| 1. Homeric Hymns, To Heracles, 11 (8th cent. BCE - 6th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •antony, motivations for human action Found in books: Dilley (2019) 101 |
| 2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human beings, contemplation and action Found in books: Dürr (2022) 80 |
| 3. Cicero, On Laws, 2.21, 2.31 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •action, human Found in books: Mackey (2022) 369 |
4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.36-2.38 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human beings, contemplation and action Found in books: Dürr (2022) 77, 78 | 2.36. Now this is the grade on which universal nature stands; and since she is of such a character as to be superior to all things and incapable of frustration by any, it follows of necessity that the world is an intelligent being, and indeed also a wise being. "Again, what can be more illogical than to deny that the being which embraces all things must be the best of all things, or, admitting this, to deny that it must be, first, possessed of life, secondly, rational and intelligent, and lastly, endowed with wisdom? How else can it be the best of all things? If it resembles plants or even animals, so far from being highest, it must be reckoned lowest in the scale of being. If again it be capable of reason yet has not been wise from the beginning, the world must be in a worse condition than mankind; for a man can become wise, but if in all the eternity of past time the world has been foolish, obviously it will never attain wisdom; and so it will be inferior to man, which is absurd. Therefore the world must be deemed to have been wise from the beginning, and divine. 2.37. "In fact there is nothing else beside the world that has nothing wanting, but is fully equipped and complete and perfect in all its details and parts. For as Chrysippus cleverly puts it, just as a shield-case is made for the sake of a shield and a sheath for the sake of a sword, so everything else except the world was created for the sake of some other thing; thus the cornº and fruits produced by the earth were created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man: for example the horse for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting and keeping guard; man himself however came into existence for the purpose of contemplating and imitating the world; he is by no means perfect, but he is 'a small fragment of that which is perfect.' 2.38. The world on the contrary, since it embraces all things and since nothing exists which is not within it, is entirely perfect; how then can it fail to possess that which is the best? but there is nothing better than intelligence and reason; the world therefore cannot fail to possess them. Chrysippus therefore also well shows by the aid of illustrations that in the perfect and mature specimen of its kind everything is better than in the imperfect, for instance in a horse than in a foal, in a dog than in a puppy, in a man than in a boy; and that similarly a perfect and complete being is bound to possess that which is the best thing in all the world; |
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| 5. Cicero, Philippicae, 2.110 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •action, human Found in books: Mackey (2022) 369 |
6. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •human beings, contemplation and action Found in books: Dürr (2022) 79| 5.9. Pythagoram autem respondisse similem sibi videri vitam vita X ( corr. V rec ) hominum et mercatum eum, qui haberetur maxumo ludorum apparatu totius Graeciae celebritate; nam ut illic illic s illi X ( del. V 2 ) cf. Neue 2, 655 ( Cael. ap. Cic. epist. 8, 15, 2 ) alii corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronae peterent, alii emendi aut vendendi quaestu et lucro ducerentur, esset esse V 1 autem quoddam genus eorum, idque vel maxime ingenuum, qui nec plausum nec lucrum quaererent, sed visendi causa venirent studioseque perspicerent, quid ageretur et quo modo, item nos quasi in mercatus quandam celebritatem celebritate X corr. V 2 ex urbe aliqua item (iter codd. ) ... 12 aliqua Non. 431, 19 sic in hanc hac K 1 vitam ex alia vita et natura profectos alios gloriae servire, alios pecuniae, raros esse quosdam, qui ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis rerum naturam studiose intuerentur; hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos—id est enim philosophos—; et ut illic liberalissimum esset spectare nihil sibi adquirentem, sic in vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum cognitionemque cognitionemque V c s cogitationemque X praestare. | |
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7. Polybius, Histories, 3.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •antony, motivations for human action Found in books: Dilley (2019) 101 | 3.2. 1. First I shall indicate the causes of the above war between Rome and Carthage, known as the Hannibalic war, and tell how the Carthaginians invaded Italy,,2. broke up the dominion of Rome, and cast the Romans into great fear for their safety and even for their native soil, while great was their own hope, such as they had never dared to entertain, of capturing Rome itself.,3. Next I shall attempt to describe how at the same period Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aetolians and settling the affairs of Greece, conceived the project of an alliance with Carthage;,4. how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled and at length went to war with each other for the possession of Coele-Syria,,5. and how the Rhodians and Prusias, declaring war on the Byzantines, compelled them to stop levying toll on ships bound for the Euxine.,6. Interrupting my narrative at this point, I shall draw up my account of the Roman Constitution, as a sequel to which I shall point out how the peculiar qualities of the Constitution conduced very largely not only to their subjection of the Italians and Sicilians, and subsequently of the Spaniards and Celts, but finally to their victory over Carthage and their conceiving the project of universal empire.,7. Simultaneously in a digression I shall narrate how the dominion of Hiero of Syracuse fell,8. and after this I shall deal with the troubles in Egypt, and tell how, on the death of Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip, conspiring to partition the dominions of his son, a helpless infant, began to be guilty of acts of unjust aggression, Philip laying hands on the islands of the Aegean, and on Caria and Samos, while Antiochus seized on Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. |
