The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Index Database

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56 results for "academics"

1. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 2.32.4 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 271

2. Plato, Menexenus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 291

246e. ἀσκῆτε, ἀσκεῖν μετʼ ἀρετῆς, εἰδότας ὅτι τούτου λειπόμενα πάντα καὶ κτήματα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακά. οὔτε γὰρ πλοῦτος κάλλος φέρει τῷ κεκτημένῳ μετʼ ἀνανδρίας— ἄλλῳ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος πλουτεῖ καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ—οὔτε σώματος κάλλος καὶ ἰσχὺς δειλῷ καὶ κακῷ συνοικοῦντα πρέποντα φαίνεται ἀλλʼ ἀπρεπῆ, καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκφαίνει τὴν δειλίαν· ΣΩ. πᾶσά τε ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη

246e. and whatsoever else ye practice ye must practice it in union with valor, being well assured that when divorced from this all possessions and pursuits are base and ignoble. For neither does wealth bring honor to its possessor if combined with cowardice—for such an one is rich for another rather than for himself,—nor do beauty and strength appear comely, but rather uncomely, when they are attached to one that is cowardly and base, since they make their possessor more conspicuous and show up his cowardice; Soc. and every form of knowledge

3. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 294

4. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan

5. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 291

6. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 291

250d. μετʼ ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δεῦρό τʼ ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται—δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν—καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά· νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστʼ ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι

250d. as I said before, shone in brilliance among those visions; and since we came to earth we have found it shining most clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the physical senses, though wisdom is not seen by it, for wisdom would arouse terrible love, if such a clear image of it were granted as would come through sight, and the same is true of the other lovely realities; but beauty alone has this privilege, and therefore it is most clearly seen

7. Plato, Phaedo, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 291

8. Plato, Letters, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan

9. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan

10. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 291

21a. ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθʼ ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφʼ ὅτι ὁρμήσειεν. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι—καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες—ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

21a. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don’t make a disturbance at what I say; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead.

11. Plato, Cratylus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 294

439d. ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶναι . ΣΩ. αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τί ἐστιν καλὸν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ῥεῖν· ἀλλʼ αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον ἀεί ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν; ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν; ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη.

439d. Cratylus. I think there is, Socrates. Socrates. Then let us consider the absolute, not whether a particular face, or something of that sort, is beautiful, or whether all these things are in flux. Is not, in our opinion, absolute beauty always such as it is? Cratylus. That is inevitable. Socrates. Can we, then, if it is always passing away, correctly say that it is this, then that it is that, or must it inevitably, in the very instant while we are speaking, become something else and pass away and no longer be what it is? Cratylus. That is inevitable.

12. Plato, Epinomis, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 291

992a. γὰρ πεφυκὼς πάντων τούτων εἷς ἀναφανήσεται διανοουμένοις —εἰ δʼ ἄλλως πως ταῦτα μεταχειριεῖταί τις, τύχην δεῖ καλεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ γε τούτων μήποτέ τις ἐν πόλεσιν εὐδαίμων γένηται φύσις, ἀλλʼ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, αὕτη ἡ τροφή, ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα· εἴτε χαλεπὰ εἴτε ῥᾴδια, ταύτῃ πορευτέον. ἀμελῆσαι δὲ οὐ θεμιτόν ἐστιν θεῶν, καταφανοῦς γενομένης τῆς πάντων αὐτῶν κατὰ τρόπον λεγομένης φήμης

992a. Ath. for it will be manifest to us, as we reflect, that there is one bond naturally uniting all these things: but if one goes about it in some other way, one must call it Fortune, as we also put it. For never, without these lessons, will any nature be happy in our cities: no, this is the way, this the nurture, these the studies, whether difficult or easy, this the path to pursue: to neglect the gods is not permissible, when it has been made manifest that the fame of them, stated in proper terms, hits the mark.

13. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 291

470d. πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν. ΣΩ. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας; ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ἀκούω γε. ΠΩΛ. εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος; ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.

470d. Pol. Well, to be sure, Socrates, there is no need to refute you with ancient instances; for those happenings of but a day or two ago are enough to refute you, and prove that many a wrongdoer is happy. Soc. What sort of thing do you mean? Pol. I suppose you see that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, is ruler of Macedonia ? Soc. Well, if I do not, at any rate I hear it. Pol. Do you consider him happy or wretched? Soc. I do not know, Polus; I have never met the man.

14. Aristotle, Fragments, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 271

15. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan

16. Numenius Heracleensis, Fragments, 25 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 223

17. Cicero, Orator, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 298

18. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.2, 1.4, 1.7-1.8, 1.22, 1.24, 1.41, 1.46-1.47, 1.53, 1.57-1.58, 1.65, 1.71-1.75, 1.94, 1.97-1.99, 2.9, 3.7, 5.1, 5.11, 5.35-5.36, 5.85 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 107, 285, 288, 290, 291, 293, 298, 303

