
29. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.17, 3.21-3.22 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • actio = Gr. energeia (activity) • good, right actions (kathorthōmata) • order and harmony of actions,

 Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 175; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 129; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 42

sup>
3.17 \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. <' "
3.21 \xa0Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â\x80\x94 in Stoic phraseology ennoia â\x80\x94 and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â\x80\x94 inasmuch I\xa0say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. <" "3.22 \xa0But since those actions which I\xa0have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I\xa0have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' <"' None
30. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.16-3.24, 3.26, 3.32-3.60, 3.62-3.64, 5.25-5.26, 5.35, 5.37, 5.42, 5.44-5.47, 5.49-5.51, 5.53, 5.55-5.56, 5.58, 5.61, 5.65, 5.68-5.69, 5.73 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • actio = Gr. energeia (activity) • actio = Gr. energeia (activity), theoretical or intellectual • action, and agency • action, and cognition • action, and cult • action, appropriate actions (kathekonta) • action, as ritual • action, intentional • action, joint • action, right actions (katorthomata) • action, theory of (Ciceronian) • action-tendency • agency, and action • appropriate actions (Lat. officia = Gr. kathēkonta) • cognition, about action • cult, action • good, right actions (kathorthōmata) • joy, as right action • order and harmony of actions, • perception, and action • readers, active engagement/response • right action

 Found in books: Atkins (2021), The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy 175, 176; Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 6; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 219; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 230, 248; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 80; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 113, 245, 279; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 101, 121, 124, 128, 129, 147, 148, 149, 153, 159, 167, 178; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 42, 43

sup>
3.16 Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo." '3.17 in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.18 artis etiam ipsas propter se adsumendas putamus, cum cum ABE tum N (t corr. ut vid., ex c), RV quia sit in iis iis Mdv. his aliquid dignum adsumptione, tum quod constent ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via. a falsa autem adsensione magis nos alienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus, quae sint sunt R contra naturam, arbitrantur. iam membrorum, id est partium corporis, alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata, ut manus, crura, pedes, ut ea, ut ea et ea BE quae sunt intus in corpore, quorum utilitas quanta sit a medicis etiam etiam a medicis R disputatur, alia autem nullam ob utilitatem quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque barba. 3.19 Haec dicuntur fortasse ieiunius; sunt enim quasi prima elementa naturae, quibus ubertas orationis adhiberi vix potest, nec equidem eam cogito consectari. verum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dicas, ipsae res verba rapiunt; ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam splendidior oratio. Est, ut dicis, inquam. sed tamen omne, quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praeclare dici videtur. istius modi autem res dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri.' "3.20 Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici." '3.21 prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.22 cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec ad ea hec R referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est est enim BE et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, etenim ( cf. p. 106,4 etenim si; contra p. 107, 5 ut si; p. 110, 17 ut enim) Se. ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo hastam aliquo N astam aliquo A aliquo hastam BE hastam aliquā V hastam ( om. aliquo) R aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet secl. Mdv. huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint sint sunt R facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit sit Ern. sed (Sed RNV) hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum. 3.23 Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab isdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. sed quem ad modum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus alicui pluris eum faciat cui commendatus sit om. BEN 1 sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus sit, quam illum, a quo, sic sic sit BR minime mirum est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam ipsam autem BE sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae o(rmh/ Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. 3.24 ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut ut arte N arte ut V in ipsa insit, insit ut sit N 1 ut insit N 2 non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. et tamen est etiam aliqua aliqua Brem. alia (est alia etiam N) cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant katorqw/mata, omnes numeros virtutis continent. sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit.
3.26 Videamus nunc, quam sint praeclare illa his, quae iam posui, consequentia. cum enim hoc sit extremum —sentis enim, credo, me iam diu, quod te/los te/los Graeci greci celos BE Graeci dicant, dicant ARV dicunt BEN id dicere tum extremum, tum ultimum, tum summum; licebit etiam finem pro extremo aut ultimo dicere—, cum igitur hoc sit extremum, extremum hoc sit BE congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere, necessario sequitur omnes sapientes semper feliciter, absolute, fortunate vivere, nulla re impediri, nulla prohiberi, nulla egere. quod autem continet non magis eam disciplinam, de qua loquor, quam vitam fortunasque nostras, id est ut, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum iudicemus, potest id quidem fuse et copiose et omnibus electissimis verbis gravissimisque sententiis rhetorice et augeri et ornari, sed consectaria me Stoicorum brevia et acuta delectant. concluduntur igitur eorum argumenta sic:
3.32 Sed in ceteris artibus cum dicitur artificiose, posterum quodam modo et consequens putandum est, quod illi e)pigennhmatiko/n appellant; cum cum Ern. Dav. quod autem in quo sapienter dicimus, dicimus etiam A ( cf. ad. v. 5 ) id a primo a primo BE ad primo AR ad primum N apprime V rectissime dicitur. quicquid enim a sapientia asapiencia E as apia (= asapientia) B a sapienti ARV a sapiente N proficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim positum est id, enim positum est id positum est enim id BE enim positum ad est ( om. id) V quod dicimus dicimus om. A esse expetendum. nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, violari ABER fana depeculari, quae sunt in effectu, effecto ABERN 1 oppido V opido sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est etiam sine effectu. verum ut haec non in posteris et in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt, sic ea, quae proficiscuntur a virtute, susceptione prima, non perfectione recta sunt iudicanda. 3.33 Bonum autem, quod in hoc sermone totiens usurpatum est, id etiam definitione explicatur. sed eorum definitiones paulum oppido inter se differunt et tamen eodem spectant. ego adsentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id, quod esset natura esset natura dett. esset enatura A esset e natura RNV esse a natura BE absolutum. id autem sequens illud etiam, quod prodesset— w)fe/lhma enim sic appellemus—, motum aut statum esse dixit e natura absoluto. absoluto Brem. absoluta cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni boni Lamb. in curis secundis ; bonum notitia notitia nocio BE facta est. cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit. 3.34 hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum. ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc, de quo agimus, est illud quidem plurimi aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio genere valet, non magnitudine. nam cum aestimatio, quae a)ci/a dicitur, neque in bonis numerata sit nec rursus rursus N 2 risus in malis, quantumcumque eo addideris, in suo genere manebit. alia est igitur propria aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet. 3.35 Nec vero perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt, quas Graeci pa/- qh appellant—poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conveniret conveniret A. Man. conveniet ABERN conveniat V ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt pa/qos . sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur nec eae perturbationes vi aliqua naturali moventur . secl. Mdv. omnesque eae eae ee RV he (h in ras. ) N hec BE; om. ( spatio parvo relicto ) A sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures, aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi h(donh/n appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam. perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia levitatis. itaque his sapiens semper vacabit. 3.36 Omne autem, quod honestum sit, id esse propter se expetendum commune nobis est cum multorum aliorum philosophorum sententiis. praeter enim tres disciplinas, quae virtutem a summo bono excludunt, ceteris omnibus philosophis haec est tuenda sententia, maxime tamen his Stoicis, qui nihil aliud in bonorum numero del. Lamb. nisi honestum esse voluerunt. sed haec quidem est perfacilis et perexpedita et expedita BEN defensio. quis est enim, aut quis umquam fuit aut avaritia tam ardenti aut tam effrenatis cupiditatibus, ut eandem illam rem, quam quam cod. Monac. sec. Mdv. ; quamquam adipisci scelere quovis velit, non multis partibus malit ad sese etiam omni inpunitate proposita sine facinore quam illo modo pervenire?' "3.37 quam vero utilitatem aut quem fructum petentes scire cupimus illa, quae occulta nobis sunt, quo modo moveantur quibusque de causis ea quae versantur versentur BE in caelo? add. (' videtur Cicero scripsisse ea quae versantur in caelo id esi corpora caelestia ') Mdv. quis autem tam agrestibus institutis vivit, aut quis se contra studia naturae tam add. Se. vehementer obduravit, ut a rebus cognitione dignis abhorreat easque sine voluptate aut utilitate aliqua non requirat et et aut BE pro nihilo putet? aut quis est, qui maiorum, aut Africanorum pro aut Africanorum ' scribendum videtur ut Africanorum, quod iam Goerenzio in mentem venit' Mdv. aut eius, quem tu in ore semper habes, proavi mei, ceterorumque virorum fortium atque omni que om. A virtute praestantium facta, dicta, consilia cognoscens nulla animo afficiatur voluptate?" '3.38 quis autem honesta in familia institutus et educatus ingenue non ipsa turpitudine, etiamsi eum laesura non sit, offenditur? quis animo aequo videt eum, quem inpure ac flagitiose putet vivere? quis non odit sordidos, vanos, leves, futtiles? quid autem dici poterit, si turpitudinem non ipsam ipsam non BE per se fugiendam esse statuemus, quo minus homines tenebras et solitudinem nacti nullo dedecore se abstineant, nisi eos per se foeditate sua turpitudo ipsa deterreat? Innumerabilia dici possunt in hanc sententiam, sed non necesse est. Nihil est enim, de quo minus dubitari possit, quam et honesta expetenda per se et eodem modo turpia per se esse fugienda. 3.39 Constituto autem illo, de quo ante diximus, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, intellegi necesse est pluris id, quod honestum sit, aestimandum esse quam illa media, quae ex eo comparentur. stultitiam autem et timiditatem timiditatem Guyet. temeritatem et iniustitiam et intemperantiam cum dicimus esse fugiendas fugiendas ( sequitur ipsis) Se. fugiendā AN fugienda ( super a lineola videtur erasa ) R fugiendam BV fugiendū E cf. I 50 copulatas et turbulentae propter eas res, quae ex ipsis eveniant, non ita dicimus, ut cum illo, quod positum est, solum id esse malum, quod turpe sit, haec pugnare videatur oratio, propterea quod ea non ad corporis incommodum referuntur, sed ad turpes actiones, quae oriuntur e vitiis. quas enim kaki/as Graeci appellant, vitia malo quam malitias nominare. 3.40 Ne tu, inquam, Cato, verbis ante aut post verbis excidisse videtur uteris illustribus inlustr. A et id, quod vis, declarantibus! itaque mihi videris Latine docere philosophiam et ei quasi civitatem dare. quae quidem adhuc peregrinari Romae videbatur nec offerre sese nostris sermonibus, et ista maxime propter limatam quandam et rerum et verborum tenuitatem. scio enim esse quosdam, qui quavis quavis dett. quāvis ABE quamvis RNV lingua philosophari possint; nullis enim partitionibus, nullis definitionibus utuntur ipsique dicunt ea se modo probare, quibus natura tacita adsentiatur. itaque in rebus minime obscuris non multus est apud eos disserendi labor. quare attendo te studiose et, quaecumque rebus iis, de quibus hic sermo est, nomina inponis, memoriae mando; mihi enim erit isdem istis fortasse iam utendum. Virtutibus igitur rectissime rectissime igitur BE mihi videris et ad consuetudinem nostrae orationis vitia posuisse contraria. quod enim vituperabile est per se ipsum, id eo id eo ideo E io R ipso vitium vitium dett, vitio nominatum puto, vel etiam a vitio dictum vituperari. sin kaki/an malitiam dixisses, ad aliud nos unum certum vitium consuetudo Latina traduceret. nunc omni virtuti vitium contrario nomine opponitur. 3.41 Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam qua tractata Guyet. a Peripateticis mollius—est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem ignorantiam R dialecticae—Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio aio aĩo V animo R oio ( prior o ab alt. m. in ras. ) N discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod non ex omni quod Dav. non quod ex omni ARV noro quod ex omni BE numquam ex omni N aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent. 3.42 An vero certius quicquam potest esse quam illorum ratione, illorum ratione Lamb. illo ratione (rōe R) AR illa ratione BEV illa ratio est N qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse sapientem beatum esse, cum eculeo equuleo R torqueatur? eorum autem, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit ut in omnibus ut in omnibus NV uti n oi ibus R uti nominibus ABE tormentis conservetur beata vita beata vitaz ARN vita beata BEV sapienti. etenim si dolores eosdem tolerabilius patiuntur qui excipiunt eos pro patria quam qui leviore leviori BE de causa, opinio facit, non natura, vim doloris aut maiorem aut minorem. 3.43 Ne illud quidem est consentaneum, ut, si, cum tria genera bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticorum, eo beatior quisque sit, quo sit corporis aut externis bonis plenior, ut hoc idem adprobandum sit nobis, ut, qui plura habeat ea, quae in corpore magni aestimantur, sit beatior. illi enim corporis commodis compleri vitam beatam putant, nostri nihil minus. nam cum ita placeat, ne eorum quidem bonorum, quae nos bona vere appellemus, frequentia beatiorem vitam fieri aut magis expetendam aut pluris aestimandam, certe minus ad beatam vitam pertinet multitudo corporis commodorum. 3.44 etenim, si et sapere expetendum sit et valere, coniunctum utrumque magis expetendum sit quam sapere solum, neque tamen, si utrumque sit aestimatione dignum, pluris sit coniunctum quam sapere ipsum separatim. nam qui valitudinem aestimatione aliqua dignam iudicamus neque eam tamen in bonis ponimus, idem censemus nullam esse tantam aestimationem, ut ea virtuti anteponatur. quod idem Peripatetici non tenent, quibus dicendum est, quae et honesta actio sit et sine dolore, eam magis esse expetendam, quam si esset eadem actio cum dolore. nobis aliter videtur, recte secusne, postea; sed potestne sed potest ne V sed postne AB sed post ne E sed ne ( inter sed et ne ras. duarum fere litt. ) R sed p o t ne (p o t ex corr. alt. m., t in ras. ) N rerum maior esse dissensio? 3.45 Ut enim obscuratur et offunditur luce solis lumen lucernae, et ut interit in magnitudine maris Aegaei add. Halm. stilla mellis, et ut in divitiis Croesi teruncii accessio et gradus unus in ea via, quae est hinc in Indiam, sic, cum sit is bonorum finis, quem Stoici dicunt, omnis ista rerum corporearum corporearum dett. incorporearum RN in corpore (incorp. E) harum ABE in corpore sitarum V aestimatio splendore virtutis et magnitudine obscuretur et obruatur atque intereat necesse est. et quem ad modum oportunitas—sic enim appellemus eu)kairi/an —non fit maior productione temporis—habent enim suum modum, quae oportuna dicuntur—, sic recta effectio— kato/rqwsin enim ita appello, quoniam quoniam A qnĩa (o et in ras. nĩa ab alt. m. ) N quod BE quomodo V rectum factum kato/rqwma —, recta igitur effectio, kato/rqwsin ... effectio ( v. 29 ) om. R item convenientia, denique ipsum bonum, quod in eo positum est, ut naturae consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. 3.46 ut enim oportunitas illa, sic haec, de quibus dixi, non fiunt temporis productione maiora, ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda beata vita, si sit longa, quam si brevis, utunturque simili: ut, si cothurni laus illa esset, ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur nec maiores minoribus, sic, quorum omne bonum convenientia atque oportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponent. anteponent Bentl. Mdv. ; anteponentur A RN V anteponerentur BE Nec vero satis acute dicunt: 3.47 si bona valitudo pluris aestimanda sit longa quam brevis, sapientiae quoque usus longissimus quisque sit plurimi. non intellegunt valitudinis aestimationem spatio iudicari, virtutis oportunitate, ut videantur qui illud dicant idem hoc esse dicturi, bonam mortem et bonum partum meliorem longum esse esse longum BE quam brevem. non vident alia brevitate pluris aestimari, alia diuturnitate. 3.48 itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse—isdem placere esse alium alio et et ABERV ( sequitur itemque; cf. p.188, 15 sq. et eos ... nosque), et (= etiam, ab alt. m., ut vid. ) N sapientiorem itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat adpropinquat (appr.) edd. ut propinquat ABER apropin- quat N 2 propinquat N 1 V ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum habitum dett. aditum (additum R) nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit. Haec mirabilia videri intellego, sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum de eorum R quidem est veritate dubitandum. sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen tamen N 2 et tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. Divitias autem Diogenes censet eam eam non eam dett. modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam; 3.49 sed, etiam uti ea uti ea Bai. ut in ea ABRN ut inea E ut ea V (etiam uti ea contineant = etiam si concedatur ea divitiis contineri) contineant, non idem facere eas in virtute neque in ceteris artibus, ad quas esse dux pecunia potest, continere autem non potest, itaque, itaque = et ita (ita i. e. si concedatur divitias voluptatem et valitudinem continere) si voluptas aut si bona valitudo sit in bonis, divitias quoque in bonis esse ponendas, at, at edd. aut si sapientia bonum sit, non sequi ut etiam divitias bonum esse dicamus. neque ab ulla re, quae non sit in bonis, id, id quod sit in bonis RN id qua sit in bonis BE nulla ars divitiis ( cf. v. 17 ) A om. V quod sit in bonis, contineri potest, ob eamque causam, quia cognitiones comprehensionesque rerum, e quibus efficiuntur artes, adpetitionem movent, cum divitiae non sint in bonis, nulla ars divitiis contineri potest. 3.50 quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE' "3.51 quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valitudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum ' ipsius Ciceronis in scribendo lapsus' Mdv. similium rerum in usu O. Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 246 alia alii AR autem non esse eius modi, itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno prohgme/non, contraque quod a)poprohgme/non nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi verbi ( post huius) om. A faciendi Zenonis exponere." "3.52 Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim id est enim Mdv. idem enim est ( in N enim ab alt. m. superscr. ; V om. enim) prohgme/non ), sed eos, qui in aliquo honore sunt, sunt R sint quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primo loco primo loco O. Heinius ibid. p. 245 pri- morie A p'mori e loco BE primove R primorie (o corr. in a) N primore V sunt, sed ea, quae ' In primorie latet primo ordine, quam vocem adscripsit qui haec ad antecedentia quorum ordo proxime accedit ut secundus sit accommodare studeret' H. A. Koch p. 37. Cf. etiam p. 110, 5 sq. secundum locum optinent, prohgme/na, id est producta, nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus—id erit verbum e verbo—vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta. re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus." '3.53 quoniam autem omne, quod est bonum, primum locum tenere dicimus, necesse est nec bonum esse nec malum hoc, quod praepositum praepositum edd. propositum vel praecipuum nominamus. idque ita definimus; quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione mediocri; quod enim illi a)dia/foron dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit, ut indifferens dicerem. neque enim illud fieri poterat ullo modo, ut nihil relinqueretur in mediis, quod aut secundum naturam esset aut contra, nec, cum id relinqueretur, nihil in his poni, quod satis satis om. A aestimabile esset, nec hoc posito non aliqua esse esse P. Man. esset praeposita. recte igitur haec facta distinctio est, atque etiam ab iis, quo facilius res perspici possit, hoc simile ponitur: 3.54 Ut enim, inquiunt, si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum, ut rectus adsistat, qui ita talus erit iactus, ut cadat rectus, praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem, qui aliter, contra, qui aliter contra edd. qualiter qui contra AR qui aliter qui contra BENV neque tamen illa praepositio tali ad eum, quem dixi, finem pertinebit, sic ea, quae sunt praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque nihil pertinent. 3.55 Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello, quae telika/ dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere, quod uno uno dett., om. ABERNV non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci poihtika/, alia utrumque. de pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam sapientiam deft. sapientem volunt esse. nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo est in illo Dav. est illo ABERN 1 est cum illo N 2 cum illo V pertinenti genere, quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones adfert et efficit, id efficiens dici potest. secl. Mdv. 3.56 Haec, quae praeposita dicimus, partim sunt per se ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid efficiunt, partim utrumque, per se, ut quidam habitus oris et vultus, ut status, ut ut et BE aut NV motus, in quibus sunt et praeponenda sunt et praeponenda RNV sunt et ponenda A et praeponenda sunt BE quaedam et reicienda; alia ob eam rem praeposita dicentur, quod ex se aliquid efficiant, ut pecunia, alia autem ob utramque rem, ut integri sensus, ut bona valitudo. 3.57 De bona autem fama—quam enim appellant eu)doci/an, aptius est bonam famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriam—Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes detracta detracta detractate quidem BE utilitate ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant; quibus ego vehementer assentior. qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc, quam dixi, bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt, esseque esseque BENV esse A om. R hominis ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque propter rem ipsam, non propter usum, dicuntque, ut ipsam non dicuntque propter usumque ut BE liberis consultum velimus, etiamsi postumi futuri sint, propter ipsos, sic futurae post mortem famae tamen esse propter rem, etiam detracto usu, consulendum. 3.58 Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam quiddam Mdv. quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis iis edd. his rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, actum est Mdv. actum sit ABEN fit V id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in ratione ... ponatur nec in om. R contrariis. 3.59 Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. 3.60 Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser.
3.62 Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63 ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.64 mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum.
5.25 Quoniam Quoniam Q uo R autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur—nihil enim prohibet quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis—, sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint sunt RNV et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. desiderat RNV' "5.26 quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum, sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini. et tamen in omnibus est est V om. BERN 'Vellem in transitu ab infinita oratione ad finitam scriberetur : summa communis est et quidem cet.' Mdv. summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur, in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut ut ( ante suo) Bentl. et in suo genere 'in suo genere scribendum videtur' C.F. W. Mue. in adn. crit. perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem conservatricem R sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur: vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente." 5.35 Corporis igitur nostri partes totaque figura et forma et statura quam apta ad naturam sit, apparet, neque est dubium, quin frons, oculi, aures et reliquae partes quales propriae sint sint Lamb. ( in curis secundis ); sunt hominis intellegatur. sed certe opus est ea valere et vigere et naturales motus ususque habere, ut nec absit quid eorum nec aegrum debilitatumve sit; id enim natura desiderat. est autem etiam actio quaedam corporis, quae motus et status naturae congruentis tenet; in quibus si peccetur distortione et depravatione quadam aut aut ac BE motu statuve deformi, ut si aut manibus ingrediatur quis aut non ante, sed retro, fugere plane se ipse et hominem ex homine exuens ex homine exuens RN 2 V exuens ( om. ex homine) N 1 exuens ex homine BE naturam odisse videatur. quam ob rem etiam sessiones quaedam et flexi fractique motus, quales protervorum hominum aut mollium esse solent, contra naturam sunt, ut, etiamsi animi vitio id eveniat, tamen in corpore immutari mutari BE hominis natura videatur.
5.37 ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo et in corpore et in animo et in corpore NV et animo et corpore (in bis om. ) BE in animo et corpore ( priore et et poster. in om. ) R perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quandoquidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. quo cognito dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate sua caritate V sua e caritate R sua ecaritate BEN colantur et per se ipsae appetantur.
5.42 quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo, in quo loco natae sunt, ex eo se non commovent, deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur. movetur moventur NV serpere anguiculos, nare nare natare Non. anaticulas, anaticulas V aneticulas BERN anaticulos Non. volare Non. evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, videamus boves Non. boves videmus BE nepas nepas RN 1 Non. nespas vel vespas V vespas BEN 2 aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. serpere ... ducem Non. p. 145 quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet. parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint. cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit, et animo utuntur et sensibus conitunturque, ut sese sese ut BE utuntur ed. Iuntina utantur erigant, et manibus utuntur et eos agnoscunt, a quibus educantur. deinde aequalibus delectantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur deque eo, quod ipsis superat, aliis gratificari volunt animadvertuntque ea, quae domi fiunt, curiosius incipiuntque commentari aliquid et discere et discere facere R et eorum, quos vident, volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant, si vicerunt, vicerunt Mdv.. vicerint BENV dicerint R efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque que om. BEN demittunt. quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est.
5.44 Intrandum est igitur igitur est BE in rerum naturam et penitus quid ea postulet pervidendum; aliter enim nosmet ipsos nosse non possumus. quod praeceptum quia maius erat, quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco assignatum est deo. iubet igitur nos Pythius Apollo noscere nosmet ipsos. cognitio autem haec est una nostri, ut vim corporis nostri, ut vim corporis Mdv. nostri ut corporis BER vim ut nostri corporis (vim in ras., nostri ab alt. m. superscr. ) N ut vim nostri corporis V animique norimus sequamurque eam vitam, quae rebus iis rebus iis (hys) BE rebus ( pro reb; us = rebus is) RNV ipsis ipsis om. BE ( vi corporis animique opponuntur res eae ipsae cf. p. 179, 7 sq ) perfruatur. quoniam autem is animi appetitus a principio fuit, ut ea, quae dixi, quam perfectissima natura haberemus, confitendum est, cum id adepti simus, quod appetitum sit, in eo quasi in in ( post quasi) om. NV ultimo consistere naturam, atque id esse summum bonum; quod certe universum sua sponte ipsum expeti et propter se necesse est, quoniam ante demonstratum est etiam singulas eius partes esse per se expetendas. 5.45 In enumerandis autem corporis commodis si quis praetermissam a nobis voluptatem putabit, in aliud tempus ea quaestio differatur. utrum enim sit voluptas in iis rebus, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, necne sit ad id, quod agimus, nihil interest. si enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, non explet bona naturae voluptas, iure praetermissa est; sin autem autem om. RNV est in ea, quod quidam quidem BER volunt, nihil impedit hanc nostram comprehensionem summi boni. quae enim constituta sunt prima naturae, ad ea si voluptas accesserit, unum aliquod accesserit commodum corporis neque eam constitutionem summi boni, quae est proposita, mutaverit. 5.46 Et adhuc quidem ita nobis progressa ratio est, ut ea duceretur omnis a prima commendatione naturae. nunc autem aliud iam argumentandi sequamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus, sed quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summe summe M. Brutus apud Dav. ; summa nostra sponte moveamur. atque ut a corpore ordiar, videsne ut, si ut si dett. si quae in membris prava aut debilitata aut inminuta sint, occultent homines? ut etiam contendant et elaborent, si efficere possint, ut aut non appareat corporis vitium aut quam minimum appareat? multosque etiam dolores curationis causa perferant, ut, si ipse usus membrorum non modo non maior, verum etiam minor futurus sit, eorum tamen species ad naturam revertatur? etenim, cum omnes omnis BERN natura totos se expetendos putent, nec id ob aliam rem, sed propter ipsos, necesse est eius etiam partis propter se expeti, quod universum propter se expetatur. 5.47 Quid? in quid in RNV quod in BE motu et et etiam BE in statu corporis nihil inest, quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? quem ad modum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui ductus oris, qui vultus in quoque sit? nihilne est in his rebus, quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? nonne odio multos dignos putamus, qui quodam motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum contempsisse? et quoniam haec deducuntur ducuntur NV de corpore, quid est cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur? nam si pravitatem inminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam fugienda BER putamus, cur non etiam, ac etiam ac N 2 iam et hanc BE etiam (eciam V) hac RV etiam hanc N 1 fortasse magis, propter se formae dignitatem sequamur? et si turpitudinem fugimus fugimus P. Man. fugiamus in statu et motu corporis, quid est cur pulchritudinem non sequamur? atque etiam valitudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter utilitatem solum, sed etiam ipsas propter se expetemus. quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit, qui est maxime e natura, quae tota perturbatur, si aut aegrum corpus corpus V opus est aut dolet aut caret viribus.
5.49 ut add. Se. mihi quidem Homerus huius modi quiddam vidisse videatur videatur BER videtur N om. V in iis, quae de Sirenum cantibus finxerit. finxerit RN 1 V finxerint BE finxerat N 2 neque enim vocum suavitate videntur aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitae, qui praetervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate adhaerescerent. ita enim invitant Ulixem—nam verti, ut quaedam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum—: O decus Argolicum, quin quin N 2 qui puppim flectis, Ulixes, Auribus ut nostros possis agnoscere cantus! Nam nemo haec umquam est transvectus caerula cursu, Quin prius adstiterit vocum dulcedine captus, Post variis avido satiatus pectore musis Doctior ad patrias lapsus pervenerit oras. Nos grave certamen belli clademque tenemus, Graecia quam Troiae divino numine vexit, Omniaque e latis rerum rerum Marsus regum vestigia terris. Vidit Homerus probari fabulam non posse, si cantiunculis tantus irretitus vir teneretur; scientiam pollicentur, quam non erat mirum sapientiae cupido patria esse patria esse (pat a ee, 1 et in ras. a ee ab alt. m. ) N patrie V patria BER cariorem. Atque omnia quidem scire, cuiuscumque modi sint, cupere curiosorum, duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum. 5.50 quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit attentius, ne patriam quidem captam esse add. ed. princ. Roman. ( sec. Mdv. sil. ) senserit? quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis? quo studio Aristophanem putamus aetatem in litteris duxisse? quid de Pythagora? quid de Platone aut de Democrito aut democrito (de mocrito V) RNV loquar? a quibus propter discendi cupiditatem videmus ultimas terras esse peragratas. quae qui non vident, nihil umquam magnum magnum ac Brem. magna ac cognitione dignum amaverunt. Atque hoc loco, qui propter animi voluptates coli dicunt ea studia, quae dixi, non intellegunt idcirco esse ea propter se expetenda, quod nulla utilitate obiecta delectentur animi atque ipsa scientia, etiamsi incommodatura sit, gaudeant. 5.51 Sed quid attinet de rebus tam apertis plura requirere? ipsi enim quaeramus a a e RNV nobis stellarum motus contemplationesque rerum caelestium eorumque omnium, quae naturae obscuritate occultantur, cognitiones quem ad modum cognitiones quem ad modum N 2 cogni- tionesque admodum nos moveant, et quid historia delectet, quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum, cum praetermissa repetimus, add. Se. inchoata persequimur. nec vero sum nescius esse utilitatem in historia, non modo voluptatem.
5.53 Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura futura Clericus ( ad Aeschinis Axioch. 17 ); natura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum aut apparatum Lamb. requirentis, nihil aliud esse esse om. BE acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo in qendo E in querendo RV inquerendo N ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus, sed etiam levamentum miseriarum. itaque multi, cum in in om. BER potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. levarunt BE
5.55 Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane perspicua minimeque dubitanda indicia inditia N iudicia naturae, maxime scilicet in homine, sed in omni animali, ut appetat animus aliquid agere semper agere semper aliquod BE neque ulla condicione quietem sempiternam possit pati. facile est hoc cernere in primis puerorum aetatulis. quamquam enim vereor, ne nimius in hoc genere videar, tamen omnes veteres philosophi, maxime nostri, ad incunabula accedunt, quod quod RNV qui BE in pueritia facillime se arbitrantur arbitrantur RNV arbitrentur BE naturae voluntatem voluntatem Lamb. voluptatem posse cognoscere. videmus igitur ut conquiescere ne infantes quidem possint. cum vero paulum processerunt, processerunt Non. processerint lusionibus vel laboriosis laboriosius Non. delectantur, cum ... delectantur Non. p. 211 cum hi vero Non. ut ne verberibus quidem deterreri possint, eaque cupiditas agendi aliquid adolescit una cum aetatibus. itaque, ne si ne si edd. nisi iucundissimis quidem nos somniis usuros putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velimus dari, idque si accidat, mortis instar putemus. 5.56 quin etiam inertissimos homines nescio qua qua qui BE singulari segnitia segnitia etiam E praeditos videmus tamen et corpore et animo moveri semper et, cum re nulla impediantur necessaria, aut alveolum poscere aut quaerere quempiam ludum aut sermonem aliquem requirere, cumque non habeant ingenuas ex doctrina oblectationes, circulos aliquos et sessiunculas consectari. quin ne bestiae quidem, quas delectationis causa concludimus, cum copiosius alantur, quam si essent liberae, facile patiuntur sese contineri motusque solutos et vagos a natura sibi tributos requirunt.
5.58 Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora maioribus, minora maioribus maioribus minoribus BE maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque cognitioque N cognitione rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes latentes iacentes R indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum scientia, tum sciendi que (ēdi que ab alt. m. in ras. ) N prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta fortis, iusta Mdv. forti si iusta B E fortis. Si iusta R fortis et iusta (& in N ab alt. m. in ras. ) NV ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeeunte deducimur. omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas teneritas NV Non. temeritas BER ac mollitia mollitia BE Non. mollities RN mollicies V quaedam, in primo ... moll. quaedam Non. p. 495 ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus.
5.61 Hoc autem loco tantum explicemus haec honesta, quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. indicant iudicant BER pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. quanta studia decertantium sunt! sunt R sint quanta ipsa certamina! ut illi efferuntur laetitia, cum vicerunt! vicerunt Mdv. vicerint ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores non perferunt, ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! atque ea in optima quaque indole indole quaque BE maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta, quae intellegimus, a natura tamquam adumbrantur.
5.65 in omni autem autem enim BE honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani. quae nata a primo satu, quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et iis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae. quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc, quam dico, societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tuens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. atque haec ita iustitiae propria sunt, ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia.
5.68 ita fit, ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum, quod est in iis, in quibus completur illud extremum, quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; haec autem, quae sunt extrinsecus, id est quae neque in animo nec in animo BE insunt neque in corpore, ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere, quo illa, non sunt. nec vero umquam umquam N unquam V inquam BER summum bonum assequi quisquam posset, si omnia illa, ilia om. BE quae sunt extra, quamquam expetenda, summo bono continerentur.' "5.69 Quo modo igitur, inquies, verum esse poterit omnia referri ad summum bonum, si amicitiae, si propinquitates, si reliqua externa summo bono non continentur? Hac videlicet ratione, quod ea, quae externa sunt, iis tuemur officiis, quae oriuntur a suo cuiusque genere virtutis. nam et amici cultus et parentis ei, ei Or. et qui officio fungitur, in eo ipso prodest, quod ita fungi officio in recte factis est, quae sunt orta a virtutibus. quae add. Lamb. quidem sapientes sequuntur duce natura tanquam videntes; sapientes sequuntur duce natura tanquam videntes Se. sa- pientes utentes sequuntur duce natura tanquam BERV sapientes vírt tes ('rt ab alt. m. in ras. ) sequuntur duce natura tamquam N. ' Latet aliquid huiusmodi : quae quidem sapientes videntes sequuntur duce natura eam viam' Mdv. non perfecti autem homines et tamen ingeniis excellentibus praediti excitantur saepe gloria, quae habet speciem honestatis et similitudinem. quodsi ipsam honestatem undique perfectam atque absolutam. rem unam praeclarissimam omnium maximeque laudandam, penitus viderent, quonam gaudio complerentur, cum tantopere eius adumbrata opinione laetentur?" 5.73 saepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia; hoc uno captus Erillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. multa sunt dicta dicta sunt BE ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despiciendis rebus humanis; hoc unum Aristo tenuit: praeter vitia atque virtutes negavit rem esse ullam aut fugiendam aut expetendam. expetendam dett. petendam positum est a nostris in iis esse rebus, quae secundum naturam essent, non dolere; hoc Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit. at vero Callipho et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamavisset, adamasset BE alter vacuitatem doloris, neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata maxime.'" None		sup>
3.16 \xa0"Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I\xa0certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I\'ll do my best," I\xa0replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I\xa0adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 3.17 \xa0Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I\xa0very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature\'s prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalÄ\x93pseis), â\x80\x94 these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. < 3.18 \xa0The sciences also, we consider, are things to be chosen for their own sake, partly because there is in them something worthy of choice, partly because they consist of acts of cognition and contain an element of fact established by methodical reasoning. The mental assent to what is false, as the Stoics believe, is more repugt to us than all the other things that are contrary to nature. "(Again, of the members or parts of the body, some appear to have been bestowed on us by nature for the sake of their use, for example the hands, legs, feet, and internal organs, as to the degree of whose utility even physicians are not agreed; while others serve no useful purpose, but appear to be intended for ornament: for instance the peacock\'s tail, the plumage of the dove with its shifting colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human being.) < 3.19 \xa0All this is perhaps somewhat baldly expressed; for it deals with what may be called the primary elements of nature, to which any embellishment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am\xa0I for my part concerned to attempt it. On the other hand, when one is treating of more majestic topics the style instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance of the language increases with the dignity of the theme." "True," I\xa0rejoined; "but to my mind, any clear statement of an important topic possesses excellence of style. It would be childish to desire an ornate style in subjects of the kind with which you are dealing. A\xa0man of sense and education will be content to be able to express his meaning plainly and clearly." < 3.20 \xa0"To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value â\x80\x94 axia as the Stoics call it â\x80\x94 this they pronounce to be \'valuable\' (for so I\xa0suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term \'valueless.\' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are \'things to be taken\' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly \'things to be rejected,\' the first \'appropriate act\' (for so I\xa0render the Greek kathÄ\x93kon) is to preserve oneself in one\'s natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by \'appropriate action\'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. <' "3.21 \xa0Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' â\x80\x94 in Stoic phraseology ennoia â\x80\x94 and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' â\x80\x94 inasmuch I\xa0say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. <" "3.22 \xa0But since those actions which I\xa0have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I\xa0have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' <" '3.23 \xa0"Again, as all \'appropriate acts\' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormÄ\x93, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. <' "3.24 \xa0For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as 'conformable' and suitable. In fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is also another point which marks a dissimilarity between Wisdom and these arts as well. In the latter a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions which together constitute the subject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions,' or 'rightly performed actions,' in Stoic phraseology katorthÅ\x8dmata, contain all the factors of virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-contained, which is not the case with the other arts. <" 3.26 \xa0"We may now observe how strikingly the principles I\xa0have established support the following corollaries. Inasmuch as the final aim â\x80\x94 (and you have observed, no doubt, that I\xa0have all along been translating the Greek term telos either by \'final\' or \'ultimate aim,\' or \'chief Good,\' and for \'final or ultimate aim\' we may also substitute \'End\') â\x80\x94 inasmuch then as the final aim is to live in agreement and harmony with nature, it necessarily follows that all wise men at all times enjoy a happy, perfect and fortunate life, free from all hindrance, interference or want. The essential principle not merely of the system of philosophy I\xa0am discussing but also of our life and destinies is, that we should believe Moral Worth to be the only good. This principle might be amplified and elaborated in the rhetorical manner, with great length and fullness and with all the resources of choice diction and impressive argument; but for my own part I\xa0like the concise and pointed \'consequences\' of the Stoics. <
3.32 \xa0"But in the other arts when we speak of an \'artistic\' performance, this quality must be considered as in a sense subsequent to and a result of the action; it is what the Stoics term epigennÄ\x93matikon (in the nature of an after-growth). Whereas in conduct, when we speak of an act as \'wise,\' the term is applied with full correctness from the first inception of the act. For every action that the Wise Man initiates must necessarily be complete forthwith in all its parts; since the thing desirable, as we term it, consists in his activity. As it is a sin to betray one\'s country, to use violence to one\'s parents, to rob a temple, where the offence lies in the result of the act, so the passions of fear, grief and lust are sins, even when no extraneous result ensues. The latter are sins not in their subsequent effects, but immediately upon their inception; similarly, actions springing from virtue are to be judged right from their first inception, and not in their successful completion. < 3.33 \xa0"Again, the term \'Good,\' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I\xa0agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. He was led by this also to pronounce the \'beneficial\' (for so let us render the Greek Å\x8dphelÄ\x93ma) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. < 3.34 \xa0At the same time Goodness is absolute, and is not a question of degree; the Good is recognized and pronounced to be good from its own inherent properties and not by comparison with other things. Just as honey, though extremely sweet, is yet perceived to be sweet by its own peculiar kind of flavour and not by being compared with something else, so this Good which we are discussing is indeed superlatively valuable, yet its value depends on kind and not on quantity. Value, in Greek axiÄ\x81, is not counted as a Good nor yet as an Evil; so that however much you increase it in amount, it will still remain the same in kind. The value of Virtue is therefore peculiar and distinct; it depends on kind and not on degree. < 3.35 \xa0"Moreover the emotions of the mind, which harass and embitter the life of the foolish (the Greek term for these is pathos, and I\xa0might have rendered this literally and styled them \'diseases,\' but the word \'disease\' would not suit all instances; for example, no one speaks of pity, nor yet anger, as a disease, though the Greeks term these pathos. Let us then accept the term \'emotion,\' the very sound of which seems to denote something vicious, and these emotions are not excited by any natural influence. The list of the emotions is divided into four classes, with numerous subdivisions, namely sorrow, fear, lust, and that mental emotion which the Stoics call by a name that also denotes a bodily feeling, hÄ\x93donÄ\x93 \'pleasure,\' but which I\xa0prefer to style \'delight,\' meaning the sensuous elation of the mind when in a state of exaltation), these emotions, I\xa0say, are not excited by any influence of nature; they are all of them mere fancies and frivolous opinions. Therefore the Wise Man will always be free from them. < 3.36 \xa0"The view that all Moral Worth is intrinsically desirable is one that we hold in common with many other systems of philosophy. Excepting three schools that shut out Virtue from the Chief Good altogether, all the remaining philosophers are committed to this opinion, and most of all the Stoics, with whom we are now concerned, and who hold that nothing else but Moral Worth is to be counted as a good at all. But this position is one that is extremely simple and easy to defend. For who is there, or who ever was there, of avarice so consuming and appetites so unbridled, that, even though willing to commit any crime to achieve his end, and even though absolutely secure of impunity, yet would not a\xa0hundred times rather attain the same object by innocent than by guilty means? < 3.37 \xa0"Again, what desire for profit or advantage underlies our curiosity to learn the secrets of nature, the mode and the causes of the movements of the heavenly bodies? Who lives in such a boorish state, or who has become so rigidly insensible to natural impulses, as to feel a repugce for these lofty studies and eschew them as valueless apart from any pleasure or profit they may bring? Or who is there who feels no sense of pleasure when he hears of the wise words and brave deeds of our forefathers, â\x80\x94 of the Africani, or my great-grandfather whose name is always on your lips, and the other heroes of valour and of virtue? <' "3.38 \xa0On the other hand, what man of honourable family and good breeding and education is not shocked by moral baseness as such, even when it is not calculated to do him personally any harm? who can view without disgust a person whom he believes to be dissolute and an evil liver? who does not hate the mean, the empty, the frivolous, the worthless? Moreover, if we decide that baseness is not a thing to be avoided for its own sake, what arguments can be urged against men's indulging in every sort of unseemliness in privacy and under cover of darkness, unless they are deterred by the essential and intrinsic ugliness of what is base? Endless reasons could be given in support of this view, but they are not necessary. For nothing is less open to doubt than that what is morally good is to be desired for its own sake, and similarly what is morally bad is to be avoided for its own sake. <" '3.39 \xa0Again, the principle already discussed, that Moral Worth is the sole Good, involves the corollary that it is of more value than those neutral things which it procures. On the other hand when we say that folly, cowardice, injustice and intemperance are to be avoided because of the consequences they entail, this dictum must not be so construed as to appear inconsistent with the principle already laid down, that moral baseness alone is evil; for the reason that the consequences referred to are not a matter of bodily harm but of the base conduct to which vices give rise (the term \'vice\' I\xa0prefer to \'badness\' as a translation of the Greek kakiÄ\x81)." < 3.40 \xa0"Indeed, Cato," said\xa0I, "your language is lucidity itself; it conveys your meaning exactly. In fact I\xa0feel you are teaching philosophy to speak Latin, and naturalizing her as a Roman citizen. Hitherto she has seemed a foreigner at Rome, and shy of conversing in our language; and this is especially so with your Stoic system because of its precision and subtlety alike of thought and language. (There are some philosophers, I\xa0know, who could express their ideas in any language; for they ignore Division and Definition altogether, and themselves profess that they only seek to commend doctrines to which nature assents without argument. Hence, their ideas being so far from recondite, they spend small pains on logical exposition.) So I\xa0am following you attentively, and am committing to memory all the terms you use to denote the conceptions we are discussing; for very likely I\xa0shall soon have to employ the same terms myself. Well, I\xa0think you are quite correct in calling the opposite of the virtues \'vices.\' This is in conformity with the usage of our language. The word \'vice\' denotes, I\xa0believe, that which is in its own nature \'vituperable\'; or else \'vituperable\' is derived from \'vice.\' Whereas if you had rendered kakiÄ\x81 by \'badness\' (\'malice\'), Latin usage would point us to another meaning, that of a single particular vice. As it is, we make \'vice\' the opposite term to \'virtue\' in general." < 3.41 \xa0"Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâ\x80\x91called \'problem of good and evil,\' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I\xa0maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. < 3.42 \xa0"Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. < 3.43 \xa0Further, on the Peripatetic theory that there are three kinds of goods, the more abundantly supplied a man is with bodily or external goods, the happier he is; but it does not follow that we Stoics can accept the same position, and say that the more a man has of those bodily things that are highly valued the happier he is. For the Peripatetics hold that the sum of happiness includes bodily advantages, but we deny this altogether. We hold that the multiplication even of those goods that in our view are truly so called does not render life happier or more desirable or of higher value; even less therefore is happiness affected by the accumulation of bodily advantages. < 3.44 \xa0Clearly if wisdom and health be both desirable, a combination of the two would be more desirable than wisdom alone; but it is not the case that if both be deserving of value, wisdom plus \')" onMouseOut="nd();"health is worth more than wisdom by itself separately. We deem health to be deserving of a certain value, but we do not reckon it a good; at the same time we rate no value so highly as to place it above virtue. This is not the view of the Peripatetics, who are bound to say that an action which is both morally good and not attended by pain is more desirable than the same action if accompanied by pain. We think otherwise â\x80\x94 whether rightly or wrongly, I\xa0will consider later; but how could there be a wider or more real difference of opinion? < 3.45 \xa0"The light of a lamp is eclipsed and overpowered by the rays of the sun; a\xa0drop of honey is lost in the vastness of the Aegean sea; an additional sixpence is nothing amid the wealth of Croesus, or a single step in the journey from here to India. Similarly if the Stoic definition of the End of Goods be accepted, it follows that all the value you set on bodily advantages must be absolutely eclipsed and annihilated by the brilliance and the majesty of virtue. And just as opportuneness (for so let us translate eukairia) is not increased by prolongation in time (since things we call opportune have attained their proper measure), so right conduct (for thus I\xa0translate katorthÅ\x8dsis, since katorthÅ\x8dma is a single right action), right conduct, I\xa0say, and also propriety, and lastly Good itself, which consists in harmony with nature, are not capable of increase or addition. < 3.46 \xa0For these things that I\xa0speak of, like opportuneness before mentioned, are not made greater by prolongation. And on this ground the Stoics do not deem happiness to be any more attractive or desirable if it be lasting than if it be brief; and they use this illustration: Just as, supposing the merit of a shoe were to fit the foot, many shoes would not be superior to few shoes nor bigger shoes to smaller ones, so, in the case of things the good of which consists solely and entirely in propriety and opportuneness, a larger number of these things will not be rated higher than a smaller number nor those lasting longer to those of shorter duration. < 3.47 \xa0No is there much point in the argument that, if good health is more valuable when lasting than when brief, therefore the exercise of wisdom also is worth most when it continues longest. This ignores the fact that, whereas the value of health is estimated by duration, that of virtue is measured by opportuneness; so that those who use the argument in question might equally be expected to say that an easy death or an easy child-birth would be better if protracted than if speedy. They fail to see that some things are rendered more valuable by brevity as others by prolongation. < 3.48 \xa0So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open for us to say, who do not think that the end of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all."I\xa0am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. < 3.49 \xa0Wealth again, in the opinion of Diogenes, though so important for pleasure and health as to be not merely conducive but actually essential to them, yet has not the same effect in relation to virtue, nor yet in the case of the other arts; for money may be a guide to these, but cannot form an essential factor in them; therefore although if pleasure or if good health be a good, wealth also must be counted a good, yet if wisdom is a good, it does not follow that we must also pronounce wealth to be a good. Nor can anything which is not a good be essential to a thing that is a good; and hence, because acts of cognition and of comprehension, which form the raw material of the arts, excite desire, since wealth is not a good, wealth cannot be essential to any art. < 3.50 \xa0But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. <' "3.51 \xa0Again among things valuable â\x80\x94 e.g.\xa0health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like â\x80\x94 they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proÄ\x93gmena and the opposite, apoproÄ\x93gmena â\x80\x94 for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. <" '3.52 \xa0"In a royal court, Zeno remarks, no one speaks of the king himself as \'promoted\' to honour (for that is the meaning of proÄ\x93gmenon), but the term is applied to those holding some office of state whose rank most nearly approaches, though it is second to, the royal preâ\x80\x91eminence; similarly in the conduct of life the title proÄ\x93gmenon, that is, \'promoted,\' is to be given not to those things which are in the first rank, but to those which hold the second place; for these we may use either the term suggested (for that will be a literal translation) or \'advanced\' and \'degraded,\' or the term we have been using all along, \'preferred\' or \'superior,\' and for the opposite \'rejected.\' If the meaning is intelligible we need not be punctilious about the use of words. <' "3.53 \xa0But since we declare that everything that is good occupies the first rank, it follows that this which we entitle preferred or superior is neither good nor evil; and accordingly we define it as being indifferent but possessed of a moderate value â\x80\x94 since it has occurred to me that I\xa0may use the word 'indifferent' to represent their term adiaphoron. For in fact, it was inevitable that the class of intermediate things should contain some things that were either in accordance with nature, or the reverse, and this being so, that this class should include some things which possessed moderate value, and, granting this, that some things of this class should be 'preferred.' <" "3.54 \xa0There were good grounds therefore for making this distinction; and furthermore, to elucidate the matter still more clearly they put forward the following illustration: Just as, supposing we were to assume that our end and aim is to throw a knuckle-bone in such a way that it may stand upright, a bone that is thrown so as to fall upright will be in some measure 'preferred' or advanced' in relation to the proposed end, and one that falls otherwise the reverse, and yet that 'advance' on the part of the knuckle-bone will not be a constituent part of the end indicated, so those things which are 'preferred' are it is true means to the End but are in no sense constituents of its essential nature. <" '3.55 \xa0"Next comes the division of goods into three classes, first those which are \'constituents\' of the final end (for so I\xa0represent the term telika, this being a case of an idea which we may decide, as we agreed, to express in several words as we cannot do so in one, in order to make the meaning clear), secondly those which are \'productive\' of the End, the Greek poiÄ\x93tika; and thirdly those which are both. The only instances of goods of the \'constituent\' class are moral action; the only instance of a \'productive\' good is a friend. Wisdom, according to the Stoics, is both constituent and productive; for as being itself an appropriate activity it comes under what I\xa0called the constituent class; as causing and producing moral actions, it can be called productive. < 3.56 \xa0"These things which we call \'preferred\' are in some cases preferred for their own sake, in others because they produce a certain result, and in others for both reasons; for their own sake, as a certain cast of features and of countece, or a certain pose or movement, things which may be in themselves either preferable or to be rejected; others will be called preferred because they produce a certain result, for example, money; others again for both reasons, like sound senses and good health. <' "3.57 \xa0About good fame (that term being a better translation in this context than 'glory' of the Stoic expression eudoxiÄ\x81) Chrysippus and Diogenes used to aver that, apart from any practical value it may possess, it is not worth stretching out a finger for; and I\xa0strongly agree with them. On the other hand their successors, finding themselves unable to resist the attacks of Carneades, declared that good fame, as I\xa0have called it, was preferred and desirable for its own sake, and that a man of good breeding and liberal education would desire to have the good opinion of his parents and relatives, and of good men in general, and that for its own sake and not for any practical advantage; and they argue that just as we desire the welfare of our children, even of such as may be born after we are dead, for their own sake, so a man ought to study his reputation even after death, for itself, even apart from any advantage. <" '3.58 \xa0"But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. < 3.59 \xa0"It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification \'on principle\' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. <' "3.60 \xa0But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. <" 3.62 \xa0"Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature\'s scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature\'s operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. <' "3.63 \xa0From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâ\x80\x91pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâ\x80\x91pen, which swims out of the seaâ\x80\x91pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â\x80\x94 these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. <" '3.64 \xa0"Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâ\x80\x91abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. <
5.25 \xa0At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the realization of their nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. < 5.26 \xa0Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same end; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a\xa0number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. <
5.35 \xa0"It is manifest how well the parts of our body, and its entire shape, form and attitude are adapted to our nature; and that special conformation of the brow, eyes, ears and other parts which is appropriate to man can be recognized without hesitation by the understanding. But of course it is necessary that these organs should be healthy and vigorous and possessed of their natural motions and uses; no part must be lacking and none must be diseased or enfeebled â\x80\x94 this is a requirement of nature. Again, there is also a certain form of bodily activity which keeps the motions and postures in harmony with nature; and any error in these, due to distortion or abnormality of movement or posture, â\x80\x94 for example, if a man were to walk on his hands, or backwards instead of forwards, â\x80\x94 would make a man appear alienated from himself, as if he had stripped off his proper humanity and hated his own nature. Hence certain attitudes in sitting, and slouching, languishing movements, such as are affected by the wanton and the effeminate, are contrary to nature, and though really arising from a defect of mind, suggest to the eye a bodily perversion of man\'s nature. <
5.37 \xa0"Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man\'s nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our faculties both of mind and body to be perfect, those faculties are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. <
5.42 \xa0Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A\xa0similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie helpless, as if absolutely iimate; when they have acquired a little more strength, they exercise their mind and senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take an inquisitive interest in what goes on in their homes; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in their contests with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. <
5.44 \xa0"We must therefore penetrate into the nature of things, and come to understand thoroughly its requirements; otherwise we cannot know ourselves. That maxim was too lofty for it to be thought to have emanated from a human being, and it was therefore ascribed to a god. Accordingly the Pythian Apollo bids us \'learn to know ourselves\'; but the sole road to self-knowledge is to know our powers of body and of mind, and to follow the path of life that gives us their full employment."Now inasmuch as our original instinct of desire was for the possession of the parts aforesaid in their fullest natural perfection, it must be allowed that, when we have attained the object of our desire, our nature takes its stand in this as its final End, and this constitutes our Chief Good; and that this End as a whole must be desired intrinsically and in and for itself, follows of necessity from the fact that the several parts of it also have already been proved to be desirable for themselves. < 5.45 \xa0"If however anyone thinks that our enumeration of bodily advantages is incomplete owing to the omission of pleasure, let us postpone this question to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not one of the objects we have called the primary things in accordance with nature makes no difference for our present inquiry. If, as I\xa0hold, pleasure adds nothing to the sumâ\x80\x91total of nature\'s goods, it has rightly been omitted. If on the contrary pleasure does possess the property that some assign to it, this fact does not impair the general outline we have just given of the Chief Good; since if to the primary objects of nature as we have explained them, pleasure be added, this only adds one more to the list of bodily advantages, and does not alter the interpretation of the Chief Good which has been propounded. < 5.46 \xa0"So far as our argument has proceeded hitherto, it has been based entirely upon the primary attractions of nature. But from this point on let us adopt a different line of reasoning, namely to show that, in addition to the argument from self-love, the fact that each part of our nature, both mental and bodily, possesses its own peculiar faculty goes to prove that the activity of our several parts is preâ\x80\x91eminently spontaneous. To start with the body, do you notice how men try to hide a deformed or infirm or maimed limb? They actually take great pains and trouble to conceal, if they possibly can, their bodily defect, or at all events to let it be seen as little as possible; they even undergo painful courses of treatment in order to restore the natural appearance of their limbs, even though the actual use of them will not only not be improved but will even be diminished. In fact, since every man instinctively thinks that he himself in his entirety is a thing to be desired, and this not for the sake of anything else but for his own sake, it follows that when a thing is desired as a whole for its own sake, the parts also of that thing are desired for their own sakes. <' "5.47 \xa0Again, is there nothing in the movements and postures of the body which Nature herself judges to be of importance? A\xa0man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular cast of features and expression â\x80\x94 is there nothing in these things that we consider worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not often think people deserving of dislike, who by some movement or posture appear to have violated a law or principle of nature? And since people try to get rid of these defects of bearing, why should not even beauty have a good claim to be considered as desirable for its own sake? For we think imperfection or mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps still greater reason pursue distinction of form for its own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily movement and posture, why should we not pursue beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility but also for their own sakes. For since our nature aims at the full development of all its parts, she desires for its own sake that state of body which is most in accordance with himself; because she is thrown into utter disorder if the body is diseased or in pain or weak. <" "
5.49 \xa0For my part I\xa0believe Homer had something of this sort in view in his imaginary account of the songs of the Sirens. Apparently it was not the sweetness of their voices or the novelty and diversity of their songs, but their professions of knowledge that used to attract the passing voyageurs; it was the passion for learning that kept men rooted to the Sirens' rocky shores. This is their invitation to Ulysses (for I\xa0have translated this among other passages of Homer): Ulysses, pride of Argos, turn thy bark And listen to our music. Never yet Did voyager sail these waters blue, but stayed His course, enchanted by our voices sweet, And having filled his soul with harmony, Went on his homeward way a wiser man. We know the direful strife and clash of war That Greece by Heaven's mandate bore to Troy, And whatsoe'er on the wide earth befalls. Homer was aware that his story would not sound plausible if the magic that held his hero immeshed was merely an idle song! It is knowledge that the Sirens offer, and it was no marvel if a lover of wisdom held this dearer than his home. A\xa0passion for miscellaneous omniscience no doubt stamps a man as a mere dilettante; but it must be deemed the mark of a superior mind to be led on by the contemplation of high matters to a passionate love of knowledge. <" '5.50 \xa0"What an ardour for study, think you, possessed Archimedes, who was so absorbed in a diagram he was drawing in the dust that he was unaware even of the capture of his native city! What genius do we see expended by Aristoxenus on the theory of music! Imagine the zeal of a lifetime that Aristophanes devoted to literature! Why should\xa0I speak of Pythagoras, or of Plato, or Democritus? For they, we are told, in their passion for learning travelled through the remotest parts of the earth! Those who are blind to these facts have never been enamoured of some high and worthy study. And those who in this connexion allege that the studies I\xa0have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be desirable for their own sake by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them when no bait of advantage is held out, and finds enjoyment in the mere possession of knowledge even though it is likely to be a positive disadvantage to its possessor. < 5.51 \xa0But what is the point of inquiring further into matters so obvious? Let us ask ourselves the question, how it is we are interested in the motions of the stars and in contemplating the heavenly bodies and studying all the obscure and secret realms of nature; why we derive pleasure from history, which we are so fond of following up, to the remotest detail, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun. Not that I\xa0am unaware that history is useful as well as entertaining. But what of our reading fiction, from which no utility can be extracted? <
5.53 \xa0The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and think that being released from all anxiety and needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, they will do nothing but spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature. We on the other hand see in such studies not only the amusement of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of misfortune; hence the numbers of men who when they had fallen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning. <
5.55 \xa0"Even more striking, and in fact absolutely obvious and convincing natural indications are not wanting, more particularly no doubt in man, but also in every living creature, of the presence of a positive craving for constant activity. Perpetual repose is unendurable on any terms. This is a fact that may be readily detected in children of the tenderest age, if I\xa0may risk being thought to lay undue stress on a field of observation sanctioned by the older thinkers, all of whom, and my own school more than others, go to the nursery, because they believe that Nature reveals her plan to them most clearly in childhood. Even infants, we notice, are incapable of keeping still. Children of a somewhat more advanced age delight in games involving considerable exertion, from which not even fear of punishment can restrain them. And this passion for activity grows as they grow older. The prospect of the most delightful dreams would not reconcile us to feeling asleep for ever: Endymion\'s fate we should consider no better than death. < 5.56 \xa0Observe the least energetic among men: even in a notorious idler both mind and body are constantly in motion; set him free from unavoidable occupations, and he calls for a dice-board, goes off to some sport, or looks for somebody to chat with, seeking at the club or at some trivial social gathering a substitute for higher and more intellectual amusements. Even the wild animals that we keep caged up for our amusement find their captivity irksome, although they are better fed than if they were at large; they miss their natural birthright of free and untrammelled movement. <
5.58 \xa0"It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature\'s own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. \'Happy the man,\' Plato well says, \'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.\' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later. <
5.61 \xa0for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I\xa0allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A\xa0hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. <
5.65 \xa0But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which, coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by the ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I\xa0speak, is termed Justice; connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared by the remaining virtues. <' "
5.68 \xa0Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one's country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good. <" '5.69 \xa0"How then, you will object, can it be true that all things are means to the Chief Good, if friendships and relationships and the other external goods are not part of the Chief Good? The answer is that it is in this way: we maintain these external goods by those acts of duty which spring from the particular class of virtue connected with each. For example, dutiful conduct towards friends and parents benefits the doer from the very fact that such performance of duty is a right action, and right actions take their rise from virtues. And whereas the Wise, under nature\'s guidance, make right action their aim, on the other hand men not perfect and yet endowed with noble characters often respond to the stimulus of honour, which has some show and semblance of Moral Worth. But if they could fully discern Moral Worth itself in its absolute perfection and completeness, the one thing of all others most splendid and most glorious, how enraptured would they be, if they take such a delight in the mere shadow and reputation of it! <
5.73 \xa0Aristotle and Theophrastus often and admirably praised knowledge for its own sake; Erillus, captivated by this single tenet, maintained that knowledge was the Chief Good and that nothing else was desirable as an end in itself. The ancients enlarged on the duty of rising proudly superior to human fortunes; Aristo singled out this one point, and declared that nothing but vice or virtue was either to be avoided or desired. Our school included freedom from pain among the things in accordance with nature; Hieronymus made it out to be the Supreme Good. On the other hand Callipho and later Diodorus, the one having fallen in love with pleasure, and the other with freedom from pain, could neither of them dispense with Moral Worth, which by our school was extolled above all else. <'' None
31. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.37 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action • contemplation, and action • human beings, contemplation and action • structure of human vocation, as contemplation and action, in ancient discourse