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| 8. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.19.12-1.19.14 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human beings, contemplation and action Found in books: Dürr (2022) 77 |
9. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.130 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •human beings, contemplation and action Found in books: Dürr (2022) 77 | 7.130. Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise of Love, and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease. |
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10. Origen, On First Principles, 3.2.4 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •antony, motivations for human action Found in books: Dilley (2019) 101 | 3.2.4. With respect to the thoughts which proceed from our heart, or the recollection of things which we have done, or the contemplation of any things or causes whatever, we find that they sometimes proceed from ourselves, and sometimes are originated by the opposing powers; not seldom also are they suggested by God, or by the holy angels. Now such a statement will perhaps appear incredible, unless it be confirmed by the testimony of holy Scripture. That, then, thoughts arise within ourselves, David testifies in the Psalms, saying, The thought of a man will make confession to You, and the rest of the thought shall observe to You a festival day. That this, however, is also brought about by the opposing powers, is shown by Solomon in the book of Ecclesiastes in the following manner: If the spirit of the ruler rise up against you, leave not your place; for soundness restrains great offenses. The Apostle Paul also will bear testimony to the same point in the words: Casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalted itself against the knowledge of Christ. That it is an effect due to God, nevertheless, is declared by David, when he says in the Psalms, Blessed is the man whose help is in You, O Lord, Your ascents (are) in his heart. And the apostle says that God put it into the heart of Titus. That certain thoughts are suggested to men's hearts either by good or evil angels, is shown both by the angel that accompanied Tobias, and by the language of the prophet, where he says, And the angel who spoke in me answered. The book of the Shepherd declares the same, saying that each individual is attended by two angels; that whenever good thoughts arise in our hearts, they are suggested by the good angel; but when of a contrary kind, they are the instigation of the evil angel. The same is declared by Barnabas in his Epistle, where he says there are two ways, one of light and one of darkness, over which he asserts that certain angels are placed — the angels of God over the way of light, the angels of Satan over the way of darkness. We are not, however, to imagine that any other result follows from what is suggested to our heart, whether good or bad, save a (mental) commotion only, and an incitement instigating us either to good or evil. For it is quite within our reach, when a maligt power has begun to incite us to evil, to cast away from us the wicked suggestions, and to resist the vile inducements, and to do nothing that is at all deserving of blame. And, on the other hand, it is possible, when a divine power calls us to better things, not to obey the call; our freedom of will being preserved to us in either case. We said, indeed, in the foregoing pages, that certain recollections of good or evil actions were suggested to us either by the act of divine providence or by the opposing powers, as is shown in the book of Esther, when Artaxerxes had not remembered the services of that just man Mordecai, but, when wearied out with his nightly vigils, had it put into his mind by God to require that the annals of his great deeds should be read to him; whereon, being reminded of the benefits received from Mordecai, he ordered his enemy Haman to be hanged, but splendid honours to be conferred on him, and impunity from the threatened danger to be granted to the whole of the holy nation. On the other hand, however, we must suppose that it was through the hostile influence of the devil that the suggestion was introduced into the minds of the high priests and the scribes which they made to Pilate, when they came and said, Sir, we remember that that deceiver said, while he was yet alive, After three days I will rise again. The design of Judas, also, respecting the betrayal of our Lord and Saviour, did not originate in the wickedness of his mind alone. For Scripture testifies that the devil had already put it into his heart to betray Him. And therefore Solomon rightly commanded, saying, Keep your heart with all diligence. And the Apostle Paul warns us: Therefore we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest perhaps we should let them slip. And when he says, Neither give place to the devil, he shows by that injunction that it is through certain acts, or a kind of mental slothfulness, that room is made for the devil, so that, if he once enter our heart, he will either gain possession of us, or at least will pollute the soul, if he has not obtained the entire mastery over it, by casting on us his fiery darts; and by these we are sometimes deeply wounded, and sometimes only set on fire. Seldom indeed, and only in a few instances, are these fiery darts quenched, so as not to find a place where they may wound, i.e., when one is covered by the strong and mighty shield of faith. The declaration, indeed, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places, must be so understood as if we meant, I Paul, and you Ephesians, and all who have not to wrestle against flesh and blood: for such have to struggle against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, not like the Corinthians, whose struggle was as yet against flesh and blood, and who had been overtaken by no temptation but such as is common to man. |
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| 11. Antony, Letters, 1 Tagged with subjects: •antony, motivations for human action Found in books: Dilley (2019) 101 |
| 12. Anon., Scholia In Lycophronem, 1.19 Tagged with subjects: •antony, motivations for human action Found in books: Dilley (2019) 101 |
| 13. Aspasius, In Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria, 17.18-17.29 Tagged with subjects: •human beings, contemplation and action Found in books: Dürr (2022) 80 |
| 14. Palladius of Aspuna, Lausiac History, 8 Tagged with subjects: •antony, motivations for human action Found in books: Dilley (2019) 101 |