1.2. Nam mores et instituta vitae resque domesticas ac familiaris nos profecto et melius tuemur et lautius, latius R 1 rem vero publicam nostri maiores certe melioribus temperaverunt et institutis et legibus. quid loquar de re militari? in qua cum virtute nostri multum valuerunt, tum plus etiam disciplina. iam illa, quae natura, non litteris adsecuti assec. KRH sunt, neque cum Graecia neque ulla cum gente cum ulla gente K sunt conferenda. quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, animi magnitudo K probitas, fides, quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum maioribus nostris comparanda? 1.4. non satis Graecorum gloriae responderunt. an censemus, cessemus KRH si Fabio, GFabio V 1 nobilissimo homini, laudi datum esset, quod pingeret, non multos etiam apud nos futuros Polyclitos et Parrhasios fuisse? honos alit artes, omnesque incenduntur acceduntur ( vel ac- cenduntur) Aug. incenduntur ex acc. H 1 ecl. 212 gloriae H ibid. cum Aug. plerisque codd. (gloriae L) Lup. ad studia gloria, iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque improbantur. honos ... 219,2 improbantur Aug. civ. 5,13 (H ecl. 212 ) et ex eo Serv. Lupus ep. 1 summam eruditionem Graeci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus; igitur et Epaminondas, princeps meo iudicio Graeciae, graecis X -ę pro -s V 1 aut c fidibus praeclare cecinisse dicitur, Themistoclesque aliquot ante annos annis edd. vett. cum in epulis recusaret recusasset V 2 s lyram, liram X est habitus indoctior. est... indoctior Quint. inst. 1,10,19 ergo in Graecia musici floruerunt, discebantque id omnes, nec qui nesciebat nesciebant V 1 satis excultus doctrina putabatur. 1.7. Sed ut Aristoteles, vir summo ingenio, scientia, scientia scientiae X -a pro -ae in r. V 2 copia, cum motus cum motus H commotus GKRV sed cũ supra com V 2 esset Isocratis isocratis V 2 s socratis X rhetoris gloria, dicere docere etiam coepit adulescentes docere s om. X post adulescentes add. decere V 2 et prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere, sic nobis placet nec pristinum dicendi studium deponere et in hac maiore et uberiore arte versari. hanc haen c R 1 enim perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere; in quam exercitationem ita nos studiose operam dedimus, del. Mur. operam inpendimus Dav. ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus. audeamus V (a in r. c ) ut nuper tuum post discessum in Tusculano cum essent complures cumplures G 1 R 1 (corr. ipsi) mecum familiares, temptavi, quid in eo genere possem. possem V 2 g possim X ( cf. auderemus v. 20 ) ut enim antea declamitabam causas, quod nemo me diutius fecit, sic haec mihi nunc senilis est declamatio. ponere iubebam, de quo quis audire vellet; ad id aut at id X (at id sed. ex aut id aut sed. K c ) sedens aut ambulans disputabam. 1.8. itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. fiebat autem ita ut, cum is his G 1 V 1 H qui audire audiri X ( corr. V 2 l e ss. K 2 ) vellet dixisset, quid quod K 1 V 2 sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et et om. V 1 add. 2 Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Philosophia ... 221, 7 narretur H (27 fieri 220, 5 litteris et 220,13 adulescentes 220, 18 dicere bis ) ergo ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c ita nascetur exordium: Malum ergo et primam lit- teram verbi malum om. R 1 V 1 spatio rubicatori relicto ; ergo add. R al. m ergo et m V c ita nasce- in r. V 1 nascatur corr. V c mihi videtur esse mors. 1.22. Aristoteles, longe omnibus—Platonem semper excipio—praestans et ingenio et diligentia, cum quattuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orerentur, orirentur H s quintam quandam naturam censet esse, esse esset GR 1 e corr. e qua equa G 1 ( in mg. de) K 1 (equae K 2 ut v. ) R esse qua V (quae V 2 ) sit mens; cogitare enim et providere et discere et docere et invenire aliquid et tam multa alia alia X exp. V vet , cf. 247,14 meminisse, amare odisse, cupere timere, angi laetari, haec et et om. H similia eorum in horum quattuor generum inesse nullo nullo numero H putat; quintum genus genus om. H adhibet vacans nomine et sic sic exp. V vet ipsum animum e)ndele/xeian endelecheian GKVH, sed in R inter e et a graecum com- pendium diphthongi ei ( ) scriptum est appellat appellant G 1 V 1 novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem. Nisi quae me forte fugiunt, fugiunt (exp. m. vet.) V haec hae V rec s sunt fere omnium post fere add. V 2 de animo sententiae. Aristoteles cum quattuor ... 229, 3 de animo sentiae H Democritum enim, magnum illum quidem virum, sed levibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum anim um V ( ss. c ) concursu quodam fortuito, omittamus; nihil est enim apud istos, quod non atomorum turba conficiat. nihil... eorum t. conficiat Non. 269,12 1.24. nam si cor cor s. G aut sanguis aut cerebrum est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; corpore V c s tempore X si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur; si ignis, extinguetur; si est Aristoxeni harmonia, harmonia GKR arm.V arm. H dissolvetur. quid de Dicaearcho dicam, qui nihil omnino animum dicat esse? efficiet ... 25 dicit esse H his sententiis omnibus nihil post mortem pertinere ad quemquam potest; pariter enim cum vita sensus amittitur; non sentientis autem nihil est ullam in partem quod intersit. reliquorum sententiae spem adferunt, si te hoc forte delectat, posse animos, cum e corporibus excesserint, in caelum quasi in domicilium suum pervenire. Me vero delectat, idque primum ita esse velim, deinde, etiamsi non sit, mihi persuaderi tamen velim. Quid tibi ergo opera nostra opus est? num eloquentia Platonem superare possumus? evolve diligenter eius eum librum, qui est de animo: anima ex -o V c? amplius quod desideres nihil erit. Feci mehercule, et quidem saepius; sed nescio quo modo, dum lego, adsentior, cum posui librum et mecum ipse de inmortalitate imm. GR animorum coepi cogitare, adsensio omnis illa elabitur. Quid? 1.41. si vero aut numerus quidam sit sit est Mdv. sed cf. comm. animus, quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide dicitur, aut cf. Aug. gen. ad litt. 7, 21 quinta illa non nominata magis quam non intellecta natura, multo etiam integriora ac puriora sunt, ut a terra longissime se se om. H ecferant. si vero ... 5 ecferant ecf. X (eff. corr. V 1 ecf. K c ) Horum igitur aliquid animus, putetur vel cogitetur fere potius supplendum quam sit (We.). est ante animus add. B s ne nec K tam vegeta vegeta V 1 (veg in r. ) K 2 veta GK 1 R mens aut in corde cerebrove aut in Empedocleo sanguine demersa iaceat. Dicaearchum vero cum Aristoxeno aequali et condiscipulo suo, doctos sane homines, omittamus; quorum alter ne nae R nę K ne, sed e in r. V 1 condoluisse quidem umquam videtur, qui animum quia nimium K 1 se habere non sentiat, alter ita delectatur suis cantibus, ut eos etiam ad haec transferre conetur. harmonian arm. ter H ( in 13 V 1 e corr., in 14 K) harmoniă K autem ex intervallis sonorum nosse possumus, quorum varia compositio etiam harmonias arm. ter H ( in 13 V 1 e corr., in 14 K) efficit pluris; membrorum vero situs vero situs om. K 1 add. c et figura corporis vacans animo quam possit harmoniam arm. ter H ( in 13 V 1 e corr., in 14 K) efficere, non video. armonian ... 17 video sed hic quidem, quamvis eruditus sit, sicut est, haec magistro concedat Aristoteli, canere ipse doceat; bene enim illo Graecorum proverbio praecipitur: quam quisque norit artem, in hac se exerceat. cf. Arist. Ve. 1431 Cic. Att. 5, 10,3 1.46. nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quae videmus; neque est enim enim est V 2 B ullus sensus in corpore, sed, ut non physici phisici KRH solum docent verum etiam medici, qui ista aperta et patefacta viderunt, viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad auris, ad naris aures...nares ex -is V 1? a sede animi perforatae. itaque saepe aut cogitatione aut aliqua vi morbi impediti apertis atque integris et oculis et auribus nec videmus nec audimus, ut ut quo ss. V 2 facile intellegi possit animum et videre et audire, non eas partis quae quasi fenestrae sint animi, non... 10 sunt animi Non. 36, 12 quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat et adsit. quid, quod quid quod V ( sed quod corr. in cū 1 ) qui quod GK 1 ( corr. c ) R eadem mente res dissimillimas comprendimus, cũ ( ex cō) prendimus V ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, sonum? quae numquam quinque nuntiis animus animi in animis corr. V 1 cognosceret, nisi ad eum omnia referrentur et is omnium iudex solus esset. atque ea profecto tum multo puriora et dilucidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, fertur K c liber animus pervenerit. illam ... 24 vult 239, 15 nulla vero est celeritas...240, 16 excitavit 240, 26 quod tandem ... 241,17 pervenerit H 1.47. nam nunc quidem, quamquam foramina illa, quae patent ad animum animos Non. a corpore, callidissimo calidissimo K 1 RV artificio natura fabricata nam 19 natura fabricatur Non. 35, 26 est, tamen terrenis concretisque corporibus sunt intersaepta intersepta X quodam modo: cum autem nihil erit praeter animum, nulla res obiecta impediet, quo minus percipiat, quale quidque sit. Quamvis copiose haec diceremus, si res postularet, quam multa, quam varia, quanta spectacula animus in locis caelestibus esset esse R 1 habiturus. 1.53. Sed si, qualis sit animus, ipse animus nesciet, nesci aet K dic quaeso, ne esse ne esse ex non esse K c quidem se sciet, ne moveri quidem se? ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis, quae a Socrate est in Phaedro Phaedr. 245 c, cf. Cic. rep. 6, 27. Ciceronem sequitur Lact. inst. 7, 8, 4 et Serv. Aen. 6, 727 phedro KRV explicata, a me autem posita est in sexto libro de re p.: “Quod semper movetur, aeternum et aet. X ( sed et exp. V vet K c ) aet. Somn. Macr. est; quod autem motum adfert alicui quodque ipsum agitatur aliunde, aliunde ( u(p' a)/llou ) H e corr. s Somn. pars Macr. alicunde X quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. solum igitur, quod se ipsum movet, quia numquam deseritur a se, quia a se s. u. add. V 2 numquam ne moveri quidem desinit; quin etiam ceteris quae moventur hic fons, hoc hoc o in r. R c principium est movendi. 1.57. Habet primum memoriam, et eam infinitam rerum innumerabilium. quam Men. 81 e sqq. quidem Plato Quam quidem Plato cf. 247, 4 Ego autem recordationem esse volt vitae superioris. nam in illo libro, qui inscribitur Menon, meñ K 1 (ñ erasum, non in mg. add. 2 ) me non V 1 pusionem quendam Socrates interrogat quaedam geometrica de dimensione quadrati. ad ea sic ille respondet respondet s respondit X Boeth. ut puer, et tamen ita faciles interrogationes sunt, ut gradatim gradatum RV 1 respondens eodem perveniat, quo si quo si quasi Boeth. K 1 V 1 ( corr. K c V c geometrica didicisset. ex quo effici volt Socrates, ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi recordari. quem locum multo etiam accuratius explicat in eo sermone, quem habuit eo ipso die, quo excessit e Phaed. 72e sqq. vita; docet enim quemvis, qui omnium rerum rudis esse videatur, bene interroganti interrogati V 1 respondentem respondem X ( corr. K 2 V c ) declarare se non tum cf. Lact. inst. 7, 22,19 illa discere, sed reminiscendo recognoscere, nec vero fieri ullo modo posse, ut a pueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi consignatas consignata V 1 (s add. c ) cognitgnatas primo R in animis notiones, quas quas add. K c e)nnoi/as ennoias X (i in e corr. V 1 ) ENNOUAC Boeth. vocant, haberemus, nisi animus, ante quam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset. 1.58. cumque nihil esset , lac. ind. Po. (suppl. fere : eorum quae sensibus perciperentur cl. div.2,9 Tim.28A) ut omnibus locis a Platone disseritur—nihil enim ille post enim hab. VBP s putat esse, quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum esse, esse s esset quod semper tale sit quale quale EIDEAN corr. Sey. est ( i)de/an appellat ille, nos speciem)—, non potuit animus haec in corpore inclusus c lusus V (ss ) adgnoscere, ad gn. G 1 a gn. V cognita attulit; ex quo tam multarum rerum rerum om. V cognitionis admiratio tollitur. neque ea plane videt animus, cum repente in in om. Boeth. tam insolitum tamque perturbatum domicilium inmigravit, sed cum se collegit collegit s recollegit Boeth. colligit X (col V) atque recreavit, tum adgnoscit ad gn. R 1 agn. V Boeth. illa reminiscendo. in illo libro... 11 vita et 14 aiunt enim nullo modo fieri pos- se ut ... 247, 3 reminiscendo ( om. 18 cumque... 24 tollitur) libere reddit Boethius in Cic. top. 76 V p. 391, 7 Bai. (Stangl, Jahrb. 127 S. 290. 299) 1.65. prorsus haec divina mihi videtur vis, quae tot res efficiat et tantas. quid est enim enim s. v. add. G 1 memoria rerum et verborum? quid porro inventio? profecto id, quo ne in deo quidem quidem V 2 s om. X quicquam maius magis V 1 (corr. rec ) intellegi potest. potest R 1 potes G non enim ambrosia deos aut nectare aut Iuventate iuventute V rec pocula ministrante laetari laetare GR 1 (corr. 1 ) V 1 (corr. 2 ) Hom. Y 232 arbitror, nec Homerum audio, qui Ganymeden ganimeden V 1 (corr. 1 ) H ab dis dis ex his R raptum ait ait ex aut K c propter formam, ut ut V Iovi bibere ministraret; ut... ministraret Arus. GL. VII458, 16 non iusta causa, cur Laomedonti tanta tanta add. K c ex tanti V 2 fieret fieret V 2 s fierit X iniuria. fingebat haec Homerus et et add. V 2 humana ad deos transferebat: -ebat in r. V c transferret ad nos ss. K 2 divina mallem ad nos. fingebat... 2 nos Aug. civ. 4, 26 conf. 1,16 quae autem divina? vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse. quid igitur... 15 videtur et quis igitur ( pro aut qui) pri- mus 250, 3 meminisse H ergo animus animusq : K ( ui ss. 2 ) lac. ind. Po. ( suppl. fere sec. § 66 et rep. 6,26 : viget invenit meminit) qui ..., qui del. Lb. quidem Sey. ut ego Eurip. fr. 1018 dico, divinus est, ut Euripides dicere audet, deus. Et quidem, et quidem ex equi- dem V 1 si si add. K c deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. nam ut illa natura caelestis et terra vacat et umore, humore X sic utriusque utrisque V 1 harum rerum humanus animus est expers; sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta primum, haec et deorum est et animorum. Hanc nos sententiam secuti sicuti K his ipsis verbis in Consolatione hoc hoc del. s, sed hoc ut p. 253, 27 de hoc ipso usurpatum est. Cic. distinguit inter hoc argumentum quod suis verbis exprimit et universam Aristotelis sententiam e qua illud ductum est. expressimus: 1.71. in animi autem autem om. H cognitione dubitare non possumus, nisi plane in physicis plumbei sumus, quin nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex: quod cum ita sit, certe nec ne nec HK (c 2 aut c ) add. Mdv. ad Fin. exc. III secerni nec dividi nec discerpi nec distrahi potest, ne interire quidem igitur. est enim interitus quasi discessus et secretio ac diremptus diremptus s V rec direptus X earum partium, quae ante interitum iunctione aliqua tenebantur. non valet animus... 253,22 tenebantur H His et talibus rationibus adductus aductus GR 1 (corr. c ) V 1 (corr. 1 ) Socrates nec patronum quaesivit ad iudicium capitis nec iudicibus supplex 254,12 saep. q; in r. R al.m. ( ex que ut v. ) fuit adhibuitque liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia, et supremo vitae die de hoc ipso multa disseruit et paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset educi e custodia, noluit, et tum, tum ex cum V 1 paene in manu iam mortiferum illud tenens poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in caelum videretur escendere. aescendere V asc. KB s 1.72. Ita Plato Phaedon 80sqq. enim censebat itaque disseruit, duas ut ante duas eras. in K esse vias duplicesque cursus animorum e corpore excedentium: nam cf. Lact. inst. 7, 10, 10 qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent et se totos toto GV 1 ( s add. 2 ) R 1 ut v. (s add. ipse, tum lib- ex bib-) libidinibus dedissent, quibus caecati vel velut X (sed ut exp. V vet ) domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinavissent vel re publica violanda rei publicae violandae V 2 fraudes inexpiabiles concepissent, concoepissent GR concęp. K is devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum a concilio deorum; qui autem se integros castosque servavissent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio seseque contagiose seque V 1 ab is semper sevocavissent s evocavissent V ( exp. vet ) essentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum, is ad illos a quibus essent profecti reditum facilem patere. 1.73. Itaque Phaed. 85b commemorat, ut cygni, qui non sine causa Apollini dicati sint, si nt V( 2) sunt Serv. sed quod ab eo divinationem habere videantur, ut cycni ... 17 videantur Serv. Aen. 1,393 qua providentes quid in morte boni sit cum cantu et voluptate moriantur, sic omnibus bonis et doctis esse faciendum. faciundum K 2 (nec vero de hoc quisquam dubitare posset, possit K 2 nisi idem nobis accideret diligenter de animo cogitantibus, quod is quo his X (quod his V c ) saepe usu venit, qui cum Phaed. 99d d el. Man. ant cum aut ut v. acriter oculis deficientem solem intuerentur, ut del. Bentl. ut in vel mut. Se. Jb. d. ph. V. 24 p. 247 aspectum omnino amitterent; sic mentis acies se ipsa intuens non numquam hebescit, ob eamque causam contemplandi diligentiam amittimus. itaque dubitans circumspectans haesitans, multa adversa reverens revertens X ( sed t exp. in V) tamquam in rate in rate cf. e)pi\ sxedi/as Phaid. 85d ratis V 2 Se. imm. R in mari inmenso 1.74. nostra vehitur oratio ratio Camerar. ). sed haec haec add. V 2 et vetera sunt post vetera add. K 2 et a Graecis; Cato autem sic abiit e vita, ut causam moriendi moriundi K 2 nactum se esse gauderet. vetat enim domis ille in in om. V nobis deus iniussu hinc nos suo demigrare; cum vero causam iustam deus ipse dederit, ut tunc tum GV Socrati, nunc Catoni, saepe multis, ne ille me Dius Fidius vir sapiens laetus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit, nec tamen ille ille Lb. ilia rup erit V vincla carceris ruperit—leges enim vetant—, sed tamquam a magistratu aut ab aliqua potestate legitima, sic a deo evocatus atque emissus exierit. Tota Plato Phaedon 80e enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem, commentatio mortis est. 1.75. nam quid nam quid quid enim V 2 aliud agimus, cum a voluptate, vol. G 1 a uuol. K 1 id est id ( pro id est) V a corpore, cum a re familiari, quae est ministra et famula corporis, cum a re publica, cum a negotio omni sevocamus omni sev. (s. i. r. V c )V omni sev. ex omnis ev. R animum, quid, inquam, in quantum GR 1 V 1 tum agimus nisi animum ad se ipsum advocamus, advocamus s avoc. X (voc. K 1 a add. K c ) secum esse cogimus cogita mus G 1 maximeque a corpore abducimus? secernere autem a corpore animum, nec quicquam post animum add. V 2 : id est se ipsum nec quicquam K ( c K c ) aliud, est mori est mori Bentl. ēmori K emori GRVH ( post aliud add. quam R al.m. nisi V rec ) cf. Plato Phaed. 67d Lact. epit. 41 : deum vere colere id est, nec quicquam aliud, sapientia. discere. quare hoc commentemur, mihi crede, disiungamusque credidis iung. GR 1 (corr. 1? ) V 1 (corr. 2 ) credi disi. H credi siung K 1 nos a corporibus, id est id ( pro id est) V consuescamus mori. hoc, et dum erimus in terris, erit illi illi K caelesti vitae simile, et cum illuc ex his vinclis vinculis K 2 V 2 emissi feremur, minus tardabitur cursus animorum. Tota... 23 animorum H nam qui in compedibus corporis semper fuerunt, etiam cum soluti sunt, tardius ingrediuntur, ut i qui ferro vincti multos annos fuerunt. fuerint V 1 quo cum venerimus, tum denique vivemus. nam haec quidem vita vita s. v. add. K 1 mors est, quam lamentari possem, si liberet. nam haec... 5 liberet Aug. epist. 155,4 liberetur GKR 1 (corr. 1 ) V 1 (ur eras. ) liberet Aug. Satis tu quidem in Consolatione es lamentatus; 1.94. cur? nam, reor, nullis, si vita longior daretur, posset esse iucundior; nihil enim est profecto homini hominis X prudentia dulcius, cf. Med. fr. 676 quam, ut quam ut quia utem K 1 cetera auferat, adfert certe senectus. Quae vero aetas longa est, aut quid omnino est post omnino add. V vet homini longum? nonne Mo/do pueros, pueri (i in r. V 1 ) V modo a/dulescentes i/n cursu a tergo i/nsequens Com. pall. inc. 43 actergo V 1 Ne/c opitis a/dsecuta est senectus? sed quia ultra nihil habemus, hoc longum dicimus. ducimus K Omnia ista, perinde ut cuique data sunt pro rata parte, ita aut longa aut parte avita longa GKR parte aucta l. in parte aut l. corr. V parte, ita aut Man. brevia dicuntur. apud Hypanim fluvium, qui ab Europae parte in Pontum influit, Aristoteles Arist. hist. an. 552b 18 ait bestiolas quasdam nasci, quae unum diem vivant. ex his igitur hora VIII quae mortua est, provecta aetate mortua est; quae vero occidente sole, decrepita, eo magis, si etiam solstitiali die. confer confert X ( corr. KV 1 ) nostram longissimam aetatem cum aeternitate: in eadem propemodum brevitate qua illae bestiolae reperiemur. reperiemus V 1 1.97. vadit enim enim om. s in eundem carcerem atque in eundem paucis post annis scyphum Socrates, eodem scelere iudicum quo tyrannorum Theramenes. QHPAMENHC X Apol. 40csqq. (libere reddita) quae est igitur eius oratio, qua facit eum Plato usum apud iudices iam morte multatum? magna me inquit “spes tenet, iudices, bene mihi evenire, quod mittar ad mortem. necesse est enim sit alterum de duobus, ut aut sensus omnino omnes omnis K (acst s = accusativus ss. 2 ) mors auferat aut in alium quendam locum ex his locis morte migretur. meretur K quam ob rem, sive sensus extinguitur morsque ei somno similis est, qui non numquam etiam sine visis somniorum placatissimam quietem adfert, di dii GRV boni, quid lucri est emori! aut quam multi dies reperiri repp. GR (corr. 1 ) V possunt, qui tali nocti antepotur! cui si si V 2 s om. X similis est perpetuitas omnis consequentis temporis, quis me beatior? 1.98. sin vera sunt quae dicuntur, migrationem esse mortem in eas oras, horas K 1 V 2 quas qui e vita excesserunt incolunt, id hic in id corr. K c multo iam beatius est. tene, cum ab is, qui se iudicum numero numerū V 1 haberi volunt, evaseris, ad eos venire, qui vere iudices appellentur, Minoem Rhadamanthum Aeacum Aeacum s Aiacem X Triptolemum, convenireque eos qui iuste et et s om. X ( e)ge/nonto e)n tw=|n e(autw=n bi/w| ) cum fide vixerint— haec peregrinatio mediocris vobis videri potest? ut vero conloqui cum Orpheo Musaeo Homero Hesiodo liceat, quanti tandem aestimatis? equidem saepe emori, si fieri posset, vellem, ut ea quae dico mihi liceret invisere. invisere V (ise in r. V c ) invenire rell. quanta delectatione autem adficerer, cum Palamedem, cum Aiacem, cum alios iudicio iniquo iniquorum ventos GR iniquorũ ventos K iniquo ( eras. 3—4 litt., tum circum in fine versus V c ) ventos V ( ei)/ tis a)/llos dia\ kri/din a)/dikon te/qnhken circumventos convenirem! temptarem etiam summi regis, qui maximas copias duxit ad Troiam, et Ulixi ulixis V 2 Sisyphique prudentiam, nec ob eam rem, cum haec exquirerem sicut hic faciebam, capite damnarer.—Ne vos quidem, iudices i qui me absolvistis, hi X si V 2 mortem timueritis. 1.99. nec nec c in r. V c enim cuiquam bono mali quicquam evenire potest nec vivo nec mortuo, nec umquam eius res a dis inmortalibus imm. KR neglegentur, nec mihi ipsi hoc accidit fortuito. nec vero ego is, a quibus accusatus aut a quibus condemnatus sum, habeo quod suscenseam, succenseam K 2 in mg. V c nisi quod mihi nocere se crediderunt.” et haec quidem hoc modo; nihil autem melius extremo: sed tempus est inquit iam hinc abire, habire G 1 R 1 me, ut moriar, vos, ut vitam agatis. utrum autem sit melius, dii inmortales imm. V 2 sciunt, hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem. utrum... 26 neminem libere Lact. inst. 7,2, 10 Ne ego h' supra ego V 2 haud aut X haud V 2 paulo hunc animum malim mallim G ( 2. l in r. ) K 1 RV 1 quam eorum omnium fortunas, qui de hoc iudicaverunt. etsi, quod praeter deos negat scire quemquam, id scit scit sit V 1 ipse utrum sit melius—nam dixit ante—, sed suum illud, nihil ut adfirmet, tenet ad extremum; 2.9. Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partis partes K 1 R 1?ecorr. disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset, quid in quaque re re add. in mg. K 2 veri simile esset, inveniri, invenire GK 1 (~i 2 aut c ) RV 1 (i V rec ) sed etiam quod esset ea maxuma dicendi exercitatio. qua qua G princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. nostra autem memoria Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum: ad quam nos consuetudinem a familiaribus nostris adducti in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumpsimus. itaque cum ante meridiem dictioni operam dedissemus, sicut pridie feceramus, post meridiem meridie X (-di V me- ridi ach. G) meridiẽ K 2 R c? cf. de orat.2, 367 et Usener, Jahrb f. Phil. 117 p. 79 in Academiam descendimus. in qua disputationem habitam non quasi narrantes exponimus, exponemus V 2 sed eisdem ex eisdem K (exp. 2 aut 1) fere verbis, ut actum disputatumque est. Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum mundum V 1 sermo ille nobis institutus et a tali et ali V 1 et tali V c quodam ductus ductus Crat. inductus cf. Brut. 21 exordio: 3.7. ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, aliquid quid adherant G 1 causam disserendi. tum res acta sic est: Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo. Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines libidines add. G 2 iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, eiusmodi V ( ss. c ) quae Graeci pa/qh pathe X appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, relique ... 29 usitate ( libere ) H uisit. G 1 ( sic etiam 322, 10; 325,16 ) nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. Mihi vero isto modo. 5.1. Quintus Quintus om. KR 1 spatio rubricatori relicto ( add. R rec ) hic dies, Brute, finem faciet Tusculanarum disputationum, quo die est a nobis ea de re, quam tu ex omnibus maxime maxime add. G 2 probas, disputatum. placere enim tibi admodum sensi et ex eo libro, quem ad me accuratissime scripsisti, et ex multis sermonibus tuis virtutem ad beate vivendum se ipsa ipsam H s esse se ipsa esse in r. V 1 contemptam G 1 H contentam. quod quod ex quo V 2 etsi difficile difficili G 2 (dific. G 1 )RV est probatu propter tam varia et tam multa tormenta fortunae, quod ... 8 fortunae Non. 163, 7 tale tamen est, ut elaborandum sit, quo quo ex quod G 2 facilius probetur. nihil est est add. K c enim omnium quae in philosophia tractantur, quod gravius magnificentiusque dicatur. 5.11. cuius multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo Platonis memoria et litteris consecrata plura genera effecit effecit s efficit X dissentientium philosophorum, e quibus nos id potissimum consecuti consecuti con del. V 2 sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, arbitramur V 2 s ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione, quid esset simillimum veri, quaereremus. quaeremus G 1 K quem morem moyerem G 2 cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias saepe et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam eam ( del. c ) R consuetudinem disputaremus. et quadridui quidem sermonem superioribus ad ad a R missimus G 1 K te perscriptum libris misimus, quinto autem die cum eodem in loco consedissemus, sic est propositum, de quo disputaremus: 5.35. 'numquam enim cum eo conlocutus sum.—ain tu? an aliter an tu an aliter X sed prius an in ain corr. V 2 an tu aliter s ( ti/ de/; suggeno/menos a)\n gnoi/hs, a)/llws de\ an)to/qen on) gignw/sxeis xtl .;) cf. Att. 4,5,1. ain tu? aliter Or. id id om. G scire non potes?—nullo modo.—tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege rege nego V 1 magno potes dicere, beatusne sit? beatus nescit K 1 —an ego possim, cum ignorem, quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus?—quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas?—ita prorsus existimo, bonos beatos, improbos miseros.—miser ergo Archelaus?—certe, si iniustus.' 5.36. videturne omnem hic beatam vitam in una virtute ponere? Quid vero? in Epitaphio Menex. 247 e quo modo idem? nam cui viro inquit ex se ex se s esse X (e se V) ipso apta sunt omnia, quae ad beate vivendum ferunt, nec suspensa aliorum aut bono casu aut contrario pendere ex alterius eventis et errare coguntur, huic optume vivendi ratio comparata est. hic est ille moderatus, hic fortis, hic sapiens, hic et nascentibus et cadentibus candentibus GR cum reliquis commodis, commodis cum modis K 1 tum maxime tumaxime GR liberis parebit et oboediet praecepto illi veteri: neque enim laetabitur umquam nec maerebit manebit GRV 1 nimis, quod quod qui V rec semper in se ipso ipso V c s ( dia\ to\ au(tw= pepoiqe/nai ) cf. Lael. 30 ipse X omnem spem reponet sui. ex hoc igitur Platonis quasi quodam sancto augustoque fonte nostra omnis manabit oratio. Unde igitur ordiri ordiri s V rec oriri X rectius possumus quam a communi parente natura? 5.85. haec igitur simplicia, illa mixta: tria genera bonorum, maxuma animi, secunda corporis, externa tertia, si...443, 4 tertia ut Peripatetici nec multo veteres Academici achademicis V 1 secus; voluptatem cum honestate Dinomachus et Callipho copulavit, indolentiam autem honestati Peripateticus Diodorus dodorus K 1 adiunxit. haec hae GRV rec H sunt sententiae, quae stabilitatis aliquid habeant; hae sunt...8 habeant nam Aristonis arrystonis G Pyrrhonis Erilli pyrroni ferilli GRV 1 (s ex f V 1 ) pyrroniserilli K ( add. c ) non nullorumque aliorum evanuerunt. hi quid possint optinere, videamus omissis omisis KH Stoicis, quorum satis videor defendisse sententiam. Et Peripateticorum peripateti quorum K quidem explicata causa est omisis...12 est H praeter Theophrastum et si qui illum secuti imbecillius imbecilius X horrent dolorem et reformidant; reliquis quidem licet facere id quod fere faciunt, ut gravitatem dignitatemque virtutis exaggerent. quam cum ad caelum extulerunt, extulerunt Mdv. extulerint ( def.Blase,Arch.f.l.L.10,337 ) quod facere eloquentes homines copiose solent, reliqua reliqui K ex conlatione facile est conterere atque contemnere. nec enim licet is, qui laudem cum dolore petendam esse dicant, negare eos esse beatos, qui illam adepti sunt. dicunt...21 adepti sint Ba.sed cf.Mue. quamquam quamquam ex quantum K c enim sint in quibusdam malis, tamen hoc nomen beati longe et et om. V late patet.