 Found in books: Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 77, 78; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 263

sup>
2.37 "In fact there is nothing else beside the world that has nothing wanting, but is fully equipped and complete and perfect in all its details and parts. For as Chrysippus cleverly puts it, just as a shield-case is made for the sake of a shield and a sheath for the sake of a sword, so everything else except the world was created for the sake of some other thing; thus the cornº and fruits produced by the earth were created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man: for example the horse for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting and keeping guard; man himself however came into existence for the purpose of contemplating and imitating the world; he is by no means perfect, but he is \'a small fragment of that which is perfect.\ ' None
32. Cicero, On Duties, 1.15-1.16, 1.51-1.53, 1.57-1.58, 1.129, 1.151, 1.153, 3.20-3.22, 3.30-3.31, 3.42, 3.50-3.57, 3.69, 3.95, 5.51 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Bathhouse activities in • Cicero, Marcus Tullius, On Appropriate Actions • action, and agency • action, and cognition • action, and cult • action, goals of • action, intentional • action, joint • action, theory of (Ciceronian) • action-tendency • agency, and action • appropriate actions • appropriate actions (Lat. officia = Gr. kathēkonta) • cognition, about action • cult, action • female spheres of activity • good, right actions (kathorthōmata) • perception, and action • readers, active engagement/response • women, economic and professional activities

 Found in books: Bruun and Edmondson (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Roman Epigraphy, 590; Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 6; Eliav (2023), A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean, 201; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 80; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 138, 148, 149, 151, 204, 205; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 99; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 113, 127, 151, 195; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 162; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 42, 46

sup>
1.51 Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium autem communia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in permultas potest: Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam, Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit. Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet, cum illi accénderit. Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; 1.52 ex quo sunt illa communia: non prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit, consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem: Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales. 1.53 Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa infinita discedatur, propior est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime homines coniunguntur; interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana, porticus, viae, leges, iura: iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea et familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur.
1.57 Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiars, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt. 1.58 Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus,proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est. Quam ob rem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur iis maxime, quos ante dixi, vita autem victusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime, estque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugavit.
1.129 Quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit. Nec vero histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est, ut iis haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta. Scaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere disciplina verecundiam, ut in scaenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo; verentur enim, ne, si quo casn evenerit, ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, aspiciantur non decore. Nostro quidem more cum parentibus puberes filii, cum soceris generi non lavantur. Retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia, praesertim natura ipsa magistra et duce.

1.151 Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura autem, si tenuis est. sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesque contulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius; de qua quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim assumes, quae ad hunc locum pertinebunt.

1.153 Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento confirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum affluentibus copiis quamvis omnia, quae cognitione digna sint, summo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam sofi/an Graeci vocant—prudentiam enim, quam Graeci fro/nhsin dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur ad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognition anteponenda est.
3.20 Erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius haec ab eis disseruntur, quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis, quibus et honestum aliquid non utile et utile non honestum. Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. 3.21 Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. 3.22 Ut, si unum quodque membrum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non repugte natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras facultates, copias, opes augeamus.
3.30 Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si quid ab homine ad nullam partem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris contraque naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam utilitatem rei publicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, afferre possis, si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin autem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra naturam morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio atque appetitio alieni, sed communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est; est enim iniusta. 3.31 Itaque lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum conservat et continet, decernet profecto, ut ab homine inerti atque inutili ad sapientem, bonum, fortem virum transferantur res ad vivendum necessariae, qui si occiderit, multum de communi utilitate detraxerit, modo hoc ita faciat, ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens hanc causam habeat ad iniuriam. Ita semper officio fungetur utilitati consulens hominum et ei, quam saepe commemoro, humanae societati.
3.42 Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque tradendae, cum iis ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa: Qui stadium, inquit, currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est.
3.50 Sed incidunt, ut supra dixi, saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videatur, ut animadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an possit cum honestate coniungi. Eius generis hae sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus Alexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti nurerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia et fame summaque annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures mercatores Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum viderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo venditurus. Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus; de eius deliberatione et consultatione quaerimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe iudicet, sed dubitet, an turpe non sit. 3.51 In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo. Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid om-nino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam vendat, velle quam optime vendere. Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quain ceteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria? 3.52 Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu cum horninibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nune te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. 3.53 Immo vero, inquiet ille, necesse est, siquidem meministi esse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem. Memini, inquiet ille; sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum cuiusque sit? Quod si ila est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed dodum. Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud dici: Quamvis hoc turpe sit, tamen, quoniam expedit, faciam, sed ita expedire, ut turpe non sit, ex altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum. 3.54 Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quae ipse norit, ceteri ignorent, pestilentes sint et habeantur salubres, ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes, male materiatae sint, ruinosae, sed hoc praeter dominum nemo sciat; quaero, si haec emptoribus venditor non dixerit aedesque vendiderit pluris multo, quam se venditurun putarit, num id iniuste aut improbe fecerit.' "3.55 Ille vero, inquit Antipater; quid est enim aliud erranti viam non monstrare, quod Athenis exsecrationibus publicis sanctum est, si hoc non est, emptorem pati ruere et per errorem in maximam fraudem incurrere? Plus etiam est quam viam non monstrare; nam est scientem in errorem alterum inducere. Diogenes contra: Num te emere coegit, qui ne hortatus quidem est? Ille, quod non placebat, proscripsit, tu, quod placebat, emisti. Quodsi, qui proscribunt villain bonam beneque aedificatam, non existimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est nec aedificata ratione, multo minus, qui domum non laudarunt. Ubi enim iudicium emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quae potest esse? Sin autem dictum non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas? Quid vero est stultius quam venditorem eius rei, quam vendat, vitia narrare? quid autem tam absurdum, quam si domini iussu ita praeco praedicet: 'Domum pestilentem vendo'?" '3.56 Sic ergo in quibusdam causis dubiis ex altera parte defenditur honestas, ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur, ut id, quod utile videatur, non modo facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere turpe. Haec est illa, quae videtur utilium fieri cum honestis saepe dissensio. Quae diiudicanda sunt; non enim, ut quaereremus, exposuimus, sed ut explicaremus. 3.57 Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodios nec hic aedium venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neque enim id est celare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire. Hoc autem celandi genus quale sit et cuius hominis, quis non videt? Certe non aperti, non simplicis, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni, versuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris, vafri. Haec tot et alia plura nonne inutile est vitiorum subire nomina?
3.69 Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis.
3.95 Quid, quod Agamemnon cum devovisset Dianae, quod in suo regno pulcherrimum natum esset illo anno, immolavit Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat eo quidem anno natum pulchrius? Promissum potius non faciendum quam tam taetrum facinus admittendum fuit. Ergo et promissa non facienda non numquam, neque semper deposita reddenda. Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit, officium non reddere. Quid? si is, qui apud te pecuniam deposuerit, bellum inferat patriae, reddasne depositum? Non credo; facias enim contra rem publicam, quae debet esse carissima. Sic multa, quae honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta; facere promissa, stare conventis, reddere deposita commutata utilitate fiunt non honesta. Ac de iis quidem, quae videntur esse utilitates contra iustitiam simulatione prudentiae, satis arbitror dictum.' ' None		sup>
1.51 \xa0This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common." Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and, though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally: "Who kindly sets a wand\'rer on his way Does e\'en as if he lit another\'s lamp by his: No less shines his, when he his friend\'s hath lit." In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. < 1.52 \xa0On this principle we have the following maxims:"Deny no one the water that flows by;" "Let anyone who will take fire from our fire;" "Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;" for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss. We should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing something to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are limited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of universal liberality must be regulated according to that test of Ennius â\x80\x94 "No less shines his" â\x80\x94 in order that we may continue to have the means for being generous to our friends. < 1.53 \xa0Then, too, there are a great many degrees of closeness or remoteness in human society. To proceed beyond the universal bond of our common humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the same people, tribe, and tongue, by which men are very closely bound together; it is a still closer relation to be citizens of the same city-state; for fellow-citizens have much in common â\x80\x94 forum, temples colonnades, streets, statutes, laws, courts, rights of suffrage, to say nothing of social and friendly circles and diverse business relations with many. But a still closer social union exists between kindred. Starting with that infinite bond of union of the human race in general, the conception is now confined to a small and narrow circle. <
1.57 \xa0But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there is no social relation among them all more close, none more close, none more dear than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; one native land embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the more execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and who are and have been engaged in compassing her utter destruction. < 1.58 \xa0Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where most of our moral obligation is due, country would come first, and parents; for their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation; next come children and the whole family, who look to us alone for support and can have no other protection; finally, our kinsmen, with whom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our lot is one. All needful material assistance is, therefore, due first of all to those whom I\xa0have named; but intimate relationship of life and living, counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest which is cemented by congeniality of character. <
1.129 \xa0In these matters we must avoid especially the two extremes â\x80\x94 our conduct and speech should not be effeminate and over-nice, on the one hand, nor coarse and boorish, on the other. And we surely must not admit that, while this rule applies to actors and orators, it is not binding upon us. As for stage-people, their custom, because of its traditional discipline, carries modesty to such a point that an actor would never step out upon the stage without a breech-cloth on, for fear he might make an improper exhibition, if by some accident certain parts of his person should happen to become exposed. And in our own custom grown sons do not bathe with their fathers, nor sons-inâ\x80\x91law with their fathers-inâ\x80\x91law. We must, therefore, keep to the path of this sort of modesty, especially when Nature is our teacher and guide. <

1.151 \xa0But the professions in which either a higher degree of intelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is derived â\x80\x94 medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching â\x80\x94 these are proper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I\xa0should say, satisfied with the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman. But since I\xa0have discussed this quite fully in my Cato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point.

