1. Cicero, Pro Archia, 27 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 39, 136 27. Decimus quidem Brutus, summus vir et imperator, Acci, amicissimi sui, carminibus templorum ac monumentorum monu. eabpc : moni. cett. aditus exornavit suorum. iam vero ille qui cum Aetolis Ennio comite bellavit Fulvius non dubitavit Martis manubias Musis consecrare. qua re, in qua urbe imperatores prope armati poetarum nomen et Musarum delubra coluerunt, in ea non debent togati togati σχς, p mg. : locati cett. iudices a Musarum honore et a poetarum salute abhorrere. | |
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2. Cicero, On Divination, 1.9, 1.11, 1.34, 1.72, 1.109-1.110, 2.13, 2.16-2.27, 2.100 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius l. Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 81 1.9. Eius rationi non sane desidero quid respondeam; satis enim defensa religio est in secundo libro a Lucilio, cuius disputatio tibi ipsi, ut in extremo tertio scribis, ad veritatem est visa propensior. Sed, quod praetermissum est in illis libris (credo, quia commodius arbitratus es separatim id quaeri deque eo disseri), id est de divinatione, quae est earum rerum, quae fortuitae putantur, praedictio atque praesensio, id, si placet, videamus quam habeat vim et quale sit. Ego enim sic existimo, si sint ea genera dividi vera, de quibus accepimus quaeque colimus, esse deos, vicissimque, si di sint, esse qui divinent. 1.11. Ego vero, inquam, philosophiae, Quinte, semper vaco; hoc autem tempore, cum sit nihil aliud, quod lubenter agere possim, multo magis aveo audire, de divinatione quid sentias. Nihil, inquit, equidem novi, nec quod praeter ceteros ipse sentiam; nam cum antiquissimam sententiam, tum omnium populorum et gentium consensu conprobatam sequor. Duo sunt enim dividi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae. 1.34. Iis igitur adsentior, qui duo genera divinationum esse dixerunt, unum, quod particeps esset artis, alterum, quod arte careret. Est enim ars in iis, qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt. Carent autem arte ii, qui non ratione aut coniectura observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quadam animi aut soluto liberoque motu futura praesentiunt, quod et somniantibus saepe contingit et non numquam vaticitibus per furorem, ut Bacis Boeotius, ut Epimenides Cres, ut Sibylla Erythraea. Cuius generis oracla etiam habenda sunt, non ea, quae aequatis sortibus ducuntur, sed illa, quae instinctu divino adflatuque funduntur; etsi ipsa sors contemnenda non est, si et auctoritatem habet vetustatis, ut eae sunt sortes, quas e terra editas accepimus; quae tamen ductae ut in rem apte cadant, fieri credo posse divinitus. Quorum omnium interpretes, ut grammatici poe+tarum, proxime ad eorum, quos interpretantur, divinationem videntur accedere. 1.72. in quo haruspices, augures coniectoresque numerantur. Haec inprobantur a Peripateticis, a Stoicis defenduntur. Quorum alia sunt posita in monumentis et disciplina, quod Etruscorum declarant et haruspicini et fulgurales et rituales libri, vestri etiam augurales, alia autem subito ex tempore coniectura explicantur, ut apud Homerum Calchas, qui ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratus est, et ut in Sullae scriptum historia videmus, quod te inspectante factum est, ut, cum ille in agro Nolano inmolaret ante praetorium, ab infima ara subito anguis emergeret, cum quidem C. Postumius haruspex oraret illum, ut in expeditionem exercitum educeret; id cum Sulla fecisset, tum ante oppidum Nolam florentissuma Samnitium castra cepit. 1.109. Sed ut, unde huc digressa est, eodem redeat oratio: si nihil queam disputare, quam ob rem quidque fiat, et tantum modo fieri ea, quae commemoravi, doceam, parumne Epicuro Carneadive respondeam? Quid, si etiam ratio exstat artificiosae praesensionis facilis, divinae autem paulo obscurior? Quae enim extis, quae fulgoribus, quae portentis, quae astris praesentiuntur, haec notata sunt observatione diuturna. Adfert autem vetustas omnibus in rebus longinqua observatione incredibilem scientiam; quae potest esse etiam sine motu atque inpulsu deorum, cum, quid ex quoque eveniat, et quid quamque rem significet, crebra animadversione perspectum est. 1.110. Altera divinatio est naturalis, ut ante dixi; quae physica disputandi subtilitate referenda est ad naturam deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus; cumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est cognatione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri. Sed vigilantes animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt diiunguntque se a societate divina vinclis corporis inpediti. 2.13. Sed animadverti, Quinte, te caute et ab iis coniecturis, quae haberent artem atque prudentiam, et ab iis rebus, quae sensibus aut artificiis perciperentur, abducere divinationem eamque ita definire: divinationem esse earum rerum praedictionem et praesensionem, quae essent fortuitae. Primum eodem revolveris. Nam et medici et gubernatoris et imperatoris praesensio est rerum fortuitarum. Num igitur aut haruspex aut augur aut vates quis aut somnians melius coniecerit aut e morbo evasurum aegrotum aut e periculo navem aut ex insidiis exercitum quam medicus, quam gubernator, quam imperator? 2.16. Medicus morbum ingravescentem ratione providet, insidias imperator, tempestates gubernator; et tamen ii ipsi saepe falluntur, qui nihil sine certa ratione opitur; ut agricola, cum florem oleae videt, bacam quoque se visurum putat, non sine ratione ille quidem; sed non numquam tamen fallitur. Quodsi falluntur ii, qui nihil sine aliqua probabili coniectura ac ratione dicunt, quid existimandum est de coniectura eorum, qui extis aut avibus aut ostentis aut oraclis aut somniis futura praesentiunt? Nondum dico, quam haec signa nulla sint, fissum iecoris, corvi cantus, volatus aquilae, stellae traiectio, voces furentium, sortes, somnia; de quibus singulis dicam suo loco; nunc de universis. 2.17. Qui potest provideri quicquam futurum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam neque notam, cur futurum sit? Solis defectiones itemque lunae praedicuntur in multos annos ab iis, qui siderum motus numeris persequuntur; ea praedicunt enim, quae naturae necessitas perfectura est. Vident ex constantissimo motu lunae, quando illa e regione solis facta incurrat in umbram terrae, quae est meta noctis, ut eam obscurari necesse sit, quandoque eadem luna subiecta atque opposita soli nostris oculis eius lumen obscuret, quo in signo quaeque errantium stellarum quoque tempore futura sit, qui exortus quoque die signi alicuius aut qui occasus futurus sit. Haec qui ante dicunt, quam rationem sequantur, vides. 2.18. Qui thesaurum inventum iri aut hereditatem venturam dicunt, quid sequuntur? aut in qua rerum natura inest id futurum? Quodsi haec eaque, quae sunt eiusdem generis, habent aliquam talem necessitatem, quid est tandem, quod casu fieri aut forte fortuna putemus? Nihil enim est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae quam fortuna, ut mihi ne in deum quidem cadere videatur, ut sciat, quid casu et fortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet; sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est; est autem fortuna; rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla praesensio est. 2.19. Aut si negas esse fortunam et omnia, quae fiunt quaeque futura sunt, ex omni aeternitate definita dicis esse fataliter, muta definitionem divinationis, quam dicebas praesensionem esse rerum fortuitarum. Si enim nihil fieri potest, nihil accidere, nihil evenire, nisi quod ab omni aeternitate certum fuerit esse futurum rato tempore, quae potest esse fortuna? qua sublata qui locus est divinationi? quae a te fortuitarum rerum est dicta praesensio. Quamquam dicebas omnia, quae fierent futurave essent, fato contineri. Anile sane et plenum superstitionis fati nomen ipsum; sed tamen apud Stoicos de isto fato multa dicuntur; de quo alias; nunc quod necesse est. 2.20. Si omnia fato, quid mihi divinatio prodest? Quod enim is, qui divinat, praedicit, id vero futurum est, ut ne illud quidem sciam quale sit, quod Deiotarum, necessarium nostrum, ex itinere aquila revocavit; qui nisi revertisset, in eo conclavi ei cubandum fuisset, quod proxuma nocte corruit; ruina igitur oppressus esset. At id neque, si fatum fuerat, effugisset nec, si non fuerat, in eum casum incidisset. Quid ergo adiuvat divinatio? aut quid est, quod me moneant aut sortes aut exta aut ulla praedictio? Si enim fatum fuit classes populi Romani bello Punico primo, alteram naufragio, alteram a Poenis depressam, interire, etiamsi tripudium solistumum pulli fecissent L. Iunio et P. Claudio consulibus, classes tamen interissent. Sin, cum