19. Philodemus of Gadara, Rhetorica, 1.46 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 104

20. Cicero, Letters, 4.16.3, 9.13.4 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 291

21. Cicero, Topica, 81 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 303

81. quaestionum autem 'quacumque de re' sunt sunt d : sint codd. duo genera genera Friedrich : genera sunt codd. : unum cognitionis alterum actionis.

22. Cicero, On Old Age, 44, 78, 7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 291

23. Cicero, On Laws, 1.39, 2.6, 2.45, 3.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 289, 291

24. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.28, 1.47, 3.21 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 291, 298

1.28. postero autem die, cum illi maiores natu satis quiessent et in ambulationem ventum esset, dicebat tum Scaevolam duobus spatiis tribusve factis dixisse 'cur non imitamur, Crasse, Socratem illum, qui est in Phaedro Platonis? Nam me haec tua platanus admonuit, quae non minus ad opacandum hunc locum patulis est diffusa ramis, quam illa, cuius umbram secutus est Socrates, quae mihi videtur non tam ipsa acula, quae describitur, quam Platonis oratione crevisse, et quod ille durissimis pedibus fecit, ut se abiceret in herba atque ita illa, quae philosophi divinitus ferunt esse dicta, loqueretur, id meis pedibus certe concedi est aequius.' 1.47. sed ego neque illis adsentiebar neque harum disputationum inventori et principi longe omnium in dicendo gravissimo et eloquentissimo, Platoni, cuius tum Athenis cum Charmada diligentius legi Gorgiam; quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem, quod mihi in oratoribus inridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur. Verbi enim controversia iam diu torquet Graeculos homines contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis. 3.21. Sed si haec maior esse ratio videtur, quam ut hominum possit sensu aut cogitatione comprehendi, est etiam illa Platonis vera et tibi, Catule, certe non inaudita vox, omnem doctrinam harum ingenuarum et humanarum artium uno quodam societatis vinculo contineri; ubi enim perspecta vis est rationis eius, qua causae rerum atque exitus cognoscuntur, mirus quidam omnium quasi consensus doctrinarum concentusque reperitur.

25. Cicero, On Duties, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.15, 1.28, 1.63, 1.85, 1.87, 2.7-2.8, 3.2, 3.7, 3.69 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 288, 291, 293, 298, 314

1.2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum, et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio), orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare. 1.4. Equidem et Platonem existimo, si genus forense dicendi tractare voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere, et Demosthenem, si illa, quae a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisse; eodemque modo de Aristotele et Isocrate iudico, quorum uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit alterum. Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa posthac, ab eo ordiri maxime volui, quod et aetati tuae esset aptissimum et auctoritati meae. Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, latissime patere videntur ea, quae de officiis tradita ab illis et praecepta sunt. Nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest, in eoque et colendo sita vitae est honestas omnis et neglegendo turpitude. 1.6. Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum, Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. 1.15. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae. Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima discripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium. 1.28. Praetermittendae autem defensionis deserendique officii plures solent esse causae; nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt aut etiam neglegentia, pigritia, inertia aut suis studiis quibusdam occupationibusve sic impediuntur, ut eos, quos tutari debeant, desertos esse patiantur. Itaque videndum est, ne non satis sit id, quod apud Platonem est in philosophos dictum, quod in veri investigatione versentur quodque ea, quae plerique vehementer expetant, de quibus inter se digladiari soleant, contemt et pro nihilo putent, propterea iustos esse. Nam alterum iustitiae genus assequuntur, ut inferenda ne cui noceant iniuria, in alterum incidunt; discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt. Itaque eos ne ad rem publicam quidem accessuros putat nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri; namhoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium. 1.63. Praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: Non, inquit, solum scientia, quae est remota ab iustitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda, verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, non utilitate communi impellitur, audaciae potius nomen habeat quam fortitudinis. Itaque viros fortes et magimnos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus; quae sunt ex media laude iustitiae. 1.85. Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt, duo Platonis praecepta teneant, unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut, quaecumque agunt, ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum, alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Ut enim tutela, sic procuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum, quibus commissa est, gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam; ex quo evenit, ut alii populares, alii studiosi optimi cuiusque videantur, pauci universorum. 1.87. Miserrima omnino est ambitio honorumque contentio, de qua praeclare apud eundem est Platonem, similiter facere eos, qui inter se contenderent, uter potius rem publicam administraret, ut si nautae certarent, quis eorum potissimum gubernaret. Idemque praecipit, ut eos adversaries existimemus, qui arma contra ferant, non eos, qui suo iudicio tueri rem publicam velint, qualis fuit inter P. Africanum et Q. Metellum sine acerbitate dissensio. 2.7. Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis quaerentibus, satisne constanter facere videamur, qui, cum percipi nihil posse dicamus, tamen et aliis de rebus disserere soleamus et hoc ipso tempore praecepta officii persequamur. Quibus vellem satis cognita esset nostra sententia. Non enim sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore nec habeat umquam, quid sequatur. Quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius non modo disputandi, sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata? Nos autem, ut ceteri alia certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes alia probabilia, contra alia dicimus. 2.8. Quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi videantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contra autem omnia disputatur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere non posset, nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio. Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror, diligenter. Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris iis simillimo, qui ista praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finitima vestris ignota esse nolui. Sed iam ad instituta pergamus. 3.2. Sed nec hoc otium cum Africani otio nec haec solitudo cum illa comparanda est. Ille enim requiescens a rei publicae pulcherrimis muneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando et e coetu hominum frequentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat, nostrum autem otium negotii inopia, non requiescendi studio constitutum est. Exstincto enim senatu deletisque iudiciis quid est quod dignum nobis aut in curia aut in foro agere possimus? 3.7. Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime disputavit, quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita potissimum secuti sumus, tribus generibus propositis, in quibus deliberare homines et consultare de officio solerent, uno, cum dubitarent, honestumne id esset, de quo ageretur, an turpe, altero, utilene esset an inutile, tertio, si id, quod speciem haberet honesti, pugnaret cum eo, quod utile videretur, quo modo ea discerni oporteret, de duobus generibus primis tribus libris explicavit, de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit dicturum nec exsolvit id, quod promiserat. 3.69. Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis.

1.28. The motives for failure to prevent injury and so for slighting duty are likely to be various: people either are reluctant to incur enmity or trouble or expense; or through indifference, indolence, or incompetence, or through some preoccupation or self-interest they are so absorbed that they suffer those to be neglected whom it is their duty to protect. And so there is reason to fear that what Plato declares of the philosophers may be inadequate, when he says that they are just because they are busied with the pursuit of truth and because they despise and count as naught that which most men eagerly seek and for which they are prone to do battle against each other to the death. For they secure one sort of justice, to be sure, in that they do no positive wrong to anyone, but they fall into the opposite injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning they leave to their fate those whom they ought to defend. And so, Plato thinks, they will not even assume their civic duties except under compulsion. But in fact it were better that they should assume them of their own accord; for an action intrinsically right is just only on condition that it is voluntary. 1.63. This, then, is a fine saying of Plato's: "Not only must all knowledge that is divorced from justice be called cunning rather than wisdom," he says, "but even the courage that is prompt to face danger, if it is inspired not by public spirit, but by its own selfish purposes, should have the name of effrontery rather than of courage." And so we demand that men who are courageous and high-souled shall at the same time be good and straightforward, lovers of truth, and foes to deception; for these qualities are the centre and soul of justice. 1.85. Those who propose to take charge of the affairs of government should not fail to remember two of Plato's rules: first, to keep the good of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the interests of some one party to betray the rest. For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted. Now, those who care for the interests of a part of the citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the civil service a dangerous element â dissension and party strife. The result is that some are found to be loyal supporters of the democratic, others of the aristocratic party, and few of the nation as a whole. 1.87. A most wretched custom, assuredly, is our electioneering and scrambling for office. Concerning this also we find a fine thought in Plato: "Those who compete against one another," he says, "to see which of two candidates shall administer the government, are like sailors quarrelling as to which one of them shall do the steering." And he likewise lays down the rule that we should regard only those as adversaries who take up arms against the state, not those who strive to have the government administered according to their convictions. This was the spirit of the disagreement between Publius Africanus and Quintus Metellus: there was in it no trace of rancour. 2.7. But people raise other objections against me â and that, too, philosophers and scholars â asking whether I think I am quite consistent in my conduct â for although our school maintains that nothing can be known for certain, yet, they urge, I make a habit of presenting my opinions on all sorts of subjects and at this very moment am trying to formulate rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper understanding of our position. For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in uncertainty and never know what principles to adopt. For what sort of mental habit, or rather what sort of life would that be which should dispense with all rules for reasoning or even for living? Not so with us; but, as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others uncertain, we, differing with them, say that some things are probable, others improbable. 2.8. What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what seems to me to be probable, while rejecting what seems to be improbable, and from shunning the presumption of dogmatism, while keeping clear of that recklessness of assertion which is as far as possible removed from true wisdom? And as to the fact that our school argues against everything, that is only because we could not get a clear view of what is "probable," unless a comparative estimate were made of all the arguments on both sides. But this subject has been, I think, quite fully set forth in my "Academics." And although, my dear Cicero, you are a student of that most ancient and celebrated school of philosophy, with Cratippus as your master â and he deserves to be classed with the founders of that illustrious sect â still I wish our school, which is closely related to yours, not to be unknown to you. Let us now proceed to the task in hand. 3.2. But I should not compare this leisure of mine with that of Africanus, nor this solitude with his. For he, to find leisure from his splendid services to his country, used to take a vacation now and then and to retreat from the assemblies and the throngs of men into solitude, as, into a haven of rest. But my leisure is forced upon me by want of public business, not prompted by any desire for repose. For now that the senate has been abolished and the courts have been closed, what is there, in keeping with my self-respect, that I can do either in the senate chamber or in the forum? 3.7. Panaetius, then, has given us what is unquestionably the most thorough discussion of moral duties that we have, and I have followed him in the main â but with slight modifications. He classifies under three general heads the ethical problems which people are accustomed to consider and weigh: first, the question whether the matter in hand is morally right or morally wrong; second, whether it is expedient or inexpedient; third, how a decision ought to be reached, in case that which has the appearance of being morally right clashes with that which seems to be expedient. He has treated the first two heads at length in three books; but, while he has stated that he meant to discuss the third head in its proper turn, he has never fulfilled his promise. 3.69. Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship â although I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and again â which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford.

26. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.6, 1.11, 1.16, 1.18-1.20, 1.53, 1.93, 2.32, 2.118, 3.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy •academic scepticism/sceptics, unity of the academy and the peripatos Found in books: Long (2006) 158, 271, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293; Tsouni (2019) 70

1.6. I observe however that a great deal of talk has been current about the large number of books that I have produced within a short space of time, and that such comment has not been all of one kind; some people have been curious as to the cause of this sudden outburst of philosophical interest on my part, while others have been eager to learn what positive opinions I hold on the various questions. Many also, as I have noticed, are surprised at my choosing to espouse a philosophy that in their view robs the world of daylight and floods it with a darkness as of night; and they wonder at my coming forward so unexpectedly as the champion of a derelict system and one that has long been given up. As a matter of fact however I am no new convert to the study of philosophy. From my earliest youth I have devoted no small amount of time and energy to it, and I pursued it most keenly at the very periods when I least appeared to be doing so, witness the philosophical maxims of which my speeches are full, and my intimacy with the learned men who have always graced my household, as well as those eminent professors, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius, who were my instructors. 1.11. To those again who are surprised at my choice of a system to which to give my allegiance, I think that a sufficient answer has been given in the four books of my Academica. Nor is it the case that I have come forward as the champion of a lost cause and of a position now abandoned. When men die, their doctrines do not perish with them, though perhaps they suffer from the loss of their authoritative exponent. Take for example the philosophical method referred to, that of a purely negative dialectic which refrains from pronouncing any positive judgement. This, after being originated by Socrates, revived by Arcesilas, and reinforced by Carneades, has flourished right down to our own period; though I understand that in Greece itself it is now almost bereft of adherents. But this I ascribe not to the fault of the Academy but to the dullness of mankind. If it is a considerable matter to understand any one of the systems of philosophy singly, how much harder is it to master them all! Yet this is the task that confronts those whose principle is to discover the truth by the method of arguing both for and against all the schools. 1.16. "Well, I too," I replied, "think I have come at the right moment, as you say. For here are you, three leaders of three schools of philosophy, met in congress. In fact we only want Marcus Piso to have every considerable school represented." "Oh," rejoined Cotta, "if what is said in the book which our master Antiochus lately dedicated to our good Balbus here is true, you have no need to regret the absence of your friend Piso. Antiochus holds the view that the doctrines of the Stoics, though differing in form of expression, agree in substance with those of the Peripatetics. I should like to know your opinion of the book, Balbus." "My opinion?" said Balbus, "Why, I am surprised that a man of first-rate intellect like Antiochus should have failed to see what a gulf divides the Stoics, who distinguish expediency and right not in name only but in essential nature, from the Peripatetics, who class the right and the expedient together, and only recognize differences of quantity or degree, not of kind, between them. This is not a slight verbal discrepancy but a fundamental difference of doctrine. 1.18. Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! "I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortune-teller, the Pronoia (which we may render 'Providence') of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream. 1.19. What power of mental vision enabled your master Plato to descry the vast and elaborate architectural process which, as he makes out, the deity adopted in building the structure of the universe? What method of engineering was employed? What tools and levers and derricks? What agents carried out so vast an undertaking? And how were air, fire, water and earth enabled to obey and execute the will of the architect? How did the five regular solids, which are the basis of all other forms of matter, come into existence so nicely adapted to make impressions on our minds and produce sensations? It would be a lengthy task to advert upon every detail of a system that is such as to seem the result of idle theorizing rather than of real research; 1.20. but the prize example is that the thinker who represented the world not merely as having had an origin but even as almost made by hand, also declared that it will exist for ever. Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal? What composite whole is not capable of dissolution? What thing is there that has a beginning but not an end? While as for your Stoic Providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as Plato's creator, I repeat my previous questions, what were its agents and instruments, and how was the entire undertaking planned out and carried though? If on the contrary it is something different, I ask why it made the world mortal, and not everlasting as did Plato's divine creator? 1.53. We for our part deem happiness to consist in tranquillity of mind and entire exemption from all duties. For he who taught us all the rest has also taught us that the world was made by nature, without needing an artificer to construct it, and that the act of creation, which according to you cannot be performed without divine skill, is so easy, that nature will create, is creating and has created worlds without number. You on the contrary cannot see how nature can achieve all this without the aid of some intelligence, and so, like the tragic poets, being unable to bring the plot of your drama to a dénouement, you have recourse to a god; 1.93. "Was it dreams like these that not only encouraged Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus to contradict Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but actually emboldened a loose woman like Leontium to write a book refuting Theophrastus? Her style no doubt is the neatest of Attic, but all the same! — such was the licence that prevailed in the Garden of Epicurus. And yet you are touchy yourselves, indeed Zeno actually used to invoke the law. I need not mention Albucius. As for Phaedrus, though he was the most refined and courteous of old gentlemen, he used to lose his temper if I spoke too harshly; although Epicurus attacked Aristotle in the most insulting manner, abused Socrates' pupil Phaedo quite outrageously, devoted whole volumes to an onslaught on Timocrates, the brother of his own associate Metrodorus, for differing from him on some point or other of philosophy, showed no gratitude toward Democritus himself, whose system he adopted, and treated so badly his own master Nausiphanes, from whom he had learnt a considerable amount. As for Zeno, he aimed the shafts of his abuse not only at his contemporaries, Apollodorus, Silus and the rest, but Socrates himself, the father of philosophy, he declared to have been the Attic equivalent of our Roman buffoons; and he always alluded to Chrysippus in the feminine gender. 2.32. For let us hear Plato, that divine philosopher, for so almost he is to be deemed. He holds that motion is of two sorts, one spontaneous, the other derived from without; and that that which moves of itself spontaneously is more divine than that which has motion imparted to it by some force not its own. The former kind of motion he deems to reside only in the soul, which he considers to be the only source and origin of motion. Hence, since all motion springs from the world-heat, and since that heat moves spontaneously and not by any impulse from something else, it follows that that heat is soul; which proves that the world is an animate being. "Another proof that the world possesses intelligence is supplied by the fact that the world is unquestionably better than any of its elements; for even as there is no part of our body that is not of less value than we are ourselves, so the whole universe must needs be of higher worth than any portion of the universe; and if this be so, it follows that the world must be endowed with wisdom, for, if it were not, man, although a part of the world, being possessed of reason would necessarily be of higher worth than the world as a whole. 2.118. But the stars are of a fiery substance, and for this reason they are nourished by the vapours of the earth, the sea and the waters, which are raised up by the sun out of the fields which it warms and out of the waters; and when nourished and renewed by these vapours the stars and the whole aether shed them back again, and then once more draw them up from the same source, with the loss of none of their matter, or only of an extremely small part which is consumed by the fire of the stars and the flame of the aether. As a consequence of this, so our school believe, though it used to be said that Panaetius questioned the doctrine, there will ultimately occur a conflagration of the whole while, because when the moisture has been used up neither can the earth be nourished nor will the air continue to flow, being unable to rise upward after it has drunk up all the water; thus nothing will remain but fire, by which, as a living being and a god, once again a new world may be created and the ordered universe be restored as before. 3.95. "I on my side," replied Cotta, "only desire to be refuted. My purpose was rather to discuss the doctrines I have expounded than to pronounce judgement upon them, and I am confident that you can easily defeat me." "Oh, no doubt," interposed Velleius; "why, he thinks that even our dreams are sent to us by Jupiter — though dreams themselves are not so unsubstantial as a Stoic disquisition on the nature of the gods." Here the conversation ended, and we parted, Velleius thinking Cotta's discourse to be the truer, while I felt that that of Balbus approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth.

27. Cicero, On Invention, 1.8 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 303

1.8. teria tripertita versari existimanda est. nam Herma- goras quidem nec quid dicat attendere nec quid polli- ceatur intellegere videtur, qui oratoris materiam in cau- sam et in quaestionem dividat, causam esse dicat rem, quae habeat in se controversiam in dicendo positam cum personarum certarum interpositione; quam nos quoque oratori dicimus esse adtributam (nam tres eas partes, quas ante diximus, subponimus, iudicialem, de- liberativam, demonstrativam). quaestionem autem eam appellat, quae habeat in se controversiam in dicendo positam sine certarum personarum interpositione, ad hunc modum: ecquid sit bonum praeter honestatem? verine sint sensus? quae sit mundi forma? quae sit solis magnitudo? quas quaestiones procul ab oratoris officio remotas facile omnes intellegere existimamus; nam quibus in rebus summa ingenia philosophorum plurimo cum labore consumpta intellegimus, eas sicut aliquas parvas res oratori adtribuere magna amentia videtur. quodsi magnam in his Hermagoras habuisset facultatem studio et disciplina comparatam, videretur fretus sua scientia falsum quiddam constituisse de oratoris artificio et non quid ars, sed quid ipse posset, exposuisse. nunc vero ea vis est in homine, ut ei multo rhetoricam citius quis ademerit, quam philosophiam concesserit: neque eo, quo eius ars, quam edidit, mihi mendosissime scripta videatur; nam satis in ea videtur ex antiquis artibus ingeniose et diligenter electas res collocasse et nonnihil ipse quoque novi protulisse; ve- rum oratori minimum est de arte loqui, quod hic fecit, multo maximum ex arte dicere, quod eum minime po- tuisse omnes videmus.

28. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.7, 2.1-2.3, 2.43, 2.52, 2.92, 2.102, 3.1, 3.41, 4.3, 4.21, 5.7, 5.16, 5.22-5.23, 5.28, 5.58, 5.89 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy •academic scepticism/sceptics, unity of the academy and the peripatos Found in books: Long (2006) 107, 285, 288, 289, 290, 291; Tsouni (2019) 70, 106