1.153 \xa0My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to Nature which depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon knowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: (1)\xa0suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that, with an abundance of everything pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace study and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the solitude were so complete that he could never see a human being, he would die. And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom â\x80\x94 what the Greeks call Ï\x83οÏ\x86ία; for by prudence, which they call Ï\x86Ï\x81Ï\x8cνηÏ\x83ιÏ\x82, we understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and of things to be avoided. (2)\xa0Again, that wisdom which I\xa0have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty which is connected with the social obligation is the most important duty. And (3)\xa0service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best seen in the safeguarding of human interests. It is essential, then, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above speculative knowledge. <' "
3.20 \xa0That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I\xa0am following in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to my rule. <" "3.21 \xa0Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. <" "3.22 \xa0Suppose, by way of comparison, that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably be annihilated. For, without any conflict with Nature's laws, it is granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but Nature's laws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by despoiling others. <" "
3.30 \xa0These cases are very easy to decide. For, if merely for one's own benefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a perfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary to Nature's law. But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to render signal service to the state and to human society â\x80\x94 if from that motive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter for censure. But, if such is not the case, each one must bear his own burden of distress rather than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not to say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of that sort is more repugt to Nature than to covet and to appropriate what is one's neighbour's; but we do maintain that disregard of the common interests is repugt to Nature; for it is unjust. <" "3.31 \xa0And therefore Nature's law itself, which protects and conserves human interests, will surely determine that a man who is wise, good, and brave, should in emergency have the necessaries of life transferred to him from a person who is idle and worthless; for the good man's death would be a heavy loss to the common weal; only let him beware that self-esteem and self-love do not find in such a transfer of possessions a pretext for wrong-doing. But, thus guided in his decision, the good man will always perform his duty, promoting the general interests of human society on which I\xa0am so fond of dwelling. <" 3.42 \xa0And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interest and surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his neighbour\'s. "When a man enters the foot-race," says Chrysippus with his usual aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive with all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own advantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour." <
3.50 \xa0But, as I\xa0said above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether their conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has sighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to report the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and sell his own stock at the highest market price? I\xa0am assuming the case of a virtuous, upright man, and I\xa0am raising the question how a man would think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians if he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt whether such silence would really be immoral. < 3.51 \xa0In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater, a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage, provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation. "I\xa0have imported my stock," Diogenes\'s merchant will say; "I\xa0have offered it for sale; I\xa0sell at a price no higher than my competitors â\x80\x94 perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is wronged?" < 3.52 \xa0"What say you?" comes Antipater\'s argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?" "It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I\xa0am not concealing from you, even if I\xa0am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I\xa0am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told." < 3.53 \xa0"Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit, if you will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by Nature and existing between man and man." "I\xa0do not forget them," the other will reply: but do you mean to say that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything away." In this whole discussion, you see, no one says, "However wrong morally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I\xa0will do it"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without being morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be done, because it is morally wrong. < 3.54 \xa0Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on account of certain undesirable features of which he himself is aware but which nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary, but has the reputation of being healthful; suppose it is not generally known that vermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is built of unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows about it except the owner; if the vendor does not tell the purchaser these facts but sells him the house for far more than he could reasonably have expected to get for it, I\xa0ask whether his transaction is unjust or dishonourable. < 3.55 \xa0"Yes," says Antipater, "it is; for to allow a purchaser to be hasty in closing a deal and through mistaken judgment to incur a very serious loss, if this is not refusing \'to set a man right when he has lost his way\' (a\xa0crime which at Athens is prohibited on pain of public execration), what is? It is even worse than refusing to set a man on his way: it is deliberately leading a man astray." "Can you say," answers Diogenes, "that he compelled you to purchase, when he did not even advise it? He advertised for sale what he did not like; you bought what you did like. If people are not considered guilty of swindling when they place upon their placards For Sale: A\xa0Fine Villa, Well Built, even when it is neither good nor properly built, still less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of their house. For there the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there be on the part of the vendor? But if, again, not all that is expressly stated has to be made good, do you think a man is bound to make good what has not been said? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a vendor to recount all the faults in the article he is offering for sale? And what would be so absurd as for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner\'s bidding, \'Here is an unsanitary house for sale\'?" < 3.56 \xa0In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral rectitude is defended on the one side, while on the other side the case of expediency is so presented as to make it appear not only morally right to do what seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do it. This is the contradiction that seems often to arise between the expedient and the morally right. But I\xa0must give my decision in these two cases; for I\xa0did not propound them merely to raise the questions, but to offer a solution. <' "3.57 \xa0I\xa0think, then, that it was the duty of that grain-dealer not to keep back the facts from the Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with his purchaser. The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails to discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person would be guilty of it? At all events he would be no candid or sincere or straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and subtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of reproach and many more besides? <" 3.69 \xa0Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I\xa0find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship â\x80\x94 although I\xa0have often made this statement, I\xa0must still repeat it again and again â\x80\x94 which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a\xa0mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I\xa0only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. <
3.95 \xa0And once more; when Agamemnon had vowed to Diana the most beautiful creature born that year within his realm, he was brought to sacrifice Iphigenia; for in that year nothing was born more beautiful than she. He ought to have broken his vow rather than commit so horrible a crime. Promises are, therefore, sometimes not to be kept; and trusts are not always to be restored. Suppose that a person leaves his sword with you when he is in his right mind, and demands it back in a fit of insanity; it would be criminal to restore it to him; it would be your duty not to do so. Again, suppose that a man who has entrusted money to you proposes to make war upon your common country, should you restore the trust? I\xa0believe you should not; for you would be acting against the state, which ought to be the dearest thing in the world to you. Thus there are many things which in and of themselves seem morally right, but which under certain circumstances prove to be not morally right: to keep a promise, to abide by an agreement, to restore a trust may, with a change of expediency, cease to be morally right. With this I\xa0think I\xa0have said enough about those actions which masquerade as expedient under the guise of prudence, while they are really contrary to justice.' ' None
33. Hebrew Bible, Daniel, 7.13, 9.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Active Intellect, Philo’s Logos related to • Build/Building Activity, Ark • Philo’s Logos, Active Intellect and • Piety, Trilogy of pious actions →Alms, Fast, Prayer • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent

 Found in books: Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 216; Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 75; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 164; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 95

sup>
7.13 חָזֵה הֲוֵית בְּחֶזְוֵי לֵילְיָא וַאֲרוּ עִם־עֲנָנֵי שְׁמַיָּא כְּבַר אֱנָשׁ אָתֵה הֲוָה וְעַד־עַתִּיק יוֹמַיָּא מְטָה וּקְדָמוֹהִי הַקְרְבוּהִי׃
9.4 וָאֶתְפַּלְלָה לַיהוָה אֱלֹהַי וָאֶתְוַדֶּה וָאֹמְרָה אָנָּא אֲדֹנָי הָאֵל הַגָּדוֹל וְהַנּוֹרָא שֹׁמֵר הַבְּרִית וְהַחֶסֶד לְאֹהֲבָיו וּלְשֹׁמְרֵי מִצְוֺתָיו׃'' None		sup>
7.13 I saw in the night visions, And, behold, there came with the clouds of heaven One like unto a son of man, And he came even to the Ancient of days, And he was brought near before Him.
9.4 And I prayed unto the LORD my God, and made confession, and said: ‘O Lord, the great and awful God, who keepest covet and mercy with them that love Thee and keep Thy commandments,'' None
34. Polybius, Histories, 6.56.6 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, divine • vitium, taints magistrate’s subsequent actions

 Found in books: Konrad (2022), The Challenge to the Auspices: Studies on Magisterial Power in the Middle Roman Republic, 191; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 368

sup>
6.56.6 μεγίστην δέ μοι δοκεῖ διαφορὰν ἔχειν τὸ Ῥωμαίων πολίτευμα πρὸς βέλτιον ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει.'' None		sup>
6.56.6 \xa0But the quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is in my opinion the nature of their religious convictions. <'' None
35. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • pastor (“herdsman”), activities of • pastoral activity

 Found in books: Konig (2022), The Folds of Olympus: Mountains in Ancient Greek and Roman Culture, 258; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 140, 152
36. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Impulse (hormē), Impulse not sufficient for action • action

 Found in books: Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 45; Wynne (2019), Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage, 54
37. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus, on action • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 232; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 245
38. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action • action roles, agent • action roles, patient • action, and cult • action, as ritual • action, deontic • action, human • action, joint • action, of agents • action, prior • agency, and action • agents, and action • cult, action • vitium, taints magistrate’s subsequent actions

 Found in books: Konrad (2022), The Challenge to the Auspices: Studies on Magisterial Power in the Middle Roman Republic, 40; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 129, 281, 345, 354, 369; Wynne (2019), Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage, 54
39. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Attention, Prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in Stoic self-interrogation • Impulse (hormē), Impulse not sufficient for action • action, and cult • action, as a term • action, emotions as • action, pursuit and avoidance • action, right actions (katorthomata) • cult, action • emotions, as actions • invidia, active vs. passive • joy, as right action • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 227, 229, 230, 232; Kaster(2005), Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 182, 183; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 105; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 45, 389
40. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Scribes/Scribal Activity • rabbinic literature, human exegetical activity in

 Found in books: Fraade (2011), Legal Fictions: Studies of Law and Narrative in the Discursive Worlds of Ancient Jewish Sectarians and Sages, 152; Shemesh (2009), Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from Qumran to the Rabbis. 42
41. None, None, nan (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Dead Sea Scrolls, and Temple activity • Scribes/Scribal Activity • rabbinic literature, human exegetical activity in

 Found in books: Fraade (2011), Legal Fictions: Studies of Law and Narrative in the Discursive Worlds of Ancient Jewish Sectarians and Sages, 56, 150, 152, 195; Shemesh (2009), Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from Qumran to the Rabbis. 44, 55, 63, 64; Taylor (2012), The Essenes, the Scrolls, and the Dead Sea, 302
42. Ovid, Ars Amatoria, 3.639-3.640 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Sex and Sexual Activities (in the baths) • female spheres of activity

 Found in books: Eliav (2023), A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean, 140; Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 94

sup>
3.639 Cum, custode foris tunicas servante puellae,' ' None		sup>
3.639 The god that fills him, and the muse revere;' ' None
43. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, 79-82 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Exodus, Miriams actions • Therapeutae, musical activities of

 Found in books: Cosgrove (2022), Music at Social Meals in Greek and Roman Antiquity: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Augustine, 279, 280; Kraemer (2010), Unreliable Witnesses: Religion, Gender, and History in the Greco-Roman Mediterranean, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88

sup>
79 But the divine army is the body of virtues, the champions of the souls that love God, whom it becomes, when they see the adversary defeated, to sing a most beautiful and becoming hymn to the God who giveth the victory and the glorious triumph; and two choruses, the one proceeding from the conclave of the men, and the other from the company of the women, will stand up and sing in alternate songs a melody responsive to one another's voices. "80 And the chorus of men will have Moses for their leader; and that of the women will be under the guidance of Miriam, "the purified outward Sense." For it is just that hymns and praises should be uttered in honour of God without any delay, both in accordance with the suggestions of the intellect and the perceptions of the outward senses, and that each instrument should be struck in harmony, I mean those both of the mind and of the outward sense, in gratitude and honour to the holy Saviour. 81 Accordingly, all the men sing the song on the sea-shore, not indeed with a blind mind, but seeing sharply, Moses being the leader of the song; and women sing, who are in good truth the most excellent of their sex, having been enrolled in the lists of the republic of virtue, Miriam being their leader. XVIII. 82 And the same hymn is sung by both the choruses, having a most admirable burden of the song which is beautiful to be sung. And it is as follows: "Let us sing unto the Lord, for he has been glorified gloriously; the horse and his rider hath he thrown into the Sea." ' "' None
44. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, 14 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • good, right actions (kathorthōmata) • right action

 Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 219; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 46

sup>
14 Now of the kind of opposition of place which is connected with standing in front of a judge for judgment, we have an example in the case of the woman who has been suspected of having committed adultery. For, says Moses, "the priest shall cause the woman to stand in front of her lord, and she shall uncover her Head." Let us now examine what he intends to show by this direction. It often happens that what ought to be done is not done, in the manner in which it ought to be done, and sometimes too that which is not proper is nevertheless done in a proper manner. For instance, when the return of a deposit is not made in an honest spirit, but is intended either to work the injury of him who receives it back again, or by way of a snare to bear out a denial in the case of another deposit of greater value, in that case a proper action is done in an improper manner. '' None
45. Philo of Alexandria, On The Confusion of Tongues, 180 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • God, Expulsion actions • smell, social activity, wickedness and • wealth, wickedness, social activity and

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 168; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 30

sup>
180 And this may be enough to say in this manner; and it is right that this point also should be considered, namely that God is the cause only of what is good but is absolutely the cause of no evil whatever, since he himself is the most ancient of all existing things, and the most perfect of all goods; and it is most natural and becoming that he should do what is most akin to his own nature, that is to say, that the best of all beings should be the cause of all the best things, but that the punishments appointed for the wicked are inflicted by the means of his subordinate ministers. '' None
46. Philo of Alexandria, On The Decalogue, 66-69, 80 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Epistemology, rational activity • Idolatry, Action

 Found in books: Gray (2021), Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers, 137, 139; Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 225

sup>
66 for those who are ministers and servants of the sun, and of the moon, and of all the host of heaven, or of it in all its integrity or of its principal parts, are in grievous error; (how can they fail to be, when they honour the subjects instead of the prince?) but still they sin less grievously than the others, who have fashioned stocks, and stones, and silver, and gold, and similar materials according to their own pleasure, making images, and statues, and all kinds of other things wrought by the hand; the workmanship in which, whether by statuary, or painter, or artisan, has done great injury to the life of man, having filled the whole habitable world. '67 For they have cut away the most beautiful support of the soul, namely the proper conception of the ever-living God; and therefore, like ships without ballast, they are tossed about in every direction for ever, being borne in every direction, so as never once to reach the haven, and never to be able to anchor firmly in truth, being blind respecting that which is worth seeing, and the only object as to which it is absolutely necessary to be sharp-sighted; 68 and such men appear to me to have a more miserable life than those who are deprived of their bodily sight; for these latter have either been injured without their own consent, or else have endured some terrible disease of the eyes, or else have been plotted against by their enemies; but those others by their own deliberate intention, have not only dimmed the eye of their soul, but have even chosen utterly to discard it; 69 on which account pity is bestowed on the one class as unfortunate, but the other class are justly punished as being wicked, who in conjunction with others have not chosen to recognize that fact which even an infant child would understand, namely, that the Creator is better than the creature; for he is both more ancient in point of time, and is also in a manner the father of that which he has made. He is also superior in power, for the agent is more glorious than the patient.
80 And, accordingly, the first foreigners who arrived in Egypt were quite worn out with laughing at and ridiculing these superstitions, till their minds had become impregnated with the conceit of the natives; but all those who have tasted of right instruction, are amazed and struck with consternation, at their system of ennobling things which are not noble, and pity those who give into it, thinking the men, as is very natural, more miserable than even the objects which they honour, since they in their souls are changed into those very animals, so as to appear to be merely brutes in human form, now returning to their original nature. ' None
47. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.29 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Idolatry, Action • sight, as active

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 294; Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 110, 127

sup>
1.29 Not but what they have also joined to themselves the arts of statuary and painting as copartners in their system of deceit, in order that, bringing over the spectators by well-fabricated appearances of colours, and forms, and distinctive qualities, and having won over by their allurements those principal outward senses of sight and hearing, the one by the exquisite beauty of lifeless forms, and the other by a poetical harmony of numbers--they may ravish the unstable soul and render it feeble, and deprive it of any settled foundation. '' None
48. Philo of Alexandria, On The Contemplative Life, 75 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Therapeutae, musical activities of • virtue, as active

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 239; Cosgrove (2022), Music at Social Meals in Greek and Roman Antiquity: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Augustine, 276

sup>
75 These, then, are the first circumstances of the feast; but after the guests have sat down to the table in the order which I have been describing, and when those who minister to them are all standing around in order, ready to wait upon them, and when there is nothing to drink, some one will say ... but even more so than before, so that no one ventures to mutter, or even to breathe at all hard, and then some one looks out some passage in the sacred scriptures, or explains some difficulty which is proposed by some one else, without any thoughts of display on his own part, for he is not aiming at reputation for cleverness and eloquence, but is only desirous to see some points more accurately, and is content when he has thus seen them himself not to bear ill will to others, who, even if they did not perceive the truth with equal acuteness, have at all events an equal desire of learning. '' None
49. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 1.23, 2.256 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Exodus, Miriams actions • Idolatry, Action • Therapeutae, musical activities of

 Found in books: Cosgrove (2022), Music at Social Meals in Greek and Roman Antiquity: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Augustine, 278, 279; Kraemer (2010), Unreliable Witnesses: Religion, Gender, and History in the Greco-Roman Mediterranean, 84; Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 113

sup>
1.23 Accordingly he speedily learnt arithmetic, and geometry, and the whole science of rhythm and harmony and metre, and the whole of music, by means of the use of musical instruments, and by lectures on the different arts, and by explanations of each topic; and lessons on these subjects were given him by Egyptian philosophers, who also taught him the philosophy which is contained in symbols, which they exhibit in those sacred characters of hieroglyphics, as they are called, and also that philosophy which is conversant about that respect which they pay to animals which they invest with the honours due to God. And all the other branches of the encyclical education he learnt from Greeks; and the philosophers from the adjacent countries taught him Assyrian literature and the knowledge of the heavenly bodies so much studied by the Chaldaeans.
2.256 For this mercy Moses very naturally honoured his Benefactor with hymns of gratitude. For having divided the host into two choruses, one of men and one of women, he himself became the leader of that of the men, and appointed his sister to be the chief of that of the women, that they might sing hymns to their father and Creator, joining in harmonies responsive to one another, by a combination of dispositions and melody, the former being eager to offer the same requital for the mercies which they had received, and the latter consisting of a symphony of the deep male with the high female voices, for the tones of men are deep and those of women are high; and when there is a perfect and harmonious combination of the two a most delightful and thoroughly harmonious melody is effected. '' None
50. Philo of Alexandria, Hypothetica, 7.13 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • virtue, as active • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 239; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 28

sup>
7.13 and, in fact, they do constantly assemble together, and they do sit down one with another, the multitude in general in silence, except when it is customary to say any words of good omen, by way of assent to what is being read. And then some priest who is present, or some one of the elders, reads the sacred laws to them, and interprets each of them separately till eventide; and then when separate they depart, having gained some skill in the sacred laws, and having made great advancers towards piety. '' None
51. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 81 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Dead Sea Scrolls, and Temple activity • virtue, as active

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 239; Taylor (2012), The Essenes, the Scrolls, and the Dead Sea, 302

sup>
81 Now these laws they are taught at other times, indeed, but most especially on the seventh day, for the seventh day is accounted sacred, on which they abstain from all other employments, and frequent the sacred places which are called synagogues, and there they sit according to their age in classes, the younger sitting under the elder, and listening with eager attention in becoming order. '' None
52. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, emotions as • action-tendency • action-tendency, of fear • action-tendency, of shame • emotions, as actions • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 229, 232; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 180, 207, 227
53. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Epicurus, and action • Proclus, Neoplatonist, Only activities, not essence, of soul can be affected • action • action, and character • action, and cult • action, voluntary • cult, action • volcanoes / volcanic activity

 Found in books: Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 230, 231; Kazantzidis (2021), Lucretius on Disease: The Poetics of Morbidity in "De rerum natura", 100, 131; King (2006), Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 227; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 94, 241; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 265; Wynne (2019), Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage, 54
54. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Campus Martius, male and female spheres of activity • female spheres of activity • male spheres of activity • reading, active

 Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 105; Pandey (2018), The Poetics of Power in Augustan Rome, 101, 102
55. None, None, nan (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • female spheres of activity • reading, active

 Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 95; Pandey (2018), The Poetics of Power in Augustan Rome, 101
56. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.17.23-1.17.26, 1.18.1-1.18.2, 1.22.10, 3.22.39, 4.1.86-4.1.87 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotelian, Proairesis involved in all action that is upto us • action • action, theory of • action-tendency, of fear • activeness (of converts) • good, appropriate actions (kathēkonta)

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 166; Harte (2017), Rereading Ancient Philosophy: Old Chestnuts and Sacred Cows, 251; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 182; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 385; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 327, 332; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 143, 154