auspiciis obtemperatum esset, interiturae classes non fuerunt, non interierunt fato; vultis autem omnia fato; 2.21. nulla igitur est divinatio. Quodsi fatum fuit bello Punico secundo exercitum populi Romani ad lacum Trasumennum interire, num id vitari potuit, si Flaminius consul iis signis iisque auspiciis, quibus pugnare prohibebatur, paruisset? Certe potuit. Aut igitur non fato interiit exercitus, aut, si fato (quod certe vobis ita dicendum est), etiamsi obtemperasset auspiciis, idem eventurum fuisset; mutari enim fata non possunt. Ubi est igitur ista divinatio Stoicorum? quae, si fato omnia fiunt, nihil nos admonere potest, ut cautiores simus; quoquo enim modo nos gesserimus, fiet tamen illud, quod futurum est; sin autem id potest flecti, nullum est fatum; ita ne divinatio quidem, quoniam ea rerum futurarum est. Nihil autem est pro certo futurum, quod potest aliqua procuratione accidere ne fiat. 2.22. Atque ego ne utilem quidem arbitror esse nobis futurarum rerum scientiam. Quae enim vita fuisset Priamo, si ab adulescentia scisset, quos eventus senectutis esset habiturus? Abeamus a fabulis, propiora videamus. Clarissimorum hominum nostrae civitatis gravissimos exitus in Consolatione collegimus. Quid igitur? ut omittamus superiores, Marcone Crasso putas utile fuisse tum, cum maxumis opibus fortunisque florebat, scire sibi interfecto Publio filio exercituque deleto trans Euphratem cum ignominia et dedecore esse pereundum? An Cn. Pompeium censes tribus suis consulatibus, tribus triumphis, maximarum rerum gloria laetaturum fuisse, si sciret se in solitudine Aegyptiorum trucidatum iri amisso exercitu, post mortem vero ea consecutura, quae sine lacrimis non possumus dicere? 2.23. Quid vero Caesarem putamus, si divinasset fore ut in eo senatu, quem maiore ex parte ipse cooptasset, in curia Pompeia ante ipsius Pompeii simulacrum tot centurionibus suis inspectantibus a nobilissumis civibus, partim etiam a se omnibus rebus ornatis, trucidatus ita iaceret, ut ad eius corpus non modo amicorum, sed ne servorum quidem quisquam accederet, quo cruciatu animi vitam acturum fuisse? Certe igitur ignoratio futurorum malorum utilior est quam scientia. 2.24. Nam illud quidem dici, praesertim a Stoicis, nullo modo potest: Non isset ad arma Pompeius, non transisset Crassus Euphratem, non suscepisset bellum civile Caesar. Non igitur fatalis exitus habuerunt; vultis autem evenire omnia fato; nihil ergo illis profuisset divinare; atque etiam omnem fructum vitae superioris perdidissent; quid enim posset iis esse laetum exitus suos cogitantibus? Ita, quoquo sese verterint Stoici, iaceat necesse est omnis eorum sollertia. Si enim id, quod eventurum est, vel hoc vel illo modo potest evenire, fortuna valet plurimum; quae autem fortuita sunt, certa esse non possunt. Sin autem certum est, quid quaque de re quoque tempore futurum sit, quid est, quod me adiuvent haruspices? qui cum res tristissimas portendi dixerunt, addunt ad extremum omnia levius casura rebus divinis procuratis; 2.25. si enim nihil fit extra fatum, nihil levari re divina potest. Hoc sentit Homerus, cum querentem Iovem inducit, quod Sarpedonem filium a morte contra fatum eripere non posset. Hoc idem significat Graecus ille in eam sententiam versus: Quod fóre paratum est, íd summum exsuperát Iovem. Totum omnino fatum etiam Atellanio versu iure mihi esse inrisum videtur; sed in rebus tam severis non est iocandi locus. Concludatur igitur ratio: Si enim provideri nihil potest futurum esse eorum, quae casu fiunt, quia esse certa non possunt, divinatio nulla est; sin autem idcirco possunt provideri, quia certa sunt et fatalia, rursus divinatio nulla est; eam enim tu fortuitarum rerum esse dicebas. 2.26. Sed haec fuerit nobis tamquam levis armaturae prima orationis excursio; nunc comminus agamus experiamurque, si possimus cornua commovere disputationis tuae. Duo enim genera dividi esse dicebas, unum artificiosum, alterum naturale; artificiosum constare partim ex coniectura, partim ex observatione diuturna; naturale, quod animus arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus ex divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Artificiosa divinationis illa fere genera ponebas: extispicum eorumque, qui ex fulgoribus ostentisque praedicerent, tum augurum eorumque, qui signis aut ominibus uterentur, omneque genus coniecturale in hoc fere genere ponebas. 2.27. Illud autem naturale aut concitatione mentis edi et quasi fundi videbatur aut animo per somnum sensibus et curis vacuo provideri. Duxisti autem divinationem omnem a tribus rebus, a deo, a fato, a natura. Sed tamen cum explicare nihil posses, pugnasti commenticiorum exemplorum mirifica copia. De quo primum hoc libet dicere: Hoc ego philosophi non esse arbitror, testibus uti, qui aut casu veri aut malitia falsi fictique esse possunt; argumentis et rationibus oportet, quare quidque ita sit, docere, non eventis, iis praesertim, quibus mihi liceat non credere. 2.100. Restant duo dividi genera, quae habere dicimur a natura, non ab arte, vaticidi et somniandi; de quibus, Quinte, inquam, si placet, disseramus. Mihi vero, inquit, placet; his enim, quae adhuc disputasti, prorsus adsentior, et, vere ut loquar, quamquam tua me oratio confirmavit, tamen etiam mea sponte nimis superstitiosam de divinatione Stoicorum sententiam iudicabam; haec me Peripateticorum ratio magis movebat et veteris Dicaearchi et eius, qui nunc floret, Cratippi, qui censent esse in mentibus hominum tamquam oraclum aliquod, ex quo futura praesentiant, si aut furore divino incitatus animus aut somno relaxatus solute moveatur ac libere. His de generibus quid sentias et quibus ea rationibus infirmes, audire sane velim. | 1.9. However, I am really at no loss for a reply to his reasoning; for in the second book Lucilius has made an adequate defence of religion and his argument, as you yourself state at the end of the third book, seemed to you nearer to the truth than Cottas. But there is a question which you passed over in those books because, no doubt, you thought it more expedient to inquire into it in a separate discussion: I refer to divination, which is the foreseeing and foretelling of events considered as happening by chance. Now let us see, if you will, what efficacy it has and what its nature is. My own opinion is that, if the kinds of divination which we have inherited from our forefathers and now practise are trustworthy, then there are gods and, conversely, if there are gods then there are men who have the power of divination. [6] 1.11. Really, my dear Quintus, said I, I always have time for philosophy. Moreover, since there is nothing else at this time that I can do with pleasure, I am all the more eager to hear what you think about divination.There is, I assure you, said he, nothing new or original in my views; for those which I adopt are not only very old, but they are endorsed by the consent of all peoples and nations. There are two kinds of divination: the first is dependent on art, the other on nature. 1.34. I agree, therefore, with those who have said that there are two kinds of divination: one, which is allied with art; the other, which is devoid of art. Those diviners employ art, who, having learned the known by observation, seek the unknown by deduction. On the other hand those do without art who, unaided by reason or deduction or by signs which have been observed and recorded, forecast the future while under the influence of mental excitement, or of some free and unrestrained emotion. This condition often occurs to men while dreaming and sometimes to persons who prophesy while in a frenzy — like Bacis of Boeotia, Epimenides of Crete and the Sibyl of Erythraea. In this latter class must be placed oracles — not oracles given by means of equalized lots — but those uttered under the impulse of divine inspiration; although divination by lot is not in itself to be despised, if it has the sanction of antiquity, as in the case of those lots which, according to tradition, sprang out of the earth; for in spite of everything, I am inclined to think that they may, under the power of God, be so drawn as to give an appropriate response. Men capable of correctly interpreting all these signs of the future seem to approach very near to the divine spirit of the gods whose wills they interpret, just as scholars do when they interpret the poets. 