1.7. Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poe+tae fabulas, male, male AR 2 N 2 mali BEN 1 mole R 1 magis V credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Medro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius, Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia; alia Urs. alias sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris. 2.1. Hic cum uterque me intueretur seseque ad audiendum significarent paratos, Primum, inquam, deprecor, ne me tamquam philosophum putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum, quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magnopere umquam probavi. quando enim Socrates, qui parens philosophiae iure dici potest, quicquam tale fecit? eorum erat iste mos qui tum sophistae nominabantur, quorum e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quaestionem, id est iubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. audax negotium, dicerem impudens, nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad philosophos nostros nostros philosophos BE esset. 2.2. sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intellegi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. is enim percontando percontando A 2 percun- tando NV percunctando A 1 BE per cunctando R atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, ea haec R quae ii ii hi BER hii A hij NV respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas archesilas A acesilaos N achesilas V eum revocavit instituitque ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quaererent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent; quod cum dixissent, ille contra. sed eum eum om. RNV qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant sententiam suam. apud ceteros autem philosophos, qui quaesivit aliquid, tacet; quod quidem iam fit etiam etiam om. BER in Academia. ubi enim is, qui audire vult, ita dixit: 'Voluptas mihi videtur esse summum bonum', perpetua oratione contra disputatur, ut facile intellegi possit eos, qui aliquid sibi videri sibi aliquid (aliquit E) videri BE aliquid videri sibi V dicant, non ipsos in ea sententia esse, sed audire velle contraria. Nos commodius agimus. 2.3. non enim solum Torquatus dixit quid sentiret, sed etiam cur. ego autem arbitror, quamquam admodum delectatus sum eius oratione perpetua, tamen commodius, cum in rebus singulis insistas et intellegas quid quisque concedat, quid abnuat, ex rebus concessis concludi quod velis et ad exitum perveniri. cum enim fertur quasi torrens oratio, quamvis multa cuiusque modi rapiat, nihil tamen teneas, nihil apprehendas, reprehendas BE nusquam orationem rapidam cœrceas. Omnis autem in quaerendo, quae via quadam et ratione habetur, oratio praescribere primum debet ut quibusdam in formulis ea res agetur, ut, inter quos disseritur, conveniat quid sit id, de quo disseratur. 2.43. Quae quod quod Mdv. cum Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt sunt visa BE pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est desitum est contra eos BE disputari. dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selectione se lectione R electione BE delectione V expoliarent expoliarent N ( sed hamulus ad litt. r pertinens et ent in ras. ), V; expoliaverunt AR spoliaverunt BE nec ei quicquam, aut unde oriretur, darent, oriretur darent ARN 2 ore retunderet BE orientur darent N 1 orirentur darent V aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt. Erillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit, sed nec optimum nec quo vita gubernari possit. itaque hic ipse iam pridem est reiectus; post enim Chrysippum contra eum add. Se. (est contra eum disp. H. A. Koch p. 37 ) non sane est disputatum. Restatis igitur vos; nam cum Academicis incerta incerta V ĩcerta (˜ et cer ab alt. man., cer in ras. ) N uncta AR iuncta BE luctatio est, qui nihil affirmant et quasi desperata cognitione certi id sequi volunt, quodcumque veri simile videatur. 2.52. 'Oculorum', inquit Plato, Plato in Phaedro p. 250 D est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus. quam illa ardentis amores excitaret sui! sui si videretur Cur V, (si videretur a man. poster. in marg. add. ) N Cur tandem? an quod ita callida est, ut optime possit architectari voluptates? an quod classidas ut... voluptates Non. p. 70 Cur iustitia laudatur? aut unde est hoc contritum vetustate proverbium: 'quicum in tenebris'? hoc dictum in una re latissime patet, ut in omnibus factis re, non teste moveamur. 2.92. Verum esto; consequatur summas voluptates non modo parvo, sed per me nihilo, si potest; sit voluptas non minor in nasturcio illo, quo vesci Persas esse solitos scribit Xenophon, quam in Syracusanis mensis, quae a Platone graviter vituperantur; sit, inquam, tam facilis, quam vultis, comparatio voluptatis, quid de dolore dicemus? cuius tanta tormenta sunt, ut in iis iis Mdu. his AER hys B hijs NV beata vita, si modo dolor summum malum est, esse non possit. ipse enim Metrodorus, paene alter alter A 2 BEN aliter A 1 R alr (= aliter) quam V Epicurus, beatum esse describit his fere verbis: cum corpus bene constitutum sit et sit exploratum ita futurum. an id exploratum cuiquam potest esse, quo modo se hoc se hoc A 2 E (h'), se haec A 1 se hic B se hee R se se hec N sese V habiturum sit corpus, non dico ad annum, sed ad vesperum? vesperam R vespm V dolor ergo, go (= ergo) ARNV igitur BE id est summum malum, metuetur semper, etiamsi non aderit; iam enim adesse poterit. qui potest igitur habitare in beata vita summi mali metus? 2.102. haec ego non possum dicere non esse hominis quamvis et belli et humani, sapientis vero nullo modo, physici praesertim, quem se ille esse vult, putare putare edd. putari ullum esse cuiusquam diem natalem. quid? idemne potest esse dies saepius, qui semel fuit? certe non potest. an eiusdem modi? ne id quidem, nisi multa annorum intercesserint milia, ut omnium siderum eodem, unde profecta sint, sunt R fiat ad unum tempus reversio. nullus est igitur cuiusquam dies natalis. At habetur! Et ego id scilicet nesciebam! Sed ut sit, etiamne post mortem coletur? idque testamento cavebit is, qui nobis quasi oraculum ediderit nihil post mortem ad nos pertinere? ad nos pertinere post mortem A haec non erant eius, qui innumerabilis mundos infinitasque regiones, quarum nulla esset ora, nulla extremitas, mente peragravisset. num quid tale Democritus? ut alios omittam, hunc appello, quem ille unum secutus est. 3.1. Voluptatem quidem, Brute, si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, concessuram arbitror convictam superiore libro dignitati. etenim sit inpudens, si virtuti diutius repugnet, aut si honestis honestis honestati NV iucunda anteponat aut pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis ex eave natam laetitiam quam gravitatem animi atque constantiam. quare illam quidem dimittamus et suis se finibus tenere tenere (ten ab alt. m. in ras. ) N petere iubeamus, ne blanditiis eius inlecebrisque impediatur disputandi severitas. 3.41. Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam qua tractata Guyet. a Peripateticis mollius—est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem ignorantiam R dialecticae—Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio aio aĩo V animo R oio ( prior o ab alt. m. in ras. ) N discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod non ex omni quod Dav. non quod ex omni ARV noro quod ex omni BE numquam ex omni N aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent. 4.3. Existimo igitur, inquam, Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, auditores Platonis BE Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum, Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitutam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni, cum Polemonem audisset, cur et ab eo ipso et a superioribus dissideret. quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim quid mutandum putes nec expectes, dum ad omnia dicam, quae a te a te ed. princ. Rom. ante dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra confligendum puto. 4.21. O magnam vim ingenii causamque iustam, cur nova existeret disciplina! Perge porro. sequuntur enim ea, quae tu scientissime complexus es, complexus es p. 107, 17-30 omnium insipientiam, iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, omniaque peccata esse paria, eosque, qui natura doctrinaque longe ad virtutem processissent, nisi eam plane consecuti essent, summe esse miseros, neque inter eorum vitam et improbissimorum quicquam omnino interesse, ut Plato, tantus ille vir, si sapiens non fuerit, nihilo melius quam quivis improbissimus nec beatius beatius dett. beatus vixerit. haec videlicet est correctio correctio V correptio philosophiae veteris et emendatio, quae omnino aditum habere nullum nullum habere BE potest in urbem, in forum, in curiam. quis enim ferre posset ita loquentem eum, qui se auctorem vitae graviter et sapienter agendae profiteretur, nomina rerum commutantem, cumque idem sentiret quod omnes, quibus rebus eandem vim tribueret, alia nomina inponentem, verba modo mutantem, de opinionibus nihil detrahentem? 5.7. Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit poterit 'emendavisse videtur Aldus' Mdv. poteris sic abire, cum hic assit—me autem dicebat—, tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad veterem illam illam veterem BE vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii ii edd. hi R hij BENV soli solum R numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps principes R Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. ad eos igitur converte te, converte te NV convertere R convertere te BE quaeso. ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poe+tae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum artificiū R officina profecti sunt. Atque ego: At ego R Et ego V 5.16. ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadea carneadia BENV nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius. est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. quoniam igitur, ut medicina valitudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. 5.22. nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadeam illam sententiam. quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id id ( post vult) om. RNV efficit turpe. ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquitis. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. hos contra singulos dici est melius. sed nunc, quod quod quid BE quid (= quidem) R agimus; 5.23. de illis, cum volemus. Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tamquam tamquam (tanquā R) tranquillitas RN tranquillitas tamquam BE tranquillitas ( om. tamquam) V tranquillitas, quam appellant eu)qumi/an, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea ipsa secl. Se. est est ipsa BE beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sit ( utroque loco ) dett. sint sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus diximus p. 163, 16 sqq. naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil quod non aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse del. Lamb. ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quicquam quicquam quitquid BE omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. ergo ergo igitur BE instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium. 5.28. etsi qui qui edd. quid potest intellegi aut cogitari esse aliquod animal, quod se oderit? res enim concurrent occurrent R contrariae. nam cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad se trahere coeperit consulto, quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod fieri non potest. necesseque est, necesseque est BE necesse ēq; (= estque) R necesse est eque N 1 V necesse est quidem N 2 si quis sibi ipsi ipsi sibi BE inimicus est, eum quae bona sunt mala putare, bona contra quae mala, et quae appetenda fugere, fugere et que BEV quae fugienda appetere, appetere dett. petere quae sine dubio vitae est est Mdv. sunt eversio. neque enim, si non nulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos aut alia exitia quaerant aut ut aut ut Mdv. ille apud Terentium, Terentium Heautontim. I 1, 95 ( 147 ): Decrevi tantisper me minus iniuriae, Chremes, meo gnato facere, dum fiam miser. qui 'decrevit tantisper tantisper dett. tantum per (tantum s per N 2 ) se minus est usus BE iniuriae suo nato facere', ut ait ipse, 'dum fiat miser', inimicus ipse sibi putandus est. 5.58. Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora maioribus, minora maioribus maioribus minoribus BE maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque cognitioque N cognitione rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes latentes iacentes R indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum scientia, tum sciendi que (ēdi que ab alt. m. in ras. ) N prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta fortis, iusta Mdv. forti si iusta B E fortis. Si iusta R fortis et iusta (& in N ab alt. m. in ras. ) NV ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeeunte deducimur. omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur, nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas teneritas NV Non. temeritas BER ac mollitia mollitia BE Non. mollities RN mollicies V quaedam, in primo ... moll. quaedam Non. p. 495 ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus. 5.89. quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? idem dicant V iā dicant R ilia appellant BE ita, quem ad modum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. bonum appello quicquid secundum naturam est, quod quod V contra malum, nec ego quam BER solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola scola BERV desinis. quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? quanti quidque sit aliter docti et indocti, sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit—si homines essent, essent V si B se E et R ( in quo s non satis cognosci potest ) usitate loquerentur—, dum res maneant, maneant dett. maneat verba fingant arbitratu suo.

2.1. Upon this they both looked at me, and signified their readiness to hear me. So I began: "First of all, I beg of you not to imagine that I am going to deliver you a formal lecture, like a professional philosopher. That is a procedure which even in the case of philosophers I have never very much approved. Socrates, who is entitled to be styled the father of philosophy, never did anything of the sort. It was the method of his contemporaries the Sophists, as they were called. It was one of the Sophists, Gorgias of Leontini, who first ventured in an assembly to 'invite a question,' that is, to ask anyone to state what subject he desired to hear discussed. A bold undertaking, indeed, I should call it a piece of effrontery, had not this custom later on passed over into our own school. 2.2. But we read how Socrates made fun of the aforesaid Gorgias, and the rest of the Sophists also, as we can learn from Plato. His own way was to question his interlocutors and by a process of cross-examination to elicit their opinions, so that he might express his own views by way of rejoinder to their answers. This practice was abandoned by his successors, but was afterwards revived by Arcesilas, who made it a rule that those who wished to hear him should not ask him questions but should state their own opinions; and when they had done so he argued against them. But whereas the pupils of Arcesilas did their best to defend their own position, with the rest of the philosophers the student who has put a question is then silent; and indeed this is nowadays the custom even in the Academy. The wouldâbe learner says, for example, 'The Chief Good in my opinion is pleasure,' and the contrary is then maintained in a formal discourse; so that it is not hard to realize that those who say they are of a certain opinion do not actually hold the view they profess, but want to hear what can be argued against it. 2.3. We are adopting a more profitable mode of procedure, for Torquatus has not only told us his own opinion but also his reasons for holding it. Still, for my part, though I enjoyed his long discourse very much, I believe all the same that it is better to stop at point after point, and make out what each person is willing to admit and what he denies, and then to draw such inferences as one desires from these admissions and so arrive at one's conclusion. When the exposition goes rushing on like a mountain stream in spate, it carries along with it a vast amount of miscellaneous material, but there is nothing one can take hold of or rescue from the flood; there is no point at which one can stem the torrent of oratory. "However, in philosophical investigation a methodical and systematic discourse must always begin by formulating a preamble like that which occurs in certain forms of process at law, 'The issue shall be as follows'; so that the parties to the debate may be agreed as to what the subject is about which they are debating. 2.43. Aristo and Pyrrho thought all these things utterly worthless, and said, for example, that there was absolutely nothing to choose between the most perfect health and the most grievous sickness; and consequently men have long ago quite rightly given up arguing against them. For in insisting upon the unique importance of virtue in such a sense as to rob it of any power of choice among external things and to deny it any starting-point or basis, they destroyed the very virtue they desired to cherish. Again, Erillus, in basing everything on knowledge, fixed his eyes on one definite Good, but this not the greatest Good, nor one that could serve as the guide of life. Accordingly Erillus himself has long ago been set aside; since Chrysippus no one has even troubled to refute him."Accordingly your school remains; for there is no coming to grips with the Academics, who affirm nothing positively, and despairing of a knowledge of certain truth, make up their minds to take apparent probability as their guide. 2.52. The sense of sight, says Plato, is the keenest sense we possess, yet our eyes cannot behold Wisdom; could we see her, what passionate love would she awaken! And why is this so? Is it because of her supreme ability and cunning in the art of contriving pleasures? Why is Justice commended? What gave rise to the old familiar saying, 'A man with whom you might play odd and even in the dark'? This proverb strictly applies to the particular case of honesty, but it has this general application, that in all our conduct we should be influenced by the character of the action, not by the presence or absence of a witness. 2.92. However, let us grant his point: let him get the highest pleasures cheap, or for all I care for nothing, if he can; allow that there is as much pleasure to be found in the cress salad which according to Xenophon formed the staple diet of the Persians, as in the Syracusan banquets which Plato takes to task so severely; grant, I say, that pleasure is as easy to get as your school makes out; â but what are we to say of pain? Pain can inflict such tortures as to render happiness absolutely impossible, that is, if it be true that pain is the Chief Evil. Metrodorus himself, who was almost a second Epicurus, describes happiness (I give almost his actual words) as 'sound health, and an assurance of its continuance.' Can anyone have an assurance of what his health will be, I don't say a year hence, but this evening? It follows that we can never be free from the apprehension of pain, which is the chief Evil, even when it is absent, for at any moment it may be upon us. How then can life be happy when haunted by fear of the greatest Evil? 2.102. That these are the words of as amiable and kindly a man as you like, I cannot deny; but what business has a philosopher, and especially a natural philosopher, which Epicurus claims to be, to think that any day can be anybody's birthday? Why, can the identical day that has once occurred recur again and again? Assuredly it is impossible. Or can a similar day recur? This too is impossible, except after an interval of many thousands of years, when all the heavenly bodies simultaneously achieve their return to the point from which they started. It follows that there is no such thing as anybody's birthday. 'But a certain day is so regarded.' Much obliged, I am sure, for the information! But even granting birthdays, is a person's birthday to be observed when he is dead? And to provide for this by will â is this appropriate for a man who told us in oracular tones that nothing can affect us after death? Such a provision ill became one whose 'intellect had roamed' over unnumbered worlds and realms of infinite space, without shores or circumference. Did Democritus do anything of the kind? (To omit others, I cite the case of the philosopher who was Epicurus's only master.) 3.1. My dear Brutus. â Were Pleasure to speak for herself, in default of such redoubtable advocates as she now has to defend her, my belief is that she would own defeat. Vanquished by the arguments of our preceding Book, she would yield the victory to true Worth. Indeed she would be lost to shame if she persisted any longer in the battle against Virtue, and rated what is pleasant above what is morally good, or maintained that bodily enjoyment or the mental gratification which springs from it is of higher value than firmness and dignity of character. Let us then give Pleasure her dismissal, and bid her keep within her own domains, lest her charms and blandishments put snares in the way of strict philosophical debate. 3.41. "Well, then," resumed Cato, "these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole soâcalled 'problem of good and evil,' there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it. 4.3. "My view, then, Cato," I proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master's predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows â but I should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting while I deal with the whole of your discourse; for I think I shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. 4.21. "What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy! But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, that all men's folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in public life, in the lawâcourts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everyone else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched? 5.7. "Perhaps," said Piso, "it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here" (meaning me) "is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who, if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." 5.16. and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire. "Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure. 5.22. Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names. "The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure. 5.23. "The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct. "Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and start as follows. 5.28. Yet how can you form any intelligible conception of an animal that should hate itself? The thing is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke of will deliberately set about drawing to itself something harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this for its own sake; therefore the animal will both hate and love itself at the same time, which is impossible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows that he will think good evil and evil good; that he will avoid things that are desirable and seek things that ought to be avoided; but this undeniably would mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A few people may be found who attempt to end their lives with a halter or by other means; but these, or the character of Terence who (in his own words) 'resolved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made less the wrong he did his son,' are not to be put down as haters of themselves. 5.58. "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities vary in kind, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Courage and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consot therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.' Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later. 5.89. What is the difference, except that I call familiar things familiar names, whereas they invent new terms to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is, â if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the substance remains the same, â let them coin new words at their pleasure.