sup>
1.17.23 SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be ualysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end. Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely, and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, Distinguish, I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, It is more urgent. This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs? I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion ( ἔκκλισιν ) except another desire and aversion? But, you object: If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me. No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.
1.18.1 IF what philosophers say is true, that all men have one principle, as in the case of assent the persuasion that a thing is so, and in the case of dissent the persuasion that a thing is not so, and in the case of a suspense of judgment the persuasion that a thing is uncertain, so also in the case of a movement towards any thing the persuasion that a thing is for a man’s advantage, and it is impossible to think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another, and to judge one thing to be proper and to move towards another, why then are we angry with the many? Mrs. Carter says: The most ignorant persons often practise what they know to be evil: and they, who voluntarily suffer, as many do, their inclinations to blind their judgment, are not justified by following it. (Perhaps she means them, their inclinations. ) The doctrine of Epictetus therefore, here and elsewhere, on this head, contradicts the voice of reason and conscience: nor is it less pernicious than ill-grounded. It destroys all guilt and merit, all punishment and reward, all blame of ourselves or others, all sense of misbehaviour towards our fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that such philosophers did not teach repentance towards God. Mrs. Carter has not understood Epictetus; and her censure is misplaced. It is true that the most ignorant persons often practise what they know to be evil, as she truly says. But she might have said more. It is also true that persons, who are not ignorant, often do what they know to be evil, and even what they would condemn in another, at least before they had fallen into the same evil themselves; for when they have done what they know to be wrong, they have a fellow-feeling with others who are as bad as themselves. Nor does he say, as Mrs. Carter seems to imply that he does, for her words are ambiguous, that they who voluntarily suffer their inclinations to blind their judgment are justified by following them. He says that men will do as they do, so long as they think as they think. He only traces to their origin the bad acts which bad men do; and he says that we should pity them and try to mend them. Now the best man in the world, if he sees the origin and direct cause of bad acts in men, may pity them for their wickedness, and he will do right. He will pity, and still he will punish severely, if the interests of society require the guilty to be punished: but he will not punish in anger. Epictetus says nothing about legal penalties; and I assume that he would not say that the penalties are always unjust, if I understand his principles. His discourse is to this effect, as the title tells us, that we ought not to be angry with the errors of others: the matter of the discourse is the feeling and disposition which we ought to have towards those who do wrong, because they are mistaken about good and evil. He does not discuss the question of the origin of these men’s mistake further than this: men think that a thing or act is advantageous; and it is impossible for them to think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another thing. Their error is in their opinion. Then he tells us to show them their error, and they will desist from their errors. He is not here examining the way of showing them their error; by which I suppose that he means convincing them of their error. He seems to admit that it may not be possible to convince them of their errors; for he says, if they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion. This is the plain and certain meaning of Epictetus which Mrs. Carter in her zeal has not seen. They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Ought we then to be angry with them, or to pity them? But show them their error, and you will see how they desist from their errors. If they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion. Ought not then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means say so, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the faculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the faculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him? If you speak thus, you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and that it is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind and deaf man? But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatest things, and the greatest thing in every man is the will or choice such as it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you also angry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected contrary to nature by the bad things of another. Pity him rather: drop this readiness to be offended and to hate, and these words which the many utter: these accursed and odious fellows. How have you been made so wise at once? and how are you so peevish? Why then are we angry? Is it because we value so much the things of which these men rob us? Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn that a thief and an adulterer have no place in the things which are yours, but in those which belong to others and which are not in your power. If you dismiss these things and consider them as nothing, with whom are you still angry? But so long as you value these things, be angry with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer. Consider the matter thus: you have fine clothes; your neighbour has not: you have a window; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know wherein man’s good consists, but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not then come and take them away? When you show a cake to greedy persons, and swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Do not provoke them: do not have a window: do not air your clothes. I also lately had an iron lamp placed by the side of my household gods: hearing a noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had been carried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp had done nothing strange. What then? To-morrow, I said, you will find an earthen lamp: for a man only loses that which he has. I have lost my garment. The reason is that you had a garment. I have pain in my head. Have you any pain in your horns? Why then are you troubled? for we only lose those things, we have only pains about those things which we possess. But the tyrant will chain—what? the leg. He will take away—what? the neck. What then will he not chain and not take away? the will. This is why the antients taught the maxim, Know thyself. Therefore we ought to exercise ourselves in small things, and beginning with them to proceed to the greater. I have pain in the head. Do not say, alas! I have pain in the ear. Do not say, alas! And I do not say, that you are not allowed to groan, but do not groan inwardly; and if your slave is slow in bringing a bandage, do not cry out and torment yourself, and say, Every body hates me : for who would not hate such a man? For the future, relying on these opinions, walk about upright, free; not trusting to the size of your body, as an athlete, for a man ought not to be invincible in the way that an ass is. Who then is the invincible? It is he whom none of the things disturb which are independent of the will. Then examining one circumstance after another I observe, as in the case of an athlete; he has come off victorious in the first contest: well then, as to the second? and what if there should be great heat? and what, if it should be at Olympia? And the same I say in this case: if you should throw money in his way, he will despise it. Well, suppose you put a young girl in his way, what then? and what, if it is in the dark? what if it should be a little reputation, or abuse; and what, if it should be praise; and what if it should be death? He is able to overcome all. What then if it be in heat, and what if it is in the rain, and what if he be in a melancholy (mad) mood, and what if he be asleep? He will still conquer. This is my invincible athlete.
1.22.10 PRAECOGNITIONS are common to all men, and praecognition is not contradictory to praecognition. For who of us does not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction arise? It arises in the adaptation of the praecognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, He has done well: he is a brave man, and another says, Not so; but he has acted foolishly; then the disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig’s flesh or not holy. You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and right? Certainly. Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to be done? I do most certainly. Adapt your praecognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, I ought not to give up Chryseis to her father. Achilles says, You ought. It is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the praecognition of ought or duty. Further, Agamemnon says, Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you. Achilles replies, Would you then take her whom I love? Yes, her whom you love. Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has no prize? Thus the dispute begins. What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the natural praecognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but others are not: in our power are will and all acts which depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country and generally, all with whom we live in society. In what then should we place the good? To what kind of things ( οὐσίᾳ ) shall we adapt it? To the things which are in our power? Is not health then a good thing, and soundness of limb, and life? and are not children and parents and country? Who will tolerate you if you deny this? Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. Is it possible then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good things, that he can be happy? It is not possible. And can he maintain towards society a proper behaviour? He can not. For I am naturally formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbour. If it is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to steal it from the bath. This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And how shall I be still able to maintain my duty towards Zeus? for if I sustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me; and what is he to me if he cannot help me; and further, what is he to me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am? I now begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples, why set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil daemons, such as to Fever; and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we place the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows. What should we do then? This is the inquiry of the true philosopher who is in labour. Upton refers to a passage in the Theaetetus (p. 150, Steph.), where Socrates professes that it is his art to discover whether a young man’s mind is giving birth to an idol (an unreality) and a falsity, or to something productive and true; and he says (p. 151) that those who associate with him are like women in child-birth, for they are in labour and full of trouble nights and days much more than women, and his art has the power of stirring up and putting to rest this labour of child-birth. The conclusion in the chapter is not clear. The student is supposed to be addressed by some rich old man, who really does not know what to say; and the best way of getting rid of him and his idle talk is by dismissing him with a joke. See Schweighaeuser’s note. Now I do not see what the Good is nor the Bad. Am I not mad? Yes. But suppose that I place the good somewhere among the things which depend on the will: all will laugh at me. There will come some greyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and he will shake his head and say, Hear, my child. It is right that you should philosophize; but you ought to have some brains also: all this that you are doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers; but you know how to act better than philosophers do.—Man, why then do you blame me, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I am silent, he will burst. I must speak in this way: Excuse me, as you would excuse lovers: I am not my own master: I am mad.
3.22.39 WHEN one of his pupils inquired of Epictetus, and he was a person who appeared to be inclined to Cynism, what kind of person a Cynic ought to be and what was the notion ( πρόληψις ) of the thing, we will inquire, said Epictetus, at leisure: but I have so much to say to you that he who without God attempts so great a matter, is hateful to God, and has no other purpose than to act indecently in public. For in any well-managed house no man comes forward, and says to himself, I ought to be manager of the house. If he does so, the master turns round, and seeing him insolently giving orders, drags him forth and flogs him. So it is also in this great city (the world); for here also there is a master of the house who orders every thing. (He says) You are the sun; you can by going round make the year and seasons, and make the fruits grow and nourish them, and stir the winds and make them remit, and warm the bodies of men properly: go, travel round, and so administer things from the greatest to the least. You are a calf; when a lion shall appear, do your proper business ( i. e. run away): if you do not, you will suffer. You are a bull: advance and fight, for this is your business, and becomes you, and you can do it. You can lead the army against Ilium; be Agamemnon. You can fight in single combat against Hector: be Achilles. But if Thersites came forward and claimed the command, he would either not have obtained it; or if he did obtain it, he would have disgraced himself before many witnesses. Do you also think about the matter carefully: it is not what it seems to you. (You say) I wear a cloak now and I shall wear it then: I sleep hard now, and I shall sleep hard then: I will take in addition a little bag now and a staff, and I will go about and begin to beg and to abuse those whom I meet; and if I see any man plucking the hair out of his body, I will rebuke him, or if he has dressed his hair, or if he walks about in purple—If you imagine the thing to be such as this, keep far away from it: do not approach it: it is not at all for you. But if you imagine it to be what it is, and do not think yourself to be unfit for it, consider what a great thing you undertake. In the first place in the things which relate to yourself, you must not be in any respect like what you do now: you must not blame God or man: you must take away desire altogether, you must transfer avoidance ( ἔκκλισις ) only to the things which are within the power of the will: you must not feel anger nor resentment nor envy nor pity; a girl must not appear handsome to you, nor must you love a little reputation, nor be pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought to know that the rest of men throw walls around them and houses and darkness when they do any such things, and they have many means of concealment. A man shuts the door, he sets somebody before the chamber: if a person comes, say that he is out, he is not at leisure. But the Cynic instead of all these things must use modesty as his protection: if he does not, he will be indecent in his nakedness and under the open sky. This is his house, his door: this is the slave before his bedchamber: this is his darkness. For he ought not to wish to hide any thing that he does: and if he does, he is gone, he has lost the character of a Cynic, of a man who lives under the open sky, of a free man: he has begun to fear some external thing, he has begun to have need of concealment, nor can he get concealment when he chooses. For where shall he hide himself and how? And if by chance this public instructor shall be detected, this paedagogue, what kind of things will he be compelled to suffer? when then a man fears these things, is it possible for him to be bold with his whole soul to superintend men? It cannot be: it is impossible. In the first place then you must make your ruling faculty pure, and this mode of life also. Now (you should say), to me the matter to work on is my understanding, as wood is to the carpenter, as hides to the shoemaker; and my business is the right use of appearances. But the body is nothing to me: the parts of it are nothing to me. Death? Let it come when it chooses, either death of the whole or of a part. Fly, you say. And whither; can any man eject me out of the world? He cannot. But wherever I go, there is the sun, there is the moon, there are the stars, dreams, omens, and the conversation ( ὁμιλία ) with Gods. Then, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic cannot be satisfied with this; but he must know that he is sent a messenger from Zeus to men about good and bad things, to show them that they have wandered and are seeking the substance of good and evil where it is not, but where it is, they never think; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes was carried off to Philip after the battle of Chaeroneia as a spy. For in fact a Cynic is a spy of the things which are good for men and which are evil, and it is his duty to examine carefully and to come and report truly, and not to be struck with terror so as to point out as enemies those who are not enemies, nor in any other way to be perturbed by appearances nor confounded. It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say like Socrates: Men, whither are you hurrying, what are you doing, wretches? like blind people you are wandering up and down: you are going by another road, and have left the true road: you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are not, and if another shows you where they are, you do not believe him. Why do you seek it without? In the body? It is not there. If you doubt, look at Myro, look at Ophellius. In possessions? It is not there. But if you do not believe me, look at Croesus: look at those who are now rich, with what lamentations their life is filled. In power? It is not there. If it is, those must be happy who have been twice and thrice consuls; but they are not. Whom shall we believe in these matters? You who from without see their affairs and are dazzled by an appearance, or the men themselves? What do they say? Hear them when they groan, when they grieve, when on account of these very consulships and glory and splendour they think that they are more wretched and in greater danger. Is it in royal power? It is not: if it were, Nero would have been happy, and Sardanapalus. But neither was Agamemnon happy, though he was a better man than Sardanapalus and Nero; but while others are snoring, what is he doing? Much from his head he tore his rooted hair: Iliad, x. 15. and what does he say himself? I am perplexed, he says, and Disturb’d I am, and my heart out of my bosom Is leaping. Iliad x. 91. Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your possessions? No. Your body? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matter with you? That part of you, whatever it is, has been neglected by you and is corrupted, the part with which we desire, with which we avoid, with which we move towards and move from things. How neglected? He knows not the nature of good for which he is made by nature and the nature of evil; and what is his own, and what belongs to another; and when any thing that belongs to others goes badly, he says, Wo to me, for the Hellenes are in danger. Wretched is his ruling faculty, and alone neglected and uncared for. The Hellenes are going to die destroyed by the Trojans. And if the Trojans do not kill them, will they not die? Yes; but not all at once. What difference then does it make? For if death is an evil, whether men die altogether, or if they die singly, it is equally an evil. Is any thing else then going to happen than the separation of the soul and the body? Nothing. And if the Hellenes perish, is the door closed, and is it not in your power to die? It is. Why then do you lament (and say) Oh, you who are a king and have the sceptre of Zeus? An unhappy king does not exist more than an unhappy god. What then art thou? In truth a shepherd: for you weep as shepherds do, when a wolf has carried off one of their sheep: and these who are governed by you are sheep. And why did you come hither? Was your desire in any danger? was your aversion ( ἔκκλισις )? was your movement (pursuits)? was your avoidance of things? He replies, No; but the wife of my brother was carried off. Was it not then a great gain to be deprived of an adulterous wife?—Shall we be despised then by the Trojans?—What kind of people are the Trojans, wise or foolish? If they are wise, why do you fight with them? If they are fools, why do you care about them? In what then is the good, since it is not in these things? Tell us, you who are lord, messenger and spy. Where you do not think that it is, nor choose to seek it: for if you chose to seek it, you would have found it to be in yourselves; nor would you be wandering out of the way, nor seeking what belongs to others as if it were your own. Turn your thoughts into yourselves: observe the preconceptions which you have. What kind of a thing do you imagine the good to be? That which flows easily, that which is happy, that which is not impeded. Come, and do you not naturally imagine it to be great, do you not imagine it to be valuable? do you not imagine it to be free from harm? In what material then ought you to seek for that which flows easily, for that which is not impeded? in that which serves or in that which is free? In that which is free. Do you possess the body then free or is it in servile condition? We do not know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, of gout, ophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of every thing which is stronger? Yes, it is a slave. How then is it possible that any thing which belongs to the body can be free from hindrance? and how is a thing great or valuable which is naturally dead, or earth, or mud? Well then, do you possess nothing which is free? Perhaps nothing. And who is able to compel you to assent to that which appears false? No man. And who can compel you not to assent to that which appears true? No man. By this then you see that there is something in you naturally free. But to desire or to be averse from, or to move towards an object or to move from it, or to prepare yourself, or to propose to do any thing, which of you can do this, unless he has received an impression of the appearance of that which is profitable or a duty? No man. You have then in these things also something which is not hindered and is free. Wretched men, work out this, take care of this, seek for good here. And how is it possible that a man who has nothing, who is naked, houseless, without a hearth, squalid, without a slave, without a city, can pass a life that flows easily? See, God has sent you a man to show you that it is possible. Look at me, who am without a city, without a house, without possessions, without a slave; I sleep on the ground; I have no wife, no children, no praetorium, but only the earth and heavens, and one poor cloak. And what do I want? Am I not without sorrow? am I not without fear? Am I not free? When did any of you see me failing in the object of my desire? or ever falling into that which I would avoid? did I ever blame God or man? did I ever accuse any man? did any of you ever see me with sorrowful countece? And how do I meet with those whom you are afraid of and admire? Do not I treat them like slaves? Who, when he sees me, does not think that he sees his king and master? This is the language of the Cynics, this their character, this is their purpose. You say No: but their characteristic is the little wallet, and staff, and great jaws: the devouring of all that you give them, or storing it up, or the abusing unseasonably all whom they meet, or displaying their shoulder as a fine thing.—Do you see how you are going to undertake so great a business? First take a mirror: look at your shoulders; observe your loins, your thighs. You are going, my man, to be enrolled as a combatant in the Olympic games, no frigid and miserable contest. In the Olympic games a man is not permitted to be conquered only and to take his departure; but first he must be disgraced in the sight of all the world, not in the sight of Athenians only, or of Lacedaemonians or of Nicopolitans; next he must be whipped also if he has entered into the contests rashly: and before being whipped, he must suffer thirst and heat, and swallow much dust. Reflect more carefully, know thyself, consult the divinity, without God attempt nothing; for if he shall advise you (to do this or anything), be assured that he intends you to become great or to receive many blows. For this very amusing quality is conjoined to a Cynic: he must be flogged like an ass, and when he is flogged, he must love those who flog him, as if he were the father of all, and the brother of all.—You say No; but if a man flogs you, stand in the public place and call out, Caesar, what do I suffer in this state of peace under thy protection. Let us bring the offender before the proconsul.—But what is Caesar to a Cynic, or what is a proconsul or what is any other except him who sent the Cynic down hither, and whom he serves, namely Zeus? Does he call upon any other than Zeus? Is he not convinced that whatever he suffers, it is Zeus who is exercising him? Hercules when he was exercised by Eurystheus did not think that he was wretched, but without hesitation he attempted to execute all that he had in hand. And is he who is trained to the contest and exercised by Zeus going to call out and to be vexed, he who is worthy to bear the sceptre of Diogenes? Hear what Diogenes says to the passers by when he is in a fever, Miserable wretches, will you not stay? but are you going so long a journey to Olympia to see the destruction or the fight of athletes; and will you not choose to see the combat between a fever and a man? Would such a man accuse God who sent him down as if God were treating him unworthily, a man who gloried in his circumstances, and claimed to be an example to those who were passing by? For what shall he accuse him of? because he maintains a decency of behaviour, because he displays his virtue more conspicuously? Well, and what does he say of poverty, about death, about pain? How did he compare his own happiness with that of the great king (the king of Persia)? or rather he thought that there was no comparison between them. For where there are perturbations, and griefs, and fears, and desires not satisfied, and aversions of things which you cannot avoid, and envies and jealousies, how is there a road to happiness there? But where there are corrupt principles, there these things must of necessity be. When the young man asked, if when a Cynic has fallen sick, and a friend asks him to come to his house and to be take care of in his sickness, shall the Cynic accept the invitation, he replied, And where shall you find, I ask, a Cynic’s friend? For the man who invites ought to be such another as the Cynic that he may be worthy of being reckoned the Cynic’s friend. He ought to be a partner in the Cynic’s sceptre and his royalty, and a worthy minister, if he intends to be considered worthy of a Cynic’s friendship, as Diogenes was a friend of Antisthenes, as Crates was a friend of Diogenes. Do you think that if a man comes to a Cynic and salutes him, that he is the Cynic’s friend, and that the Cynic will think him worthy of receiving a Cynio into his house? So that if you please, reflect on this also: rather look round for some convenient dunghill on which you shall bear your fever and which will shelter you from the north wind that you may not be chilled. But you seem to me to wish to go into some man’s house and to be well fed there for a time. Why then do you think of attempting so great a thing (as the life of a Cynic)? But, said the young man, shall marriage and the procreation of children as a chief duty be undertaken by the Cynic? If you grant me a community of wise men, Epictetus replies, perhaps no man will readily apply himself to the Cynic practice. For on whose account should he undertake this manner of life? However if we suppose that he does, nothing will prevent him from marrying and begetting children; for his wife will be another like himself, and his father in law another like himself, and his children will be brought up like himself. But in the present state of things which is like that of an army placed in battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should without any distraction be employed only on the ministration of God, It is remarkable that Epictetus here uses the same word ( ἀπερισπάστως ) with St. Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 35, and urges the same consideration, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from marriage. His observation too that the state of things was then ( ὡς ἐν παρατάξει ) like that of an army prepared for battle, nearly resembles the Apostle’s ( ἐνεστῶσα ἀνάγκη ) present necessity. St. Paul says 2 Tim. ii. 4 ( οὐδεὶς στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται etc.) no man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of life. So Epictetus says here that a Cynic must not be ( ἐμπεπλεγμένον ) in relations etc. From these and many other passages of Epictetus one would be inclined to think that he was not unacquainted with St. Paul’s Epistles or that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine. Mrs. Carter. I do not find any evidence of Epictetus being acquainted with the Epistles of Paul. It is possible that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine, but I have not observed any evidence of the fact. Epictetus and Paul have not the same opinion about marriage, for Paul says that if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn. Accordingly his doctrine is to avoid fornication let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband. He does not directly say what a man should do when he is not able to maintain a wife; but the inference is plain what he will do (I Cor. vii. 2). Paul’s view of marriage differs from that of Epictetus, who recommends marriage. Paul does not: he writes, I say therefore to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they abide even as I. He does not acknowledge marriage and the begetting of children as a duty; which Epictetus did. In the present condition of the world Epictetus says that the minister of God should not marry, because the cares of a family would distract him and make him unable to discharge his duties. There is sound sense in this. A minister of God should not be distracted by the cares of a family, especially if he is poor. able to go about among men, not tied down to the common duties of mankind, nor entangled in the ordinary relations of life, which if he neglects, he will not maintain the character of an honourable and good man? and if he observes them he will lose the character of the messenger, and spy and herald of God. For consider that it is his duty to do something towards his father in law, something to the other kinsfolks of his wife, something to his wife also (if he has one). He is also excluded by being a Cynic from looking after the sickness of his own family, and from providing for their support. And to say nothing of the rest, he must have a vessel for heating water for the child that he may wash it in the bath; wool for his wife when she is delivered of a child, oil, a bed, a cup: so the furniture of the house is increased. I say nothing of his other occupations, and of his distraction. Where then now is that king, he who devotes himself to the public interests, The people’s guardian and so full of cares. Homer, Iliad ii. 25 whose duty it is to look after others, the married and those who have children; to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly; who quarrels; what family is well administered, what is not; going about as a physician does and feels pulses? He says to one, you have a fever, to another you have a head-ache, or the gout: he says to one, abstain from food; to another he says, eat; or do not use the bath; to another, you require the knife, or the cautery. How can he have time for this who is tied to the duties of common life? is it not his duty to supply clothing to his children, and to send them to the school-master with writing tablets, and styles (for writing). Besides must he not supply them with beds? for they cannot be genuine Cynics as soon as they are born. If he does not do this, it would be better to expose the children as soon as they are born than to kill them in this way. Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down to, how we are taking his royalty from him.—Yes, but Crates took a wife.—You are speaking of a circumstance which arose from love and of a woman who was another Crates. But we are inquiring about ordinary marriages and those which are free from distractions, and making this inquiry we do not find the affair of marriage in this state of the world a thing which is especially suited to the Cynic. How then shall a man maintain the existence of society? In the name of God, are those men greater benefactors to society who introduce into the world to occupy their own places two or three grunting children, or those who superintend as far as they can all mankind, and see what they do, how they live, what they attend to, what they neglect contrary to their duty? Did they who left little children to the Thebans do them more good than Epaminondas who died childless? And did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons or Danaus or Aeolus contribute more to the community than Homer? then shall the duty of a general or the business of a writer exclude a man from marriage or the begetting of children, and such a man shall not be judged to have accepted the condition of childlessness for nothing; and shall not the royalty of a Cynic be considered an equivalent for the want of children? Do we not perceive his grandeur and do we not justly contemplate the character of Diogenes; and do we instead of this turn our eyes to the present Cynics who are dogs that wait at tables, and in no respect imitate the Cynics of old except perchance in breaking wind, but in nothing else? For such matters would not have moved us at all nor should we have wondered if a Cynic should not marry or beget children. Man, the Cynic is the father of all men; the men are his sons, the women are his daughters: he so carefully visits all, so well does he care for all. Do you think that it is from idle impertinence that he rebukes those whom he meets? He does it as a father, as a brother, and as the minister of the father of all, the minister of Zeus. If you please, ask me also if a Cynic shall engage in the administration of the state. Fool, do you seek a greater form of administration than that in which he is engaged? Do you ask if he shall appear among the Athenians and say something about the revenues and the supplies, he who must talk with all men, alike with Athenians, alike with Corinthians, alike with Romans, not about supplies, nor yet about revenues, nor about peace or war, but about happiness and unhappiness, about good fortune and bad fortune, about slavery and freedom? When a man has undertaken the administration of such a state, do you ask me if he shall engage in the administration of a state? ask me also if he shall govern (hold a magisterial office): again I will say to you, Fool, what greater government shall he exercise than that which he exercises now? It is necessary also for such a man (the Cynic) to have a certain habit of body: for if he appears to be consumptive, thin and pale, his testimony has not then the same weight. For he must not only by showing the qualities of the soul prove to the vulgar that it is in his power independent of the things which they admire to be a good man, but he must also show by his body that his simple and frugal way of living in the open air does not injure even the body. See, he says, I am a proof of this, and my own body also is. So Diogenes used to do, for he used to go about fresh looking, and he attracted the notice of the many by his personal appearance. But if a Cynic is an object of compassion, he seems to be a beggar: all persons turn away from him, all are offended with him; for neither ought he to appear dirty so that he shall not also in this respect drive away men; but his very roughness ought to be clean and attractive. There ought also to belong to the Cynic much natural grace and sharpness; and if this is not so, he is a stupid fellow, and nothing else; and he must have these qualities that he may be able readily and fitly to be a match for all circumstances that may happen. So Diogenes replied to one who said, Are you the Diogenes who does not believe that there are gods? And, how, replied Diogenes, can this be when I think that you are odious to the gods? On another occasion in reply to Alexander, who stood by him when he was sleeping, and quoted Homer’s line (Iliad, ii. 24) A man a councillor should not sleep all night, he answered, when he was half asleep, The people’s guardian and so full of cares. But before all the Cynic’s ruling faculty must be purer than the sun; and if it is not, he must necessarily be a cunning knave and a fellow of no principle, since while he himself is entangled in some vice he will reprove others. For see how the matter stands: to these kings and tyrants their guards and arms give the power of reproving some persons, and of being able even to punish those who do wrong though they are themselves bad; but to a Cynic instead of arms and guards it is conscience ( τὸ συνειδός ) which gives this power. When he knows that he has watched and laboured for mankind, and has slept pure, and sleep has left him still purer, and that he thought whatever he has thought as a friend of the gods, as a minister, as a participator of the power of Zeus, and that on all occasions he is ready to say Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O Destiny; and also, If so it pleases the gods, so let it be; why should he not have confidence to speak freely to his own brothers, to his children, in a word to his kinsmen? For this reason he is neither over curious nor a busybody when he is in this state of mind; for he is not a meddler with the affairs of others when he is superintending human affairs, but he is looking after his own affairs. If that is not so, you may also say that the general is a busybody, when he inspects his soldiers, and examines them and watches them and punishes the disorderly. But if while you have a cake under your arm, you rebuke others, I will say to you, Will you not rather go away into a corner and eat that which you have stolen; what have you to do with the affairs of others? For who are you? are you the bull of the herd, or the queen of the bees? Show me the tokens of your supremacy, such as they have from nature. But if you are a drone claiming the sovereignty over the bees, do you not suppose that your fellow citizens will put you down as the bees do the drones? The Cynic also ought to have such power of endurance as to seem insensible to the common sort and a stone: no man reviles him, no man strikes him, no man insults him, but he gives his body that any man who chooses may do with it what he likes. For he bears in mind that the inferior must be overpowered by the superior in that in which it is inferior; and the body is inferior to the many, the weaker to the stronger. He never then descends into such a contest in which he can be overpowered; but he immediately withdraws from things which belong to others, he claims not the things which are servile. But where there is will and the use of appearances, there you will see how many eyes he has so that you may say, Argus was blind compared with him. Is his assent ever hasty, his movement (towards an object) rash, does his desire ever fail in its object, does that which he would avoid befal him, is his purpose unaccomplished, does he ever find fault, is he ever humiliated, is he ever envious? To these he directs all his attention and energy; but as to every thing else he snores supine. All is peace; there is no robber who takes away his will, no tyrant. But what say you as to his body? I say there is. And his possessions? I say there is. And as to magistracies and honours?— What does he care for them?—When then any person would frighten him through them, he says to him, Begone, look for children: masks are formidable to them; but I know that they are made of shell, and they have nothing inside. About such a matter as this you are deliberating. Therefore, if you please, I urge you in God’s name, defer the matter, and first consider your preparation for it. For see what Hector says to Andromache, Retire rather, he says, into the house and weave: War is the work of men of all indeed, but specially ’tis mine. II. vi. 490. So he was conscious of his own qualification, and knew her weakness.
4.1.86 HE is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action ( ὁρμαί ) are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid ( ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι ). Who then chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any bad man free. If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this, if you add, But you are a wise man; this is nothing to you: he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, and say, You differ not at all from those who have been thrice sold as to being yourself not a slave, what else ought you to expect than blows? For he says, What, I a slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free I whom no man can purchase: I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of Caesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves.—In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this to you? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you a coward; if they had the power of self-restraint, and you are not able to exercise it. And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing to do with being a slave? It is something, you say: but who is able to compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar? Then even you yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this console you at all: but know that you are a slave in a great family. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim, By the fortune of Caesar, we are free. However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at present. But tell me this: did you never love any person, a young girl, or slave, or free? What then is this with respect to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by the person beloved to do something which you did not wish to do? have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? And yet if any man compelled you to kiss Caesar’s feet, you would think it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else then is slavery? Did you never go oat by night to some place whither you did not wish to go, did you not expend that you did not wish to expend, did you not utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to abuse and to be excluded? But if you are ashamed to confess your own acts, see what Thrasonides says and does, who having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave) does not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would have cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? A worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did. Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a girl, and a worthless girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why do you talk of your service in the army? Then he calls for a sword and is angry with him who out of kindness refuses it; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and intreats and weeps, and on the other hand having had a little success he is elated. But even then how? was he free enough neither to desire nor to fear? Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ the notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed them, and some take them about; and who will say that this lion is free? Is it not the fact that the more he lives at his ease, so much the more he is in a slavish condition? and who if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these lions? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to escape? and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardly live and with suffering pine away; and if they ever find any opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this? What do you say? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the open air, to sing when I choose: you deprive me of all this, and say, what harm is it to you? For this reason we shall say that those animals only are free, which cannot endure capture, but as soon as they are caught. escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that there is only one way to freedom, and that is to die content: and he writes to the Persian king. You cannot enslave the Athenian state any more than you can enslave fishes. How is that? cannot I catch them? If you catch them, says Diogenes, they will immediately leave you, as fishes do; for if you catch a fish, it dies; and if these men that are caught shall die, of what use to you is the preparation for war? These are the words of a free man who had carefully examined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it. But if you look for it in a different place from where it is, what wonder if you never find it? The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why? Do you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of twentieths? No; but because he imagines that hitherto through not having obtained this, he is hindered and unfortunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness, I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them, I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go where I choose. Then he is set free; and forthwith having no place where he can eat, he looks for some man to flatter, some one with whom he shall sup: then he either works with his body and endures the most dreadful things; and if he can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than his former slavery; or even if he is become rich, being a man without any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a slave again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery? Another clothed me, another supplied me with shoes, another fed me, another looked after me in sickness; and I did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man, what things I suffer, being a slave to many instead of to one. But however, he says, if I shall acquire rings then I shall live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to acquire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of; then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same. Then he says, If I shall be engaged in military service, I am free from all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers as much as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a second service and a third. After this, when he has put the finishing stroke (the colophon) to his career, and is become a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the assembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery—not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, what is the nature of each thing that exists, and that a man should not rashly adapt preconceptions ( προλήψεις ) to the several things which are. For this is the cause to men of all their evils, the not being able to adapt the general preconceptions to the several things. But we have different opinions (about the cause of our evils). One man thinks that he is sick: not so however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his preconceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor; another that he has a severe father or mother; and another again that Caesar is not favourable to him. But all this is one and only one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions. For who has not a preconception of that which is bad, that it is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every way to be guarded against? One preconception is not repugt to another, only where it comes to the matter of adaptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful, and a thing to be avoided? He answers not to be Caesar’s friend.—He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adaptation, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at all pertinent to the matter; for when he has succeeded in being Caesar’s friend, never the less he has failed in finding what he sought. For what is that which every man seeks? To live secure, to be happy, to do every thing as he wishes, not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance? free from compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy? of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? Come forward and tell us when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar’s friend? Immediately you hear the answer, Stop, I intreat you, and do not mock me: you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth: then come troubles and cares—Well, when did you sup with more pleasure, now or before? Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained: and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do any thing foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid of; lest he should be lashed like a slave? How can he expect any thing so good? No, but as befits so great a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And when did you bathe more free from trouble, and take your gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine, which kind of life did you prefer? your present or your former life? I can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar. Since then neither those who are called kings live as they choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who are free? Seek, and you will find; for you have aids from nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able yourself by going along these ways only to discover that which follows, listen to those who have made the inquiry. What do they say? Does freedom seem to you a good thing? The greatest good. Is it possible then that he who obtains the greatest good can be unhappy or fare badly? No. Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do declare it. We have now then got away from buying and selling and from such arrangements about matters of property: for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he cannot be free, nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who has been twice consul.—Be it so. Further then answer me this question also, does freedom seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?—How should it not seem so? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be mean?—It is not possible—When then you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government (province) or a consulship: and call these men little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.—This is admitted also—Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self governing?— Certainly—Whomsoever then it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I intreat you, after his grandfathers and great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, Master, even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, Wretch that I am, how much I suffer, call him a slave. If finally you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave though he wears a praetexta. If then he is doing nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune; and if you find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia: say that his master is from home: he will return soon, and you will know what he suffers. Who will return? Whoever has in himself the power over anything which is desired by the man, either to give it to him or to take it away? Thus then have we many masters? We have: for we have circumstances as masters prior to our present masters; and these circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be that those who have the power over any of these circumstances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar himself, but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth, the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When we love, and hate and fear these things, it must be that those who have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore we adore them even as gods; for we think that what possesses the power of conferring the greatest advantage on us is divine. Then we wrongly assume ( ὑποτάσσομεν ) that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages; therefore he is something divine. For if we wrongly assume that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages, it is a necessary consequence that the conclusion from these premises must be false. What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then is it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a general way: but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others can be free from hindrance? No—Is it possible for him to be unimpeded? No—Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then: whether we have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of others.—What do you mean?— When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it in your power or not?—It is not in my power—When you wish it to be healthy?—Neither is this in my power.— When you wish it to be handsome?—Nor is this—Life or death?—Neither is this in my power.—Your body then is another’s, subject to every man who is stronger than yourself—It is—But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please?—No—And your slaves?—No—And your clothes?—No—And your house?—No—And your horses?—Not one of these things—And if you wish by all means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your power?—This also is not in my power. Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you any thing of the kind?—I know not—Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii. 22, 42. In the matter of assent then : this is the third τόρος or locus or division in philosophy (iii. 2, 1–5). As to the Will, compare i. 17, note 10. Epictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds, which begin with the words, I believe etc., he knows or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to profess or to express the same belief: but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God, if he denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe; or in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to any thing which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances. To return to the matter under consideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when lie believes that it is not true; and this act of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Yet it is said (Mark xvi. 11,) in the received text, as it now stands, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians; but all men do not admit the explanation to be sufficient: and it does not concern the present subject. —No man—In the matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction.—Granted—Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that to which you do not choose?—He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then, you despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him?—No—Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours?—It is my act—It is your own act then also to desire to move towards a thing: or is it not so?—It is my own act—But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also is your act—What then if I have attempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me—What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?—No: but my poor body—Yes, as he would do with a stone— Granted; but I no longer walk—And who told you that walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to move: but where there is need of body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted this also—And who can compel you to desire what you do not wish?—No man—And to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man compel you?—He cannot do this: but he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire.—If you desire any thing which is your own, and one of the things which cannot be hindered, how will he hinder you?—He cannot in any way—Who then tells you that he who desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance? Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor any thing else that belongs to another: for what is not in your power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave; you have subjected your neck, if you admire any thing not your own, to every thing that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to which you have conceived a liking.—Is not my hand my own?—It is a part of your own body; but it is by nature earth, subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of every thing which is stronger. And why do I say your hand? You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there be a press, and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist, nor murmur; if you do, you will receive blows, and never the less you will also lose the ass. But when you ought to feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains to be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder. Let these also go: get rid of them quicker and more readily than of the ass. When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear any man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? about the things which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and who has power over these things? who can take them away? who can impede them? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are not yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have you come to the philosophers? was it that you may never the less be unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are within the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a proper and regulated desire: but of the things which are not in the power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty. When then you are thus affected towards things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? For what has a man which is formidable to another, either when you see him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him? Not more than one horse has with respect to another, or one dog to another, or one bee to another bee. Things indeed are formidable to every man; and when any man is able to confer these things on another or to take them away, then he too becomes formidable. How then is an acropolis (a stronghold or fortress, the seat of tyranny) demolished? Not by the sword, not by fire, but by opinion. For if we abolish the acropolis which is in the city, can we abolish also that of fever, and that of beautiful women? Can we in a word abolish the acropolis which is in us and cast out the tyrants within us, whom we have daily over us, sometimes the same tyrants, at other times different tyrants? But with this we must begin, and with this we must demolish the acropolis and eject the tyrants, by giving up the body, the parts of it, the faculties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices, honours, children, brothers, friends, by considering all these things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been ejected from us, why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall of circumvallation, at least on my account; for if it still stands, what does it do to me? why do I still eject (the tyrant’s) guards? For where do I perceive them? against others they have their fasces, and their spears and their swords. But I have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled when I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed my movements towards action ( ὁρμήν ) in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should move towards any thing? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain any thing? It is my wish also. Does he not will? I do not wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the rack? It is my will then to die: it is my will then to be put to the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hinder or compel Zeus. Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companionship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world the wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest. Where is there any place of refuge? how shall he pass along without being attacked by robbers? what company shall he wait for that he may pass along in safety? to whom shall he attach himself? To what person generally? to the rich man, to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments. But what if the fellow companion himself turns against me and becomes my robber, what shall I do? I will be a friend of Caesar: when I am Caesar’s companion no man will wrong me. In the first place, that I may become illustrious, what things must I endure and suffer? how often and by how many must I be robbed? Then, if I become Caesar’s friend, he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstance becomes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a desert? Well, does fever not come there? What shall be done then? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faithful one, strong, secure against all surprises? Thus he considers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his journey in safety. How do you understand attaching yourself to God? In this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then shall this be done? In what other way than by examining the movements ( ὁρμάς , the acts) of God Schweig. expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word ( ὁρμάς ) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it Dei appetitionem, and Upton impetum. He says that he has translated it consilium. It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words in which they speak of man. and his administration? What has he given to me as my own and in my own power? what has he reserved to himself? He has given to me the things which are in the power of the will ( τὰ προαιρετικὰ ): he has put them in my power free from impediment and hindrance. How was he able to make the earthy body free from hindrance? He could not, and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole ( τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ ) possessions, household things, house, children, wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what does not depend on the will? why do I will to have absolutely what is not granted to me? But how ought I to will to have things? In the way in which they are given and as long as they are given. But he who has given takes away. Why then do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For whence had I things when I came into the world?— My father gave them to me—And who gave them to him? and who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth? and who the seasons? and who made the connection of men with one another and their fellowship? Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen?—No; but I would still enjoy the feast.—The initiated too would wish to be longer in the initiation: and perhaps also those at Olympia to see other athletes; but the solemnity is ended: go away like a grateful and modest man; make room for others: others also must be born, as you were, and being born they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the world?—Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife—What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to him who is superior?—Why then did he introduce me into the world on these conditions?—And if the conditions do not suit you, depart. And is this all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can give to the good man under severe distress? Either tell yourself that present suffering void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your existence and mingle with the elements of the Universe ! Unspeakably more rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master’s exhortation to the persecuted Christian: Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. Mrs. Carter. I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, as he assumes, believers in God or in the Gods, and his argument is that a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are from God. If he cannot be contented with things as they are, and make the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also a believer in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to him also. The case is past help or advice. The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly ( πανήγυρις ); for they did not when they were present behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers of magimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom.—For what purpose then have I received these things? —To use them—How long?—So long as he who has lent them chooses.—What if they are necessary to me?—Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary: do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary. This study you ought to practise from morning to evening, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small estate in land: then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers. Look all round and throw these things from you (which are not yours). Purge your opinions, so that nothing cleave to you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you; and say, while you are daily exercising yourself as you do there (in the school), not that you are philosophizing, for this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are presenting an asserter of freedom: for this is really freedom. To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For this reason when he was taken prisoner, how did he behave to the pirates? Did he call any of them master? and I do not speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of the state of mind, by which the word is produced. How did he reprove them for feeding badly their captives? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? no; but a slave. And when he was sold how did he behave to his master? Immediately he disputed with him and said to his master that he ought not to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner; and about the children he told them how he ought to bring them up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had bought an exercise master, would he have employed him in the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master? and sc if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in every matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then generally possesses the science of life, what else must he be than master? For who is master in a ship? The man who governs the helm? Why? Because he who will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then without suffering for it? So I also used to think. But because he cannot do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is not in his power: and no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in chains? what do you think that is? The fact of putting the slave in chains:—and you also will admit this, if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then is a man’s nature? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison and to behead? No; but to do good, to co-operate with others, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condition, whether you chose to admit it or not, when he is acting foolishly. Socrates then did not fare badly?—No; but his judges and his accusers did.—Nor did Helvidius at Rome fare badly?—No; but his murderer did. How do you mean?— The same as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when he has gained the victory and been severely wounded; but that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and is unhurt: nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pursues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating, when you see him in pain and panting violently after running. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say that the evil in every thing is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing? Is this a paradox? for do you not say this in the case of all other things? Why then in the case of man only do you think differently? But because we say that the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you will not say that this is a paradox? It is not—What then is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded? does he not, if he suffers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and profit? But is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful and disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or viper or wasp? Well then let us recapitulate the things which have been agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances against his will, is a slave. But who is free from restraint? He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And what are the things which belong to others? Those which are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner. Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to another, possession (property) belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pay the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul Lead me, O Zeus, and thou 0 destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go. But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me—Let me consider—Will you consider now? But when you were in the school, what was it which you used to consider? Did you not study what are the things that are good and what are bad, and what things are neither one nor the other?—I did.—What then was our opinion?—That just and honourable acts were good; and that unjust and disgraceful (foul) acts were bad.—Is life a good thing?—No.—Is death a bad thing?—No.—Is prison?—No.—But what did we think about mean and faithless words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant?—That they are bad.—Well then, you are not considering, nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the matter for consideration, is it whether it is becoming for me, when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to avoid) the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and necessary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you really imagined that base things were bad and honourable things were good, and that all other things were neither good nor bad, you would not even have approached this enquiry, nor have come near it; but immediately you would have been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses? How then do you now say that you are considering whether things which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more than things which are bad? But you do not possess these opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to be neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the greatest evils; nor do you think those other things (mean and faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have accustomed yourself. Where am I? In the schools: and are any listening to me? I am discoursing among philosophers. But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of scholars and fools. Thus a friend is overpowered by the testimony of a philosopher: thus a philosopher becomes a parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money: thus in the senate a man does not say what he thinks; in private (in the school) he proclaims his opinions. You are a cold and miserable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the report)?—I do not say, that your child is dead—for how could you bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by you while you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philosopher, you say something different in the school. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are only a worm, do you say that you are a man? I should like to be present when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is uttering, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads. And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this, whether you who are rich choose or not.—And who is your evidence for this?—who else than yourselves? who have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedience to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a scowling countece; you who court old women and old men, and say, I cannot do this: it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power? Did you not lately contend with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla has hindered me? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one to assert your freedom ( καρπιοτήν ), when you have so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to follow it, one might consider him still more worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner a divine power. But who could endure you who are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old women’s noses, and wash them and give them presents, and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead, and question the physicians whether they are sick unto death? And again, when in order to obtain these great and much admired magistracies and honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who gave it to you? I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help of Felicion and endure his arrogance and servile insolence: for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride. You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the Gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free?—not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it: if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered that every thing which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes:— For this reason, he says, Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the Lacedaemonians, as you please. Was it because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians because they were born of slaves, could not talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because law is every thing to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free. And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by whom he could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he exposed himself to danger most unsparingly; and when he was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliberate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal), if it so happened. And what difference did that make to him? for he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. Then when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life, did he behave like a man who had children, who had a wife? No, but he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do when he was (ordered) to drink the poison, and when he had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socrates say? did he consider the power of escape as an unexpected gain? By no means: he considered what was fit and proper; but the rest he did not even look at or take into the reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act; he who would not put the Athenians to the vote when they clamoured that he should do so, he who refused to obey the tyrants, he who discoursed in such a manner about virtue and right behaviour. It is not possible to save such a man’s life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away. For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting beyond the proper time. What then shall the children of Socrates do? If, said Socrates, I had gone off to Thessaly, would you have taken care of them; and if I depart to the world below, will there be no man to take care of them? See how he gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you and I had been in his place, we should have immediately answered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be repaid in the same way, and we should have added, I shall be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be useful to no man. For, if it had been necessary, we should have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And how in that case should we have been useful to any man? for where would they have been then staying? or if we were useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought? And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive. This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued: the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. The life of the dead, says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Roman jurist and Cicero’s friend, rests in the remembrance of the living. Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or could not have used.—Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man’s daily life and his intercourse with other men: in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will; and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was as he said, to know himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle, Know thyself ( γνῶθι σεαυτόν ): and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the end of man; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates was conformable to his life and teaching. Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenophon, Apol. § 22 ), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind. (Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus, by F. C. Baur.) This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However the essay is well worth the trouble of reading. The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. What prejudices, what blindness must a man have, says Rousseau, when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of Mary!—The death of Socrates philosophising tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire; that of Jesus expiring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that: man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it and weeps; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God. (Rousseau, Emile, vol. iii. p. 166. Amsterdam, 1765 .) Think of these things, these opinions, these words: look to these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished: and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging and in a word to give up all which is not your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar’s residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to those who have not yet obtained them there is an imagination ( φαντασία ), that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you have laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make you free; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man: be seen about a philosopher’s doors: you will not disgrace yourself by being seen; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least: the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful. 4.1.87 HE is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action ( ὁρμαί ) are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid ( ἐκκλίσεις ἀπερίπτωτοι ). Who then chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any bad man free. If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this, if you add, But you are a wise man; this is nothing to you: he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, and say, You differ not at all from those who have been thrice sold as to being yourself not a slave, what else ought you to expect than blows? For he says, What, I a slave, I whose father was free, whose mother was free I whom no man can purchase: I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of Caesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves.—In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is possible, what is this to you? What if they were of a noble nature, and you of a mean nature; if they were fearless, and you a coward; if they had the power of self-restraint, and you are not able to exercise it. And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave? Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing to do with being a slave? It is something, you say: but who is able to compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar? Then even you yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this console you at all: but know that you are a slave in a great family. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim, By the fortune of Caesar, we are free. However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at present. But tell me this: did you never love any person, a young girl, or slave, or free? What then is this with respect to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by the person beloved to do something which you did not wish to do? have you never flattered your little slave? have you never kissed her feet? And yet if any man compelled you to kiss Caesar’s feet, you would think it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else then is slavery? Did you never go oat by night to some place whither you did not wish to go, did you not expend that you did not wish to expend, did you not utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to abuse and to be excluded? But if you are ashamed to confess your own acts, see what Thrasonides says and does, who having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave) does not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would have cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? A worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did. Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a girl, and a worthless girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why do you talk of your service in the army? Then he calls for a sword and is angry with him who out of kindness refuses it; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and intreats and weeps, and on the other hand having had a little success he is elated. But even then how? was he free enough neither to desire nor to fear? Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ the notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed them, and some take them about; and who will say that this lion is free? Is it not the fact that the more he lives at his ease, so much the more he is in a slavish condition? and who if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these lions? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to escape? and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardly live and with suffering pine away; and if they ever find any opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this? What do you say? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the open air, to sing when I choose: you deprive me of all this, and say, what harm is it to you? For this reason we shall say that those animals only are free, which cannot endure capture, but as soon as they are caught. escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that there is only one way to freedom, and that is to die content: and he writes to the Persian king. You cannot enslave the Athenian state any more than you can enslave fishes. How is that? cannot I catch them? If you catch them, says Diogenes, they will immediately leave you, as fishes do; for if you catch a fish, it dies; and if these men that are caught shall die, of what use to you is the preparation for war? These are the words of a free man who had carefully examined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it. But if you look for it in a different place from where it is, what wonder if you never find it? The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why? Do you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of twentieths? No; but because he imagines that hitherto through not having obtained this, he is hindered and unfortunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness, I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them, I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go where I choose. Then he is set free; and forthwith having no place where he can eat, he looks for some man to flatter, some one with whom he shall sup: then he either works with his body and endures the most dreadful things; and if he can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than his former slavery; or even if he is become rich, being a man without any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a slave again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery? Another clothed me, another supplied me with shoes, another fed me, another looked after me in sickness; and I did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man, what things I suffer, being a slave to many instead of to one. But however, he says, if I shall acquire rings then I shall live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to acquire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of; then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same. Then he says, If I shall be engaged in military service, I am free from all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers as much as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a second service and a third. After this, when he has put the finishing stroke (the colophon) to his career, and is become a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the assembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery—not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, what is the nature of each thing that exists, and that a man should not rashly adapt preconceptions ( προλήψεις ) to the several things which are. For this is the cause to men of all their evils, the not being able to adapt the general preconceptions to the several things. But we have different opinions (about the cause of our evils). One man thinks that he is sick: not so however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his preconceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor; another that he has a severe father or mother; and another again that Caesar is not favourable to him. But all this is one and only one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions. For who has not a preconception of that which is bad, that it is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every way to be guarded against? One preconception is not repugt to another, only where it comes to the matter of adaptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful, and a thing to be avoided? He answers not to be Caesar’s friend.—He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adaptation, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at all pertinent to the matter; for when he has succeeded in being Caesar’s friend, never the less he has failed in finding what he sought. For what is that which every man seeks? To live secure, to be happy, to do every thing as he wishes, not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance? free from compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy? of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? Come forward and tell us when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar’s friend? Immediately you hear the answer, Stop, I intreat you, and do not mock me: you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth: then come troubles and cares—Well, when did you sup with more pleasure, now or before? Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained: and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do any thing foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid of; lest he should be lashed like a slave? How can he expect any thing so good? No, but as befits so great a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And when did you bathe more free from trouble, and take your gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine, which kind of life did you prefer? your present or your former life? I can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar. Since then neither those who are called kings live as they choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who are free? Seek, and you will find; for you have aids from nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able yourself by going along these ways only to discover that which follows, listen to those who have made the inquiry. What do they say? Does freedom seem to you a good thing? The greatest good. Is it possible then that he who obtains the greatest good can be unhappy or fare badly? No. Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do declare it. We have now then got away from buying and selling and from such arrangements about matters of property: for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he cannot be free, nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who has been twice consul.—Be it so. Further then answer me this question also, does freedom seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?—How should it not seem so? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be mean?—It is not possible—When then you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government (province) or a consulship: and call these men little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.—This is admitted also—Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self governing?— Certainly—Whomsoever then it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I intreat you, after his grandfathers and great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, Master, even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, Wretch that I am, how much I suffer, call him a slave. If finally you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave though he wears a praetexta. If then he is doing nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune; and if you find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia: say that his master is from home: he will return soon, and you will know what he suffers. Who will return? Whoever has in himself the power over anything which is desired by the man, either to give it to him or to take it away? Thus then have we many masters? We have: for we have circumstances as masters prior to our present masters; and these circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be that those who have the power over any of these circumstances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar himself, but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth, the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When we love, and hate and fear these things, it must be that those who have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore we adore them even as gods; for we think that what possesses the power of conferring the greatest advantage on us is divine. Then we wrongly assume ( ὑποτάσσομεν ) that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages; therefore he is something divine. For if we wrongly assume that a certain person has the power of conferring the greatest advantages, it is a necessary consequence that the conclusion from these premises must be false. What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then is it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a general way: but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others can be free from hindrance? No—Is it possible for him to be unimpeded? No—Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then: whether we have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of others.—What do you mean?— When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it in your power or not?—It is not in my power—When you wish it to be healthy?—Neither is this in my power.— When you wish it to be handsome?—Nor is this—Life or death?—Neither is this in my power.—Your body then is another’s, subject to every man who is stronger than yourself—It is—But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please?—No—And your slaves?—No—And your clothes?—No—And your house?—No—And your horses?—Not one of these things—And if you wish by all means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your power?—This also is not in my power. Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you any thing of the kind?—I know not—Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii. 22, 42. In the matter of assent then : this is the third τόρος or locus or division in philosophy (iii. 2, 1–5). As to the Will, compare i. 17, note 10. Epictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds, which begin with the words, I believe etc., he knows or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to profess or to express the same belief: but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God, if he denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe; or in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to any thing which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances. To return to the matter under consideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when lie believes that it is not true; and this act of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Yet it is said (Mark xvi. 11,) in the received text, as it now stands, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians; but all men do not admit the explanation to be sufficient: and it does not concern the present subject. —No man—In the matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction.—Granted—Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that to which you do not choose?—He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then, you despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him?—No—Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours?—It is my act—It is your own act then also to desire to move towards a thing: or is it not so?—It is my own act—But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also is your act—What then if I have attempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me—What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?—No: but my poor body—Yes, as he would do with a stone— Granted; but I no longer walk—And who told you that walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to move: but where there is need of body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted this also—And who can compel you to desire what you do not wish?—No man—And to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present themselves, can any man compel you?—He cannot do this: but he will hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire.—If you desire any thing which is your own, and one of the things which cannot be hindered, how will he hinder you?—He cannot in any way—Who then tells you that he who desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance? Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor any thing else that belongs to another: for what is not in your power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave; you have subjected your neck, if you admire any thing not your own, to every thing that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to which you have conceived a liking.—Is not my hand my own?—It is a part of your own body; but it is by nature earth, subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of every thing which is stronger. And why do I say your hand? You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there be a press, and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist, nor murmur; if you do, you will receive blows, and never the less you will also lose the ass. But when you ought to feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains to be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder. Let these also go: get rid of them quicker and more readily than of the ass. When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear any man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? about the things which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and who has power over these things? who can take them away? who can impede them? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be afraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are not yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have you come to the philosophers? was it that you may never the less be unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are within the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a proper and regulated desire: but of the things which are not in the power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty. When then you are thus affected towards things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? For what has a man which is formidable to another, either when you see him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him? Not more than one horse has with respect to another, or one dog to another, or one bee to another bee. Things indeed are formidable to every man; and when any man is able to confer these things on another or to take them away, then he too becomes formidable. How then is an acropolis (a stronghold or fortress, the seat of tyranny) demolished? Not by the sword, not by fire, but by opinion. For if we abolish the acropolis which is in the city, can we abolish also that of fever, and that of beautiful women? Can we in a word abolish the acropolis which is in us and cast out the tyrants within us, whom we have daily over us, sometimes the same tyrants, at other times different tyrants? But with this we must begin, and with this we must demolish the acropolis and eject the tyrants, by giving up the body, the parts of it, the faculties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices, honours, children, brothers, friends, by considering all these things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been ejected from us, why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall of circumvallation, at least on my account; for if it still stands, what does it do to me? why do I still eject (the tyrant’s) guards? For where do I perceive them? against others they have their fasces, and their spears and their swords. But I have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled when I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed my movements towards action ( ὁρμήν ) in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should move towards any thing? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain any thing? It is my wish also. Does he not will? I do not wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the rack? It is my will then to die: it is my will then to be put to the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hinder or compel Zeus. Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companionship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world the wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest. Where is there any place of refuge? how shall he pass along without being attacked by robbers? what company shall he wait for that he may pass along in safety? to whom shall he attach himself? To what person generally? to the rich man, to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments. But what if the fellow companion himself turns against me and becomes my robber, what shall I do? I will be a friend of Caesar: when I am Caesar’s companion no man will wrong me. In the first place, that I may become illustrious, what things must I endure and suffer? how often and by how many must I be robbed? Then, if I become Caesar’s friend, he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstance becomes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a desert? Well, does fever not come there? What shall be done then? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faithful one, strong, secure against all surprises? Thus he considers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his journey in safety. How do you understand attaching yourself to God? In this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then shall this be done? In what other way than by examining the movements ( ὁρμάς , the acts) of God Schweig. expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word ( ὁρμάς ) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it Dei appetitionem, and Upton impetum. He says that he has translated it consilium. It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words in which they speak of man. and his administration? What has he given to me as my own and in my own power? what has he reserved to himself? He has given to me the things which are in the power of the will ( τὰ προαιρετικὰ ): he has put them in my power free from impediment and hindrance. How was he able to make the earthy body free from hindrance? He could not, and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole ( τῇ τῶν ὅλων περιόδῳ ) possessions, household things, house, children, wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what does not depend on the will? why do I will to have absolutely what is not granted to me? But how ought I to will to have things? In the way in which they are given and as long as they are given. But he who has given takes away. Why then do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For whence had I things when I came into the world?— My father gave them to me—And who gave them to him? and who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth? and who the seasons? and who made the connection of men with one another and their fellowship? Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen?—No; but I would still enjoy the feast.—The initiated too would wish to be longer in the initiation: and perhaps also those at Olympia to see other athletes; but the solemnity is ended: go away like a grateful and modest man; make room for others: others also must be born, as you were, and being born they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the world?—Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife—What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to him who is superior?—Why then did he introduce me into the world on these conditions?—And if the conditions do not suit you, depart. And is this all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can give to the good man under severe distress? Either tell yourself that present suffering void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your existence and mingle with the elements of the Universe ! Unspeakably more rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master’s exhortation to the persecuted Christian: Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. Mrs. Carter. I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, as he assumes, believers in God or in the Gods, and his argument is that a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are from God. If he cannot be contented with things as they are, and make the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also a believer in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to him also. The case is past help or advice. The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly ( πανήγυρις ); for they did not when they were present behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers of magimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom.—For what purpose then have I received these things? —To use them—How long?—So long as he who has lent them chooses.—What if they are necessary to me?—Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary: do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary. This study you ought to practise from morning to evening, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small estate in land: then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers. Look all round and throw these things from you (which are not yours). Purge your opinions, so that nothing cleave to you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you; and say, while you are daily exercising yourself as you do there (in the school), not that you are philosophizing, for this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are presenting an asserter of freedom: for this is really freedom. To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For this reason when he was taken prisoner, how did he behave to the pirates? Did he call any of them master? and I do not speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of the state of mind, by which the word is produced. How did he reprove them for feeding badly their captives? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? no; but a slave. And when he was sold how did he behave to his master? Immediately he disputed with him and said to his master that he ought not to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner; and about the children he told them how he ought to bring them up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had bought an exercise master, would he have employed him in the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master? and sc if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in every matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then generally possesses the science of life, what else must he be than master? For who is master in a ship? The man who governs the helm? Why? Because he who will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then without suffering for it? So I also used to think. But because he cannot do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is not in his power: and no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in chains? what do you think that is? The fact of putting the slave in chains:—and you also will admit this, if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then is a man’s nature? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison and to behead? No; but to do good, to co-operate with others, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condition, whether you chose to admit it or not, when he is acting foolishly. Socrates then did not fare badly?—No; but his judges and his accusers did.—Nor did Helvidius at Rome fare badly?—No; but his murderer did. How do you mean?— The same as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when he has gained the victory and been severely wounded; but that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and is unhurt: nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pursues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating, when you see him in pain and panting violently after running. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say that the evil in every thing is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing? Is this a paradox? for do you not say this in the case of all other things? Why then in the case of man only do you think differently? But because we say that the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you will not say that this is a paradox? It is not—What then is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded? does he not, if he suffers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and profit? But is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful and disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or viper or wasp? Well then let us recapitulate the things which have been agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances against his will, is a slave. But who is free from restraint? He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And what are the things which belong to others? Those which are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner. Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to another, possession (property) belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pay the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul Lead me, O Zeus, and thou 0 destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go. But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not? Answer me—Let me consider—Will you consider now? But when you were in the school, what was it which you used to consider? Did you not study what are the things that are good and what are bad, and what things are neither one nor the other?—I did.—What then was our opinion?—That just and honourable acts were good; and that unjust and disgraceful (foul) acts were bad.—Is life a good thing?—No.—Is death a bad thing?—No.—Is prison?—No.—But what did we think about mean and faithless words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant?—That they are bad.—Well then, you are not considering, nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the matter for consideration, is it whether it is becoming for me, when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to avoid) the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and necessary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you really imagined that base things were bad and honourable things were good, and that all other things were neither good nor bad, you would not even have approached this enquiry, nor have come near it; but immediately you would have been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses? How then do you now say that you are considering whether things which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more than things which are bad? But you do not possess these opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to be neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the greatest evils; nor do you think those other things (mean and faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have accustomed yourself. Where am I? In the schools: and are any listening to me? I am discoursing among philosophers. But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of scholars and fools. Thus a friend is overpowered by the testimony of a philosopher: thus a philosopher becomes a parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money: thus in the senate a man does not say what he thinks; in private (in the school) he proclaims his opinions. You are a cold and miserable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the report)?—I do not say, that your child is dead—for how could you bear that?—but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by you while you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philosopher, you say something different in the school. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are only a worm, do you say that you are a man? I should like to be present when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is uttering, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads. And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this, whether you who are rich choose or not.—And who is your evidence for this?—who else than yourselves? who have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedience to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a scowling countece; you who court old women and old men, and say, I cannot do this: it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power? Did you not lately contend with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla has hindered me? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one to assert your freedom ( καρπιοτήν ), when you have so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to follow it, one might consider him still more worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner a divine power. But who could endure you who are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old women’s noses, and wash them and give them presents, and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead, and question the physicians whether they are sick unto death? And again, when in order to obtain these great and much admired magistracies and honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who gave it to you? I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help of Felicion and endure his arrogance and servile insolence: for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride. You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the Gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free?—not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it: if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered that every thing which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes:— For this reason, he says, Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the Lacedaemonians, as you please. Was it because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians because they were born of slaves, could not talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because law is every thing to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free. And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by whom he could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he exposed himself to danger most unsparingly; and when he was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliberate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal), if it so happened. And what difference did that make to him? for he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. Then when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life, did he behave like a man who had children, who had a wife? No, but he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do when he was (ordered) to drink the poison, and when he had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socrates say? did he consider the power of escape as an unexpected gain? By no means: he considered what was fit and proper; but the rest he did not even look at or take into the reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act; he who would not put the Athenians to the vote when they clamoured that he should do so, he who refused to obey the tyrants, he who discoursed in such a manner about virtue and right behaviour. It is not possible to save such a man’s life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away. For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting beyond the proper time. What then shall the children of Socrates do? If, said Socrates, I had gone off to Thessaly, would you have taken care of them; and if I depart to the world below, will there be no man to take care of them? See how he gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you and I had been in his place, we should have immediately answered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be repaid in the same way, and we should have added, I shall be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be useful to no man. For, if it had been necessary, we should have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And how in that case should we have been useful to any man? for where would they have been then staying? or if we were useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought? And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive. This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued: the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. The life of the dead, says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Roman jurist and Cicero’s friend, rests in the remembrance of the living. Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or could not have used.—Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man’s daily life and his intercourse with other men: in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will; and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was as he said, to know himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle, Know thyself ( γνῶθι σεαυτόν ): and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the end of man; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates was conformable to his life and teaching. Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenophon, Apol. § 22 ), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind. (Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus, by F. C. Baur.) This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However the essay is well worth the trouble of reading. The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. What prejudices, what blindness must a man have, says Rousseau, when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of Mary!—The death of Socrates philosophising tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire; that of Jesus expiring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that: man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it and weeps; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God. (Rousseau, Emile, vol. iii. p. 166. Amsterdam, 1765 .) Think of these things, these opinions, these words: look to these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished: and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging and in a word to give up all which is not your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar’s residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to those who have not yet obtained them there is an imagination ( φαντασία ), that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you have laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make you free; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man: be seen about a philosopher’s doors: you will not disgrace yourself by being seen; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least: the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful.'' None
57. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 2.346, 20.100 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Exodus, Miriams actions • Merchants, mercantile activity, traders • Therapeutae, musical activities of • smell, social activity, wickedness and • wealth, wickedness, social activity and