1.72. But those methods of divination which are dependent on conjecture, or on deductions from events previously observed and recorded, are, as I have said before, not natural, but artificial, and include the inspection of entrails, augury, and the interpretation of dreams. These are disapproved of by the Peripatetics and defended by the Stoics. Some are based upon records and usage, as is evident from the Etruscan books on divination by means of inspection of entrails and by means of thunder and lightning, and as is also evident from the books of your augural college; while others are dependent on conjecture made suddenly and on the spur of the moment. An instance of the latter kind is that of Calchas in Homer, prophesying the number of years of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows. We find another illustration of conjectural divination in the history of Sulla in an occurrence which you witnessed. While he was offering sacrifices in front of his head-quarters in the Nolan district a snake suddenly came out from beneath the altar. The soothsayer, Gaius Postumius, begged Sulla to proceed with his march at once. Sulla did so and captured the strongly fortified camp of the Samnites which lay in front of the town of Nola. 1.109. But let us bring the discussion back to the point from which it wandered. Assume that I can give no reason for any of the instances of divination which I have mentioned and that I can do no more than show that they did occur, is that not a sufficient answer to Epicurus and to Carneades? And what does it matter if, as between artificial and natural divination, the explanation of the former is easy and of the latter is somewhat hard? For the results of those artificial means of divination, by means of entrails, lightnings, portents, and astrology, have been the subject of observation for a long period of time. But in every field of inquiry great length of time employed in continued observation begets an extraordinary fund of knowledge, which may be acquired even without the intervention or inspiration of the gods, since repeated observation makes it clear what effect follows any given cause, and what sign precedes any given event. 1.110. The second division of divination, as I said before, is the natural; and it, according to exact teaching of physics, must be ascribed to divine Nature, from which, as the wisest philosophers maintain, our souls have been drawn and poured forth. And since the universe is wholly filled with the Eternal Intelligence and the Divine Mind, it must be that human souls are influenced by their contact with divine souls. But when men are awake their souls, as a rule, are subject to the demands of everyday life and are withdrawn from divine association because they are hampered by the chains of the flesh. 2.13. But I observed, Quintus, that you prudently withdrew divination from conjectures based upon skill and experience in public affairs, from those drawn from the use of the senses and from those made by persons in their own callings. I observed, also, that you defined divination to be the foreknowledge and foretelling of things which happen by chance. In the first place, that is a contradiction of what you have admitted. For the foreknowledge possessed by a physician, a pilot, and a general is of things which happen by chance. Then can any soothsayer, augur, prophet, or dreamer conjecture better than a physician, a pilot, or a general that an invalid will come safely out of his sickness, or that a ship will escape from danger, or that an army will avoid an ambuscade? 2.16. By the use of reason the physician foresees the progress of a disease, the general anticipates the enemys plans and the pilot forecasts the approach of bad weather. And yet even those who base their conclusions on accurate reasoning are often mistaken: for example, when the farmer sees his olive-tree in bloom he expects also, and not unreasonably, to see it bear fruit, but occasionally he is disappointed. If then mistakes are made by those who make no forecasts not based upon some reasonable and probable conjecture, what must we think of the conjectures of men who foretell the future by means of entrails, birds, portents, oracles, or dreams? I am not ready yet to take up one by one the various kinds of divination and show that the cleft in the liver, the croak of a raven, the flight of an eagle, the fall of a star, the utterances of persons in a frenzy, lots, and dreams have no prophetic value whatever; I shall discuss each of them in its turn — now I am discussing the subject as a whole. 2.17. How can anything be foreseen that has no cause and no distinguishing mark of its coming? Eclipses of the sun and also of the moon are predicted for many years in advance by men who employ mathematics in studying the courses and movements of the heavenly bodies; and the unvarying laws of nature will bring their predictions to pass. Because of the perfectly regular movements of the moon the astronomers calculate when it will be opposite the sun and in the earths shadow — which is the cone of night — and when, necessarily, it will become invisible. For the same reason they know when the moon will be directly between the earth and the sun and thus will hide the light of the sun from our eyes. They know in what sign each planet will be at any given time and at what time each day any constellation will rise and set. You see the course of reasoning followed in arriving at these predictions. [7] 2.18. But what course of reasoning is followed by men who predict the finding of a treasure or the inheritance of an estate? On what law of nature do such prophecies depend? But, on the other hand, if the prophecies just mentioned and others of the same class are controlled by some natural and immutable law such as regulates the movements of the stars, pray, can we conceive of anything happening by accident, or chance? Surely nothing is so at variance with reason and stability as chance? Hence it seems to me that it is not in the power even of God himself to know what event is going to happen accidentally and by chance. For if He knows, then the event is certain to happen; but if it is certain to happen, chance does not exist. And yet chance does exist, therefore there is no foreknowledge of things that happen by chance. 2.19. But if you deny the existence of chance and assert that the course of everything present or future has been inevitably determined from all eternity, then you must change your definition of divination, which you said was the foreknowledge of things that happen by chance. For if nothing can happen, nothing befall, nothing come to pass, except what has been determined from all eternity as bound to happen at a fixed time, how can there be such a thing as chance? And if there is no such thing as chance, what room is there for that divination, which you termed a foreknowledge of things that happen by chance? And you were inconsistent enough, too, to say that everything that is or will be is controlled by Fate! Why, the very word Fate is full of superstition and old womens credulity, and yet the Stoics have much to say of this Fate of yours. A discussion on Fate is reserved for another occasion; at present I shall speak of it only in so far as it is necessary. [8] 2.20. of what advantage to me is divination if everything is ruled by Fate? On that hypothesis what the diviner predicts is bound to happen. Hence I do not know what to make of the fact that an eagle recalled our intimate friend Deiotarus from his journey; for if he had not turned back he must have been sleeping in the room when it was destroyed the following night, and, therefore, have been crushed in the ruins. And yet, if Fate had willed it, he would not have escaped that calamity; and vice versa. Hence, I repeat, what is the good of divination? Or what is it that lots, entrails, or any other means of prophecy warn me to avoid? For, if it was the will of Fate that the Roman fleets in the First Punic War should perish — the one by shipwreck and the other at the hands of the Carthaginians — they would have perished just the same even if the sacred chickens had made a tripudium solistimum in the consulship of Lucius Junius and Publius Claudius! On the other hand, if obedience to the auspices would have prevented the destruction of the fleets, then they did not perish in accordance with Fate. But you insist that all things happen by Fate; therefore there is no such thing as divination. 