29. Cicero, De Finibus, 1.7, 2.1-2.3, 2.43, 2.52, 2.92, 2.102, 3.1, 3.41, 4.3, 4.21, 5.7, 5.16, 5.22-5.23, 5.28, 5.58, 5.89 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy •academic scepticism/sceptics, unity of the academy and the peripatos Found in books: Long (2006) 107, 285, 288, 289, 290, 291; Tsouni (2019) 70, 106

30. Cicero, On Fate, None (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 288

31. Cicero, On Divination, 1.1, 1.6-1.8, 2.4, 2.8-2.9, 2.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 285, 287, 288, 289, 291

1.1. Vetus opinio est iam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Graeci mantikh/n appellant, id est praesensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum. Magnifica quaedam res et salutaris, si modo est ulla, quaque proxime ad deorum vim natura mortalis possit accedere. Itaque ut alia nos melius multa quam Graeci, sic huic praestantissimae rei nomen nostri a divis, Graeci, ut Plato interpretatur, a furore duxerunt. 1.6. Sed cum Stoici omnia fere illa defenderent, quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset et ea Cleanthes paulo uberiora fecisset, accessit acerrumo vir ingenio, Chrysippus, qui totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraclis, uno de somniis; quem subsequens unum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit, eius auditor, duo Antipater, quinque noster Posidonius. Sed a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae, Posidonii doctor, discipulus Antipatri, degeneravit, Panaetius, nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse dividi, sed dubitare se dixit. Quod illi in aliqua re invitissumis Stoicis Stoico facere licuit, id nos ut in reliquis rebus faciamus, a Stoicis non concedetur? praesertim cum id, de quo Panaetio non liquet, reliquis eiusdem disciplinae solis luce videatur clarius. 1.7. Sed haec quidem laus Academiae praestantissumi philosophi iudicio et testimonio conprobata est. Etenim nobismet ipsis quaerentibus, quid sit de divinatione iudicandum, quod a Carneade multa acute et copiose contra Stoicos disputata sint, verentibusque, ne temere vel falsae rei vel non satis cognitae adsentiamur, faciendum videtur, ut diligenter etiam atque etiam argumenta cum argumentis comparemus, ut fecimus in iis tribus libris, quos de natura deorum scripsimus. Nam cum omnibus in rebus temeritas in adsentiendo errorque turpis est, tum in eo loco maxime, in quo iudicandum est, quantum auspiciis rebusque divinis religionique tribuamus; est enim periculum, ne aut neglectis iis impia fraude aut susceptis anili superstitione obligemur. 1.8. Quibus de rebus et alias saepe et paulo accuratius nuper, cum essem cum Q. fratre in Tusculano, disputatum est. Nam cum ambulandi causa in Lyceum venissemus (id enim superiori gymnasio nomen est), Perlegi, ille inquit, tuum paulo ante tertium de natura deorum, in quo disputatio Cottae quamquam labefactavit sententiam meam, non funditus tamen sustulit. Optime vero, inquam; etenim ipse Cotta sic disputat, ut Stoicorum magis argumenta confutet quam hominum deleat religionem. Tum Quintus: Dicitur quidem istuc, inquit, a Cotta, et vero saepius, credo, ne communia iura migrare videatur; sed studio contra Stoicos disserendi deos mihi videtur funditus tollere. 2.4. Cumque Aristoteles itemque Theophrastus, excellentes viri cum subtilitate, tum copia, cum philosophia dicendi etiam praecepta coniunxerint, nostri quoque oratorii libri in eundem librorum numerum referendi videntur. Ita tres erunt de oratore, quartus Brutus, quintus orator. Adhuc haec erant; ad reliqua alacri tendebamus animo sic parati, ut, nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset, nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris inlustratus pateret. Quod enim munus rei publicae adferre maius meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem? his praesertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium opibus refreda atque coe+rcenda sit. 2.8. Nam cum de divinatione Quintus frater ea disseruisset, quae superiore libro scripta sunt, satisque ambulatum videretur, tum in bibliotheca, quae in Lycio est, adsedimus. Atque ego: Adcurate tu quidem, inquam, Quinte, et Stoice Stoicorum sententiam defendisti, quodque me maxime delectat, plurimis nostris exemplis usus es, et iis quidem claris et inlustribus. Dicendum est mihi igitur ad ea, quae sunt a te dicta, sed ita, nihil ut adfirmem, quaeram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi ipse diffidens. Si enim aliquid certi haberem, quod dicerem, ego ipse divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego. 2.9. Etenim me movet illud, quod in primis Carneades quaerere solebat, quarumnam rerum divinatio esset, earumne, quae sensibus perciperentur. At eas quidem cernimus, audimus, gustamus, olfacimus, tangimus. Num quid ergo in his rebus est, quod provisione aut permotione mentis magis quam natura ipsa sentiamus? aut num nescio qui ille divinus, si oculis captus sit, ut Tiresias fuit, possit, quae alba sint, quae nigra, dicere aut, si surdus sit, varietates vocum aut modos noscere? Ad nullam igitur earum rerum, quae sensu accipiuntur, divinatio adhibetur. Atqui ne in iis quidem rebus, quae arte tractantur, divinatione opus est. Etenim ad aegros non vates aut hariolos, sed medicos solemus adducere, nec vero, qui fidibus aut tibiis uti volunt, ab haruspicibus accipiunt earum tractationem, sed a musicis. 2.15. Potestne igitur earum rerum, quae nihil habent rationis, quare futurae sint, esse ulla praesensio? Quid est enim aliud fors, quid fortuna, quid casus, quid eventus, nisi cum sic aliquid cecidit, sic evenit, ut vel aliter cadere atque evenire potuerit? Quo modo ergo id, quod temere fit caeco casu et volubilitate fortunae, praesentiri et praedici potest?

1.1. Book I[1] There is an ancient belief, handed down to us even from mythical times and firmly established by the general agreement of the Roman people and of all nations, that divination of some kind exists among men; this the Greeks call μαντική — that is, the foresight and knowledge of future events. A really splendid and helpful thing it is — if only such a faculty exists — since by its means men may approach very near to the power of gods. And, just as we Romans have done many other things better than the Greeks, so have we excelled them in giving to this most extraordinary gift a name, which we have derived from divi, a word meaning gods, whereas, according to Platos interpretation, they have derived it from furor, a word meaning frenzy. 1.6. The Stoics, on the other hand (for Zeno in his writings had, as it were, scattered certain seed which Cleanthes had fertilized somewhat), defended nearly every sort of divination. Then came Chrysippus, a man of the keenest intellect, who exhaustively discussed the whole theory of divination in two books, and, besides, wrote one book on oracles and another on dreams. And following him, his pupil, Diogenes of Babylon, published one book, Antipater two, and my friend, Posidonius, five. But Panaetius, the teacher of Posidonius, a pupil, too, of Antipater, and, even a pillar of the Stoic school, wandered off from the Stoics, and, though he dared not say that there was no efficacy in divination, yet he did say that he was in doubt. Then, since the Stoics — much against their will I grant you — permitted this famous Stoic to doubt on one point will they not grant to us Academicians the right to do the same on all other points, especially since that about which Panaetius is not clear is clearer than the light of day to the other members of the Stoic school? 1.7. At any rate, this praiseworthy tendency of the Academy to doubt has been approved by the solemn judgement of a most eminent philosopher. [4] Accordingly, since I, too, am in doubt as to the proper judgement to be rendered in regard to divination because of the many pointed and exhaustive arguments urged by Carneades against the Stoic view, and since I am afraid of giving a too hasty assent to a proposition which may turn out either false or insufficiently established, I have determined carefully and persistently to compare argument with argument just as I did in my three books On the Nature of the Gods. For a hasty acceptance of an erroneous opinion is discreditable in any case, and especially so in an inquiry as to how much weight should be given to auspices, to sacred rites, and to religious observances; for we run the risk of committing a crime against the gods if we disregard them, or of becoming involved in old womens superstition if we approve them. [5] 1.8. This subject has been discussed by me frequently on other occasions, but with somewhat more than ordinary care when my brother Quintus and I were together recently at my Tusculan villa. For the sake of a stroll we had gone to the Lyceum which is the name of my upper gymnasium, when Quintus remarked:I have just finished a careful reading of the third book of your treatise, On the Nature of the Gods, containing Cottas discussion, which, though it has shaken my views of religion, has not overthrown them entirely.Very good, said I; for Cottas argument is intended rather to refute the arguments of the Stoics than to destroy mans faith in religion.Quintus then replied: Cotta says the very same thing, and says it repeatedly, in order, as I think, not to appear to violate the commonly accepted canons of belief; yet it seems to me that, in his zeal to confute the Stoics, he utterly demolishes the gods. 2.4. Inasmuch as Aristotle and Theophrastus, too, both of whom were celebrated for their keenness of intellect and particularly for their copiousness of speech, have joined rhetoric with philosophy, it seems proper also to put my rhetorical books in the same category; hence we shall include the three volumes On Oratory, the fourth entitled Brutus, and the fifth called The Orator.[2] I have named the philosophic works so far written: to the completion of the remaining books of this series I was hastening with so much ardour that if some most grievous cause had not intervened there would not now be any phase of philosophy which I had failed to elucidate and make easily accessible in the Latin tongue. For what greater or better service can I render to the commonwealth than to instruct and train the youth — especially in view of the fact that our young men have gone so far astray because of the present moral laxity that the utmost effort will be needed to hold them in check and direct them in the right way? 2.8. After my brother Quintus had delivered his views on divination, as set out in the preceding volume, and we had walked as much as we wished, we took our seats in the library in my Lyceum, and I remarked:Really, my dear Quintus, you have defended the Stoic doctrine with accuracy and like a Stoic. But the thing that delights me most is the fact that you illustrated your argument with many incidents taken from Roman sources — incidents, too, of a distinguished and noble type. I must now reply to what you said, but I must do so with great diffidence and with many misgivings, and in such a way as to affirm nothing and question everything. For if I should assume anything that I said to be certain I should myself be playing the diviner while saying that no such thing as divination exists! 2.9. I am impressed with the force of the questions with which Carneades used to begin his discussions: What are the things within the scope of divination? Are they things that are perceived by the senses? But those are things that we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Is there, then, in such objects some quality that we can better perceive with the aid of prophecy and inspiration than we can with the aid of the senses alone? And is there any diviner, anywhere, who, if blind, like Tiresias, could tell the difference between white and black? Or, who, if deaf, could distinguish between different voices and different tones? Now you must admit that divination is not applicable in any case where knowledge is gained through the senses.Nor is there any need of divination even in matters within the domain of science and of art. For, when people are sick, we, as a general rule, do not summon a prophet or a seer, but we call in a physician. Again, persons who want to learn to play on the harp or on the flute take lessons, not from a soothsayer, but from a musician. 2.15. Can there, then, be any foreknowledge of things for whose happening no reason exists? For we do not apply the words chance, luck, accident, or casualty except to an event which has so occurred or happened that it either might not have occurred at all, or might have occurred in any other way. How, then, is it possible to foresee and to predict an event that happens at random, as the result of blind accident, or of unstable chance?

32. Cicero, Brutus, 16.8-16.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 314

33. Cicero, Brutus, 16.8-16.9 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 314

34. Cicero, Academica, 1.13, 1.16-1.17, 1.24-1.33, 1.44, 1.46, 2.7-2.9, 2.16, 2.66-2.67, 2.77-2.78, 2.145 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 96, 102, 105, 107, 108, 109, 223, 232, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 294

1.13. Tum ille: 'Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. sed de te ipso quid est' inquit quod audio? Quanam inquam de re? VA. Relictam a te veterem Academiam Academiam Bentl. iam *g*d inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid ergo inquam Antiocho id magis licuerit nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova, quam nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime. quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, pholo *g magnus vir ut tu existimas estimas vel ex(s)t- *g ipse, †negaret negat Dav. negare solet Pl. in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse, erroremque eorum qui ita putarent coarguit. VA. Est inquit ut dicis; sed ignorare te non arbitror quae contra Philonis Antiochus scripserit. scripsit gf 1.16. hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab is qui illum audierunt perscripti varie copioseque que om. px sunt, ita disputat ut nihil affirmet ipse refellat alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, pr. se m ; praestarem p 1 (ceteris in ras. ) quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, putent *dn -ant *g ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se se rem *g arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una hominis omnis *d . cf. Plato apol. 23 A Lact. ira 1, 6 s. epit. 35, 5 sapientia, non arbitrari sese se gf scire quod nesciat. quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tantum tantum Dav. ad Lact. epit. 37 tam *g*d tamen vel tum s in virtute laudanda et in hominibus hom. omnibus *d o. h. s ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris maximeque Platonis intellegi potest. 1.17. Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta constituta *g est Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. nam cum Speusippum sororis filium Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, duo duos p 2 p 1 p 2 rg 2 f c autem praestantissimo praestatnissimos mn studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Calchedonium et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele Peripatetici dicti sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, quia quia *g*p qui wn Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitanter dubitanter Bai. -tantem *g -tationem *d (tionem in ras. p ) de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem consuetudine mn ; adh. cons. in. ras. p disserendi reliquerunt. ita facta est, est disserendi *d (diss. in ras. p ) quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 1.24. De cf. Lact. inst. 7,3,1 natura autem (id enim sequebatur) ita dicebant docebant *g ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, eaque ea qua Man. ex qua Turn. ex eaque Mue. ea nominativus efficeretur efficerentur *gr 1 aliquid. in eo quod efficeret vim esse censebant, in eo autem quod efficeretur tantum modo tantum modo om. *d materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur. sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant—dabitis habitis *g enim profecto ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum inauditis.' 1.25. Nos vero inquit Atticus; quin etiam Graecis licebit utare cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient. VA. Bene sane facis; sed enitar ut ut in p 1 Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce eiusce *gx modi verbis ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. qualitates s cf. Mart. Cap. 5, 510 igitur appellavi quas poio/thtas Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum sed philosophorum, atque id in multis; dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur. et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium; s. cf. fin. 3, 3 nat. deor. 1, 44 frg. inc. K 10 Hier. in Gal. 3, 26 aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. quod si Graeci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam saecla versantur, quanto id nobis magis m. n. *d n. maius p p smn concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur. 1.26. 'Tu vero' inquam Varro bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut effecisti, ut fecisti s uti f- RKl. sed etiam verborum. VA. Audebimus ergo inquit 'novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. erit *gpx est w —earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes aliae ex his ortae. principes sunt unius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. itaque aer (hoc inde ab hoc rursus deest s hoc om. *d quoque utimur enim enim iam Ha. pro Latino) et et 1 om. *d ignis et aqua et terra prima primae s sunt; ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra. ergo illa initia et ut e Graeco vertam elementa dicuntur; e quibus aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare singulares *gw eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles Arist. cf. AKail diss. phil. Vind. 11, 90 quoddam esse rebatur. 1.27. Sed subiectam putant putant x -at *d -abant *g omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque effecta efficat Turn. sint, quae tota omnia accipere possit possit x -sunt *g -sint *dn omnibusque modis mutari mutari s ? Dav. -re *g*d atque ex omni parte eoque eque *g eamque Chr. etiam interire, non in nihilum sed in suas partes, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat. quae autem moveantur omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 1.28. et cum ita moveatur illa vis quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro citroque introque p in utroque w versetur, et materiam ipsam totam totam ipsam *g penitus commutari putant et illa effici quae appellant qualia; e quibus in in del. Dav. omni natura cohaerente cohaerente *gp m x cohercente *d et continuata cum omnibus suis partibus unum unum om. *d effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla pars materiae mat. par *g sit nullumque corpus. Partis autem esse mundi omnia quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna (nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat); 1.29. quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse esse 2 om. *g mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum quae sunt sint Mue. ei subiectae quasi prudentiam providentiam Lb. quandam procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quae pertineant pertinent r 1 wm ad homines; quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter dum interdum p 1, idem et item p m inter *g*d seriem causarum Pl. * * * quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni, non no num p numquam quidem quidem om. *g eandem fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa et et s ? Lb. haec *g*d ac Ha. necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum. fortunam — — quod multa eff. inopinata nobis ... causarum Lact. inst. 3, 29, 3, cf. ibid. 18 (ign. rerum atque caus.) 1.30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus tamen non non om. *g ; tamen non in ras. p esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. mentem volebant rerum esse esse ereum ngf iudicem, solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset (hanc illi i)de/an appellabant, appellabant *gw -labantur m 1 -lant pg iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere). 1.31. sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur nec percipere ullo modo res eas quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quod quod *g quae *d essent aut ita parvae ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae ut nihil umquam unum esset et add. Ha. aut Reid constans, ne idem ne idem Man. eidem *g*d quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. itaque hanc omnem partem artem Non. rerum opinabilem opinabilium Goer. appellabant; itaque ... appellabant Non. p. 148 (opinabile) appellabat Non. ? 1.32. scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus notionibus s ? Lb. mot- *g*d atque rationibus. qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant et has ad omnia de quibus disceptabatur adhibebant; verborum etiam explicatio explicari *g probabatur, probatur *g id est qua de causa quaeque essent esset m p px ita nominata, quam e)tumologi/an appellabant; post argumentis quibusdam quibusdam om. *d et quasi rerum notis ducibus et rer. not. quasi duc. Dav. utebantur ad probandum ad prob. rursus accedit s et ad concludendum id quod explanari volebant. in qua in quo Man. denique Mue. tradebatur omnis dialecticae dialectica w disciplina id est orationis ratione conclusae; conclusa rw huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. 1.33. Haec forma forma om. *d erat illis prima, a Platone tradita; cuius quas acceperim dissupationes dissupationes Bai. disputat- *g*d si vultis exponam.' Nos vero volumus inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam. ATT. Et recte quidem quidem om. *d inquit respondes; praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. VA. “Aristoteles igitur igitur om. *d primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, quas ... erat amplexatus pars codicum Non. p. 470 ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, ferret Ern. vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 1.44. Tum ego Cum Zenone inquam “ut accepimus Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi quidem mihi *gp videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et vel ut iam ante et iam ante Dav. ad Lact. epit. 32 et ueluti amantes *g*d Socratem Democritum Anaxagoram Empedoclem omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus imbecillos inbecilles p 1 sgf animos brevia curricula vitae et et om. sgf ut Democritus cf. p. 43, 13 in profundo veritatem esse demersam, demersam gfx dim- smnp m diuersam *d opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati ueritate *g relinqui, deinceps deinceps denique Bentl. densis IACvHeusde ' Cic. filopla/twn ' ( 1836 ) 236 n. 1 omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. cf. Lact. inst. 3, 4, 11. 28, 12 s. 30, 6 Democr. fr. 117 Deiels Emped. fr. 2 D. ( Kranz Herm. 47, 29 n. 2 ) 1.46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur—sed tamen illa quam exposuisti exposuisti Dur. exposui *g*d ; an a Cicerone neglegenter scriptum ? vetus, haec nova nominetur. quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, producta mn (per in ras. p ) qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex is qui illum audierant maximeque ex Epicureo Epicureo ms -ZZZo *g*d Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate et to fuit īo facultate et do m 1, īo del. et do ctrina m 2 ; et to om. *dn et co pia dicendi Chr. ” quid autem stomachatur stomachetur Sig. Mnesarchus, quid Antipater digladiatur Non. p. 65 (digladiari) digladiatur F 1 -etur cett. cum Carneade tot voluminibus? *