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 19; Cosgrove (2022), Music at Social Meals in Greek and Roman Antiquity: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Augustine, 278; Kraemer (2010), Unreliable Witnesses: Religion, Gender, and History in the Greco-Roman Mediterranean, 86; Salvesen et al. (2020), Israel in Egypt: The Land of Egypt as Concept and Reality for Jews in Antiquity and the Early Medieval Period, 269

sup>
2.346 καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτοί τε τὸν κίνδυνον οὕτως ἐκφυγόντες καὶ προσέτι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπιδόντες κεκολασμένους, ὡς οὐκ ἄλλοι τινὲς μνημονεύονται τῶν πρόσθεν ἀνθρώπων, ἐν ὕμνοις ἦσαν καὶ παιδιαῖς ὅλην τὴν νύκτα, καὶ Μωυσῆς ᾠδὴν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐγκώμιόν τε καὶ τῆς εὐμενείας εὐχαριστίαν περιέχουσαν ἐν ἑξαμέτρῳ τόνῳ συντίθησιν.' ' None		sup>
2.346 And now these Hebrews having escaped the danger they were in, after this manner, and besides that, seeing their enemies punished in such a way as is never recorded of any other men whomsoever, were all the night employed in singing of hymns, and in mirth. Moses also composed a song unto God, containing his praises, and a thanksgiving for his kindness, in hexameter verse.' ' None
58. Josephus Flavius, Against Apion, 1.209 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • women, Pauls missionary activity • – and military activity

 Found in books: Kattan Gribetz et al. (2016), Genesis Rabbah in Text and Context. 52; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 28

sup>
1.209 “οἱ καλούμενοι ̓Ιουδαῖοι πόλιν οἰκοῦντες ὀχυρωτάτην πασῶν, ἣν καλεῖν ̔Ιεροσόλυμα συμβαίνει τοὺς ἐγχωρίους, ἀργεῖν εἰθισμένοι δι' ἑβδόμης ἡμέρας καὶ μήτε τὰ ὅπλα βαστάζειν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις χρόνοις μήτε γεωργίας ἅπτεσθαι μήτε ἄλλης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι λειτουργίας μηδεμιᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐκτετακότες τὰς χεῖρας"" None		sup>
1.209 “There are a people called Jews, who dwell in a city the strongest of all other cities, which the inhabitants call Jerusalem, and are accustomed to rest on every seventh day; on which times they make no use of their arms, nor meddle with husbandry, nor take care of any affairs of life, but spread out their hands in their holy places, and pray till the evening. '' None
59. Mishnah, Tamid, 5.6 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, importance of • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 203; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 39

sup>
5.6 הִגִּיעוּ בֵּין הָאוּלָם וְלַמִּזְבֵּחַ, נָטַל אֶחָד אֶת הַמַּגְרֵפָה וְזוֹרְקָהּ בֵּין הָאוּלָם וְלַמִּזְבֵּחַ. אֵין אָדָם שׁוֹמֵעַ קוֹל חֲבֵרוֹ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם מִקּוֹל הַמַּגְרֵפָה. וּשְׁלשָׁה דְבָרִים הָיְתָה מְשַׁמֶּשֶׁת, כֹּהֵן שֶׁשּׁוֹמֵעַ אֶת קוֹלָהּ, יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֶחָיו הַכֹּהֲנִים נִכְנָסִים לְהִשְׁתַּחֲווֹת, וְהוּא רָץ וּבָא. וּבֶן לֵוִי שֶׁהוּא שׁוֹמֵעַ אֶת קוֹלָהּ, יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֶחָיו הַלְוִיִּם נִכְנָסִים לְדַבֵּר בַּשִּׁיר, וְהוּא רָץ וּבָא. וְרֹאשׁ הַמַּעֲמָד הָיָה מַעֲמִיד אֶת הַטְּמֵאִים בְּשַׁעַר הַמִּזְרָח:'' None		sup>
5.6 When they came between the Sanctuary and the altar, one took the magrefah and threw it between the Sanctuary and the altar. People could not hear one another speak in Jerusalem from the noise of the magrefah. It served three purposes: When a priest heard the sound of it he knew that his fellow priests were going in to bow down, and he would run to join them. When a Levite heard the noise he knew that his fellow Levites were going in to sing, and he would run to join them. And the head of the Ma’amad used to make the unclean stand in the east gate.'' None
60. Mishnah, Yoma, 7.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, of priests in Leviticus • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 212; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 43

sup>
7.1 בָּא לוֹ כֹהֵן גָּדוֹל לִקְרוֹת. אִם רָצָה לִקְרוֹת בְּבִגְדֵי בוּץ, קוֹרֵא. וְאִם לֹא, קוֹרֵא בְאִצְטְלִית לָבָן מִשֶּׁלּוֹ. חַזַּן הַכְּנֶסֶת נוֹטֵל סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה וְנוֹתְנוֹ לְרֹאשׁ הַכְּנֶסֶת, וְרֹאשׁ הַכְּנֶסֶת נוֹתְנוֹ לַסְּגָן, וְהַסְּגָן נוֹתְנוֹ לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, וְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל עוֹמֵד וּמְקַבֵּל וְקוֹרֵא עוֹמֵד, וְקוֹרֵא אַחֲרֵי מוֹת וְאַךְ בֶּעָשׂוֹר. וְגוֹלֵל סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה וּמַנִּיחוֹ בְחֵיקוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר, יוֹתֵר מִמַּה שֶּׁקָּרָאתִי לִפְנֵיכֶם כָּתוּב כָּאן, וּבֶעָשׂוֹר שֶׁבְּחֻמַּשׁ הַפְּקוּדִים קוֹרֵא עַל פֶּה, וּמְבָרֵךְ עָלֶיהָ שְׁמֹנֶה בְרָכוֹת, עַל הַתּוֹרָה, וְעַל הָעֲבוֹדָה, וְעַל הַהוֹדָאָה, וְעַל מְחִילַת הֶעָוֹן, וְעַל הַמִּקְדָּשׁ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, וְעַל יִשְׂרָאֵל בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָן וְעַל יְרוּשָׁלַיִם בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ וְעַל הַכֹּהֲנִים בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָן וְעַל שְׁאָר הַתְּפִלָּה:'' None		sup>
7.1 The high priest then came to read. If he wished to read in linen garments, he reads, and if not he reads in his own white cloak. The synagogue attendant would take a Torah scroll and give it to the head of the synagogue, and the head of the synagogue gives it to deputy high priest, and the deputy high priest gives it to the high priest, and the high priest stands and receives it, and reads, section beginning “After the death …” (Leviticus 16:1-34) and “But on the tenth…” (Leviticus 23:26-32). Then he would roll up the Torah scroll and put it in his bosom and say, “More than what I have read out before you is written here.” And “On the tenth …” (Numbers 29:7-11) which is in the Book of Numbers he recites by heart. And he recites on it eight benedictions: “For the law”, “For the Temple service,” “For thanksgiving,” “For the forgiveness of sins” and “For the Temple” on its own, and “For Israel” on its own and “For Jerusalem” on its own, “For the priests” on their own and “For the rest of the prayer.”'' None
61. New Testament, 1 Peter, 1.5-1.7, 1.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Build/Building Activity, By the Wicked • action-tendency • action-tendency, of distress • action-tendency, of fear • action-tendency, of joy • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent

 Found in books: Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 105, 127, 131, 132, 139, 140, 193, 194; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 111; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 280

sup>
1.5 τετηρημένην ἐν οὐρανοῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ φρουρουμένους διὰ πίστεως εἰς σωτηρίαν ἑτοίμην ἀποκαλυφθῆναι ἐν καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ. 1.6 ἐν ᾧ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, ὀλίγον ἄρτι εἰ δέον λυπηθέντες ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς, 1.7 ἵνα τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως πολυτιμότερον χρυσίου τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου διὰ πυρὸς δὲ δοκιμαζομένου εὑρεθῇ εἰς ἔπαινον καὶ δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.
1.17 καὶ εἰπατέρα ἐπικαλεῖσθετὸν ἀπροσωπολήμπτως κρίνοντα κατὰ τὸ ἑκάστου ἔργον, ἐν φόβῳ τὸν τῆς παροικίας ὑμῶν χρόνον ἀναστράφητε·'' None		sup>
1.5 who by the power of God are guarded through faith for a salvation ready to be revealed in the last time. 1.6 Wherein you greatly rejoice, though now for a little while, if need be, you have been put to grief in various trials, 1.7 that the proof of your faith, which is more precious than gold that perishes even though it is tested by fire, may be found to result in praise, glory, and honor at the revelation of Jesus Christ -- ' "
1.17 If you call on him as Father, who without respect of persons judges according to each man's work, pass the time of your living as strangers here in reverent fear: "' None
62. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 2.1-2.5, 4.13, 5.9-5.11, 6.12, 8.1, 9.13, 9.17, 9.19-9.23, 10.1-10.13, 10.20, 12.9, 12.13, 12.30, 14.3-14.5, 14.23-14.25, 14.33-14.35 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Holy Spirit, activity of • Paul, missionary activity • action, and cult • action, joint • cult, action • good, appropriate actions (kathēkonta) • good, right actions (kathorthōmata) • group-orientation, and moral actions • instruction genre, Egyptian, intellectual activity, growth of • morality, moral actions • ritual actions • travel, missionary activity • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent • women, charismatic activities • women, illegitimate activities • women, legitimate activities

 Found in books: Damm (2018), Religions and Education in Antiquity, 207; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 389, 428, 432; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 158; Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 268; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 13, 164, 317; Nasrallah (2019), Archaeology and the Letters of Paul, 101, 102; Nutzman (2022), Contested Cures: Identity and Ritual Healing in Roman and Late Antique Palestine 138; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 73, 131, 135, 137, 151, 154, 158, 161, 180

sup>
2.1 Κἀγὼ ἐλθὼν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, ἦλθον οὐ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας καταγγέλλων ὑμῖν τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ, 2.2 οὐ γὰρ ἔκρινά τι εἰδέναι ἐν ὑμῖν εἰ μὴ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν καὶ τοῦτον ἐσταυρωμένον· 2.3 κἀγὼ ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρόμῳ πολλῷ ἐγενόμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς, 2.4 καὶ ὁ λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου οὐκ ἐν πιθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις ἀλλʼ ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως, 2.5 ἵνα ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν μὴ ᾖ ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλʼ ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ.
4.13 δυσφημούμενοι παρακαλοῦμεν· ὡς περικαθάρματα τοῦ κόσμου ἐγενήθημεν, πάντων περίψημα, ἕως ἄρτι.
5.9 Ἔγραψα ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι πόρνοις, 5.10 οὐ πάντως τοῖς πόρνοις τοῦ κόσμου τούτου ἢ τοῖς πλεονέκταις καὶ ἅρπαξιν ἢ εἰδωλολάτραις, ἐπεὶ ὠφείλετε ἄρα ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελθεῖν. 5.11 νῦν δὲ ἔγραψα ὑμῖν μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι ἐάν τις ἀδελφὸς ὀνομαζόμενος ᾖ πόρνος ἢ πλεονέκτης ἢ εἰδωλολάτρης ἢ λοίδορος ἢ μέθυσος ἢ ἅρπαξ, τῷ τοιούτῳ μηδὲ συνεσθίειν.
6.12 Πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν· ἀλλʼ οὐ πάντα συμφέρει. πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν· ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐγὼ ἐξουσιασθήσομαι ὑπό τινος.
8.1 Περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων, οἴδαμεν ὅτι πάντες γνῶσιν ἔχομεν.
9.13 οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι οἱ τὰ ἱερὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐσθίουσιν, οἱ τῷ θυσιαστηρίῳ παρεδρεύοντες τῷ θυσιαστηρίῳ συνμερίζονται;
9.17 εἰ γὰρ ἑκὼν τοῦτο πράσσω, μισθὸν ἔχω· εἰ δὲ ἄκων, οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι.
9.19 Ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ πάντων πᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα, ἵνα τοὺς πλείονας κερδήσω· 9.20 καὶ ἐγενόμην τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ὡς Ἰουδαῖος, ἵνα Ἰουδαίους κερδήσω· τοῖς ὑπὸ νόμον ὡς ὑπὸ νόμον, μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον, ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον κερδήσω· 9.21 τοῖς ἀνόμοις ὡς ἄνομος, μὴ ὢν ἄνομος θεοῦ ἀλλʼ ἔννομος Χριστοῦ, ἵνα κερδανῶ τοὺς ἀνόμους· 9.22 ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν ἀσθενής, ἵνα τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς κερδήσω· τοῖς πᾶσιν γέγονα πάντα, ἵνα πάντως τινὰς σώσω. 9.23 πάντα δὲ ποιῶ διὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, ἵνα συνκοινωνὸς αὐτοῦ γένωμαι.
10.1 Οὐ θέλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, ἀδελφοί, ὅτι οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν πάντες ὑπὸ τὴν νεφέλην ἦσαν καὶ πάντες διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης διῆλθον, 10.2 καὶ πάντες εἰς τὸν Μωυσῆν ἐβαπτίσαντο ἐν τῇ νεφέλῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, 10.3 καὶ πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν βρῶμα ἔφαγον 10.4 καὶ πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν ἔπιον πόμα, ἔπινον γὰρ ἐκ πνευματικῆς ἀκολουθούσης πέτρας, ἡ πέτρα δὲ ἦν ὁ χριστός· 10.5 ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν αὐτῶν ηὐδόκησεν ὁ θεός,κατεστρώθησανγὰρἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ. 10.6 Ταῦτα δὲ τύποι ἡμῶν ἐγενήθησαν, εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἡμᾶςἐπιθυμητὰςκακῶν,καθὼς κἀκεῖνοιἐπεθύμησαν. 10.7 μηδὲ εἰδωλολάτραι γίνεσθε, καθώς τινες αὐτῶν· ὥσπερ γέγραπταιἘκάθισεν ὁ λαὸς φαγεῖν καὶ πεῖν, καὶ ἀνέστησαν παίζειν. 10.8 μηδὲ πορνεύωμεν, καθώς τινες αὐτῶν ἐπόρνευσαν, καὶ ἔπεσαν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ εἴκοσι τρεῖς χιλιάδες. 10.9 μηδὲ ἐκπειράζωμεν τὸν κύριον, καθώς τινες αὐτῶν ἐπείρασαν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ὄφεων ἀπώλλυντο.
10.10 μηδὲ γογγύζετε, καθάπερ τινὲς αὐτῶν ἐγόγγυσαν, καὶ ἀπώλοντο ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀλοθρευτοῦ.
10.11 ταῦτα δὲ τυπικῶς συνέβαινεν ἐκείνοις, ἐγράφη δὲ πρὸς νουθεσίαν ἡμῶν, εἰς οὓς τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων κατήντηκεν.
10.12 Ὥστε ὁ δοκῶν ἑστάναι βλεπέτω μὴ πέσῃ.
10.13 πειρασμὸς ὑμᾶς οὐκ εἴληφεν εἰ μὴ ἀνθρώπινος· πιστὸς δὲ ὁ θεός, ὃς οὐκ ἐάσει ὑμᾶς πειρασθῆναι ὑπὲρ ὃ δύνασθε, ἀλλὰ ποιήσει σὺν τῷ πειρασμῷ καὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν τοῦ δύνασθαι ὑπενεγκεῖν.
10.20 ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἃ θύουσιν τὰ ἔθνη,δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ θύουσιν,οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς κοινωνοὺς τῶν δαιμονίων γίνεσθαι.
12.9 ἑτέρῳ πίστις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πνεύματι, ἄλλῳ δὲ χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ πνεύματι,
1
2.13 καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν, εἴτε Ἰουδαῖοι εἴτε Ἕλληνες, εἴτε δοῦλοι εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ πάντες ἓν πνεῦμα ἐποτίσθημεν.
12.30 μὴ πάντες χαρίσματα ἔχουσιν ἰαμάτων; μὴ πάντες γλώσσαις λαλοῦσιν; μὴ πάντες διερμηνεύουσιν;
14.3 ὁ δὲ προφητεύων ἀνθρώποις λαλεῖ οἰκοδομὴν καὶ παράκλησιν καὶ παραμυθίαν. 14.4 ὁ λαλῶν γλώσσῃ ἑαυτὸν οἰκοδομεῖ· 14.5 ὁ δὲ προφητεύων ἐκκλησίαν οἰκοδομεῖ. θέλω δὲ πάντας ὑμᾶς λαλεῖν γλώσσαις, μᾶλλον δὲ ἵνα προφητεύητε· μείζων δὲ ὁ προφητεύων ἢ ὁ λαλῶν γλώσσαις, ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ διερμηνεύῃ, ἵνα ἡ ἐκκλησία οἰκοδομὴν λάβῃ.
14.23 Ἐὰν οὖν συνέλθῃ ἡ ἐκκλησία ὅλη ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάντες λαλῶσιν γλώσσαις, εἰσέλθωσιν δὲ ἰδιῶται ἢ ἄπιστοι, οὐκ ἐροῦσιν ὅτι μαίνεσθε; 14.24 ἐὰν δὲ πάντες προφητεύωσιν, εἰσέλθῃ δέ τις ἄπιστος ἢ ἰδιώτης, ἐλέγχεται ὑπὸ πάντων, ἀνακρίνεται ὑπὸ πάντων, 14.25 τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς καρδίας αὐτοῦ φανερὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὕτως πεσὼν ἐπὶ πρόσωπονπροσκυνήσειτῷ θεῷ, ἀπαγγέλλων ὅτιὌντως ὁ θεὸς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστίν.

14.33 οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀκαταστασίας ὁ θεὸς ἀλλὰ εἰρήνης?̓ ὡς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν ἁγίων.
14.34 Αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις σιγάτωσαν, οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτρέπεται αὐταῖς λαλεῖν· ἀλλὰ ὑποτασσέσθωσαν, καθὼς καὶ ὁ νόμος λέγει.
14.35 εἰ δέ τι μανθάνειν θέλουσιν, ἐν οἴκῳ τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας ἐπερωτάτωσαν, αἰσχρὸν γάρ ἐστιν γυναικὶ λαλεῖν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ.' ' None		sup>
2.1 When I came to you, brothers, I didn't come with excellence ofspeech or of wisdom, proclaiming to you the testimony of God." '2.2 ForI determined not to know anything among you, except Jesus Christ, andhim crucified. 2.3 I was with you in weakness, in fear, and in muchtrembling. 2.4 My speech and my preaching were not in persuasivewords of human wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power,' "2.5 that your faith wouldn't stand in the wisdom of men, but in thepower of God." 4.13 Being defamed, we entreat. We are made as the filthof the world, the dirt wiped off by all, even until now.
5.9 I wrote to you in my letter to have no company with sexual sinners; 5.10 yet not at all meaning with the sexual sinners of this world, orwith the covetous and extortioners, or with idolaters; for then youwould have to leave the world.' "5.11 But as it is, I wrote to you notto associate with anyone who is called a brother who is a sexualsinner, or covetous, or an idolater, or a slanderer, or a drunkard, oran extortioner. Don't even eat with such a person." 6.12 "All things are lawful for me," but not all thingsare expedient. "All things are lawful for me," but I will not bebrought under the power of anything.
8.1 Now concerning things sacrificed to idols: We know that we allhave knowledge. Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up.' "
9.13 Don't you know that those who serve around sacred thingseat from the things of the temple, and those who wait on the altar havetheir portion with the altar?" 9.17 For if I do this of my own will, Ihave a reward. But if not of my own will, I have a stewardshipentrusted to me.
9.19 For though I was free fromall, I brought myself under bondage to all, that I might gain the more. 9.20 To the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain Jews; to thosewho are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain those whoare under the law; 9.21 to those who are without law, as without law(not being without law toward God, but under law toward Christ), that Imight win those who are without law. 9.22 To the weak I became asweak, that I might gain the weak. I have become all things to all men,that I may by all means save some.' "9.23 Now I do this for thegospel's sake, that I may be a joint partaker of it." 10.1 Now I would not have you ignorant, brothers, that our fatherswere all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; 10.2 andwere all baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea; 10.3 andall ate the same spiritual food; 10.4 and all drank the samespiritual drink. For they drank of a spiritual rock that followed them,and the rock was Christ. 10.5 However with most of them, God was notwell pleased, for they were overthrown in the wilderness. 10.6 Nowthese things were our examples, to the intent we should not lust afterevil things, as they also lusted. 10.7 Neither be idolaters, as someof them were. As it is written, "The people sat down to eat and drink,and rose up to play." 10.8 Neither let us commit sexual immorality,as some of them committed, and in one day twenty-three thousand fell. 10.9 Neither let us test the Lord, as some of them tested, andperished by the serpents.
10.10 Neither grumble, as some of them alsogrumbled, and perished by the destroyer.
10.11 Now all these thingshappened to them by way of example, and they were written for ouradmonition, on whom the ends of the ages have come.' "
10.12 Thereforelet him who thinks he stands be careful that he doesn't fall." 10.13 No temptation has taken you but such as man can bear. God isfaithful, who will not allow you to be tempted above what you are able,but will with the temptation also make the way of escape, that you maybe able to endure it.' "
10.20 But I say that thethings which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons, and notto God, and I don't desire that you would have communion with demons." 12.9 to another faith, by the sameSpirit; and to another gifts of healings, by the same Spirit;
1
2.13 For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whetherJews or Greeks, whether bond or free; and were all given to drink intoone Spirit.
12.30 Do all have gifts of healings? Do all speak with variouslanguages? Do all interpret?
14.3 But he who prophesies speaks tomen for their edification, exhortation, and consolation. 14.4 He whospeaks in another language edifies himself, but he who prophesiesedifies the assembly. 14.5 Now I desire to have you all speak withother languages, but rather that you would prophesy. For he is greaterwho prophesies than he who speaks with other languages, unless heinterprets, that the assembly may be built up.' "
14.23 If therefore thewhole assembly is assembled together and all speak with otherlanguages, and unlearned or unbelieving people come in, won't they saythat you are crazy?" '14.24 But if all prophesy, and someoneunbelieving or unlearned comes in, he is reproved by all, and he isjudged by all. 14.25 And thus the secrets of his heart are revealed.So he will fall down on his face and worship God, declaring that God isamong you indeed.