2.21. Again, if it was the will of Fate that the Roman army should perish at Lake Trasimenus in the Second Punic War, could that result have been avoided if the consul Flaminius had obeyed the signs and the auspices which forbade his joining battle? Assuredly not. Therefore, either the army did not perish by the will of Fate, or, if it did (and you are certainly bound as a Stoic to say that it did), the same result would have happened even if the auspices had been obeyed; for the decrees of Fate are unchangeable. Then what becomes of that vaunted divination of you Stoics? For if all things happen by Fate, it does us no good to be warned to be on our guard, since that which is to happen, will happen regardless of what we do. But if that which is to be can be turned aside, there is no such thing as Fate; so, too, there is no such thing as divination — since divination deals with things that are going to happen. But nothing is certain to happen which there is some means of dealing with so as to prevent its happening. [9] 2.22. And further, for my part, I think that a knowledge of the future would be a disadvantage. Consider, for example, what Priams life would have been if he had known from youth what dire events his old age held in store for him! But let us leave the era of myths and come to events nearer home. In my work On Consolation I have collected instances of very grievous deaths that befell some of the most illustrious men of our commonwealth. Passing by men of earlier day, let us take Marcus Crassus. What advantage, pray, do you think it would have been to him, when he was at the very summit of power and wealth, to know that he was destined to perish beyond the Euphrates in shame and dishonour, after his son had been killed and his own army had been destroyed? Or do you think that Gnaeus Pompey would have found joy in his three consulships, in his three triumphs, and in the fame of his transcendent deeds, if he had known that he would be slain in an Egyptian desert, after he had lost his army, and that following his death those grave events would occur of which I cannot speak without tears? 2.23. Or what do we think of Caesar? Had he foreseen that in the Senate, chosen in most part by himself, in Pompeys hall, aye, before Pompeys very statue, and in the presence of many of his own centurions, he would be put to death by most noble citizens, some of whom owed all that they had to him, and that he would fall to so low an estate that no friend — no, not even a slave — would approach his dead body, in what agony of soul would he have spent his life!of a surety, then, ignorance of future ills is more profitable than the knowledge of them. 2.24. For, assuming that men knew the future it cannot in any wise be said — certainly not by the Stoics — that Pompey would not have taken up arms, that Crassus would not have crossed the Euphrates, or that Caesar would not have embarked upon the civil war. If so, then, the deaths that befell these men were not determined by Fate. But you will have it that everything happens by Fate; consequently, knowledge of the future would have done these men no good. In reality it would have entirely deprived the earlier portion of their lives of enjoyment; for how could they have been happy in reflecting what their ends would be? And so, however the Stoics turn and twist, all their shrewdness must come to naught. For, if a thing that is going to happen, may happen in one way or another, indifferently, chance is predomit; but things that happen by chance cannot be certain. But if it is certain what is going to befall me in reference to any matter and on every occasion, how do the soothsayers help me by saying that the greatest misfortunes await me? [10] 2.25. To the last point the Stoics make the rejoinder that every evil which is going to befall us is made lighter by means of religious rites. But if nothing happens except in accordance with Fate, no evil can be made lighter by means of religious rites. Homer shows his appreciation of this fact when he represents Jupiter as complaining because he could not snatch his son Sarpedon from death when Fate forbade. The same thought is expressed in the following verses translated from a Greek poet:That which has been decreed by Fate to beAlmighty Jove himself cannot prevent.The whole idea of Fate in every detail is justly, as I think, the subject of derision even in Atellan farces, but in a discussion as serious as ours joking is out of place. So then let us sum up our argument: If it is impossible to foresee things that happen by chance because they are uncertain, there is no such thing as divination; if, on the contrary, they can be foreseen because they are preordained by Fate, still there is no such thing as divination, which, by your definition, deals with things that happen by chance. 2.26. But this introductory part of my discussion has been mere skirmishing with light infantry; now let me come to close quarters and see if I cannot drive in both wings of your argument.[11] You divided divination into two kinds, one artificial and the other natural. The artificial, you said, consists in part of conjecture and in part of long-continued observation; while the natural is that which the soul has seized, or, rather, has obtained, from a source outside itself — that is, from God, whence all human souls have been drawn off, received, or poured out. Under the head of artificial divination you placed predictions made from the inspection of entrails, those made from lightnings and portents, those made by augurs, and by persons who depend entirely upon premonitory signs. Under the same head you included practically every method of prophecy in which conjecture was employed. 2.27. Natural divination, on the other hand, according to your view, is the result — the effusion, as it were — of mental excitement, or it is the prophetic power which the soul has during sleep while free from bodily sensation and worldly cares. Moreover, you derived every form of divination from three sources — God, Fate, and Nature. And although you could not give a reason for any kind of divination, still you carried on the war by marshalling an astonishing array of examples from fiction. of such a course I wish to say emphatically that it is not becoming in a philosopher to introduce testimony which may be either true by accident, or false and fabricated through malice. You ought to have employed arguments and reason to show that all your propositions were true and you ought not to have resorted to so‑called occurrences — certainly not to such occurrences as are unworthy of belief. [12] 2.100. There remain the two kinds of divination which we are said to derive from nature and not from art — vaticination and dreams, — these, my dear Quintus, if agreeable to you, let us now discuss.Delighted, I assure you, said he, for I am in entire accord with the views which you have so far expressed. To be quite frank, your argument has merely strengthened the opinion which I already had, for my own reasoning had convinced me that the Stoic view of divination smacked too much of superstition. I was more impressed by the reasoning of the Peripatetics, of Dicaearchus, of ancient times, and of Cratippus, who still flourishes. According to their opinion there is within the human soul some sort of power — oracular, I might call it — by which the future is foreseen when the soul is inspired by a divine frenzy, or when it is released by sleep and is free to move at will. I should like very much to learn your views of these two classes of divination and by what arguments you disprove them. [49] |
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3. Cicero, Brutus, 73, 72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Giusti (2018), Disclosure and Discretion in Roman Astrology: Manilius and his Augustan Contemporaries, 67 72. atqui hic Livius [qui qui secl Schütz ] primus fabulam C. Claudio Caeci filio et M. Tuditano consulibus docuit anno ipso ante quam natus est Ennius, post Romam conditam autem conditam autem FO : autem conditam codd. quartodecimo et quingentensimo, ut hic ait, quem nos sequimur. Est enim inter scriptores de numero annorum controversia. Accius autem a Q. Maximo' quintum consule consule M2G2 : cos. F : consulem codd. captum captum vulg. : capta L Tarento scripsit Livium annis xxx post quam eum fabulam docuisse et Atticus scribit et nos in antiquis commentariis invenimus, | |
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4. Cicero, On Duties, 1.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar), tereus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 95 1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. | |
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5. Cicero, Letters, 1.15.1, 12.45.2, 13.28.3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar), tereus •accius, l. Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 95; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 39 |
6. Cicero, In Pisonem, 23, 58, 65, 95, 94 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Pausch and Pieper (2023), The Scholia on Cicero’s Speeches: Contexts and Perspectives, 53 |
7. Cicero, Orator, 36 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, as scholar Found in books: Culík-Baird (2022), Cicero and the Early Latin Poets, 50 |
8. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.2 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar), tereus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 95 1.2. contra quos omnis dicendum breviter existimo. Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis responsum est eo libro, quo a nobis philosophia philosophia a nobis BE defensa et collaudata est, cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi veritus ne movere hominum studia viderer, retinere non posse. Qui autem, si maxime hoc placeat, placet BEV moderatius tamen id volunt fieri, difficilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo, quod semel admissum admissum dett iam missum coe+rceri reprimique non potest, ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis, qui omnino avocent a philosophia, quam his, qui rebus infinitis modum constituant in reque eo meliore, quo maior sit, mediocritatem desiderent. | |
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9. Accius, Poeta, 3 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •l. accius Found in books: Rüpke (2011), The Roman Calendar from Numa to Constantine Time, History and the Fasti 108 |
10. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 3.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius l. Found in books: Maso (2022), CIcero's Philosophy, 81 | 3.5. "Very well," rejoined Cotta, "let us then proceed as the argument itself may lead us. But before we come to the subject, let me say a few words about myself. I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that you put forward at the conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontife. This no doubt meant that I ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down to us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion. For my part I always shall uphold them and always have done so, and no eloquence of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall ever dislodge me from the belief as to the worship of the immortal gods which I have inherited from our forefathers. But on any question of el I am guided by the high pontifes, Titus Coruncanius, Publius Scipio and Publius Scaevola, not by Zeno or Cleanthes or Chrysippus; and I have Gaius Laelius, who was both an augur and a philosopher, to whose discourse upon religion, in his famous oration, I would rather listen than to any leader of the Stoics. The religion of the Roman people comprises ritual, auspices, and the third additional division consisting of all such prophetic warnings as the interpreters of the Sybil or the soothsayers have derived from portents and prodigies. While, I have always thought that none of these departments of religion was to be despised, and I have held the conviction that Romulus by his auspices and Numa by his establishment of our ritual laid the foundations of our state, which assuredly could never have been as great as it is had not the fullest measure of divine favour been obtained for it. |
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11. Dionysius of Halycarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 4.27.7 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 39 | 4.27.7. Besides these achievements in both peace and war, he built two temples to Fortune, who seemed to have favoured him all his life, one in the market called the Cattle Market, the other on the banks of the Tiber to the Fortune which he named Fortuna Virilis, as she is called by the Romans even to this day. And being now advanced in years and not far from a natural death, he was treacherously slain by Tarquinius, his son-inâlaw, and by his own daughter. I shall also relate the manner in which this treacherous deed was carried out; but first I must go back and mention a few things that preceded it. |
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12. Horace, Sermones, 1.9.22-1.9.23, 1.10.81-1.10.84 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 227 |
13. Vitruvius Pollio, On Architecture, 5.5.8 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 39 |
14. Livy, History, 2.10.12 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 136 |
15. Ovid, Amores, 1.15.1-1.15.32 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Laemmle (2021), Lists and Catalogues in Ancient Literature and Beyond: Towards a Poetics of Enumeration, 373 1.15.1. Quid mihi Livor edax, ignavos obicis annos, 1.15.2. Ingeniique vocas carmen inertis opus; 1.15.3. Non me more patrum, dum strenua sustinet aetas, 1.15.4. Praemia militiae pulverulenta sequi, 1.15.5. Nec me verbosas leges ediscere nec me 1.15.6. Ingrato vocem prostituisse foro? 1.15.7. Mortale est, quod quaeris, opus. mihi fama perennis 1.15.8. Quaeritur, in toto semper ut orbe canar. 1.15.9. Vivet Maeonides, Tenedos dum stabit et Ide, 1.15.10. Dum rapidas Simois in mare volvet aquas; 1.15.11. Vivet et Ascraeus, dum mustis uva tumebit, 1.15.12. Dum cadet incurva falce resecta Ceres. 1.15.13. Battiades semper toto cantabitur orbe; 1.15.14. Quamvis ingenio non valet, arte valet. 1.15.15. Nulla Sophocleo veniet iactura cothurno; 1.15.16. Cum sole et luna semper Aratus erit; 1.15.17. Dum fallax servus, durus pater, inproba lena 1.15.18. Vivent et meretrix blanda, Medros erit; 1.15.19. Ennius arte carens animosique Accius oris 1.15.20. Casurum nullo tempore nomen habent. 1.15.21. Varronem primamque ratem quae nesciet aetas, 1.15.22. Aureaque Aesonio terga petita duci? 1.15.23. Carmina sublimis tunc sunt peritura Lucreti, 1.15.24. Exitio terras cum dabit una dies; 1.15.25. Tityrus et segetes Aeneiaque arma legentur, 1.15.26. Roma triumphati dum caput orbis erit; 1.15.27. Donec erunt ignes arcusque Cupidinis arma, 1.15.28. Discentur numeri, culte Tibulle, tui; 1.15.29. Gallus et Hesperiis et Gallus notus Eois, 1.15.30. Et sua cum Gallo nota Lycoris erit. 1.15.31. Ergo, cum silices, cum dens patientis aratri 1.15.32. Depereant aevo, carmina morte carent. | |
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16. Augustus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, 2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 227 |
17. Ovid, Tristia, 2.528 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 231 2.528. et modo maternis tecta videtur aquis, | |
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18. Sallust, Catiline, 54.6 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 231 |
19. Horace, Odes, 1.6, 1.6.8, 1.16, 1.16.17-1.16.18 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 227 |
20. Plutarch, Moralia, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 39 |
21. Josephus Flavius, Jewish War, 5.231-5.236 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 136 | 5.231. When he officiated, he had on a pair of breeches that reached beneath his privy parts to his thighs, and had on an inner garment of linen, together with a blue garment, round, without seam, with fringework, and reaching to the feet. There were also golden bells that hung upon the fringes, and pomegranates intermixed among them. The bells signified thunder, and the pomegranates lightning. 5.232. But that girdle that tied the garment to the breast was embroidered with five rows of various colors, of gold, and purple, and scarlet, as also of fine linen and blue, with which colors we told you before the veils of the temple were embroidered also. 5.233. The like embroidery was upon the ephod; but the quantity of gold therein was greater. Its figure was that of a stomacher for the breast. There were upon it two golden buttons like small shields, which buttoned the ephod to the garment; in these buttons were enclosed two very large and very excellent sardonyxes, having the names of the tribes of that nation engraved upon them: 5.234. on the other part there hung twelve stones, three in a row one way, and four in the other; a sardius, a topaz, and an emerald; a carbuncle, a jasper, and a sapphire; an agate, an amethyst, and a ligure; an onyx, a beryl, and a chrysolite; upon every one of which was again engraved one of the forementioned names of the tribes. 5.235. A mitre also of fine linen encompassed his head, which was tied by a blue ribbon, about which there was another golden crown, in which was engraven the sacred name [of God]: it consists of four vowels. 5.236. However, the high priest did not wear these garments at other times, but a more plain habit; he only did it when he went into the most sacred part of the temple, which he did but once in a year, on that day when our custom is for all of us to keep a fast to God. |
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22. Pliny The Elder, Natural History, 7.126, 34.39, 35.6, 35.102, 35.133, 35.136 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 30, 39, 136, 231 |
23. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 1.4.3, 1.7.24, 3.8.45, 10.1.98 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus •accius (tragic poet and scholar) Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 219, 226; Laemmle (2021), Lists and Catalogues in Ancient Literature and Beyond: Towards a Poetics of Enumeration, 379; Pausch and Pieper (2023), The Scholia on Cicero’s Speeches: Contexts and Perspectives, 44 | 1.4.3. For the art of writing is combined with that of speaking, and correct reading precedes interpretation, while in each of these cases criticism has its work to perform. The old school of teachers indeed carried their criticism so far that they were not content with obelising lines or rejecting books whose titles they regarded as spurious, as though they were expelling a supposititious child from the family circle, but also drew up a canon of authors, from which some were omitted altogether. 1.7.24. Sibe and quase are found in many books, but I cannot say whether the authors wished them to be spelt thus: I learn from Pedianus that Livy, whose precedent he himself adopted, used this spelling: toâday we make these words end with an i. 3.8.45. Thus Sallust makes Catiline speak as one who is driven to crime not by wickedness but by indignation, and Varius makes Atreus say: "My wrongs are past all speech, And such shall be the deeds they force me to." How much more has this pretence of honour to be kept up by those who have a real regard for their own good name! |
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24. Artemidorus, Oneirocritica, 1.26 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar) Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 110 |
25. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 1.4.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Laemmle (2021), Lists and Catalogues in Ancient Literature and Beyond: Towards a Poetics of Enumeration, 379 | 1.4.3. For the art of writing is combined with that of speaking, and correct reading precedes interpretation, while in each of these cases criticism has its work to perform. The old school of teachers indeed carried their criticism so far that they were not content with obelising lines or rejecting books whose titles they regarded as spurious, as though they were expelling a supposititious child from the family circle, but also drew up a canon of authors, from which some were omitted altogether. |
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26. Appian, The Illyrian Wars, 30 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 30 |
27. Tacitus, Dialogus De Oratoribus, 3.3, 12.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar) •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 219, 221 |
28. Tacitus, Annals, 6.29.4-6.29.7 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar) •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 221 |
29. Seneca The Younger, Dialogi, 3.20.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar) •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 221 |
30. Seneca The Younger, Thyestes, 176-339, 341-403, 682-729, 340 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 221 |
31. Suetonius, Fragments, 10, 12-13, 19, 44, 5, 55-56, 65, 72 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Pausch and Pieper (2023), The Scholia on Cicero’s Speeches: Contexts and Perspectives, 44 |
32. Suetonius, Augustus, 85.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 30, 231 |
33. Philostratus The Athenian, Life of Apollonius, 2.22 (2nd cent. CE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 231 2.22. ὃν δὲ διέτριβεν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ χρόνον, πολὺς δὲ οὗτος ἐγένετο, ἔστ' ἂν ἀγγελθῇ τῷ βασιλεῖ ξένους ἥκειν, “ὦ Δάμι” ἔφη ὁ ̓Απολλώνιος, “ἔστι τι γραφική;” “εἴ γε” εἶπε “καὶ ἀλήθεια.” “πράττει δὲ τί ἡ τέχνη αὕτη;” “τὰ χρώματα” ἔφη “ξυγκεράννυσιν, ὁπόσα ἐστί, τὰ κυανᾶ τοῖς βατραχείοις καὶ τὰ λευκὰ τοῖς μέλασι καὶ τὰ πυρσὰ τοῖς ὠχροῖς.” “ταυτὶ δὲ” ἦ δ' ὃς “ὑπὲρ τίνος μίγνυσιν; οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ μόνου τοῦ ἄνθους, ὥσπερ αἱ κήριναι.” “ὑπὲρ μιμήσεως” ἔφη “καὶ τοῦ κύνα τε ἐξεικάσαι καὶ ἵππον καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ναῦν καὶ ὁπόσα ὁρᾷ ὁ ἥλιος: ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν ἐξεικάζει τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τεττάρων ἵππων, οἷος ἐνταῦθα λέγεται φαίνεσθαι, τοτὲ δ' αὖ καὶ διαπυρσεύοντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπειδὰν αἰθέρα ὑπογράφῃ καὶ θεῶν οἶκον.” “μίμησις οὖν ἡ γραφική, ὦ Δάμι;” “τί δὲ ἄλλο;” εἶπεν “εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο πράττοι, γελοία δόξει χρώματα ποιοῦσα εὐήθως.” “τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ” ἔφη “βλεπόμενα, ἐπειδὰν αἱ νεφέλαι διασπασθῶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τοὺς κενταύρους καὶ τραγελάφους καὶ, νὴ Δί', οἱ λύκοι τε καὶ οἱ ἵπποι, τί φήσεις; ἆρ' οὐ μιμητικῆς εἶναι ἔργα;” “ἔοικεν,” ἔφη. “ζωγράφος οὖν ὁ θεός, ὦ Δάμι, καὶ καταλιπὼν τὸ πτηνὸν ἅρμα, ἐφ' οὗ πορεύεται διακοσμῶν τὰ θεῖά τε καὶ ἀνθρώπεια, κάθηται τότε ἀθύρων τε καὶ γράφων ταῦτα, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες ἐν τῇ ψάμμῳ;” ἠρυθρίασεν ὁ Δάμις ἐς οὕτως ἄτοπον ἐκπεσεῖν δόξαντος τοῦ λόγου. οὐχ ὑπεριδὼν οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ ̓Απολλώνιος, οὐδὲ γὰρ πικρὸς πρὸς τὰς ἐλέγξεις ἦν, “ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο” ἔφη “βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Δάμι, τὸ ταῦτα μὲν ἄσημά τε καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φέρεσθαι τόγε ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ, ἡμᾶς δὲ φύσει τὸ μιμητικὸν ἔχοντας ἀναρρυθμίζειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ ποιεῖν;” “μᾶλλον” ἔφη “τοῦτο ἡγώμεθα, ὦ ̓Απολλώνιε, πιθανώτερον γὰρ καὶ πολλῷ βέλτιον.” “διττὴ ἄρα ἡ μιμητική, ὦ Δάμι, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡγώμεθα οἵαν τῇ χειρὶ ἀπομιμεῖσθαι καὶ τῷ νῷ, γραφικὴν δὲ εἶναι ταύτην, τὴν δ' αὖ μόνῳ τῷ νῷ εἰκάζειν.” “οὐ διττήν,” ἔφη ὁ Δάμις “ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν τελεωτέραν ἡγεῖσθαι προσήκει γραφικήν γε οὖσαν, ἣ δύναται καὶ τῷ νῷ καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ἐξεικάσαι, τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν ἐκείνης μόριον, ἐπειδὴ ξυνίησι μὲν καὶ μιμεῖται τῷ νῷ καὶ μὴ γραφικός τις ὤν, τῇ χειρὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐς τὸ γράφειν αὐτὰ χρήσαιτο.” “ἆρα,” ἔφη “ὦ Δάμι, πεπηρωμένος τὴν χεῖρα ὑπὸ πληγῆς τινος ἢ νόσου;” “μὰ Δί'” εἶπεν “ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ μήτε γραφίδος τινὸς ἧφθαι, μήτε ὀργάνου τινὸς ἢ χρώματος, ἀλλ' ἀμαθῶς ἔχειν τοῦ γράφειν.” “οὐκοῦν,” ἔφη “ὦ Δάμι, ἄμφω ὁμολογοῦμεν μιμητικὴν μὲν ἐκ φύσεως τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἥκειν, τὴν γραφικὴν δὲ ἐκ τέχνης. τουτὶ δ' ἂν καὶ περὶ τὴν πλαστικὴν φαίνοιτο. τὴν δὲ δὴ ζωγραφίαν αὐτὴν οὔ μοι δοκεῖς μόνον τὴν διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ γὰρ ἓν χρῶμα ἐς αὐτὴν ἤρκεσε τοῖς γε ἀρχαιοτέροις τῶν γραφέων καὶ προϊοῦσα τεττάρων εἶτα πλειόνων ἥψατο, ἀλλὰ καὶ γραμμὴν καὶ τὸ ἄνευ χρώματος, ὃ δὴ σκιᾶς τε ξύγκειται καὶ φωτός, ζωγραφίαν προσήκει καλεῖν: καὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης τε ὁρᾶται εἶδός τε καὶ νοῦς καὶ αἰδὼς καὶ θρασύτης, καίτοι χηρεύει χρωμάτων ταῦτα, καὶ οὔτε αἷμα ἐνσημαίνει οὔτε κόμης τινὸς ἢ ὑπήνης ἄνθος, ἀλλὰ μονοτρόπως ξυντιθέμενα τῷ τε ξανθῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔοικε καὶ τῷ λευκῷ, κἂν τούτων τινὰ τῶν ̓Ινδῶν λευκῇ τῇ γραμμῇ γράψωμεν, μέλας δήπου δόξει, τὸ γὰρ ὑπόσιμον τῆς ῥινὸς καὶ οἱ ὀρθοὶ βόστρυχοι καὶ ἡ περιττὴ γένυς καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς οἷον ἔκπληξις μελαίνει τὰ ὁρώμενα καὶ ̓Ινδὸν ὑπογράφει τοῖς γε μὴ ἀνοήτως ὁρῶσιν. ὅθεν εἴποιμ' ἂν καὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας τὰ τῆς γραφικῆς ἔργα μιμητικῆς δεῖσθαι: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπαινέσειέ τις τὸν γεγραμμένον ἵππον ἢ ταῦρον μὴ τὸ ζῷον ἐνθυμηθείς, ᾧ εἴκασται, οὐδ' ἂν τὸν Αἴαντά τις τὸν Τιμομάχου ἀγασθείη, ὃς δὴ ἀναγέγραπται αὐτῷ μεμηνώς, εἰ μὴ ἀναλάβοι τι ἐς τὸν νοῦν Αἴαντος εἴδωλον καὶ ὡς εἰκὸς αὐτὸν ἀπεκτονότα τὰ ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ βουκόλια καθῆσθαι ἀπειρηκότα, βουλὴν ποιούμενον καὶ ἑαυτὸν κτεῖναι. ταυτὶ δέ, ὦ Δάμι, τὰ τοῦ Πώρου δαίδαλα μήτε χαλκευτικῆς μόνον ἀποφαινώμεθα, γεγραμμένοις γὰρ εἴκασται, μήτε γραφικῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐχαλκεύθη, ἀλλ' ἡγώμεθα σοφίσασθαι αὐτὰ γραφικόν τε καὶ χαλκευτικὸν ἕνα ἄνδρα, οἷον δή τι παρ' ̔Ομήρῳ τὸ τοῦ ̔Ηφαίστου περὶ τὴν τοῦ ̓Αχιλλέως