35. Cicero, Republic, 1.15-1.16, 1.66, 4.5, 6.25-6.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 291

1.15. Tum ille: Visne igitur, quoniam et me quodam modo invitas et tui spem das, hoc primum, Africane, videamus, ante quam veniunt alii, quidnam sit, de isto altero sole quod nuntiatum est in senatu? neque enim pauci neque leves sunt, qui se duo soles vidisse dicant, ut non tam fides non habenda quam ratio quaerenda sit. Hic Scipio: Quam vellem Panaetium nostrum nobiscum haberemus! qui cum cetera, tum haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere. Sed ego, Tubero, (nam tecum aperte, quod sentio, loquar) non nimis adsentior in omni isto genere nostro illi familiari, qui, quae vix coniectura qualia sint possumus suspicari, sic adfirmat, ut oculis ea cernere videatur aut tractare plane manu. Quo etiam sapientiorem Socratem soleo iudicare, qui omnem eius modi curam deposuerit eaque, quae de natura quaererentur, aut maiora, quam hominum ratio consequi posset, aut nihil omnino ad vitam hominum adtinere dixerit. 1.16. Dein Tubero: Nescio, Africane, cur ita memoriae proditum sit, Socratem omnem istam disputationem reiecisse et tantum de vita et de moribus solitum esse quaerere. Quem enim auctorem de illo locupletiorem Platone laudare possumus? cuius in libris multis locis ita loquitur Socrates, ut etiam, cum de moribus, de virtutibus, denique de re publica disputet, numeros tamen et geometriam et harmoniam studeat Pythagorae more coniungere. Tum Scipio: Sunt ista, ut dicis; sed audisse te credo, Tubero, Platonem Socrate mortuo primum in Aegyptum discendi causa, post in Italiam et in Siciliam contendisse, ut Pythagorae inventa perdisceret, eumque et cum Archyta Tarentino et cum Timaeo Locro multum fuisse et Philoleo commentarios esse ctum, cumque eo tempore in iis locis Pythagorae nomen vigeret, illum se et hominibus Pythagoreis et studiis illis dedisse. Itaque cum Socratem unice dilexisset eique omnia tribuere voluisset, leporem Socraticum subtilitatemque sermonis cum obscuritate Pythagorae et cum illa plurimarum artium gravitate contexuit. 1.66. 'Cum' enim inquit 'inexplebiles populi fauces exaruerunt libertatis siti malisque usus ille ministris non modice temperatam, sed nimis meracam libertatem sitiens hausit, tum magistratus et principes, nisi valde lenes et remissi sint et large sibi libertatem ministrent, insequitur, insimulat, arguit, praepotentes, reges, tyrannos vocat.' Puto enim tibi haec esse nota. L. Vero mihi, inquit ille, notissima. 4.5. Non. 362M et noster Plato magis etiam quam Lycurgus, omnia qui prorsus iubet esse communia, ne quis civis propriam aut suam rem ullam queat dicere. Non. 308M Ego vero eodem, quo ille Homerum redimitum coronis et delibutum unguentis emittit ex ea urbe, quam sibi ipse fingit. 6.25. Quocirca si reditum in hunc locum desperaveris, in quo omnia sunt magnis et praestantibus viris, quanti tandem est ista hominum gloria, quae pertinere vix ad unius anni partem exiguam potest? Igitur alte spectare si voles atque hanc sedem et aeternam domum contueri, neque te sermonibus vulgi dedideris nec in praemiis humanis spem posueris rerum tuarum; suis te oportet inlecebris ipsa virtus trahat ad verum decus, quid de te alii loquantur, ipsi videant, sed loquentur tamen. Sermo autem omnis ille et angustiis cingitur iis regionum, quas vides, nec umquam de ullo perennis fuit et obruitur hominum interitu et oblivione posteritatis extinguitur. 6.26. Quae cum dixisset, Ego vero, inquam, Africane, siquidem bene meritis de patria quasi limes ad caeli aditum patet, quamquam a pueritia vestigiis ingressus patris et tuis decori vestro non defui, nunc tamen tanto praemio exposito enitar multo vigilantius. Et ille: Tu vero enitere et sic habeto, non esse te mortalem, sed corpus hoc; nec enim tu is es, quem forma ista declarat, sed mens cuiusque is est quisque, non ea figura, quae digito demonstrari potest. Deum te igitur scito esse, siquidem est deus, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus, cui praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus; et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse deus aeternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet.

36. Philo of Alexandria, On The Eternity of The World, None (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 271

41. But the second reason deserves no superficial examination; for if he were intending to make another world instead of that which exists at present, then of necessity this second world that would be made, in that case, would be either worse than, or similar to, or better than the first; everyone of which ideas is inadmissible; for if the new world is to be worse than the former, then the maker must be also worse: but all the works of God are without blemish, beyond all reproach and wholly faultless, inasmuch as they are wrought with the most consummate skill and knowledge; for as the proverb says; -- "For e'en a woman's wisdom's not so coarse As to despise the good and choose the worse." But it is consistent with the character of, and becoming to God to give form to what is shapeless, and to invest what is most ugly with admirable beauty.

37. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.159-1.214, 4.1209-4.1232 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 158

1.159. Nam si de nihilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus 1.160. omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret. 1.161. e mare primum homines, e terra posset oriri 1.162. squamigerum genus et volucres erumpere caelo; 1.163. armenta atque aliae pecudes, genus omne ferarum, 1.164. incerto partu culta ac deserta tenerent. 1.165. nec fructus idem arboribus constare solerent, 1.166. sed mutarentur, ferre omnes omnia possent. 1.167. quippe ubi non essent genitalia corpora cuique, 1.168. qui posset mater rebus consistere certa? 1.169. at nunc seminibus quia certis quaeque creantur, 1.170. inde enascitur atque oras in luminis exit, 1.171. materies ubi inest cuiusque et corpora prima; 1.172. atque hac re nequeunt ex omnibus omnia gigni, 1.173. quod certis in rebus inest secreta facultas. 1.174. Praeterea cur vere rosam, frumenta calore, 1.175. vites autumno fundi suadente videmus, 1.176. si non, certa suo quia tempore semina rerum 1.177. cum confluxerunt, patefit quod cumque creatur, 1.178. dum tempestates adsunt et vivida tellus 1.179. tuto res teneras effert in luminis oras? 1.180. quod si de nihilo fierent, subito exorerentur 1.181. incerto spatio atque alienis partibus anni, 1.182. quippe ubi nulla forent primordia, quae genitali 1.183. concilio possent arceri tempore iniquo. 1.184. Nec porro augendis rebus spatio foret usus 1.185. seminis ad coitum, si e nilo crescere possent; 1.186. nam fierent iuvenes subito ex infantibus parvis 1.187. e terraque exorta repente arbusta salirent. 1.188. quorum nil fieri manifestum est, omnia quando 1.189. paulatim crescunt, ut par est semine certo, 1.190. crescentesque genus servant; ut noscere possis 1.191. quicque sua de materia grandescere alique. 1.192. Huc accedit uti sine certis imbribus anni 1.193. laetificos nequeat fetus submittere tellus 1.194. nec porro secreta cibo natura animantum 1.195. propagare genus possit vitamque tueri; 1.196. ut potius multis communia corpora rebus 1.197. multa putes esse, ut verbis elementa videmus, 1.198. quam sine principiis ullam rem existere posse. 1.199. Denique cur homines tantos natura parare 1.200. non potuit, pedibus qui pontum per vada possent 1.201. transire et magnos manibus divellere montis 1.202. multaque vivendo vitalia vincere saecla, 1.203. si non, materies quia rebus reddita certast 1.204. gignundis, e qua constat quid possit oriri? 1.205. nil igitur fieri de nilo posse fatendumst, 1.206. semine quando opus est rebus, quo quaeque creatae 1.207. aeris in teneras possint proferrier auras. 1.208. Postremo quoniam incultis praestare videmus 1.209. culta loca et manibus melioris reddere fetus, 1.210. esse videlicet in terris primordia rerum 1.211. quae nos fecundas vertentes vomere glebas 1.212. terraique solum subigentes cimus ad ortus; 1.213. quod si nulla forent, nostro sine quaeque labore 1.214. sponte sua multo fieri meliora videres. 4.1209. Et commiscendo quom semine forte virilem 4.1210. femina vim vicit subita vi corripuitque, 4.1211. tum similes matrum materno semine fiunt, 4.1212. ut patribus patrio. sed quos utriusque figurae 4.1213. esse vides, iuxtim miscentes vulta parentum, 4.1214. corpore de patrio et materno sanguine crescunt, 4.1215. semina cum Veneris stimulis excita per artus 4.1216. obvia conflixit conspirans mutuus ardor, 4.1217. et neque utrum superavit eorum nec superatumst. 4.1218. fit quoque ut inter dum similes existere avorum 4.1219. possint et referant proavorum saepe figuras, 4.1220. propterea quia multa modis primordia multis 4.1221. mixta suo celant in corpore saepe parentis, 4.1222. quae patribus patres tradunt a stirpe profecta. 4.1223. inde Venus varia producit sorte figuras, 4.1224. maiorumque refert voltus vocesque comasque; 4.1225. quandoquidem nihilo magis haec de semine certo 4.1226. fiunt quam facies et corpora membraque nobis. 4.1227. et muliebre oritur patrio de semine saeclum 4.1228. maternoque mares existunt corpore creti; 4.1229. semper enim partus duplici de semine constat, 4.1230. atque utri similest magis id quod cumque creatur, 4.1231. eius habet plus parte aequa; quod cernere possis, 4.1232. sive virum suboles sivest muliebris origo.

38. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 10.1.123 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 291

39. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 97

40. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 96

41. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.151-7.157 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 96

42. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 11.51 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academic scepticism/sceptics, unity of the academy and the peripatos Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 52

43. Athenaeus, The Learned Banquet, None (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 104

21a. For people used to employ the word "dancing" for any physical motion or excitation. Thus Anacreon: "The fair-haired daughters of Zeus danced with light step." And Ion: "So unexpected were these things that his heart danced the more." Hermippus says that Theophrastus used to appear at the School at the regular hour glistening with oil and exquisitely dressed,

44. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, 25 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 223

45. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, 25 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 223

46. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 14.6.4-14.6.6, 14.6.12-14.6.13 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 102, 103

47. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 4.2-4.3, 4.22, 4.24-4.25, 4.27-4.32, 4.36, 4.43-4.45, 4.59, 4.62, 5.37, 5.43, 7.4, 7.12, 7.162-7.163, 7.171, 7.183, 9.51, 9.61 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 96, 97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109

4.2. It was said that among those who attended his lectures were the two women who had been pupils of Plato, Lastheneia of Mantinea and Axiothea of Phlius. And at the time Dionysius in a letter says derisively, We may judge of your wisdom by the Arcadian girl who is your pupil. And, whereas Plato exempted from fees all who came to him, you levy tribute on them and collect it whether they will or no. According to Diodorus in the first book of his Memorabilia, Speusippus was the first to discern the common element in all studies and to bring them into connexion with each other so far as that was possible. 4.3. And according to Caeneus he was the first to divulge what Isocrates called the secrets of his art, and the first to devise the means by which fagots of firewood are rendered portable.When he was already crippled by paralysis, he sent a message to Xenocrates entreating him to come and take over the charge of the school. They say that, as he was being conveyed to the Academy in a tiny carriage, he met and saluted Diogenes, who replied, Nay, if you can endure to live in such a plight as this, I decline to return your greeting. At last in old age he became so despondent that he put an end to his life. Here follows my epigram upon him:Had I not learnt that Speusippus would die thus, no one would have persuaded me to say that he was surely not of Plato's blood; for else he would never have died in despair for a trivial cause. 4.22. Hence Arcesilaus, who had quitted Theophrastus and gone over to their school, said of them that they were gods or a remt of the Golden Age. They did not side with the popular party, but were such as Dionysodorus the flute-player is said to have claimed to be, when he boasted that no one ever heard his melodies, as those of Ismenias were heard, either on shipboard or at the fountain. According to Antigonus, their common table was in the house of Crantor; and these two and Arcesilaus lived in harmony together. Arcesilaus and Crantor shared the same house, while Polemo and Crates lived with Lysicles, one of the citizens. Crates, as already stated, was the favourite of Polemo and Arcesilaus of Crantor. 4.24. 5. CRANTORCrantor of Soli, though he was much esteemed in his native country, left it for Athens and attended the lectures of Xenocrates at the same time as Polemo. He left memoirs extending to 30,000 lines, some of which are by some critics attributed to Arcesilaus. He is said to have been asked what it was in Polemo that attracted him, and to have replied, The fact that I never heard him raise or lower his voice in speaking. He happened to fall ill, and retired to the Asklepeion, where he proceeded to walk about. At once people flocked round him in the belief that he had retired thither, not on account of illness, but in order to open a school. Among them was Arcesilaus, who wished to be introduced by his means to Polemo, notwithstanding the affection which united the two, as will be related in the Life of Arcesilaus. 4.25. However, when he recovered, he continued to attend Polemo's lectures, and for this he was universally praised. He is also said to have left Arcesilaus his property, to the value of twelve talents. And when asked by him where he wished to be buried, he answered:Sweet in some nook of native soil to rest.It is also said that he wrote poems and deposited them under seal in the sanctuary of Athena in his native place. And Theaetetus the poet writes thus of him:Pleasing to men, more pleasing to the Muses, lived Crantor, and never saw old age. Receive, O earth, the hallowed dead; gently may he live and thrive even in the world below. 4.27. or art thou the child of wise Cypris, or of Earth, or of the Winds? So many are the goods and ills thou devisest for men in thy wanderings. Therefore hast thou a body of double form.He was also clever at inventing terms. For instance, he said of a tragic player's voice that it was unpolished and unpeeled. And of a certain poet that his verses abounded in miserliness. And that the disquisitions of Theophrastus were written with an oyster-shell. His most highly esteemed work is the treatise On Grief. He died before Polemo and Crates, his end being hastened by dropsy. I have composed upon him the following epigram:The worst of maladies overwhelmed you, Crantor, and thus did you descend the black abyss of Pluto. While you fare well even in the world below, the Academy and your country of Soli are bereft of your discourses. 4.28. 6. ARCESILAUSArcesilaus, the son of Seuthes, according to Apollodorus in the third book of his Chronology, came from Pitane in Aeolis. With him begins the Middle Academy; he was the first to suspend his judgement owing to the contradictions of opposing arguments. He was also the first to argue on both sides of a question, and the first to meddle with the system handed down by Plato and, by means of question and answer, to make it more closely resemble eristic.He came across Crantor in this way. He was the youngest of four brothers, two of them being his brothers by the same father, and two by the same mother. of the last two Pylades was the elder, and of the former two Moereas, and Moereas was his guardian. 4.29. At first, before he left Pitane for Athens, he was a pupil of the mathematician Autolycus, his fellow-countryman, and with him he also travelled to Sardis. Next he studied under Xanthus, the musician, of Athens; then he was a pupil of Theophrastus. Lastly, he crossed over to the Academy and joined Crantor. For while his brother Moereas, who has already been mentioned, wanted to make him a rhetorician, he was himself devoted to philosophy, and Crantor, being enamoured of him, cited the line from the Andromeda of Euripides:O maiden, if I save thee, wilt thou be grateful to me?and was answered with the next line:Take me, stranger, whether for maidservant or for wife. 4.30. After that they lived together. Whereupon Theophrastus, nettled at his loss, is said to have remarked, What a quick-witted and ready pupil has left my school! For, besides being most effective in argument and decidedly fond of writing books, he also took up poetry. And there is extant an epigram of his upon Attalus which runs thus:Pergamos, not famous in arms alone, is often celebrated for its steeds in divine Pisa. And if a mortal may make bold to utter the will of heaven, it will be much more sung by bards in days to come.And again upon Menodorus, the favourite of Eugamus, one of his fellow-students: 4.31. Far, far away are Phrygia and sacred Thyatira, thy native land, Menodorus, son of Cadanus. But to unspeakable Acheron the ways are equal, from whatever place they be measured, as the proverb saith. To thee Eugamus raised this far-seen monument, for thou wert dearest to him of all who for him toiled.He esteemed Homer above all the poets and would always read a passage from him before going to sleep. And in the morning he would say, whenever he wanted to read Homer, that he would pay a visit to his dear love. Pindar too he declared matchless for imparting fullness of diction and for affording a copious store of words and phrases. And in his youth he made a special study of Ion. 4.32. He also attended the lectures of the geometer Hipponicus, at whom he pointed a jest as one who was in all besides a listless, yawning sluggard but yet proficient in his subject. Geometry, he said, must have flown into his mouth while it was agape. When this man's mind gave way, Arcesilaus took him to his house and nursed him until he was completely restored. He took over the school on the death of Crates, a certain Socratides having retired in his favour. According to some, one result of his suspending judgement on all matters was that he never so much as wrote a book. Others relate that he was caught revising some works of Crantor, which according to some he published, according to others he burnt. He would seem to have held Plato in admiration, and he possessed a copy of his works. 4.36. A certain dialectic, a follower of Alexinus, was unable to repeat properly some argument of his teacher, whereupon Arcesilaus reminded him of the story of Philoxenus and the brickmakers. He found them singing some of his melodies out of tune; so he retaliated by trampling on the bricks they were making, saying, If you spoil my work, I'll spoil yours. He was, moreover, genuinely annoyed with any who took up their studies too late. By some natural impulse he was betrayed into using such phrases as I assert, and So-and-so (mentioning the name) will not assent to this. And this trait many of his pupils imitated, as they did also his style of speaking and his whole address. 4.43. Another pleasant story told of him is this. Some one had inquired why it was that pupils from all the other schools went over to Epicurus, but converts were never made from the Epicureans: Because men may become eunuchs, but a eunuch never becomes a man, was his answer.At last, being near his end, he left all his property to his brother Pylades, because, unknown to Moereas, he had taken him to Chios and thence brought him to Athens. In all his life he never married nor had any children. He made three wills: the first he left at Eretria in the charge of Amphicritus, the second at Athens in the charge of certain friends, while the third he dispatched to his home to Thaumasias, one of his relatives, with the request that he would keep it safe. To this man he also wrote as follows:Arcesilaus to Thaumasias greeting. 4.44. I have given Diogenes my will to be conveyed to you. For, owing to my frequent illnesses and the weak state of my body, I decided to make a will, in order that, if anything untoward should happen, you, who have been so devotedly attached to me, should not suffer by my decease. You are the most deserving of all those in this place to be entrusted with the will, on the score both of age and of relationship to me. Remember then that I have reposed the most absolute confidence in you, and strive to deal justly by me, in order that, so far as you are concerned, the provisions I have made may be carried out with fitting dignity. A copy is deposited at Athens with some of my acquaintance, and another in Eretria with Amphicritus.He died, according to Hermippus, through drinking too freely of unmixed wine which affected his reason; he was already seventy-five and regarded by the Athenians with unparalleled good-will. 4.45. I have written upon him as follows:Why, pray, Arcesilaus, didst thou quaff so unsparingly unmixed wine as to go out of thy mind? I pity thee not so much for thy death as because thou didst insult the Muses by immoderate potations.Three other men have borne the name of Arcesilaus: a poet of the Old Comedy, another poet who wrote elegies, and a sculptor besides, on whom Simonides composed this epigram:This is a statue of Artemis and its cost two hundred Parian drachmas, which bear a goat for their device. It was made by Arcesilaus, the worthy son of Aristodicus, well practised in the arts of Athena.According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, the philosopher described in the foregoing flourished about the 120th Olympiad. 4.59. 8. LACYDESLacydes, son of Alexander, was a native of Cyrene He was the founder of the New Academy and the successor of Arcesilaus: a man of very serious character who found numerous admirers; industrious from his youth up and, though poor, of pleasant manners and pleasant conversation. A most amusing story is told of his housekeeping. Whenever he brought anything out of the store-room, he would seal the door up again and throw his signet-ring inside through the opening, to ensure that nothing laid up there should be stolen or carried off. So soon, then, as his rogues of servants got to know this, they broke the seal and carried off what they pleased, afterwards throwing the ring in the same way through the opening into the store-room. Nor were they ever detected in this. 4.62. 9. CARNEADESCarneades, the son of Epicomus or (according to Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers) of Philocomus, was a native of Cyrene. He studied carefully the writings of the Stoics and particularly those of Chrysippus, and by combating these successfully he became so famous that he would often say:Without Chrysippus where should I have been?The man's industry was unparalleled, although in physics he was not so strong as in ethics. Hence he would let his hair and nails grow long from intense devotion to study. Such was his predomice in philosophy that even the rhetoricians would dismiss their classes and repair to him to hear him lecture. 5.37. Furthermore, he was ever ready to do a kindness and fond of discussion. Casander certainly granted him audience and Ptolemy made overtures to him. And so highly was he valued at Athens that, when Agnonides ventured to prosecute him for impiety, the prosecutor himself narrowly escaped punishment. About 2000 pupils used to attend his lectures. In a letter to Phanias the Peripatetic, among other topics, he speaks of a tribunal as follows: To get a public or even a select circle such as one desires is not easy. If an author reads his work, he must re-write it. Always to shirk revision and ignore criticism is a course which the present generation of pupils will no longer tolerate. And in this letter he has called some one pedant. 5.43. of Old Age, one book.On the Astronomy of Democritus, one book.On Meteorology, one book.On Visual Images or Emanations, one book.On Flavours, Colours and Flesh, one book.of the Order of the World, one book.of Mankind, one book.Compendium of the Writings of Diogenes, one book.Three books of Definitions.Concerning Love, one book.Another Treatise on Love, one book.of Happiness, one book.On Species or Forms, two books.On Epilepsy, one book.On Frenzy, one book.Concerning Empedocles, one book.Eighteen books of Refutative Arguments.Three books of Polemical Objections.of the Voluntary, one book.Epitome of Plato's Republic, two books.On the Diversity of Sounds uttered by Animals of the same Species, one book.of Sudden Appearances, one book.of Animals which bite or gore, one book.of Animals reputed to be spiteful, one book.of the Animals which are confined to Dry Land, one book. 7.4. For a certain space, then, he was instructed by Crates, and when at this time he had written his Republic, some said in jest that he had written it on Cynosura, i.e. on the dog's tail. Besides the Republic he wrote the following works:of Life according to Nature.of Impulse, or Human Nature.of Emotions.of Duty.of Law.of Greek Education.of Vision.of the Whole World.of Signs.Pythagorean Questions.Universals.of Varieties of Style.Homeric Problems, in five books.of the Reading of Poetry.There are also by him:A Handbook of Rhetoric.Solutions.Two books of Refutations.Recollections of Crates.Ethics.This is a list of his writings. But at last he left Crates, and the men above mentioned were his masters for twenty years. Hence he is reported to have said, I made a prosperous voyage when I suffered shipwreck. But others attribute this saying of his to the time when he was under Crates. 7.12. Thraso of the deme Anacaea, Philocles of Peiraeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystus, Medon of Acharnae, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Paeania have been elected commissioners for the making of the crown and the building.These are the terms of the decree.Antigonus of Carystus tells us that he never denied that he was a citizen of Citium. For when he was one of those who contributed to the restoration of the baths and his name was inscribed upon the pillar as Zeno the philosopher, he requested that the words of Citium should be added. He made a hollow lid for a flask and used to carry about money in it, in order that there might be provision at hand for the necessities of his master Crates. 7.162. After meeting Polemo, says Diocles of Magnesia, while Zeno was suffering from a protracted illness, he recanted his views. The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses. 7.163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you? and when the other answered No, he rejoined,Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?The books attributed to him are as follows:Exhortations, two books.of Zeno's Doctrines.Dialogues.Lectures, six books.Dissertations on Philosophy, seven books.Dissertations on Love.Commonplaces on Vainglory.Notebooks, twenty-five volumes.Memorabilia, three books.Anecdotes, eleven books.Against the Rhetoricians.An Answer to the Counter-pleas of Alexinus.Against the Dialecticians, three books.Letters to Cleanthes, four books.Panaetius and Sosicrates consider the Letters to be alone genuine; all the other works named they attribute to Ariston the Peripatetic. 7.171. Once when he was reproached with cowardice, he replied, That is why I so seldom go wrong. Again, when extolling his own manner of life above that of the wealthy, he used to say that, while they were playing at ball, he was at work digging hard and barren ground. He would often find fault with himself too, and one day when Ariston heard him doing this and asked, Who is it you are scolding so? he, laughing, said, An old man with grey hairs and no wits. To some one who declared that Arcesilaus did not do what he ought, his reply was, No more of this; do not censure him. For if by his words he does away with duty, he maintains it at all events by his deeds. And Arcesilaus rejoined, I am not to be won by flattery. Whereupon Cleanthes said, True, but my flattery consists in alleging that your theory is incompatible with your practice. 7.183. At wine-parties he used to behave quietly, though he was unsteady on his legs; which caused the woman-slave to say, As for Chrysippus, only his legs get tipsy. His opinion of himself was so high that when some one inquired, To whom shall I entrust my son? he replied, To me: for, if I had dreamt of there being anyone better than myself, I should myself be studying with him. Hence, it is said, the application to him of the line:He alone has understanding; the others flit shadow-like around;andBut for Chrysippus, there had been no Stoa. 9.51. Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other, and he even argued in this fashion, being the first to do so. Furthermore he began a work thus: Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not. He used to say that soul was nothing apart from the senses, as we learn from Plato in the Theaetetus, and that everything is true. In another work he began thus: As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either that they exist or that they do not exist. For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life. 9.61. 11. PYRRHOPyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates. According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, he was first a painter; then he studied under Stilpo's son Bryson: thus Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers. Afterwards he joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement. He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust. And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself any more this than that.

48. Augustine, Contra Academicos, 3.38 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 102

49. Anon., Anonymi Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum, 2.11 Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 232

50. Philodemus, History of The Academy, None Tagged with subjects: •academic scepticism/sceptics, unity of the academy and the peripatos Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 207

51. Philodemus, Academicorum Historia, 15, 17-18, 21 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 108

52. Cicero, Academic Books, 17 Tagged with subjects: •academic scepticism/sceptics, unity of the academy and the peripatos Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 70

53. Atticus, Frs., None Tagged with subjects: •academic scepticism/sceptics, unity of the academy and the peripatos Found in books: Tsouni (2019) 207

54. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.338 Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 107

55. Strabo, Geography, 1.15 Tagged with subjects: •academics, the academy Found in books: Long (2006) 107

56. Timaeus, Theaetetus, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Long (2006) 291

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database