14.33 for God is not a God of confusion, but of peace.As in all the assemblies of the saints,
14.34 let your wives keepsilent in the assemblies, for it has not been permitted for them tospeak; but let them be in subjection, as the law also says.
14.35 Ifthey desire to learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home,for it is shameful for a woman to chatter in the assembly.' " None
63. New Testament, 1 Thessalonians, 1.9-1.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Holy Spirit, activity of • Paul, missionary activity • activeness (of converts) • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 320; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 188; Malherbe et al. (2014), Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J, 268; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 5, 112

sup>
1.9 αὐτοὶ γὰρ περὶ ἡμῶν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὁποίαν εἴσοδον ἔσχομεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ πῶς ἐπεστρέψατε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων δουλεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ, 1.10 καὶ ἀναμένειν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν, ὃν ἤγειρεν ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, Ἰησοῦν τὸν ῥυόμενον ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης.'' None		sup>
1.9 For they themselves report concerning us what kind of a reception we had from you; and how you turned to God from idols, to serve a living and true God, 1.10 and to wait for his Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead -- Jesus, who delivers us from the wrath to come. '' None
64. New Testament, Acts, 2.10, 3.19, 3.21, 5.14, 7.48, 8.1, 8.9-8.12, 9.22, 10.14, 10.20, 10.45-10.47, 11.20, 13.14-13.16, 13.26, 13.39, 13.42-13.48, 15.21, 16.13, 16.15, 17.10-17.12, 17.17, 18.21, 19.23-19.41, 21.21, 21.26-21.27, 26.6-26.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Economic activity • God, Creative action • God,act/activity, mighty/ powerful of • Paul (Saint), missionary activity of • Paul, his activity/attitudes to the Law, Jesus and sacrifice • Paul, missionary activity • Prophecy, symbolic actions • Temple Action Episode • Uncertainty, about actions, decisions, destiny etc. • action, high intensity • activeness (of converts) • group-orientation, and moral actions • missionary activity • morality, moral actions • participation, members’ active, • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Avery-Peck, Chilton, and Scott Green (2014), A Legacy of Learning: Essays in Honor of Jacob Neusner , 247; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 31; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 189, 389; Gabrielsen and Paganini (2021), Private Associations in the Ancient Greek World: Regulations and the Creation of Group Identity, 160; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 142; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 50, 56, 116, 117, 501; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 336, 342, 343, 347, 352, 360; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 82; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 111; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 24, 25, 326; Parkins and Smith (1998), Trade, Traders and the Ancient City, 207; Petropoulou (2012), Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234; Sandnes and Hvalvik (2014), Early Christian Prayer and Identity Formation 107

sup>
2.10 Φρυγίαν τε καὶ Παμφυλίαν, Αἴγυπτον καὶ τὰ μέρη τῆς Λιβύης τῆς κατὰ Κυρήνην, καὶ οἱ ἐπιδημοῦντες Ῥωμαῖοι,
3.19 μετανοήσατε οὖν καὶ ἐπιστρέψατε πρὸς τὸ ἐξαλιφθῆναι ὑμῶν τὰς ἁμαρτίας,
3.21 ἃν δεῖ οὐρανὸν μὲν δέξασθαι ἄχρι χρόνων ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων ὧν ἐλάλησεν ὁ θεὸς διὰ στόματος τῶν ἁγίων ἀπʼ αἰῶνος αὐτοῦ προφητῶν.
5.14 ἀλλʼ ἐμεγάλυνεν αὐτοὺς ὁ λαός, μᾶλλον δὲ προσετίθεντο πιστεύοντες τῷ κυρίῳ πλήθη ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν·
7.48 ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ ὕψιστος ἐν χειροποιήτοις κατοικεῖ· καθὼς ὁ προφήτης λέγει
8.1 Σαῦλος δὲ ἦν συνευδοκῶν τῇ ἀναιρέσει αὐτοῦ.Ἐγένετο δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διωγμὸς μέγας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὴν ἐν Ἰεροσολύμοις· πάντες δὲ διεσπάρησαν κατὰ τὰς χώρας τῆς Ἰουδαίας καὶ Σαμαρίας πλὴν τῶν ἀποστόλων.
8.9 Ἀνὴρ δέ τις ὀνόματι Σίμων προυπῆρχεν ἐν τῇ πόλει μαγεύων καὶ ἐξιστάνων τὸ ἔθνος τῆς Σαμαρίας, λέγων εἶναί τινα ἑαυτὸν μέγαν,
8.10 ᾧ προσεῖχον πάντες ἀπὸ μικροῦ ἕως μεγάλου λέγοντες Οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ καλουμένη Μεγάλη.
8.11 προσεῖχον δὲ αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ ἱκανῷ χρόνῳ ταῖς μαγίαις ἐξεστακέναι αὐτούς.
8.12 ὅτε δὲ ἐπίστευσαν τῷ Φιλίππῳ εὐαγγελιζομένῳ περὶ τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐβαπτίζοντο ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες.
9.22 Σαῦλος δὲ μᾶλλον ἐνεδυναμοῦτο καὶ συνέχυννεν Ἰουδαίους τοὺς κατοικοῦντας ἐν Δαμασκῷ, συνβιβάζων ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ χριστός.
10.14 ὁ δὲ Πέτρος εἶπεν Μηδαμῶς, κύριε, ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἔφαγον πᾶν κοινὸν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον.
10.20 ἀλλὰ ἀναστὰς κατάβηθι καὶ πορεύου σὺν αὐτοῖς μηδὲν διακρινόμενος, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀπέσταλκα αὐτούς.
10.45 καὶ ἐξέστησαν οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς πιστοὶ οἳ συνῆλθαν τῷ Πέτρῳ, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔθνη ἡ δωρεὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου ἐκκέχυται· 10.46 ἤκουον γὰρ αὐτῶν λαλούντων γλώσσαις καὶ μεγαλυνόντων τὸν θεόν. 10.47 τότε ἀπεκρίθη Πέτρος Μήτι τὸ ὕδωρ δύναται κωλῦσαί τις τοῦ μὴ βαπτισθῆναι τούτους οἵτινες τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἔλαβον ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς;
11.20 Ἦσαν δέ τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρες Κύπριοι καὶ Κυρηναῖοι, οἵτινες ἐλθόντες εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν ἐλάλουν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνιστάς, εὐαγγελιζόμενοι τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν.
13.14 Αὐτοὶ δὲ διελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς Πέργης παρεγένοντο εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν τὴν Πισιδίαν, καὶ ἐλθόντες εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῶν σαββάτων ἐκάθισαν. 13.15 μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν ἀπέστειλαν οἱ ἀρχισυνάγωγοι πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγοντες Ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί, εἴ τις ἔστιν ἐν ὑμῖν λόγος παρακλήσεως πρὸς τὸν λαόν, λέγετε. 13.16 ἀναστὰς δὲ Παῦλος καὶ κατασείσας τῇ χειρὶ εἶπεν Ἄνδρες Ἰσραηλεῖται καὶ οἱ φοβούμενοι τὸν θεόν, ἀκούσατε.
13.26 Ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί, υἱοὶ γένους Ἀβραὰμ καὶ οἱ ἐν ὑμῖν φοβούμενοι τὸν θεόν, ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τῆς σωτηρίας ταύτης ἐξαπεστάλη.
13.39 ἐν νόμῳ Μωυσέως δικαιωθῆναι ἐν τούτῳ πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων δικαιοῦται.
13.42 Ἐξιόντων δὲ αὐτῶν παρεκάλουν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ σάββατον λαληθῆναι αὐτοῖς τὰ ῥήματα ταῦτα. 13.43 λυθείσης δὲ τῆς συναγωγῆς ἠκολούθησαν πολλοὶ τῶν Ἰουδαίων καὶ τῶν σεβομένων προσηλύτων τῷ Παύλῳ καὶ τῷ Βαρνάβᾳ, οἵτινες προσλαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς προσμένειν τῇ χάριτι τοῦ θεοῦ. 13.44 Τῷ δὲ ἐρχομένῳ σαββάτῳ σχε δὸν πᾶσα ἡ πόλις συνήχθη ἀκοῦσαι τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ. 13.45 ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι τοὺς ὄχλους ἐπλήσθησαν ζήλου καὶ ἀντέλεγον τοῖς ὑπὸ Παύλου λαλουμένοις βλασφημοῦντες. 13.46 παρρησιασάμενοί τε ὁ Παῦλος καὶ ὁ Βαρνάβας εἶπαν Ὑμῖν ἦν ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον λαληθῆναι τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ· ἐπειδὴ ἀπωθεῖσθε ἀὐτὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀξίους κρίνετε ἑαυτοὺς τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς, ἰδοὺ στρεφόμεθα εἰς τὰ ἔθνη· 13.47 οὕτω γὰρ ἐντέταλται ἡμῖν ὁ κύριος 13.48 ἀκούοντα δὲ τὰ ἔθνη ἔχαιρον καὶ ἐδόξαζον τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἐπίστευσαν ὅσοι ἦσαν τεταγμένοι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον·
15.21 Μωυσῆς γὰρ ἐκ γενεῶν ἀρχαίων κατὰ πόλιν τοὺς κηρύσσοντας αὐτὸν ἔχει ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς κατὰ πᾶν σάββατον ἀναγινωσκόμενος.
16.13 τῇ τε ἡμέρᾳ τῶν σαββάτων ἐξήλθομεν ἔξω τῆς πύλης παρὰ ποταμὸν οὗ ἐνομίζομεν προσευχὴν εἶναι, καὶ καθίσαντες ἐλαλοῦμεν ταῖς συνελθούσαις γυναιξίν.
16.15 ὡς δὲ ἐβαπτίσθη καὶ ὁ οἶκος αὐτῆς, παρεκάλεσεν λέγουσα Εἰ κεκρίκατέ με πιστὴν τῷ κυρίῳ εἶναι, εἰσελθόντες εἰς τὸν οἶκόν μου μένετε· καὶ παρεβιάσατο ἡμᾶς.
17.10 Οἱ δὲ ἀδελφοὶ εὐθέως διὰ νυκτὸς ἐξέπεμψαν τόν τε Παῦλον καὶ τὸν Σίλαν εἰς Βέροιαν, οἵτινες παραγενόμενοι εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἀπῄεσαν· 17.11 οὗτοι δὲ ἦσαν εὐγενέστεροι τῶν ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ, οἵτινες ἐδέξαντο τὸν λόγον μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας, τὸ καθʼ ἡμέραν ἀνακρίνοντες τὰς γραφὰς εἰ ἔχοι ταῦτα οὕτως. 17.12 πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπίστευσαν, καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων γυναικῶν τῶν εὐσχημόνων καὶ ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ὀλίγοι.
17.17 διελέγετο μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις καὶ τοῖς σεβομένοις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν πρὸς τοὺς παρατυγχάνοντας.
18.21 ἀλλὰ ἀποταξάμενος καὶ εἰπών Πάλιν ἀνακάμψω πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοῦ θεοῦ θέλοντος ἀνήχθη ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐφέσου,
19.23 Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνον τάραχος οὐκ ὀλίγος περὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ. 19.24 Δημήτριος γάρ τις ὀνόματι, ἀργυροκόπος, ποιῶν ναοὺς ἀργυροῦς Ἀρτέμιδος παρείχετο τοῖς τεχνίταις οὐκ ὀλίγην ἐργασίαν, 19.25 οὓς συναθροίσας καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐργάτας εἶπεν Ἄνδρες, ἐπίστασθε ὅτι ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἐργασίας ἡ εὐπορία ἡμῖν ἐστίν, 19.26 καὶ θεωρεῖτε καὶ ἀκούετε ὅτι οὐ μόνον Ἐφέσου ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν πάσης τῆς Ἀσίας ὁ Παῦλος οὗτος πείσας μετέστησεν ἱκανὸν ὄχλον, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοὶ οἱ διὰ χειρῶν γινόμενοι. 19.27 οὐ μόνον δὲ τοῦτο κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν τὸ μέρος εἰς ἀπελεγμὸν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆς μεγάλης θεᾶς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερὸν εἰς οὐθὲν λογισθῆναι, μέλλειν τε καὶ καθαιρεῖσθαι τῆς μεγαλειότητος αὐτῆς, ἣν ὅλη ἡ Ἀσία καὶ ἡ οἰκουμένη σέβεται. 19.28 ἀκούσαντες δὲ καὶ γενόμενοι πλήρεις θυμοῦ ἔκραζον λέγοντες Μεγάλη ἡ Ἄρτεμις Ἐφεσίων. 19.29 καὶ ἐπλήσθη ἡ πόλις τῆς συγχύσεως, ὥρμησάν τε ὁμοθυμαδὸν εἰς τὸ θέατρον συναρπάσαντες Γαῖον καὶ Ἀρίσταρχον Μακεδόνας, συνεκδήμους Παύλου. 19.30 Παύλου δὲ βουλομένου εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὸν δῆμον οὐκ εἴων αὐτὸν οἱ μαθηταί· 19.31 τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀσιαρχῶν, ὄντες αὐτῷ φίλοι, πέμψαντες πρὸς αὐτὸν παρεκάλουν μὴ δοῦναι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ θέατρον. 19.32 ἄλλοι μὲν οὖν ἄλλο τι ἔκραζον, ἦν γὰρ ἡ ἐκκλησία συνκεχυμένη, καὶ οἱ πλείους οὐκ ᾔδεισαν τίνος ἕνεκα συνεληλύθεισαν. 19.33 ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὄχλου συνεβίβασαν Ἀλέξανδρον προβαλόντων αὐτὸν τῶν Ἰουδαίων, ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος κατασείσας τὴν χεῖρα ἤθελεν ἀπολογεῖσθαι τῷ δήμῳ. 19.34 ἐπιγνόντες δὲ ὅτι Ἰουδαῖός ἐστιν φωνὴ ἐγένετο μία ἐκ πάντων ὡσεὶ ἐπὶ ὥρας δύο κραζόντων Μεγάλη ἡ Ἄρτεμις Ἐφεσίων . 19.35 καταστείλας δὲ τὸν ὄχλον ὁ γραμματεύς φησιν Ἄνδρες Ἐφέσιοι, τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐ γινώσκει τὴν Ἐφεσίων πόλιν νεωκόρον οὖσαν τῆς μεγάλης Ἀρτέμιδος καὶ τοῦ διοπετοῦς; 19.36 ἀναντιρήτων οὖν ὄντων τούτων δέον ἐστὶν ὑμᾶς κατεσταλμένους ὑπάρχειν καὶ μηδὲν προπετὲς πράσσειν. 19.37 ἠγάγετε γὰρ τοὺς ἄνδρας τούτους οὔτε ἱεροσύλους οὔτε βλασφημοῦντας τὴν θεὸν ἡμῶν. 19.38 εἰ μὲν οὖν Δημήτριος καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ τεχνῖται ἔχουσιν πρός τινα λόγον, ἀγοραῖοι ἄγονται καὶ ἀνθύπατοί εἰσιν, ἐγκαλείτωσαν ἀλλήλοις. 19.39 εἰ δέ τι περαιτέρω ἐπιζητεῖτε, ἐν τῇ ἐννόμῳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐπιλυθήσεται. 19.40 καὶ γὰρ κινδυνεύομεν ἐγκαλεῖσθαι στάσεως περὶ τῆς σήμερον μηδενὸς αἰτίου ὑπάρχοντος, περὶ οὗ οὐ δυνησόμεθα ἀποδοῦναι λόγον περὶ τῆς συστροφῆς ταύτης. 19.41 καὶ ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἀπέλυσεν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.
21.21 κατηχήθησαν δὲ περὶ σοῦ ὅτι ἀποστασίαν διδάσκεις ἀπὸ Μωυσέως τοὺς κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη πάντας Ἰουδαίους, λέγων μὴ περιτέμνειν αὐτοὺς τὰ τέκνα μηδὲ τοῖς ἔθεσιν περιπατεῖν.
21.26 τότε ὁ Παῦλος παραλαβὼν τοὺς ἄνδρας τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ σὺν αὐτοῖς ἁγνισθεὶς εἰσῄει εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, διαγγέλλων τὴν ἐκπλήρωσιν τῶν ἡμερῶν τοῦ ἁγνισμοῦ ἕως οὗ προσηνέχθη ὑπὲρ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ἡ προσφορά. 21.27 Ὡς δὲ ἔμελλον αἱ ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι συντελεῖσθαι, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἰουδαῖοι θεασάμενοι αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ συνέχεον πάντα τὸν ὄχλον καὶ ἐπέβαλαν ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τὰς χεῖρας,
26.6 καὶ νῦν ἐπʼ ἐλπίδι τῆς εἰς τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν ἐπαγγελίας γενομένης ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἕστηκα κρινόμενος, 26.7 εἰς ἣν τὸ δωδεκάφυλον ἡμῶν ἐν ἐκτενείᾳ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν λατρεῦον ἐλπίζει καταντῆσαι· περὶ ἧς ἐλπίδος ἐγκαλοῦμαι ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων, βασιλεῦ· 26.8 τί ἄπιστον κρίνεται παρʼ ὑμῖν εἰ ὁ θεὸς νεκροὺς ἐγείρει;'' None		sup>
2.10 Phrygia, Pamphylia, Egypt, the parts of Libya around Cyrene, visitors from Rome, both Jews and proselytes,
3.19 "Repent therefore, and turn again, that your sins may be blotted out, that so there may come times of refreshing from the presence of the Lord,
3.21 whom the heaven must receive until the times of restoration of all things, whereof God spoke by the mouth of his holy prophets that have been from ancient times.
5.14 More believers were added to the Lord, multitudes of both men and women. ' "
7.48 However, the Most High doesn't dwell in temples made with hands, as the prophet says, " 8.1 Saul was consenting to his death. A great persecution arose against the assembly which was in Jerusalem in that day. They were all scattered abroad throughout the regions of Judea and Samaria, except for the apostles.
8.9 But there was a certain man, Simon by name, who had used sorcery in the city before, and amazed the people of Samaria, making himself out to be some great one,
8.10 to whom they all listened, from the least to the greatest, saying, "This man is that great power of God."
8.11 They listened to him, because for a long time he had amazed them with his sorceries.
8.12 But when they believed Philip preaching good news concerning the Kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized, both men and women.
9.22 But Saul increased more in strength, and confounded the Jews who lived at Damascus, proving that this is the Christ.
10.14 But Peter said, "Not so, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is common or unclean."
10.20 But arise, get down, and go with them, doubting nothing; for I have sent them."
10.45 They of the circumcision who believed were amazed, as many as came with Peter, because the gift of the Holy Spirit was also poured out on the Gentiles. 10.46 For they heard them speak with other languages and magnify God. Then Peter answered, 10.47 "Can any man forbid the water, that these who have received the Holy Spirit as well as we should not be baptized?"
11.20 But there were some of them, men of Cyprus and Cyrene, who, when they had come to Antioch, spoke to the Greeks, preaching the Lord Jesus.
13.14 But they, passing through from Perga, came to Antioch of Pisidia. They went into the synagogue on the Sabbath day, and sat down. 13.15 After the reading of the law and the prophets, the rulers of the synagogue sent to them, saying, "Brothers, if you have any word of exhortation for the people, speak." 13.16 Paul stood up, and beckoning with his hand said, "Men of Israel, and you who fear God, listen.
13.26 Brothers, children of the stock of Abraham, and those among you who fear God, the word of this salvation is sent out to you.
13.39 and by him everyone who believes is justified from all things, from which you could not be justified by the law of Moses.
13.42 So when the Jews went out of the synagogue, the Gentiles begged that these words might be preached to them the next Sabbath. 13.43 Now when the synagogue broke up, many of the Jews and of the devout proselytes followed Paul and Barnabas; who, speaking to them, urged them to continue in the grace of God. 13.44 The next Sabbath almost the whole city was gathered together to hear the word of God. 13.45 But when the Jews saw the multitudes, they were filled with jealousy, and contradicted the things which were spoken by Paul, and blasphemed. 13.46 Paul and Barnabas spoke out boldly, and said, "It was necessary that God\'s word should be spoken to you first. Since indeed you thrust it from you, and judge yourselves unworthy of eternal life, behold, we turn to the Gentiles. 13.47 For so has the Lord commanded us, saying, \'I have set you as a light of the Gentiles, That you should be for salvation to the uttermost parts of the earth.\'" 13.48 As the Gentiles heard this, they were glad, and glorified the word of God. As many as were appointed to eternal life believed.
15.21 For Moses from generations of old has in every city those who preach him, being read in the synagogues every Sabbath."
16.13 On the Sabbath day we went forth outside of the city by a riverside, where we supposed there was a place of prayer, and we sat down, and spoke to the women who had come together.
16.15 When she and her household were baptized, she begged us, saying, "If you have judged me to be faithful to the Lord, come into my house, and stay." She urged us.
17.10 The brothers immediately sent Paul and Silas away by night to Beroea. When they arrived, they went into the Jewish synagogue. 17.11 Now these were more noble than those in Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of the mind, examining the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so. 17.12 Many of them therefore believed; also of the Greek women of honorable estate, and not a few men.
17.17 So he reasoned in the synagogue with Jews and the devout persons, and in the marketplace every day with those who met him.
18.21 but taking his leave of them, and saying, "I must by all means keep this coming feast in Jerusalem, but I will return again to you if God wills," he set sail from Ephesus.
19.23 About that time there arose no small stir concerning the Way. 19.24 For a certain man named Demetrius, a silversmith, who made silver shrines of Artemis, brought no little business to the craftsmen, 19.25 whom he gathered together, with the workmen of like occupation, and said, "Sirs, you know that by this business we have our wealth. 19.26 You see and hear, that not at Ephesus alone, but almost throughout all Asia, this Paul has persuaded and turned away many people, saying that they are no gods, that are made with hands. 19.27 Not only is there danger that this our trade come into disrepute, but also that the temple of the great goddess Artemis will be counted as nothing, and her majesty destroyed, whom all Asia and the world worships." 19.28 When they heard this they were filled with anger, and cried out, saying, "Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!"' "19.29 The whole city was filled with confusion, and they rushed with one accord into the theater, having seized Gaius and Aristarchus, men of Macedonia, Paul's companions in travel. " "19.30 When Paul wanted to enter in to the people, the disciples didn't allow him. " '19.31 Certain also of the Asiarchs, being his friends, sent to him and begged him not to venture into the theater. ' "19.32 Some therefore cried one thing, and some another, for the assembly was in confusion. Most of them didn't know why they had come together. " '19.33 They brought Alexander out of the multitude, the Jews putting him forward. Alexander beckoned with his hand, and would have made a defense to the people. 19.34 But when they perceived that he was a Jew, all with one voice for a time of about two hours cried out, "Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!" 19.35 When the town clerk had quieted the multitude, he said, "You men of Ephesus, what man is there who doesn\'t know that the city of the Ephesians is temple-keeper of the great goddess Artemis, and of the image which fell down from Zeus? ' "19.36 Seeing then that these things can't be denied, you ought to be quiet, and to do nothing rash. " '19.37 For you have brought these men here, who are neither robbers of temples nor blasphemers of your goddess. 19.38 If therefore Demetrius and the craftsmen who are with him have a matter against anyone, the courts are open, and there are proconsuls. Let them press charges against one another. 19.39 But if you seek anything about other matters, it will be settled in the regular assembly. 19.40 For indeed we are in danger of being accused concerning this day\'s riot, there being no cause. Concerning it, we wouldn\'t be able to give an account of this commotion." 19.41 When he had thus spoken, he dismissed the assembly.
21.21 They have been informed about you, that you teach all the Jews who are among the Gentiles to forsake Moses, telling them not to circumcise their children neither to walk after the customs.
21.26 Then Paul took the men, and the next day, purified himself and went with them into the temple, declaring the fulfillment of the days of purification, until the offering was offered for every one of them. 21.27 When the seven days were almost completed, the Jews from Asia, when they saw him in the temple, stirred up all the multitude and laid hands on him,
26.6 Now I stand here to be judged for the hope of the promise made by God to our fathers, 26.7 which our twelve tribes, earnestly serving night and day, hope to attain. Concerning this hope I am accused by the Jews, King Agrippa! 26.8 Why is it judged incredible with you, if God does raise the dead? '' None
65. New Testament, James, 5.17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ritual actions • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent

 Found in books: Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 111, 112; Nutzman (2022), Contested Cures: Identity and Ritual Healing in Roman and Late Antique Palestine 138

sup>
5.17 πολὺ ἰσχύει δέησις δικαίου ἐνεργουμένη. Ἠλείας ἄνθρωπος ἦν ὁμοιοπαθὴς ἡμῖν, καὶ προσευχῇ προσηύξατο τοῦ μὴ βρέξαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔβρεξεν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐνιαυτοὺς τρεῖς καὶ μῆνας ἕξ·'' None		sup>
5.17 Elijah was a man with a nature like ours, and he prayed earnestly that it might not rain, and it didn't rain on the earth for three years and six months. "" None
66. New Testament, Colossians, 3.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Paul, missionary activity • activeness (of converts)

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 38; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 190

sup>
3.11 ὅπου οὐκ ἔνι Ἕλλην καὶ Ἰουδαῖος, περιτομὴ καὶ ἀκροβυστία, βάρβαρος, Σκύθης, δοῦλος, ἐλεύθερος, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν Χριστός.'' None		sup>
3.11 where there can't be Greek and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bondservant, freeman; but Christ is all, and in all. "" None
67. New Testament, Ephesians, 4.17-4.24, 5.31-5.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Paul, missionary activity • Speech acts and actions • action • activeness (of converts)

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 38; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 190; Lynskey (2021), Tyconius’ Book of Rules: An Ancient Invitation to Ecclesial Hermeneutics, 117; Tite (2009), Valentinian Ethics and Paraenetic Discourse: Determining the Social Function of Moral Exhortation in Valentinian Christianity, 268

sup>
4.17 Τοῦτο οὖν λέγω καὶ μαρτύρομαι ἐν κυρίῳ, μηκέτι ὑμᾶς περιπατεῖν καθὼς καὶ τὰ ἔθνη περιπατεῖ ἐν ματαιότητι τοῦ νοὸς αὐτῶν, 4.18 ἐσκοτωμένοι τῇ διανοίᾳ ὄντες, ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ θεοῦ, διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὴν πώρωσιν τῆς καρδίας αὐτῶν, 4.19 οἵτινες ἀπηλγηκότες ἑαυτοὺς παρέδωκαν τῇ ἀσελγείᾳ εἰς ἐργασίαν ἀκαθαρσίας πάσης ἐν πλεονεξίᾳ. 4.20 Ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἐμάθετε τὸν χριστόν, 4.21 εἴ γε αὐτὸν ἠκούσατε καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδιδάχθητε, καθὼς ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ, 4.22 ἀποθέσθαι ὑμᾶς κατὰ τὴν προτέραν ἀναστροφὴν τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν φθειρόμενον κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης, 4.23 ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοὸς ὑμῶν, 4.24 καὶ ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας.
5.31 ἀντὶ τούτου καταλείψει ἄνθρωπος τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ προσκολληθήσεται πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν. 5.32 τὸ μυστήριον τοῦτο μέγα ἐστίν, ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.'' None		sup>
4.17 This I say therefore, and testify in the Lord, that you no longer walk as the rest of the Gentiles also walk, in the futility of their mind, 4.18 being darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God, because of the ignorance that is in them, because of the hardening of their hearts; 4.19 who having become callous gave themselves up to lust, to work all uncleanness with greediness. 4.20 But you did not learn Christ that way; 4.21 if indeed you heard him, and were taught in him, even as truth is in Jesus: 4.22 that you put away, as concerning your former way of life, the old man, that grows corrupt after the lusts of deceit; 4.23 and that you be renewed in the spirit of your mind, 4.24 and put on the new man, who in the likeness of God has been created in righteousness and holiness of truth.
5.31 "For this cause a man will leave his father and mother, and will be joined to his wife. The two will become one flesh." 5.32 This mystery is great, but I speak concerning Christ and of the assembly. '' None
68. New Testament, Galatians, 1.15-1.16, 2.11-2.14, 2.20, 3.23, 3.28, 4.21 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Paul, missionary activity • Prophecy, symbolic actions • action • activeness (of converts) • good, appropriate actions (kathēkonta) • good, right actions (kathorthōmata) • travel, missionary activity • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent • women, illegitimate activities

 Found in books: Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 26; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 186, 187, 188, 190, 434; Lynskey (2021), Tyconius’ Book of Rules: An Ancient Invitation to Ecclesial Hermeneutics, 117; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 70, 164; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 24; Nasrallah (2019), Archaeology and the Letters of Paul, 83, 85, 100; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 109, 161, 186

sup>
1.15 Ὅτε δὲ εὐδόκησεν ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἀφορίσας μεἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μουκαὶκαλέσαςδιὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ 1.16 ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἵνα εὐαγγελίζωμαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, εὐθέως οὐ προσανεθέμην σαρκὶ καὶ αἵματι,
2.11 Ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν Κηφᾶς εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν, κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτῷ ἀντέστην, ὅτι κατεγνωσμένος ἦν· 2.12 πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἐλθεῖν τινὰς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν· ὅτε δὲ ἦλθον, ὑπέστελλεν καὶ ἀφώριζεν ἑαυτόν, φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς. 2.13 καὶ συνυπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Ἰουδαῖοι, ὥστε καὶ Βαρνάβας συναπήχθη αὐτῶν τῇ ὑποκρίσει. 2.14 ἀλλʼ ὅτε εἶδον ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθοποδοῦσιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, εἶπον τῷ Κηφᾷ ἔμπροσθεν πάντων Εἰ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ὑπάρχων ἐθνικῶς καὶ οὐκ Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῇς, πῶς τὰ ἔθνη ἀναγκάζεις Ἰουδαΐζειν;
2.20 ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός· ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ.
3.23 Πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἐλθεῖν τὴν πίστιν ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρουρούμεθα συνκλειόμενοι εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι.
3.28 οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστὲ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.
4.21 Λέγετέ μοι, οἱ ὑπὸ νόμον θέλοντες εἶναι, τὸν νόμον οὐκ ἀκούετε;' ' None		sup>
1.15 Butwhen it was the good pleasure of God, who separated me from my mother'swomb, and called me through his grace, " "1.16 to reveal his Son in me,that I might preach him among the Gentiles, I didn't immediately conferwith flesh and blood, " 2.11 But when Peter came to Antioch, I resisted him to the face,because he stood condemned. 2.12 For before some people came fromJames, he ate with the Gentiles. But when they came, he drew back andseparated himself, fearing those who were of the circumcision. 2.13 And the rest of the Jews joined him in his hypocrisy; so that evenBarnabas was carried away with their hypocrisy. 2.14 But when I sawthat they didn\'t walk uprightly according to the truth of the gospel, Isaid to Peter before them all, "If you, being a Jew, live as theGentiles do, and not as the Jews do, why do you compel the Gentiles tolive as the Jews do?
2.20 I have been crucified with Christ, andit is no longer I that live, but Christ living in me. That life which Inow live in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me,and gave himself up for me.
3.23 But before faith came, we were kept in custodyunder the law, shut up to the faith which should afterwards berevealed.
3.28 There is neither Jewnor Greek, there is neither slave nor free man, there is neither malenor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. ' "
4.21 Tell me, you that desire to be under the law, don't you listen to thelaw? " " None
69. New Testament, Philippians, 3.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • good, appropriate actions (kathēkonta) • instruction genre, Egyptian, intellectual activity, growth of

 Found in books: Damm (2018), Religions and Education in Antiquity, 205; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 60

sup>
3.20 ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει, ἐξ οὗ καὶ σωτῆρα ἀπεκδεχόμεθα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν,'' None		sup>
3.20 For our citizenship is in heaven, from where we also wait for a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ; '' None
70. New Testament, Romans, 1.2, 1.17, 1.20, 3.21, 3.26, 5.1-5.6, 5.9, 5.21, 10.3-10.4, 10.9, 12.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Idolatry, Action • Paul, his activity/attitudes to the Law, Jesus and sacrifice • action • action nouns, and adjectives • activeness (of converts) • adjectives, and action nouns • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent • vision, as mode of knowing, witnessing Christ’s actions in the world, Athanasius on

 Found in books: Ayres Champion and Crawford (2023), The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions. 470; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 351, 355; Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 252, 253, 254, 255; Lynskey (2021), Tyconius’ Book of Rules: An Ancient Invitation to Ecclesial Hermeneutics, 117; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 5, 112, 164; Petropoulou (2012), Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200, 235, 243, 270; Rogers (2016), God and the Idols: Representations of God in 1 Corinthians 8-10. 186, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 212

sup>
1.2 ὃ προεπηγγείλατο διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις
1.17 δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπταιὉ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.

1.20 τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους,
3.21 νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται, μαρτυρουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν,
3.26 ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ, πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ.
5.1 Δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως εἰρήνην ἔχωμεν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 5.2 διʼ οὗ καὶ τὴν προσαγωγὴν ἐσχήκαμεν τῇ πίστει εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἑστήκαμεν, καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐπʼ ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ· 5.3 οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσιν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἡ θλίψις ὑπομονὴν κατεργάζεται, 5.4 ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ δοκιμήν, ἡ δὲ δοκιμὴ ἐλπίδα, 5.5 ἡ δὲἐλπὶς οὐ καταισχύνει.ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν· 5.6 εἴ γε Χριστὸς ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν ἔτι κατὰ καιρὸν ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀπέθανεν.
5.9 πολλῷ οὖν μᾶλλον δικαιωθέντες νῦν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ σωθησόμεθα διʼ αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.
5.21 ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ, οὕτως καὶ ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ διὰ δικαιοσύνης εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν.
10.3 ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ζητοῦντες στῆσαι, τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐχ ὑπετάγησαν· 10.4 τέλος γὰρ νόμου Χριστὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι.
10.9 ὅτι ἐὰν ὁμολογήσῃςτὸ ῥῆμα ἐν τῷ στόματί σουὅτι ΚΥΡΙΟΣ ΙΗΣΟΥΣ, καὶ πιστεύσῃςἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σουὅτι ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ἤγειρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν, σωθήσῃ·
12.1 Παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν τοῦ θεοῦ παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν ἁγίαν τῷ θεῷ εὐάρεστον, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν·' ' None		sup>
1.2 which he promised before through his prophets in the holy Scriptures,
1.17 For in it is revealed God\'s righteousness from faith to faith. As it is written, "But the righteous shall live by faith."