ἀσπίδα ἀναφαίνεται. μεστὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ὀλλύντων τε καὶ ὀλλυμένων, καὶ τὴν γῆν ᾑματῶσθαι φήσεις χαλκῆν οὖσαν.” | 2.22. While he was waiting in the Temple, — and it took a long time for the king to be informed that strangers had arrived, — Apollonius said: O Damis, is there such a thing as painting? Why yes, he answered, if there be any such thing as truth. And what does this art do? It mixes together, replied Damis, all the colors there are, blue with green, and white with black, and red with yellow. And for what reason, said the other, does it mix these? For it isn't merely to get a color, like dyed wax. It is, said Damis, for the sake of imitation, and to get a likeness of a dog, or a horse, or a man, or a ship, or of anything else under the sun; and what is more, you see the sun himself represented, sometimes borne upon a four horse car, as he is said to be seen here, and sometimes again traversing the heaven with his torch, in case you are depicting the ether and the home of the gods. Then, O Damis, painting is imitation? And what else could it be? said he: for if it did not effect that, it would voted to be an idle playing with colors. And, said the other, the things which are seen in heaven, whenever the clouds are torn away from one another, I mean the centaurs and stag-antelopes, yes, and the wolves too, and the horses, what have you got to say about them? Are we not to regard them as works of imitation? It would seem so, he replied. Then, Damis, God is a painter, and has left his winged chariot, upon which he travels, as he disposes of affairs human and divine, and he sits down on these occasions to amuse himself by drawing these pictures, as children make figures in the sand. Damis blushed, for he felt that his argument was reduced to such an absurdity. But Apollonius, on his side, had no wish to humiliate him, for he was not unfeeling in his refutations of people, and said: But I am sure, Damis, you did not mean that; rather that these figures flit through the heaven not only without meaning, but, so far as providence is concerned, by mere chance; while we who by nature are prone to imitation rearrange and create them in these regular figures. We may, he said, rather consider this to be the case, O Apollonius, for it is more probable, and a much sounder idea. Then, O Damis, the mimetic art is twofold, and we may regard the one kind as an employment of the hands and mind in producing imitations, and declare that this is painting, whereas the other kind consists in making likenesses with the mind alone. Not twofold, replied Damis, for we ought to regard the former as the more perfect and more complete kind, being anyhow painting and a faculty of making likenesses with the help both of mind and hand; but we must regard the other kind as a department that, since its possessor perceives and imitates with the mind, without having the delineative faculty, and would never use his hand in depicting its objects. Then, said Apollonius, you mean, Damis, that the hand may be disabled by a blow or by disease? No, he answered, but it is disabled, because it has never handled pencil nor any instrument or color, and has never learned to draw. Then, said the other, we are both of us, Damis, agreed that man owes his mimetic faculty to nature, but his power of painting to art. And the same would appear to be true of plastic art. But, methinks, you would not confine painting itself to the mere use of colors, for a single color was often found sufficient for this purpose by our older painters; and as the art advanced, it employed four, and later, yet more; but we must also concede the name of a painting to an outline drawn without any color at all, and composed merely of shadow and light. For in such designs we see a resemblance, we see form and expression, and modesty and bravery, although they are altogether devoid of color; and neither blood is represented, nor the color of a man's hair or beard; nevertheless these compositions in monochrome are likenesses of people either tawny or white, and if we drew one of these Indians with a pencil without color, yet he would be known for a negro, for his flat nose, and his stiff curling locks and prominent jaw, and a certain gleam about his eyes, would give a black look to the picture and depict an Indian to the eyes of all those who have intelligence. And for this reason I should say that those who look at works of painting and drawing require a mimetic faculty; for no one could appreciate or admire a picture of a horse or of a bull, unless he had formed an idea of the picture represented. Nor again could one admire a picture of Ajax, by the painter Timomachus, which represents him in a state of madness, unless one had conceived in one's mind first an idea or notion of Ajax, and had entertained the probability that after killing the flocks in Troy he would sit down exhausted and even meditate suicide. But these elaborate works of Porus we cannot, Damis, regard as works of brass founding alone, for they are cast in brass; so let us regard them as the chefs d'oeuvre of a man who is both painter and brass-founder at once, and as similar to the work of Hephaestus upon the shield of Achilles, as revealed in Homer. For they are crowded together in that work too men slaying and slain, and you would say that the earth was stained with gore, though it is made of brass. |
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34. Festus Sextus Pompeius, De Verborum Significatione, 228.20-228.23 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •l. accius Found in books: Rüpke (2011), The Roman Calendar from Numa to Constantine Time, History and the Fasti 108 |
35. Gellius, Attic Nights, 4.5.1-4.5.5, 9.11 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 136 |
36. Cassius Dio, Roman History, 43.42, 43.45, 44.7.1, 44.17.2, 58.24.3-58.24.5, 59.5 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. •accius (tragic poet and scholar) •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 219, 221, 223, 226, 227; Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 30, 39 | 43.42. 1. For, although he had conquered no foreign nation, but had destroyed a vast number of citizens, he not only celebrated the triumph himself, incidentally feasting the entire populace once more, as if in honour of some common blessing, but also allowed Quintus Fabius and Quintus Pedius to hold a celebration, although they had merely been his lieutets and had achieved no individual success.,2. Naturally this occasioned ridicule, as did also the fact that they used wooden instead of ivory representations of certain achievements together with other similar triumphal apparatus. Nevertheless, most brilliant triple triumphs and triple processions of the Romans were held in honour of those very events, and furthermore a thanksgiving of fifty days was observed.,3. The Parilia was honoured by permanent annual games in the Circus, yet not at all because the city had been founded on that very day, but because the news of Caesar's victory had arrived the day before, toward evening. 43.45. 1. Nevertheless, these measures, even though they seemed to some immoderate and contrary to precedent, were not thus far undemocratic. But the senate passed the following decrees besides, by which they declared him a monarch out and out. For they offered him the magistracies, even those belonging to the plebs, and elected him consul for ten years, as they previously made him dictator.,2. They ordered that he alone should have soldiers, and alone administer the public funds, so that no one else should be allowed to employ either of them, save whom he permitted. And they decreed at this time that an ivory statue of him, and later that a whole chariot, should appear in the procession at the games in the Circus, together with the statues of the gods.,3. Another likeness they set up in the temple of Quirinus with the inscription, "To the Invincible God," and another on the Capitol beside the former kings of Rome.,4. Now it occurs to me to marvel at the coincidence: there were eight such statues, â seven to the kings, and an eighth to the Brutus who overthrew the Tarquins, â and they set up the statue of Caesar beside the last of these; and it was from this cause chiefly that the other Brutus, Marcus, was roused to plot against him. 44.7.1. At the same time with these measures they passed another which most clearly indicated their disposition it gave him the right to place his tomb within the pomerium; and the decrees regarding this matter they inscribed in golden letters on silver tablets and deposited beneath the feet of Jupiter Capitolinus, thus pointing out to him very clearly that he was a mortal. 