1.20 For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse.
3.21 But now apart from the law, a righteousness of God has been revealed, being testified by the law and the prophets;
3.26 to demonstrate his righteousness at this present time; that he might himself be just, and the justifier of him who has faith in Jesus.
5.1 Being therefore justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ; 5.2 through whom we also have our access by faith into this grace in which we stand. We rejoice in hope of the glory of God. 5.3 Not only this, but we also rejoice in our sufferings, knowing that suffering works perseverance; 5.4 and perseverance, proven character; and proven character, hope: ' "5.5 and hope doesn't disappoint us, because God's love has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who was given to us. " '5.6 For while we were yet weak, at the right time Christ died for the ungodly. ' "
5.9 Much more then, being now justified by his blood, we will be saved from God's wrath through him. " 5.21 that as sin reigned in death, even so might grace reign through righteousness to eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord. ' "
10.3 For being ignorant of God's righteousness, and seeking to establish their own righteousness, they didn't subject themselves to the righteousness of God. " '10.4 For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes.
10.9 that if you will confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.
12.1 Therefore I urge you, brothers, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is your spiritual service. ' ' None
71. New Testament, John, 6.35 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Active Intellect, Torah identified with • Active Intellect, ẓaddik united with • Torah, Active Intellect identified with • education, Logos’ educational activity • emotion-fused action, • theurgy, activities of ẓaddik of • women, Pauls missionary activity • yod, Active Intellect united with • yod, theurgical activities (uniting the sefirot) of

 Found in books: Heo (2023), Images of Torah: From the Second-Temple Period to the Middle Ages. 361; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 46, 51; Robbins et al. (2017), The Art of Visual Exegesis, 124, 148; Černušková, Kovacs and Plátová (2016), Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria , 273

sup>
6.35 εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς· ὁ ἐρχόμενος πρὸς ἐμὲ οὐ μὴ πεινάσῃ, καὶ ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ οὐ μὴ διψήσει πώποτε.' ' None		sup>
6.35 Jesus said to them. "I am the bread of life. He who comes to me will not be hungry, and he who believes in me will never be thirsty. ' ' None
72. New Testament, Luke, 1.1-1.4, 4.15, 4.27, 6.48-6.49, 10.7-10.8, 18.2, 19.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Build/Building Activity, By the Wicked • God, Expulsion actions • God,act/activity, mighty/ powerful of • Prophecy, symbolic actions • Temple Action Episode • evil, actions • missionary activities, Christian • missionary activities, images of • missionary activities, tradition and • scribal activity • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022), Why We Sing: Music, Word, and Liturgy in Early Christianity, 245; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 75; Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 108; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 46, 48, 49, 50; Levison (2009), Filled with the Spirit, 361; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 293; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 25, 26; Sandnes and Hvalvik (2014), Early Christian Prayer and Identity Formation 107; Strong (2021), The Fables of Jesus in the Gospel of Luke: A New Foundation for the Study of Parables 441, 442; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 420

sup>
1.1 ΕΠΕΙΔΗΠΕΡ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ἐπεχείρησαν ἀνατάξασθαι διήγησιν περὶ τῶν πεπληροφορημένων ἐν ἡμῖν πραγμάτων, 1.2 καθὼς παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν οἱ ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς αὐτόπται καὶ ὑπηρέται γενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου, 1.3 ἔδοξε κἀμοὶ παρηκολουθηκότι ἄνωθεν πᾶσιν ἀκριβῶς καθεξῆς σοι γράψαι, κράτιστε Θεόφιλε, 1.4 ἵνα ἐπιγνῷς περὶ ὧν κατηχήθης λόγων τὴν ἀσφάλειαν.
4.15 καὶ αὐτὸς ἐδίδασκεν ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς αὐτῶν, δοξαζόμενος ὑπὸ πάντων.
4.27 καὶ πολλοὶ λεπροὶ ἦσαν ἐν τῷ Ἰσραὴλ ἐπὶ Ἐλισαίου τοῦ προφήτου, καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἐκαθαρίσθη εἰ μὴ Ναιμὰν ὁ Σύρος.
6.48 ὅμοιός ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ οἰκοδομοῦντι οἰκίαν ὃς ἔσκαψεν καὶ ἐβάθυνεν καὶ ἔθηκεν θεμέλιον ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν· πλημμύρης δὲ γενομένης προσέρηξεν ὁ ποταμὸς τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἐκείνῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἴσχυσεν σαλεῦσαι αὐτὴν διὰ τὸ καλῶς οἰκοδομῆσθαι αὐτήν. 6.49 ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας καὶ μὴ ποιήσας ὅμοιός ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ οἰκοδομήσαντι οἰκίαν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν χωρὶς θεμελίου, ᾗ προσέρηξεν ὁ ποταμός, καὶ εὐθὺς συνέπεσεν, καὶ ἐγένετο τὸ ῥῆγμα τῆς οἰκίας ἐκείνης μέγα.
10.7 ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ οἰκίᾳ μένετε, ἔσθοντες καὶ πίνοντες τὰ παρʼ αὐτῶν, ἄξιος γὰρ ὁ ἐργάτης τοῦ μισθοῦ αὐτοῦ. μὴ μεταβαίνετε ἐξ οἰκίας εἰς οἰκίαν. 10.8 καὶ εἰς ἣν ἂν πόλιν εἰσέρχησθε καὶ δέχωνται ὑμᾶς,
18.2 λέγων Κριτής τις ἦν ἔν τινι πόλει τὸν θεὸν μὴ φοβούμενος καὶ ἄνθρωπον μὴ ἐντρεπόμενος.
19.12 εἶπεν οὖν Ἄνθρωπός τις εὐγενὴς ἐπορεύθη εἰς χώραν μακρὰν λαβεῖν ἑαυτῷ βασιλείαν καὶ ὑποστρέψαι.'' None		sup>
1.1 Since many have undertaken to set in order a narrative concerning those matters which have been fulfilled among us, 1.2 even as those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word delivered them to us, 1.3 it seemed good to me also, having traced the course of all things accurately from the first, to write to you in order, most excellent Theophilus; 1.4 that you might know the certainty concerning the things in which you were instructed.
4.15 He taught in their synagogues, being glorified by all.
4.27 There were many lepers in Israel in the time of Elisha the prophet, yet not one of them was cleansed, except Naaman, the Syrian."
6.48 He is like a man building a house, who dug and went deep, and laid a foundation on the rock. When a flood arose, the stream broke against that house, and could not shake it, because it was founded on the rock. 6.49 But he who hears, and doesn\'t do, is like a man who built a house on the earth without a foundation, against which the stream broke, and immediately it fell, and the ruin of that house was great." ' "
10.7 Remain in that same house, eating and drinking the things they give, for the laborer is worthy of his wages. Don't go from house to house. " '10.8 Into whatever city you enter, and they receive you, eat the things that are set before you.
18.2 saying, "There was a judge in a certain city who didn\'t fear God, and didn\'t respect man.
19.12 He said therefore, "A certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return. '' None
73. New Testament, Mark, 1.21-1.28, 5.1-5.20, 6.52, 14.36, 14.43-14.45, 14.49 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Bathhouse activities in • Build/Building Activity, Ark • Economic activity • Judas, motivation and knowledge in actions • ritual actions • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Avery-Peck, Chilton, and Scott Green (2014), A Legacy of Learning: Essays in Honor of Jacob Neusner , 247; Eliav (2023), A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean, 249; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 46, 51; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 260, 261; Nutzman (2022), Contested Cures: Identity and Ritual Healing in Roman and Late Antique Palestine 119; Scopello (2008), The Gospel of Judas in Context: Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Gospel of Judas, 74; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 95

sup>
1.21 Καὶ εἰσπορεύονται εἰς Καφαρναούμ. Καὶ εὐθὺς τοῖς σάββασιν εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν ἐδίδασκεν. 1.22 καὶ ἐξεπλήσσοντο ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ, ἦν γὰρ διδάσκων αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων καὶ οὐχ ὡς οἱ γραμματεῖς. 1.23 καὶ εὐθὺς ἦν ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ αὐτῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτῳ, καὶ ἀνέκραξεν 1.24 λέγων Τί ἡμῖν καὶ σοί, Ἰησοῦ Ναζαρηνέ; ἦλθες ἀπολέσαι ἡμᾶς; οἶδά σε τίς εἶ, ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ. 1.25 καὶ ἐπετίμησεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς λέγων Φιμώθητι καὶ ἔξελθε ἐξ αὐτοῦ. 1.26 καὶ σπαράξαν αὐτὸν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκάθαρτον καὶ φωνῆσαν φωνῇ μεγάλῃ ἐξῆλθεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἐθαμβήθησαν ἅπαντες, 1.27 ὥστε συνζητεῖν αὐτοὺς λέγοντας Τί ἐστιν τοῦτο; διδαχὴ καινή· κατʼ ἐξουσίαν καὶ τοῖς πνεύμασι τοῖς ἀκαθάρτοις ἐπιτάσσει, καὶ ὑπακούουσιν αὐτῷ. 1.28 Καὶ ἐξῆλθεν ἡ ἀκοὴ αὐτοῦ εὐθὺς πανταχοῦ εἰς ὅλην την περίχωρον τῆς Γαλιλαίας.
5.1 Καὶ ἦλθον εἰς τὸ πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης εἰς τὴν χώραν τῶν Γερασηνῶν. 5.2 καὶ ἐξελθόντος αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου εὐθὺς ὑπήντησεν αὐτῷ ἐκ τῶν μνημείων ἄνθρωπος ἐν πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτῳ, 5.3 ὃς τὴν κατοίκησιν εἶχεν ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν, καὶ οὐδὲ ἁλύσει οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο αὐτὸν δῆσαι 5.4 διὰ τὸ αὐτὸν πολλάκις πέδαις καὶ ἁλύσεσι δεδέσθαι καὶ διεσπάσθαι ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τὰς ἁλύσεις καὶ τὰς πέδας συντετρίφθαι, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἴσχυεν αὐτὸν δαμάσαι· 5.5 καὶ διὰ παντὸς νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἦν κράζων καὶ κατακόπτων ἑαυτὸν λίθοις. 5.6 καὶ ἰδὼν τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἀπὸ μακρόθεν ἔδραμεν καὶ προσεκύνησεν αὐτόν, 5.7 καὶ κράξας φωνῇ μεγάλῃ λέγει Τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί, Ἰησοῦ υἱὲ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ὑψίστου; ὁρκίζω δε τὸν θεόν, μή με βασανίσῃς. 5.8 ἔλεγεν γὰρ αὐτῷ Ἔξελθε τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκάθαρτον ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. 5.9 καὶ ἐπηρώτα αὐτόν Τί ὄνομά σοι; καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ Λεγιὼν ὄνομά μοι, ὅτι πολλοί ἐσμεν·
5.10 καὶ παρεκάλει αὐτὸν πολλὰ ἵνα μὴ αὐτὰ ἀποστείλῃ ἔξω τῆς χώρας.
5.11 Ἦν δὲ ἐκεῖ πρὸς τῷ ὄρει ἀγέλη χοίρων μεγάλη βοσκομένη·
5.12 καὶ παρεκάλεσαν αὐτὸν λέγοντες Πέμψον ἡμᾶς εἰς τοὺς χοίρους, ἵνα εἰς αὐτοὺς εἰσέλθωμεν.
5.13 καὶ ἐπέτρεψεν αὐτοῖς. καὶ ἐξελθόντα τὰ πνεύματα τὰ ἀκάθαρτα εἰσῆλθον εἰς τοὺς χοίρους, καὶ ὥρμησεν ἡ ἀγέλη κατὰ τοῦ κρημνοῦ εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν, ὡς δισχίλιοι, καὶ ἐπνίγοντο ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ.
5.14 Καὶ οἱ βόσκοντες αὐτοὺς ἔφυγον καὶ ἀπήγγειλαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς· καὶ ἦλθον ἰδεῖν τί ἐστιν τὸ γεγονός.
5.15 καὶ ἔρχονται πρὸς τὸν Ἰησοῦν, καὶ θεωροῦσιν τὸν δαιμονιζόμενον καθήμενον ἱματισμένον καὶ σωφρονοῦντα, τὸν ἐσχηκότα τὸν λεγιῶνα, καὶ ἐφοβήθησαν.
5.16 καὶ διηγήσαντο αὐτοῖς οἱ ἰδόντες πῶς ἐγένετο τῷ δαιμονιζομένῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν χοίρων.
5.17 καὶ ἤρξαντο παρακαλεῖν αὐτὸν ἀπελθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων αὐτῶν.
5.18 Καὶ ἐμβαίνοντος αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ πλοῖον παρεκάλει αὐτὸν ὁ δαιμονισθεὶς ἵνα μετʼ αὐτοῦ ᾖ.
5.19 καὶ οὐκ ἀφῆκεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ λέγει αὐτῷ Ὕπαγε εἰς τὸν οἶκόν σου πρὸς τοὺς σούς, καὶ ἀπάγγειλον αὐτοῖς ὅσα ὁ κύριός σοι πεποίηκεν καὶ ἠλέησέν σε. 5.20 καὶ ἀπῆλθεν καὶ ἤρξατο κηρύσσειν ἐν τῇ Δεκαπόλει ὅσα ἐποίησεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς, καὶ πάντες ἐθαύμαζον.
6.52 καὶ λίαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐξίσταντο, οὐ γὰρ συνῆκαν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρτοις, ἀλλʼ ἦν αὐτῶν ἡ καρδία πεπωρωμένη.
14.36 καὶ ἔλεγεν Ἀββά ὁ πατήρ, πάντα δυνατά σοι· παρένεγκε τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ· ἀλλʼ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί σύ.
14.43 Καὶ εὐθὺς ἔτι αὐτοῦ λαλοῦντος παραγίνεται ὁ Ἰούδας εἷς τῶν δώδεκα καὶ μετʼ αὐτοῦ ὄχλος μετὰ μαχαιρῶν καὶ ξύλων παρὰ τῶν ἀρχιερέων καὶ τῶν γραμματέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων. 14.44 δεδώκει δὲ ὁ παραδιδοὺς αὐτὸν σύσσημον αὐτοῖς λέγων Ὃν ἂν φιλήσω αὐτός ἐστιν· κρατήσατε αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπάγετε ἀσφαλῶς. 14.45 καὶ ἐλθὼν εὐθὺς προσελθὼν αὐτῷ λέγει Ῥαββεί, καὶ κατεφίλησεν αὐτόν.
14.49 καθʼ ἡμέραν ἤμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ διδάσκων καὶ οὐκ ἐκρατήσατέ με· ἀλλʼ ἵνα πληρωθῶσιν αἱ γραφαί.'' None		sup>
1.21 They went into Capernaum, and immediately on the Sabbath day he entered into the synagogue and taught. 1.22 They were astonished at his teaching, for he taught them as having authority, and not as the scribes. 1.23 Immediately there was in their synagogue a man with an unclean spirit, and he cried out, 1.24 saying, "Ha! What do we have to do with you, Jesus, you Nazarene? Have you come to destroy us? I know you who you are: the Holy One of God!" 1.25 Jesus rebuked him, saying, "Be quiet, and come out of him!" 1.26 The unclean spirit, convulsing him and crying with a loud voice, came out of him. 1.27 They were all amazed, so that they questioned among themselves, saying, "What is this? A new teaching? For with authority he commands even the unclean spirits, and they obey him!" 1.28 The report of him went out immediately everywhere into all the region of Galilee and its surrounding area.
5.1 They came to the other side of the sea, into the country of the Gadarenes. 5.2 When he had come out of the boat, immediately there met him out of the tombs a man with an unclean spirit, 5.3 who had his dwelling in the tombs. Nobody could bind him any more, not even with chains, 5.4 because he had been often bound with fetters and chains, and the chains had been torn apart by him, and the fetters broken in pieces. Nobody had the strength to tame him. 5.5 Always, night and day, in the tombs and in the mountains, he was crying out, and cutting himself with stones. 5.6 When he saw Jesus from afar, he ran and bowed down to him, 5.7 and crying out with a loud voice, he said, "What have I to do with you, Jesus, you Son of the Most High God? I adjure you by God, don\'t torment me." 5.8 For he said to him, "Come out of the man, you unclean spirit!" 5.9 He asked him, "What is your name?"He said to him, "My name is Legion, for we are many."
5.10 He begged him much that he would not send them away out of the country.
5.11 Now there was on the mountainside a great herd of pigs feeding.
5.12 All the demons begged him, saying, "Send us into the pigs, that we may enter into them."
5.13 At once Jesus gave them permission. The unclean spirits came out and entered into the pigs. The herd of about two thousand rushed down the steep bank into the sea, and they were drowned in the sea.
5.14 Those who fed them fled, and told it in the city and in the country. The people came to see what it was that had happened.
5.15 They came to Jesus, and saw him who had been possessed by demons sitting, clothed, and in his right mind, even him who had the legion; and they were afraid.
5.16 Those who saw it declared to them how it happened to him who was possessed by demons, and about the pigs.
5.17 They began to beg him to depart from their region.
5.18 As he was entering into the boat, he who had been possessed by demons begged him that he might be with him.
5.19 He didn\'t allow him, but said to him, "Go to your house, to your friends, and tell them what great things the Lord has done for you, and how he had mercy on you." 5.20 He went his way, and began to proclaim in Decapolis how Jesus had done great things for him, and everyone marveled. ' "
6.52 for they hadn't understood about the loaves, but their hearts were hardened. " 14.36 He said, "Abba, Father, all things are possible to you. Please remove this cup from me. However, not what I desire, but what you desire."
14.43 Immediately, while he was still speaking, Judas, one of the twelve, came -- and with him a multitude with swords and clubs, from the chief priests, the scribes, and the elders. 14.44 Now he who betrayed him had given them a sign, saying, "Whoever I will kiss, that is he. Seize him, and lead him away safely." 14.45 When he had come, immediately he came to him, and said, "Rabbi! Rabbi!" and kissed him.
14.49 I was daily with you in the temple teaching, and you didn\'t arrest me. But this is so that the Scriptures might be fulfilled."'' None
74. New Testament, Matthew, 5.3-5.12, 5.19, 5.21-5.48, 6.5-6.15, 6.30, 7.7-7.12, 7.25-7.26, 9.13, 14.31, 18.18-18.20, 21.42, 23.5, 26.39 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Assent, distinguished assent in Christians to thoughts, to their lingering, to the pleasure of their lingering, to action • Build/Building Activity, By the Wicked • Piety, Trilogy of pious actions →Alms, Fast, Prayer • Sin, distinguished assent to pleasure, to lingering, to action • Temple Action Episode • activeness (of converts) • evil, actions • group-orientation, and moral actions • morality, moral actions • trust, attitude and action, not always co-existent • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Berglund Crostini and Kelhoffer (2022), Why We Sing: Music, Word, and Liturgy in Early Christianity, 245; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 285; Esler (2000), The Early Christian World, 389; Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 12, 13, 16, 126, 136; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 40, 41; Morgan (2022), The New Testament and the Theology of Trust: 'This Rich Trust', 260, 261; Sandnes and Hvalvik (2014), Early Christian Prayer and Identity Formation 93, 98, 101; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 372; Stuckenbruck (2007), 1 Enoch 91-108, 420, 421

sup>
5.3 ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΙ οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν. 5.4 μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακληθήσονται. 5.5 μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς, ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσι τὴν γῆν. 5.6 μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται. 5.7 μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται. 5.8 μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται. 5.9 μακάριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί, ὅτι αὐτοὶ υἱοὶ θεοῦ κληθήσονται. 5.10 μακάριοι οἱ δεδιωγμένοι ἕνεκεν δικαιοσύνης, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν. 5.11 μακάριοί ἐστε ὅταν ὀνειδίσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ διώξωσιν καὶ εἴπωσιν πᾶν πονηρὸν καθʼ ὑμῶν ψευδόμενοι ἕνεκεν ἐμοῦ· 5.12 χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· οὕτως γὰρ ἐδίωξαν τοὺς προφήτας τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν.
5.19 ὃς ἐὰν οὖν λύσῃ μίαν τῶν ἐντολῶν τούτων τῶν ἐλαχίστων καὶ διδάξῃ οὕτως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐλάχιστος κληθήσεται ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν· ὃς δʼ ἂν ποιήσῃ καὶ διδάξῃ, οὗτος μέγας κληθήσεται ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν.
5.21 Ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Οὐ φονεύσεις· ὃς δʼ ἂν φονεύσῃ, ἔνοχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει. 5.22 Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ὀργιζόμενος τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ ἔνοχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει· ὃς δʼ ἂν εἴπῃ τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ Ῥακά, ἔνοχος ἔσται τῷ συνεδρίῳ· ὃς δʼ ἂν εἴπῃ Μωρέ, ἔνοχος ἔσται εἰς τὴν γέενναν τοῦ πυρός. 5.23 ἐὰν οὖν προσφέρῃς τὸ δῶρόν σου ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον κἀκεῖ μνησθῇς ὅτι ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἔχει τι κατὰ σοῦ, 5.24 ἄφες ἐκεῖ τὸ δῶρόν σου ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου, καὶ ὕπαγε πρῶτον διαλλάγηθι τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου, καὶ τότε ἐλθὼν πρόσφερε τὸ δῶρόν σου. 5.25 ἴσθι εὐνοῶν τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σου ταχὺ ἕως ὅτου εἶ μετʼ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ, μή ποτέ σε παραδῷ ὁ ἀντίδικος τῷ κριτῇ, καὶ ὁ κριτὴς τῷ ὑπηρέτῃ, καὶ εἰς φυλακὴν βληθήσῃ· 5.26 ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, οὐ μὴ ἐξέλθῃς ἐκεῖθεν ἕως ἂν ἀποδῷς τὸν ἔσχατον κοδράντην. 5.27 Ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη Οὐ μοιχεύσεις. 5.28 Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ. 5.29 εἰ δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ὁ δεξιὸς σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔξελε αὐτὸν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ, συμφέρει γάρ σοι ἵνα ἀπόληται ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου βληθῇ εἰς γέενναν·
5.30 καὶ εἰ ἡ δεξιά σου χεὶρ σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔκκοψον αὐτὴν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ, συμφέρει γάρ σοι ἵνα ἀπόληται ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου εἰς γέενναν ἀπέλθῃ.
5.31 Ἐρρέθη δέ Ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ, δότω αὐτῇ ἀποστάσιον.
5.32 Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας ποιεῖ αὐτὴν μοιχευθῆναι, καὶ ὃς ἐὰν ἀπολελυμένην γαμήσῃ μοιχᾶται.
5.33 Πάλιν ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Οὐκ ἐπιορκήσεις, ἀποδώσεις δὲ τῷ κυρίῳ τοὺς ὅρκους σου.
5.34 Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν μν̀ ὀμόσαι ὅλως· μήτε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὅτι θρόνος ἐστὶν τοῦ θεοῦ·
5.35 μήτε ἐν τῇ γῇ, ὅτι ὑποπόδιόν ἐστιν τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ· μήτε εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα, ὅτι πόλις ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως·
5.36 μήτε ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ σου ὀμόσῃς, ὅτι οὐ δύνασαι μίαν τρίχα λευκὴν ποιῆσαι ἢ μέλαιναν.
5.37 ἔστω δὲ ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν ναὶ ναί, οὒ οὔ· τὸ δὲ περισσὸν τούτων ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ ἐστίν.
5.38 Ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη Ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ ὀδόντα ἀντὶ ὀδόντος.
5.39 Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν μὴ ἀντιστῆναι τῷ πονηρῷ· ἀλλʼ ὅστις σε ῥαπίζει εἰς τὴν δεξιὰν σιαγόνα σου, στρέψον αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην· 5.40 καὶ τῷ θέλοντί σοι κριθῆναι καὶ τὸν χιτῶνά σου λαβεῖν, ἄφες αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον· 5.41 καὶ ὅστις σε ἀγγαρεύσει μίλιον ἕν, ὕπαγε μετʼ αὐτοῦ δύο. 5.42 τῷ αἰτοῦντί σε δός, καὶ τὸν θέλοντα ἀπὸ σοῦ δανίσασθαι μὴ ἀποστραφῇς. 5.43 Ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου καὶ μισήσεις τὸν ἐχθρόν σου. 5.44 Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν καὶ προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν διωκόντων ὑμᾶς· 5.45 ὅπως γένησθε υἱοὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς, ὅτι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους. 5.46 ἐὰν γὰρ ἀγαπήσητε τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας ὑμᾶς, τίνα μισθὸν ἔχετε; οὐχὶ καὶ οἱ τελῶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν; 5.47 καὶ ἐὰν ἀσπάσησθε τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς ὑμῶν μόνον, τί περισσὸν ποιεῖτε; οὐχὶ καὶ οἱ ἐθνικοὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν; 5.48 Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν.
6.5 Καὶ ὅταν προσεύχησθε, οὐκ ἔσεσθε ὡς οἱ ὑποκριταί· ὅτι φιλοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς γωνίαις τῶν πλατειῶν ἑστῶτες προσεύχεσθαι, ὅπως φανῶσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀπέχουσι τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν. 6.6 σὺ δὲ ὅταν προσεύχῃ, εἴσελθε εἰς τὸ ταμεῖόν σου καὶ κλείσας τὴν θύραν σου πρόσευξαι τῷ πατρί σου τῷ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ· καὶ ὁ πατήρ σου ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ ἀποδώσει σοι. 6.7 Προσευχόμενοι δὲ μὴ βατταλογήσητε ὥσπερ οἱ ἐθνικοί, δοκοῦσιν γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῇ πολυλογίᾳ αὐτῶν εἰσακουσθήσονται· 6.8 μὴ οὖν ὁμοιωθῆτε αὐτοῖς, οἶδεν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὧν χρείαν ἔχετε πρὸ τοῦ ὑμᾶς αἰτῆσαι αὐτόν. 6.9 Οὕτως οὖν προσεύχεσθε ὑμεῖς Πάτερ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· Ἁγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου, 6.10 ἐλθάτω ἡ βασιλεία σου, γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου, ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς· 6.11 Τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσιον δὸς ἡμῖν σήμερον· 6.12 καὶ ἄφες ἡμῖν τὰ ὀφειλήματα ἡμῶν, ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀφήκαμεν τοῖς ὀφειλέταις ἡμῶν· 6.13 καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν, ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. 6.14 Ἐὰν γὰρ ἀφῆτε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰ παραπτώματα αὐτῶν, ἀφήσει καὶ ὑμῖν ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος· 6.15 ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀφῆτε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰ παραπτώματα αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ἀφήσει τὰ παραπτώματα ὑμῶν.
6.30 εἰ δὲ τὸν χόρτον τοῦ ἀγροῦ σήμερον ὄντα καὶ αὔριον εἰς κλίβανον βαλλόμενον ὁ θεὸς οὕτως ἀμφιέννυσιν, οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς, ὀλιγόπιστοι;
7.7 Αἰτεῖτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· ζητεῖτε, καὶ εὑρήσετε· κρούετε, καὶ ἀνοιγήσεται ὑμῖν. 7.8 πᾶς γὰρ ὁ αἰτῶν λαμβάνει καὶ ὁ ζητῶν εὑρίσκει καὶ τῷ κρούοντι ἀνοιγήσεται. 7.9 ἢ τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν ἄνθρωπος, ὃν αἰτήσει ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἄρτον—μὴ λίθον ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ; 7.10 ἢ καὶ ἰχθὺν αἰτήσει—μὴ ὄφιν ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ; 7.11 εἰ οὖν ὑμεῖς πονηροὶ ὄντες οἴδατε δόματα ἀγαθὰ διδόναι τοῖς τέκνοις ὑμῶν, πόσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς δώσει ἀγαθὰ τοῖς αἰτοῦσιν αὐτόν. 7.12 Πάντα οὖν ὅσα ἐὰν θέλητε ἵνα ποιῶσιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε αὐτοῖς· οὗτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται.
7.25 καὶ κατέβη ἡ βροχὴ καὶ ἦλθαν οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἔπνευσαν οἱ ἄνεμοι καὶ προσέπεσαν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἐκείνῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἔπεσεν, τεθεμελίωτο γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν. 7.26 Καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀκούων μου τοὺς λόγους τούτους καὶ μὴ ποιῶν αὐτοὺς ὁμοιωθήσεται ἀνδρὶ μωρῷ, ὅστις ᾠκοδόμησεν αὐτοῦ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄμμον.
9.13 πορευθέντες δὲ μάθετε τί ἐστιν Ἔλεος θέλω καὶ οὐ θυσίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἦλθον καλέσαι δικαίους ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτωλούς.
14.31 εὐθέως δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα ἐπελάβετο αὐτοῦ καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ Ὀλιγόπιστε, εἰς τί ἐδίστασας;
18.18 Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὅσα ἐὰν δήσητε ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσται δεδεμένα ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ὅσα ἐὰν λύσητε ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσται λελυμένα ἐν οὐρανῷ. 18.19 Πάλιν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐὰν δύο συμφωνήσωσιν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς περὶ παντὸς πράγματος οὗ ἐὰν αἰτήσωνται, γενήσεται αὐτοῖς παρὰ τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς. 18.20 οὗ γάρ εἰσιν δύο ἢ τρεῖς συνηγμένοι εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα, ἐκεῖ εἰμὶ ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν.
21.42 Οὐδέποτε ἀνέγνωτε ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς Λίθον ὃν ἀπεδοκίμασαν οἱ οἰκοδομοῦντες οὗτος ἐγενήθη εἰς κεφαλὴν γωνίας· παρὰ Κυρίου ἐγένετο αὕτη, καὶ ἔστιν θαυμαστὴ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν;
23.5 πάντα δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ποιοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· πλατύνουσι γὰρ τὰ φυλακτήρια αὐτῶν καὶ μεγαλύνουσι τὰ κράσπεδα,
26.39 καὶ προελθὼν μικρὸν ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ προσευχόμενος καὶ λέγων Πάτερ μου, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν, παρελθάτω ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο· πλὴν οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλʼ ὡς σύ.' ' None		sup>
5.3 "Blessed are the poor in spirit, For theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. 5.4 Blessed are those who mourn, For they shall be comforted. 5.5 Blessed are the gentle, For they shall inherit the earth. 5.6 Blessed are those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, For they shall be filled. 5.7 Blessed are the merciful, For they shall obtain mercy. 5.8 Blessed are the pure in heart, For they shall see God. 5.9 Blessed are the peacemakers, For they shall be called sons of God. ' "5.10 Blessed are those who have been persecuted for righteousness' sake, For theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. " '5.11 "Blessed are you when people reproach you, persecute you, and say all kinds of evil against you falsely, for my sake. 5.12 Rejoice, and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. For that is how they persecuted the prophets who were before you.
5.19 Whoever, therefore, shall break one of these least commandments, and teach others to do so, shall be called least in the Kingdom of Heaven; but whoever shall do and teach them shall be called great in the Kingdom of Heaven.
5.21 "You have heard that it was said to the ancient ones, \'You shall not murder;\' and \'Whoever shall murder shall be in danger of the judgment.\ "5.22 But I tell you, that everyone who is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment; and whoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca!' shall be in danger of the council; and whoever shall say, 'You fool!' shall be in danger of the fire of Gehenna. " '5.23 "If therefore you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has anything against you, 5.24 leave your gift there before the altar, and go your way. First be reconciled to your brother, and then come and offer your gift. 5.25 Agree with your adversary quickly, while you are with him in the way; lest perhaps the prosecutor deliver you to the judge, and the judge deliver you to the officer, and you be cast into prison. 5.26 Most assuredly I tell you, you shall by no means get out of there, until you have paid the last penny. 5.27 "You have heard that it was said, \'You shall not commit adultery;\ '5.28 but I tell you that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his heart. 5.29 If your right eye causes you to stumble, pluck it out and throw it away from you. For it is profitable for you that one of your members should perish, than for your whole body to be cast into Gehenna.
5.30 If your right hand causes you to stumble, cut it off, and throw it away from you: for it is profitable for you that one of your members should perish, and not your whole body be thrown into Gehenna.
5.31 "It was also said, \'Whoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorce,\ 5.32 but I tell you that whoever who puts away his wife, except for the cause of sexual immorality, makes her an adulteress; and whoever marries her when she is put away commits adultery.
5.33 "Again you have heard that it was said to them of old time, \'You shall not make false vows, but shall perform to the Lord your vows,\ "
5.34 but I tell you, don't swear at all: neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God; " 5.35 nor by the earth, for it is the footstool of his feet; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. ' "
5.36 Neither shall you swear by your head, for you can't make one hair white or black. " "
5.37 But let your 'Yes' be 'Yes' and your 'No' be 'no.' Whatever is more than these is of the evil one. " 5.38 "You have heard that it was said, \'An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.\ "
5.39 But I tell you, don't resist him who is evil; but whoever strikes you on your right cheek, turn to him the other also. " '5.40 If anyone sues you to take away your coat, let him have your cloak also. 5.41 Whoever compels you to go one mile, go with him two. ' "5.42 Give to him who asks you, and don't turn away him who desires to borrow from you. " '5.43 "You have heard that it was said, \'You shall love your neighbor, and hate your enemy.\ '5.44 But I tell you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who mistreat you and persecute you, 5.45 that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven. For he makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust. ' "5.46 For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Don't even the tax collectors do the same? " "5.47 If you only greet your friends, what more do you do than others? Don't even the tax collectors do the same? " '5.48 Therefore you shall be perfect, just as your Father in heaven is perfect.
6.5 "When you pray, you shall not be as the hypocrites, for they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen by men. Most assuredly, I tell you, they have received their reward. 6.6 But you, when you pray, enter into your inner chamber, and having shut your door, pray to your Father who is in secret, and your Father who sees in secret will reward you openly. ' "6.7 In praying, don't use vain repetitions, as the Gentiles do; for they think that they will be heard for their much speaking. " "6.8 Therefore don't be like them, for your Father knows what things you need, before you ask him. " "6.9 Pray like this: 'Our Father in heaven, may your name be kept holy. " '6.10 Let your kingdom come. Let your will be done, as in heaven, so on earth. 6.11 Give us today our daily bread. 6.12 Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors. ' "6.13 Bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one. For yours is the kingdom, the power, and the glory forever. Amen.' " '6.14 "For if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. ' "6.15 But if you don't forgive men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. " "
6.30 But if God so clothes the grass of the field, which today exists, and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, won't he much more clothe you, you of little faith? " 7.7 "Ask, and it will be given you. Seek, and you will find. Knock, and it will be opened for you. 7.8 For everyone who asks receives. He who seeks finds. To him who knocks it will be opened. 7.9 Or who is there among you, who, if his son asks him for bread, will give him a stone? 7.10 Or if he asks for a fish, who will give him a serpent? 7.11 If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those who ask him! 7.12 Therefore whatever you desire for men to do to you, you shall also do to them; for this is the law and the prophets. ' "
7.25 The rain came down, the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat on that house; and it didn't fall, for it was founded on the rock. " "7.26 Everyone who hears these words of mine, and doesn't do them will be like a foolish man, who built his house on the sand. " 9.13 But you go and learn what this means: \'I desire mercy, and not sacrifice,\' for I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance."
14.31 Immediately Jesus stretched out his hand, took hold of him, and said to him, "You of little faith, why did you doubt?"
18.18 Most assuredly I tell you, whatever things you will bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever things you will loose on earth will be loosed in heaven. 18.19 Again, assuredly I tell you, that if two of you will agree on earth concerning anything that they will ask, it will be done for them by my Father who is in heaven. 18.20 For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there I am in the midst of them."
21.42 Jesus said to them, "Did you never read in the Scriptures, \'The stone which the builders rejected, The same was made the head of the corner. This was from the Lord. It is marvelous in our eyes?\ 23.5 But all their works they do to be seen by men. They make their phylacteries broad, enlarge the fringes of their garments,
26.39 He went forward a little, fell on his face, and prayed, saying, "My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass away from me; nevertheless, not what I desire, but what you desire."' ' None
75. Tacitus, Annals, 2.85, 14.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Merchants, mercantile activity, traders • missionary activity • rhetoric, and/vs. action • women, economic and professional activities

 Found in books: Bruun and Edmondson (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Roman Epigraphy, 589; Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 235; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 56; Salvesen et al. (2020), Israel in Egypt: The Land of Egypt as Concept and Reality for Jews in Antiquity and the Early Medieval Period, 284

sup>
2.85 Eodem anno gravibus senatus decretis libido feminarum coercita cautumque ne quaestum corpore faceret cui avus aut pater aut maritus eques Romanus fuisset. nam Vistilia praetoria familia genita licentiam stupri apud aedilis vulgaverat, more inter veteres recepto, qui satis poenarum adversum impudicas in ipsa professione flagitii credebant. exactum et a Titidio Labeone Vistiliae marito cur in uxore delicti manifesta ultionem legis omisisset. atque illo praetendente sexaginta dies ad consultandum datos necdum praeterisse, satis visum de Vistilia statuere; eaque in insulam Seriphon abdita est. actum et de sacris Aegyptiis Iudaicisque pellendis factumque patrum consultum ut quattuor milia libertini generis ea superstitione infecta quis idonea aetas in insulam Sardiniam veherentur, coercendis illic latrociniis et, si ob gravitatem caeli interissent, vile damnum; ceteri cederent Italia nisi certam ante diem profanos ritus exuissent.
14.2 Nerone quartum Cornelio Cosso consulibus quinquennale ludicrum Romae institutum est ad morem Graeci certaminis, varia fama, ut cuncta ferme nova. quippe erant qui Gn. quoque Pompeium incusatum a senioribus ferrent quod mansuram theatri sedem posuisset. nam antea subitariis gradibus et scaena in tempus structa ludos edi solitos, vel si vetustiora repetas, stantem populum spectavisse, ne, si consideret theatro, dies totos ignavia continuaret. spectaculorum quidem antiquitas servaretur, quoties praetores ederent, nulla cuiquam civium necessitate certandi. ceterum abolitos paulatim patrios mores funditus everti per accitam lasciviam, ut quod usquam corrumpi et corrumpere queat in urbe visatur, degeneretque studiis externis iuventus, gymnasia et otia et turpis amores exercendo, principe et senatu auctoribus, qui non modo licentiam vitiis permiserint, sed vim adhibeant ut proceres Romani specie orationum et carminum scaena polluantur. quid superesse nisi ut corpora quoque nudent et caestus adsumant easque pugnas pro militia et armis meditentur? an iustitiam auctum iri et decurias equitum egregium iudicandi munus expleturos, si fractos sonos et dulcedinem vocum perite audissent? noctes quoque dedecori adiectas ne quod tempus pudori relinquatur, sed coetu promisco, quod perditissimus quisque per diem concupiverit, per tenebras audeat.14.2 Tradit Cluvius ardore retinendae Agrippinam potentiae eo usque provectam ut medio diei, cum id temporis Nero per vinum et epulas incalesceret, offerret se saepius temulento comptam et incesto paratam; iamque lasciva oscula et praenuntias flagitii blanditias adnotantibus proximis, Senecam contra muliebris inlecebras subsidium a femina petivisse, immissamque Acten libertam quae simul suo periculo et infamia Neronis anxia deferret pervulgatum esse incestum gloriante matre, nec toleraturos milites profani principis imperium. Fabius Rusticus non Agrippinae sed Neroni cupitum id memorat eiusdemque libertae astu disiectum. sed quae Cluvius eadem ceteri quoque auctores prodidere, et fama huc inclinat, seu concepit animo tantum immanitatis Agrippina, seu credibilior novae libidinis meditatio in ea visa est quae puellaribus annis stuprum cum Lepido spe dominationis admiserat, pari cupidine usque ad libita Pallantis provoluta et exercita ad omne flagitium patrui nuptiis. ' None		sup>
2.85 \xa0In the same year, bounds were set to female profligacy by stringent resolutions of the senate; and it was laid down that no woman should trade in her body, if her father, grandfather, or husband had been a Roman knight. For Vistilia, the daughter of a praetorian family, had advertised her venality on the aediles\' list â\x80\x94 the normal procedure among our ancestors, who imagined the unchaste to be sufficiently punished by the avowal of their infamy. Her husband, Titidius Labeo, was also required to explain why, in view of his wife\'s manifest guilt, he had not invoked the penalty of the law. As he pleaded that sixty days, not yet elapsed, were allowed for deliberation, it was thought enough to pass sentence on Vistilia, who was removed to the island of Seriphos. â\x80\x94 Another debate dealt with the proscription of the Egyptian and Jewish rites, and a senatorial edict directed that four thousand descendants of enfranchised slaves, tainted with that superstition and suitable in point of age, were to be shipped to Sardinia and there employed in suppressing brigandage: "if they succumbed to the pestilential climate, it was a cheap loss." The rest had orders to leave Italy, unless they had renounced their impious ceremonial by a given date. <' "
14.2 \xa0It is stated by Cluvius that Agrippina's ardour to keep her influence was carried so far that at midday, an hour at which Nero was beginning to experience the warmth of wine and good cheer, she presented herself on several occasions to her half-tipsy son, coquettishly dressed and prepared for incest. Already lascivious kisses, and endearments that were the harbingers of guilt, had been observed by their intimates, when Seneca sought in a woman the antidote to female blandishments, and brought in the freedwoman Acte, who, alarmed as she was both at her own danger and at Nero's infamy, was to report that the incest was common knowledge, since his mother boasted of it, and that the troops would not submit to the supremacy of a sacrilegious emperor. According to Fabius Rusticus, not Agrippina, but Nero, desired the union, the scheme being wrecked by the astuteness of the same freedwoman. The other authorities, however, give the same version as Cluvius, and to their side tradition leans; whether the enormity was actually conceived in the brain of Agrippina, or whether the contemplation of such a refinement in lust was merely taken as comparatively credible in a woman who, for the prospect of power, had in her girlish years yielded to the embraces of Marcus Lepidus; who, for a similar ambition had prostituted herself to the desires of Pallas; and who had been inured to every turpitude by her marriage with her uncle. <"' None
76. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Bacchanalia, action against them in • rhetoric, and/vs. action

 Found in books: Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 169; Isaac (2004), The invention of racism in classical antiquity, 453
77. None, None, nan (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, and rhetoric vs. action • Demosthenes (orator), and the balance between rhetoric and action • readers, active engagement/response • rhetoric(al), contrasted with action

 Found in books: Chrysanthou (2018), Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement. 47; Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 66
78. Apuleius, The Golden Ass, 11.13 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, and cult • action, and speech acts • action, high intensity • action, tendencies • cult activities • cult, action • speech act,, and action

 Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 81, 106, 314; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 107

sup>
11.13 The priest, having been advised the night before, stood still and holding out his hand, and thrust out the garland of roses into my mouth. I (trembling) devoured it with a great eagerness. And as soon as I had eaten them, I found that the promise made to me had not been in vain. For my deformed face changed, and first the rugged hair of my body fell off, my thick skin grew soft and tender, the hooves of my feet changed into toes, my hands returned again, my neck grew short, my head and mouth became round, my long ears were made little, my great and stony teeth grew more like the teeth of men, and my tail, which had burdened me most, disappeared. Then the people began to marvel. The religious honored the goddess for so evident a miracle. They wondered at the visions which they saw in the night, and the ease of my restoration, whereby they rendered testimony of so great a benefit that I had received from the goddess.'' None
79. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 3.23.5 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • God, Expulsion actions • ordering of knowledge, epistemology in late antique world, Irenaeus on ordering of activity

 Found in books: Ayres Champion and Crawford (2023), The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions. 86; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 115

sup>
3.23.5 The case of Adam, however, had no analogy with this, but was altogether different. For, having been beguiled by another under the pretext of immortality, he is immediately seized with terror, and hides himself; not as if he were able to escape from God; but, in a state of confusion at having transgressed His command, he feels unworthy to appear before and to hold converse with God. Now, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom;" the sense of sin leads to repentance, and God bestows His compassion upon those who are penitent. For Adam showed his repentance by his conduct, through means of the girdle which he used, covering himself with fig-leaves, while there were many other leaves, which would have irritated his body in a less degree. He, however, adopted a dress conformable to his disobedience, being awed by the fear of God; and resisting the erring, the lustful propensity of his flesh (since he had lost his natural disposition and child-like mind, and had come to the knowledge of evil things), he girded a bridle of continence upon himself and his wife, fearing God, and waiting for His coming, and indicating, as it were, some such thing as follows: Inasmuch as, he says, I have by disobedience lost that robe of sanctity which I had from the Spirit, I do now also acknowledge that I am deserving of a covering of this nature, which affords no gratification, but which gnaws have retained this clothing for ever, thus humbling himself, if God, who is merciful, had not clothed them with tunics of skins instead of fig-leaves. For this purpose, too, He interrogates them, that the blame might light upon the woman; and again, He interrogates her, that she might convey the blame to the serpent. For she related what had occurred. "The serpent," says she, "beguiled me, and I did eat." But He put no question to the serpent; for He knew that he had been the prime mover in the guilty deed; but He pronounced the curse upon him in the first instance, that it might fall upon man with a mitigated rebuke. For God detested him who had led man astray, but by degrees, and little by little, He showed compassion to him who had been beguiled.'' None
80. Pausanias, Description of Greece, 1.4.4, 3.16.3 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Zeus Soter, rarely seen in action • action, taken by heroines • cult activities • heroines, actions of • memories, kept alive or evoked in ritual, contested, of conflict

 Found in books: Jim (2022), Saviour Gods and Soteria in Ancient Greece, 11; Kowalzig (2007), Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece, 200; Lyons (1997), Gender and Immortality: Heroines in Ancient Greek Myth and Cult, 164; Steiner (2001), Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought, 113

sup>
1.4.4 οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοὺς Ἕλληνας τρόπον τὸν εἰρημένον ἔσωζον, οἱ δὲ Γαλάται Πυλῶν τε ἐντὸς ἦσαν καὶ τὰ πολίσματα ἑλεῖν ἐν οὐδενὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ποιησάμενοι Δελφοὺς καὶ τὰ χρήματα. τοῦ θεοῦ διαρπάσαι μάλιστα εἶχον σπουδήν. καί σφισιν αὐτοί τε Δελφοὶ καὶ Φωκέων ἀντετάχθησαν οἱ τὰς πόλεις περὶ τὸν Παρνασσὸν οἰκοῦντες, ἀφίκετο δὲ καὶ δύναμις Αἰτωλῶν· τὸ γὰρ Αἰτωλικὸν προεῖχεν ἀκμῇ νεότητος τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον. ὡς δὲ ἐς χεῖρας συνῄεσαν, ἐνταῦθα κεραυνοί τε ἐφέροντο ἐς τοὺς Γαλάτας καὶ ἀπορραγεῖσαι πέτραι τοῦ Παρνασσοῦ, δείματά τε ἄνδρες ἐφίσταντο ὁπλῖται τοῖς βαρβάροις· τούτων τοὺς μὲν ἐξ Ὑπερβορέων λέγουσιν ἐλθεῖν, Ὑπέροχον καὶ Ἀμάδοκον, τὸν δὲ τρίτον Πύρρον εἶναι τὸν Ἀχιλλέως· ἐναγίζουσι δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης Δελφοὶ τῆς συμμαχίας Πύρρῳ, πρότερον ἔχοντες ἅτε ἀνδρὸς πολεμίου καὶ τὸ μνῆμα ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ.
3.16.3 ὁ δὲ οἰκίας μὲν τῆς ἄλλης ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ἔνθα ἂν ἐθέλωσιν οἰκῆσαι, τὸ δὲ οἴκημα οὐκ ἔφη δώσειν· θυγάτηρ γὰρ ἔτυχέν οἱ παρθένος ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτῷ δίαιταν. ἐς δὲ τὴν ὑστεραίαν παρθένος μὲν ἐκείνη καὶ θεραπεία πᾶσα ἡ περὶ τὴν παῖδα ἠφάνιστο, Διοσκούρων δὲ ἀγάλματα ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι εὑρέθη καὶ τράπεζά τε καὶ σίλφιον ἐπʼ αὐτῇ.'' None		sup>
1.4.4 So they tried to save Greece in the way described, but the Gauls, now south of the Gates, cared not at all to capture the other towns, but were very eager to sack Delphi and the treasures of the god. They were opposed by the Delphians themselves and the Phocians of the cities around Parnassus ; a force of Aetolians also joined the defenders, for the Aetolians at this time were pre-eminent for their vigorous activity. When the forces engaged, not only were thunderbolts and rocks broken off from Parnassus hurled against the Gauls, but terrible shapes as armed warriors haunted the foreigners. They say that two of them, Hyperochus and Amadocus, came from the Hyperboreans, and that the third was Pyrrhus son of Achilles. Because of this help in battle the Delphians sacrifice to Pyrrhus as to a hero, although formerly they held even his tomb in dishonor, as being that of an enemy.
3.16.3 He replied that they might lodge in any other part of the house they wished, but that they could not have the chamber. For it so happened that his maiden daughter was living in it. By the next day this maiden and all her girlish apparel had disappeared, and in the room were found images of the Dioscuri, a table, and silphium upon it.'' None
81. Pliny The Younger, Letters, 10.33 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • administration, activities • participation, members’ active,

 Found in books: Gabrielsen and Paganini (2021), Private Associations in the Ancient Greek World: Regulations and the Creation of Group Identity, 160; Marek (2019), In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World, 370

sup>
10.33 To Trajan. While I was visiting a distant part of the province a most desolating fire broke out at Nicomedia and destroyed a number of private houses and two public buildings, the almshouse * and temple of Isis, although a road ran between them. The fire was allowed to spread farther than it need have done, first, owing to the violence of the wind, and, secondly, to the laziness of the inhabitants, it being generally agreed that they stood idly by without moving and merely watched the catastrophe. Moreover, there is not a single public fire-engine ** or bucket in the place, and not one solitary appliance for mastering an outbreak of fire. However, these will be provided in accordance with the orders I have already given. But, Sir, I would have you consider whether you think a guild of firemen, of about 150 men, should be instituted. I will take care that no one who is not a genuine fireman should be admitted, and that the guild should not misapply the charter granted to it, and there would be no difficulty in keeping an eye on so small a body. 0 '' None
82. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • activity (έἐέργεια) • demons, xii; origin, nature and activity of

 Found in books: Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 342; Sider (2001), Christian and Pagan in the Roman Empire: The Witness of Tertullian, 46
83. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Caracalla (Roman emperor), Alexandria, punitive actions against • Septimius Severus, L. (Roman emperor), peacetime actions and routine of • rhetoric, and/vs. action

 Found in books: Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 235, 255; Scott (2023), An Age of Iron and Rust: Cassius Dio and the History of His Time. 144, 172
84. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Attention, Prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in Stoic self-interrogation • individual, religious actions

 Found in books: Rüpke and Woolf (2013), Religious Dimensions of the Self in the Second Century CE. 78; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389
85. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Impulse (hormē), Impulse not sufficient for action • action, emotions as • action-tendency • emotions, as actions

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 67, 68; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 69; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 44
86. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Caracalla (Roman emperor), Alexandria, punitive actions against • communicative action, literacy and • readers, active engagement/response • rhetoric, and/vs. action

 Found in books: Ando (2013), Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire, 136; Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 160, 195, 235; Scott (2023), An Age of Iron and Rust: Cassius Dio and the History of His Time. 171
87. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Spirit, characterizations as,, active principle • appropriate actions (Lat. officia = Gr. kathēkonta)

 Found in books: Frey and Levison (2014), The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 42; Tsouni (2019), Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics, 83
88. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • God, Creative action • Irenaeus of Lyons, action and change, psychology of

 Found in books: Ayres Champion and Crawford (2023), The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions. 83; Graham (2022), The Church as Paradise and the Way Therein: Early Christian Appropriation of Genesis 3:22–24, 155, 172
89. None, None, nan (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Cicero, and rhetoric vs. action • readers, active engagement/response

 Found in books: Chrysanthou (2018), Plutarch's 'Parallel Lives': Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement. 29; Chrysanthou (2022), Reconfiguring the Imperial Past: Narrative Patterns and Historical Interpretation in Herodian’s History of the Empire. 6
90. Babylonian Talmud, Berachot, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • substitution, of sacrifice with other actions • women, Pauls missionary activity

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 4; Levine (2005), The Ancient Synagogue, The First Thousand Years, 24

26b תנו רבנן טעה ולא התפלל מנחה בערב שבת מתפלל בליל שבת שתים טעה ולא התפלל מנחה בשבת מתפלל במוצאי שבת שתים של חול מבדיל בראשונה ואינו מבדיל בשניה ואם הבדיל בשניה ולא הבדיל בראשונה שניה עלתה לו ראשונה לא עלתה לו,למימרא דכיון דלא אבדיל בקמייתא כמאן דלא צלי דמי ומהדרינן ליה,ורמינהו טעה ולא הזכיר גבורות גשמים בתחיית המתים ושאלה בברכת השנים מחזירין אותו הבדלה בחונן הדעת אין מחזירין אותו מפני שיכול לאומרה על הכוס קשיא,איתמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר תפלות אבות תקנום רבי יהושע בן לוי אמר תפלות כנגד תמידין תקנום,תניא כוותיה דר\' יוסי ברבי חנינא ותניא כוותיה דרבי יהושע בן לוי תניא כוותיה דרבי יוסי בר\' חנינא אברהם תקן תפלת שחרית שנא\' (בראשית יט, כז) וישכם אברהם בבקר אל המקום אשר עמד שם ואין עמידה אלא תפלה שנאמר (תהלים קו, ל) ויעמד פינחס ויפלל,יצחק תקן תפלת מנחה שנאמר (בראשית כד, סג) ויצא יצחק לשוח בשדה לפנות ערב ואין שיחה אלא תפלה שנאמר (תהלים קב, א) תפלה לעני כי יעטף ולפני ה\' ישפוך שיחו,יעקב תקן תפלת ערבית שנאמר (בראשית כח, יא) ויפגע במקום וילן שם ואין פגיעה אלא תפלה שנאמר (ירמיהו ז, טז) ואתה אל תתפלל בעד העם הזה ואל תשא בעדם רנה ותפלה ואל תפגע בי,ותניא כוותיה דר\' יהושע בן לוי מפני מה אמרו תפלת השחר עד חצות שהרי תמיד של שחר קרב והולך עד חצות ורבי יהודה אומר עד ארבע שעות שהרי תמיד של שחר קרב והולך עד ארבע שעות,ומפני מה אמרו תפלת המנחה עד הערב שהרי תמיד של בין הערבים קרב והולך עד הערב רבי יהודה אומר עד פלג המנחה שהרי תמיד של בין הערבים קרב והולך עד פלג המנחה,ומפני מה אמרו תפלת הערב אין לה קבע שהרי אברים ופדרים שלא נתעכלו מבערב קרבים והולכים כל הלילה,ומפני מה אמרו של מוספין כל היום שהרי קרבן של מוספין קרב כל היום רבי יהודה אומר עד שבע שעות שהרי קרבן מוסף קרב והולך עד שבע שעות,ואיזו היא מנחה גדולה משש שעות ומחצה ולמעלה ואיזו היא מנחה קטנה מתשע שעות ומחצה ולמעלה,איבעיא להו רבי יהודה פלג מנחה קמא קאמר או פלג מנחה אחרונה קאמר תא שמע דתניא ר\' יהודה אומר פלג המנחה אחרונה אמרו והיא י"א שעות חסר רביע,נימא תיהוי תיובתיה דר\' יוסי בר\' חנינא אמר לך ר\' יוסי בר\' חנינא לעולם אימא לך תפלות אבות תקנום ואסמכינהו רבנן אקרבנות דאי לא תימא הכי תפלת מוסף לר\' יוסי בר\' חנינא מאן תקנה אלא תפלות אבות תקנום ואסמכינהו רבנן אקרבנות:,רבי יהודה אומר עד ארבע שעות: איבעיא להו עד ועד בכלל או דלמא עד ולא עד בכלל תא שמע ר\' יהודה אומר עד פלג המנחה אי אמרת בשלמא עד ולא עד בכלל היינו דאיכא בין ר\' יהודה לרבנן אלא אי אמרת עד ועד בכלל ר\' יהודה'' None26b On a similar note, the Sages taught in a baraita: One who erred and did not recite the afternoon prayer on the eve of Shabbat, prays in the evening prayer two Amida prayers on Shabbat evening. One who erred and did not recite the afternoon prayer on Shabbat, recites two weekday Amida prayers in the evening prayer at the conclusion of Shabbat. He recites havdala the prayer of distinction between the sanctity of Shabbat and the profanity of the week by reciting: You have graced us, etc., in the fourth blessing of the Amida, which is: Who graciously grants knowledge, in the first prayer, as it is the actual evening prayer, but he does not recite havdala in the second prayer, which is in place of the afternoon prayer. Moreover, if he recited havdala in the second prayer and did not recite havdala in the first, the second prayer fulfilled his obligation, the first one did not fulfill his obligation.,The Gemara comments: Is that to say that since he did not recite havdala in the first prayer, he is as one who did not pray and we require him to return to the beginning of the prayer and repeat it? If so, the conclusion is that one who fails to recite havdala in the prayer must repeat that prayer.,The Gemara raises a contradiction to the above conclusion from the Tosefta: One who erred and did not mention the might of the rains: He makes the wind blow and rain fall in the second blessing of the Amida, the blessing on the revival of the dead, and one who erred and failed to recite the request for rain in the ninth blessing of the Amida, the blessing of the years, we require him to return to the beginning of the prayer and repeat it. However, one who erred and failed to recite havdala in the blessing: Who graciously grants knowledge, we do not require him to return to the beginning of the prayer and repeat it, as he can recite havdala over the cup of wine, independent of his prayer. This contradiction was not resolved and remains difficult.,The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the times beyond which the different prayers may not be recited is rooted in a profound disagreement, also manifest in a later amoraic dispute. It was stated: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: The practice of praying three times daily is ancient, albeit not in its present form; prayers were instituted by the Patriarchs. However, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that the prayers were instituted based on the daily offerings sacrificed in the Holy Temple, and the prayers parallel the offerings, in terms of both time and characteristics.,The Gemara comments: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, and it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. The Gemara elaborates: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina: Abraham instituted the morning prayer, as it is stated when Abraham came to look out over Sodom the day after he had prayed on its behalf: “And Abraham rose early in the morning to the place where he had stood before the Lord” (Genesis 19:27), and from the context as well as the language utilized in the verse, the verb standing means nothing other than prayer, as this language is used to describe Pinehas’ prayer after the plague, as it is stated: “And Pinehas stood up and prayed and the plague ended” (Psalms 106:30). Clearly, Abraham was accustomed to stand in prayer in the morning.,Isaac instituted the afternoon prayer, as it is stated: “And Isaac went out to converse lasuaḥ in the field toward evening” (Genesis 24:63), and conversation means nothing other than prayer, as it is stated: “A prayer of the afflicted when he is faint and pours out his complaint siḥo before the Lord” (Psalms 102:1). Obviously, Isaac was the first to pray as evening approached, at the time of the afternoon prayer.,Jacob instituted the evening prayer, as it is stated: “And he encountered vayifga the place and he slept there for the sun had set” (Genesis 28:11). The word encounter means nothing other than prayer, as it is stated when God spoke to Jeremiah: “And you, do not pray on behalf of this nation and do not raise on their behalf song and prayer, and do not encounter tifga Me for I do not hear you” (Jeremiah 7:16). Jacob prayed during the evening, after the sun had set.,And it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that the laws of prayer are based on the laws of the daily offerings: Why did the Rabbis say that the morning prayer may be recited until noon? Because, although the daily morning offering is typically brought early in the morning, it may be sacrificed until noon. And Rabbi Yehuda says: My opinion, that the morning prayer may be recited until four hours into the day, is because the daily morning offering is sacrificed until four hours.,And why did the Rabbis say that the afternoon prayer may be recited until the evening? Because the daily afternoon offering is sacrificed until the evening. Rabbi Yehuda says that the afternoon prayer may be recited only until the midpoint of the afternoon because, according to his opinion, the daily afternoon offering is sacrificed until the midpoint of the afternoon.,And why did they say that the evening prayer is not fixed? Because the burning of the limbs and fats of the offerings that were not consumed by the fire on the altar until the evening. They remained on the altar and were offered continuously throughout the entire night.,And why did the Rabbis say that the additional prayer may be recited all day? Because the additional offering is brought throughout the entire day. However, Rabbi Yehuda says that the additional prayer may be recited until the seventh hour of the day, because the additional offering is sacrificed until the seventh hour.,The baraita continues and states that there are two times for the afternoon prayer. Greater, earlier minḥa minḥa gedola and lesser, later minḥa minḥa ketana. The Gemara clarifies the difference between them: Which is minḥa gedola? From six-and-a-half hours after sunrise and on, which is a half an hour after noon and on. It is the earliest time that the daily afternoon offering may be sacrificed, as in the case on the eve of Passover that occurs on Shabbat. Which is minḥa ketana? From nine-and-a-half hours and on, which is the standard time that the daily afternoon offering is sacrificed.,On that note, a dilemma was raised before them: Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the afternoon prayer may be recited only until the midpoint of the afternoon, does he say the midpoint of the first minḥa, minḥa gedola? Or, does he say the midpoint of the last minḥa? Come and hear an explicit resolution to this dilemma: As it was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Yehuda says: They said the midpoint of the last minḥa, and that is eleven hours minus a quarter of an hour after sunrise, i.e., an hour-and-a-quarter hours before sunset.,In any case, it is clear that according to this baraita the halakhot of prayer are based on the Temple offerings. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who held that the forefathers instituted the prayers. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, could have said to you: Actually, I will say to you that the Patriarchs instituted the prayers and the Sages based the times and characteristics of prayer on the Temple offerings, even though they do not stem from the same source. As, if you do not say so, that even Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, would agree that the laws of offerings and those of prayers are related, then, according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who instituted the additional prayer? It is not one of the prayers instituted by the forefathers. Rather, even according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, the prayers were instituted by the Patriarchs and the Sages based them on the laws of the offerings.,We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: The morning prayer may be recited until four hours of the day. A dilemma was raised before the yeshiva students: When Rabbi Yehuda says until, does he mean until and including the fourth hour, or, perhaps when he says “until” he means until and not including, in which case one may not pray during the fourth hour? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma based on the mishna. Rabbi Yehuda says: The afternoon prayer may be recited only until the midpoint of the afternoon. Now, granted, if you say that until means until and not including, then there is a difference between the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and the opinion of the Rabbis. However, if you say that until means until and including, then the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda'' None
91. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.85-7.86, 7.88, 7.104-7.105, 7.107-7.109, 7.111, 7.116, 7.121, 7.127, 7.129-7.130, 7.135, 7.175 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Attention, Prosokhē, prosekhein, attention to own thoughts and actions in Stoic self-interrogation • Clement of Alexandria, Platonism and Stoicism in,, on contemplation and action • action, appropriate actions (kathekonta) • action, emotions as • action, right actions (katorthomata) • action, theory of • action, voluntary • action-tendency • action-tendency, of fear • activeness (of converts) • appropriate actions • cause (aitia, aition), active • contemplation, and action • emotions, as actions • good passions (eupatheiai), contributing actively (boulēsis) • good, appropriate actions (kathēkonta) • good, right actions (kathorthōmata) • human beings, contemplation and action • joy, as right action • nature, pervaded by the active principle • pastor (“herdsman”), activities of • principle (archē), active • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions • right action • sexual activity • structure of human vocation, as contemplation and action, in ancient discourse

 Found in books: Ayres and Ward (2021), The Rise of the Early Christian Intellectual, 133; Brouwer (2013), The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, 37, 89; Despotis and Lohr (2022), Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions, 195; Dürr (2022), Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition, 77; Geljon and Runia (2019), Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 212, 263; Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 39, 230, 232, 248; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 329; Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 69, 80, 180; Jedan (2009), Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics, 133, 134, 204, 205; Long (2006), From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, 239; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 167; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 234; Sorabji (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 389; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 20, 43, 46, 73; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 119

sup>
7.85 An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it." "7.86 As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically." 7.88 And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions.' "
7.104 To benefit is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with virtue; whereas to harm is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with vice.The term indifferent has two meanings: in the first it denotes the things which do not contribute either to happiness or to misery, as wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy without having these, although, if they are used in a certain way, such use of them tends to happiness or misery. In quite another sense those things are said to be indifferent which are without the power of stirring inclination or aversion; e.g. the fact that the number of hairs on one's head is odd or even or whether you hold out your finger straight or bent. But it was not in this sense that the things mentioned above were termed indifferent," '7.105 they being quite capable of exciting inclination or aversion. Hence of these latter some are taken by preference, others are rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense affords no ground for either choosing or avoiding.of things indifferent, as they express it, some are preferred, others rejected. Such as have value, they say, are preferred, while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are rejected. Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the life according to nature: which is as much as to say any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts – as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in.' "
7.107 Again, of things preferred some are preferred for their own sake, some for the sake of something else, and others again both for their own sake and for the sake of something else. To the first of these classes belong natural ability, moral improvement, and the like; to the second wealth, noble birth, and the like; to the last strength, perfect faculties, soundness of bodily organs. Things are preferred for their own sake because they accord with nature; not for their own sake, but for the sake of something else, because they secure not a few utilities. And similarly with the class of things rejected under the contrary heads.Furthermore, the term Duty is applied to that for which, when done, a reasonable defence can be adduced, e.g. harmony in the tenor of life's process, which indeed pervades the growth of plants and animals. For even in plants and animals, they hold, you may discern fitness of behaviour." "7.108 Zeno was the first to use this term καθῆκον of conduct. Etymologically it is derived from κατά τινας ἥκειν, i.e. reaching as far as, being up to, or incumbent on so and so. And it is an action in itself adapted to nature's arrangements. For of the acts done at the prompting of impulse some, they observe, are fit and meet, others the reverse, while there is a third class which is neither the one nor the other.Befitting acts are all those which reason prevails with us to do; and this is the case with honouring one's parents, brothers and country, and intercourse with friends. Unbefitting, or contrary to duty, are all acts that reason deprecates, e.g. to neglect one's parents, to be indifferent to one's brothers, not to agree with friends, to disregard the interests of one's country, and so forth." "7.109 Acts which fall under neither of the foregoing classes are those which reason neither urges us to do nor forbids, such as picking up a twig, holding a style or a scraper, and the like.Again, some duties are incumbent unconditionally, others in certain circumstances. Unconditional duties are the following: to take proper care of health and one's organs of sense, and things of that sort. Duties imposed by circumstances are such as maiming oneself and sacrifice of property. And so likewise with acts which are violations of duty. Another division is into duties which are always incumbent and those which are not. To live in accordance with virtue is always a duty, whereas dialectic by question and answer or walking-exercise and the like are not at all times incumbent. The same may be said of the violations of duty." "
7.111 They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself." 7.116 Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness.
7.121 But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal.Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him – so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life – since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same;
7.127 It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues, and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods:
7.129 Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics.' "7.130 Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise of Love, and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease." 7.135 Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena. A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names.
7.175 Antiquities.of the Gods.of Giants.of Marriage.On Homer.of Duty, three books.of Good Counsel.of Gratitude.An Exhortation.of the Virtues.of Natural Ability.of Gorgippus.of Envy.of Love.of Freedom.The Art of Love.of Honour.of Fame.The Statesman.of Deliberation.of Laws.of Litigation.of Education.of Logic, three books.of the End.of Beauty.of Conduct.of Knowledge.of Kingship.of Friendship.On the Banquet.On the Thesis that Virtue is the same in Man and in Woman.On the Wise Man turning Sophist.of Usages.Lectures, two books.of Pleasure.On Properties.On Insoluble Problems.of Dialectic.of Moods or Tropes.of Predicates.This, then, is the list of his works.'" None
92. None, None, nan (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Action (πρᾶξις) • Forms, as active causes • One, the, activity of • Plato, on action • Plotinus, and activity • action • actions, gods do not engage in • double activity • human beings, and action • intellect, premises of action derived from • myth of Er, of action • virtue, as active • virtues, of soul's activity • world soul, thought activity of

 Found in books: Birnbaum and Dillon (2020), Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, 244; Gerson and Wilberding (2022), The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, 125, 127, 146, 147; Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 415, 416, 417, 423; Horkey (2019), Cosmos in the Ancient World, 147; Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 67; Marmodoro and Prince (2015), Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, 32, 151, 208; Sattler (2021), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World, 94
93. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • ritual actions • substitution, of sacrifice with other actions

 Found in books: Balberg (2017), Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature, 238; Janowitz (2002b), Icons of Power: Ritual Practices in Late Antiquity, 17
94. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • action, as ritual • vitium, taints magistrate’s subsequent actions

 Found in books: Konrad (2022), The Challenge to the Auspices: Studies on Magisterial Power in the Middle Roman Republic, 59; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 345
95. None, None, nan (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • bishops, Nicene, anti-Jewish actions of • ritual actions

 Found in books: Kraemer (2020), The Mediterranean Diaspora in Late Antiquity: What Christianity Cost the Jews, 185; Nutzman (2022), Contested Cures: Identity and Ritual Healing in Roman and Late Antique Palestine 120
96. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • World Soul activating nature • gods, creation and activity of

 Found in books: Hoenig (2018), Plato's Timaeus and the Latin Tradition, 133, 134; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 126
97. None, None, nan (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Action (πρᾶξις) • active motion/change (kinêsis, κίνησις‎) • active/causal/productive (gennetikê, γεννητική‎; paraktikê, παρακτική‎) potency/power (dunamis, δύναμις‎) • causal activity

 Found in books: Joosse (2021), Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher, 59, 63; d'Hoine and Martijn (2017), All From One: A Guide to Proclus, 50, 53, 68
98. None, None, nan (6th cent. CE - 8th cent. CE)
 Tagged with subjects: • Bathhouse activities in • missionary activities

 Found in books: Eliav (2023), A Jew in the Roman Bathhouse: Cultural Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean, 203; Lavee (2017), The Rabbinic Conversion of Judaism The Unique Perspective of the Bavli on Conversion and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 176
99. Vergil, Aeneis, 3.156-3.159, 6.384-6.397, 6.847-6.848
 Tagged with subjects: • Hercules, civilizing activities of • Uncertainty, about actions, decisions, destiny etc. • action, religious • reading, active • volcanoes / volcanic activity

 Found in books: Farrell (2021), Juno's Aeneid: A Battle for Heroic Identity, 166; Kazantzidis (2021), Lucretius on Disease: The Poetics of Morbidity in "De rerum natura", 148; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 90; Moxon (2017), Peter's Halakhic Nightmare: The 'Animal' Vision of Acts 10:9–16 in Jewish and Graeco-Roman Perspective. 321; Pandey (2018), The Poetics of Power in Augustan Rome, 153

sup>
3.156 Nos te, Dardania incensa, tuaque arma secuti, 3.157 nos tumidum sub te permensi classibus aequor, 3.158 idem venturos tollemus in astra nepotes, 3.159 imperiumque urbi dabimus: tu moenia magnis
6.384 Ergo iter inceptum peragunt fluvioque propinquant. 6.386 per tacitum nemus ire pedemque advertere ripae, 6.387 sic prior adgreditur dictis, atque increpat ultro: 6.388 Quisquis es, armatus qui nostra ad flumina tendis, 6.389 fare age, quid venias, iam istinc, et comprime gressum. 6.390 Umbrarum hic locus est, somni noctisque soporae; 6.391 corpora viva nefas Stygia vectare carina. 6.392 Nec vero Alciden me sum laetatus euntem 6.393 accepisse lacu, nec Thesea Pirithoumque, 6.394 dis quamquam geniti atque invicti viribus essent. 6.395 Tartareum ille manu custodem in vincla petivit, 6.396 ipsius a solio regis, traxitque trementem; 6.397 hi dominam Ditis thalamo deducere adorti.
6.847 Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, 6.848 credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore voltus,' ' None		sup>
3.156 rests in the middle sea. Thence Ida soars; 3.157 there is the cradle of our race. It boasts 3.158 a hundred cities, seats of fruitful power. 3.159 Thence our chief sire, if duly I recall
6.384 These were but shapes and shadows sweeping by, 6.386 Hence the way leads to that Tartarean stream 6.387 of Acheron, whose torrent fierce and foul 6.388 Disgorges in Cocytus all its sands. 6.389 A ferryman of gruesome guise keeps ward 6.390 Upon these waters,—Charon, foully garbed, 6.391 With unkempt, thick gray beard upon his chin, 6.392 And staring eyes of flame; a mantle coarse, 6.393 All stained and knotted, from his shoulder falls, 6.394 As with a pole he guides his craft, tends sail, ' "6.395 And in the black boat ferries o'er his dead;— " "6.396 Old, but a god's old age looks fresh and strong. " '6.397 To those dim shores the multitude streams on—
6.847 Lo! on the left and right at feast reclined 6.848 Are other blessed souls, whose chorus sings ' ' None
100. Vergil, Georgics, 3.34
 Tagged with subjects: • action, religious • reading, active

 Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 90; Pandey (2018), The Poetics of Power in Augustan Rome, 229, 240, 241

sup>
3.34 Stabunt et Parii lapides, spirantia signa,'' None		sup>
3.34 of gold and massive ivory on the door'' None
101. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • female spheres of activity • pastor (“herdsman”), activities of

 Found in books: Jenkyns (2013), God, Space, and City in the Roman Imagination, 94; Nelsestuen (2015), Varro the Agronomist: Political Philosophy, Satire, and Agriculture in the Late Republic. 135
102. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus, on action • activity (έἐέργεια) • cause (aitia, aition), active

 Found in books: Hankinson (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought, 244, 245; Schibli (2002), Hierocles of Alexandria, 337
103. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Chrysippus, on causes of action • action • action, emotions as • action, pursuit and avoidance • emotions, as actions • good, appropriate actions (kathēkonta) • good, right actions (kathorthōmata) • responsibility, moral, for actions and emotions

 Found in books: Graver (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, 27, 227, 229, 232; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 42, 135, 143
104. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • action, and cult • action, in pursuit of pleasure • action-tendency • cult, action

 Found in books: Hockey (2019), The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, 74; Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 214
105. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • action, and cult • cult, action • sexual activity

 Found in books: Mackey (2022), Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion, 229; Yona (2018), Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire, 119
106. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Ritual actions, mimesis/theater • participation, members’ active,

 Found in books: Connelly (2007), Portrait of a Priestess: Women and Ritual in Ancient Greece, 107; Gabrielsen and Paganini (2021), Private Associations in the Ancient Greek World: Regulations and the Creation of Group Identity, 67, 160, 218
107. None, None, nan
 Tagged with subjects: • Lykourgos, active interest in cult • Ritual action, alterations • Ritual action, modifications

 Found in books: Papazarkadas (2011), Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens, 21, 23, 50; Stavrianopoulou (2006), Ritual and Communication in the Graeco-Roman World, 146



Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.