44.17.2. Moreover, omens not a few and not without significance came to him: the arms of Mars, at that time deposited in his house, according to ancient custom, by virtue of his position as high priest, made a great noise at night, and the doors of the chamber where he slept opened of their own accord. 58.24.3. Among the various persons who perished either at the hands of the executioners or by their own act was Pomponius Labeo. This man, who had once governed Moesia for eight years after his praetorship, was indicted, together with his wife, for taking bribes, and voluntarily perished along with her. Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus, on the other hand, who had never governed a province or accepted bribes, was convicted because of a tragedy he had composed, and fell a victim to a worse fate than that which he had described. 58.24.4. "Atreus" was the name of his drama, and in the manner of Euripides it advised one of the subjects of that monarch to endure the folly of the reigning prince. Tiberius, upon hearing of it, declared that this had been written with reference to him, claiming that he himself was "Atreus" because of his bloodthirstiness; and remarking, "I will make him Ajax," he compelled him to commit suicide. 58.24.5. The above, however, was not the accusation that was actually brought against him, but instead, he was charged with having committed adultery with Livilla; indeed, many others also were punished on her account, some with good reason and some as the result of false accusations. 59.5. 1. This was the kind of emperor into whose hands the Romans were then delivered. Hence the deeds of Tiberius, though they were felt to have been very harsh, were nevertheless as far superior to those of Gaius as the deeds of Augustus were to those of his successor.,2. For Tiberius always kept the power in his own hands and used others as agents for carrying out his wishes; whereas Gaius was ruled by the charioteers and gladiators, and was the slave of the actors and others connected with the stage. Indeed, he always kept Apelles, the most famous of the tragedians of that day, with him even in public.,3. Thus he by himself and they by themselves did without let or hindrance all that such persons would naturally dare to do when given power. Everything that pertained to their art he arranged and settled on the slightest pretext in the most lavish manner, and he compelled the praetors and the consuls to do the same, so that almost every day some performance of the kind was sure to be given.,4. At first he was but a spectator and listener at these and would take sides for or against various performers like one of the crowd; and one time, when he was vexed with those of opposing tastes, he did not go to the spectacle. But as time went on, he came to imitate, and to contend in many events,,5. driving chariots, fighting as a gladiator, giving exhibitions of pantomimic dancing, and acting in tragedy. So much for his regular behaviour. And once he sent an urgent summons at night to the leading men of the senate, as if for some important deliberation, and then danced before them. |
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37. Obsequens, De Prodigiis, None (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 30 |
38. Macrobius, Saturnalia, 1.7.36 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •l. accius Found in books: Rüpke (2011), The Roman Calendar from Numa to Constantine Time, History and the Fasti 108 |
39. Servius, Commentary On The Aeneid, 7.603 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 30 |
40. Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Hadrian, 19.6, 26.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 110 |
41. Procopius, De Bellis, 5.12.42 (6th cent. CE - 6th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 136 |
42. Strabo, Geography, 7.6.1 Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 30 | 7.6.1. Pontic seaboard The remainder of the country between the Ister and the mountains on either side of Paeonia consists of that part of the Pontic seaboard which extends from the Sacred Mouth of the Ister as far as the mountainous country in the neighborhood of the Haemus and as far as the mouth at Byzantium. And just as, in traversing the Illyrian seaboard, I proceeded as far as the Ceraunian Mountains, because, although they fall outside the mountainous country of Illyria, they afford an appropriate limit, and just as I determined the positions of the tribes of the interior by these mountains, because I thought that marks of this kind would be more significant as regards both the description at hand and what was to follow, so also in this case the seaboard, even though it falls beyond the mountain-line, will nevertheless end at an appropriate limit — the mouth of the Pontus — as regards both the description at hand and that which comes next in order. So, then, if one begins at the Sacred Mouth of the Ister and keeps the continuous seaboard on the right, one comes, at a distance of five hundred stadia, to a small town, Ister, founded by the Milesians; then, at a distance of two hundred and fifty stadia, to a second small town, Tomis; then, at two hundred and eighty stadia, to a city Callatis, a colony of the Heracleotae; then, at one thousand three hundred stadia, to Apollonia, a colony of the Milesians. The greater part of Apollonia was founded on a certain isle, where there is a sanctuary of Apollo, from which Marcus Lucullus carried off the colossal statue of Apollo, a work of Calamis, which he set up in the Capitolium. In the interval between Callatis and Apollonia come also Bizone, of which a considerable part was engulfed by earthquakes, Cruni, Odessus, a colony of the Milesians, and Naulochus, a small town of the Mesembriani. Then comes the Haemus Mountain, which reaches the sea here; then Mesembria, a colony of the Megarians, formerly called Menebria (that is, city of Menas, because the name of its founder was Menas, while bria is the word for city in the Thracian language. In this way, also, the city of Selys is called Selybria and Aenus was once called Poltyobria). Then come Anchiale, a small town belonging to the Apolloniatae, and Apollonia itself. On this coast-line is Cape Tirizis, a stronghold, which Lysimachus once used as a treasury. Again, from Apollonia to the Cyaneae the distance is about one thousand five hundred stadia; and in the interval are Thynias, a territory belonging to the Apolloniatae (Anchiale, which also belongs to the Apolloniatae), and also Phinopolis and Andriake, which border on Salmydessus. Salmydessus is a desert and stony beach, harborless and wide open to the north winds, and in length extends as far as the Cyaneae, a distance of about seven hundred stadia; and all who are cast ashore on this beach are plundered by the Astae, a Thracian tribe who are situated above it. The Cyaneae are two islets near the mouth of the Pontus, one close to Europe and the other to Asia; they are separated by a channel of about twenty stadia and are twenty stadia distant both from the sanctuary of the Byzantines and from the sanctuary of the Chalcedonians. And this is the narrowest part of the mouth of the Euxine, for when one proceeds only ten stadia farther one comes to a headland which makes the strait only five stadia in width, and then the strait opens to a greater width and begins to form the Propontis. |
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43. Epigraphy, I. Thespiae, 358 Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar) •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 219, 221, 223, 226, 227 |
44. Accius, Fr., 198-199 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 226 |
45. Varius Rufus, Thy. Fr., None Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar), atreus Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 226, 227 |
46. Epigraphy, Seg, 33.770 Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar) Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 110 |
51. Epigraphy, Magnesia, 192 Tagged with subjects: •accius (tragic poet and scholar) Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 110 |
52. Epigraphy, Didyma, 233, 163 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Csapo et al. (2022), Theatre and Autocracy in the Ancient World, 219, 221, 223, 226, 227 |
53. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, 8.14.2 Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 39, 136 |
54. Various, Anthologia Planudea, 83 Tagged with subjects: •accius, l. Found in books: Rutledge (2012), Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity, and the Culture of Collecting, 231 |